1
Dr. Margrit MüllerUniversity of Zurich, Institute for Empirical Research in EconomicsWinterthurerstrasse 30, CH-8006 ZürichE-mail: [email protected]
XIV International Economic History Congress, Helsinki 2006Session 17: The European Enterprise.Has European Integration created a specific firmapart from national and global enterprise?
The impact of European integration oninstitutional change and corporate behaviour in Switzerland
(work in progress, not to be quoted)
1. Introduction
In several theoretical approaches, special weight is given to the national origin of firms as a
kind of natural basis for their competitive advantage.1 These theoretical concepts concentrate
on the differences between nations. With regard to our theme the question has been raised,
whether the national origin as distinguishing feature has been overestimated in the case of
European nations. The literature on different types of capitalism highlights common features
for different groups of European countries and for specific periods of time.2 Within the
European Union not convergence but uneasy rivalry seems to have prevailed. 3 Can Europe be
understood as a supranational context that shapes “European firms”?
I believe that in the outlines and background information we received from Harm Schröter,
three main approaches to our theme can be distinguished:
(1) Firms in European countries are and have always been European firms, because they share
a common historical and cultural background. It is possible to identify the common traits by
comparing firms in different European countries with firms in other regions, especially in the
US and Japan. In my view, this concept of the “European firm” is not very promising as a
1 Porter, Michael E. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations. London: McMillan; Lundvall, B. A. (ed.)(1992), National Systems of Innovation - Towards a Theory of Innovation and Interactive Learning. Pinter:London; Nelson, Richard R., National innovation systems,1993.2 Katzenstein P. (1985) Small States in World Markets. Industrial Policy in Europe, Cornell University Press,Ithaca; Hall Peter A., David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism. The Institutional Foundation of ComparativeAdvantage. Oxford University Press 20013 Wilks Stephen, Regulatory compliance and capitalist diversity in Europe. Journal of European Public Policy 3;4 December 1996: 536-59; De Clercq M., Institutional Dynamics in the EC. In: Rugman, Alan M.; Van denBroeck, Julien; Verbeke, Alain.Beyond the Diamond. London: JAI Press, 1995, pp. 201-228
2
general approach, because of the variety of national or regional business systems within
Europe (and we know from other comparative research that historical comparison leads to
interesting results with regard to diversity, but hardly produces findings that can be
generalized in time and space). The necessary conditions for such a comparative approach to
reveal similarities are common constraints that differ from those in other regions and shape
the firms in the European countries in a specific way. The approach may, therefore, be
adequate for certain sectors of the economy, for example for public utilities in western
European countries.
2) Another approach conceives European firms as a consequence of the fact that firms in
European countries expanded their activities mainly to other European countries and
inevitably integrated the different institutional settings and cultures. The firms emancipated
from their national origin, and in the course of this process, they began to understand
themselves as European (not British, French or Swiss) firms. The problem with this concept is
that firms have expanded their activities also to other regions of the world (for example to the
colonies) or only to the neighbouring European countries. Further more, they may have
handled cultural diversity within their firm not by creating a European corporate culture but
by becoming “multidomestic” firms, in the sense of Porter.4 It should be noticed that this
second concept of the “European firm” is not compatible with the first one. Firms active only
in the domestic market are excluded, even if they share common characteristics according to
the first concept.
3) The third approach focuses on the evolution of the “European firm” as a possible
consequence of European integration. The main agent of change is the European
Community/Union and “Europe” comprises the EC/EU and EFTA countries. This approach
has only apparently some similarity with the second one. In contrast with the second concept,
it focuses on the evolution of common formal institutions, on the main agents of change, their
aims and means on the European and national level, and not on the location of the firms’
business activities. It differs also from the first concept, because it starts from the assumption
that there are large differences between national business systems within Europe and the
questions are, when, where and in what areas trends towards homogenization can be
perceived.
4 Porter, Michael E. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations. London: McMillan, p. 53 f.
3
In my paper I shall concentrate on the third approach. In the literature on institutional change
in Switzerland it is widely acknowledged that the impact of the EC/EU on institutional change
was quite strong in some areas, especially in the 1990s, notwithstanding the fact that
Switzerland had rejected the EEA agreement in 1992.5 These studies concentrate on the
process of legislation at the political level. The focus of this paper is on the role of business
associations as intermediaries between business and politics and as agents of institutional
change in the sense of North.6 To what extent did theses associations influence the adaptation
of national legislation to the rules established within the EC/EU? Business associations might
have been interested either in adapting national institutions to European rules and norms in
order to reduce transaction costs, or in sticking to national institutions in order to create
location specific advantages for Swiss firms. What was the role of the associations with
regard to European integration in their own perspective? In what areas did the process of
European integration influence institutional change in Switzerland? Can we distinguish areas
of harmonization and differentiation? Did the business associations themselves become more
European? Did the establishment of common institutions result in making Swiss firms more
similar to the firms within the European Union? What was the impact of other international
organizations (GATT and WTO, OECD, UNO) on institutional change in Switzerland,
compared with the impact of European integration?
In the next section I shall concentrate on the question whether Swiss firms could be
understood as European firms according to the first and second concept. I shall deal with this
topic very briefly. Subsequently, I shall focus on the third concept, namely Europeanization as
a consequence of institutional change. This approach is especially interesting in the case of
Switzerland because it is not a member state of the EU. In this first draft of the paper I shall
deal only with the period from the early 1980s until 1992, the year of the creation of a single
European market and the European Economic Area. I shall concentrate mainly on the annual
reports of four business associations. Internal sources are not accessible for the period
covered. There is the possibility to recur on other published sources, namely the results of
surveys and publications to specific themes. A valuable oral source could be interviews with
key decision-makers within these associations.
5 Schmid Hans, Stefan Graf, Thomas Liebig (2004), Das Ausland und die schweizerische Wirtschaftspolitik seit1945, Bern: Haupt; Fischer Alex (2005), Die Auswirkungen der Internationalisierung/Europäisierung aufSchweizer Entscheidungsprozesse (forthcoming 2005).6 North, D.C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge et al.: CambridgeUniversity Press.
4
2. Swiss firms in the European context
Swiss firms in the main industries (textiles, watches, machinery and chemicals) and in some
of the service sectors (banking, insurance, trade, transport, finance) had strong but also highly
volatile relations with the European countries. Swiss firms established trade relationships with
more distant European countries and with countries in other regions of the world, in order to
compensate for the frequent fluctuations of demand of their main trading partners already in
the 19th and even more so during the 20th century. The importance of Western Europe for
exports and imports was high but not increasing during the 20th century. The available data on
FDI and the location of affiliates of the Swiss multinationals confirm the preference of Swiss
firms for the large European countries Germany, France, Great Britain and Italy, an
expansion, which was certainly facilitated by the existence of different cultures within
Switzerland itself. But from the 1930s onwards, the United States was perceived as the most
promising market and gradually became the preferred destination for FDI.
In order to remain competitive, Swiss firms had to distinguish themselves from their
competitors in the larger European countries and occupy market niches. They usually
competed in quality and not in prices and relied on the national reputation for precision and
high quality. Firms in the watch industries relied heavily on „made in Switzerland“, the Swiss
banks on being “located in Switzerland”, but in the other outward oriented industries and
services firms had been able to loosen the link between the qualification of their goods as
being of „Swiss quality“ and the location of the production of these goods. Where the national
origin of products and services was a competitive advantage or required by law, the strategy
of the Swiss firms was to become “multidomestic”. It seems that in the 1990s, the nation-
based distinction was no longer perceived as an advantage, but as a disadvantage.7 The large
MNEs turned to presenting themselves as “Global Players”. At the same time, in the annual
reports separate figures on Switzerland (turnover, employment, investment etc.) disappeared
and were absorbed into “Europe” as one of the broad regional categories beside “America”
and “Asia”.
7 This change in self-representation can be observed in several Swiss MNEs. According to SwissCham, thefederation of the Swiss Chambers of Commerce in foreign countries, the large Firms did not understandthemselves as „Swiss“ but as „multinational“, because of the increasing isolationof Switzerland in Europe. Theattribute „Swiss“ was connected with a negative image. Martina Gisler, die Bedeutung der heutigen SwissChamfür die Förderung der schweizerischen Aussenwirtschaft in den Jahren 1975-1994, Diplomarbeit, UniversitätZürich, Juni 2005.
5
Besides these outward oriented branches there have been large sectors of the economy, which
concentrated exclusively on the domestic market. This was the case for firms in the service
sector (for example retail trade) and in the public utilities (railways, telecommunication,
electricity). The state-owned firms were “European” in the sense of being typical for firms of
the same sector in the other European countries. Their activities were limited to the domestic
market because Europe was segmented into national markets dominated by state-owned firms.
It is in this sector that deregulation and privatisation, starting in the 1980s and accelerating in
the 1990s has lead to the evolution of “European firms” in the sense of firms expanding their
activities from the national to the European market. In Switzerland, the process of
deregulation and privatization was delayed, and the fact that the country rejected the EEA-
treaty in 1992 may have been a major cause for this delay. But also in other European
countries the barriers to European integration in the public service sector are still quite strong.
The transformation of the public sector is still at an initial stage, and since it has started earlier
in some and later in other European countries, it has, at first, lead to more divergence within
Europe. The firms are transformed from “European firms” in the sense of the first approach to
“European firms” in according the second approach.
3. Business associations as intermediaries between business and politics in the process of
European integration
Europe has been composed of a large number of large and small countries with different
internal rules and norms, and these differences are still quite remarkable. 8 Swiss firms had to
take into account the different formal and informal national rules, if they wanted to
successfully do business with and in these countries. It seems that up to the 1980s, there was
no pressure from the export branches to adapt internal rules to the rules of other European
countries. The share of any European country in total trade or FDI would hardly have justified
such an endeavour. Further more, the cultural diversity and the federal structure of the country
had led to the evolution of a variety of rules within the country itself.9 Firms were thus used to
cope with different legal and cultural systems both at home and abroad.
8 If we rely on the Ifo Database for Institutional Comparisons in Europe (, institutional divergence is indeed stillquite pronounced among the EC and EFTA-countries: www.cesifo.de/DICE. The indicators measured are, forexample: Codes and Principles of Corporate Governance, Systems of Corporate Governance Protecting Invstors,Regulation of Product Markets, Hiring and Firing Workers.9 The internal “single market”, one of the main objectives of the constitution of 1848, is still far from havingbeen achieved. The “Binnenmarktgesetz” introduced in 1995, had remained largely ineffective. Cantonalspecificities still prevail, limiting the free access of employees and entrepreneurs to jobs and public orders. Thenew “Binnenmarktgesetz” is being discussed in parliament this year.
6
In this context, the decision of the EC to establish a single European market was a major and
far-reaching step, because it was not limited to reducing traditional trade barriers, but included
the abolition of technical barriers by establishing common rules, norms and technical or
organizational standards. For Switzerland, the single market project threatened to establish
new trade barriers, leading to a competitive disadvantage for their export-oriented firms in
comparison with the firms within the EC. But participating in the process of integration had to
be balanced against possible disadvantages in non-European markets. For firms focusing on
the domestic market institutional differences protected the internal market and their abolition
enhanced foreign competition. In the internationally oriented banking sector, national
institutional specificities were perceived as a major location-specific advantage (bank secret,
tax laws). The problem for these interest groups was how to preserve such advantages in the
course of European institutional integration. Further more, other international organisations
(OECD, GATT, UNO) were influencing institutional change worldwide.
I shall concentrate on the following associations: the federation of Swiss trade and industry
(SHIV), comprising a broad range of mainly outward oriented branches and organisations,
two associations of the highly export-oriented branches machines (VSM) and chemicals
(SGCI) and the federation of the inward oriented branches (SGV).
3.1 Europeanization in the forefront of the single European market and the EEA
- SHIV (Schweizerischer Handels- und Industrieverein))
Already at the beginning of the 1980s, the SHIV was associated with several international
organisations: the “Conseil des federations industrielles d’Europe (CIFE)”, the “Business and
Industry Advisory Committee to OECD (BIAC)” and the “Internationale Handelskammer
(IHK)”. Throughout the period there were yearly meetings with the corresponding federations
of Austria, Denmark, the German Republic, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Great
Britain.10 In the course of the 1980s, participation in the “Union der Industrien der
Europäischen Gemeinschaft (UNICE)” became more and more important.11 The SHIV
became an associated member in 1980.
10 SHIV, Annual Report 1981/82, p. 19.11 The SHIV was a member of UNICE. In the Annual Report 1985/86, p. 16, it is mentioned that the SHIVparticipated in various committees. These activities were important, because the decisions of the EC had animpact on Switzerland, whether directly or indirectly.
7
On the national level, the SHIV participated in practically all government commissions
dealing with economic policies and legal reforms. It represented the economic interests of its
members, and these interests were identified through surveys among its members or at
internal meetings and conferences.12 In the annual reports, the federation conveys a broad
overview on its main activities, its aims and expectations. It is therefore possible to assert
when, to what extent and in what fields the process of European integration had a major
impact on the policies and strategies pursued by the SHIV.
Until 1986, the impact of European integration on the activities of the SHIV remained rather
marginal and limited to specific topics: In 1980/81 the EC-guideline for a uniform European
product liability law was mentioned as much more important than the convention of the
Council of Europe on the same topic, because once accepted, the EC member-states will be
forced to adopt it. For firms in non-member states with different rules there would be a
competitive disadvantage.13 But in 1984/85 this topic was still controversial and
harmonisation within the EC had not been achieved.14 Under the heading “Relationship
Switzerland / European Community” the main themes were minor adaptations, clarifications
or revisions of the free trade agreement between EC and EFTA concluded in 1972. Recurrent
themes were the endeavour to simplify the rules of origin of the free trade agreements, the
adjustment of trademark rights in the member-states and the question how the non-member
states could participate in these simplifications.15 Quite generally, reducing technical trade
barriers was addressed every year with regard to changing topics.
One major concern was the tendency, in a period marked by a worldwide recession and high
unemployment rates in the EC-countries, to distinguish between the European free trade area
according to the agreements of 1972 and the EC. The plans of the EC-Commission to create a
single internal market strengthened these fears. A possible counter measure was an agreement
between the EFTA and the EC, in order to eliminate the resulting discrimination.16 At the
same time, the SHIV did not want to have its hands tied to a regional system. The degree of
economic integration with the EC-area was high, but about 40% of total exports went to non-
European markets and direct investments in overseas countries were considerable. Therefore,
12 In 1980/81 (1990) the members of the SHIV are: 18 (19) cantonal chambers of commerce, 111 (100) branchassociation and 7 (6) other sections.13 The EC-Richtlinie follows develpments in the USA. SHIV, Annual Report 1980/81, p. 39 ff.14 SHIV, Annual Report 1984/85, p. 144 f.15 SHIV, Annual Report 1982/83, p. 75 ff.; 1983/84 p. 74 f.16 SHIV, Annual Report 1982/83, p. 59 ff.
8
according to the SHIV, Switzerland had to take an active part in the GATT-negotiations,
which had started in November 1982. But having access to the EC-market remained
important. In April 1984 an initiative was started to enhance the trade of goods between the
EFTA- and the EC-countries by reducing technical barriers to trade. The topics were: border
formalities, customs documents, rules of origin and the participation of EFTA-countries in the
EC programs for industrial research. But no quick progress was expected, because of the
opposition of some of the EC-countries.17 In effect, the EC was absorbed by other tasks,
namely to establish the single European market. Cooperation with the EFTA-countries was of
secondary importance.18 In 1985, EFTA celebrated its 25th anniversary. The SHIV was
convinced that the organization would continue to be useful, even if its objectives had been
achieved and two more countries, Portugal and Spain, had joined the EC.19 With the economic
upswing felt since 1983 the apprehension of a new wave of protectionism within the EC
disappeared, but it was feared that with the single European market new borders within
Europe were created.20 For the EFTA-countries the relations with the EC became time
absorbing to the extent that the relations among themselves and to other countries outside the
EC-area were largely neglected.21
An area of harmonization showing little progress during the 1980s was corporation law.
Especially the proposition of an EC-guideline on the rights of employees in transnational
companies was highly controversial. The SHIV cooperated with UNICE in opposing
supranational rules and insisting on the principle of subsidiarity.22 Several EC-guidelines dealt
with corporation law and group law. The SHIV was actively involved in the discussions about
these guidelines within UNICE, but no reference was made in the sections on the revision of
the Swiss corporation law going on since the early 1970s.23 This was probably due to the fact
that these EC-guidelines were highly controversial among the EC-countries themselves.24 The
introduction of a unified customs document for the EC also for the EFTA-countries was
accepted – albeit with some reluctance – also for Switzerland. An inquiry among the members
of the SHIV had shown, that Switzerland could not risk being the sole country not adopting
17 SHIV, Annual Report 1984/85, p. 61 ff. According to the SHIV, this proposition was made by Switzerland.18 SHIV, Annual Report 1985/86, p. 53.19 SHIV, Annual Report 1984/85, p. 64; Annual Report 1985/86 p. 52 ff.20 SHIV, Annual Report 19986/87, p. 59 f.21 SHIV, Annual Report 1986/87, p. 65.22 SHIV, Annual Report 1982/83, p. ...;23 SHIV, Annual Report 1982/83, p. 83 ff.; Annual Report 1983/84, p. 86 ff.24 SHIV, Annual Report 1983/84, p. 89 ff.; Annual Report 1985/86, p. 69 ff.; Annual Report 1986/87, p. 82 f.
9
this document, but for the SHIV this new mode of harmonization considerable problems with
regard to internal adaptation.25
The “white book” containing the measures undertaken by the EC in order to complete the
single European market was widely discussed by the Federal authorities in Switzerland and
within the SHIV.26 Besides the negotiations between EFTA and EC there were ongoing
bilateral negotiations between the EC and Switzerland throughout the period, the topics
usually remained on the agendas for years without leading to substantial solutions. Other
international organisations (GATT, OECD, UNO) also acted as rule-setters with regard to
international trade or the behaviour of transnational companies, but in contrast with the EC-
guidelines these organisations produced “soft rules”, which could be applied and respected
voluntarily.27 That was for example the case for the code on cartels of the United Nations.28
Nonetheless, the SHIV was continuously taking an active part in the different rounds of
multilateral negotiations, but its engagements remained strictly “economic”.29 With regard to
the referendum on Switzerland joining the United Nations, the SHIV was neutral because in
its perspective it was a political decision.30 Environmental policies and consumer policies as
well as the revision of the rules concerning public sector activities seem to have been the
domain of the OECD or the UNO up to the middle of the 1980s.31 On this level, the
guidelines had no binding character but took the form of recommendations or were limited to
identifying problems and suggesting solutions.
From most major topics of economic policy dealt with during the early 1980s – competition
policy, the revision of the law on cartels and of the sales tax, structural and regional policy or
the energy business - the EC as rule-setter was completely absent. With regard to cartel law
reform, the absence of references to EC-rules is rather surprising. Obviously, cartel law
belonged to the internal policy domain, and the main particularities of the Swiss cartel law
25 SHIV, Annual Report 1986/87, p. 61 f.26 SHIV, Annual Report 1986/87, p. 59 ff.27 SHIV, Annual Report 1980/81, p. 66 ff.; Annual Report 1982/83, p. 85 ff.; Annual Report 1983/84, p. 79 ff.;Annual Report 1984/85 p. 70 ff.28 SHIV, Annual Report 1980/81, p. 109.29 SHIV, Annual Report 1985/86, p. 60 f.30 SHIV, Annual Report 1985/86, p. 83 ff. Two inquiries in all sections of the SHIV in 1984 and 1985 had showna majority of opponents und sceptics, a small group of moderate supporters, some sections without a clearmajority and only one section that declared openly and clearly that it wanted Switzerland to join the UNO.31 SHIV, Annual Report 1984/85, p. 101 ff. and p. 155.
10
were retained.32 Even the first steps towards deregulating the telecommunication sector in
1984 were reported without making any reference to developments on the European level.33
At this time, the telecommunication sector of Switzerland and other European countries was
perceived as being locked into national monopolies. Due to the new technologies facilitating
the transnational transfer of information this national order had become inefficient and the
state monopolies threatened free communication for the users of these networks. Quite
generally, deregulation and privatization and, concomitantly, reducing government spending
were delineated as internal policy matters.34
A new field of attention, R&D and innovation, came up in 1982 and was directly related to
the European Commission’s program for a new European strategy for Science and technology
for the period 1984-87. The situation of Switzerland with regard to the high share of private
expenditures of R&E was perceived as special in the European context and possibly leading
to a backlog. The SHIV was not impressed and very sceptical with regard to the role of the
state in fostering R&D.35 The topic became more pressing a few years later, when
international competition in R&D became more pronounced and the fact that private Swiss
R&D expenditures were rising more quickly abroad than at home became a matter of concern
on the political level. Having access to international and especially EC R&D-programs was
then perceived as vital for Swiss firms. The strictly liberal view upheld by the SHIV about the
limited role of the state in supporting R&D and the forms and intensity of international
cooperation had to be somewhat relieved, if Switzerland wanted to participate in these
programs. At the same time, internal means for fostering R&D were increased. 36
From 1987 onwards, the creation of the single European market and its consequences for the
Swiss economy were the dominant theme of the annual reports of the SHIV. The state of the
economy with regard to deregulation and privatization of state-owned enterprises was
compared with what had been done in the other European countries. Switzerland was lagging
32 SHIV, Annual Report 1985/86, p. 99: „Das Kartellgesetz ist ein taugliches Instrument für die schweizerischeWettbewerbspolitik ... Es bedeutet keinen Bruch mit der bisherigen Praxis, bringt aber doch in verschiedenenPunkten eine Klärung.“33 SHIV, Annual Report 1984/85, p. 42 ff.34 SHIV, Annual Report 1985/86, p.12, Forword of the president: „Erwartet wird eine Verbesserung nicht vonaufwendigen Gipfelkonferenzen, sondern indem durch eine solide, den eigenen Möglichkeiten angepasstemarktwirtschaftliche Politik für Ordnung im eigenen Haus gesorgt wird.“35 SHIV, Annual Report 1982/83, p. 39 ff., with referenct to the „4. Erhebung des Vororts über F&E in derschweizerischen Privatwirtschaft“. Expenditures for R&D were to three quarters financed by the private sectorand only one quarter by the state.36 SHIV, Annual Report 1985/86, p. 32 f. and p. 108 f.; Annual Report 1986/87, p. 117 ff.; Annual Report1987/88, p. 29.
11
behind and losing competitive advantages.37 The service sector was identified as a new
important area of liberalization, because the EC had assigned high priority to this topic in
completing the single European market.38 The Uruguay-Round of the GATT had taken up this
topic too in 1986, but these negotiations had not produced concrete results and were focused
on establishing general principles. The program of the EC embraced all major service sectors,
(namely financial services, transport and traffic systems, telecommunication, capital
transactions). It included tax regulations, provisions for the free movement of labour
(including the acceptance of professional qualifications) as well as the liberalization of public
orders. How should Switzerland react to all these challenges?39
Little room of manoeuvre was perceived with regard to the banking sector (banking secret and
domestic tax laws) and in the transport sector (internal rules for the “Alpentransit”). In the
field of telecommunication it seemed obvious that Switzerland had to be prepared to
cooperate with the EC, and the same was the case for energy policy. Even agrarian policy was
no longer a purely internal affair. The agrarian sector was coming under pressure both from
the Uruguay-round and the single European market.40 Still, the revision of corporation law
did not make any reference to what was going on in the EC in this respect.41
The immediate effect of the foreseeable creation of a single European market for services
within the EC was increased uncertainty. Switzerland seemed ill prepared for this type of
market integration. In most fields, internal rules, policies and attitudes clashed with those
dominating within the EC. For the SHIV it was high time that what was going on in Europe
became an integral part of the internal discussion on economic policies.42 At the same time,
the SHIV feared that the important GATT-negotiations were getting out of sight because
everybody was engaged with the “Binnenmarkt-Termin 1992”.43 According to the SHIV, the
Uruguay-round will determine the rules valid for international trade in the years to come,
whether they are a success or not. These negotiations should therefore not be neglected. And
it was important for Swiss firms to remain competitive on markets outside the EC, because
37 SHIV, Annual Report 1987/88, p. 7, Foreword of the president.38 SHIV, Annual Report 1987/88, p. 36 ff.39 SHIV, Annual Report 1987/88, p. 39-47.40 SHIV, Annual Report 1987/88, p. 101 ff.41 SHIV, Annual Report 1987/88, p. 125 ff.42 SHIV, Annual Report 1987/88, p. 46; Annual Report 1990, p. 8 f.43 SHIV, Annual Report 1987/88, p. 62.
12
over one third of Swiss exports were going to overseas markets and growth rates were higher
in the US and in Asia than in the European countries.44
Autonomous measures strengthening the competitiveness of the Swiss economy, reducing the
potential for conflicts with the EC and facilitating further integration was one way for coping
with the changed conditions within Europe.45 One concrete proposition was to replace the
existing sales tax with the value added tax, in analogy to the EC, another was to find an
acceptable solution for the “Alpentransit”.46 The other promising vision for overcoming the
threatening divide within Europe was the offer of the EC-commission for closer cooperation
with the EFTA countries by expanding the “four freedoms” of the single market (for goods,
services, persons and capital) to the EFTA-counties.47 This proposal was the main topic of the
EFTA-Summit-Meeting in March 1989. Discussions were taken up immediately and soon the
different attitudes of the EFTA countries emerged. Sweden and Norway aimed at full
participation within the single European market. Austria intended to apply for EC-
membership. Switzerland was also in favour of an extensive cooperation with its neighbours,
but had to respect the constraints imposed by the internal political situations.48 On the other
hand, Switzerland had to avoid being left asides. The SHIV, therefore, supported the plan to
create a European Economic Area (EEA) between EC and EFTA and developed some ideas
how such an EEA would have to be conceived in order the obtain the support form the large
majority of firms in the different branches of the Swiss economy.49
All in all, at the end of the 1980s, the different programs for European integration within the
EC and between the EC and EFTA, together with the overthrow in Eastern Europe, the
reforms planned for the home market and the slowly but clearly progressing Uruguay-Round
within the GATT made the international economic context the SHIV tried to cope with
extremely complex.50 And the process of integration within the EC continued at a very fast
44 SHIV, Annual Report 1988/89, p. 7 and 35.45 Parallel to adapting to European integratsion, it was also the home country that a single market had to berealised. SHIV, Annual Report 1989/90, p. 29.46 SHIV, Annual Report 1988/89, p. 29 and 39 f.47 SHIV, Annual Report 1988/89, p. 48, refers to the discourse of the President of the EC-commission J. Delorson the 17th of January 1989.48 SHIV, Annual Report 1988/89, p. 52 f.49 SHIV, Annual Report 1989/90, p. 25 ff.50 One main area of interest were the negotiations on liberalizations in the service sector (GATS). A surveyamong the firms of the service sector showed that those firms concentrated mainly on Europe und less on NorthAmerica and the Far East. The main obstacles in Europe were sector specific laws, acceptance of professionalcertificates and employment regulations. SHIV, Annual Report 1989/90, p. 56 ff. and 64 ff. According to theSHIV, Switzerland invested much time and energy in these negotiations and their representatives were alsoinvolved.
13
pace: Already in the 1990s there were conferences on the creation of a monetary union and a
political union. Further more, the EC became more attractive for the EFTA countries: Austria
had applied for membership in 1989 and Sweden planned to do so in 1991. Even countries in
middle and Eastern Europe aimed at participating in the EC. 51 For the SHIV, an organisation
used to the slow pace of institutional change in Switzerland (where every modification has to
go through various rounds of consultations before it is presented in parliament, and after
having been accepted in parliament there is still the possibility of a referendum) the pace of
European integration must have been breath-taking.
The creation of the EEA clearly dominated the agenda up to 1992. The tendency was to shift
pending requests (for example simplifying the rules of origin) into the EEA-package.52 The
increasing importance of the EC was also reflected in the decision taken in 1988 to establish a
permanent office in Brussels. At that time, the SHIV was the only member of the UNICE
without a permanent representation in Brussels. The new permanent office was conceived as a
major and direct source of information on EC-matters for Swiss firms, especially the SMEs.53
With regard to R&D the readiness to cooperate with the EC clearly increased.54 In further
areas, till then untouched by the developments within the EC, the influence of European
integration became stronger: For the first time the commission for the revision of the Swiss
Corporation Law noticed a contradiction with EC notions and took it into account; the
enactment of the EC guideline on product liability immediately provoked corresponding
activities of the EFTA-states and the revision of the Swiss liability law. 55 Also with regard to
the policy on foreigners, the creation of the EEA gave rise to rules that complied with
Europe.56 With regard to the planned structural reform of telecommunication services the
SHIV recommended to wait until the “Greenbook” of the EC was available.57
51 SHIV, Annual Report 1990, p. 35 f.52 SHIV, Annual Report 1989/90, p. 5953 SHIV, Annual Report 1988/89, p. 50; Annual Report 1989/90, p. 11 f.Several publications of the SHIV arededicated to topics related to European integration and international competitiveness of the Swiss economy: DieSchweizer Wirtschaft vor den Herausforderungen des EG-Binnenmarktes 1992. Eine praxisorientierteLageanalyse, September 1988; Pierre Bourgeaud: Prüfsteine der schweizerischen Wirtschaftspolitik; Energie undeuropäische Integration, Schriftenreihe des Vororts, Nr. 51, Oktober 1988; Stephan Schmidheiny: Die Schweizim Wettbewerb der Nationen, Schriftenreihe des Vororts, Nr. 52, Dezember 1989; Euro-Brevier für kleine undmittlere Unternehmen. Standortbestimmung, Strategien und Anpassungsmassnahmen, 1990; Die schweizerischeWirtschaft und der Europäische Wirtschaftsraum. Stand und Perspektiven, August 1990.54 SHIV,, Annual Report, p. 94.55 SHIV, Annual Report 1988/89, p. 128 ff. and 137.56 SHIV, Annual Report 1989/90, p. 114 ff.; Annual Report 1990, p. 198 ff.57 SHIV, Annual Report 1990, p. 91 f.
14
In the view of the SHIV, the EEA was basically a good idea, but it also raised a major
problem: the EFTA countries had to adopt all the relevant EC single market laws (the “Acquis
communautaires”) into their national legal order. Hopes to obtain the same rights as the EC-
countries in the decision-making process or some possibility to deviate from these rules were
quickly shattered. The position of the EC was defined as: total autonomy of the EC and total
homogeneity of the EEA, not only for the current state of the law but also for any future EC-
law. Consequently, in the current and future areas regulated by the EC the EFTA-countries
were to lose their autonomy completely.58 Under these circumstances, joining the EC was an
easy way out of this uncomfortable position. Consequently, the EEA was increasingly
perceived as a provisional solution up to joining the EC.59 For the SHIV, joining the EC was
still no option, because there was no majority within the Swiss population and the Swiss
cantons for such a step. The other alternative, “splendid isolation”, was an illusionary
concept. The only realistic option for the future was an EEA-treaty that was acceptable for
both sides.60 In June 1990 negotiations were taken up within five groups on a high
administrative level. The SHIV had representatives in several of these groups. Negotiations
were reported as difficult, for institutional and legal reasons and for the fact, that the EC had
linked the question of through traffic with the bilateral agreements.61 After negotiations were
closed in October 1991, two members of the Swiss Federal Council declared, that the final
objective for Switzerland was to join the EC and that the EEA-agreement was a useful step on
the way to complete integration.62 On the basis of a broad internal survey among its members
the SHIV approved the EEA-agreement and the objective to join the EC mentioned above was
commented on favourably.63 But according to the SHIV, such a step should be made after the
EEA-treaty had been accepted by the Swiss people and the Swiss cantons and after having
integrated the EC-law (EUROLEX) into Swiss law. Even if the legal adaptations were limited
to the strictly necessary, the process was highly unpredictable within the Swiss institutional
framework, where a referendum on any part of the agreement or a “Volksinitiative” that was
not compatible with the EEA could create major problems both before and after the
acceptance of the EEA.
58 SHIV, Annual Report 1990, p. 36 ff.59 Austria has applied for membership in the EC in summer 1989, Sweden in July 1991, anf Finnland in March1992. SHIV, Annual Report 1991, p. 31 f.60 SHIV, Annual Report 1990, p. 40.61 SHIV, Annual Report 1990, p. 57: „Ohne Transitabkommen gibt es keinen Europäsichen Wirtschaftsraum,sagt die EG.“62 SHIV, Annual Report 1991, p. 29.63 SHIV, Annual Report 1991, p. 30 f. and 53. According to the Members of the SHIV, the advantages largelycompensated the disadvantages. The EEA is a useful step in order to get prepared fort joining the EC later on.
15
To some extent, bilateral negotiations between Switzerland and the EC continued.64 And in
some areas the influence of EC-rules was still limited or even firmly rejected. This was for
example the case for corporation law, especially with regard to the participation of
employees.65 Rather surprisingly, a similar attitude prevailed with regard to the law on cartels.
According to the SHIV, the ban on cartels of EC competition law would only take effect for
the transnational exchange of goods and services, for purely internal agreements the Swiss
cartel law allowing cartels with certain restrictions remained valid.66 The extension of the
activities of the EC-Commission from the EC-single market program to the social and labour
policies was observed with apprehension, but these topics were not part of the EEA yet. The
SHIV exerted its influence within the UNICE, where the representatives of European business
united forces against the attempts to shift this field from the national to the EC-level.67
External communication became more important with the approaching conclusion of the EEA
and the pending popular ballot on this wide-reaching institutional change. Although the SHIV
ascribed high importance to convincing the people of the advantages of the EEA, the broader
impact of the SHIV was, of course, limited. Its arguments were enhanced or weakened by the
activities of other interest groups. 68
- “Verein Schweizerischer Maschinen-Industrieller” (VSM)69
From 1988 onwards the creation of the EC single market, its consequences for the Swiss firms
in the machine industry and the advantages of the EEA-agreement was the main theme dealt
with in the annual reports. The main objective of the VSM was to adapt Swiss technical rules
and norms to the harmonized technical rule and Norms valid within the EC in order to achieve
EC compatibility (“Europaverträglichkeit”) of its products. The attitude of the VSM was
clear: As long as the rules in Switzerland differed from those in the EC, the Swiss producer
had a disadvantage compared to his competitor in the EC. Consequently, such differences had
64 SHIV, Annual Report 1989/90, p. 60 f., Zollabkommen Schweiz-EG; Annual Report 1990, p. 56.65 SHIV, Annual Report 1989/90, p. 138: „Entschieden lehnt der Vorort Versuche ab, auf dem Umweg über dieEWR-Verhandlungen Postulate in die Schweiz zu „importieren“, die bei uns bisher mit guten Gründen klarabgelehnt wurden. Dazu gehören beispielsweise die Mitbestimmung der Arbeitnehmer oder ein mit unseremSystem nicht vereinbarer Kündigungsschutz. SHIV, Annual Report 1990, p. 128 ff.; 1991, p. 148 f.66 SHIV, Annual Report 1991, p. 79 ff.67 SHIV, Annual Report 1990, p. 15.68 SHIV, Annual Report 1990, p. 13; Annual Report 1991, p. 12.69 The VSM was founded in 1883. All firms located in Switzerland, with at least 20 employees and active in themachine-, electric- or metal-industry can become members of the VSM. In 1989 the firms producing good orservices for members of the association were included. VSM, Annual Report 1989, p. 4. The reason fort thismodification was to include firms, which had been desinvested. In 1983 the associations had 484 member firmswith about 200’000 employee, in 1993 the number of firms had increased to 629 with 150’000 employees.Obviously, most firms were of small or medium size.
16
to be eliminated or avoided.70 A survey among the VSM-members in 1989 resulted in a
broadly based approval to adjusting Swiss technical norms to those valid for the EC.71
European integration became more and more important, and in 1990, the VSM formed a new
working group “Europe”. The realisation of the EC single marked proceeded at a very fast
pace and the EEA-negotiations were initiated in 1989. The fact that some fields, which had
been previously excluded (namely energy and water supply, traffic systems and
telecommunication), were included again was welcomed. An internal survey revealed that
more than 86% of the firms agreed with the position of the VSM to open those markets for the
whole EEA-area.72 The results of another survey on the question whether Switzerland should
accept the EEA-agreement were also clear-cut: 90% of the firms approved joining the EEA;
10% favoured direct membership in the EC, nobody voted to go it alone.73
The VSM and its numerous subgroups were all members of the respective European
associations. Being associated to the European federation was important, because at that level
all information concerning the EC was available quickly and reliably. For the VSM, the main
European connection was ORGALIME (Organisme de Liaison des Industries Métalliques
Européennes).74 The planned extension of its activities was approved and the VSM
participated actively in the various working groups and committees. While all the subgroups
(except one) were linked with European associations of the same branches, only very few
participated also in world-wide associations. 75 The annual reports of the VSM contain little
information on the activities of these groups, but it seems that their main objective during the
late 1980s and early 1990s was the harmonization of Swiss regulations and norms with
European regulations and norms in order to avoid competitive disadvantages for Swiss firms
on the EC-market.
Special commissions of the VSM were continuously observing the revisions of legal rules in
Switzerland, in the European context and on the international level. These commissions
intervened on the national level by commenting on drafts for new rules and indicating
possible problems if the proposed regulation was not harmonised with the respective EC-
70 VSM, Annual Report 1988, p. 10; Annual Report 1989, p. 9 f.:71 VSM, Annual Report 1989, p. 11.72 VSM, Annual Report 1990, p. 9.73 VSM, Annual Report 1991, p. 8.74 VSM, Annual Report 1988, p. 18; Annual Report 1990, 1475 The exception was the group „Käsereianlagebau”. In the late 1980s and 1990s, there are about a dozen*subgroups for different branches within the machine industry (from the traditional group of texile machines orof machine tools to the new groups of communication technology, environmental technology and space(Raumfahrt) technology, VSM, Annual Report 1988-1991.
17
guidelines. Some members of the VSM were active in the commission on intellectual property
of the SHIV and in working groups of UNICE.76 The main topics discussed with regard to the
EC during the late 1980s and early 1990s were: product liability, the rules for certification and
examination, patent law, trademark protection law and copy right. In the field of technical
harmonization great importance was attached to the Greenbook on the development of
European norms for the realisation of the single European market.77
The GATT-negotiations were also important, but the regulations of the GATT-Kodex had
largely remained ineffective. The plans of the EC with regard to the creation of a of the single
internal market had a very different meaning.78 Given the hectic pace prevailing in the EC, it
was even feared that the successful conclusion of the Uruguay round was put into question
because of the high priority attributed to the process of European integration. This was a
matter of concern because 35% of exports of the machine industry were going to other world
regions. For the Swiss machine industry an open world trade system was almost as important
as the process of European integration.79
The member firms were continuously kept informed in “Europa-Seminarien” (1988, p. 11)
and Workshops for entrepreneurs (1989 p. 9). Quite generally, European integration had high
priority in the public relations activities of the association.80 The main areas of interest of the
Swiss machine industry were: liberalization of the telecommunication sector and participating
in EC research projects.81 With regard to research policies the attitude of the VSM was less
ambiguous than the position of the SHIV. The VSM claimed full participation of Switzerland
in the EC-programs and, with regard to financial support, equal treatment as the other EC and
EFTA countries.82 This aim was achieved in 1991.83 Other major developments commented
on in the annual reports of the VSM was the breakdown of the Comecon trade system, which
resulted in a substantial decline of trade flows to those markets.84
- Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Chemische Industrie (SGCI)
76 VSM, Annual Report 1989, p. 53 ff.77 VSM, Annual Report 1990, p. 1078 VSM, Annual Report 1988, p. 1179 VSM, Annual Report 1988, p. 19; Annual Report 1989, p. 1180 VSM, Annual Report 1988, p. 11; Annual Report 1989, p. 9; Annual Report 1990, p. 7; Annual Report 1991,p. 24.81 VSM, Annual Report 1988, p. 12 f., Annual Report 1989, p. 11.82 VSM, Annual Report 1989, p. 11; Annual Report 1990, p. 1383 VSM, Annual Report 1991, p. 11 f.84 VSM, Annual Report 1990, p. 16
18
The chemical-pharmaceutical industry has been one of the most globally oriented Swiss
industries. The European market is important, especially for imports, but since the late 1970s
the US are the most attractive market because of higher incomes and growth rates and a less
regulated health sector, a consequence of the different role of the state in Europe and the US.
In analogy to the other major export industries, there have been a few large MNEs, but most
firms were SMEs.85
The SGCI was founded in 1882. In the year of its 100 anniversary, the industry consisted of
350 firms and employed 68'000 persons in Switzerland. About 250 firms were members of
the SGCI. The association’s links with other national and international business associations
and governmental delegations have been quite extensive and mirror the great importance
attributed to this industry for the Swiss economy.86 In national policy matters, the SGCI
usually intervened indirectly as a member of the SHIV. Links with the European Chemical
Association had been established right from its foundation in 1959. The international network
included about a dozen international organization, of which about two thirds were European
associations.
Due to its global orientation, the main interest with regard to international trade in the early
1980s was a liberal world trade system without protectionist policies and trade barriers. These
objectives were pursued on the level of the GATT, but progress at this level was slow and the
results of the various rounds of negotiations disappointing: the main problems caused by the
spread of bilateralism were identified, but they remained unresolved.
Up to the middle of the 1980s, the EC as rule-setter remained marginal, limited to question of
origin and customs tariff between EC and EFTA. The basis for negotiations was the European
free trade agreement concluded in 1972. With regard to such questions, cooperation within
CEFIC (European Chemical Industry Council) proved highly satisfactory.87 At first, plans of
the EC to create a single European market were a matter of preoccupation, because the SGCI
feared the formation of trade blocks. It was therefore important to accompany this
85 Müller Margrit (2006). The Export-Dependence of the Swiss Chemical Industry and the Internationalization ofSwiss Chemical Firms (1950-2000), in: L. Galambos, T. Hikono, V. Zamagni (eds.), The global chemicalindustry in the age of the pretrochemical revolution, CUP.86 The SGCI had delegates in about 30 federal commissions and committees, in 22 national organisations and inbetween a dozen and 15 international organization, of which about two thirds were European organisations. The19 subsections had also links with mainly European associations. SGCI, Annual Reports, 1981 to 1986.87 SGCI, Annual Report 1985, p. 10.
19
development. In this regard, the European branch association had an important role.88 In the
later 1980s, the section on foreign trade concentrated mainly on the changing relationship
between EC and EFTA. The position of Switzerland was weakened, because the EFTA was
losing members and often the remaining member states did not support the requests of
Switzerland. These developments may also have weakened the position of Switzerland in the
European associations. The question was how a marginalisation of Switzerland could be
avoided. In this context, the SGCI favoured approaching the EC by the means of bilateral
agreements and in any case to strive for parallelism of the law setting process in the EC-states
and in Switzerland. Joining the EC was out of question “for well-known reasons”.89
Other areas of concern, namely health and environmental protection as well as transport of
dangerous goods were dealt with either in the national context or on the international level
(UNO, WHO, UNEC, FAO, GATT; OECD). The influence of the EC in matters of traffic and
transport was felt only in the early 1990s. The special problems related to trade with
pharmaceuticals, namely the increasing intervention of the state on price-setting policies, was
not perceived as a specific European problem. Similar tendencies were present in countries of
other world regions. These tendencies were strongest in some important European countries,
but it was the result of national policies. This changed with the creation of the single
European market and the EEA. Being a member association of the EFPHIA, but also of the
world association IFMPA was becoming more important.
The chemical-pharmaceutical industry was clearly the leader with regard to R&D
expenditures in Switzerland. Not surprisingly, the other main interests were the means to
protect trademarks and patents. Also in this respect, the influence of the EC was absent in the
early 1980s. These topics were dealt with either on the national level or within international
organizations (OECD, UNCTAD, GATT). In the case of patent protection, the national rules
became more efficient, but also less important because Swiss firms rarely used the national
channels for patent protection. The EC played an active role with regard to product liability
and consumer protection, strongly influenced by development in the US. In the late 1980s and
1990s, developments in the EC were perceived as constraints for national law-setting
processes also with regard to the law on trademarks and patent law.90 Quite generally, new
legislation in the national context was approved if the developments in the EC were taken into
88 SGCI, Annual Report 1984, p. 11.89 SGCI, Annual Report 1986, p. 10.90 SGCI, Annual Report 1988, p. 27 and 1991, p. 28.
20
account; the process of legislation was suspended, if the corresponding process within the EC
was uncertain.
By 1988, the attitude of the SGCI with regard to the creation of a single European market had
clearly become more positive. The SGCI campaigned for the “Europafähigkeit” of the
chemical industry in Switzerland. Renouncing on “customised” Swiss guidelines for
environmental protection was one way to demonstrate solidarity with Europe and the positive
attitude of the Swiss chemical industry towards the EC single market. The official
acknowledgment of the concept of “Europafähigkeit” understood as enhancing the
competitiveness of Swiss firms, on the one hand, and establishing legal compatibility with EC
rules, on the other hand, was highly welcomed.91 The objective of the SGCI was to avoid
disparities between EC-guidelines and Swiss regulations. Three years later, the position of the
SGCI was clearly pro-European. In its view, the EEA was a good basis for a temporary
transitional solution, but in the long term, only full membership in the EC was the adequate
form of relationship.92* With regard to the EEA, the SGCI had regular contacts to the Swiss
delegations negotiating the agreement. In 1991, a slight but important change can be noticed.
Then, the EEA was described as an unbalanced agreement, inadequate as self-contained und
durable instrument of integration. Consequently, the SGCI would approve if, subsequently,
Switzerland joined the EC. The association suggested that the federal government should
deposit an application for membership in the EU. The SGCI was satisfied, that the federal
government had adopted the attitude of the SGCI. Under these circumstances, the committee
of the SGCI agreed to join the EEA.93
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990ss, the SGCI continued to support all endeavours for
expanding and strengthening the liberal world trade system. The necessary condition was the
successful conclusion of the current Uruguay round of the GATT.
- Schweizerischer Gewerbeverband (SGV)
91 SGCI, Annual Report 1988, p. 5 and 8.92* „Die SGCI ist überzeugt, dass die Wahrung der wirtschaftlichen Attraktivität unseres Landes die Oeffnunggegenüber der EG voraussetzt. Wir betrachten dabei den EWR als gute Grundlage für eine befristeteUebergangslösung. Längerfristig kann nur die Mitgliedschaft in der EG der Schweiz eine gleichwertigeMitsprache bei der Gestaltung der europäischen und damit auch der eigenen Zukunft gewähren.“93 SGCI, Annual Report 1991, p. 9.
21
The SGV is the federation of the economic and professional organisations of the domestic
branches of the Swiss economy.94 Consequently, domestic topics dominated even in the late
1980s and early 1990s, when European integration became a major theme even for this
organisation. The SGV had its representatives in a large number of federal commissions and
organisations of tertiary education. There have been only two institutionalised links with
international organisation: the “Conférence internationale du travail”and the “Union
internationale de l’artisanat et des petites et moyennes enterprise” (Internationale
Gewerbeunion, IGU).95 The SGV was not a member organisation of the SHIV, but often
cooperated with the SHIV on specific topics.
The annual reports contain little information on the activities of the SGV and its subgroups.
Up to 1989, developments regarding EC, EFTA and EEA are mentioned very briefly. In the
view of the SGV, those topics concerned first of all the export sector of the economy. Even if
it was acknowledged that the creation of a single European market was important also for the
domestic firms, these effects were perceived as rather limited. The SGV adopted a defensive
attitude and focused on those areas and rules, which should be kept untouched from
developments in the EC.96 The proposal to adapt Swiss law on product liability to the EC-
guideline, for example, was plainly rejected.97 The main problem related with the single
European market was the „Saisonnierstatut“ für temporary foreign labour, which was not
compatible with the EC principles of the four liberties. The SGV campaigned to preserve the
„Saisonnierstatut“, but by 1991 it became clear that this was not possible.98
Only in the 1990s, the EEA and EC were acknowledged as main themes of economic policy
in Switzerland and commented on more extensively. The impression is that the SGV was
hardly able to keep pace with the rapid developments on the international level.99The member
firms asked for more information with regard to European integration, and the SGV
complained that the information policy of the Federal Council was not satisfactory. The main
94 On 31st December 1991, the members are listed as follows: 25 cantonal „Gewerbeverbände“, 197 professionalorganisations, 43 Selbsthilfeorganisationen and 5 Anstalten und Institute. SGV, Annual Report, 1991, p. 7.95 In 1991, the SGVC had ist delegates in 86 domestic commissions and interest groups. SGV, Annual Report1991, 65 f. The business location was in Switzerland. In 1990 it was transferred from Bern to Lausanne.96 SGV, Annual Report 1989, p. 25 ff. These areas were: the agrarian sector, road traffic and the rules fort rucks,cartel law, and foreign labour policy. of the öffentliches Einkaufs- und Subventionswesen according to the EC-guidelines is quite impossible for the SGV.97 SGV, Annual Report 1989, p 63: „Die Stellungnahme (der Arbeitsgruppe des SGV) geht grundsätzlich davonaus, dass eine Uebernahme der EG-Haftpflichtrichtlininen nicht möglich ist und dass für eine schweizerischeProduktehaftpflichtregelung das Verschulden weitehrin ausdrückliche Grundlage der Haftung sein muss.“98 SGV, Annual Report 1989, p. 51; Annual Report 1990, p. 51; Annual Report 1991, p. 39 f.99 VSG, Annual Report 1990, p. 27.
22
critic was that the pace adopted by the EC was too hectic.100 A working group was established
in 1990. It was to analyze the possible alternative scenarios for Switzerland within Europe.101
But since it was still unclear what the EEA-treaty would look like, the analysis simply
assumed, as a starting point, that Switzerland would join neither the EEA nor the EC.102
In 1991, the EEA was the main theme in the section on economic policy of the annual report.
It was now clear that the EEA agreement will have important consequences for the national
laws in various fields (cartel law, submission law, technical norms, product liability, copy
right, agrarian policy, property laws, regulations on foreign labour, corporation law, the
education and social systems, consumer law, etc.), And in view of all these changes, the
Committee of the SGV decided that the EEA was politically unacceptable.103 At the
“Gewerbliche Winterkonferenz” in January (the main annual meeting of the federation) the
EEA was hardly mentioned and at the “Schweizerischer Gewerbekongress” the EEA-treaty
was only mentioned in the discourse of the guest speaker (Federal Council Delamuraz).104
The “Schweizerische Gewerbekammer” dealt with the planned access of Switzerland to the
IMF and EEA at an extraordinary meeting in Bern and concluded that it had not been possible
to prove the economic necessity for the country to participate in the EEA. In further meetings
of the SGV in April, May and August 1991 the EEA treaty was discussed.
At the yearly meetings of the IGU, the main themes were the Uruguay-round of the GATT
and the far-reaching changes in middle and eastern European countries in 1989. In the view of
the SGV, the GATT will not only concern certain branches but the whole economy. The
chance that barriers of trade will be reduced had to be supported. The successful conclusion of
the Uruguay-round of the GATT was perceived as a kind of safety net for small export
dependent countries and a means to overcome the obstacles, which will inevitably result from
the EEA.105
100 VSM, Annual Report 1990, p. 9 ff. . “Kritisiert wird die hektische Gangart, die von EG-Kreisen auf denBundesrat übertragen wird.”101 SGV, Annual Report 1990, p. 10.102 VSM, Annual Report 1990, p. 11.103 SGV, Annual Report 1991, p. 22 f.; p. 23: Der Vorstand des Schweizerischen Gewerbeverbandes ist an seinerSitzung nach reiflicher Ueberlegung zur Ansicht gelangt, dass der EWR politisch nicht tragbar sei.104 The guest speaker was Bundesrat Delamuraz.105 SGV, Annual Report 1990, p. 28.
23
The EEA and the EC single market was the dominant theme also in 1992. The consequences
of joining the EEA in various fields were now commented on more extensively.106 The
necessary adaptations included in the Eurolex-package comprising the modifications of about
60 laws and 100 reuglations.107 Nonetheless, at the extraordinary “Schweizerischer
Gewerbekongress” in September 1992, the more than 1000 delegates of all member
organisations said “yes” to the EEA (with 549 against 456 votes). The majority may have
been convinced of the advantages of joining the EEA, especially for the large number of sub-
suppliers, the minority was probably scared by the far-reaching and uncertain consequences of
accepting the EEA agreement. 108
4. Beyond the break of December 1992
Notwithstanding the support of all major business associations, in the referendum voted on
the 6th of December 1992, the EEA agreement was rejected with a small majority of votes
(1’786’708 against 1 762 872) and a large majority of the cantons (8 against 18).109 The
immediate reaction of the Swiss government was to proceed with the implementation of the
Eurolex-package foreseen in case that the EEA-agreement had been accepted.110 The other
aim was to avoid discrimination of Swiss firms by concluding bilateral agreements with the
EU in order to reach a level of economic integration similar to the EEA.
The SHIV commented the negative decision with regret and claimed that all options vis-à-vis
Europe were kept open and that all measures to improve business location in Switzerland
should be undertaken immediately.111The strategy pursued before had been to achieve
substantial economic reforms by participating in the EEA. This strategy had become obsolete
and had to be replaced by an autonomous program of internal reform including “eine gezielte
Ausrichtung der schweizerischen Gesetzgebung auf die europäische Rechtsordnung, um
hausgemachte Diskriminierungen auszumerzen oder zu vermeiden.” But the room of
manoeuvre had changed: “Eine Uebernahme tel quell kann nicht in Frage kommen. Wir
müssten die diesbezüglichen Freiheitsgrade nach dem Nein zum EWR intelligent nutzen und
106 SGV, Annual Report 1992, p. 36 f. (labour law); p. 41 ff. (foreign labour); p. 43 ff.: competition andconsumer policy; p. 54 (product liability):107 SGV, Annual Report 1992, p. 22.108 SGV, Annual Report 1991, p. 9 f. The importance of the topic is underlined by the fact that it was the secondextraordinary „Gewerbekongress“ since the foundation of the SGV in 1879.109 SHIV, Annual Report 1992, p. 8 f. 50,3 % of the people and 14 cantons + 4 half-cantons had voted no.Stimmbeteiligung of 78,3% was extremely high for Switzerland.110 SHIV, Annual Report 1992, p. 49. The Eurolex-package, consisting of 59 Bundesbeschlüsse und federal laws,had been accepted in parliament with a clear majority on the 9th of October 1992111 SHIV, Annual Report 1992, p. 23 f.
24
nur solche Vorhaben umsetzen, die der Standortqualität der Schweiz förderlich sind.”112 EC
competition law was one of those areas where the SHIV wanted to stick to the much weaker
domestic rules.113 Wide room was dedicated to the discussion of the different attitudes within
the EC and in Switzerland with regard to the energy industry. In this respect, the SHIV relied
on the European Energy-Charta, where Switzerland continued to participate as fully-fledged
partner. With regard to the liberalization of the Swiss post, the “greenbook” of the EC
remained an important point of reference.114
European integration was thus not stopped with the rejection of the EEA, but continued,
although with other means and somewhat changed objectives. But the end result of the
process had become highly uncertain and time consuming. The importance of Europe as the
main market for exports and imports had also changed, not so much with regard to the actual
shares of exports and imports, but with regard to future business prospects. Europe’s growth
rates, especially those of the large countries were low, while the US economy and the
economies of the Far East were booming. The shift of attention towards the higher level of
world wide economic integration is visible already in 1993. Being able to represent the
interests of Swiss industry by taking part in the various activities of UNICE was perceived as
being even more important than before the rejection of the EAA, but more weight was also
given to supporting the successful conclusion of the Uruguay round. 115
In an expanded version of the paper, the process of European integration and its impact on
institutional change could be followed up to the present in order to identify continuity or
discontinuity with regard to the main areas of convergence or divergence and the impact of
the EC as rule-setter.
5. Preliminary conclusions
The three business organisations SHIV, VSM and SGCI, were clearly exerting pressure on the
public authorities for making national legislation compatible with the rules established within
the EC. Their main motive was to avoid competitive disadvantages for their member firms in
the EC market. The tendency to enhance competitiveness by adopting EC standards and rules
112 SHIV, Annual Report 1992, p. 27113 SHIV, Annual Report 1992, p. 79 f.114 SHIV, Annual Report 1992, p. 93.115 SHIV, Annual Report 1992, p. 39 and 51.
25
in the national context clearly prevailed during this period. The areas subject to EC-rules were
continuously extended and finally culminated in the Eurolex-Package containing all
adaptations of internal legislation demanded by the EEA agreement. Only the SGV was
interested in sticking to national institutions in order to raise barriers to trade and create
competitive advantages for domestic firms. But notwithstanding its passive and defensive
attitude towards European integration, the majority of its member organisations did not
support this attitude and voted in favour of joining the EEA.
SHIV, VSM and SGCI became involved at an early stage of the negotiations and basically
accepted the process of European integration. The participation of Switzerland in this process
was a matter of course, their links with the European associations were strengthened and their
views were increasingly shaped by the European context. The SGV took little interest in the
process of European integration, and where it did intervene it was in order to defend the status
quo. In its view, the best support for the Swiss export industries were international free trade
agreements. To this organisation, the successful conclusion of the Uruguay round was more
important for the export oriented branches then Switzerland’s participation in European
integration.
From about 1985, when the EC decided to create a single market, up to 1992, European
integration had a deep impact on the way institutional change proceeded in Switzerland. In
several fields, the EC became the main agent of institutional change, and national law had to
conform or be compatible with EC guidelines. This process of “Europeanization” was
interrupted, when the EEA agreement was rejected and the planned harmonization of a large
body of legislation became again a matter of internal debate.