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#1
Elections,Computer Security,
and Electronic Voting
CS161 4/19/2010David Wagner
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#2
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#3
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#4
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#5
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#6
• Integrity: No election fraud
• Transparency: Everyone – especially theloser – must be able to verify that theelection was conducted appropriately
• Privacy: No one learns how the voterhas voted
• Secret ballot: Voter cannot prove howshe voted
Security Goals for an Election
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#7
Breakthrough! — the Australian secret ballot.
Ballot printed by govt. Ballot boxes monitored byobservers. Ballots counted, by hand, in public. Competing interests keep each other honest.
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#8
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#9
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#11
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#14
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#15
Another anomaly during the 2000 election
From: Lana Hires
Subject: 2000 November Election
I need some answers! Our department is being audited by the
County.
I have been waiting for someone to give me an explanation as to
why Precinct 216 gave Al Gore a minus 16022 when it was
uploaded. Will someone please explain this so that I have the
information to give the auditor instead of standing here "looking
dumb".
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#16
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#17
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#18
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#19
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#20
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#21
Question: How do election security goals apply to touchscreen (DRE) electronic voting machines?
Security Goals for an Election:Integrity, Transparency, Privacy, Secret ballot
1. Machine must allow each authorized voter to vote exactly once; must prevent tampering with votes after they are cast.
2. Machine should be verifiably trustworthy.
3. Machine must randomize the order in which votes were cast.
4. Machine must not give voter a ―receipt‖.
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#22
Nov 4, 2002:State of Georgia votes on Diebold DREs.
March 18, 2003:Diebold source code leaks.
July 23, 2003:Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Avi Rubin, Dan Wallach, ―Analysis of an Electronic Voting System‖.
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#23
smartcard
QueryStatus
ACTIVE (0x01)
SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)
Succeeded
(record vote)
Status = CANCELED
The voter authorization protocol
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#24
smartcard
QueryStatus
ACTIVE (0x01)
SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)
Succeeded
(record vote)
[Are you a valid card?]
[Yup.]
[Please cancel yourself.]
[Ok.]Status = CANCELED
The voter authorization protocol
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#25
malicioussmartcard
QueryStatus
ACTIVE (0x01)
SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)
Succeeded
(record vote)
QueryStatus
ACTIVE (0x01)
SetStatus CANCELED (0x08)
Succeeded
(record another vote)
Attack!
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#26
What’s the secret PIN?
2301
What kind of card are you?
An administrator card.
Authenticating election officials
2301
Ok, you have admin access.
What’s the secret PIN?
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#27
Source code excerpts
#define DESKEY ((des_key*)”F2654hD4”)
DESCBCEncrypt((des_c_block*)tmp, (des_c_block*)record.m_Data, totalSize, DESKEY, NULL, DES_ENCRYPT);
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#28
Source code excerpts
// LCG - Linear Congruential Generator -// used to generate ballot serial numbers// A psuedo-random-sequence generator// (per Applied Cryptography, Bruce Schneier)
int lcgGenerator(int lastSN) {return ((lastSN*1366) + 150889)%714025;
}
―Unfortunately, linear congruentialgenerators cannot be used for cryptography.‖
— Applied Cryptography, p.369
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#31
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#32
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#33
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#34
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#36
California Top-to-Bottom Review
In 2007, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen commissions a review of California’s voting systems.
43 experts (led by David Wagner & Matt Bishop) examine voting systems used nationally.
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#37
Technical findings of the CA TTBR
All voting systems examined have serious security problems:• None followed sound engineering principlesexpected of security-critical systems.
• All were vulnerable to viral attacks: one outsidercould subvert all voting machines countywide
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#38
Example flaw (Premier system)
Bug: The code that reads data off the memory card has buffer overrun vulnerabilities.
Attack:1. Attacker writes malicious code onto 1 card2. When central PC reads votes off card on
election night, it gets infected3. Infected PC writes malicious code onto all
cards used in the next election, infecting entire county
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#39
Quotes from the reports
―We found pervasive security weaknesses throughout the Sequoia software. Virtually every important software security mechanism is vulnerable to circumvention.‖
―Our study of the Diebold source code found that the system does not meet the requirements for a security-critical system. It is built upon an inherently fragile design and suffers from implementation flaws that can expose the entire voting system to attacks.‖
―The Hart software and devices appear to be susceptible to a variety of attacks which would allow an attacker to gain control of some or all of the systems in a county. [..] Many of these attacks can be mounted in a manner that makes them extremely hard to detect and correct. We expect that many of them could be carried out in the field by a single individual, without extensive effort, and without long-term access to the equipment.‖
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#40
Outcome of the CA TTBR
Bowen decertifies most DRE voting systems and imposes strict new procedural protections.
Result: Most Californians now vote on paper ballots.
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#41
Ronald Dale Harris
Employee, Gaming Control Board, 1983-1995
Arrested, Jan 15,1995Convicted, Sept 23, 1997, for rigging slot machines
Trojan Horses and the Insider Threat
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#42
…schedule();goto repeat;
}if ((options == (__WCLONE|__WALL)) && current->uid = 0))
retval = -EINVAL;retval = -ECHILD;end_wait4:current->state = TASK_RUNNING;…
Attempted Trojan Horse in Linux Kernel
???
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#44
Trojan Horses and Voting Machines
Malicious logic hidden by an insider might, e.g., record votes incorrectly to favor one candidate. How would we defend a voting system against this kind of insider threat?
Potential solutions:• Verify that the software is free of Trojans andwill work correctly on all future elections.(beyond the state of the art)
• Assume sw might contain Trojans. Verify thatsw worked correctly in this particular election.(voter-verified paper records + random audits)
Voting on Satan’scomputer.
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#45
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#46
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#47
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#48
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#49
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#50
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#52
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#56
Statistical audit
• After election, randomly choose 1% ofmachines and manually recount the paperrecords on those machines. If paper count electronic count, there was fraud.
• If » 100 machines cheat, detection is likely.Consequently: If paper count electronic count,then no more than ~100 machines cheated.
Prover(Elec. Official)
Verifier(skeptical voter)
The tallies are t1, …, tn
Show me the paper for machine i.
(voter-verified paper audit trail)
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#57
Trends in e-voting technology
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Adoption of paper records + random audits
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#59
Timeline
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
HAVA
SarasotaFlorida
TTBR
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#60
• E-voting security is hard, but...• E-voting can be made secure and trustworthy,if it can be audited.
• Technical principles:- Two-person control, separation of duties- Statistical audit- Security against malicious insiders
Conclusions
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#61
• Understand security requirements before youdesign & deploy an information system.
• Independent review is valuable.• Sometimes technical threats can be handledthrough non-technical defenses.
• Seek independent, end-to-end checks that thesystem is working properly.
• Securing systems against malicious insiders isextremely challenging.
• Business structure determines the technologythat is built & deployed. If buyers cannotmeasure how secure a product is, be preparedfor market failures.
Lessons
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#63