Everything has to change for things to stay the same
“New” approaches confront “old challenges” in public sector reform
Pablo Yanguas University of Manchester
Badru Bukenya Makerere University
DSA Conference
Panel - “The Pursuit of State Effectiveness”
1 November 2014
1. The failure of the PSR agenda
2. “Old” challenges
3. “New” approaches
4. Time for an old-ish PSR strategy?
1. The failure of PSR
Four “generations” of PSR
Structural adjustment (1980s)
Good governance & incentives (1990s)
Access to services (& ease of doing business) (2000s)
Public provision capacity (post-2015?)
1. The failure of PSRThe Public Sector Reform Agenda
Component Aims
Civil service and
administrative reform
High-performing and affordable civil service managed in an
efficient, nondiscretionary, and transparent manner
Public expenditure and
financial management
Good management and discipline in the allocation of resources
according to policy priorities
Anticorruption and
transparency
Accountability and transparency in the management of resources
to discourage the use of public office for private gain
Tax administrationImproved revenue performance through an equitable and efficient
tax service
Participation and co-
production
Efficient and accountable service delivery through public-private
partnerships
DecentralisationTransfer of political, administrative, and fiscal authority to sub-
national levels of government
1. The failure of PSR
World Bank 2008 evaluation
Some success in PFM and tax administration, much lower in civil service and anti-corruption:
CS: “lack of a coherent strategy”, “inherent political difficulty”, “weak diagnostic work”
AC: “indirect measures” had some success; “direct measures … rarely succeeded, as they often lacked the necessary support from political elites and the judicial system.”
1. The failure of PSR
Matt Andrews (2013)Of 80 countries receiving PSR support between 2007 and 2009, fewer than 40% registered improved institutional indicators; a third stayed the same; and a quarter actually declined
Pritchett, Woolcock & Andrews (2013)
“Looking like a state: Techniques of persistent failure in state capability for implementation”
2. “Old” challenges
World Bank 2008 evaluation
“Most developing countries today (such as Western Europe and the United States 150 years ago) have political systems that depend fundamentally on patronage. Some countries have progressed more quickly in recent years, but an open dialogue about the realistic expectations has been missing.”
2. “Old” challenges
Chasing an ideal-type
Rationality (Weber, Evans & Rauch, Fukuyama)
Restraint (Weber, Finer)
Autonomy (Evans, Fukuyama)
VS…
2. “Old” challenges
The subversive nature of Weberian bureaucracy
Technical recruitment Equality of treatment Professional culture
“levelling” of status
“Everywhere bureaucracy foreshadows mass democracy”
2. “Old” challenges
A history of “persistent failure”
“Juridical statehood” vs “empirical statehood” (Jackson & Rosberg 1982)
Neo-Patrimonialism (van de Walle 2001)
A Weberian façade
A patrimonial structure
2. “Old” challenges
Political and moral economy of reform
Administrative patrimonialism
Public corruption
Political capture
2. “Old” challenges
Assumptions and Challenges of Public Sector Reform
Assumptions Challenges Evidence
RationalityAdministrative
patrimonialism
Isolated reform efforts, persistent
informal practices, personal
disincentives to enforcement.
Restraint Public corruption
Disempowered reporting, social
sanction of corruption, political
interference.
Autonomy Political capture
Regime-state confusion, merging of
the public and private, lack of
bureaucratic autonomy.
3. “New” approaches
From “best practice” to “best fit”
Three flawed assumptions (Englebert & Tull 2004) Western institutions can be transplanted to Africa Local elites want to cooperate with donors Donors can support long-term reform
“Good enough governance” (Grindle 2004)
“Square peg reforms in round hole governments” (Andrews 2013)of them” requires unpacking the “PEA of us”
3. “New” approaches
Leadership(It’s the commitment, stupid!)
Basic claim: Political commitment and capacity at the top is essential for reform
Sample reform strategies:
Executive office capacity-building
Performance contracts
Executive communications and agenda management
Typical case: Tony Blair’s Africa Governance Initiative
3. “New” approaches
Leadership(It’s the commitment, stupid!)
Challenges:
– Islands of excellence
– Short political cycles
– Reforms linked to political gains
– Incentive to misreport
3. “New” approaches
Social accountability(It’s the participation, stupid!)
Basic claim: citizen participation and government transparency can increase demand for public sector effectiveness
Sample reform strategies: Participatory planning and budgeting Open government Co-production
Typical case: Open Government Partnership
3. “New” approaches
Social accountability(It’s the participation, stupid!)
Challenges:
– The politics of state-society relations
– Little impact on existing social capital
– Success tends to be linked to traditional forms of accountability (i.e. elections)
3. “New” approaches
Policy adaptation(It’s the iteration, stupid!)
Basic claim: Replication of foreign templates results in “isomorphic mimicry”, whereby the form is copied but the substance remains the same
Sample reform strategies: Problem identification through dialogue Central-local collective action (APPP) Iterative design
Typical case: Problem-driven iterative adaptation (PDIA)
3. “New” approaches
Policy adaptation(It’s the iteration, stupid!)
Challenges:
– Experimentation tends to happen under political leadership
– Local institutions may be incompatible with reform aims
– Generating local collective action is in itself another collective action problem
3. “New” approachesNew Approaches to Public Sector Reform
Approaches Expectations Evidence
Leadership
Executive co-ordination and
monitoring increases
performance.
Short-term political incentives
driving policy; “developmental
patrimonialism”.
Social
accountability
Government transparency
and citizen participation
increases demand for good
governance.
Citizens don’t have the capacity or
interest to police low-level
bureaucratic malpractice.
Policy
adaptation
Innovative and adaptive
problem-solving increases
performance.
Adaptation relies heavily on pre-
existing political will and reliable
capacity for evaluation.
4. An “old-ish” strategy?
Early days for new approaches
They are likely to work better in tandem
Committed leadership coupled with strong social accountability, transparency initiatives which give rise to innovative reforms guided by clear vision, and policy adaptation driven by long-term political commitment open to public criticism
These hypotheses need to be tested
4. An “old-ish” strategy?
ESID’s PSR project
4 countries: Ghana, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda Time frame: 15-20 years 5 core public sector functions:
Coordination Public financial management Public/civil service management Auditing Anti-corruption
Two implementation dimensions: Mandate Practice
4. An “old-ish” strategy?
ESID’s PSR project
Intervening variables 4 reform approaches:
Executive control Social accountability Policy adaptation Institution building
Elite commitment (policy, implementation)
Political settlement of the PSR policy domain Elite dynamics Elite ideas Local-transnational
4. An “old-ish” strategy?
Lacklustre PSR performance is not about having the wrong goals, but the wrong frame for intervention and assessment
PSR – state-building – is a hard, long-term struggle between tradition and change: building new institutions, overcoming entrenched social norms, and attracting the ire of those who stand to profit from informality
The “failure” of the PSR development agenda lies in the mistaken assumption that contentious goals could be achieved in the span of a three- or five-year programme
The failure of PSR was virtually inevitable
4. An “old-ish” strategy?
“Old” challenges call for a clear political strategy
HOWEVER:
“New” approaches feel like
short-term fixes to donor problems
4. An “old-ish” strategy?
Embattled reformers need strategic political support:
sustained over the long institution building cycle courageous enough to build reform coalitions within and
beyond the public sector itself acceptant of the risk of displeasing some actors
This is what local reform advocates doAND what donors actually do when they support
civil society organisations and bureaucrats