From Airport Scanners to License Plate Readers, DHS Has Your BacksideJeremiah Riley
September 11, 2001 is a day that many still remember. I was an LDS missionary living
in McCook, Nebraska when the towers fell. In a lot of ways, Nebraska is far removed from New
York City, but the tragedy still felt close to home. I assume it felt that way for all Americans. It
certainly did for the Bush administration. In the wake of the attack, President Bush promised
that the government would “come together to improve air safety…and take new measures to
prevent hijacking.” Moreover, he promised that the government “will come together to
strengthen [its] intelligence capabilities to know the plans of terrorists before they act and to find
them before they strike.”1
To a large extent, Bush kept that promise. The government responded to the 9-11 events
with remarkable speed and force. Its response included a new, massive cabinet-level department
charged with securing our boarders and preventing future terrorist attacks.2 In a way, the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) stands as a monument to the tragedy’s fallen, and it is
evidence of our country’s persistent fear of a repeat attack. The threat of another large-scale
terrorist attack is so real that almost overnight DHS became the third largest department in the
Federal Government.3 The Department employs over 200,000 individuals and operates through a
budget that exceeds $40 billion annually.4 DHS provides our vast country—and its busy modes
of travel—increased security. There have been no large-scale terrorist attacks within our
boarders over the past 12.5 years. That is commendable and, to an extent, it is remarkable. 1 President Bush Addresses the Nation, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2001, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html2 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Our Mission (Feb. 24, 2014, 12:35 PM), http://www.dhs.gov/our-mission3 Is DHE Effectively Implementing a Strategy to Counter Emerging Threats, 112th Cong. 1-3 (2012) (Committee on Homeland Security).4 Id.
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However, our increased security comes with a price beyond the multi-billion dollar budget. The
additional price for us—the average, innocent, and semi-free among us—is privacy.
DHS extends its protective tentacles into our lives regularly—in ways both seen and
unseen.5 But perhaps the most obvious way that the DHS “interacts” with Americans is through
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and its many ever-probing, light-blue, latex
hands. With bureaucratic enthusiasm, TSA personnel herd thousands of travelers—families,
workers, lovers, and friends—through America’s airports. Like interest, TSA never sleeps. In
airports around the country, TSA agents are always present. In fact, TSA’s operations are so
extensive that it screens every commercial airline passenger in the U.S.6
Like the DHS, TSA (an agency within the DHS) was a response to the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. Less than two months after 9-11, President Bush signed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act (ATSA) into law, which created TSA. A year after the ATSA
became law, TSA assumed all passenger and baggage screening at domestic airports.7 TSA
screens over two million travelers daily at various airports throughout the United States.8 TSA’s
screening process is thorough—similar to a jail booking, really. The main difference between
the two is that not even low threat inmates can bring their MacBook Airs—and quart-sized bags
of liquids—into the local big house. But when someone gets booked into jail, there is a good
chance that he/she did something wrong. When TSA “books” a traveler into his/her flight, there
is a good chance that person did nothing wrong. In fact, TSA has caught very few terrorists
5 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Who Joined DHS (Feb. 25, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.dhs.gov/who-joined-dhs6 Transportation Security Administration, About TSA (Feb. 26, 2014, 12:03 PM), http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa7 Brittany R. Stancombe, Fed Up with Being Felt Up: The Complicated Relationship Between the Fourth Amendment and TSA's "Body Scanners" and "Pat-Downs", 42 Cumberland L. Rev. 181, 183 (2012).8 Id. at 184
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attempting to board passenger flights in the U.S.9
1. DHS and AIT Scanners
But the threat of a repeat attack is real. It is real enough that most Americans support
TSA’s various screening methods, including body and belonging searches. However, TSA’s
body searches expose more than many travelers think. For instance, TSA’s Advanced Imaging
Technology (AIT) captures a naked image of each traveler who walks through it.10 TSA views
the AIT scanners as a valuable tool in their fight against terrorism.11 Although AIT scanners
supposedly blur the outline of naked travelers, some judges and scholars view them as a major
encroachment on privacy rights.12
Before the current AIT scanners, TSA used another intrusive system. It is called
backscatter x-ray technology. Like AIT scanners, backscatter is superman-like. It can see
through travelers’ clothing with ease. In fact, the images that backscatter produces are so
detailed that they look like a low-budget “adult” magazine. It is that bad.
I vividly recall the first time that I saw backscatter technology in use. It was a year
before the first traveler stood sheepishly under its all-glaring eye. I saw the technology at the
Force Protection Equipment Demonstration (FPED) outside of Washington, DC. FPED is an
industry show where defense contractors showcase the most advanced defense technology
available. However, at FPED, the consumers are high-ranking military officers from the U.S.
and various allied countries throughout the world. At FPED it is common to see a group of
9 Stephen Dinan, TSA Profiling at Airports Has yet to Nab a Terrorist, The Wash. Times, Nov. 14, 2013 at , http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/14/tsa-profiling-at-airports-has-yet-to-nab-a-terrori/?page=all.10 U.S. Senate Homeland Sec. & Gov't Affairs Comm., TSA Airport Screening (2010).11 Transportation Security Administration, Advanced Imaging Technology (Mar. 8, 2014, 1:08 PM), http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/advanced-imaging-technology-ait12 Yofi Tirosh & Michael Birnhack, Naked in Front of the Machine: Does Airport Scanning Violate Privacy, 74:6 Ohio St. L. J. 1263, 1265 (2012).
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multi-star generals evaluating star technologies. And the backscatter inspection system was no
different.
With a group of military elite looking on, the backscatter demonstrator explained the
advanced abilities of the machine. He assured the generals that nothing—absolutely nothing—
could escape the backscatter’s discriminate gaze. And then he proved it. The demonstrator
walked into the machine. The crowd could see it. The man’s stark naked body flashed onto a
life-sized screen mounted off to the side of the remarkable technology. After a few moments, the
demonstrator walked out of the machine and shamelessly explained how the technology could
change the way that TSA processed travelers. After the demonstration, I walked away
wondering what Hobbes would have thought. Maybe the federal government had become the
great Leviathan. To ensure that we are safe from terrorists, the government has begun treating us
all as if we were one.
Backscatter x-ray and AIT scanners are key components to TSA’s threat detection and
mitigation. But the scanners see through citizens’ clothing. And as such the technology literally
“butts up” to the Constitution in notable ways. For instance, the Fourth Amendment guarantees
that “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”13 The Amendment at least implies that the
government shouldn’t use advanced technology to see through the clothing of millions of
innocent citizens.
ACLU argues that, “passengers expect privacy underneath their clothing and should not
be required to display highly personal details of their bodies—such as evidence of mastectomies,
13 U.S. CONT. amend. IV.
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colostomy appliances, penile implants, catheter tubes, and the size of their breasts or genitals—as
a prerequisite to boarding a plane.”14 Although the ACLU and others make compelling
arguments against TSA’s screening practices, courts have declined to extend the Fourth
Amendment to airport screenings.
In her article, “Fed Up With Being Felt Up,” Brittany Stancomb calls attention to cases
that highlight the judicial stance on TSA’s security methods.15 In New York v. Burger, officers
searched a private scrap yard without a warrant.16 In that case, the officers were searching for
stolen vehicles and auto parts.17 The officers conducted their search pursuant to a New York
state statute, which regulated the purchase and sale of vehicles.18 The Court held that business
owners who operate in highly regulated industries should have a reduced expectation of privacy,
and moreover, the officers in Burger acting pursuant to a statute did not require a warrant to
conduct the search.19
New York v. Burger limited the Fourth Amendment in an unfortunate way. However,
Burger is not alone. The Court’s decision in Burger largely turned on two prior cases, which
were Colonnade Catering v. U.S. and U.S. v. Biswell. The cases combined create what is known
as the Colannade-Biswell doctrine—a major Fourth Amendment limiter.20 In Colonnade the
Court reviewed the constitutionality of a federal statute, which authorized warrantless searches
of liquor license holders.21 In that case, an IRS agent was a patron on the Colonnade premises
14 Stancombe, supra. at 202.15 Id. at 203.16 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).17 Burger, 482 U.S. at 693-9418 Id.19 Id. at 712.20 John S. Morgan, The Junking of the Fourth Amendment: Illinois V. Krull and New York V. Burger, 63 Tulane L. Rev.355 335, 342 (1988).
21 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 75, 90 S. Ct. 774, 776, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1970).
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when he witnessed a possible violation of excise tax law.22 The IRS agent requested that the
owner of the premises unlock a storage room so he could inspect it.23 When the owner declined,
the agent broke the lock and forced his way in without a warrant.24 The Court held that although
the agent acted beyond his statutory authority, the statute itself, which granted IRS agents the
authority to conduct warrantless searches—under certain circumstances—was constitutional.25
Although Colonnade inhibited the Fourth Amendment’s reach, U.S. v. Biswell is the true
Fourth Amendment limiter. Indeed Biswell, is the heavier half of the Colonnade-Biswell
doctrine. In Biswell the Court considered the constitutionality of the Gun Control Act of 1968,
which authorized warrantless searches on the premises of licensed firearms dealers.26 In Biswell
the respondent was a licensed dealer who was going about his business when a city police officer
and a U.S. treasury agent visited him and demanded that he open his locks and his books for their
perusal.27 The respondent complied with the officials’ demands; however, the officials found
him in violation of the law.28 The Biswell Court held that because the search was administrative,
the officials did not need a warrant; therefore, their search did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.29
The holdings in Colonnade and Biswell support the federal government’s practice of
conducting warrantless inspections in closely regulated industries.30 The Colonnade-Biswell
doctrine stands for the principle that the federal government is given great deference to search
without a warrant so long as the administrative searches are limited in their “time, place, and
22 Id. at 73.23 Id.24 Id.25 Id. at 82.26 Morgan, supra. at 344.27 United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 312, 92 S. Ct. 1593, 1594, 32 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1972).28 Id.29 Id. at 317.30 Morgan, supra. at 342.
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scope.”31 And for better or worse—mostly worse—courts view airport passenger screenings as
“administrative searches” that do not require a warrant.32
Although courts hold that TSA does not require a warrant to conduct its passenger
screenings, the practice is still very controversial. In part because individuals do not know what
TSA does with its passenger images after the screening is complete. And that concern is well
founded.
According to a letter from TSA to Congressman Thompson, Chairman of the House
Committee on Homeland Security, TSA requires that all airport passenger scanners are capable
of storing and transmitting images for “testing, training, and evaluation purposes.”33 Moreover,
Marc Rotenberg, executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), says
that TSA’s body scanners are, “designed and deployed in a way that allows the images to be
routinely stored and recorded.”34 In fact, a TSA procurement notice for body scanners says that
the scanners must “allow exporting of image data in real time” and allow for “high-speed
transfer of image data” over TSA’s network.35 Like many things in DHS—and the current
Executive for that matter—TSA’s practices are veiled in secrecy. Travelers rightfully wonder
where the images go. Many are left to assume that images of their naked bodies leave the airport
before their flights actually do.
Because courts do not recognize the Fourth Amendment in the passenger-screening
context, TSA is free to search as it pleases—and that it does. As such travelers have few options.
31 Stancombe, supra. at 203.32 See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that airport screenings are reasonable administrative searches because they are part of a broad regulatory scheme intended to protect passengers from terrorist threats).33 Declan McCullagh, Feds Admit Storing Checkpoint Body Scan Images, 2010 CNET, Aug. 4, 2010 at (2010), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-20012583-281.html.34 Id.35 Id.
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Citizens can choose between TSA’s thorough pat-downs or TSA’s electronic strip-search. No
other choice—except the bus. But on the Grey Hound, your privacy violator probably isn’t kind
enough to wear latex gloves.
2. DHS and License Plate Readers
Although TSA is the “touch point” of the DHS in the lives of most Americans, the DHS
oversees much more than passenger screenings at U.S. airports. Its operations are extremely
broad and, as such, its privacy issues are too. DHS’ “components”—from TSA and Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) to Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—monitor a lot of
things and they capture, store, and share a lot of images. There is an emerging DHS practice that
concerns privacy advocates as much as TSA’s use of body scanners. Like airport screening, the
practice involves images of citizens’ backsides. However, the “backsides” at controversy here
are the backs of cars, not people.
When DHS captures an image of the back of a vehicle, it does so to capture the vehicle’s
license plate. License plates function as vehicle owners’ nametags and by capturing license
plates, DHS can determine individuals’ locations—both citizens and non-citizens. DHS utilizes
a technology called License Plate Readers (LPRs) to capture the license plate images. The
technology is so advanced that it captures license plate images of moving vehicles, sometimes at
great distances.36
ACLU calls attention to governments’ increasing use of LPRs saying, “The information
captured by the readers…is being collected and sometimes pooled into regional sharing systems.
As a result, enormous databases of innocent motorists’ location information are growing rapidly.
This information is often retained for years or even indefinitely.”37 Moreover, according to the
36 ACLU, You Are Bing Tracked, How License Plate Readers Are Being Used to Record Americans’ Movements (Mar. 14, 2014, 6:23 PM), https://www.aclu.org/alpr37 Id.
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ACLU, the use of LPRs has few, if any, restrictions to protect individuals’ privacy rights.38
Still more disconcerting is DHS’ interest in establishing a national license plate tracking
system that would provide the government with a treasure trove of information that reveals
where innocent and guilty Americans are at all times.39 The proposed license plate database
would be massive and could easily contain over 1 billion records.40 DHS could share these
records with myriad agencies and potentially open the doors for the government to scrutinize the
movements of ordinary citizens.41
According to Jennifer Lynch, an attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF),
DHS’ proposal would “ultimately [create] a national database of location information.”42 And
the networked LPRs would be powerful enough to “track somebody as they’re going through
their life.”43 DHS’ LPRs and database would be huge. In fact, the proposed database would be
the first of its kind—in both size and scope.44 Needless to say that the proposed program raises
significant privacy concerns.45
Just days after releasing a solicitation for bids to begin developing its massive LPR
database, the DHS abruptly canceled its plans.46 Why the cancelation? According to Jeh
38 Id.39 Ellen Nakashima & Josh Hicks, Homeland Security Is Seeking a National License Plate Tracking System, The Wash. Post, Feb. 18, 2014 at 9:33 AM, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/homeland-security-is-seeking-a-national-license-plate-tracking-system/2014/02/18/56474ae8-9816-11e3-9616-d367fa6ea99b_story.html.40 Id.41 Id.42 Id.43 Id.44 Jennifer Lynch, Update: National License Plate Recognition Database: What It Is and Why It's a Bad Idea, Electronic Frontier Found., Feb. 19, 2014 at 9:52 AM, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/02/national-license-plate-recognition-database-what-it-and-why-its-bad-idea.45 Id.46 DHS Cancels Plan to Collect License Plate Data, Fox NewsPol., Feb. 19, 2014 at , http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2014/02/19/dhs-plan-for-national-license-plate-tracking-
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Johnson, Secretary of Homeland Security, DHS canceled the solicitation because it was posted
without “the awareness of ICE leadership.”47 Johnson’s reason for the cancelation should
concern privacy advocates. Within hours of DHS’ solicitation, civil liberties groups around the
country began calling attention to the privacy issues of DHS’ proposal. In fact, DHS canceled
the solicitation the day after The Washington Post reported on Homeland Security’s plans.48 One
could suspect that Johnson canceled the program in response to the negative press and public
uproar. I think that’s likely. But Johnson said nothing about the program’s future.
Although DHS managing a national database of license plates is alarming (to say the
least), private companies are quietly amassing billions of license plate reads and storing the data
with little oversight. Seeking to put the brakes on this shadow industry, Utah State Senator,
Daniel McCay sponsored a state bill that would restrict the private collection of LPR data.49
Although the Utah legislation would be a boon to personal privacy, two major LPR firms saw the
issue differently and filed a lawsuit.50 Their suit is seeking a “permanent injunction against the
application or enforcement of the Act.”51 Moreover, the LPR firms claim that the Act violates
the First Amendment because taking photographs is Constitutionally protected, and the Act
would prohibit the firms from taking photographs of license plates in the public.52
There are countervailing Constitutional currents relating to the use of LPRs. On one
hand companies seek to enjoin the government from prohibiting their use of LPRs for First
Amendment reasons, and on the other hand privacy advocates argue that in light of the Fourth
system-raises-privacy-concerns/.47 Id.48 Id.49 Cyrus Farivar, Private Firms Argue First Amendment Right to Collect License Plate Data, Ars Technica, Feb. 14, 2013 at 11:00 AM, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/02/private-firms-argue-first-amendment-right-to-collect-license-plate-data/.50 Id.51 Id.52 Id.
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Amendment, the government should limit its use of the technology.53
Parties disagree as to whether the Fourth Amendment applies to the government’s use of
LPRs. Although the Fourth Amendment deals with privacy, it does not explicitly outline a right
of privacy; the Amendment simply implies that the right exists.54 Much of the law concerning
individuals’ privacy rights comes from the Court applying the Fourth Amendment in case law.55
A great deal of privacy law comes from Katz v. United States. In that famous case the Supreme
Court articulated a two-part, objective and subjective, privacy rights test.56
In Katz the FBI attached an electronic bug to a telephone booth, which the defendant
routinely used for illegal gambling.57 The FBI recorded the defendant’s conversations, and the
government later used the recordings as evidence to convict the defendant of “transmitting
wagering information by telephone” among other things.58 The defendant challenged his
conviction, and ultimately the Supreme Court held that because the defendant entered the booth
and closed the door, he assumed his conversations were private and would not be “broadcast to
the world.”59 In conclusion the Court held that the “government’s activities in electronically
listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably
relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”60
The Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine resulting primarily from Katz focuses on three
53 Tyson E. Hubbard, Automatic License Plate Recognition: An Exciting New Law Enforcement Tool with Potentially Scary Consequences, Syracuse Sci. & Tech. L. Rep. 1, 9, http://jost.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/automatic-license-plate-recognition_an-exciting-new-law-enforcement-tool-with-potentially-scary-consequences.pdf.54 Id. at 13.55 Id.56 Id.57 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 354, 88 S. Ct. 507, 512, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967).58 Id. at 349.59 Id. at 353.60 Id. at 353.
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issues: (1) whether an individual had a subjective expectation of privacy (prong one of Katz test);
(2) whether society deems the individual’s privacy expectation as reasonable (prong two of Katz
test); and (3) the relative intrusiveness of the supposed privacy violation.61 Although the privacy
doctrine affirms individuals’ privacy rights in private places, it does little for Fourth Amendment
rights in the public. Under the traditional view of the Katz framework, DHS’ warrantless use of
surveillance technology—like LPRs—fits within the Constitutional doctrine of the Fourth
Amendment because individuals do not have an objectively reasonable expectation to privacy
when driving their cars in public.62
Although the practice of DHS recording the license plates of vehicles is not particularly
intrusive, individuals likely expect that their movements—in aggregate—are private. And if so,
DHS’ proposed national system of LPRs would be counter to the Fourth Amendment’s privacy
rights. Let me explain. Average people—you, me, most of us in society—subscribe to the
“large school of fish safety doctrine;” that is, we expect that many of our actions in public or
private go unnoticed because there are so many of us. When you are in public, you would
rightfully assume that someone is watching each thing you are doing, but you would not expect
someone to watch everything you are doing. So when an individual goes about his/her day, that
person expects that no one is keeping track of everything; therefore, that individual has a
reasonable expectation that the aggregate of his/her actions is private.
DHS’ national LPR network could also violate the objective prong of the Katz test
because society would probably accept that an individual’s public actions—if aggregated
together—should be private. Most people are fine with the government seeing snippets of their
public actions. But few people are fine with the government compiling their actions into a large,
61 Stephen Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 281 U. of Ill. J. of Law, Tech. & Pol'y 282, 282-283 (2011) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).62 Id.
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detailed mosaic because that view into their lives would undoubtedly be intrusive.
Constitutional or questionable, many agree that both the LPR technology and DHS’
proposed applications are intrusive. Speaking of the intrusive nature of LPR technology itself,
UT State Senator Todd Weiler, the author of Utah’s LPR bill, said: “this [LPR] technology…can
cut through fog, it can see in the dark, it’s very invasive—it doesn’t matter if you’re going 80
mph. It’s not just a photograph, it’s the direction of travel, time, and GPS location…I think it’s
an invasion of privacy. This technology is very intrusive…”63 And if LPRs are an invasion of
privacy, they are an invasion everywhere. Due to the widespread use of LPRs, the government
—federal, state and local—knows where you are, whether in a large city or in a small town.64
Like many emerging technologies, LPR technology is developing faster than the
associated privacy regulations.65 The existing LPR privacy laws are a patchwork of state and
local regulations.66 In light of the limited legal oversight, many government agencies—from
small counties to DHS—are free to use LPR technology as they choose. And agencies are not
regulating themselves in the public’s best interest. As an example, ACLU compiled data on LPR
usage within 293 agencies; only a fraction had internal policies governing LPR use.67
Before considering a nationwide network of LPRs, lawmakers should make note of the
way LPRs compromise privacy in other countries. For instance, Australia’s active use of LPR
63 Cyrus Farivar, Private Firms Argue First Amendment Right to Collect License Plate Data, Ars Technica, Feb. 14, 2013 at 11:00 AM, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/02/private-firms-argue-first-amendment-right-to-collect-license-plate-data/.64 Allie Bohm, "Limited Only By the Imagination": The Need for Legal Limits on License Plate Reader Use, Free Future, Protecting Civ. Liberties in the Digital AgeYou Are Bing Tracked, July 19, 2013 at 10:13 AM, https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security/limited-only-imagination-need-legal-limits-license.65 Id.66 Id.67 Id.
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technology rightfully concerns many of its citizens.68 Australian critics condemn the LPR
networks as “a Pandora’s box for abuse of power, mistakes and illegal disclosure” because the
network allows the government to “compile an extraordinary amount of data about [individuals].
This includes your name, address, contact details, driving history and license status.”69 David
Jancik, a privacy advocate and critic of Australia’s LPR networks observed that “Innocent people
are increasingly being treated with suspicion due to the tiny chance that some offence [sic] may
be committed.”70 Undoubtedly a lot of people in the U.S. feel the same way about DHS’ strong,
emerging interest in the lives’ of innocent Americans.
Privacy stands at the basis of liberty. Many believe—and far too many accept—that
privacy is dying. As Howard Rheinglod said, “You can’t assume any place you go is private
because…surveillance [is] becoming so affordable and so invisible.” I agree that very few
places are truly private. However, each public stop—although not private itself—is a
brushstroke in the portrait that composes an individual’s private life. When citizens open their
doors and step out into the world, they do not leave the Fourth Amendment behind.
DHS’ proposed national LPR network compromises our Constitutional privacy rights.
DHS’ plan should fail under the Katz privacy test—assuming the test is applied broadly—in part
because individuals have an expectation that the aggregate of their public actions are private.
Moreover, the privacy expectation would be objectively reasonable. As such, the federal
government should not pursue a national LPR network. Furthermore, state and local
governments should ensure that their LPR networks do not compile information on innocent
people going about their innocent lives.
68 Paul Joseph Watson, Homeland Security to Activate 'National License Plate Recognition Database', INFOWARS.com, Feb. 13, 2014, http://www.infowars.com/homeland-security-to-activate-national-license-plate-recognition-database/.69 Id.70 Id.
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In principle, our Founders would abhor the federal government’s pervasive surveillance.
In practice, our watchful, all-knowing, all-powerful government is just steps away from using
advanced technology to monitor most of our public actions. This means that DHS will have the
ability to monitor an innocent individual’s drive from his home to the airport. And after he
arrives at the airport, DHS will use another advanced technology to electronically remove his
clothing. It’s just an administrative inconvenience—while his naked body flickers on a screen.
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