Draft:11-15-20
GaslightingCitizensEricBeerbohmandRyanDavis
Gaslighting,asaninterpersonalwrong,bringsitsvictimstodoubtthesourcesoftheirevidence.Thispaperholdsthatpoliticalgaslighting,byleadingcitizenstoholdbeliefsdisconnectedfromtheavailableevidence,posesadistinctivethreattodemocraticpolitics.Butholding“audaciousbeliefs”—beliefsthatareaheadoftheevidence—canserveasacoreingredientfordemocraticmovements.Thiscreatesadilemmaforcitizens,whomustchoosebetweentwokindsofevidentialpolicies.Howcantheyprotectthemselvesfromthegaslightingwithoutrenderingthemselvesinsusceptibletothemobilizingeffortscentraltodemocraticpolitics?Citizens,then,faceastandingchallenge:toremainopentothebullypulpitwhilevigilantagainstthegaslighter’sepistemicbullying.
Membersofpoliticalmovementsfacedauntingodds.Evenminorchangestopolicyarehard
won.Mostattemptsfail.Ifthemovementsucceeds,it’shardtoconnectthesuccessofthegroupto
anyindividualmember’scontribution.Ifyouwanttochangetheworld,theobjectivechancethat
you’llprevailisprobablybleak.Soit’sunsurprisingthatcitizenscollectivelyengagedineffortsto
putadentintheworldhavetoadoptandmaintainbeliefsthat–insomeways–extendbeyondthe
evidenceavailabletothem.We’lldescribethesebeliefsasaudacious.Theempiricalliterature
suggeststhattheyplayanimportantroleinsuccessfuldemocraticefforts.Butthisdistance
betweenbeliefsandevidenceisalsosymptomaticofvictimsofgaslighting,whoseperceptionsand
attitudesareatoddswithreality.Thechargeofgaslighting—bringingpeopletodoubttheirown
attitudesorcapacities—hasquicklygainedpopularityasanexplicitlypoliticalcharge(Hoberman
2019).
Thisessayexploresgaslightingasapoliticalphenomenon.Wearguethatgaslighting
operatesasahigher-orderattack,threateningitsvictims’identities.Thissetsitapartfromordinary
deceptioninpolitics,andexplainsthedistinctivethreatthatitposestodemocraticcitizenship.Our
argumentproceedsinsixparts.First,wewillsketchtheconceptasithasbeendevelopedinthe
philosophicalliterature.Thesecondsectionappliestheconcepttocasesofmanipulationby
politicalelites.It’stemptingtothinkthattheproblemsassociatedwithgaslightingmightbe
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alleviatedeitherbyapolicyofbelievingonlyontheevidence,orelsebyavoidingrelationsof
epistemicdependenceonothers.Buteffectivepoliticalagencycandependonsharedbeliefs—
aboutourselves,ouropponentsandourinstitutions—thatgobeyondtheevidence.Weexplainthe
rolethataudaciousbeliefsplayinperseveringinourindividualandcollectiveprojects.Thefinal
sectionsrespondtoadilemmaforcitizenshipasanidealthatgovernsourevidentialpolicies.How
cancitizensprotectthemselvesfromthegaslighterwithoutrenderingthemselvesinsusceptibleto
themobilizingeffortscentraltodemocraticpolitics?
1.Gaslighting:ThePersonalIntheplayandsubsequentmovie,Gaslight,GregoryintentionallyattemptstocausePaulato
doubthersensoryinputs.Inthetitularactofmanipulation,Gregorychangesthebrightnessofthe
gaslightsintheirhomebutinsistentlydeniesthatthereisanydifferencewhenPaularepeatedly
noticesthatthelightshavedimmed.ThismomentservesasaparadigmforKateAbramson’s
account.Forher,gaslighting“induce[s]insomeonethesensethatherreactions,perceptions,
memoriesand/orbeliefsarenotjustmistaken,bututterlywithoutgrounds”(Abramson2014,2).
Thegaslighter’sfinalgoalisnottoleadthevictimtodoubttheirownperceptionsandbeliefs,butto
protectthegaslighter’sownconceptionoftheworldbyeliminatingeventhepossibilityofchallenge
ordisagreement(2014,9-10).What’scrucialaboutthisrelationshipisthatthevictimcomesto
endorsethegaslighter’sownbeliefs(Abramson2014;Spear2018,230).Tosecurethiskindof
epistemiccapture,gaslightinginvolvesadiachronicprocessinwhichtheperpetratorseeksto
undermineandultimatelydestroythe“independent,separate,deliberativeperspectivefromwhich
thedisagreementarises”(Abramson2014,10).Onlywhenthevictim’sownperspectivehasbeen
thoroughlyunderminedcanthegaslighterbeconfidentthattheirworldviewhasbeensecured
againstthepossibilityofchallenge.
Thelossofthegaslitagent’spointofviewhaspracticalaswellasepistemicconsequences.
Thegaslighteraimstodisplacethevictim’sself-trustwithtrustin—oratleast,relianceon—their
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beliefs,sointhefirstinstancetheyseekcontroloverthevictim’sbelief-formingprocesses(Cf.
Spear2018,2321).Insodoing,theyunderminethevictim’sabilitytomakeassertionsaboutthe
world,ortheirownexperiences,apartfromthegaslighter’ssignalsaboutwhatmaybesaidor
believed.Asepistemologistshaverecentlypointedout,thepracticeofassertioncarriesintowa
claimtoakindofauthority(Wanderer2012;Goldberg2015).Inassertingapropositionastrue,an
agentimplicitlyclaimstobeinpositiontoprovidereasonsinsupportoftheassertion,ortobeheld
accountablebyotheragentswhoacceptandactonit(Tanesini2016).Toplaytheserolesisto
claimauthoritywithinacommunityofspeakers(Goldberg2015,187-188).Thisauthorityis
ethicallysignificant,sinceholdingandbeingheldaccountableinturnaremorallyserious.Sothe
statusasanasserterpartlyconstitutestheagent’smoralstatus.Bycompromisinganagent’s
epistemicauthority,gaslightingreducesonetotheroleofobjectratherthansubjectinthepractice
ofsharingknowledge(cf.Fricker2007,pp.132-133).Inthisway,gaslightingalsothreatensthe
agent’smoralstatus(Abramson2014,16).
Wecandrawtogetherthesharedpropertiesfromthisconceptualwork.Atitscoreisthe
ideathatitsvictims’rationalfacultieshavebeencapturedinadistinctiveway:
Gaslighting:Agent[A]wronglyinducesanotheragent[B]todoubtB’sabilitytorespondrationallytoevidence,inordertomakeBepistemicallyreliantonA.
Thisaccountmarksoutanendandthecharacteristicmeans.Gaslighterscreatearelationshipof
objectionabledependencebyplayingwiththeirvictim’sgripontheevidencebeforethem.A
frequentattackvectoristhevictim’shigher-orderevidence(Feldman2005;Kelly2010).Our
evidenceaboutourevidencetendstohavespecialvulnerabilities.Gaslightingcanworkbysupplying
higher-orderdefeaters,exposingthevictim’sbeliefsastheupshotofafaultyprocessandleading
victimstoconcludethattheirattitudeswereneverjustifiedinthefirstplace.
Thisexplainshowgaslightingtargetsthevictim’sownpointofview(Abramson2014;Spear
2018;Stark2019,224).Whetheryouenjoyauthoritywithinapracticeofassertiondependson
yourjudgementsaboutyourowncapacities.Althoughyoumightdoubtyourbeliefs,youwillnotbe
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driventoquestionyourauthoritativestandpointaslongasyourconfidenceinyourbeliefforming
capacitiesremainsintact.Ifthewrongnessofgaslightingisgroundedincompromisingthis
standing,thenitmakessensetounderstanditasundermininganagent’sconfidenceinthese
capacities(Cf.SliwaandHorowitz2015).
Everydaydeceptionandmanipulation,whensuccessful,undermineourfirst-order
evidence.Gaslighting,incontrast,functionsasahigher-orderattack,threateningitsvictim’s
particularidentity.Inordinarycases,“theimportofaparticularbitofevidencemaydependonthe
thinker’sbackgroundbeliefs,butitdoesnotdependonwhothethinkeris”(Christensen2010,
190).However,ifyoulearnthatyourparticularbelief-formingprocesswasdefective,thenyouhave
areasontotreattheevidencedifferentlythanyouotherwisewouldinvirtueoffactsaboutyou,
ratherthanfactsaboutthefirst-orderevidencealone.Thegaslighter“claimsthatthetarget’s
judgmentslackcredibility”asaresultof“adefectinher”(Stark2019,224).
Contrastthiswithordinarychallengestoourfirst-orderevidence.Supposeyoubecome
convincedthatyourbeliefsinsomedomainaresystematicallyincorrect,duetosomeclearly
identifiableerror.Perhapsyouhaveaclusteroffalsebeliefsaboutthecityyou’revisitingbecause
you’vebeenreadingthemapupsidedown,oryouhaveaseriesoffalsemoralbeliefsbecauseyou
havebeenpersuadedofanextensionallyincorrecttheory.Incaseslikethese,discoveringthatone’s
beliefsaresystematicallymistaken—orevenutterlywithoutgrounds—wouldn’tinduceany
skepticismaboutyourauthoritativestandingwithinacommunityofmoralagents.Yourfalse
beliefsmightonlysaysomethingaboutthetoolsyouwereusingortheevidenceyouhad.They
don’tsayanythingaboutyou.Youmaytakecomfortinthethoughtthatthiserrorcouldhave
happenedtoanyone.
Thewrongofgaslightingisalwaysrelativetoaparticularagentorgroup.Putdifferently,
whetheragaslightingspeechactwouldchallengemyepistemicagencydependsonindexicalfacts
—whoIamaffectshowtheutteranceaffectsme.Partofwhatmakesgaslightinginsidiousisthatit
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exploitsthevulnerabilityofsomeagentswhileleavingothers(characteristicallyoutsidethetarget
group)perplexedabouthowanythingseriouslywrongcouldhavebeenperpetratedatall.
Thesignificanceoftheidentityofmembersofthetargetgroupfindssupportinsociological
workongaslighting.Sweet(2019)explainsthat“gaslightingiseffectivewhenitisrootedinsocial
inequalities,especiallygenderandsexuality,andexecutedinpower-ladenintimaterelationships”
(852).Intersectinginequalitiesmayamplifytheseeffects,suggestingthat“womenofcolor,poor
women,immigrantwomen”andothersmaybeespeciallyvulnerabletogaslighting(Sweet2019,
856).Whilenotstrictlynecessaryfortheconcepttoapply,wewillsuggestinthenextsectionsthat
thissociologicalfindingcanhelpinformunderstandingofgaslightinginpoliticalcontextsaswell.
2.PoliticalGaslighting
Ifdeepenough,politicaldisagreementcansignalnotonlythatouropponentsareincorrect,
butthattheyarefailingtorespondtotheevidenceinaremedialway.Sobeginsamuchsharper
allegation:thatouropponentisnotjustmistaken,but“crazy.”Inapartisanworld,therhetorical
forceofthisaccusationiseasilyweaponized.Ifouropponentslackbasicepistemiccapacities,wedo
themnowrongbyignoringthem,andencouragingotherstoignorethemaswell.Apolarized
politicscanseemlikeatargetrichenvironmentalforprospectivegaslighters.
Butourparadigmcaseshavetakenplaceinintimatesettings,involvingclosepersonal
relationships,oratleasttheirperversefacsimiles.Itisnotobviousthatalloftheseingredients
couldbeinplaceinpolitics.Andyet,politicsisnowthebellwetheroftheconcept’sprominencein
populardiscourse.Doesthechargeofgaslightingtravelfromthepersonaltothepolitical?Consider
threeexamples:
(a) DuringtheRepublicanPrimaryprocess,Trumprepeatedlyinsinuated(andthendenied
hewassuggesting)thatGeorgeW.Bushwasresponsibleinsomewayfor9/11,and
floatedconspiracistnarrativesconjecturingthatthepublicdidnotunderstandthe
attacks(cf.Glueck2016;Bort2019).
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(b) Afterhisinauguration,Trumpandhissurrogatesfamouslymaintainedthatthe
inauguralcrowds“wentallthewaybacktotheWashingtonmonument”and“wasthe
largestaudiencetoeverwitnessaninauguration,”publiclydisputingmediaandDC
Metroaccountsandphotographsdisconfirmingtheseclaims.(RobertsonandFarley
2017).
(c) InJuly,2019,Trumptweetedthatfourprogressivecongresswomenshould‘goback’to
wheretheycamefrom,falselyimplyingthattheywerenotUScitizens.Hethenclaimed,
contrarytovideoevidence,thathedidnotoriginatethephrase,andthathetriedto
preventacrowdatarallyfromchantingit.(Rupar2019;Crowley2019).
Theseepisodeshavebeenthebasisforaccusationsofgaslightinginpopularmedia(Rupar2019;
Carpenter2018).We’llnowconsiderhowouraccountcanexplainthepoliticalwrongsatstakein
thesecases.
First,eachofthesecasesinvolvesdenyingfactswhichwereeithereasilyconfirmedthrough
secondarysources,orelsecouldbeperceiveddirectlybyonlookers.Inorderfortheclaimstobe
believed,citizenswouldhavetodiscountthedeliverancesoftheirowncapacitiesforobservation
andevidencegathering,orelserefusetoexercisethosecapacitiesentirely.Second,Trumpandhis
surrogatesinsistedthatopposingevidencecouldnotbetrusted,includingevidencefrom
supporters’ownobservations.“Justremember,whatyou’reseeingandwhatyou’rereadingisnot
what’shappening,”Trumpadvisedonerallycrowd(Rupar2019).Third,theclaimscouldbe
interpretedaspartofacampaigntoruleoutcounterargumentandmakemembersofthetarget
audienceepistemicallyreliantonthespeaker(cf.Hahl,Kim,andSivan2018).Fourth,theclaims
invokedpowerasymmetries,includingthosecreatedbyintersectionalinequality,inordertorule
outcertaindeliberativeviewpoints.Inthecaseofthe“sendthemback”tweet,thetargetgroupwas
comprisedofminoritywomen,includingoneimmigrant–echoingtheidentitycategories
prominentinfirst-personalcasesofgaslighting(Sweet2019,856).
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Thereisevidencethatthesetacticsdohelpfacilitatethegaslighter’scentralobjective:
insulatingthespeaker’sassertionsagainstthepossibilityofchallengebyoccludingeventhe
possibilityofdisagreement.Remarkably,whenshownpicturesrevealingthecrowdtobevisibly
smalleratthe2017inaugurationthanin2009,15percentofTrumpvotersdeniedtheapparently
obviousevidenceandincorrectlyidentifiedthesmallercrowdaslarger.Politically-engaged
supportersweremorethantwiceaslikelytochooseincorrectlyastheirunengagedcounterparts
(SchaffnerandLuks2018).Theseresultscoherewithbroaderfindingsinpoliticalpsychologythat
partisanidentitystronglyinfluencesattitudes,andthatpartisanswillsimplyfollowelitesignals
whenreportingtheirpoliticalviews–includingaboutseeminglyfactualmatters(Bartels2002;
Flynn,Nyhan,andReifler2017;BisgaardandSlothuus2018).Partisanloyaltiesmakepoliticsan
especiallycongenialdomainforthegaslighter’stactics.
Wethinkthattherearen’ttwoconceptshere,butacommonone.Toextendtheconcept
fromthepersonaltothepoliticaldomain,weproposethisanalogue:
PoliticalGaslighting:Apoliticalactorwronglyinducesagroupofcitizenstolimittheexerciseoftheirbelief-formingandrevisingcapacitiesinwaysthatservethepoliticalendsofthegaslighter,inordertobringaboutthatthegroupbecomesepistemicallyreliantonthegaslighter.
Theexploitliesinthegapbetweenthevictim’sbeliefsandtheiravailableevidenceaboutthe
politicalworld.Whensuccessful,gaslightingchangeshowtheyholdandhandlethosebeliefs.On
thisaccount,victimsneedn’tcometodoubttheirownepistemiccapacities.Farfromquestioning
theircapacities,theaudiencesofthetacticsdescribedin(a)-(c)reproducedthespeaker’sattitudes
withahighlevelofconfidence.Themanipulatorexpresslywentoutofhiswaytopraisethe
audience’scapacities.Thiscanseematoddswiththeearlieraimofunderminingconfidence.Inthe
casethatlaunchedtheconcept,thevictimlosesconfidenceinherbeliefs.Bystarkcontrast,strong
partisanstendtobeespeciallyconfidentintheirownexperiencesandperspective.Indeed,it’sthis
veryconfidencethatinspiresthemtoturnoutinhighernumbersatthepolls(Ortolevaand
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Snowberg2015).Perhapsparadoxically,thosepartisanswhoaremostsusceptibletomanipulation
alsodisplaythemostconfidenceintheirpoliticalbeliefs(Anson2018).
Ouraccountallowsforthisvariationbyfixingoneffortstolimitcitizens’exerciseoftheir
rationalcapacities.Intheinterpersonalcase,thegaslightersoughtakindofcontrol,makingthe
targetdependentonthem.Politicalcasesmakeclearthatthiscaninvolvebothunderminingand
inflatingatarget’sself-confidence.Bothtacticsmayappear–thoughperhapslessconspicuously–
ininterpersonalcasesaswell.It’snotuncommonforvictimsofinterpersonalgaslightingto
confabulatefalseperceptionsorevidenceinsupportofthegaslighter’sclaims,andtherebyto
becomeoverconfidentaswell(Spear2019).Likewise,sometargetsofpoliticalgaslightingreport
anecdotallytheexperienceofhavingtheirrealitydestabilized,asinpersonalcases(cf.Carpenter
2018,67).Eitherway,gaslighter’scentralaimistoprotecttheirownworldviewagainstthe
possibilityofchallenge.Sometimes,thisaimmightbebetterachievedbyremoving,ratherthan
creating,thesensationofself-doubt.Thegaslighter’saimscannotbefulfilledwithoutthetarget
being“insomewayinvestedinwhatthemanipulatorbelieves”(Stark2019,223).Thatis,thetarget
audiencemustsomehowshareanidentitywiththegaslighter.
Inpolitics,partisanshipfurnishesthesharedidentitythatmotivatessuchaninvestmentin
avowingthepartyline.Tribalallegiancesriskerasingtheindividualcitizen’sindependentpointof
view.BarberandPopetakeadvantageofTrump’stendencytoassertbothconservativeandliberal
opinionsinavarietyofpolicyareas(e.g.minimumwage,taxes,abortion,etc.).Theyfindthatif
primedwithastatementfromthePresident,RepublicansmostlyfollowedTrump’slead,regardless
ofwhetherhewassayingsomethingliberalorconservative(2018,42).Theyconcludethat
“partisanloyaltyismorerelevanttoalargegroupofRepublicansthanisanykindofconservative
issuepreference”(43).Becauseoftheirinvestmentinwhattheirrespectiveelitessay,partisansare
especiallysusceptibletomanipulation.Ifbeliefsareconstitutedinpartbyakindofmodalstability
—orresistancetoreconsideration(Friedman2017),thenthepartisanfollowermightlackany
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beliefsatall(cf.Mason2018;Bisgaard2015).Eveniftheydon’texhibitanyactualdoubtsabout
eithertheirbeliefsortheirbeliefformingprocesses,theydisplayafunctionallysimilarepistemic
profile.Theyspeakandactlikepeoplewhoaredependentonsignalsfromothersfortheirown
beliefs,orattitudesthatdon’tdisplaythestabilityofbeliefstates.Justasintheparadigmcase,
successfulgaslightingproducesfollowerswhodonotjustdefertoelitesonasingleissue,butwill
followthemacrossawidevarietyofissueswithoutmuchregardforaccuracy(Swireetal.2017).In
theedgecase,thegaslitcitizen’spointofviewisusheredoffthedeliberativestageofdemocratic
politicsaltogether.
Thispointstothecorecontinuitybetweengaslightinginthepersonalandpoliticalorbits.
Thechargeissuesanaccusation:thegaslighterwantstoruleoutchallengestotheirownview,and
somustutilizestrategiestopreventthetargetfromthreateningtheirfavoredstory.Inallcases,the
destinationwasnottheself-doubtofthetargetinitsownright,buttheeliminationofthetarget’s
distinctivestandpoint.By“standpoint,”wehaveinmindtheperspectivefromintowhichevidence
andobservationsarecollected,andfromwhichjudgmentsabouttheworldandintentionsabout
howtoactareissued.Inotherwords,thegaslighterisnotseekingtoeliminateanother’s
standpointby–say–druggingorkillingthem,evenifsuchoutcomescouldbeachievedwithout
consequence.Thegaslighterwantstoleavethetarget’sbasicagencyintact,albeittobedeployed
accordingtothegaslighter’sdiscretion.
Thestandpointofthegaslighter’stargetisnottheonlyperspectiveatrisk.Forinthe
domainofpolitics,whenthingsgowell,thereisn’tjustacollectionofindividualpointsofview,but
alsoapointofviewthatcanbeshared.Thisideadoesn’tturnonanextra-strongviewabout
collectiveagency.Ifweassumethere’sanotheragentintheroom,“thepeople,”anargument
revealingacollectivevictimofgaslightingcomesrelativelyeasily.Butwethinkthatthereisamore
ecumenicalpremisethatwillallowtheargumenttogothrough.Allthat’sneededistheattractive
ideathatfellowcitizens,whentheyreasonwitheachother,areengagedinsomethinglikeshared
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action(Stilz2016).Itsufficesthatmyreasoningaboutwhatweshoulddotogetherbesincerely
opentoconsiderationsprovidedbyotheragents,andthatmyjudgmentsaboutsharedplansbe
responsivetothem.WithoutanArchimedeanpointlikejointdeliberation,theveryconceptofa
“commongood”lookslikeacategorymistake(BeerbohmandDavis2017).
Ifthispremiseaboutjointdeliberationisplausible,thenpoliticalgaslightingdoes,afterall,
threatenamorallyvaluablepointofview.Recallthatthegaslighterseekstocutoffthetargetfrom
othersourcesofinformation,insteadbecominganexclusivesourceofinputsforbeliefsand
planning.Sideliningdeliberativeinputsfromothersourcesthwartscitizensfromgathering
normativeandempiricaldatafromeachother,impairingtheirabilitytoforgeashared“common
good”(Cf.Westlund2009).Itshouldn’tsurpriseusthatwhenpeoplereasononlywithco-partisans
whoalreadyholdacommonoutlook,theyaremorelikelytoshowdirectionalratherthanaccuracy
motivation(Klar2014).Wecannotgetatthetruthofcommonvalueswhengaslightershavetheir
way,andcompetingsourcesofinformationareeliminated.Gaslightingcompromisestheshared
perspectiveofcitizenstogether.
Noristhisthelastresult.Weexerciseourownreasoningcapacitiesbestwhenwehaveto
sortthroughreasonsthatinteractincomplexways.Themessinessofpoliticsrequiresthatwe
reflectondifferinginputs.Soweshouldworrythatrulingoutlisteningtopoliticalopponents–as
thepoliticalgaslighterwouldhope–willcompounddifficultieswiththinkingonourown.And
thereisreasontothinkthisfearisbornoutinreal-worldpolitics.Citizenswhoaremorereflective,
ormorewillingtoscrutinizetheirownpoliticalbeliefs,aremoreabletoseethevirtuesofthose
theydisagreewith(ArceneauxandVanderWielen2017,135-151).Hatingone’sopponentspredicts
diminishedreflectiveness.IfwefollowtheoldKantianideathatpartofbeinganagentisbeingable
toexerciseacapacitytoreflectonone’sownattitudes,theninducingincendiaryviewstoward
opponentsmightcompromiseanindividual’sownagency,afterall.Inshort,politicalgaslightingcan
damageatarget’spointofview,andalsounderminecitizens’collectivecapacitytothinkfroma
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sharedpointofview.Andthat,inturn,compoundstheproblemsforeachindividual’sownagential
perspective.Oncebegun,thegaslighting’scontagioncanspreadthroughouttheciviclandscape.
Themechanismsofpoliticalgaslightingmaybemorevariablethaninpairwisecases,and
mayrelyonsharedin-groupidentityratherthanpersonalintimacy.Ineffect,thepoliticalgaslighter
seekstoinstallthemselvesintheroleoftrustedfriendship,butwithoutanyofthefeaturesofan
ordinarypersonalrelationshipmakingthattrustappropriate.Thenthegaslighterseekstoexploit
therelationshiptoruleoutvoicesotherthantheirown.Issuchmanipulationunavoidablein
democraticpolitics?Inthenextsection,wewillconsiderwhethergaslightingcanbecircumscribed
insuchawayastoavoidcoveringmodesofcitizenshipthataremorallyimportantfordemocratic
practice.
3.AudaciousBelieving
Gaslightingtargetsanagent’sconfidenceintheirrationalcapacities.Deployedinpolitics,it
attemptstounderminetheconfidenceofgroupsofcitizensintheirrationalcapacities,oratleast
inducethemtoactasiftheirconfidencewereundermined.Theeffect,again,istoeliminatea
perspective–eitherofanindividualorofagroup–fromdeliberativeconsideration.Inpersonal
andpoliticalcasesalikeitrendersthetargetagentdependentonthegaslighterasasourceof
beliefsandothercommitments.Whenitsucceeds,thevictim’sbeliefsareresponsivetothe
gaslighter,andsobecomedisconnectedfromtheevidence.Yetseveringtheconnectionbetween
beliefandevidence“raisesthespecterofaninflexibledogmatism”amongcitizenswhotaketheir
cuesfrompartyelites,makingsuchdependence“problematicformanyconceptionsofgood
citizenship”(Druckman,Fein,andLeeper2012).Ingeneral,politicalscientistshavebeen
sympathetictotheideathatcitizens’beliefsoughttoaimataccuracyorthetruth–thatis,thatthey
shouldbeapportionedonlyaccordingtoepistemicallyrelevantconsiderations(Hochschildand
Einstein2015).Whatcomplicatesthispictureisthatthereareplentyofpracticalcasesinwhicha
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littleinflexibility—evenwhatlookslikeselectivedogmatism—canlooklikeapartofpractically
rationalagency.Thissectionwillintroducetheroleofmotivatedbelievingfordemocraticpolitics.It
willbringintofocusadilemmaforthecitizenwhowantstobothavoidgaslightingandparticipate
inpoliticalmovements.
IndividualAudacity
SupposeyoucommittoclimbMountEverest,ortorunamarathon.Eachdayoftraining,
let’spresumethatyoubelievethatyouwillcompletethisproject.Butyouarealsoawareofthe
considerableevidencethatsuggeststhatyouwillfailtomakeittothesummit,orthefinishline.
Perhapsyou’veseenthehardnumbersonthesuccessratesofpeoplewithyoursimilartrainingand
background.Ifyourbeliefthatyouwillsucceedpersists,itdoessoinspiteoftherelevantevidence.
Yourhopethatyouwillcompletethesedifficultprojectsrestontheexpectationthatyourtraining
willpayoff(Duckworth2016).Wewilldescriberationallypermissiblebeliefsthatplacegreater
credenceintheprospectsforone’ssuccessthantheevidencerequiresasaudaciousbeliefs.
Thisdefinitionprescindsfromavarietyofepistemologicalpossibilities.Audaciousbeliefs
maybeformedinpartinresponsetopragmaticratherthanevidentialconsiderations,maydiscount
evidenceoffailureforactionsthataresomehow“uptous”(Marušić2015),ormaylandonthe
optimisticsideoftherationallypermissiblerangeofpossiblebeliefs(Preston-Roedder2013)–
amongotherpossibilities.
Anagentwithaudaciousbeliefswilldifferwithwhatarationalthird-partybelievesabout
them(McCormick2014;Marušić2015).Considertheexchange:
C-3PO:“Sir,thepossibilityofsuccessfullynavigatinganasteroidfieldisapproximatelythreethousandsevenhundredandtwentytoone.”HanSolo:“Nevertellmetheodds”(Brackettetal.2006).
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HereC-3POisinvitingSolototakeupapredictivestance—perhapsasaresultofhismechanical
make-up,hemaynotbecapableoftakingP.F.Strawson’sparticipantstance(Strawson1962).But
wecanbracketthat.Soloisseekingtoavoidevidencehere,preventinghimfromacquiringabelief.
Ononeinterpretation,Solohasalreadycommittedtoflythroughthefield,andhasnootherchoices,
solearningtheoddswouldhavenovalue.ButperhapsSoloappreciatesthethreatthistestimony
poses.Asecondtakesuggeststhatheresiststheevidencebecauseitmayleadhimtoabandonhis
project.DoesSoloreallyneedtobelievethathewillnavigatetheasteroidfield?Itmaybeenough
forhimtoavoidholdingC-3P0’sprobabilisticreport.Ifhecametobelievethattheoddswere
vanishinglysmall,hecouldn’tsincerelyretainhiscommitmenttothemission.
Evenifwesupposethatbeliefsshouldberesponsivetoevidenceofwhatistrueandonly
suchevidence,thereisafurtherquestionaboutpoliciestowardsevidence.Howstrongmust
opposingevidencebeforittorationallydemandthatabeliefbeabandonedorrevised.Mortonand
Paulcallthisthe“evidentialthreshold”forbeliefchange.Evenanevidentialistaboutbeliefcould
allowthatequallyrationalagentsmightyethavedifferentthresholds(MortonandPaul2019,191;
Lawlor2014).Ifevidencealonedoesnotsettlewheretosetthethresholdforbeliefrevision,then
anagent’simplicitpolicyaboutwhentoreviseabeliefcoulddependinpartonpractical
considerations.1Individualscouldholdbeliefssensitivetotheevidence,butalsohavehigh
thresholdsforevidencecontrarytothefuturesuccessoftheiraims.Suchagentswouldhold
epistemicpoliciesexhibitingakindof“grit”(MortonandPaul2019).
Inadoptingthisevidentialpolicy,SolomayhavetoldC-3PO:“Feelfreetotellmetheodds,
butmyevidentialthresholdforconsiderationsagainstmysuccessisextremelyhigh.”Solo’s
insistencethathewillbetheexceptiontotherule—tohisdroid’smodeling—canbedefendedas
1Althoughwefindthisoutlookappealing,itdoespresupposeacommitmenttoakindofpermissivismaboutbelief,whichroughlydeniesthatone’stotalbodyofevidencealwayspicksoutauniquelyrationaldoxasticstate.Forskepticalviewsonpermissivism,see,forexample,Horowitz(2019)andWhite(2007).
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resilience.Thereissomethingaudaciousaboutthiskindofpolicy—noonewouldaccuseSoloof
modesty.Butitneedn’tbeirrationaleither.
CollectiveAudacity
Socialmovementsarepronetoself-doubt.Markedbylooseconnections,smallnumbers,
andpowerfulopponents,theirmembersregularlyencounterevidencethattheymightfail.Their
sharedaims,afterall,aredifficult,long-formandrisky—whatJamesBaldwincalledthe
“dangerousroad.”Nolessthanmarathonsandmountain-climbing,thejointcommitmenttobring
abouttransformationalchangeseemstorequireaudaciousbelievingofsomekind.Inhisclassic
workonthe1880sFarmers’Alliance,LawrenceGoodwynpicksout“collectiveself-confidence”asa
centralbuildingblockofmassdemocraticpolitics(Goodwyn1978).
Toseecollectiveconfidence—evenover-confidence—atwork,considerthelogistical
backendoftheMontgomeryBusBoycott,whichlasted381days.ThenightRosaParkswas
arrested,onDecember1,1955,JoAnnRobinsonmimeographed52,000leaflets.Withinaday,these
weredistributedtosixty-eightblacksocialorganizationsacrossMontgomery.Theboycottwas
plannedtolastoneday,onMonday,December5.Itwasfarfromclearthattheboycottcould
succeedasaone-offprotest.TosustainitthroughDecember20,1956requiredavastcarpool
network,“325privatecarstransportedpassengersfrom43dispatchstationsand42pickup
stationsfromfiveinthemorningtotenatnight”(Tufekci2017,64).
Canaudaciousbelief,seenasafirst-personalattitude,scaletocollectiveprojects?Ifso,what
rolecansharedbeliefsplayinthepersistenceofjointeffortsinthefaceofevidenceabouttheir
diminishingchancesofsuccess?Atthegrouplevel,thepoliciesofresiliencefromthelastsection
arecomplicatedintwoways.First,membersofmovementsneedn’tonlyholdbeliefsabout
15
themselves,butineachother.Sowehavetomakesenseofwhatthisother-directedattitude—
believinginourco-citizens—couldlooklike.2
ConsiderMartinLutherKingJr.’sconfidenceinthearcofthemoraluniverse’sdirection.
Thismetaphorhasthepotentialtomislead,ifwetakeKingtohaveannouncedabeliefthathehas
simplyreadofffromtheworld.Hisconfidencewasn’tmerelyafunctionofproportioninghis
(cosmic)beliefsabouthumanity’sfuturetotheevidence.Ittookconsiderableeffortandepistemic
resilience.InresponsetotheBlackPowermovement’srejectionofnonviolence,Kingconcededthat
thisapproachwasafunctionof“despairanddisappointment.”Theevidentialbasisforthis
despairingwasascleartoKingashisopponents.Itwas,inBrandonTerry’swords,“aresponseto
severaluglyfacts,includingthefrequencywithwhichwhitebrutalitycontinuedtogounpunished
(evenafterSelma)”(Terry2018,278).KingwasalivetothesenseinwhichmembersoftheBlack
Powermovementwereproportioningtheirbeliefstothecruelevidenceinfrontofthem.Iftheydug
downintheirresponsetothatevidence,Kinginsistedthatalternativestononviolencewould
backfire,furtheringthesenseofpowerlessnessandraisingthetemptationofsourgrapes-style
reasoning.
King’sworryabouttheself-defeatofsuchtacticswasn’tvolitional,butepistemic:bya
processofelimination,nonviolencewastheonlystancecompatiblewithpreservingtheconfidence
ofmovementmembersabouttheirvictory.Putintopractice,Kingthoughtthatalternativesto
nonviolencewouldleadmemberstobelievethattherewasnohope.King’sNobelPrizeAcceptance
Speechhelpsexplain,ifnotfullydefend,hisjustifiedoptimism:“WithanabidingfaithinAmerica
andanaudaciousfaithinthefutureofmankind,”KingemployslanguagecompatiblewithWilliam
2In“BelievinginOthers,”SarahPaulandJenniferMortondefendthepermissibility,and
sometimesrequirement,tobelieveourfriends’capacitytosticktotheirprojects,evenwhentheevidencepointsintheotherdirection.Theirdefenseofthiswayofbelievinginotherscloselyparallelstheirdefenseofraisingourevidentialthresholdtoprotectourbeliefsaboutoursuccess;theythinkwecanraisethatthresholdforevidencethatbearsonthesuccessofintimates.Ourquestioniswhetherthisstancecanextendtopoliticalrelationships(PaulandMorton2018).
16
James’spragmatism,“Irefusetoaccepttheideathatthe‘isness’ofman’spresentnaturemakeshim
morallyincapableofreachingupfortheeternal‘oughtness’thatforeverconfrontshim”(Kingand
Washington1991).Theacknowledgementofitsaudacityisprobativeevidencethatthiskindof
believingisn’ttextbookevidentialism.Kingadoptedanevidentialpolicythatpermittedhimtoact
—inthiscasethroughspeechacts—intheabsenceof,oragainstthegrainofevidence.
Kingfacedpressuretoaccountforthebasisofhisoptimism.RobertWilliams,inhis
extendeddebatewithKingovernonviolentmeans,asked:“Canaprogramofnonviolence...
realisticallyexpecttodealwithsuchanenormous,entrenchedevil?”(KingJr2010,52)3If
audaciousbelievinghasrationalcredentialsthatwishfulorotherkindsofmotivatedreasoninglack,
Kinghasresourcestodefendhisepistemicresiliencefromthischallenge.Inindividualand
collectivecasesofaudaciousbelieving,moralandpoliticalconsiderationsplayalegitimaterolein
howwehandleevidence.Theyraisetheevidentialthresholdforconsiderationsthatsuggeststhat
oughtdoesn’t,intheend,implycan.Theseconsiderationssupportagents’confidencethattheycan
succeedindoingwhattheymorallyoughttodo.
Forustoformaudaciousbeliefsthataresharedaboutourcause,itisnotenoughtobelieve
inanygivenco-memberofourmovement—inapairwiseway.Foritseemsthatyouneedtohold
commitmentswhosedirectobjectsarefirst-personalplural.4Theobjectofconfidence,then,is
doublycollective:notonlymustIbelievethat“we”willsucceedinourproject.Itmaybeimportant
forustosharethisattitude.5Soyouwillneedabeliefaboutmyconfidenceinourproject,andvice
versa.Efficacy-directedsloganslike“yeswecan”shouldn’tbepassedoverasmerecheaptalkor
overblownrhetoric.Theconfidence,evenoverconfidence,ofmembersofsocialanddemocratic
3ThispassageiscitedinTerry2018,307.4Beliefsingroupefficacymustbeshared,since“individualsaremorefocusedonachieving
groupgoalsthroughthejointeffortofcollectiveaction.”(VanZomeren,Leach,andSpears2010,1056).
5Insomecasesgroupefficacybeliefsareproducedbyreasoningtogether.Whengroupmembersdiscussplanstogether,theybecomemoreconfidentinthesuccessofjointprojects.Suchattitudesarefundamentallyshared.See,forexample,ThomasandLouis2013.
17
movementsmakespossiblesignalsoftheirstrengththatareoutsized.Thereisconsiderable
instrumentalvalueintheprotester’sportfolio:rallies,occupations,speechifyingmarches.Allofthat
talkingandgatheringisaproofofconceptofthedepthandbreadthofthefront-line.
4.Gaslightingvs.Mobilizing
Whenfacedwithevidencethattheirpoliticalaimsmayfail,citizenswhopersevere
demonstrateakindofepistemicresilience.Theycometoholdbeliefsthatarelessthantightly
connectedtotheevidence.Orattheveryleast,theyholdevidentialpoliciesthatareinformed,
perhapsimplicitly,bymoralconsiderationsthatsustaintheirabilitytokeeptheircommitments.To
securesteadfastness,mobilizersattempttoensurethatmembers’sharedbeliefsintheireventual
successwillresistdefeatbytheinevitablepresenceofcountervailingevidence.Themobilizer,in
otherwords,seekstoinfluencemembers’epistemicpoliciesinawaythatinsulatesthemagainst
thediversityofopposingevidence.Whileherewewillfocusonevidencerelatingtoself-efficacy,
collectiveaudaciousbeliefsmakeupamuchlargersetofviews,relatingtotheevidenceaboutthe
goodwillofone’spoliticalopponents,thestrengthofprevailingnormsandtheirsusceptibilityto
violation,thecapacityofone’shomeinstitutionstochange.
Thisslackbetweenbeliefsandevidenceisdiagnosticofgaslitcitizens.Tohiveofffollowers
frombeliefsthatmayundercuttheirauthority,gaslighterstelltheiraudiencesthatcoresensory
inputsofthecitizen—thenewsmedia—isnothingmorethanacounterfeiterofevidence.Any
beliefsthatcitizenshaveacquiredthroughthistestimonialmechanismshouldbe,byextension,
abandoned.Gaslighterswillprotecttheirfollowers’higher-orderevidencefromcertainclassesof
counter-evidenceabouttheirevidence.Ortheywillpresentdefeatersdesignedtochallengetheir
target’shigher-orderevidence.
Onemightcounterthatthereisnodeepdilemmabetweengaslightingandaudacious
believing.Afterall,it’srelativelystraightforwardtothinkthatoneshouldsetahighevidential
thresholdwhenitcomestoconfidenceinone’sindividualorcollectiveprojects,butstillregarditas
18
anobviouserrortoignoreevidencethataleaderislyingorexploitive.Why,theobjectiongoes,
shouldweworrythatanaudaciousbelieverisatsomespecialriskofgaslighting?
Togetatthisissue,itwillhelptoworkthroughspecificcases.Forsimplicity,we’llwork
withanindividualcaseofaudaciousbelief,offeredbyPaulandMorton:
Whenthecoachcheershertraineeonfromthesidelines,theswimmerneednotbeoutrightdeceivedaboutwhatthecoachisupto(thoughhemightwellrefrainfromreflectingexplicitlyonhermotives).Andifhebelievesthatbeingconfidentisgoingtohelphimsucceed,hemightreasonablyexpecthiscoachtospintheevidencepositivelytoencouragehim(PaulandMorton2018,92).
Thestoryfeaturesperfectlyfamiliarmotivationaltechniques.Thecoachistryingtogetthe
swimmertoadoptaudaciousbeliefs,butcertainlyisnotgaslighting.Foronething,theswimmer
retainsanindependentstandpointontheevidence.Onewayofseeingthisisthatwearetoldthe
swimmerandcoachshareanend,sotheswimmercan“reasonablyexpect”thecoach’sspinonthe
facts.Whenlistenersandspeakersshareanendthatisadvancedbyagivenassertion,andthereisa
kindofimplicitagreementthatspeechwillbeusedinthisway,thenitseemsmorallyinnocuous.
However,supposethecoachdecideditmighthelptoputjustalittlemorespinonthefacts.
Sayshestartstellinghimthingsthatarenot–strictlyspeaking–true,butwhichmightbemade
trueifhebecamesufficientlyconvincedofthem.Or,inastepfurther,supposeshetellshimthings
whichshedoubtscouldbemadetruebyanylevelofbelief,orwhichsheactivelydisbelieves.Still,
shemightreason,suchfalsebeliefswouldbeinstrumentaltoinspiringstillfastertimes.Perhapsit
wouldalsohelptheswimmertodevelopamorepositiveself-imagegenerally–notjustabouthis
capacitiesasaswimmer.Littlebylittle,thecoachincreasestherangeofheradvice–extendingto
swimmer’sintelligence,popularity,relationships,etc.
Eventuallythecoachmayexceedanyimplicitagreementonhowspeechshouldbeused
withintherelationship.Flaggingthisfact,theswimmermightask,“Doyoureallybelieveanyof
thesewords,orareyoujusttryingtogetmetobelieveit?”Nowimaginethatthecoachreplies,
“Don’tworryaboutit.Justkeepyourmindontheprize.FocusonwhatItellyoutillyougetyourself
19
tobelieveit.”Nowitlookslikethecoachhasenteredtheterritoryofthegaslighter.Sheisnotjust
encouragingtheswimmertosetahighevidentialthreshold,butisattemptingtogethimtoreplace
hisownjudgementswithhers.Sheisactivelytalkinghimoutofholdinghisown,independent
deliberativestandpointontheevidence.
What’sambiguousisthespaceinbetweenthecaseasdescribedbyPaulandMorton,and
thisfinalcase.Where,wemightwonder,doestheimplicitagreement(signalingthatswimmer’s
independentsharingoftheend)runout?Perhapsthereisnofinalfactofthematteraboutprecisely
howfartheiragreementextends.Thecoach,motivatedmerelytomaintaintheswimmer’s
audaciousbeliefs,mightslipintogaslightingwithoutrealizingit.
Let’sturntoapoliticalcase.ConsiderthisexchangebetweenaLatinocanvasserand
persuadablevoters::
[Icanvassed]18individualsthatwere,Mexicanos,Hispanos,evenanAsiancouple,theyallopenedtheirdoorsandactuallyhearwhatIhadtosay…Butmoreimportantly,wereenjoyingitandwerelike,“okay,we’regoingtovoteforthat.”Itwasn’toutofthejadedperspectivethatnomatterwhatwesay,they’regoingtostilldowhattheywant.Itwasmore“Ifeelwhatyou’resayingandIfeelyourpassion.AndIbelieveyounow.”AndIwaslike,“Yes!”It’simportantthatwebelievethatwehavethepowertomakechangesinsteadoffeelinglikewe’regoingtocontinuouslybeinferiortoeveryoneelse.”(Carson,Abrajano,andBedolla2020,p.126)
Wetakethistobeaparadigmcaseofanaudaciousbelief.Ourmobilizerisattemptingtochangethe
targetaudience’ssenseoftheirsocialpositionandpower.Thereisclearlyanaffectiveandgroup-
orientedcomponent.Thecanvasserisenthusiasticaboutspreadingasharedsenseofcollective
empowerment.Thereisalsoadoxasticcomponent.It’snotjustthatthemobilizerishighly
motivated.Thismotivationisconnectedto—andpartlymaintainedby—abeliefthatthegroup
doeshavethepowertomakeadifference.Third,thisbeliefingroup-efficacyisregardedbythe
speakeras“important”notmerelybecauseitisjustified,butbecauseofwhatithelpstodo.The
significanceofthebeliefisthatithelpstocounteractfeelingsofinequalityandsubservienceto
othergroups—perhapsthosewithgreaterextantpoliticalinfluence.Believinginone’spowerto
20
makeadifferenceispartofdefeatingthepoliticaltemptationtofeel“continuouslyinferiorto
everyoneelse.”
Ourmobilizerispresentinganaudaciousbelief.Itisabeliefintheprospectiveefficacyof
thegroupofwhichthespeakerisapart,basedpartlyonevidence(infact,thespeakerandthe
groupreallyarenotthepoliticalinferiorsofothersinsociety)butalsopartlyonthedesirabilityof
thebelief(itisimportanttothinkthatonehasthepowertomakeadifferenceinordertorealize
thispower).Thelattercomponentshowsthatthebeliefisnotrequiredbytheevidence;itsgrounds
includeevidenceandpragmaticusefulness.
Nowconsidertwowaysthespeakercouldproceed:
(a) Thespeakercouldcontinueto(i)talkabouthowthespeakerandthelistenercanmakeadifferencethroughexercisingtheircapacities(ii)inwaysthatwouldhelpthemrealizeendstheyselectedthemselvesand(iii)thatdemonstratetheirequalitytoothermembersofthepoliticalcommunity.
(b) Thespeakercouldtalkabouthow(i)thelistenershouldgoalongwiththespeaker’s
assertionswithoutfurtherreflection(ii)inwaysthatwouldhelpthemrealizeendsthatmayormaynotbesharedbybothparties,while(iii)insistingonorpraisingthelistener’sloyaltytothespeakerorotherleaders,asopposedtoothersourcesofinformation.
Wethinkthatinthefirstcase(whichmapsontotheactualpassage),thereareindicatorsthe
canvasserandlisteneralikeareexercisingtheirbelief-formingandrevisingcapacities.The
canvasserquotesalistenertoshowuptakeofthefactthattheyactivelysharedthesameends.Their
exchangeindicatestheyalsoshareanaffectivemotivationandsenseofsharedgroup-efficacy.The
speakeralsoindicatesthatbothoftheirbeliefsaresincere,expressedbythetoneoftheexchange
aswellastheobservationthatinterlocutorsdidnothavea“jadedperspective.”Thecanvasserhasa
politicalproject,butthereisasenseofempowermentcreatingconditionsofequalitybetween
agents.Inthesecondcase,thespeakerdoesnotwantthelistenertoexercisetheirowncapacities,
eithertoformbeliefsorselectpoliticalends.Theassuranceofequalstandinghasdisappeared,and
aneffortisafoottoexcludeothersourcesofinformation.
21
Supposewefurtherlearnedthatthespeakerandlistenerwouldcontinuetosupporttheir
currentpoliticalcauses,eveniftheleadersoftheircausepromptlyswitchedsides.Orsupposethat
ifthespeakeracquireddisconfirmingevidence,theywouldupdatetheirbeliefs(oratleasttreat
thisevidenceinotherwaysasdeliberativelyrelevant).Suchactionswouldsuggestthespeaker’s
audaciousbeliefsweremaintainedthroughcapacitieswhoseexercisedidnotdependwholesaleon
someoneelse.Alternatively,supposethatthespeakerhadtheaudaciousbeliefsasdescribed,but
wasrobustlydisposedtoswitchdirectionsentirelyuponreceivingdifferingsignalsfromthe
relevantelites.Thatwouldsuggestthatwhilethespeakerhadavowedtheirown“power”,itwas
moreaproxyforanexternalpower.
Inboththeswimmerandcanvassercases,wecanconnectgaslightingtoabelief’spedigree,
aswellastoitsmaintenance.Twoswimmersmighthavethesamesetsofaudaciousbeliefs,butif
onehadthemoutofunconstraineddeferencetoacoach’sinsistence,intheabsenceofclearly
sharedends,thenthatpedigreeisprobativeevidenceofgaslighting.Twocanvassersmighttryto
inspireothersintheaudaciousagenda,butifonewouldeasilyshiftbeliefsatthewhimofaparty
elite,thenwecouldworrytheirattitudeshadbeenmaintainedthroughgaslighting.Giventhe
ambiguitiesofeitherrelationship,thelinebetweenmobilizingaudaciousbeliefsandgaslighting
willnotbeself-explanatory.
5.ADilemmaforCitizenship
Twoaspectsofouridealofactivecitizenshipstandintension.Thefirstisanidealofshared
democraticagency.Withouttheabilitytopursuelong-termprojectswithothers,wecanfeel
hopeless—withoutasenseofco-agency.Thesecondisanidealofindependence.Wewantto
maintainourownpointofviewwithinacommunityofself-reflective,reasoningagents.Butthe
22
sameevidentialpoliciesthatcan,undersomecircumstances,empowerusasgrittyparticipants
supportinginspiredleadersmay,inlessfortuitoustimes,leaveusdupedbygaslighters.6
Cancitizensfindpoliciestomaintainactivecitizenshipwithoutfallingpreytogaslighting?
Onepossibilityistomakeamplespaceforaudaciousbelief,givingthebenefitofthedoubtto
ambitiousmobilizers.Butthepedigreeofsuchbeliefs,aswellasthepoliciesformaintainingthem,
mayrevealone’sagencyhasbeencompromised.Gaslightingcanbemorallycostly.Whenyou
believeself-servingfalsehoodsaboutyourpoliticalopponents,youriskwrongingthemwithyour
beliefs(Schroeder2018;Preston-Roedder2013).Failingtoseeevidencefromtheotherside—
eventheinabilityto“code”theirassertionsasevidentiallyrelevant—putsyouinapositionto
inflicttestimonialinjusticeonthem(Fricker2007).
Alternatively,onecouldkeepone’sfocusontheevidence,notallowingoneselftobetiedtoo
closelytoanypoliticalgroup.Whilethiswouldaverttherisksassociatedwithgaslightingand
concomitantfailuresofjustice,itwouldimposecostsonmobilizingandmaintainingthesolidarity
ofgroupsofcitizens.
Thesetwostrategiesbothsimplifytoafault.Theydothisbyreducingtheconceptualspace
betweentheevidentialistcitizenandtheactivistcitizentoasingledimension.Citizensmightopt
insteadforamiddleground,division-of-laborstrategy.Somemembersofapoliticalgroupcould
serveasthoroughgoing,hard-nosedevidentialists,whileothersarevisionarybelievers.Onthis
proposal,whatweneedisnotasingle“correct”normtofollow,butavarietyofcitizenswith
differentepistemicandpracticalvirtues.WesawKing’sself-reportsabouthisepistemicconfidence,
whichincludedthedisclaimerthattheywereindeedaudacious.ButKingdidn’texpectthatthe
activists’epistemicpolicycameinonesize.Therewasroomfornon-theistsbuy-insolongasthey
continuedtobelievethat“somethingintheuniverseunfoldsforjustice”(KingandWashington
6WilliamJamesmusedthatevidentialismwasbasedonthe“preponderanthorrorof
becomingadupe.”Hecounteredthatthereare“worsethingsthanbeingdupedmayhappentoamaninthisworld”(McDermott2013,727).
23
1991,14).ThisbeliefissurelyweakerthanKing’sown“infinitehope.”It’sevenlessrosythanits
variant,thearcofthemoraluniversestandardofpatientoptimism.ForKing,theCivilRights
Movementcanholdupevenwith,orperhapsbenefitfrom,adivisionofevidentialpoliciesamong
itsmembers.
Onecosttoadivision-of-laborstrategyisthatitbacksawayfromanidealofgenuinely
shareddeliberation.Citizensreasontogether,buttheymayhavetroublefindingwaysofreaching
agreement.Iftheevidentialnormstheyfollowdiverge,thentheymaypermanentlydifferonwhat
considerationscountasreasons,andonhowtocombinethoseconsiderations.Thissolutionrisks
leavingoutthesharedperspective,describedearlier,fromwhich“decidingtogether”ispossible
(Westlund2009).
Ifamixedstrategycouldbeforgedthatensuredgenuinedeliberativecooperationwhilealso
resistinggaslighting,itmightshedlightonhowtoretainthevirtuesofcivicmobilizationwhile
avoidingtheperilsofgaslighting.Onethingtobearinmindinthisprocessisthataudacious
believerscan–andcharacteristicallydo–remainsensitivetonewcontraryevidence,evenwhen
suchevidencedoesnotreachtheirthresholdforbeliefrevision.Kingdidnotencouragemembersof
thecivilrightsmovementtoignoreevidenceofobstaclestotheirsuccess,thoughhealsodidn’t
wantthemtoloseconfidenceeither.Thereisnoinconsistencyinthismiddleground.Evidence
mightaffectanagent’sattitudesinotherways–suchasmodifyingherplansandintentions–even
ifitdoesnotchangeherbeliefs(MortonandPaul2019,196;Friedman2017).Remainingopento
newevidencealsoensuresthatwhenthethresholdforbeliefrevisionisreached,agentswillbeable
torecognizeitandrespondaccordingly.
Here,then,isanothercontrastbetweenthemobilizerandthegaslighter.Unlikeaudacious
believers,gaslightersdonotcharacteristicallywanttheirfollowerstoappreciateopposingevidence
atall.Theirmessageisnotthattheirpoliticalgroupcanovercomeobstacles,butthatthereareno
obstacles,orthattheobstacleshavealreadybeendefeated,oraremereillusionpropagatedbytheir
24
enemiestodiscouragethem.Recalltheexamplesofprominentpoliticalgaslighting.Thefirstrelied
oninsinuationtoavoidbeingheldresponsibleforone’sclaim,therebyavoidinganydemandsto
provideevidenceforit(cf.Camp2018).Inthesecondcase,gaslightingtooktheformofaboldor
transparentlie.Ifwetreattransparentliesassupplyingfauxevidenceatthefirst-orderlevel,they
canappeardownrightpuzzling.Whyattempttodeceiveinsuchabald-facedway?Butseenasa
second-orderchallenge—asanattackonourevidenceaboutourevidence,thetransparentliecan
beacorepartofthegaslighter’stoolkit.Fortheycancurryfavorwithmembersofone’spolitical
in-group,showinghowone’sdedicationtotheircausedefiesanyopposingevidence(cf.Hahl,Kim,
andSivan2018).Inthethirdcase,the“sendthemback”chanttriedtoexcludeopponentsfromthe
setofagentswithstandingtoprovideevidenceatall.
Ineachofthesecases,thegaslighterdeploystacticstorefuseoravoidevidence,ratherthan
acknowledgeitwhileremainingsteadfastinone’sbeliefs.Toavoidtherisksofgaslighting,the
audaciousbelievercanconscientiouslyattendtoevidenceopposinghergroup’ssuccess,including
evidenceprovidedbypoliticalopponents.Theerroringaslightingisnotjustthatitraisesthe
evidentialthresholdforbeliefrevision,butthatitdeniesoravoidsopposingevidencealtogether.
Thisdifference,inturn,shedslightonwhatmakestheroleofthemobilizermorally
important.Themobilizerwillfindwaystodirectfollowerstoappreciatealloftheevidencewhile
remainingconfidentintheirownviews.Forexample,giventhechancetopassivelyignorefalse
disparaginginformationaboutapoliticalopponent,themobilizerwillcorrectfollowers’
misperceptions–evenifthosemisperceptionsmighthaveaidedtheirpoliticalcause.Or,giventhe
optiontoacceptfavorableconspiracytheorieswhich,iftrue,wouldmakesuccessmorelikely,the
mobilizerwilltakestepstoeschewsuchbeliefs.Inthisway,mobilizersbegintomakespacefor
epistemiccontributionsfromepistemicauthoritiesoutsideoftheirgroup(e.g.scientificor
journalisticsources),aswellasacknowledgingvalidcontributionsfromtheirpoliticalopponents.
25
Thislastapproachtriestomarryresistancetogaslightingtogetherwithactivecitizenship
bywayofanidealofshareddeliberation.Thinkingwithothersresistsgaslightingandimproves
politicalactivity.Ofcourse,thisisthemostfamiliarofphilosophicalproposalsfordemocratic
citizenship.Italsoisonlythebeginningofapathforwardnegotiatingthetensionbetweenbeing
opentoactivecitizenshipbutwaryofpotentialgaslighters.Exactlyhowandwhentobeopento
politicalenemiesandalliesaremattersofrecentethicalandepistemiccontroversy(cf.Fantl2018;
Rini2018).Likethejokeaboutofferingdirectionsbysuggesting,“Iwouldn’tstartfromhere,”there
maybetimeswhenourpriorbeliefscreateepistemicallyadverseconditions.Itcanhappenthat
there’ssomedoxasticresponsethatyourepistemicpositionmakesappropriate,butthatthere’sno
epistemicallygooddynamicroutefromyourcurrentattitudestothatresponse.Why?Becauseyou
mayalsohave(unjustified)beliefsinUthatgetinthewayofhavingadoxasticallyjustifiedbeliefin
Q.AnditmightnotbepermissibleforyoutorefrainfrombelievingQ,either,sinceafterall
believingQiswhatyourevidencedoessupport.
Conclusion
Nofriendofdemocracy,JamesFitzjamesStephenheldthatindemocraticpolitics,“the
rulingmenwillbethewire-pullersandtheirfriends”(Stephen1967,239).It’stemptingforcitizens
toseethemselvesaseithervictimsofmanipulationoroneofitsagents.Herewe’veswitchedback
andforthfromthesetwopointsofview.Eachsuppliesuswithawayof“seeingas”acitizen:victim
oragent.7Gaslightingandmobilizingbothtargethowcitizenshandleevidenceabouttheirpolitical
world.We’vearguedthatgaslightingmanipulatescitizensinawaythatisasmorallydistinctiveas
itisdisturbing,posingathreattoouragencythatcanperverselymakeuscomplicitintheprocess.
7LudwigWittgensteinusestherabbit-duckillusiontodistinguishbetween“seeingas”and
“seeingthat.”Herewe’veattemptedtotakeseriouslytheformer,first-personalperspectiveoncitizensastheymanagetheevidencebeforethem(Wittgenstein2009,194-99).
26
Yetinsistingonexercisingourownepistemiccapacities,andfortifyingagainstgaslighting,
canthreatenourabilitytosustainmeaningfulpoliticalactionwithothers.What’satstakeisthefelt
needofcitizenship—toseeourownagencyinourhomeinstitutions.8Inordinarylife,we
experienceouragencymostdramaticallywhenwemanagetosticktocommitmentsovertime,
allowingustocompletedifficultandriskyprojects.Thatneedisnolesssignificantindemocratic
politics,whereconfidencethatwewillbejointlyefficaciousispartofthepriceofadmission.
Mobilizers,whensuccessful,managetochangethewaytheiraudiencehandlesthedamning
evidenceinfrontofthem.Theygetthemtoholdbeliefs,orevidentialpolicies,thatprotectthem
fromasenseoffutilityandhopelessness.Weareleftwithastandingchallenge:toremainopento
thebullypulpitwhilevigilantagainstthisformofepistemicbullyingthattargetscitizenship.
8ThisthemerunsthroughWaldron1999,101-118andTuck2016.
27
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