Download - Goldman sachs ipo dilemma - case study
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TO IPO OR NOT TO IPO?
GOLDMAN SACHS
Presented by Arun Jose, IIM LucknowAyush Gutgutia, IIM Lucknow
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Why has Goldman Sachs enjoyed the greatest reputation among its peers?
Question #1
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THE NUMBERS…. speak for themselves
#1M&A Advisory
#2Debt & Equity Underwriting
#1IPO
Underwriting
#1Debt & Equity Underwriting
But how did they achieve this?But how did they achieve this ?
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FIRST RATE CLIENT LIST
Historical IPO’s and M&A’s
Ambassador Culture
Sidney Weinberg sat on board of 30+ companies
attending 250+ meetings per year
Worked in secret with Henry Ford II to take FMC public
Largest IPO to date
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HOLDING FIRM TO ITS VALUES
Short term profits should never be earned at the expense of long term relationships. Reckless risk taking should be replaced by cautious business development
-The Two Johns
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HOLDING FIRM TO ITS VALUES
• Avoided reckless risk taking• 1st WS Firm to institutionalize ethics• Did not represent hostile bidders• White knight strategy• Intensely trained customer-centric
workforce
…..led to Goldman being viewed as a trustworthy partner
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BUILDING QUALITY TALENT POOL
Although our activities are measured in billions of dollars, we select our people one by one. In a service business we know that without the best people we cannot be the best firm.
-Hank Paulson, Ex-CEO, Goldman Sachs
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BUILDING QUALITY TALENT POOL
• Hired the best talent• Strong focus on retention• Promoted talent from within it’s own ranks• Interesting deals low turnover• Promoted team effort (8th commandment)• Compensation linked to seniority not
performance
…..led to employees remaining loyal and working hard to climb the ladder
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Why did it take so long to decide on the IPO issue?
Question #2
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The firm does not have to follow the rest of Wall Street. The challenge is keeping our culture, our profitability and our growth. It is human nature not to tinker with a good thing
-John Weinberg, Managing Partner, Goldman Sachs
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IPO would bring many challenges
• Currently operating at a good level• Capital base growing compared to
competitors• IPO could dilute culture and work ethics• Increased regulatory scrutiny• Dissolution of partnership model• High compensations and voting rights
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Capital base growing comparably to publicly traded competitors
• Highest ROE
• 5th largest capital base
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• Base salary: $45,000• Bonus: $15,000 to $25,000Analyst• Base salary: $75,000• Signing Bonus: $25,000• End of year bonus: $40,000 - $50,000
Associate
• Salary & Bonus:$4,00,000-$7,00,000Vice
President
• Base Salary: $2,00,000• Stake in company • Returns $3 to $6 million annually
Partners
Goldman Sachs pays deeply for retention
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Did Goldman Sachs have enough capital to grow? Can it grow fast enough to retain its
position?
Question #3
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Gradually shifting philosophy
• Rubin’s philosophy of “No risk No profit” led Goldman to become involved in principal transactions risking it’s own capital in exchange for higher returns
• Revenues of $886MM(1990), $1150MM(1991) & $1460MM(1992)
• Opened offices globally – Frankfurt, Milan, Seoul, Beijing, Mexico City and Shanghai
New philosophy required larger capital expenditures
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The Disaster of 1994
• Suffered substantial losses with annual expenses rising to $3.6B(twice that of 1990)
• 30% partners(who signed in 1992) departed
• Assets fell from $115B(1993) to $95B(1994)
• Capital to assets dropped 50%
There was a rapid flight of capital in 1994
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You cannot run a multinational global business on partnership capital…a risky
business on top of a risky capital structure
-Unnamed Former Partner, Goldman Sachs
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CHANGING INDUSTRY DYNAMICS
• Industry consolidation(1995-97) Morgan Stanley – Dean Witter Travelers – Salamon Brothers UBS-Swiss Bank Corp Travelers – Citicorp
• Transition towards asset management Low fees & high volatility in traditional business Greater understanding of asset management
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HOW THE INDUSTRY LOOKED LIKECompany Debt Equity Capital
Merril Lynch 43.1 8.3 51.4
Morgan Stanley 25.8 14 39.7
Salamon Smith 19.1 8.5 17.6
Lehman Brothers 20.3 4.5 24.8
Goldman Sachs 15.7 6.1 21.8
Bear Stearns 10.9 3.9 14.8
Paine Webber 4 1.9 5.9
Donaldson Lufkin 2.3 2.3 4.5
Credit Suisse 2.6 1.2 3.7
BT Alex Brown 1.2 1.2 2.4
Goldman Sachs was losing ground on the competition
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Although Goldman Sachs was against having a larger organization for fear of
culture dilution it was in need of capital infusion so that it could stay in competition with the other players in
the market
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Could they retain their capital base?
Question #4
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Disaster year – 1994• Annual expenses - $3.6 billion (twice of 1990)• Poor risk management• Friedman’s retirement in Aug ‘94, lost $42MM in Q4
Outcomes:• Decline in partner confidence• Departure of more than 40 partners• Devastated employee morale• Weakened partnership capital
Improving Bottom Line:• Reduced operations cost by large scale lay offs• Salary structure was reformed
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• Capital-to-assets ratio halved since 1990
• Halved partners share from 80% to 40%
Sumitomo Bank and Bernice Pauahi Bishops Estate: Received 20% of annual earnings/losses as it raised
$1344MM
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Would M&A be a better route?
Question #5
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M&A opens several doors…
• Access to new market segments
• New innovation opportunities
• New revenue streams and new capabilities
• Stronger positioning at merger time, thereby maximizing ROI
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… But also closes quite a few
• Compatibility issues• Legal costs• Short term opportunity cost• Cost of takeover• Potential devaluation of equity• Intangible costs
M&A presents several bottlenecks that might not be cleared and cannot be an ideal solution
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Would increased scurrility in going public damage Goldman Sachs?
Question #6
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What could an IPO bring about?
• Uncertain about impact on culture• Large size might erode excellence• Employees might lose motivation • Might dilute prestige and uniqueness• Harder to retain employees in a public
firm• Morgan Stanley lost its charm after IPO
Partners were extremely concerned that going public might negatively affect image
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What will be impact IPO on senior partners, non partner employees Sumitomoto &
Bernice, Limited partners, shareholders, customer, competitors?
Question #7
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Stakeholder Impact
Partners Wealth increase by $50 million plus
Senior partners Potentially realization +$100 billion
Non-partner employees
50% of 1997/98 compensation in addition to a bonus for each year of service
Sumitomo & Bishops Estates
Vote their shares of common stock
Limited partners Premium over the book value of investment- 25% to 55% depending on choice of cash/stock
Customers New avenues
Competitors Competitive environment
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Would the agency problems increase or decrease after IPO? How might moral
hazard & selection (ESOPs) might arise?
Question #8
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A public currency in the hands of an expansive management team is like a bazooka in the hands of a nine year old.
-Unnamed Senior Partner, Goldman Sachs
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Increasing Agency Problems
• Only 14% equity is diluted to the public• Employees will be more concerned with
increasing transactional profits to meet earnings expectations over long-term shareholder wealth
• The loss of lucrative pay packages at partner level will lead to greater employee turnover
• Lack of accountability of capital will lead to reckless spending
….Hence Goldman incorporated ESOP’s with lock-in period to reduce agency problems
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But ESOP’s wont solve everything!
• Employees will take decisions in a bid to increase short term share prices
• More riskier decisions would be taken to improve annual profitability metrics
• Values might be compromised to attain annual targets
….Hence ESOP’s could be a source of tremendous moral hazard
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Would the contract monitoring be based on outcome or behavior based (before and
after the merger)?
Question #9
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Behavioral changes to be expected
Before Merger: Behavior Based• Monitoring mechanisms • Equity of agents at stake• Partners are principals
Post Merger: Outcome Based• Effective in curbing agent opportunism
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THANK YOU