Download - HANDOUT - Kant, Deontological Ethics

8/13/2019 HANDOUT - Kant, Deontological Ethics

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KANT

HANDOUTKant Extract from the Groundwork of the Metaphy!c ofMora"#

1. It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can betaken as good without qualification, except a good (=excellent, powerful! will. Intelligence,wit, "udgment, and any other talents of the mind we may care to name, or courage,resolution, and constancy of purpose, as qualities of temperament, are without doubt goodand desirable in many respects# but they can also be extremely bad and hurtful, when thewill is not good which has to make use of these gifts of nature. It is exactly the same withgifts of fortune. $ower, wealth, honour, even health and that complete well%being andcontentment with one&s state which goes by the name of happiness, produce boldnessand as a consequence often over%boldness as well, unless a good will is present by whichtheir influence on the mind may be corrected and ad"usted to universal ends.

'. good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes ) because of its fitnessfor attaining some proposed end* it is good through its willing alone ) that is, good initself. +onsidered in itself it is to be esteemed beyond comparison as far higher than anything it could ever bring about -ven if this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out

its intentions# if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, and only good will is left(not, admittedly, as a mere wish, but as the straining of every means so far as they are inour control!# even then it would still shine like a "ewel for its own sake

. reason/0s true function must be to produce a will which is good, not as a means to somefurther end, but in itself /it is uncond!t!ona"# 2uch a will need not on this account be thesole and complete good, but it must be the highest good and the condition of all the rest,even of all our demands for happiness the cultivation of reasonmay in many ways, atleast in this life, restrict the attainmentof happiness ) which is always conditioned# andindeed that it can even reduce happiness to less than 3ero* for reason, which recognisesas its highest practical function the establishment of a good will, in attaining this end is

capable only of its own peculiar kind of contentment

4. 5e have now to elucidate the concept of a will estimable in itself and good apart from anyfurther end. 5e will therefore take up the concept of duty which includes that of a goodwillI will here pass over all actions already recogni3ed as contrary to duty I will alsoset aside actions which in fact accord with duty, yetwhich menperform becauseimpelled to do so by some other inclination. 6or example it certainly accords with dutythat a grocer should not overcharge his inexperienced customer# and where there is much


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competition a sensible shopkeeper refrains from so doing and keeps to a fixed andgeneral price for everybody...7hus people are served honestly# but this is not nearlyenough to "ustify us in believing that the shopkeeper has acted in this way from duty orfrom principles of fair dealing# his interests required him to do sothe action was doneneither from duty nor from immediate inclination, but solely from purposes of self%interest.

8. 9n the other hand, to preserve one&s life is a duty, and besides this every one has also animmediate inclination to do so. :ut on account of this the often anxious precautions takenby the greater part of mankind /to preserve their lives for this purpose have no innerworth, and the maxim of their action is without moral content. 7hey do protect their lives inconformity with duty but not from the motive of duty. 5hen on the contrarydisappointments and hopeless misery have quite taken away the taste for life# when awretched man, strong in soullongs for death and still preserves his life without loving it,not from inclination or fear but from duty# then indeed his maxim has a moral content.

;. 7o help others where one can is a duty, and besides this there are many spirits /who findan inner pleasure in spreading happiness around them . 7o assure one&s own happiness is a duty:ut here also, all men have already ofthemselves the strongest and deepest inclinationbut when the universal inclination

towards happiness has failed to determine a man&s willwhat remainsis a law ) thelaw of furthering his happiness, not from inclination, but from duty# and in thus for the firsttime his conduct has a real moral worth.

?. It is doubtless in this sense that we should understand too the passages from 2cripture inwhich we are commanded to love our neighbour and even our enemy. 6or love out ofinclination cannot be commanded# but kindness done from duty ) although no inclinationimpels us, and even although natural and unconquerable disinclination stands in our wayit is this practical love alone which can be an ob"ect of command.

[email protected] second proposition is this* action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the

purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decidedupon

11.9ur third proposition, as an inference from the two preceding, I would express thus* Autyis the necessity to act out of reverence for the law. Bow an action done from duty has toset aside altogether the influence of inclination, and along with inclination every ob"ect ofthe will# so there is nothing left able to determine the will except ob"ectively the law andsub"ectively pure reverence for this practical law, and therefore the maxim of obeying thislaw even to the detriment of all my inclinationsll moral interest so called consists solelyin reverence for the law.

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1'.:ut what kind of law can this be(which! without regard to the results expected from it,has to determine the will2ince I have robbed the will of every inducement that mightarise for it as a consequence of obeying any particular law, nothing is left but theconformity of actions to universal law as such, and this alone must serve the will as itsprinciple. 7hat is to say, I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will thatmy maxim should become a universal law. Cere bare conformity to universal law as such

is what serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it if duty is not to be everywherean empty delusion and a chimerical concept.

1.7ake this question, for example. Day I not, when I am hard pressed, make a promise withthe intention of not keeping it Cere I readily distinguish the two senses which thequestion can have ) Is it prudent (=practically wise!, or is it right, to make a falsepromise 7he first no doubt can often be the case. I do indeed see that /because theconsequences are hard to foreseeit may be a more prudent action to proceed here on ageneral maxim and make it my habit not to give a promise except with the intention ofkeeping it.


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which is necessarily an end for every one, because it is an end in itself, it forms anob"ective principle of the will, and consequently can serve as a practical law. 7he groundof this principle is this* Eational nature exists as an end in itself. 7his is the way in which aman necessarily conceives his own existence# it is therefore so far a principle of humanactions. :ut it is also the way in which every other rational being conceives his existenceon the same rational ground which is valid also for me# hence it is at the same time an

ob"ective principle, from which, as a supreme practical ground, it must be possible toderive all laws for the will. 7he practical imperative will therefore be as follows* ct in sucha way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of anyother, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.

$ead!n% &uet!on on the extract from the Groundwork#

1. Eead paragraphs 1 and '. Cow does Fant describe the 0good will& 5hat do you takehim to mean by it

'. Eead paragraph . 5hat difference is there between reason and happiness 5hich inFant&s view should be dominant, and what might this mean practically

. $aragraphs 4 to 11 talk about duty, or the practical application of the 0good will&.

a. 5hat is the example of the shopkeeper, and what does it demonstrateb. 7hinking about para. 8, what does Fant say about those who 0preserve their lives in

conformity with duty but not out of duty&c. 5hat about helping others, discussed in paras. ; G d. 5hat is Fant&s view about 0love out of inclination&, discussed in para. ? 5hat

might be peculiar about this, to youe. In para.11., how does Fant define 0duty&, and what does moral interest consist in,

on his account

4. Cow ought you never to act, in para. 1' 5hat 0alone serves the will as its principle&

8. 5hat is the account of breaking promises that Fant gives in para. 1 and 14

;. Eead over para. 18. Cow must rational beings be treated, from a moral standpoint

. Hook at the last paragraph. 5hat is the practical imperative that arises out of the+ategorical Imperative

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Kant on one !de of A'

(nf"uence7he -nlightenment Aare to knowJ Bewton Kniversal laws $lato 7wo realms ofreality Eousseau 7he fundamental dignity of humans

Fant is a deontologist Dorality is based on DUT). Fant focuses on motivation and intention.5hat matters is that a person does their duty out of the sense that they have a GOOD *(++,techn!ca" doesn&t mean that you are well%inclined.

Fant says that we are half animal, half angel because we are influenced by both reason andinstinct % but because we have $EA-ON, and so are able to choose, we should beAUTONOMOU-(self%governing! in our morality. (Cowever, as Fant believed that becauserationality and reason are common to us all, we should reach the same conclusions aboutright and wrong.!

2o how do we know what to do Fant distinguishes between Hypothet!ca"(Ao this if you

want this to happen! and .ate%or!ca"(Ao thisJ! (mperat!/e.

ny right action must conform to three formu"at!on of the .ate%or!ca" (mperat!/e01. ct in such a way as you would be willing to make your action into a universal law. -.g.

Aon&t lie because you can&t desire that everyone lie.'. ct in a way that treats people always as an end in themselves and never only as a

means to an end. -.g Aon&t torture an innocent person to get information you need.. ct as if you were a universal lawmaker in a kingdom of ends.

-tren%th *eaknee

Lives people autonomy we are rationally

equipped to work out right and wrong forourselves.

7oo rigid. 2ometimes consequences can

change the rightnessMwrongness of an action.

$romotes equality you can&t make decisionsto "ust benefit yourself.


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Kant!an Eth!c !n more deta!"

DE1(N(T(ON O1 KANT(AN ETH(.-2 person who acts out of a sense of the goodwill, following reason, which is a priori (innate!# doing duty for duty&s sake and so acting according tothe categorical imperative.

H(-TO$(.A+ 3A.KG$OUND1. 4+ATON(. T$AD(T(ON ,'th .ENTU$) 3.E52 Fant worked within a $latonic tradition and, like

$lato, believed in two realms of human existence* (1! 7he intelligible world which Fant called theBoumenal realm, (7he inaccessible world of things in themselves# constant and unchanging! and('! 7he sensible work which Fant called the phenomenal realm. (7he world as it appears to us,changing and transient!

'. +UTHE$AN 3A.KG$OUND ,67th .E3TU$) .E52 7he Hutheran background of Fant&s parentsemphasi3ed intrinsic values such as sincerity, honesty and integrity as opposed to church doctrine(official teachings!. 7he foundation for Fant&s universal idea of duty was also a feature of thepietism of the Hutheran church and so may have influenced this feature of Fant&s categoricalirnperative.

. 8EAN98A.:UE- $OU--EAU ,6;th .ENTU$) .E52 2upposedly the only time Fant was late forhis midday walk was when he was reading Eousseau&s Social Contract, which talks of the freedomand dignity of all human beings. 7his influenced Fant&s ideas, as only by having free will andfollowing their rational selves are people truly autonomous. $eople are capable of establishingtheir own code of morality# as opposed to having morality imposed upon them by a moral lawgiver, be it Lod or the church.

4. (-AA. NE*TON ,6;th .ENTU$)52 Bewton explained the physical world as being governed byuniversal laws of nature. Fant accepted Bewton&s laws of nature as governing the sensible,empirical world (which Fant called the phenomenal realm!


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without appetites and desires to lead them astray from following reason and ob"ective moral laws.In the middle of these two is human nature, experiencing the tension of desires (the animal self!versus the voice of reason (their Lod%like self!. Cuman beings may only be moral when they freelydecide to follow their rational selves.

>. THE 4HENOMENA+ $EA+M AND THE NOUMENA+ $EA+MFant worked within a $latonic tradition, and, like $lato, believed in two realms of human existence.7he intelligible world is the inaccessible world of things in themselves, constant and unchanging )such a world Fant called the noumenal realm. 5hereas the sensible world is the world as itappears to us, changing and transient, this Fant called thephenomenal realm. Fant&s view ofhuman nature (sharing the 0animal self& of desires M appetites and an 0angelic self& of reason!means that humans have access to both the noumenal (through reason alone! and phenomenal(sensual! realms. Fant argued that "ust as Bewton&s laws of science explained how thephenomenal world is governed by universal laws of nature, so the moral law, based on reason, apriori, is also universal and absolute, though it operates within the noumenal realm.

?. AUTONOM)


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are universal and absolute. 7he categorical imperative adopts a deontological approach to ethics*duty for duty&s sake. In contrast the hypothetical imperative is a conditional command, willed as ameans to an end* Ao 0x& if you wish to achieve y. Cypothetical imperatives are concerned withinstrumental goods, influenced by desires and inclination# their commands are relative to thesituation. Cypothetical imperatives are consequential# where the Nend "ustifies the means.O Fantidentifies three main categorical imperatives*

12. A.T ON+) ON THAT MA?(M TH$OUGH *H(.H )OU .AN AT THE -AME T(ME *(++ THAT(T -HOU+D 3E.OME A UN(


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1. THE .ATEGO$(.A+ (M4E$AT(. THE .ATEGO$(.A+ (M4E$AT(


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'. $EA-ON (- .O+D AND (M4E$-ONA+Auty, without guidance from human benevolence and sympathy, can lead to rigid moral fanaticisme.g. during the trial of dolf -ichmann, +hief dministrator of the Colocaust, Perusalem 1?;1*N-ichmann suddenly declared with great emphasis that he had 0lived his whole life according toFant&s moral precepts, and especially according to a Fantian definition of duty... I meant by myremark about Fant that the principle of my will must always be such that it can become theprinciple of general laws.&O -ichmann also cited, in support of his Fantian attitude to his duty, the

fact that out of the millions of cases that passed through his hands, he allowed sympathy to swayhim from his path of duty on only two occasions. 7he implication clearly is that on other occasionshe felt sympathy for the Pews he was sending to the gas chambers, but because he believed oneshould do one&s duty unaffected by sympathy, he steadfastly stuck to his duty, instead of beingtempted to bend the rules and help the Pews.& (quoted in ,o! Are We $o -i%e?&by$eter2inger! 9ther approaches such as ristotle&s virtue ethics recognise the importance of practicalreason (phronesis! but are also very much aware of the need to complement reason withappropriate emotions and a balanced appetite* N5e may even go so far as to state that the manwho does not en"oy performing noble actions is not a good man at all. Bobody would call a man

"ust who does not en"oy acting "ustly, nor generous who does not en"oy generous actionsO('icomachean .thics)

24. A .ONT$AD(.T(ON2 (-


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'. (- DUT) $EA++) A UN(


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-tren%th and weakne of Kant!an Deonto"o%!ca" Eth!c "aCe" each@ pro/!de a hortexamp"e@ %!/e Kant# repone ,!f appropr!ate5

1. chieving good ends by despicable means is ruled out.

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-tarter2 Kant# Cack%round0 *ho or whatB

1. a cultural movement of intellectuals beginning in the late 1th and 1>thcentury -urope emphasi3ing reason and individualism rather than tradition. Itchallenged superstition, intolerance, and ideas grounded in tradition and

faith, and promoted the scientific method, skepticism, and intellectualinterchange.

'. Lerman theologian and leader of a reform movement in 1;th century+hristianity. 7aught that salvation is not earned as a consequence of gooddeeds but is a free gift of LodQs grace through faith in Pesus +hrist. $iety andobedience matter. 7aught that the :ible is the only source of divinelyrevealed knowledge from Lod (not the $ope, tradition!. 7ranslated :ible intothe vernacular. Fant&s parents were followers.

. 2wissM6rench political philosopher. Influenced 6rench Eevolution, politics,education, sociology. 6ocused on sub"ectivity and introspection and thedevelopment of the individual.

4. 2cottish thinker interested in philosophical empiricism and skepticism.5orked on creating a naturalistic Rscience of manR that examined thepsychological basis of human nature. +oncluded that desire rather thanreason governed human behaviour* REeason is, and ought only to be theslave of the passionsR and we are governed by custom instead. Eeading him

woke Fant from his Rdogmatic slumbersR.

8. an -nglish physicist and mathematician. Fey figure in the scientific revolution.6ormulated laws of motion and universal gravitation that dominated scientistsQview of the physical universe for the next three centuries. Aemonstrated thatthe motion of ob"ects on the -arth and that of celestial bodies could bedescribed by the same principles and so removed the last doubts about thevalidity of the heliocentric model of the cosmos.

;. Influential classical philosopher who pri3ed rationality above all things and

thought that a supra%sensible world formed or was the origin of the physicalone. 7hought that this noumenal world could be known via reason.

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