HAZOP STUDY REPORT,
REMEDIATION OF THE FORMER
ORICA VILLAWOOD SITE
Prepared by: Dean Shewring
17 April 2013
Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited ABN 83 098 666 703
PO Box 5024 Elanora Heights
NSW Australia 2101 Telephone: (02) 9913 7284 Facsimile: (02) 9913 7930
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Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013
Disclaimer
This report was prepared by Pinnacle Risk Management Pty Limited (Pinnacle Risk Management) as an account of work for Orica. The material in it reflects Pinnacle Risk Management’s best judgement in the light of the information available to it at the time of preparation. However, as Pinnacle Risk Management cannot control the conditions under which this report may be used, Pinnacle Risk Management will not be responsible for damages of any nature resulting from use of or reliance upon this report. Pinnacle Risk Management’s responsibility for advice given is subject to the terms of engagement with Orica.
HAZOP Study Report, Remediation of the Former
Orica Villawood Site
Rev Date Description Reviewed By
A 27/6/12 Draft for Comment Orica
B 12/8/12 Orica Comments Included Orica
C 13/8/12 Final Issue -
D 16/4/13 Supplementary and Water Treatment Plant HAZOPs Added
Orica
E 17/4/13 Final Issue -
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CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................ I
GLOSSARY ............................................................................................................ II
1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1
2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND HAZOP SCOPE .................................................. 2
3 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................. 2
3.1 General ............................................................................................. 2
3.2 Meeting Procedures ........................................................................ 3
4 STUDY TEAM ................................................................................................. 4
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS ..................................................................... 5
5.1 Analysis of Main Findings .............................................................. 5
5.2 Actions Arising from the HAZOP ................................................... 6
6 REFERENCES ................................................................................................ 7
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1 – HAZOP Team .................................................................................... 4
LIST OF APPENDICES
Appendix 1 - Approval of HAZOP Chair.
Appendix 2 - Process Description
Appendix 3 - HAZOP Drawings
Appendix 4 - HAZOP Guide Words.
Appendix 5 - HAZOP Minutes.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Orica is proposing to install and operate a soil processing facility at the former Orica Villawood site. The Site contains waste byproducts of industrial activities which ceased in 2000, in particular DDT and its degradation products DDD and DDE. The contaminants will be separated from the soil and destroyed within the process.
The Minister for Planning granted development consent for the Project in May, 2012. Project Development Consent Condition 21(b) requires the preparation of a Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) Study.
Orica requested that Dean Shewring from Pinnacle Risk Management chair the HAZOP study. This report details the results of the HAZOP study in accordance with the requirements of the Department of Planning and Infrastructure’s HAZOP Guidelines.
The main participants had appropriate experience in the design and operation of soil processing (or similar) plants. Therefore, the hazards were generally well known as well as the required control measures to reduce risk to acceptable levels.
The plant design is an established design with a number of similar plants being operated throughout the world. Therefore, many of the significant potential hazardous events and operability problems were already known which reduced the demand on this study. This included incidents from recently commissioned plants for Orica and other companies.
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GLOSSARY
DoPI Department of Planning and Infrastructure
DTD Directly-heated Thermal Desorption
ECS Emission Control System
FSB Feed Soil Building
HAZOP Hazard and Operability Study
HIPAP Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper
PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis
P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
STA Soil Treatment Area
VOC Volatile Organic Compound
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REPORT
1 INTRODUCTION
Orica is proposing to install and operate a soil processing facility at the former Orica Villawood site. The Site contains waste byproducts of industrial activities which ceased in 2000, in particular DDT and its degradation products DDD and DDE. The contaminants will be separated from the soil and destroyed within the process.
The Minister for Planning granted development consent for the project in May, 2012.
Development Consent Condition 21(b) specifies the following requirements for the HAZOP study.
"Prior to Site Establishment, the Proponent shall obtain the Director-General’s approval of the following study:
b) a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) chaired by an independent, qualified person or team. The independent person or team shall be approved by the Director-General. The Study shall be carried out in accordance with the Department's publication Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper (HIPAP) No. 8 - HAZOP Guidelines (Ref 1) and shall include consideration of measures to prevent any accidental spills of liquids and/ or liquid wastes on all relevant tanks and equipment used for the storage and handling of liquids or liquid wastes, including associated pipes and hoses.
Orica requested that Dean Shewring from Pinnacle Risk Management chair the required HAZOP study. The approval received from the Department of Planning and Infrastructure (DoPI) for the chair of this project’s HAZOP study is shown in Appendix 1.
This report details the results of the HAZOP study and is written to meet the requirements of the Department of Planning and Infrastructure’s HIPAP Number 8 and Development Consent Condition 21(b).
The HAZOP study on the main contaminant destruction process was detailed in revisions A to C of this report. Following this study, two additional HAZOPs were performed. The first additional study reviewed the air compressor for the evaporative cooler and the pugmill water system. The second additional study reviewed the waste water treatment plant. The results of these two additional studies have been added to revision D of this report.
The aim of the HAZOP study is to identify potential hazardous events and significant operability problems associated with the proposed operations. This
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aim is inherent for all HAZOP studies. The scope for this study is detailed in Section 2 of this report.
2 PROCESS DESCRIPTION AND HAZOP SCOPE
A copy of the detailed process description for the soil treatment plant is supplied in Appendix 2.
In summary, the feed soil is initially heated in a dryer to remove the volatile contaminants which are then destroyed in a directly-heated thermal desorption unit. The resultant product gases are then absorbed within a scrubber. Treated soil can then be returned to the site.
In the waste water treatment plant, water from various site containments is processed via settlers, flocculation (including chemical additional and pH adjustment) and a series of filters to remove the contaminants. The purified water is discharged to sewer.
Copies of the drawings used in the study which detail the process areas are supplied in Appendix 3.
As the natural gas supply train to the directly-heated desorption unit will be compliant to the relevant Australian Standard then the HAZOP just considered deviations from the design intent associated with natural gas supply (rather than try to alter an Australian Standard compliant system).
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 GENERAL
A HAZOP study is a hazard study which concentrates on how the design will cope with abnormal conditions, rather than on how it will perform under normal conditions. The study is comprised of a review of each unit operation, examining each for possible causes of a wide range of process abnormalities and their consequences.
HAZOP provides the opportunity for people to think creatively and examine ways in which hazards or operating problems might arise. To reduce the chance of missing something, a HAZOP is carried out in a systematic manner, using guide words to consider each pipeline and each type of hazard in turn. The study is carried out by a team so that input from all areas of functional expertise can be provided.
The results of a HAZOP depend heavily upon the experience and attitudes of the team members and on the leadership style adopted. In this study, the members of the team had good experience, knowledge and skills and had the authority to approve the actions decided upon.
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3.2 MEETING PROCEDURES
The HAZOP study of each section of plant followed the procedure given below:
The process design engineer outlined the broad purpose of the section of design under study and displayed on the relevant P&ID’s on the wall. This outline included design features, operating conditions, description of fittings and details of equipment.
Any general questions about the scope and intent of the design were answered.
The first section or area of the design was highlighted for study, typically an area where material flows into the plant.
Any general questions about this area were then answered. Minutes may be generated during this discussion. If so, they have been recorded with the guide word ”General Discussion”.
The detailed "line by line" study commenced at this point. The HAZOP leader led the group through the HAZOP guide words. Each guide word is a prompt, such as "MORE OF OR HIGH FLOW", which identifies a deviation from normal operating conditions that may lead to a hazardous event or significant operability problem. This is used to prompt discussion of the possible causes and effects of flow at an undesirably high rate. If, in the opinion of the team, the safeguards for the combination of the consequences and likelihood of a credible event are inadequate then an action is recorded in the minutes.
For major risk areas the need for action is assessed quantitatively (by Hazard or Reliability Analysis). For less significant risks the need for action can be based on experience and judgement. For this study, all actions could be appropriately addressed by the nominated HAZOP team members / company.
The main aim of the meeting was to find problems needing solution, rather than the actual solution. When the group became tied down by trying to resolve a problem, the issue was minuted as requiring further review outside the meeting, and the study proceeded.
All changes agreed at the meeting were minuted with some being marked on the HAZOP master P&ID’s.
Note that all actions were recorded in the minutes as well as significant discussion points which did not result in any actions. The latter were recorded as a means to record the basis of safety for a potential hazardous event or operability problem.
The guide words used during the study are listed in Appendix 4.
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All actions are listed in the HAZOP minutes, contained in Appendix 5. It is noted that safeguards are only recorded by exception. It is assumed that the procedures within the Orica safety management system will be used effectively (as discussed throughout the HAZOP study).
As the purpose of a HAZOP study is to identify, i.e. not necessarily solve, potential hazardous events and significant operability problems associated with the process under review, some of the actions require further review post the study. As a general rule, a HAZOP facilitator allows approximately 5 to 10 minutes to resolve any issues identified during the study. If a solution cannot be agreed to within this timeframe then the issue is minuted and the study proceeds.
The reason for this approach is that a positive, open, questioning mindset is required from the team members. This allows creative brainstorming to identify possible abnormal plant conditions that may lead to potential hazardous events and/or significant operability problems. Teams that become tied down trying to resolve all issues, in particular problems that require further calculations etc, lose their creativity and hence the basis for the study effectiveness is lost.
4 STUDY TEAM
The HAZOP study for the project was conducted in a number of sessions from January to November, 2012.
The main HAZOP team participants had the appropriate level of experience in design and/or operation of soil processing plants (or similar processes). Table 1 shows the team members who participated in the HAZOP study.
The meetings were led by Dean Shewring with the minutes being recorded by Peter O’Dea.
Table 1 – HAZOP Team
HAZOP Role Name Company
HAZOP Chair Dean Shewring Pinnacle Risk Management
HAZOP Secretary Peter O’Dea Orica
Project Management Peter O’Dea Lindsay Killin Cameron McLean Richard Giles
Orica EnviroPacific EnviroPacific EnviroPacific
Site Management Representative
Gwenda Lister Orica
Process Design and Plant Operation Representatives
Brett Garton Bala Kathiravelu Rudy Maes Keith Chapman Tai Truong Pearce Anderson
EnviroPacific Orica Consultant to Chapman Services Chapman Services EnviroPacific EnviroPacific
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1 ANALYSIS OF MAIN FINDINGS
The HAZOP team assembled for the study was well balanced in terms of disciplines and experience. The team sizes were generally kept to the required four to eight people. This increases the ability to achieve a creative brainstorming workshop to help ensure maximum effectiveness and quality.
The main participants had appropriate experience in the design and operation of soil processing (or similar) plants. Therefore, the hazards were generally well known as well as the required control measures to reduce risk to acceptable levels.
The plant design is an established design with a number of similar plants being operated throughout the world. Therefore, many of the significant potential hazardous events and operability problems were already known which reduced the demand on this study. This included incidents from recently commissioned plants for Orica and other companies.
Potential hazardous events concerning releases of harmful materials via gaseous, liquid or solid losses of containment were reviewed during the study. Assuming the proposed safeguards remain effective then the risk of such events should be low.
Any significant changes to the HAZOP design should be separately assessed for new potential hazardous events and operability problems. This is commonly achieved by utilising a management of change programme within the project and may require further review using the HAZOP technique.
During the study, industry standard operating procedures were discussed and included as potential causes for hazardous events and significant operability problems. Any significant issues identified have been recorded in the HAZOP minutes for inclusion in the final version of the standard operating procedures for the Orica facility.
HAZOP studies are, by definition, a qualitative risk assessment. The decisions made by the HAZOP team members are based on their experience and knowledge of the type of processing plant under review. If the HAZOP team members determined the existing control measures were adequate then no further action is required. Significant points of discussion (generally if significant consequential impacts are possible) were recorded even though the control measures were deemed acceptable by the HAZOP team. All issues requiring a response were included in the HAZOP minutes.
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5.2 ACTIONS ARISING FROM THE HAZOP
Completed HAZOP actions need to be tracked within the project’s HAZOP action register or equivalent. Regular project meetings should include a review of the progress of closing-out all of the actions. It is normally the responsibility of the project manager to ensure that all of the HAZOP actions are completed. The HAZOP drawings and a record of the completed actions should be retained with the plant files.
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Appendix 1
Approval of HAZOP Chair
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Appendix 1 – Approval of HAZOP Chair.
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Appendix 2
Process Description
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Appendix 2 – Process Description.
1. Pre-Treatment of Materials
The pre-treatment of excavated materials will be undertaken in two stages. Initially, excavated
material and overlying material may be screened within the Remediation Area compound.
Material required to be treated (in the Directly-heated Thermal Desorption (DTD) Plant) will be
transported to the Feed Soil Building (FSB), where further handling and testing of this material
will take place.
The material will be stockpiled in the FSB using a front end loader before undergoing further
screening and testing for contaminant levels and other characteristics which will be required for
the DTD treatment process. The material will then be blended to achieve a relatively
homogenous feed material prior to being loaded into the feed hopper of the DTD Plant.
Activities within the FSB, including screening and testing will take place 24 hours per day, seven
days per week.
2. Feed Soil Building and Emission Control System
The purpose of the FSB is to control emissions during pre-treatment activities and ensure these
emissions are vented to atmosphere through an Emission Control System (ECS).
The FSB will be constructed of a steel frame with metal sheeting. The building will contain an
approximate seven day working inventory of feed soil plus a sufficient buffer for soil drying and
other pre-treatment activities. This inventory volume is designed to provide adequate storage
capacity to feed the thermal treatment plant during periods when unforeseen conditions
interfere with normal excavation activities.
The FSB will be fitted with an air-lock and automated wheel wash, louvres and an ECS for air
quality control.
The FSB will be equipped with personnel entrances and truck entrances. The truck entrances
will include an air-lock consisting of a small structure internal to the enclosure. The air-lock will
be equipped with two doors. When a truck enters the air-lock, the outer door will open while the
inside door is closed. Once the truck enters the air-lock, the outer door will close, the inner door
will open and the truck will enter the enclosure. The procedure will be reversed when a truck
exits the enclosure.
An ECS will be constructed and operated to preserve air quality within the building and minimise
emissions (dust and organic vapours) to the atmosphere. The ECS will be operated to ensure
the flow of air into the FSB (i.e. air pressure within the FSB will be slightly lower than ambient air
pressure). Conceptually, the ECS will comprise an induced draft fan, duct work system,
particulate control device (dust filters) and a stack.
The air exhausted from the FSB will first pass through a particulate control device to remove
fugitive dust. Dust removed will be collected in enclosed drums or hoppers. When the dust
collection container is taken off-line, the dust will be taken to the Soil Treatment Area (STA) for
treatment.
Air will be exhausted to the atmosphere via a stack. Periodic stack testing will be undertaken in
accordance with license requirements. Permanent analysers will also be installed on the stack to
detect any unacceptable contaminant concentration levels.
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3. Directly-heated Thermal Desorption Plant
The DTD Plant will be located within the STA. After pre-treatment in the FSB, the excavated
materials will be fed into the feed hopper located inside the FSB. The materials will be
transported via a conveyor to the DTD Plant for treatment.
The DTD Plant will operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week with the seventh day typically
scheduled as downtime for maintenance. The nominal maximum rate of treatment through the
DTD Plant is 15 tonnes per hour.
The DTD Plant will have a footprint of approximately 50 m by 25 m. It will be established within
a concrete paved and bunded area having its own internal surface water drainage control
measures. Electrical power to the DTD Plant will be provided by mains power, with a diesel
powered generator used as a back-up. Natural gas sourced from the mains supply, will be used
to fire the heating burners of the plant.
Brief descriptions of typical key unit operations in the process are presented below.
Rotary Dryer
The first step in the DTD treatment process involves the volatilisation or separation of
contaminants from the material in the rotary dryer.
The rotary dryer utilises natural gas as fuel to heat the contaminated material to a temperature
of approximately 350ºC to 450ºC.
In a co-current system, the contaminated material enters the rotary dryer at the end where the
burner is located and the combustion gas and treated soil move in the same direction to where
they exit at the opposite end of the dryer.
Contaminants desorb and volatilise as they pass through the dryer. Soil is heated in the first
third of the dryer with most desorption and volatilisation occurring in the next third as
contaminants reach their boiling points.
Once it has passed through the rotary dryer, the heated soil material passes to a pugmill where
it is sprayed with water for cooling and rewetting. The treated material is then transferred to
temporary treated soil stockpiles awaiting validation.
Cyclone
The off-gases flow from the rotary dryer through a cyclone, where large dust particles are
removed, to the thermal oxidiser. The dust from the cyclone is directed to the pugmill where it is
mixed with the treated soil for rewetting and validation.
Thermal Oxidiser
The thermal oxidiser is used to treat the gases produced through the heating of the soil material
in the rotary dryer and would be designed to be Stockholm compliant, i.e. with appropriate
residence time, temperature and turbulence.
The thermal oxidiser operates at a temperature of about 1,000ºC using natural gas. At this
temperature, the contaminants present in the gas (from the feed material) oxidise or decompose
forming carbon dioxide, water vapour and hydrogen chloride with small amounts of other by-
products such as chlorine and sulphur compounds.
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In order to maintain the correct temperature to maximise destruction efficiency and minimise the
formation of by-products, the thermal oxidiser will be fitted with a sophisticated temperature
control system which will be consistently monitored.
Quench
Once gases have passed through the thermal oxidiser they must be rapidly cooled to minimise
the potential for dioxin formation and allow further treatment before release to the atmosphere
(as required by the Stockholm Convention).
To achieve this, the hot gases are drawn into the quench by an induced draught fan. In the
quench, water is injected to rapidly cool the gases to a temperature which is suitable for further
treatment.
Baghouse
The cooled gas from the quench is combined with steam from the pugmill and drawn into the
baghouse by an induced draught fan. The baghouse contains a series of fabric filters which
remove particulates.
Acid Gas Scrubber
The final step in the treatment process involves the removal of acid gases from the exhaust gas.
The acid gas scrubber consists of a packed tower with a re-circulating caustic solution that
reacts with any hydrogen chloride and chlorine in the exhaust gas to form a salt solution.
Following this, the ‘clean’ treated gas is vented to the atmosphere via the scrubber stack which
is some 30 m in height.
Treated Soil
Treated soil will be stockpiled adjacent to the STA with drains and bunds provided to manage
runoff. Treated materials stored in this area will undergo validation testing and reclassification.
This is to determine whether the process has been effective and whether or not the materials
are ready for reuse at the Site. Stockpiles will be stabilised with spray grass or other such
treatment and will be wetted when necessary to control dust.
The treated, stockpiled soil will be retained until completion of remediation works at the Site
when it will be transported (by truck) to the Remediation Areas for reinstatement works.
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Appendix 3
HAZOP Drawings
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Appendix 3 – HAZOP Drawings.
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Appendix 4
HAZOP Guide Words
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Appendix 4 – HAZOP Guide Words.
Note that the main headings are shown only. Some main headings included various sub-prompts as well.
Line-By-Line Guide Words – Continuous Fluid Systems
High Level / High Flow
Low Level / Low Flow
Zero Flow / Empty
Reverse Flow
High Pressure
- Venting, relief
Low Pressure
- Venting, relief
High Temperature
Low Temperature
Impurities
- Gaseous, liquid, solid
Change in Concentration or Composition / Two Phase Flow / Reactions
Testing
- Equipment / product
Plant Items
- Operable / maintainable
Electrical
Instruments
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Overview Guide Words
Toxicity
Commissioning
Startup
Shutdown (isolation, purging)
Breakdown (including services failure)
Effluent
Fire and Explosion
Noise / Vibration
Materials of Construction
Quality and Consistency
Output - Reliability and Bottlenecks
Efficiency – Losses
Simplicity
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Appendix 5
HAZOP Minutes
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Appendix 5 – HAZOP Minutes.
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
1. General Discussion
Bricks, rubble and oversized material, clay etc
Feed interrupted due to blockages or equipment damage
No need for hopper screen or clay breaker as pre-screening. will be done in the feed soil building
No further action required - -
2. General Discussion
Chemical (i.e. from the contaminated soil) attack on conveyor belts
Belt failure, maintenance
Will use chemical resistant belts
No further action required - -
3. General Discussion
Rain Increased moisture impacts process
Conveyor covers to be installed
No further action required - -
4. High Flow / High Level
Front end loader (FEL) overfills hopper
Spill to the bunded building floor
DTD operator in contact with FEL operator, any spilt soil can be swept up and reprocessed
Review the need for providing a mirror or screen in the FEL cabin so the FEL driver can see the level in the feed hopper
LK
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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
5. Low Flow / Low Level
Soil clumps in hopper
Potential to fall onto the belt below (damage) and possibly cause blockages
Steep sided hopper minimises the risk of material hold-up on the hopper walls. Can adjust the gap below the hopper during commissioning
No further action required - -
6. Zero Flow / Empty
Hopper empty Only financial – keep burning gas etc
Process controls come into effect to trip downstream fired appliances
No further action required - -
7. Zero Flow / Empty
Feeder fails Hopper full of material. Confined space entry to unblock
Routine checks on belt feeder during shutdowns, confined space risk assessment
Preventive maintenance procedures to emphasise belt feed conveyor checks
BG
8. Zero Flow / Empty
Feeder fails (as above)
Hopper full of material. Confined space entry to unblock
Routine checks on belt feeder during shutdowns, confined space risk assessment
Review the need for hatches etc in the feed bin walls for ease of clearing material provided they also do not hold up material
LK
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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
9. Zero Flow / Empty
Spillage from conveyors
Clean-up. Damage to adjacent equipment
Scrapers prevent return below belt. Canopy over conveyors
Provide a cover around the slinger conveyor to prevent any spilt soil damaging adjacent gas burner and other equipment
10. Zero Flow / Empty
Friction, e.g. from wood stuck on belt etc
Conveyor belt fire with toxic products of combustion potentially smoke logging the building
Fire hose nearby. Building vented through carbon filters
Include in the fire safety study assessment of belts fires and the risk to emergency responders from toxic products of combustion
LK
11. Zero Flow / Empty
Plant outage Potential for conveyor belt fire on restart if material dries out / solidifies
Slinger conveyor can be run backwards for material to be collected in a truck, i.e. to clear the conveyors
No further action required - -
12. Reverse Flow Belt stops on the inclined conveyor and runs back due to soil load
Spillage at bottom requiring cleaning up
Back stop provided on the conveyor
No further action required - -
13. Impurities Asbestos cement sheeting pieces in the feed
Exposure to personnel who contact the treated soil and maintain the plant
Will be removed in accordance will agreed practices by licensed contractor
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Feed Supply Bin and Conveyors LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10001 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
14. Impurities PPE disposed of via the process
Possibility of embers getting to the baghouse and causing damage to the filters
Will be collected and disposed of as special waste
No further action required - -
15. Plant Items Lack of access for maintenance and operational checks
Reduced online time Include in the project plan an operability and maintainability access review to all equipment items
16. Plant Items Feed soil building emission control system out of service
Atmosphere unsuitable for personnel
Likely to be confined space entry if the feed soil building emission control system fails
Risk assessment, including on confined space entry, required to determine suitable safeguards for people entering the feed soil building when the emission control system fails
17. Plant Items Wayward FEL operation etc
Damage to feed hopper, conveyors etc
Will provide Jersey barriers
No further action required - -
18. Electrical Magnetic field from tramp metal collector
Impact on people with pacemakers
Check impact of magnet on implanted pacemakers and any other critical electrical devices
BG
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Dryer and Cyclone LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
19. General Discussion (note the cyclones remove particles to 30 microns)
LEL exceeded in the dryer
Explosion With the soil at Villawood, the LEL cannot be exceeded. Therefore do not need pop-off damper and other such provisions
No further action required - -
20. High Flow / High Level
Knockout box blockage
Dryer full of soil requiring confined space for cleaning
Low soil temperature and position switches on the sluice gate or rotary valve will initiate action prior to significant consequential impact
No further action required - -
21. High Flow / High Level
High gas flow Overheating of materials and hence the potential for equipment damage
Plant will shut down from high temperature in the flue gases (back up thermocouples provided). Steel designed for 650 deg. C
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Dryer and Cyclone LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
22. Low Flow / Low Level
Low solid separation in cyclones from a plant turndown
Baghouse overloaded Cyclones designed for minimum turndown of the burner
No further action required - -
23. Zero Flow / Empty
Unplanned plant shutdown
Material sitting hot in the bottom of the dryer can deform the dryer drum
Drum must be able to turn
Make provisions to turn the drum in case of plant, including power, shutdown, e.g. manual jogging
KC
24. Reverse Flow Burner continues to run when the ID fan stops
High temperature damage to the dryer or injury to personnel if flames are emitted from the dryer
Run on of the fan when shutting down and the draft from the stack will initially prevent damage and the burner flame is contained within the dryer, i.e. no potential for impact on personnel
No further action required - -
25. High Temperature
Hot exterior of dryer and ductwork
Burns to personnel Personal protection, e.g. mesh guards or insulation, will be provided for surfaces over 60 deg. C
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Dryer and Cyclone LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
26. Plant Items Dryer flight breakage Equipment damage Routine maintenance checks and operator response to noise from within the dryer
No further action required - -
27. Electrical Lightning Instrument damage Review the need for lightning (surge) protection of the instruments
KC
28. Instruments Ensure redundant pressure transmitters on the dryer, i.e. separate transmitters for control and trip actions
KC
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Thermal Oxidiser LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10006 Rev A MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
29. General Discussion
Burner continues to run when the ID fan stops
High temperature damage to the burner or injury to personnel if flames are emitted from the burner
Run on of the fan when shutting down and the draft from the stack will initially prevent damage and the burner flame is contained within the burner, i.e. no potential for impact on personnel
No further action required - -
30. High Flow / High Level
High feed rate Thermal oxidiser (TO) residence time less than design
TO designed for > 2 seconds at maximum flow plus there is some extra time in the ducts to the baghouse
No further action required - -
31. High Flow / High Level
Buildup of slag in bottom of TO
Shutdown for cleanout Special burner / inlet gas design eliminates creation of sticky particles and agglomeration
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Thermal Oxidiser LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10006 Rev A MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
32. Low Pressure ID fan draws too much flow
Worst case – could extinguish burner
Burner management system takes control, i.e. flameout detector shuts of the natural gas flow
No further action required - -
33. High Temperature
Too much natural gas flow due to the control temperature transmitter reading too low
Equipment damage TO temperature trips plus there are also downstream temperature controls
No further action required - -
34. High Temperature
Refractory failure Shell temperature rises (would probably see glow on the outside of the shell)
Plant operators will regularly shoot measurements with an infrared gun to detect hot spots
No further action required - -
35. Low Temperature Loss of process control due to the control temperature transmitter reading too high
Fail to achieve regulatory destruction temperature
Thermocouples in series will pick up temperature discrepancies. Calibration instrument has been purchased
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Thermal Oxidiser LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10006 Rev A MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
36. Low Temperature Emergency stop Residual material in the TO cools with potential to form other compounds, e.g. dioxins, furans
Slow cooling allows plant to be purged of gases using ID fan
No further action required - -
37. Plant Items Flame impingement on shell opposite burner
Damage to vessel shell Burner entry is longer than burner flame length so direct flame impingement not expected
No further action required - -
38. Plant Items Dust in the TO Flame detector does not see the flame and hence nuisance trips
Flame sensor is self-checking and air purged. System fails safe
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Evaporative Cooler including the Air / Water Flows
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10007 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
39. General Discussion
Power failure Loss of water flow leading to high temperature and hence damage to equipment, e.g. the downstream scrubber
Inlet water valve fails open
Show the inlet water valve on the P&ID to fail open – designate as FO
KC
40. General Discussion
Rapid quenching does not occur
Dioxin formation Design is to quench to below 200 deg. C in 1 second
No further action required - -
41. High Flow / High Level
False low temperature reading at the outlet duct
Too much water flow resulting in pooling in the vessel bottom causing corrosion
Water will evaporate. Operator is constantly observing temperature to the baghouse
Review the need to install a low temperature alarm on the existing downstream thermocouple
RM
42. High Flow / High Level
Dilution air damper open when it should not be
Nothing unsafe just a change in plant pressure
Will be detected through plant pressure controls
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Evaporative Cooler including the Air / Water Flows
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10007 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
43. High Flow / High Level
ECU (emission control unit) water pump keeps running when the evaporative cooler is shutdown
Bottom of the evaporative cooler floods
Procedures dictate pumps to be manually shut down when the plant stops. Water will come out the dilution air damper and become visible
No further action required - -
44. Low Flow / Low Level
Loss of water flow High temperature and hence damage to equipment, e.g. the downstream scrubber
Dilution air damper opens. If control not regained, plant trips
Dilution air damper to be as close to the evaporative cooler outlet duct as possible for effective cooling
KC
45. Low Flow / Low Level
Low air flow, even if air pressure is maintained due to the air nozzle clogging
Large water particles created. Inefficient cooling. Control system calls for more water
Operator is constantly observing temperature to the baghouse and a low temperature alarm
No further action required - -
46. Reverse Flow Hot gases out the open dilution damper??? - no record of this happening
Burns to nearby personnel
Damper located sufficiently high to avoid damage
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Evaporative Cooler including the Air / Water Flows
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10007 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
47. Impurities Oil from the air compressor
Could send some of the stack readings high
The compressor will be oil-free or have a coalescing filter
Confirm compressor selection and hence no oil will flow to the evaporative cooler
LK
48. Change in Composition or Concentration / Two-Phase Flow / Reactions
Poor spray nozzle atomisation
Pooling in the vessel bottom causing corrosion
Nozzles can be withdrawn and tested
No further action required - -
49. Testing Bypass valves on the air or water supply left open
No serious outcome Bypasses are useful for maintenance purposes and are to be retained
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Baghouse and Dust Screws LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10004 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
50. Low Flow / Low Level
Inadequate air pulsing
Bags become blinded High differential pressure alarm
Review the air pulsing duration and frequency in the detailed design
RM
51. Zero Flow / Empty
Dust in the bottom of the baghouse plus moisture, e.g. during a shutdown
Dust goes solid and hence maintenance access is required
Procedure is to run and empty the dust screw for prolonged shutdowns
No further action required - -
52. Zero Flow / Empty
Backup of dust if a screw conveyor fails
Dust is held-up in the system
The last screw runs faster than the 2
nd last
which runs faster than dust screw at the baghouse bottom to prevent dust being held-up
No further action required - -
53. Impurities Torn bags falling onto the dust screw in the bottom of the baghouse
Dust screw blocked A grate is provided at the bottom above the baghouse dust screw
No further action required - -
54. Plant Items Bag failure Dust not collected PM10 analyser and low differential pressure alarm
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Baghouse and Dust Screws LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10004 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
55. Plant Items Moisture ingress Corrosion, e.g. of the baghouse dust screw conveyor
Appropriate materials of construction
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber (gas stream to atmosphere) including the Induced Draft Fan
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
56. General Discussion
HCl will be present at elevated temperatures
Corrosion and hence equipment damage
Appropriate materials of construction will be provided
No further action required - -
57. Low Flow / Low Level
Low plant feed rate Low stack velocity, poor dispersion
The stack top diameter will be such that the minimum velocity to ensure good dispersion will be maintained at the design plant turndown
No further action required - -
58. Impurities Baghouse failure Solids through to the scrubber
TDS (total dissolved solids) analyser provided
No further action required - -
59. Plant Items Stack top silencer corrosion
Higher risk maintenance due to work at heights
Fan is silenced. Unsure if the stack top needs to include a silencer
Check the need from the noise studies for a stack top silencer – not preferred as it will be difficult to maintain
POD
60. Plant Items Stack top silencer corrosion (as above)
Higher risk maintenance due to work at heights
Fan is silenced. Unsure if the stack top needs to include a silencer
If uncertain about the need for a stack-top silencer, make provision for bolting one on later (including allowance for the weight)
KC
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Cameron McLean, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 23/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber (gas stream to atmosphere) including the Induced Draft Fan
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
61. Plant Items Caustic leak Splashing and corrosive burns to personnel
Safety showers Provide safety showers with insulated pipes (to prevent hot water flowing during high ambient temperatures), green fluoro light above the shower, a flow sensor to alarm when a person is using a shower and procedures for lone workers
LK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber – Make-up Water Supply Feeds
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
62. General Discussion
Dust carryover from baghouse
Demister blockage and hence high scrubber differential pressure
Sprays onto demister, high differential pressure alarm across the scrubber
No further action required - -
63. General Discussion
Power failure and the recycle pumps stop
Loss of containment of acidic gases to atmosphere
Emergency power generator feeds the scrubber pumps, analysers installed on the scrubber stack
No further action required - -
64. General Discussion
Failure of the check valve to the scrubber quench
Caustic flows back to the towns water tank
The makeup water supply main block valve to the scrubber quench is normally closed and will only be opened when the scrubber recycle pumps are not operating
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber – Make-up Water Supply Feeds
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
65. General Discussion
Review need for the low flow alarm on the make-up water supply line to the quench as this will be a nuisance alarm during normal operation when there is no flow in this line (i.e. as above, this line is left isolated when the scrubber recycle pumps are running)
RM
66. General Discussion
Check with BK the reason for installing the flow meter in the make-up water supply line to the quench given the operation is manual
POD
67. General Discussion
Show on the P&ID the sump pump and its controls
KC
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber – Make-up Water Supply Feeds
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
68. High Flow / High Level
Solenoid valve to the scrubber sump fails open
Scrubber sump fills and then overflows via the emergency overflow
Sump high level alarm. pH meter will detect a drop in pH. The emergency overflow is sized for all make-up water supply flows operating together at maximum rates. Bunded area if it does overflow
Show on the P&ID the 2nd
level detector in the scrubber sump to separate the control and trip functions
KC
69. Zero Flow / Empty
Solenoid valve to the demister sprays is stuck closed
Buildup of solids on the demister resulting in high scrubber differential pressure
Scrubber DP high alarm Include in the functional description a low flow alarm that is only active when the solenoid valve to demister sprays should be open (i.e. to avoid a nuisance alarm when the solenoid is meant to be closed)
RM
70. Reverse Flow Acidic gases absorb back into the make-up water feed lines
Corrosion of the piping and piping items
Appropriate materials of construction, e.g. stainless steel or plastic
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber – Make-up Water Supply Feeds
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
71. Plant Items Control valves wrongly selected, e.g. solenoids for larger (100 to 150 mm) lines not appropriate
Loss of plant control Correct valve selection Amend the P&ID to show actual types of valves: electric or pneumatic actuation
KC
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber Recycle LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
72. General Discussion
Scrubber recycle pump failure
Plant shuts down (accepted response)
Manual changeover of pumps
No further action required - -
73. High Flow / High Level
Pump seals fail Release of 80 C liquid. Slow leak only expected from these types of pumps
Operator regular inspection and maintenance as required
No further action required - -
74. High Flow / High Level
Overdosing caustic High pH – no significant consequences identified
pH meter will alarm high pH
No further action required - -
75. Low Flow / Low Level
Underdosing caustic (e.g. from pH meter drifting, failure to top up the caustic IBC)
Lack of absorption of acidic gases and hence atmospheric emission
Routine manual sampling of the scrubber recycle liquid. pH meter including a low alarm. CEMS stack analysers, e.g. NOx and SOx will also rise and alarm for operator response
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber Recycle LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
76. Low Flow / Low Level
Nozzles fall off the reflux distributor (screw type which can unwind)
Inadequate liquid / gas contact due to channelling in the packing
Nozzles to be screwed in tight and are replaceable through the side of the scrubber column
No further action required - -
77. Low Flow / Low Level
Loss of scrubber flow Increase in temperature in the plastic packing with possible damage
Correct packing selection
Ensure the scrubber packing can withstand higher temperatures due to deviations in the recycle scrubber flow rate
78. Zero Flow / Empty
Valve left shut before the scrubber liquor analysers
Analysers do not detect changes in pH or conductivity hence the potential for poor scrubber performance
Operator observes signals not fluctuating, analysers in the stack will alarm
Include in the functional description flat-line detection on the signals from the pH and conductivity analysers
RM
79. Reverse Flow Recycle flow goes back to the caustic pumps
Overpressure, loss of containment at the caustic IBC
Pressure control valve in the common delivery line from the caustic pumps
Review need for a check valve in the common caustic pump discharge line
RM
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Scrubber Recycle LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10005 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
80. High Temperature
Hot pipelines (i.e. approximately 80 C)
Burns on contact Pipes above 60 deg. C potentially in contact with personnel to be provided with personnel protection through insulation, mesh guarding, signage, etc
No further action required - -
81. Impurities Iron oxide dust not collected in baghouse
Blockage in the scrubber
Operator checks for water discolouration
No further action required - -
82. Change in Composition or Concentration / Two-Phase Flow / Reactions
Solids buildup in system
High conductivity but this is a slow process and can be controlled manually
Manual blowdown to control conductivity is appropriate. Therefore, delete the actuated blowdown valve and upstream / downstream isolation valves
83. Testing High flow when taking samples
Splashing Valves (e.g. gate type) that can be slowly cracked open, PPE
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Liquid Feeds to Pugmill LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 & C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10003 Rev B
MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
84. General Discussion
Pump requires maintenance
The pump discharge (i.e. after the check valve) needs to be flushed for maintenance
Review the need for individual drain valves on the discharge of each pump (as per the scrubber recycle pumps) for maintenance purposes when the other pump is still operational
85. General Discussion
Power failure Loss of water to the pugmill – dust release in the area
Show the flow control valve to the pugmill as fail open on the P&ID
86. General Discussion
Hazop suspended until the liquid balance assessment is carried out on the liquid feeds to the pugmill. Preference is to use treated water instead of Towns Water for sustainability reasons. Note: the current design requires makeup water via the scrubber and hence excessive caustic usage will result. It is expected the liquid feed system design will change and then the HAZOP should be performed
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/2012
SYSTEM: Soil to and from the Pugmill (including the cyclones underflow)
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10002 & C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10003 Rev B
MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
87. Low Flow / Low Level
Rock, metal piece, etc gets into the pugmill
Baghouse drive overloads and equipment damage
High current detected shutting down the pugmill
No further action required - -
88. Zero Flow / Empty
Screw conveyor below the cyclones or rotary valve stops
High dust flow to the baghouse
Pressure measurements and/or operator will shut down the plant
No further action required - -
89. Zero Flow / Empty
Loss of water Soil too hot, potential damage to conveyor belts, burns, etc. Potential for a build-up of solids in the dryer and hence heat damage to the dryer
High temperature alarms. Camera shows high dust. Constant operator attendance. Operator shuts down pugmill if it cannot be controlled
Show on the P&IDs a trip of the dryer if the pugmill is shut down
RM
90. High Temperature
Loss of water to the pugmill
Potential for burns from the hot treated soil
Temperature alarms. Operator intervention
Ensure barriers, etc so people cannot come into contact with hot material
LK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Gwenda Lister, Keith Chapman, Rudy Maes, Lindsay Killin, Brett Garton
DATE: 27/1/12
SYSTEM: Overview LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: All Drawings MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
91. Toxicity No further issues identified with the overview guide words
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
92. General Discussion
Note only: The caustic storage vessel will be an IBC – manual changeover via hoses to a second IBC about once per week (with a portable plastic bund underneath)
No further action required - -
93. General Discussion
Note only: The pumps will be diaphragm pumps with internal pressure relief, manual changeover, located in a bund and a safety shower nearby
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
94. General Discussion
PCV 1082C to have a pressure indicator integral to the valve to allow the operators to set the pressure on the regulator and monitor its performance
LK
95. High Flow / High Level
Overdosing caustic pH exceeds limit In the scrubber recycle circuit – no significant consequences identified
pH meter and alarm (it is expected to be reliable in this service with routine maintenance)
No further action required - -
96. High Flow / High Level
Loss of containment, e.g. forklift tynes puncture the IBC, hose failure, etc
Potential to cause injury to personnel
P10 high pressure plastic piping, no joints outside the bunded area
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
97. High Flow / High Level
Pumping caustic when the plant is shut down
Scrubber sump overflow. Temperature rise due to heat of mixing
High level alarm in the scrubber sump
Determine the maximum temperature rise and whether there is a detrimental effect on the scrubber system materials of construction. Calculate the volume in the scrubber sump between the normal highest level and overflow to check that a maximum of 1 m
3 from an IBC will not result in
overflow from the scrubber overflow pipe. Review the need for a hard wired trip to stop the caustic pump if being run in manual. Also, review the need for PLC alarms to indicate that the caustic pump is left running in manual and hence the control system trips etc will not be functional
TT
98. High Flow / High Level
Stormwater falling into the bunded area
Stormwater management required
Bunded area, sump, discharge to water treatment plant
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
99. High Flow / High Level
Pipe breakage, e.g. mechanical impact
Caustic leak with the potential to harm personnel
Strong materials of construction for the proposed tubing
Ensure that the small bore caustic piping is adequately protected from mechanical impact
LK
100. Low Flow / Low Level
Empty IBC, leaks, pump not fast enough
Loss of acidic gas scrubbing
pH alarm and interlock, scrubber stack analysers and alarms
No further action required - -
101. Zero Flow / Empty
Valves shut, IBC empty, pump deadheaded
Potential to exceed the piping system design pressure for the deadhead case and hence result in a loss of containment of caustic which could harm personnel
Internal pressure relief to be included with the pump, pH meter and alarm in the scrubber recycle circuit
No further action required - -
102. Reverse Flow No credible causes identified given the safeguards
Non return valve, PCV 1082C will close when the caustic pump stops, suction and discharge valves for the pump will also act to prevent reverse flow
No further action required - -
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Caustic IBC and Pumping System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10011 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
103. Low Pressure IBC vent left closed Suck in the IBC Procedures and training for bung removal or some IBCs have vents included
No further action required - -
104. High Temperature
Heat of dilution with caustic and water
No significant consequences identified
Materials adequate for 100 deg. C
No further action required - -
105. Low Temperature Standby pump freezes on cold night
No caustic flow to the scrubber when pumps changed over
pH alarm and interlock, scrubber stack analysers and alarms
Delete the standby pump and piping and provide a spare pump in store
LK
106. Low Temperature Pump pressure relief inlet and outlet lines freeze
Loss of deadhead protection for the caustic pump and hence the potential for a loss of containment of caustic which could harm personnel
Review the need for insulation or heat tracing on the pump pressure relief inlet and outlet lines
LK
107. Plant Items IBC changeover Potential incidents associated with forklift trucks and hose disconnection and reconnection
Review the layout for forklift accessibility as well as the operability of the caustic hose connections including hose draining
LK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
108. General Discussion
Thoroughly flush the Towns Water supply pipe during commissioning to ensure all residual solids are removed (plus check quality of gas supply with respect to solids in the pipeline as well)
GL
109. General Discussion
Ensure the Towns Water pipe from the Sydney Water main is large enough to avoid the need for a booster pump, i.e. delete the booster pump and fill the Towns Water tank directly from the Sydney Water mains supply
LK
110. General Discussion
Show other consumers of Towns Water on the drawing, e.g. safety showers, ablutions, etc. These off-takes are to be from the supply pipe upstream of the Towns Water tank for supply quality reliability (e.g. no process contaminants due to reverse flow)
LK
111. High Flow / High Level
Supply pipe ruptured, e.g. by backhoe
Tank fails to fill. No water flow to the ECU, pugmill, scrubber, etc
Low pressure and flow alarms and trips on the downstream water users
Ensure the Towns Water supply line is away from the project excavation areas
LK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
112. Low Flow / Low Level
Level control valve insufficiently open
Tank fails to fill. No water flow to ECU, pugmill, scrubber, etc
Low pressure and flow alarms and trips on the downstream water users
No further action required - -
113. Reverse Flow The tank overflow is to be lower than the water inlet to ensure there the risk of reverse flow into the Towns Water supply line to the tank is as low as possible
114. Impurities Frogs, vermin, etc in tank
Blockage of the water supply pumps inlet strainers
Pump strainer maintenance and downstream pressure and flow alarms
No further action required - -
115. Plant Items Locate the LCV close to the Towns Water tank roof manhole for ease of inspection and maintenance
LK
116. Plant Items Work at heights when maintaining the tank’s level transmitter
Potential for falls and serious injuries
Permit to work system including controls for fall prevention
Use a differential pressure transmitter for tank level measurement (located at grade) in lieu of an ultrasonic transmitter on top of tank
LK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
117. Plant Items Work at heights when maintaining the tank’s LCV
Potential for falls and serious injuries
Permit to work system including controls for fall prevention
Review to option for replacing the roof mounted level control valve to one at grade (i.e. eliminate the need for a float valve at the top of the tank and hence work at heights injuries)
LK
118. Instruments Failure of the sight glass
Water leaks Maintenance and replacement of the sight glass
Review type of sight glass level indication and also the need for a sight glass for LI1074 to minimise the risk of leaks
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Pumping Systems LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
119. General Discussion
The scrubber blowdown (max 20-40 l/min) will go directly to the pugmill from the discharge side of the scrubber recycle pumps, not via the pugmill water supply pumps. As this line has not been HAZOPed, perform a formal design change assessment when the final design details are known. Therefore, pumps PUI-0907 and 0908 are duty/standby and are the same design as the other water pumpsets shown on this P&ID
TT
120. General Discussion
Review the need to replace the 6 Y-type strainers with 2 strainers in the common suction line to all pumpsets (ease of maintenance)
TT
121. General Discussion
Add an isolation valve upstream of PCV1052 (to be consistent with the other water pumping systems design)
TT
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Pumping Systems LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
122. High Flow / High Level
Running 2 pumps simultaneously
No significant consequences identified
Duty/standby selector switch. Flow controls downstream will ensure the users only take what water they need
No further action required - -
123. Low Flow / Low Level
Blocked strainers, valves gagged, pump problems
Loss of the required flow to the ECU, scrubber and pugmill (as previously HAZOPed above)
Alarms and trips at each user of the water, e.g. low pressure or flow. Critical pumps can be started manually when emergency generator started
No further action required - -
124. Zero Flow / Empty
Loss of water to the ECU
Potential for heat damage to the water spray nozzles when the plant is tripped on low water flow
Confirm that the nozzles are made from appropriate materials of construction for high temperature following a plant trip
LK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Towns Water Pumping Systems LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10009 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
125. Reverse Flow Loss of the quench water pumps to the scrubber
Potential for acidic mist to absorb into the water in the supply pipe to the scrubber and cause corrosion
As per Plant Items, review the materials of construction for all equipment throughout the plant
LK
126. Reverse Flow Pumps stops, e.g. loss of power
Water in the pipes to the ECU and scrubber flows back and hence drawing gases from these vessels, i.e. corrosion potential as above
As above, the correct materials of construction are to be confirmed
No further action required - -
127. Plant Items Acidic vapours, etc throughout the plant
Corrosion of equipment as above
Review the materials of construction for all equipment throughout the plant
LK
128. Electrical Power failure Loss of critical equipment
Emergency generator Confirm the required items connected to the emergency power supply
BK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Instrument and Compressed Air LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10010 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
129. General Discussion
Review the need for the standby air compressor, including the need for the isolation valve on the discharge of compressor AC-1002. Delete if not required
LK
130. General Discussion
Historical incidents involving oil filled compressors running too hot and hence cracking the oil
The cracked oil can leave dust deposits within the piping system and hence is an internal dust explosion hazard
Running the air compressor within the design limits, routine oil sampling and replacement
The air compressor is to be oil free LK
131. General Discussion
Review the final design details from vendor for the compressor and dryers (HAZOP assumes desiccant dryer) including inlet air strainer, check valve to avoid depressurisation of the air receiver when the compressors trip, dew point measurement, weatherproofing to avoid rain ingress to the compressor suction, signals to control room, functional logic, etc
LK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Instrument and Compressed Air LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10010 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
132. General Discussion
The maximum air pressure is to be designed for adequate operation of the ECU nozzles (possibly 10 barg plus)
LK
133. General Discussion
Update the air compressor P&ID to show all air users, e.g. the ECU
LK
134. General Discussion
Rationalise the number, location and set pressure for the pressure regulators (e.g. PCV1079A/B/C appear to be controlling the same pressure and hence there is the potential for these regulators to hunt). For the required pressure regulators, supply pressure indication for testing and monitoring purposes
LK
135. General Discussion
Make the complete system dry air (i.e. dry air is required to all users) to avoid wet air blocking the baghouse filter bags. This will remove the additional air receiver, associated equipment and controls
LK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: Instrument and Compressed Air LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-DTDU-10010 Rev B MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
136. High Flow / High Level
Regulator failure Potential for the maximum air supply pressure to be within the supply pipe to the final isolation valve at each air user
Confirm that the design is rated for full air pressure to the final isolation valves for each air user
LK
137. Zero Flow / Empty
Loss of power No air to users Low pressure alarms and trips
No further action required - -
138. High Pressure Compressor deadheaded
Potential for equipment damage and possible failure leading to missiles, i.e. harm to people and damage to equipment
Make sure the vendor package has appropriate safeguards for compressor deadhead and if a blow off valve / pressure safety valve is provided then it should not yield unacceptable noise levels (e.g. provide a silencer)
LK
139. High Temperature
Heat from 10 bar pressure requirement
Potential high temperature damage to the downstream equipment
Review the maximum compressor discharge temperature and ensure that adequate safeguards are included, e.g. ensure the compressor package has a cooler
LK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong
DATE: 26/6/12
SYSTEM: OVERVIEW LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: Caustic, Water and Air P&IDs MINUTES BY: Peter O’Dea
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
140. Commissioning Provide high point vents and low point drains for hydrotesting once the piping layout drawings are known
LK
141. Commissioning Foreign objects in the pipes during commissioning
Potential to damage equipment
Provide temporary cone strainers, remove sensitive instruments and valves, etc for line flushing during commissioning
LK
142. Commissioning Potential for dioxin formation from the plant
Impact to people and the business
Incorporate the learnings from the ATMR plant commissioning especially re dioxin prevention and control
TT
143. Commissioning Provide sufficient process sampling points between the main plant items to be able to measure gas composition and diagnose problems, e.g. levels of unwanted by-products
LK
144. Materials of Construction
Potential incompatibility of the materials of construction with the process materials
Corrosion and equipment failure with a loss of containment
Review the compatibility of the chosen materials of construction, including gaskets, with the process materials via the Hazard Study 1 chemicals compatibility of materials chart
BK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter O’Dea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Air Compressor for the Evaporative Cooler
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10010 (mark-up) MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
145. General Discussion
The tag numbers on the two air compressor, e.g. hand switches, need to be unique. Mark up the P&ID accordingly
KC
146. High Pressure Compressor high pressure protection for deadheading
The compressor is a screw compressor and hence the potential for overpressuring the discharge piping with possible failures leading to missiles
Check the vendor P&ID that high pressure protection is provided. Also, review the vendor supply details to confirm adequate controls and safeguarding is being provided, e.g. suction screen and an aftercooler and a high outlet temperature alarm
KC
147. High Temperature
Operating the oil flooded compressor (to be confirmed) at high temperatures
Potential to crack the oil and lead to a build-up on the inside of the pipes which can explode
Minute 130 (above) regarding the need for an oil free compressor is to be reconsidered. If the compressor is not oil free then provide an oil filter and confirm the operating temperature is less than 140 deg C exit the aftercooler
KC
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter O’Dea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Air Compressor for the Evaporative Cooler
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10010 (mark-up) MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
148. Low Temperature Cooling of the air in the air receiver
Condensate will form and build-up within the air receiver
Manual draining Install an automatic condensate drain on the receiver(s?) with an isolation valve and bypass valve for maintenance
KC
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter O’Dea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Pugmill Water System (pumps 0907 and 0908)
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003 Rev D
MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
149. General Discussion
Following discussion, the scrubber blowdown is to be sent to the effluent treatment system. The main issues being: 1. The potential for corrosion in the pugmill system, e.g. high chlorides levels in a hot, wet environment or from changes in pH 2. Contamination of the treated soil 3. The historical problems with solids in the scrubber blowdown causing blockages (e.g. of the spray nozzles) and settling (e.g. within tanks), and 4. That the treated water can be rerun and hence is not a potential loss from plant. Therefore, Towns Water is to be used for the pugmill water spray systems. Also, provide appropriate connections for a possible future scrubber bleed blowdown tank (if required) and allow adequate space in the plot planning
KC
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter O’Dea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Pugmill Water System (pumps 0907 and 0908)
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003 Rev D
MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
150. General Discussion
Need to balance flow to pugmill sprays
Mark up the P&ID to show individual isolation supply valves to each pugmill spray nozzle
KC
151. General Discussion
P&ID correction Show PCV1052 controlling upstream pressure as this valve is used for deadhead protection for the pumps
KC
152. General Discussion
P&ID correction The Towns Water pumps kickback lines are to be top entry into the Towns Water tank (to prevent reverse flow issues from submerged entries). Therefore delete the isolation valves at each kickback line nozzle to the Towns Water tank and the check valve in the kickback line for pumps 0907 and 0908
KC
153. General Discussion
P&ID correction FCV 1019 is to be a modulating valve and it is to fail last position on loss of air to the actuator, i.e. show a mushroom head valve and FLP on the P&ID
KC
154. General Discussion
P&ID correction Provide an isolation valve on PI 1019B (consistent with all PIs)
KC
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter O’Dea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Pugmill Water System (pumps 0907 and 0908)
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003 Rev D
MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
155. General Discussion
P&ID correction Delete the line on P&ID 1003 shown as “Cooling Water from Scrubber” to the pugmill sprays (as this was formally used for return scrubber liquid – no longer required) and also delete PT 1019C and the associated alarms on this line
KC
156. High Flow / High Level
Spray nozzle unwinding and falling off
Too much water flow to the pugmill – no significant consequences identified
Spot weld the spray nozzles onto the pipes to prevent them from falling off
KC
157. High Flow / High Level
The pugmill pump stops and water syphons forward through them to the pugmill
Too much water flow to the pugmill – no significant consequences identified
Include in the functional description the need to have FVC 1019 & SV 1019 closed when the pugmill pump stops
KC
158. High Temperature
Note that the scrubber blowdown is approximately 80 deg C
Potential for burn injuries if personnel contact hot surfaces
Provide appropriate personal protection to avoid burns for the scrubber blowdown line
LK
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PROJECT: Orica, Villawood, DTD Project TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Gwenda Lister, Lindsay Killin, Tai Truong, Peter O’Dea, Rudy Maes, Keith Chapman
DATE: 19/10/12
SYSTEM: Overview - Air Compressor to the Evaporative Cooler and the Pugmill Water System
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10009 and 10003 Rev D, C143-PF-96D-CTCU-10010 (mark-up)
MINUTES BY: Bala Kathiravelu
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
159. No further significant hazardous events or operability problems identified for these systems using the “Overview” guide words
- -
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
160. General Discussion
Delete the butterfly valve on the clarified liquid line from the settling tank as this line is free draining and hence does not need to be isolated
PA
161. General Discussion
Mark up the P&IDs to show all line sizes, e.g. the clarified water line from the settling tank
PA
162. General Discussion
Delete the additional diaphragm valve downstream of the settling tank sump gate valves. The gate valves are at ground level (i.e. accessible) and can be used for isolation for pump flushing etc instead
PA
163. High Flow / High Level
Losses of containment from the coagulant pumping system
Potential environmental consequences of overflow to the ground
System leak checked prior to operation, the coagulant IBC is bunded
Ensure the coagulant pumping system is within the IBC bunded area to contain any leaks. Apply this action to all chemical dosing systems
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
164. Zero Flow / Empty
Solids fouling of the static mixer on the inlet to the settling tank
Plant downtime for maintenance
Delete the static mixer and add the coagulant upstream in the feed line to allow sufficient line length for mixing
PA
165. Reverse Flow Confirm that design will prevent reverse flow of coagulant to the upstream sources (these upstream sources are to be shown on the P&ID)
PA
166. High Pressure Deadhead of the sludge pump
Potential to rupture the downstream piping system
Operators to keep the isolation valves open during normal operation
Replace the high pressure instrumented protection system (i.e. a potential Safety Instrumented Function to AS61511) with a suitable mechanical over-pressure device, e.g. a PRV or kick back line (Note: consider the implications of sludge fouling a PRV). Also, note that if a PRV is installed, it should be installed immediately downstream of the pump for the case where the NRV is stuck in the closed position
PA
167. Plant Items Confirm all off-takes from the sludge lines are horizontal to vertical to prevent settling and compaction of solids in the branches
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
168. Plant Items Preference is to not use PVC due to interaction between solvents and plasticiser. If used, then the preference is to use UPVC (i.e. un-plasticised PVC)
PA
169. Plant Items Operator leaves the sludge pump running for too long
Overfilling the sedimentation tanks
Procedures and training Install a timer on the sludge pump to prevent excessive amounts of water being flushed to the sedimentation tanks and also to allow adequate flushing of sludge pump and lines during pump operation
PA
170. I Plant Items Isolation of water in the aboveground piping
Potential for heating by the sun and thermal overpressure, i.e. piping system failure
Procedures and training Include in the SOPs the need to keep aboveground pipework open (i.e. not isolated) to prevent thermal overpressure from isolated liquid being heated by the sun
PA
171. P Plant Items Solids settling in the feed lines to the settling tank
Fouling of the feed lines Provide means to allow flushing of the inlet lines to the settling tank. Treated water to be used (not potable water due to the risk of reverse flow and hence contamination)
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: High Capacity Settling Tank LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883-301 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
172. Plant Items Delete the second isolation valve on discharge side of the coagulant dosing pump as it is only isolating a reducer and double isolation is not required. Apply this action to all chemical dosing systems
PA
173. Instruments Provide a diaphragm connection to all instruments on sludge lines in the plant to prevent blocking of the impulse lines from the solids
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Feed Tank System including the Untreated Water Basin
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 301 Rev A, SAS10883 – 302 Rev 0
MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
174. High Flow / High Level
Rain and the water treatment plant not available
Overfilling the untreated water basin
Procedural control monitoring water levels
Install a flashing light (to be visible from the DTDU) and/or use a SMS text warning service to alert the operators of any unacceptable process conditions when the plant is unattended
PA
175. High Flow / High Level
Draining of both sedimentation tanks to the feed tank, e.g. manual valves passing or left open
Potential to initially overflow the feed tank and then overflow the pump well bund
Operator to check level in the feed tank prior to discharge from the sedimentation tank. High level alarms and trip 2.1 to stop some feed pumps into the feed tank
Review the need to overflow the pump well bund to the adjacent bunded area given the current containment areas capacities
LK
176. Zero Flow / Empty
Operator does not perform recycle from the break tank to the feed tank during start up
Higher than normal solids through to the zeolite filters resulting in plant recovery impacts due to the need to backwash the filters
SOPs and training Review the need for automating the break tank recycle valves to lower the risk of this occurring, e.g. two actuated valves for flow path determination after the transfer pump
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Feed Tank System including the Untreated Water Basin
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 301 Rev A, SAS10883 – 302 Rev 0
MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
177. Impurities Foreign objects entering the un-treated water basin
Blockage and/or damage to the raw water feed pump
Install a screen on the inlet to the raw water feed pump. Apply this action to all sump pumps in the plant
PA
178. Instruments Plant inlet water flowrate monitoring for mass balances and performance checks
Provide means to monitor the water flow into the mixing tank, e.g. replace the flow switch with flow meter and a low flow trip
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Flocculation Tank and Chemical Dosing Systems (HAZOPed by Difference)
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 302 Rev 0 MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
179. General Discussion
Review the possibility of overflowing from the flocculation tank chamber 1 to chamber 2 to minimise risk of short circuiting in the first chamber and hence inadequate mixing (i.e. use a higher elevation overflow line)
PA
180. General Discussion
Markup the P& ID to show the drain valves on the flocculation tank chambers
PA
181. General Discussion
Show both isolation valves on the outlet of flocculation chamber 2 from the flocculation tank
PA
182. High Flow / High Level
Caustic line breakage through high pressure / damage
Potential to splash a person and cause a corrosive burn
System to be leak checked prior to use, high pressure tubing to be used
Add a flow switch alarm to the water supply to the proposed safety shower in case a lone worker requires assistance when using the safety shower
PA
183. High Flow / High Level
Loss of containment of flocculant
Slip hazard Utility station to be added to allow wash down of any spills of flocculant
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Flocculation Tank and Chemical Dosing Systems (HAZOPed by Difference)
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 302 Rev 0 MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
184. Reverse Flow Failure of the flocculant discharge non-return valve and the pump suction and discharge (check) valves
Drain the entire flocculation tank, including both chambers, to the flocculant IBC
Maintenance on the piping system and check valves
As above, preference is to overflow from the mixing tank (chamber 1) at a high point which would be ideal for the flocculant addition point to reduce the chance of this reverse flow scenario. Further review required
PA
185. High Temperature
Water supply line to the safety shower / eyewash heated by the sun
Hot water from the safety shower eyewash with the potential to render the unit inoperable
Ensure the potable water to safety shower eyewash is protected from reaching high temperature due to heating by the sun
LK
186. Low Temperature Cold winter night Potential to freeze caustic (46 to 50%), in particular, in small bore lines that have intermittent flows
Review means to ensure the caustic does not freeze in the dosing lines
SA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Flocculation Tank and Chemical Dosing Systems (HAZOPed by Difference)
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 302 Rev 0 MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
187. Plant Items Personnel or wildlife contact with caustic when splash filling into the mixing tank
Corrosive burn injuries Caustic not dosed during maintenance (the system is shut down). Plant will be shutdown during maintenance of the pH probe
Perform a risk assessment on the caustic dosing point for this scenario to check if additional safety controls are required, e.g. cowling around the caustic dosing point
SA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Lamella Settlers LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 303 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
188. General Discussion
Apply the common actions from the settling tank sludge pump as appropriate, i.e. actions 7, 8 and 10. No further significant issues identified
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Break Tank / Zeolite Feed Tank (HAZOPed by Difference) and the Filter Pumping System, i.e. Filters on-line
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 303 Rev A, SAS10883 – 304 Rev A
MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
189. General Discussion
Review the need for having two tanks in series, i.e. the break tank and the zeolite feed tank. Can the plant be operated adequately with only one tank (e.g. consider sludge fouling the filters at a higher frequency if only one tank was used). Delete one tank from the scope if two are not required
PA
190. General Discussion
Operator leaves one or more filter manual valves in the incorrect position during or after a backwash operation
Unwanted misdirected flows, e.g. backwash water to the GAC feed tank
SOPs and training acceptable given the consequential impacts
No further action required - -
191. High Pressure Zeolite filters outlet valves shut
Potential to exceed the design pressure of the filters from the filter feed pumps
PSH on filter feed pumps discharge, however, its set point is unknown
Confirm that there are adequate safeguards to protect against over-pressure of the filters as they are designed for maximum pressure of 250 kPag
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Break Tank / Zeolite Feed Tank (HAZOPed by Difference) and the Filter Pumping System, i.e. Filters on-line
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 303 Rev A, SAS10883 – 304 Rev A
MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
192. Testing Install an analysis point on the common line to the GAC feed tank to allow the operators to test the performance of the zeolite filters
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: Zeolite Filters Backwashing LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 304 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
193. General Discussion
Install an additional valve downstream of zeolite filters to isolate the filter system from the GAC feed tank for backwashing of the zeolite filters
PA
194. Low Flow / Low Level
All three filters become blinded
Inability to backwash Provide means to backwash all three filters when blinded, e.g. install an additional hose connection on common backwash inlet to all three filters for connecting a hose (must consider the maximum water supply pressure to ensure this does not exceed the filter maximum pressure) or install a filter bypass line to allow backwash with non-filtered water from the zeolite filter feed pump
PA
195. Instruments Review the need for the flow switch after the zeolite feed pumps as the PSH can be used for filter blockage and deadhead protection. Delete if not required
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed by Difference) and GAC Filters
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
196. General Discussion
Update the P&ID to show the tank liquid outlet nozzle isolation valve
PA
197. General Discussion
Operator leaves one or more GAC manual valves in the incorrect position
Unwanted misdirected flows, e.g. non-treated water to the treated water basins, or deadhead of the GAC feed pump
SOPs and training acceptable given the consequential impacts
No further action required - -
198. High Flow / High Level
Two pumps in operation
Potential to carry over activated carbon to the downstream treated water tank and beyond
The stand-by pump is to be removed from the field and used as a hot spare (i.e. two pump operation not possible). Also, include in SOPs the need to only run one pump at a time in the future to avoid fluidisation of the GAC if a second stand-by pump is installed
PA
199. High Flow / High Level
Incorrect valve alignment
Potential contaminants going into the treated water feed tank and/or dead head the GAC feed pump
Testing of the treated water prior to discharge to the sewer and the ability to rerun off-spec water through the plant
Include in the SOPs the need for supervisory checking of valve positions after a GAC unit valve change / change over
LK
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed by Difference) and GAC Filters
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
200. High Flow / High Level
GAC purifier feed pump is larger in size than the current pump
Increase pumping rate has potential to fluidise the carbon bed and hence the increase risk of carry-over of GAC
Confirm the new pump will not result in fluidisation of the GEC purifiers
SA
201. Zero Flow / Empty
GAC feed pump stops
Water in the GAC purifiers will drain down to the treated water tank and form a vacuum in the upper sections of the GAC Purifiers. Also, if the pump check valve fails, the pressure in the GACs will be close to a full vacuum when draining back to the GAC feed tank
Confirm that the GAC vessels are adequately rated for the maximum vacuum that can be generated
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed by Difference) and GAC Filters
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
202. High Pressure New pump feeding the GACs
Potential to exceed the maximum design pressure for the GAC vessels as this is a larger duty pump
Confirm that the maximum design pressure of the GAC vessels exceeds the maximum supply pressure from the new pump. If not, review the need to replace the existing PRVs with larger valves
LK
203. Impurities Extended shutdown (i.e. 4-5 weeks or more)
Potential for biological growth on the GAC and hence deactivation
Install a recirculation line from the outlet of the GACs to the GAC feed tank to allow GAC recirculation during downtime
PA
204. Impurities Fines from the initial flushing of the zeolite filters
Blinding of the activated carbon and hence deactivation (as above)
Include in the SOPs the need to rinse the zeolite filters to the sedimentation tank via the rinse valves
PA
205. Testing Determine availability of methods to get quick turnaround on GAC bed analyses, or indicator tests while awaiting lab results
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Richard Giles, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 29/11/12
SYSTEM: GAC Feed Tank System (HAZOPed by Difference) and GAC Filters
LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 305 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
206. Plant Items Confirm the mechanical integrity of the equipment available in the existing parts of the WTP including the structures (e.g. stairs and platforms) and the vessels (e.g. routine pressure vessel inspection and testing required?)
LK
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Treated Water Basin System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 306 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
207. General Discussion
As the treated water tank and pump are not required to recover off-spec material etc then these can be removed from the design. To prevent draining and hence forming a vacuum in the GACs when the GAC feed pump stops install a motorised solenoid valve on the common outlet line (close to the GACs) which is to close the when the GAC feed pump stops. Also, include position switches on this motorised valve to allow interlocking to pump operation, i.e. prevent pump operation if the motorised valve is stuck closed and raise an alarm if this valve is open when it should be closed. The valve should fail to the last position
PA
208. General Discussion
Retain means to recirculate the basins, e.g. for pH correction. Note: sampling can be achieved by manually dipping the basin
PA
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PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Treated Water Basin System LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 306 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
209. High Flow / High Level
Passing butterfly valve
Relatively small amount of off-spec material could flow to sewer but probably still on spec in relation to trade waste consent
Change the destination selection valves in pipes from the basin to ball valves. Establish a protocol in which Orica and EPS agree on discharge to the sewer to minimise the risk of off-spec discharge, e.g. supervisory checks that the valves are in the correct position prior to discharging to the sewer
PA
210. High Flow / High Level
Off-spec treated water running to two basins, e.g. basin inlet valve passing or inadvertently left open
Putting an on-spec basin off-spec and hence having to rerun a basin back through the plant prior to discharge
Visible inlets to basins to make sure the operator can check visually during inspections
Change the three basins inlet butterfly valves to ball valves for improved reliability of shut-off. These are to be lockable ball valves to allow full isolation of basins
PA
211. Low Pressure Motorised valve to treated water basins closes quickly
Potential to form a vacuum downstream of the motorised valve and suck in the poly pipe
Provide means to mitigate the vacuum that could be formed, e.g. install a vent (vent could have a non-return valve to prevent water discharge but allow air in) or a vacuum breaker
SA
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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Sedimentation Tanks LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 307 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
212. General Discussion
Review the option of using bulkabags under the sedimentation tank drains instead of the drying beds to improve ease of handling of sludge
LK
213. General Discussion
Mark up the P & ID to show the bund under the sedimentation tanks
PA
Pinnacle Risk Management
Orica Villawood HAZOP Report Rev E.Doc 17 April 2013 A5.69
PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Sedimentation Tanks LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 307 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
214. Zero Flow / Empty
Sludge caking within the sludge outlet line
Inability to drain the sedimentation tank
Lines can be rodded. Sedimentation tank to be isolated by the first outlet valve and the second outlet valve is to remain open (to prevent sludge blockages between these two valves). For improved operation, the preference is to keep one tank offline and hence have the option to use this standby tank should the first tank/lines become blocked
As an option in the SOPs put the sludge line from the high capacity settler to only one of the sedimentation tanks, i.e. minimise the risk of blocking both tanks with the higher sludge containing stream
PA
215. Zero Flow / Empty
Fouling of the sand dryer bed with the sludge
Inability to drain through the beds
Operation to be reviewed during commissioning and bulkabags considered as alternative option to beds if the beds are blocked too often
LK
Pinnacle Risk Management
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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Sedimentation Tanks LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: SAS10883 – 307 Rev A MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
216. Plant Items Personnel exposed to DDT etc contained within the sludge
Health impacts on personnel
SWMS/JSA to be performed on sludge handling, e.g. disposal via the DTDU
No further action required - -
217. Instruments Position the level switch in each sedimentation tank for ease of maintenance access and away from the sludge inlet to avoid any materials potentially seizing up the instrument
PA
Pinnacle Risk Management
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PINNACLE RISK MANAGEMENT - HAZOP RECORD SHEET
PROJECT: Orica Villawood Water Treatment Plant
TEAM MEMBERS: Bala Kathiravelu, Peter O’Dea, Pearce Anderson, Lindsay Killin
DATE: 30/11/12
SYSTEM: Overview LEADER: Dean Shewring
DRAWING: All WTP P&IDs MINUTES BY: Lindsay Killin
No. GUIDE WORDS POSSIBLE CAUSES CONSEQUENCES EXISTING
SAFEGUARDS
ACTION RECOMMENDED BY DONE
218. Commissioning Contamination of the pressure test / wash water with existing contaminants in the plant
Problems in disposing of the wash-water
Include in the commissioning plan the ability to store water used to rinse and test the plant and equipment for processing through the plant at a later date. Also, avoid using detergents / dispersants when cleaning. These can cause future issues with the settling processes
LK
219. Materials of Construction
Review the existing and proposed materials of construction to ensure that potential contaminants do not react / interfere with plant components. Analysis is also required for the potential for construction materials being impregnated by contaminants and therefore being unsuitable for reuse on future projects or difficult to dispose of
PA
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6 REFERENCES
1 Department of Planning, Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper Nº 8 - HAZOP Guidelines, NSW Government, Sydney