Download - How Parties of Corporatist-Conservative Welfare States Respond to the International Economy -
How Parties of Corporatist-How Parties of Corporatist-Conservative Welfare States Conservative Welfare States
Respond to the Respond to the International Economy -International Economy -
A Comparison of A Comparison of Austria & GermanyAustria & Germany
Andrea B. HauptAndrea B. Haupt
University of California Santa BarbaraUniversity of California Santa Barbara
Globalization and Political Globalization and Political Parties- Research Questions:Parties- Research Questions:
How does rising international economic openness influence How does rising international economic openness influence parties’ ideological positioning on economic issues? Do we parties’ ideological positioning on economic issues? Do we observe policy convergence? Divergence? Neither? A shift in observe policy convergence? Divergence? Neither? A shift in policy regime?policy regime?
Have social democratic parties embraced neoliberalism in light Have social democratic parties embraced neoliberalism in light
of systemic economic pressures? Has neoliberalism become of systemic economic pressures? Has neoliberalism become their new policy paradigm and is social democracy facing a their new policy paradigm and is social democracy facing a crisis?crisis?
Do the neoliberal pressures associated with economic openness Do the neoliberal pressures associated with economic openness allow Christian-democratic and/or mainstream conservative allow Christian-democratic and/or mainstream conservative parties to shift further to the right? parties to shift further to the right?
If parties change their ideological positioning, how does this If parties change their ideological positioning, how does this affect intra-party relations? Inter-party relations?affect intra-party relations? Inter-party relations?
If parties are in government, how does this affect their If parties are in government, how does this affect their policy moves?policy moves?
The Effect of Globalization The Effect of Globalization on the Welfare State: on the Welfare State: Conflicting PredictionsConflicting Predictions
ConvergenceConvergence globalization entails a loss of state power over markets globalization entails a loss of state power over markets
because it increase the influence of capital vis-à-vis labor, because it increase the influence of capital vis-à-vis labor, capital mobility undermines politics of intervention, of capital mobility undermines politics of intervention, of redistribution and a large public sector redistribution and a large public sector (e.g. Berger 2000; (e.g. Berger 2000; Glyn 2001; Rodrik 1997)Glyn 2001; Rodrik 1997)
vs.vs.
DivergenceDivergence Empirical evidence of welfare state expenditureEmpirical evidence of welfare state expenditure The role of institutionsThe role of institutions Popular demands for compensationPopular demands for compensation
Globalization & Political Globalization & Political PartiesPartiesConvergenceConvergence
Some believe that the pervasive influence of transnational Some believe that the pervasive influence of transnational actors and financial flows undermines parties’ ability to actors and financial flows undermines parties’ ability to satisfy local interests, which in turn undermines party’s satisfy local interests, which in turn undermines party’s legitimacy (Mair 1995)legitimacy (Mair 1995)
Partisan-decline thesis: based on the logic of convergence, Partisan-decline thesis: based on the logic of convergence, it will become inconsequential “whether the left or the it will become inconsequential “whether the left or the right wins the election, [as] the constraints of the right wins the election, [as] the constraints of the internationalized economy will oblige either party to follow internationalized economy will oblige either party to follow the same monetary and fiscal policies” (Berger 2000:51). the same monetary and fiscal policies” (Berger 2000:51).
Globalization and Social Globalization and Social DemocracyDemocracy
The future of social democracy has sparked especially wide The future of social democracy has sparked especially wide interest in the scholarly community (Callaghan 2003; interest in the scholarly community (Callaghan 2003; Garrett 1998; Glyn 2001; Kitschelt 1994; Kuhnle 2000; Garrett 1998; Glyn 2001; Kitschelt 1994; Kuhnle 2000; Ladrech 2000; Lordon 2001; Luther and Müller-Rommel Ladrech 2000; Lordon 2001; Luther and Müller-Rommel 2002; Mishra 1999; Notermans 2001; Pierson 1995, 1999; 2002; Mishra 1999; Notermans 2001; Pierson 1995, 1999; Przeworski 1985; Roder 2003; Scharpf 1999, 2001; Schmitt Przeworski 1985; Roder 2003; Scharpf 1999, 2001; Schmitt 2002; Thompson 2000 )2002; Thompson 2000 )
Electoral dilemma: social democracy Electoral dilemma: social democracy caught in a “catch-caught in a “catch-22:”22:” they must either scale down their commitments, or they must either scale down their commitments, or promise what they are unable to deliver to their electorate promise what they are unable to deliver to their electorate (Heywood et.al. 2002)(Heywood et.al. 2002)
Globalization and Globalization and Mainstream Rightwing Mainstream Rightwing PartiesParties Christian democratic parties have played an important role Christian democratic parties have played an important role
in the development of the welfare state (Kalyvas 1996). in the development of the welfare state (Kalyvas 1996). However, their role in welfare state retrenchment or their However, their role in welfare state retrenchment or their reaction to globalization has not been explored widelyreaction to globalization has not been explored widely
Few theories to explain the behavior of Christian-Few theories to explain the behavior of Christian-democratic or mainstream conservative parties to democratic or mainstream conservative parties to globalization (but see Kaiser and Gehler 2004)globalization (but see Kaiser and Gehler 2004)
Convergence argument: implies that right-wing parties are Convergence argument: implies that right-wing parties are more static on the left-right ideological spectrum? more static on the left-right ideological spectrum?
Partisan DeclinePartisan DeclineIs there evidence for convergence? Is there evidence for convergence?
Glyn (2001) finds that in the time period between 1980 and Glyn (2001) finds that in the time period between 1980 and 2000, numerous leftist governments accepted orthodox 2000, numerous leftist governments accepted orthodox policiespolicies
Ladrech finds that following support for European Ladrech finds that following support for European integration, European social democrats were faced with integration, European social democrats were faced with “the loss of a critical area of programmatic distinction and “the loss of a critical area of programmatic distinction and identity from…. right of center parties” (Ladrech 200:4).identity from…. right of center parties” (Ladrech 200:4).
Huber and Stephens (2001) confirm a decline of partisan Huber and Stephens (2001) confirm a decline of partisan political effects, while the economic agenda “is by and political effects, while the economic agenda “is by and large either a defense or retrenchment of the welfare large either a defense or retrenchment of the welfare state. Expansion is off the agenda” (2001:6)state. Expansion is off the agenda” (2001:6)
Przeworski states “the major policy innovation of social Przeworski states “the major policy innovation of social democrats was the very idea that capitalist economies can democrats was the very idea that capitalist economies can be regulated and the effects of markets can be corrected” be regulated and the effects of markets can be corrected” (Przworski, 2001, p. 327). Przeworski concludes that “[t]he (Przworski, 2001, p. 327). Przeworski concludes that “[t]he policy regimes are converging again, this time to the right” policy regimes are converging again, this time to the right” (Przeworksi 2001:325). (Przeworksi 2001:325).
Why Convergence might not Why Convergence might not be as Likely as Predictedbe as Likely as Predicted Social democratic parties have traditionally been more Social democratic parties have traditionally been more
policy-seekingpolicy-seeking than their conservative parties. Przeworski than their conservative parties. Przeworski and Sprague (1986) argue that socialist parties sought to and Sprague (1986) argue that socialist parties sought to transformtransform society and society and shape public opinionshape public opinion, which renders , which renders them them ideologically less flexibleideologically less flexible than their right-wing parties than their right-wing parties which typically defend the status quowhich typically defend the status quo
Organizational ties to unions arguably also contribute to Organizational ties to unions arguably also contribute to ideological inflexibility, as these ties uphold an association ideological inflexibility, as these ties uphold an association with the working class even when social-democratic parties with the working class even when social-democratic parties pursued cross-class electoral strategies (Adams, Haupt, pursued cross-class electoral strategies (Adams, Haupt, Stoll 2006, forthcoming). Stoll 2006, forthcoming).
public opinion public opinion has consistently supported existing national has consistently supported existing national welfare state structures and has arguably become welfare state structures and has arguably become disenchanted with neoliberalism (Przeworksi 2001). disenchanted with neoliberalism (Przeworksi 2001).
**Right-wing parties might have an incentive to shift further **Right-wing parties might have an incentive to shift further rightright
The HypothesesThe Hypotheses Based on the assumption that parties simultaneously seek Based on the assumption that parties simultaneously seek
votes, office and policies (Müller and Strom 1999) , I argue votes, office and policies (Müller and Strom 1999) , I argue that neoliberal convergence is not an inevitable outcome of that neoliberal convergence is not an inevitable outcome of economic openness (Hypothesis 1). economic openness (Hypothesis 1). First, though leftist parties are pressured to adopt “third First, though leftist parties are pressured to adopt “third
ways,” their traditional policy-seeking orientations, their quest ways,” their traditional policy-seeking orientations, their quest to shape public opinion, as well as their organizational links to to shape public opinion, as well as their organizational links to unions limit their ideological flexibility and their responses to unions limit their ideological flexibility and their responses to neoliberal pressures (Sub-Hypothesis 1a). neoliberal pressures (Sub-Hypothesis 1a).
By contrast, rightist parties are expected to benefit from By contrast, rightist parties are expected to benefit from economic openness, as market oriented policies complement economic openness, as market oriented policies complement their economic policy approach. While rightist parties face their economic policy approach. While rightist parties face incentives to move further to the right, they continue to be incentives to move further to the right, they continue to be office seekersoffice seekers and, thus, move to the right and, thus, move to the right only ifonly if this move is this move is electorally advantageous (Sub-Hypothesis 1b).electorally advantageous (Sub-Hypothesis 1b).
Building on hypothesis, I argue that the whether social Building on hypothesis, I argue that the whether social democratic parties are in government or in opposition democratic parties are in government or in opposition should influence the severity of their “electoral dilemma.” should influence the severity of their “electoral dilemma.” Thus, social democratic parties in office should be more Thus, social democratic parties in office should be more responsive to neoliberalism than social democratic parties responsive to neoliberalism than social democratic parties in opposition (Hypothesis 2). in opposition (Hypothesis 2).
MethodologyMethodology
My analysis of the parties’ economic policy evolution My analysis of the parties’ economic policy evolution is primarily based on qualitative research (e.g. interviews is primarily based on qualitative research (e.g. interviews
with policy actors) conducted during field workwith policy actors) conducted during field work the study of parties’ programs the study of parties’ programs the extant literature on Austria’s and Germany’s parties the extant literature on Austria’s and Germany’s parties data published by the Comparative Manifesto Research data published by the Comparative Manifesto Research
GroupGroup
Austria’s vs. Germany’s Social Austria’s vs. Germany’s Social DemocratsDemocrats
‘‘Alive and well’ vs. ‘divided and in a crisis’Alive and well’ vs. ‘divided and in a crisis’ both parties embraced neoliberalism – the both parties embraced neoliberalism – the
Austrian Social Democrats (SPÖ) Austrian Social Democrats (SPÖ) temporarily during the 1990s, the German temporarily during the 1990s, the German Social Democrats half-heartedly since Social Democrats half-heartedly since 19981998
both parties embraced the market while in both parties embraced the market while in governmentgovernment
Austria’s vs. Germany’s Austria’s vs. Germany’s Christian DemocratsChristian Democrats
‘‘alive and well’ vs. in a crisisalive and well’ vs. in a crisis both parties have oriented themselves both parties have oriented themselves
toward the market, the Austrian ÖVP to a toward the market, the Austrian ÖVP to a greater degree than the German CDUgreater degree than the German CDU
the Austrian ÖVP has aggressively pursued the Austrian ÖVP has aggressively pursued welfare state reform while in office since welfare state reform while in office since 20002000
Convergence, Divergence or Convergence, Divergence or Neither?Neither?
Austria: divergence/polarization and Austria: divergence/polarization and important break in consensus-oriented important break in consensus-oriented politicspolitics
Germany: no convergence, some Germany: no convergence, some polarization. both parties internally polarization. both parties internally divideddivided
Comparison of Germany & Comparison of Germany & AustriaAustria
Social DemocracySocial Democracy Christian Democracy/Christian Democracy/
ConservativeConservative
AustriaAustria 1970s:1970s:
in government,in government,
+ Keynesianism+ Keynesianism
1980-90s:1980-90s:
in government,in government,
+ market+ market
2000-2006:2000-2006:
in opposition,in opposition,
- market, + Keynesianism - market, + Keynesianism
1970s1970s: :
in opposition, in opposition,
+ Keynesianism+ Keynesianism
1980-1990s:1980-1990s:
in government,in government,
+ market+ market
2000:2000:
in government, in government,
+ market + market
GermanyGermany 1970s:1970s:
in government, in government,
+ Keynesianism then – Keynesianism+ Keynesianism then – Keynesianism
1980-98:1980-98:
in opposition: in opposition:
disorientation, Keynesianismdisorientation, Keynesianism
1998-2005:1998-2005:
in government, + marketin government, + market
1970s:1970s:
in opposition, in opposition,
social-market economy with somesocial-market economy with some
KeynesianismKeynesianism
1982-1998:1982-1998:
in government: + market (EU), in government: + market (EU),
1998-2005:1998-2005:
in opposition, in opposition,
+market+market
The ArgumentThe ArgumentBased on a study of Austria’s and Germany’s catch-all parties, I Based on a study of Austria’s and Germany’s catch-all parties, I
present three central findings: present three central findings:
1. Systemic constraints stemming from the 1. Systemic constraints stemming from the internationalization of the economy have entailed an upsurge internationalization of the economy have entailed an upsurge of market-oriented policies - however, this has NOT led to of market-oriented policies - however, this has NOT led to neoliberal policy convergence nor is there sufficient evidence neoliberal policy convergence nor is there sufficient evidence to claim that neoliberalism has become dominant policy to claim that neoliberalism has become dominant policy regime regime
2. Economic openness entailed increased policy 2. Economic openness entailed increased policy divergence, divergence, as economic openness has opened a window of opportunity as economic openness has opened a window of opportunity for conservative parties to pursue market-oriented structural for conservative parties to pursue market-oriented structural reforms, while social democratic parties remain reluctant to reforms, while social democratic parties remain reluctant to commit to ‘third ways.’ Along with divergence, a rise in both commit to ‘third ways.’ Along with divergence, a rise in both intra-party and inter-party tensions can be observed. intra-party and inter-party tensions can be observed.
3. The degree of polarization is less if social democratic 3. The degree of polarization is less if social democratic parties have been in office; lending support to arguments parties have been in office; lending support to arguments about social democratic parties’ electoral dilemmas about social democratic parties’ electoral dilemmas
Austria’s Parties on Economic Austria’s Parties on Economic PoliciesPolicies
Figure 1: Comparison of Social Democrat’s and People’s Party Shifts on Economic Policy Proposals and Reference to the European Union
Comparison of Social Democrats' and People's Party's Shifts of Economic and EU Policies
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-20.00
-10.00
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
Election Years 1949 to 2002
CM
P S
cale
-100
to 1
00
SPÖ Left-Right Shifts
ÖVP Left-Right Shifts
Austria’s Parties on Social Austria’s Parties on Social JusticeJustice Figure 2: Comparison of Austrian Social Democrat’s and People’s Party References to Social
Justice
Comparison of SPÖ's and ÖVP's Emphases of "Social Justice"
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2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
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20.00
1949
1952
1955
1958
1961
1964
1967
1970
1973
1976
1979
1982
1985
1988
1991
1994
1997
2000
Election Years 1949-2002
Salience
of
Issue
SPÖ Emphasis Social Justice
ÖVP Emphasis Social Justice
Germany’s Parties on Economic Germany’s Parties on Economic PoliciesPolicies
Figure 3: Comparison of Social Democrats’ and Christian Democrats’ Shift on Economic and EU Policy
Comparison of Social Democrats' and Christian Democrats' Shifts on Economic and EU Policies
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-30.00
-20.00
-10.00
0.00
10.00
20.00
Elections 1949-2002
CM
P S
cale
-100 t
o 1
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CDU Left-Right Shifts
SPD Left-Right Shifts
Germany’s Parties on Social Germany’s Parties on Social JusticeJustice
Comparison of CDU's and SPD's Emphases of "Social Justice"
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
9.00
10.00
Election Years 1949-2002
Salie
nce o
f Is
sue
CDU Emphasis Social Justice
SPD Emphasis Social Justice
CMP Left--Right Measure for CMP Left--Right Measure for Position on EconomyPosition on EconomyA. Rightist Position A. Rightist Position B. Leftist Position B. Leftist Position Right-Left Index Economy (A-B)Right-Left Index Economy (A-B)
per108 EU Reference positive per108 EU Reference positive Per110 EU Reference Negative Per110 EU Reference Negative
per401 Free Enterprise per401 Free Enterprise per403 Market Regulation per403 Market Regulation
per402 Incentives per402 Incentives per404 Economic Planning per404 Economic Planning
per407 Protection Negative per407 Protection Negative per 405Corporatism per 405Corporatism
per414 Econ Orthodoxy per414 Econ Orthodoxy per406 Protec Positive per406 Protec Positive
per505 Welfare Limitation per505 Welfare Limitation per409 Keynesian Demand per409 Keynesian Demand Management Management
per412Controlled Econ per412Controlled Econ
per413Nationalizationper413Nationalization
per 415 Marxist Analysis per 415 Marxist Analysis
per416 Anti Growth per416 Anti Growth
per504 Welfare State Expansion per504 Welfare State Expansion
per702 Labour Groups negative per702 Labour Groups negative per701 Labour Groups positive per701 Labour Groups positive
Sum of Column B subtracted Sum of Column B subtracted form sum of Column B = form sum of Column B = Left_Right Index for EconomyLeft_Right Index for Economy
Austria Economic OpennessAustria Economic OpennessFigure 1: Austria Economic Openness
Austria Economic Opennss
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1968-2001
% o
f G
DP Exports as % of GDP
Imports as % of GDPTrade as % of GDPCapital Flows as % of GDPFDI as % of GDP
Germany Economic Germany Economic OpennessOpenness
Germany Economic Openness
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1971-2001
% o
f G
DP Export as % of GDP
Import as % of GDPTrade as % of GDPCapital Flows as % of GDPFDI as % of GDP
ContributionContributionThe findings The findings call arguments about neoliberal call arguments about neoliberal
convergence into questionconvergence into question point to the importance of right-wing point to the importance of right-wing
parties for the globalization research parties for the globalization research agendaagenda
facilitate a better understanding of the facilitate a better understanding of the policy dynamics underlying ideological policy dynamics underlying ideological change and constancy change and constancy
Remaining QuestionsRemaining Questions
The role of institutionsThe role of institutions Under what conditions – if at all, will Under what conditions – if at all, will
we observe neoliberal convergence?we observe neoliberal convergence?