Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical
Infrastructure Communications Networks
November 2005
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 2
Copyright 2005 United Telecom Council
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical
methods, without prior written permission of the United Telecom Council.
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regulatory and technical environment in which all members and stakeholders will thrive. We do this through a variety of advocacy, compliance, technology, information, and education programs.
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The United Telecom Council represents electric and gas utilities, water companies, energy
pipelines, and other critical infrastructure companies, as well as their technology partners and other corporate telecom/IT users � all united in their commitment to ensuring the best, most reliable systems and networks critical to their core business and the customers they serve.
United Telecom Council
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Washington, DC 20006 202.872.0030
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UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.0 Executive Summary ..................................................... 2
2.0 Background .................................................................. 4
3.0 Survey Questions and Results .................................... 8
3.1 Communications Systems Performance ..................... 8
3.2 Land Mobile Radio, Backbone Survivor .................... 10
3.3 Utility Fiber Networks Benefited from Pre-planning. 12
3.4 Microwave Systems Stood up to the Storms............. 13
3.5 Utilities and Public Safety Need Better Coordination 14
4.0 Summary of Utility Communications Performance Issues from 2005 Hurricanes ..................................... 16
APPENDIX � QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES ......................... 20
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 2
1.0 Executive Summary The hurricane season of 2005 resulted in immense damage and tragic loss of life to Florida and the Gulf Coast of the United States. Storms Katrina, Rita and Wilma also pointed out the weaknesses in many of our critical infrastructures, including telecommunications networks, some of which are still recovering months later. However, in sharp contrast to many commercial wireless, landline telephone and other telecommunications networks, the private, internal networks (radio, microwave and fiber) of electric, gas and water utilities for the most part continued to function throughout and immediately after the storms. In some cases, it was utility communications networks that provided the only reliable communications among emergency responders and other officials during the first few days after the storms. The reliable performance of these internal systems was neither unexpected nor unusual; utility communications systems are constructed specifically to withstand major disasters. The United Telecom Council (UTC), the international trade association representing the telecommunications interests of critical infrastructure industries,1 has conducted informal polling of its members after such emergencies as a major Northeast ice storm in 1998; the huge electric blackout of August 2003; and the hurricanes of 2004, with similar results. However, given the magnitude of this year�s disasters and resulting national discussions concerning the survivability of communications networks, UTC felt it imperative to undertake a formal survey of Gulf Coast electric, gas and water utilities of all sizes, to generate data that would quantify our anecdotal information. Overall findings: ! 86% of impacted CII entities responding reported that their
communications networks generally survived the hurricanes and continued to operate well throughout restoration efforts;
! Private land mobile radio (LMR) networks provided critical communications
among crews; however, the huge number of responding entities from around the country taxed capacity or could not operate on local systems, pointing up the need for CII interoperability;
1 UTC�s membership consists primarily of publicly-held, municipal and cooperative electric, gas and water utilities and gas pipelines, and Federal power authorities. Through affiliated association members, UTC reaches out to other Critical Infrastructure Industries (CII) as defined by the FCC in Section 90.7 of its Rules (47 CFR § 90.7), including petroleum and oil pipeline companies and railroads.
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 3
! Utility fiber and microwave systems survived and generally continued to function; however, this was due in part to built-in redundancies, robustness and recovery mechanisms that would be cost-prohibitive for a for-profit network designed to serve the general public. Therefore, CII entities will continue to require private networks to meet mission-critical needs for the foreseeable future, along with the ability to expand them as needed to meet system growth requirements.
! Unfortunately, there was little or no formal coordination with state or local
agencies or public safety organizations during or after the storms. Given the opportunities for improved response communications offered by robust CII systems, and the presence of CII personnel �on the ground� in nearly every disaster scenario, this lack emphasizes that CII MUST be included in emergency response planning at the Federal level.
We believe these findings should be of significant importance to Congress and to Federal agencies charged with communications-related Homeland Security responsibilities, such as the Federal Communications Commission and the Department of Homeland Security. UTC and its members look forward to discussing these findings and their implications with policymakers and others.
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 4
2.0 Background During the months of August, September and October of 2005, the Gulf Coast of the United States and both coasts of Florida were belted by a series of three devastating hurricanes: Katrina, Rita and Wilma. Katrina put much of New Orleans under water; trees were flattened as well as homes, public buildings and communications towers by Category 4 winds. Loss of life from this storm was tragic, and unusually high. Rescue and restoration effort were severely hampered by the loss of public switched network (PSTN) landlines and wireless carrier communications. Scores of individuals were isolated without power in unsanitary conditions, desperately in need of help, without the means to request it. Still recovering, Gulf States were again pelted by Hurricane Rita just weeks later and then by Wilma in October. While these storms were not quite as severe as Katrina, the rapid succession tested the limits of overstressed public safety and utility repair personnel. It became clear as response efforts continued that the recovery of nearly all other infrastructures was dependent on electric power restoration. Moreover, all people have a vital need for safe drinking water and public health demands reliable wastewater facilities. Within these industries, as always, coordination of repair crews, rapid restoration and interaction with public safety personnel depends upon working communications channels. As days passed, stories from the utility companies in the area emerged in which it became apparent that the performance of private CII networks was markedly different from the more-publicized state of communications networks in the commercial and public safety sectors. Residents of the Gulf Coast and Florida are served by a wide variety of electric, gas and water utilities, including many small regional cooperatives and municipal power/water authorities whose service territories lie within those of larger entities. These include large, investor-owned electric power companies, electric generating companies and natural gas utilities. The utility service territories most severely impacted by the storms fall around the hurricane storm tracks depicted by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA):
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 5
http://alt.ngs.noaa.gov/katrina/KATRINA0000.HTM On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana, with 140 mph winds. It then continued northward and made a second landfall, on the same day, on the Louisiana/Mississippi border with winds of 125 mph.2
2 http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2005/tws/MIATWSAT_aug.shtml?
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 6
http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/rita/RITA0000.HTM
http://ngs.woc.noaa.gov/wilma/WILMA0000.HTM
After hearing a great deal of anecdotal evidence about the performance of member communications systems, UTC looked for as many CII entities as
Most recently (October 24), Hurricane Wilma made landfall on the western coast of Florida, displaying category 3 wind intensity, near Cape Romano. It accelerated, crossing Florida in just five hours time.
Less than a month later, on September 24, Hurricane Rita made landfall just east of the Texas/Louisiana boarder, near Galveston, with category 3 intensity winds of 120 mph. Rita was reported by the NOAA as having caused devastating storm surges and wind damage in Southwestern Louisiana and the extreme southeastern portion of Texas.
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 7
possible in the most-impacted areas; after identifying 21 utility companies of various sizes in the areas hardest-hit by the storms, we contacted them in order to assess consistently the effects upon their communications systems. The list, while a fairly comprehensive cross-section of utility sizes and types, is not offered as a complete directory of affected entities.
Company Impacted by Katrina
Impacted by Rita
Impacted by Wilma
Baldwin EMC ● Centerpoint (includes Reliant) ● CLECO Power ●
Coast EP ● Dixie Electric Power Association ●
Entergy (Louisiana, New Orleans and Gulf States)
●
Florida Power and Light ● Huntsville Utilities ● Joe Wheeler Electric Cooperative ●
Lafayette Utilities Systems ● ● Lafourche Parish Water District No. 1 ●
Louisiana Generating LLC ● ● Magnolia EPA ●
Mississippi Power Co. (Southern Company) ● Pearl River EPA ● Sam Houston Electric Cooperative ●
Singing River EPA ● South Mississippi Electric Power Association ●
Southern Pine Electric Power Association ● Southwest Louisiana EMC ●
Washington St. Tammany EC ●
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 8
3.0 Survey Questions and Results The United Telecom Council posed five basic questions to utilities in hard-hit areas to determine how their various communications systems fared during and after the hurricanes, and analyzed the resulting data. Of the 21 electric and water utilities identified and contacted, 14 responded to the survey, a 66% response rate we deeply appreciate given the repair work to infrastructure still underway in some areas. In addition to answering the questions, many respondents offered anecdotal information; this is included as an Appendix at the end of this report to provide additional insights.
3.1 Communications Systems Performance Most utilities, regardless of service territory size or proximity to the centers of the storms, reported that their communications systems stood up well to the hurricanes. This stands in stark contrast to the public switched network (PSTN) in the region and wireless carriers, who suffered extensive loss of service and slow recovery time. The comparison points to the fact that communications systems, if built extremely well, can withstand the intense wind and/or flooding associated with these events; however, unlike public networks, CII systems� redundancies and robustness can be limited in size and scope, since they are designed and constructed to meet the specialized needs of a single entity or group of companies. Such construction would be cost-prohibitive for a commercial system designed to serve millions of the general public. Thus, in spite of the growth of various commercial communications networks, there will be a continued need for CII entities to maintain their own private communications networks for mission-critical functions, including backbone networks. Of the fourteen companies responding, twelve (86%) said that their communications systems stood up excellently or well, with only two companies (14%) having serious communications problems.3 Most companies that suffered damage to their equipment and networks fixed it very quickly, generally within 24-48 hours following the passing of the hurricane.4 Such repairs were carried
3 One of these was due to the company�s reliance on cell phones; the other company did not specify the reason for its poor performance (see Appendix). 4 Note that repairs to communications networks included ensuring that generators were operational and fully fueled, so that communications facilities operated where no grid-based power was available. In at least one case, electric utility telecom personnel were detailed to an uninhabitable headquarters building the day after Katrina to ensure that all local communications nodes were functioning via generator. In another instance, telecom networks were kept operating by sandbagging a flooded building, keeping water levels down to only six inches in the communications equipment room; the
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 9
out according to detailed emergency plans, since communications networks are vital to power restoration and infrastructure recovery efforts being undertaken area-wide. Across the board, private systems out-performed the commercial. Utilities reported that cell phones and landlines were down, leased lines did not fare well and that satellite communications were choppy at best. One small water district authority that depends entirely on cellular communications suffered serious communications difficulties. The utilities that had the greatest communications difficulties were the smaller cooperatives and municipal authorities. Such performance differences highlight the need to share resources in emergency situations and for interoperability among CII entities. Whereas cooperatives tend to help cooperatives and IOUs help IOUs, currently there tends not to be assistance provided between utility segments. Lack of interoperability among utilities and between utilities and public safety remains a serious problem that hampers restoration efforts; hurricane rescue and restoration efforts provide an example of the benefit that could be reaped from allocating a small amount of dedicated spectrum for CII, with systems to be built using an open architecture and made available to all emergency responders as needed for disaster recovery.
associated power generation plant at the same location had been knocked out by storm damage.
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
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3.2 Land Mobile Radio, Backbone Survivor Without exception, survey respondents that maintain land mobile radio (LMR) systems were pleased with their performance during and after the storms. Unlike most commercial wireless systems, these networks are built specifically to weather such disasters and to continue to operate in extended power outages, in support of restoration crews carrying out extremely hazardous duties.5 Where possible, LMR networks also support radios brought in by visiting crews from utilities across the region or from other parts of the country. However, the superior performance of individual systems and the industry in general is offset by the lack of interoperability between systems and the lack of dedicated spectrum to share with other utilities and public safety. Where host utilities had no additional capacity, or assisting utilities used other frequency bands, valuable time was wasted in restoration efforts because of the need to work around communications difficulties or use host utility personnel to guide visiting crews without another means of contacting emergency control centers. LMR is at this time the most critical tool of critical infrastructure communications in emergency situations. It provides for necessary mobility and quality of service as crews travel throughout the damaged service territory. In many cases during events such as Katrina, it provides the only means of wireless communications during the first critical days after storm impact. The overall performance of private utility communications systems during the catastrophic storms, in comparison with consumer networks, reinforces the industry position that private systems must be maintained, and encouraged for emergency response. The emphasis upon reliability for utility operations dictates that critical infrastructure entities not depend upon commercial systems for core communications for the foreseeable future. However, one downside to the current LMR framework is that responding utilities operate on several different frequency bands: below 100 MHz, 150-512 MHz, 900 MHz and 800 MHz for voice systems alone. This hampers the ability of neighboring utilities to help each other and hamstrings utilities that travel to assist with restoration and recovery efforts. Unlike traditional public safety, energy companies such as electric utilities assume a nationwide response from other entities as part of their emergency response planning. A broad network of mutual assistance contracts is in place across the country, and in severe situations such as the hurricane seasons of 2004 and 2005, other companies also 5 The job of electric lineman is consistently rated one of the ten most hazardous in the nation based on per capita deaths (Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics), and visiting crews working long hours under unfamiliar conditions must be considered even more at risk. LMR units are carried and relied upon as safety equipment by field crews, who expect ubiquitous coverage across the entire service territory regardless of terrain or population density.
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 11
are contacted for equipment and crews. Assistance generally runs along ownership lines: investor-owned utilities generally come to the aid of other IOUs, while crews from other cooperatives are called to assist impacted cooperative utilities. It is not at all unusual to see crews from 30 or more utilities in convoys of trucks heading for the area ahead of time when a severe event is forecast, or immediately afterward when an unexpected disaster strikes. Outside crew convoys, especially from larger utilities, carry their own supplies and stage themselves near the area of disaster impact. In the case of disasters such as hurricanes, they enter the area and begin recovery work as soon as wind levels fall. Assisting companies should be able to bring their own radios to the area with the knowledge that they will function on the host utility�s system. Where this was possible in some areas post-Katrina (for example, one utility�s new 900 MHz trunked system accommodated assisting crews from two other, out-of-state companies), generally host utility personnel carrying local radios must serve as guides and communications links to assisting crews, a waste of personnel and time better spent in recovery efforts. Meanwhile, entities sending crews to assist must obtain emergency Special Temporary Authority from the FCC to use their own, portable equipment in areas where they are not licensed to operate. This is hardly an ideal situation. In order to take full advantage of the robustness of LMR networks, CII companies should have a small allocation of dedicated spectrum on which an open architecture, interoperable system can be built to CII standards. Such a system could ensure reliable wireless communication for emergency response, not only to a large number of responding CII personnel, but to public safety and Federal responders, as well. The storms of 2005, as well as the other disasters of the past and the certainty of more in the future, make a strong case for pursuing this option.
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 12
3.3 Utility Fiber Networks Benefited from Pre-planning The performance of private and commercial fiber networks during the hurricanes demonstrates that utilities build more reliability and redundancy into fiber networks than their commercial communications networks counterparts. The technology itself offers all system operators multiple opportunities to secure communications through the ability to deploy features such as intelligent, self-healing rings and by burying cables. The different performance levels of private and some commercial fiber networks throughout the Gulf Coast and Florida point to the fact that the entities have entirely different objectives in mind from the onset: utilities build for reliability because communications is critical to the functioning of the core business (electric, natural gas or water delivery), while commercial communications companies build for the general population to provide consumer services. While the difference in end-goals is entirely understandable, the redundancy and geographic diversity of utility fiber networks makes them potentially excellent candidates to meet Homeland Security goals of survivable networks. Responses to the third survey question bear out the conclusion that private fiber networks survived the storms due to pre-planning for worst case scenarios. Respondents owning fiber networks, as would be expected, are generally large in size. All reported that they stood up very well to the storms: where there were problems, they were overcome by inherent features of the technology. These features were pre-planned and built into the networks. By contrast, commercial companies suffered more difficulties with broken cables than private, internal networks and had more difficulty restoring service. Smaller utilities relying upon commercial fiber-based networks reported that it took weeks for service to be restored or that it still was not functioning properly at the time of interview. In only one case among respondents was significant difficulty by an IOU alluded to by a smaller company sharing the IOU�s fiber. It is interesting to note, as stated by a large electric IOU, that more damage to cable was done during the recovery effort by repair crews than by the storms themselves.
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 13
3.4 Microwave Systems Stood up to the Storms Like fiber networks, microwave systems stood up very well to the storms, a somewhat surprising outcome given the intense winds accompanying these events. Overall, some damage to microwave towers and attachments was reported, but this damage was not as extensive as it was to other types of communications towers such as generally taller broadcast towers. Additionally, utilities reported that they employed detailed backup plans, including employing mobile towers and safeguarding communications through redundant links. Any needed repairs, such as refocusing dishes to restore links, were accomplished in the days immediately following the storms. Some interesting anecdotal information relating to tower repairs included the physical difficulties for crews in reaching the tower sites due to downed trees; also, securing fuel supplies for generators was sometimes difficult. While many CII entities� response planning includes contracting for a reliable fuel supply, the 2005 hurricanes created unusual fuel shortages; in addition, Federal emergency responders often commandeered available supplies in the area, although no respondent to this survey specifically noted this as a cause for a lack of fuel in this case. Again, the Katrina response story among public safety, Federal, state and local officials, and CII entities, along with other industries, points to the need to include all emergency responders in disaster planning.
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 14
3.5 Utilities and Public Safety Need Better Coordination Given the outstanding performance of utility communications during the hurricanes and critical infrastructure personnel�s� role as emergency responders, as well as the dependence of all other infrastructures on reliable power (and all people on safe water), thorough Homeland Security planning demands CII participation. A number of Congressional hearings, including testimony by DHS officials on the subjects of interoperability, spectrum management and Incident Command Systems (ICS), took place in the weeks after Katrina and Rita. Much attention was paid to the role and needs of Public Safety (PS); however, in spite of statements noting the reliance of recovery on power restoration, CII entities were largely overlooked in the discussions. To do so deprives policymakers of a prime opportunity to use proven reliability for the good of Americans affected by disasters. Unfortunately, however, UTC�s research shows that, for whatever reason, local coordination between public safety and CII is inconsistent and patchy, a situation that must improve to enable efficient emergency response. The last question of this survey asked about coordination between public safety and CII entities during storm recovery. While utility communications systems fared well during the hurricanes, there was little or no coordination with state or local public safety organizations aside from some informal sharing of resources, such the assistance of a dispatch operator and/or a dedicated E911 line. In the examples given by respondents, the utilities played the role of assisting public safety, and not the other way around. At least one respondent noted that public safety agencies requested use of its communications network; such requests are not uncommon and reflect local understanding of the robustness of CII systems. What coordination existed clearly had been arrived at locally by personnel understanding the need for some form of communications, but with the exception of one statewide network, there was little in UTC�s survey responses to inspire confidence in this area.6 Beside the clear needs of dedicated spectrum for CII and accompanying advancements in communications interoperability, CII entities responding to disasters should be included in any State or Federally developed coordination process. Post-Hurricane Hearings During congressional hearings on September 29, 2005, witness David E. Liebersbach of the National Emergency Management Association noted that, �� local gas, electric and oil companies [need] to know exactly where [who] to go to in ICS (national Incident Command System) during emergency response.�7 6 Anecdotally, UTC members noted that public safety personnel unfamiliar with some utility truck logos sometimes refused entry to impacted areas by crews seeking to restore power. Such incidents underscore the need for prior planning at a higher level. 7 House Homeland Security Committee Hearing on Incident Command, Control and Communications during Catastrophic Events, October 19, 2005.
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 15
Even with excellent internal utility company emergency response plans, CII should be included in the next step of participating in an area-wide response effort. According to National Fraternal Order of Police President Chuck Canterbury, most communities use some form of the ICS system [this is not the case for utilities], but a national plan is required. During Katrina there was a situation of �self-dispatching� [for public safety], �and where there is a virtual destruction of the local command center � there needs to be a backup (national) command structure.8 As industries with thousands of personnel moving through the area in recovery efforts, CII entities need to be a part of this development. During the House hearings Chief William D. �Bill� Killen, President of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, stated that in order to be successful a national ICS needs the following: 1. DHS to require everyone to take an online course 2. NIS security requirements 3. DHS must offer resources to communities that submit a mutual aid plan 4. Congress must fully fund ICS9 CII entities are deeply involved with DHS, especially in the areas of critical infrastructure protection and cybersecurity, because of large enterprise IT networks and critical control systems such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA. However, CII must be included in interoperability efforts, as well. Following an announcement by FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, Ken Moran, Director of Homeland Security for the FCC, stated in post-hurricane Senate hearings that a working group has been formed to study communications and specifically, ways to fund interoperability development. CII has a significant contribution to offer to such efforts, and must have a presence in these discussions.10 Equipment that is not dependent on frequency assignments is extremely important to both CII and public safety, while again, unlike traditional public safety, CII has no dedicated spectrum on which to operate a next-generation communications system. This definitely is a long-term effort and one that will require massive investment by all parties concerned in new infrastructure and new user equipment.
8 Id. 9 Id. 10 Senate Commerce hearing on Communications Interoperability, October 19, 2005.
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
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4.0 Summary of Utility Communications Performance Issues from 2005 Hurricanes Utilities and other critical infrastructure companies along the Gulf Coast have a great deal to be proud of in their response to the catastrophic hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma. The massive responsibility of power restoration depended on a number of factors; chief among them was the necessity of functioning communications systems. Utilities are traditionally conservative in planning communications networks, placing heavy emphasis upon reliability. Thankfully, redundancy and contingency planning paid off for all but the hardest- hit in these industries. Survey questions posed reveal several important points:
• In sharp contrast to commercial wireless, landline telephone and other telecommunications networks, the private, internal networks (radio, microwave and fiber) of electric, gas and water utilities for the most part continued to function throughout and immediately after the storms;
• Interoperability among utilities and between utilities and public safety remains a serious problem that hampers restoration efforts.
• CII needs a small spectrum allocation to make possible a tough, resistant, interoperable network, whether to be used by CII alone or made available to other emergency responders in such situations.
• Given the good performance of utility communications and our role as emergency responders, as well as the dependence of all other infrastructures on reliable power (and all people on safe water), our members should be included in Homeland Security planning.
UTC recognizes the immense efforts undertaken by utilities facing the challenges of restoration and recovery. On many levels, a fine spirit of cooperation, selflessness and courage emerged during our conversations with the men and women operating utility communications systems along the Gulf Coast and Florida. UTC encourages readers of this report to review the individual responses provided in the attached Appendix � you will hear in that text both their concern for the devastation they witnessed, and their pride in maintaining systems vital to restoration of their communities. The aim of this report is to bring to the attention of CII entities the need for active engagement in government discussions regarding the role of communications during emergency response. Through this small study, UTC also hopes to emphasize to policymakers the rich resource of robust infrastructure, emergency planning and commitment to community that CII entities can bring to emergency response planning and interoperability efforts. UTC and its members will continue to stress the key role of both the restoration of the services we
UTC RESEARCH REPORT: Hurricanes of 2005: Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure Communications Networks
© 2005 United Telecom Council. All Rights Reserved 17
provide and the value of our robust internal communications networks during such emergencies, to make sure that our specialized needs, and ultimately the interests of the American public, are addressed.
UTC
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ce r
ecei
ved
serv
ice
afte
r ab
out
2 w
eeks
. We
ende
d up
pur
chas
ing
seve
ral S
outh
ern
LIN
C ra
dios
to u
se b
etw
een
offic
es a
nd a
few
in t
he fi
eld
to a
llevi
ate
som
e of
the
rad
io
cong
estio
n an
d to
use
to
call
long
dis
tanc
e, s
ince
tha
t was
the
onl
y w
ay o
f doi
ng s
o at
the
tim
e.
●
Ka
trin
a Ri
ta
In N
ew O
rlean
s, m
any
com
mun
icat
ions
site
s an
d su
bsta
tions
wer
e un
derw
ater
and
wer
e no
t im
med
iate
ly
rest
ored
sin
ce t
he p
opul
atio
n ha
s no
t re
turn
ed t
o th
ose
area
s. F
ollo
win
g Ri
ta, 9
0+%
of t
he T
X si
tes
wer
e fu
nctio
nal.
●
W
ilma
This
is in
clus
ive
of n
ot o
nly
the
Priv
ate
Wire
less
Sys
tem
s bu
t al
so in
clud
es [
of o
ur]
WAN
and
PBX
in
fras
truc
ture
s.
Ther
e w
as r
ecov
ery
requ
ired
to s
ome
degr
ee fo
r al
l sys
tem
s bu
t th
e ne
twor
ks a
re d
esig
ned
with
a h
igh
leve
l of r
edun
danc
y so
rec
over
y w
as v
ery
prom
pt fo
llow
ing
●
Ka
trin
a N
o ef
fect
from
sto
rms
●
Ka
trin
a W
ilma
Did
not
lose
any
com
mun
icat
ions
at
all-
it w
as u
p co
mpl
etel
y an
d co
ntin
uous
ly t
hrou
ghou
t. I
n th
e m
iddl
e of
bo
th K
atrin
a an
d W
ilma
but
mos
t ef
fect
was
upo
n th
e el
ectr
ic li
nes,
abo
ut 3
day
s w
ork
rest
orin
g se
rvic
e.
UTC
RE
SEA
RC
H R
EPO
RT:
Hur
rica
nes o
f 200
5: P
erfo
rman
ce o
f Gul
f Coa
st C
ritic
al In
fras
truc
ture
Com
mun
icat
ions
Net
wor
ks
© 2
005
Uni
ted
Tele
com
Cou
ncil.
All
Righ
ts Re
serv
ed
19
● Ka
trin
a Ex
trem
ely
poor
- W
e us
e ce
llula
r ph
ones
w/d
irect
con
nect
feat
ures
for
com
mun
icat
ion.
●
Ka
trin
a W
ilma
Our
com
pany
ow
ned
com
mun
icat
ion
syst
em s
tood
ver
y w
ell d
urin
g an
d af
ter
hurr
ican
es K
atrin
a an
d Ri
ta.
Leas
ed s
ervi
ces
did
not
fare
wel
l and
wer
e ou
t up
to
a m
onth
aft
er t
he s
torm
s.
●
Ka
trin
a O
ur s
yste
m w
orke
d w
ell f
or t
he a
mou
nt o
f dam
age
we
had.
●
Ka
trin
a An
ythi
ng t
hat
was
lost
was
rep
aire
d w
ithin
24
hour
s. T
his
incl
udes
LM
R, M
W, r
adio
, sat
ellit
e�To
wer
s ar
e bu
ilt t
o w
ithst
and
hurr
ican
es. S
ome
land
lines
wen
t do
wn.
●
Katr
ina
VHF
radi
o sy
stem
sur
vive
d al
mos
t co
mpl
etel
y in
tact
. One
pro
blem
we
did
have
was
with
ren
ted
data
line
s (c
ontr
ol c
ircui
ts)
to o
ur r
epea
ter
site
s. W
e w
orke
d ar
ound
thi
s by
usi
ng m
obile
rad
ios
with
pow
er s
uppl
ies
to
wor
k as
bas
e st
atio
ns.
We
also
had
dam
age
to o
ur a
nten
nas
and
coax
line
s bu
t th
at d
id n
ot s
top
our
syst
em
from
wor
king
. W
e ha
ve im
plem
ente
d re
pairs
.
●
Ka
trin
a Co
mm
unic
atio
ns w
ere
neve
r lo
st d
urin
g th
e st
orm
, whi
ch in
volv
ed r
edun
danc
y du
e to
one
tow
er fa
ilure
.
● Ka
trin
a O
vera
ll, t
he u
tility
�s c
omm
unic
atio
ns s
yste
ms
did
not
stan
d up
the
sto
rm a
t al
l.
UTC
RE
SEA
RC
H R
EPO
RT:
Hur
rica
nes o
f 200
5: P
erfo
rman
ce o
f Gul
f Coa
st C
ritic
al In
fras
truc
ture
Com
mun
icat
ions
Net
wor
ks
© 2
005
Uni
ted
Tele
com
Cou
ncil.
All
Righ
ts Re
serv
ed
20
Q2:
Wha
t ef
fect
was
the
re o
n yo
ur L
and
Mob
ile R
adio
(LM
R)
syst
em (
on w
hat
freq
uenc
y ba
nd(s
)), a
nd h
ow w
ell d
id it
fun
ctio
n to
sup
port
res
tora
tion
?
LMR
w
orke
d w
ell
LMR
pr
oble
ms
Freq
. b
and
use
d
Impa
cted
P
rim
arily
b
y:
An
ecdo
tal I
nfo
rmat
ion
●
800
MH
z Ri
ta
No
prob
lem
s w
ith L
MR.
We
use
800M
Hz
for
pers
onal
com
mun
icat
ions
.
●
900
MH
z
Katr
ina
Rita
N
ew 9
00M
Hz
trun
ked
radi
o sy
stem
and
�cr
itica
l tow
er s
ite (
are)
con
figur
ed w
ith fo
ur c
hann
els
for
voic
e co
mm
unic
atio
ns -
a fo
ur-f
old
incr
ease
in u
ser
com
mun
icat
ions
occ
urre
d, w
ithou
t ta
lkin
g ov
er e
ach
othe
r.
Sepa
ratio
n of
voi
ce a
nd d
ata
allo
ws
the
serv
ice
crew
s to
con
tinue
com
mun
icat
ing,
uni
nter
rupt
ed b
y da
ta ..
. Po
rtab
le "
wal
kie-
talk
ies"
wer
e cr
itica
l.
●
Ka
trin
a Th
ere
wer
e no
ill e
ffect
s on
the
LM
R sy
stem
itse
lf, ju
st th
e co
nges
tion
prob
lem
.
●
800
MH
z
Katr
ina
Rita
Pe
rfor
med
) ve
ry w
ell,
part
icul
arly
follo
win
g Ri
ta.
Afte
r Ka
trin
a, w
e ha
d ab
out
90%
of o
ur r
adio
s si
tes
back
on
line
by
Tues
day.
Onl
y 1
radi
o si
te �
was
off
line
for
an e
xten
ded
perio
d of
tim
e du
e to
hig
h w
ater
in t
he
area
. (U
se)
800
MH
z M
otor
ola
Smar
tzon
e. A
dditi
onal
por
tabl
es w
ere
acqu
ired
and
used
by
the
inco
min
g (n
on-c
ompa
ny)
crew
s. W
e al
so a
dded
rep
eate
rs t
o si
tes
whe
re t
raffi
c w
as h
igh
to r
educ
e tr
affic
con
gest
ion.
●
900
MH
z 45
0 M
Hz
Wilm
a (W
e us
e) a
900
MH
z M
/A-C
OM
Tru
nked
Rad
io S
yste
m fo
r vo
ice
disp
atch
ing
and
a 45
0 M
Hz
Dat
aTAC
Sys
tem
fo
r fie
ld d
ata
com
mun
icat
ions
. �
Alth
ough
the
net
wor
k co
nnec
ting
the
tow
er s
ites
is d
epen
dent
on
the
loca
l te
lco
prov
ider
s (w
e) c
reat
ed h
ighl
y re
dund
ant
netw
ork
with
con
tinge
ncie
s to
add
ress
loss
es in
bot
h te
lco
and
elec
tric
al s
ervi
ce.
●
450
MH
z Ka
trin
a W
ithou
t th
is s
yste
m it
cou
ld h
ave
take
n se
vera
l wee
ks to
res
tore
pow
er�
(in
stea
d of
3-4
day
s).
●
Ka
trin
a W
ilma
No
effe
cts
●
150
MH
z
Katr
ina
We
oper
ate
a hi
gh b
and
repe
ater
sys
tem
from
tow
ers.
We
had
to in
stal
l gen
erat
ors
at t
he t
ower
site
s as
no
pow
er w
as a
t loc
atio
n fo
r da
ys.
We
had
com
mun
icat
ion
to a
ll tr
ucks
thr
ough
out
the
stor
m.
●
800
MH
z 45
0 M
Hz
Katr
ina
LMR
stoo
d up
ver
y w
ell.
We
use
800
MH
z So
uthe
rn L
INC
radi
os (
Mot
orol
a) a
nd s
ome
450
MH
z in
add
hoc
pl
aces
. Rad
ios
wer
e us
ed a
t ca
paci
ty o
f cou
rse,
sin
ce t
hey
wer
e be
ing
shar
ed w
ith p
eopl
e co
min
g in
to
help
●
800
MH
z Ka
trin
a Th
e sy
stem
func
tione
d ex
celle
ntly
� W
e su
stai
ned
dam
age
due
to w
ater
in o
nly
one
loca
tion.
•
Ka
trin
a Th
ere
was
virt
ually
no
voic
e co
mm
unic
atio
n an
d ce
ll ph
ones
� b
eing
use
d�w
ere
not
fully
func
tiona
l at
all
times
.
UTC
RE
SEA
RC
H R
EPO
RT:
Hur
rica
nes o
f 200
5: P
erfo
rman
ce o
f Gul
f Coa
st C
ritic
al In
fras
truc
ture
Com
mun
icat
ions
Net
wor
ks
© 2
005
Uni
ted
Tele
com
Cou
ncil.
All
Righ
ts Re
serv
ed
21
Q3:
Wha
t w
as t
he e
ffec
t on
fib
er n
etw
orks
?
Fib
er
Net
wor
k w
orke
d w
ell
Dam
age
or p
oor
perf
orm
ance
Impa
cted
P
rim
arily
b
y:
An
ecdo
tal I
nfo
rmat
ion
●
Rita
Fi
ber
is 9
7% b
urie
d so
ther
e w
ere
no c
able
bre
aks,
no
prob
lem
s.
●
Katr
ina
Rita
Li
mite
d im
pact
to
com
pany
dep
enda
nt c
omm
unic
atio
ns. A
lthou
gh w
e ha
d m
ultip
le fi
ber
optic
bre
aks,
due
to
faul
t to
lera
nt r
edun
danc
y, m
ost
syst
ems
rem
aine
d fu
nctio
nal.
Lea
sed
circ
uits
wer
e m
ore
diffi
cult
to r
esto
re a
nd t
ook
mor
e tim
e. L
ease
d ci
rcui
t pr
ovid
ers
wer
e un
able
to
prov
ide
repa
ir da
tes.
In
Texa
s, d
urin
g Ri
ta, F
iber
bre
aks
near
La
ke C
harle
s ca
used
2 s
ites
to b
e of
f the
air
for
a fe
w d
ays
but
over
lapp
ing
cove
rage
lim
ited
impa
ct a
nd fa
ult
tole
ranc
e fib
er r
ings
lim
ited
impa
ct t
o ot
her
com
pany
sys
tem
s. W
e ha
ve a
n ex
tens
ive
fiber
sys
tem
ove
r a
four
sta
te
area
mos
t of w
hich
is c
arrie
d in
the
sta
tic s
hiel
d w
ire o
n tr
ansm
issi
on li
nes.
Dur
ing
the
stor
ms,
man
y tr
ansm
issi
on
lines
wer
e da
mag
ed.
Som
etim
es t
he fi
ber
rem
aine
d in
ser
vice
on
a do
wne
d lin
e bu
t ev
en w
hen
it w
as b
roke
n, t
he
redu
ndan
t rin
gs li
mite
d im
pact
to c
ompa
ny d
epen
dant
com
mun
icat
ions
incl
udin
g ra
dio,
voi
ce, a
nd d
ata
●
Wilm
a (W
e ut
ilize
) a
ringe
d ar
chite
ctur
e fo
r (t
he)
Fibe
r N
etw
ork.
Alth
ough
the
re w
ere
brea
ks in
the
Fib
er s
yste
m t
he
alte
rnat
ive
rout
ing
prov
ided
by
the
ringe
d ar
chite
ctur
e pr
ovid
ed c
ontin
uity
of s
ervi
ce.
In t
he 2
004
Hur
rican
e se
ason
th
ere
wer
e br
eaks
in t
he F
iber
Net
wor
k th
at r
esul
ted
in lo
ss o
f the
prim
ary
and
seco
ndar
y pa
ths.
(W
e w
ere)
pr
epar
ed t
o m
ake
imm
edia
te t
empo
rary
res
tora
tions
and
mos
t cr
itica
l ser
vice
s w
ere
rest
ored
with
in 2
4 to
36
hour
s.
●
Katr
ina
Wilm
a N
o ef
fect
s
●
Katr
ina
We
have
non
e bu
t th
e te
leph
one
syst
em in
the
are
a ha
d bi
g pr
oble
ms
and
is s
till n
ot w
orki
ng li
ke p
re-K
atrin
a.
●
Katr
ina
Wilm
a W
e do
not
ow
n a
fiber
net
wor
k ho
wev
er, w
e do
sha
re in
the
use
of t
he (
larg
er I
OU
) fib
er s
yste
m.
This
fibe
r sy
stem
w
as b
roke
n in
sev
eral
pla
ces
follo
win
g H
urric
ane
Katr
ina.
It
took
sev
eral
wee
ks to
res
tore
.
●
Katr
ina
Ring
s ar
e in
telli
gent
, sel
f-he
alin
g rin
gs s
o ev
en t
houg
h th
ere
wer
e fib
er b
reak
s, t
here
was
no
sign
ifica
nt lo
ss o
f tr
affic
. We
actu
ally
had
mor
e br
eaks
aft
er t
he s
torm
whe
n th
e re
pair
crew
s w
ere
wor
king
tha
n du
ring�
●
Katr
ina
The
effe
ct o
n (c
omm
erci
al)
fiber
net
wor
ks w
as s
uch
that
tel
epho
nes
wer
e co
nsid
ered
to b
e nu
ll an
d vo
id. S
ome
area
s ar
e ju
st b
egin
ning
to
rece
ive
tele
phon
e se
rvic
e, w
hile
oth
er a
reas
stil
l don
�t ha
ve it
. But
it is
slo
wly
com
ing
back
.
UTC
RE
SEA
RC
H R
EPO
RT:
Hur
rica
nes o
f 200
5: P
erfo
rman
ce o
f Gul
f Coa
st C
ritic
al In
fras
truc
ture
Com
mun
icat
ions
Net
wor
ks
© 2
005
Uni
ted
Tele
com
Cou
ncil.
All
Righ
ts Re
serv
ed
22
Q
4:
H
ow w
ell d
id y
our
mic
row
ave
links
/com
mun
icat
ions
tow
ers
wit
hsta
nd t
he
hurr
ican
e?
M
W
perf
orm
ed
wel
l
N/A
Im
pact
ed
Pri
mar
ily
by:
An
ecdo
tal I
nfo
rmat
ion
●
Rita
Lo
st n
o to
wer
s. J
ust l
ost
2 or
3 d
ishe
s th
at a
ffect
ed 2
maj
or S
CAD
A sy
stem
s. E
very
thin
g w
as r
epai
red
in 4
8 ho
urs.
●
Katr
ina
Rita
Au
g. 2
9th
Tele
com
m c
rew
s er
ecte
d a
new
100
� mob
ile to
wer
. . .
in t
he S
ervi
ce C
ente
r. T
he m
obile
tow
er w
as th
e on
ly c
omm
unic
atio
ns s
yste
m o
pera
tiona
l in
the
paris
h fo
r th
e fir
st 1
2 ho
urs.
Our
cor
e m
icro
wav
e sy
stem
sus
tain
ed
no d
amag
e an
d w
as u
naffe
cted
by
the
stor
m. W
e ha
d ab
out
3 sp
read
spe
ctru
m li
nks
(2.4
GH
z) t
hat
had
dish
es
mov
ed o
ff-pa
th, b
ut t
hose
wer
e co
rrec
ted
rath
er q
uick
ly.
We'
ve a
lso
adde
d st
iff a
rms
to th
ose
site
s, s
o th
is s
houl
d no
t be
a p
robl
em in
the
futu
re. T
he b
igge
st p
robl
em w
as c
lear
ing
the
tree
s of
f of t
he r
oad
to g
et to
the
tow
er s
ite.
We
used
our
100
' cra
nk-u
p to
wer
for
the
first
12
hour
s un
til w
e co
uld
get
to t
he m
ain
tow
er s
ite to
tur
n it
back
on.
●
Katr
ina
All 4
tow
ers
fare
d w
ell.
●
Katr
ina
Rita
N
O t
ower
s re
ceiv
ed s
igni
fican
t da
mag
e be
yond
tur
ned
dish
es &
loos
e fe
edlin
es. K
atrin
a, m
inim
al d
amag
e ex
cept
fo
r (o
ne)
site
... R
ita, n
umer
ous
dish
es in
TX
wer
e tu
rned
by
the
win
d bu
t m
ost
path
s re
mai
ned
in s
ervi
ce w
ith
redu
ced
qual
ity.
All w
ere
retu
rned
to
norm
al o
r se
rvic
e re
rout
ed w
ithin
5 d
ays.
One
of t
he m
ost
diffi
cult
issu
es
was
kee
ping
our
com
mun
icat
ions
gen
erat
ors
runn
ing
and
fuel
ed.
●
Wilm
a (W
e) d
id n
ot e
xper
ienc
e th
e lo
ss o
f any
com
mun
icat
ion
tow
ers/
stru
ctur
es in
the
200
5 H
urric
ane
Seas
on.
In 2
004
� lo
st 1
ligh
t du
ty to
wer
tha
t w
as o
ver
30 y
ears
old
.
●
Katr
ina
The
stor
ms
did
not
effe
ct o
ur m
icro
wav
e lin
ks
●
Katr
ina
Wilm
a N
o ef
fect
s
●
Katr
ina
Wilm
a M
W li
nks
and
tow
ers
with
stoo
d th
e tw
o hu
rric
anes
ver
y w
ell.
Two
emer
genc
y ge
nera
tors
exp
erie
nced
pro
blem
s;
how
ever
, the
y w
ere
deal
t w
ith e
ffect
ivel
y.
●
Katr
ina
Tow
ers
with
stoo
d da
mag
e at
our
loca
tion.
●
Katr
ina
We
did
not l
ose
any
MW
tow
ers
at a
ll, o
nly
faci
litie
s at
the
base
. Som
e tr
ansm
issi
on e
quip
men
t w
as lo
st.
●
Katr
ina
We
have
no
mic
row
ave
but
our
com
mun
icat
ions
tow
ers
with
stoo
d th
e st
orm
ver
y w
ell.
Inte
rope
rabi
lity
with
co
oper
ativ
e cr
ews
and
cont
ract
cre
ws
wou
ld h
ave
been
of u
se.
●
Katr
ina
One
of t
he fo
ur m
icro
wav
e lin
ks fa
iled.
The
ope
ratio
n su
ffere
d lit
tle d
ue t
o re
dund
ancy
.
●
Katr
ina
The
tow
ers
are
good
; th
ey w
ithst
ood
the
stor
ms
fairl
y w
ell.
How
ever
, ove
r 80
% o
f the
grid
� e
lect
rical
pow
er �
had
to
be
repl
aced
. Nei
ghbo
ring
(util
ity)
had
prob
lem
s w
ith t
hat
(too
).
UTC
RE
SEA
RC
H R
EPO
RT:
Hur
rica
nes o
f 200
5: P
erfo
rman
ce o
f Gul
f Coa
st C
ritic
al In
fras
truc
ture
Com
mun
icat
ions
Net
wor
ks
© 2
005
Uni
ted
Tele
com
Cou
ncil.
All
Righ
ts Re
serv
ed
23
Q5:
Wha
t co
ordi
nati
on d
id y
ou h
ave
wit
h lo
cal o
r st
ate
publ
ic s
afet
y, a
nd h
ow
shou
ld t
his
be im
prov
ed?
A
ny
Coo
rdin
atio
n w
ith
pu
blic
sa
fety
?
Sh
ould
co
ordi
nat
ion
be
impr
oved
?
Impa
cted
P
rim
arily
b
y:
An
ecdo
tal I
nfo
rmat
ion
● ●
Katr
ina
The
Dep
artm
ent
of T
rans
port
atio
n an
d O
ccup
atio
n, S
afet
y &
Hea
lth [
OSH
A] t
ouch
ed b
ase,
but
the
re w
asn�
t an
y ot
her
coor
dina
tion.
With
the
mag
nitu
de o
f wha
t ha
ppen
ed a
nd t
he d
amag
e, n
ot s
ure
how
any
sys
tem
co
uld
impr
ove
the
coor
dina
tion.
�N
othi
ng c
ould
�ve
help
ed.�
Fur
ther
wes
t w
asn�
t as
bad
, but
her
e in
thi
s lo
catio
n th
e tr
ees
wer
e do
wn
and
the
pow
er li
nes
wer
e ou
t.
●
Rita
W
e w
ere
talk
ing
to c
ity o
ffici
als
3 or
4 ti
mes
dai
ly. W
e ha
d pr
oble
ms
with
blo
cked
roa
ds a
nd I
thi
nk t
he
deci
sion
to
evac
uate
nee
ds to
be
mad
e m
ore
judi
ciou
sly.
Not
eve
rybo
dy h
ad to
leav
e to
wn.
●
Katr
ina
Rita
Ev
en s
tate
pol
ice
was
dow
n du
ring
the
initi
al a
sses
smen
t ph
ase
(I d
on't
have
an
exac
t tim
e on
how
long
th
ey w
ere
dow
n).
● ●
Katr
ina
Ther
e w
as s
ome
coor
dina
tion
but
prob
ably
not
to
the
exte
nt t
hat
you
wou
ld li
ke t
o se
e. I
'm n
ot s
ure
wha
t th
e be
st w
ay t
o im
prov
e th
at c
oord
inat
ion
wou
ld b
e, b
ut h
avin
g at
leas
t on
e co
mm
on m
etho
d of
co
mm
unic
atio
ns b
esid
es la
nd li
nes
and
cellu
lar
phon
es b
etw
een
ours
elve
s an
d pu
blic
saf
ety
wou
ld b
e (d
esira
ble)
.
Katr
ina
Rita
At
my
leve
l, m
inim
al.
I di
d vo
lunt
eer
our
com
mun
icat
ions
tow
ers
and
AC p
ower
whe
n re
ques
ted.
● ●
Katr
ina
We
give
the
loca
l 911
offi
ces
an u
nlis
ted
phon
e nu
mbe
r so
the
y ca
n ge
t th
roug
h to
our
dis
patc
her.
Thi
s w
orks
OK,
we
som
etim
es t
hink
we
need
an
extr
a pe
rson
to
take
the
se c
alls
so
the
disp
atch
er c
an fo
cus
on
gett
ing
crew
s to
out
ages
●
Katr
ina
Wilm
a W
e ar
e lin
ked
into
E91
1 sy
stem
s at
the
sta
te le
vel.
We
have
our
ow
n Em
erge
ncy
Man
agem
ent
syst
em t
hat
coor
dina
tes
with
the
sta
te. E
very
thin
g w
orke
d w
ell.
●
Katr
ina
Ther
e w
as n
one.
The
y ha
d th
eir
own
prob
lem
s.
Katr
ina
Wilm
a W
e di
d no
t ha
ve m
uch,
if a
ny, c
oord
inat
ion
with
sta
te o
r lo
cal a
utho
ritie
s. (
We)
not
ow
n tr
ansm
issi
on li
nes
and
do n
ot h
ave
the
wor
k cr
ews
that
oth
er u
tiliti
es h
ave.
Our
wor
k fo
rce
is s
mal
l, si
nce
we
mai
ntai
n su
bsta
tions
and
not
line
s.
●
Katr
ina
We
had
dire
ct li
nes
to o
nes
that
had
pho
ne li
nes
plus
we
mon
itore
d th
eir
freq
. and
rad
io tr
affic
. W
e m
aint
aine
dph
one
seic
ein
oa
eaas
ea
eno
thof
the
coas
tb
150
mile
s
UTC
RE
SEA
RC
H R
EPO
RT:
Hur
rica
nes o
f 200
5: P
erfo
rman
ce o
f Gul
f Coa
st C
ritic
al In
fras
truc
ture
Com
mun
icat
ions
Net
wor
ks
© 2
005
Uni
ted
Tele
com
Cou
ncil.
All
Righ
ts Re
serv
ed
24
mai
ntai
ned
phon
e se
rvic
e in
our
are
a as
we
are
nort
h of
the
coa
st b
y 15
0 m
iles
●
Katr
ina
Publ
ic S
afet
y fo
lks
calle
d to
ask
how
to g
et o
n ou
r sy
stem
s an
d ho
w t
hey
coul
d w
ork
with
us.
The
re w
as n
o fo
rmal
pro
cess
� in
mos
t ca
ses
PS k
new
peo
ple
with
in th
e IT
dep
artm
ent.
● ●
Katr
ina
Dur
ing
the
first
tw
o w
eeks
aft
er t
he s
torm
the
re w
as a
lot
of c
onfu
sion
from
all
part
ies.
We
did
wor
k th
ings
ou
t w
ith e
mer
genc
y of
ficia
ls b
ut h
ad n
o di
rect
com
mun
icat
ions
via
rad
io w
ith a
ny o
ne o
ther
tha
n ou
r lo
cal
G&
T [g
ener
atio
n an
d tr
ansm
issi
on p
rovi
der]
.
●
Katr
ina
Coor
dina
tion
with
sta
te p
ublic
saf
ety
etc.
was
don
e on
ded
icat
ed p
hone
line
s an
d no
t th
ru a
ny r
adio
link
. Th
e co
mm
unic
atio
n to
my
know
ledg
e di
d no
t su
ffer
any
maj
or p
robl
em.