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Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement in K-12 Education PolicyAuthor(s): John W. SippleSource: American Educational Research Journal, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 447-488Published by: American Educational Research AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1163547 .
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American
Educational
Research
ournal
Fall
1999,
Vol.
36,
No.
3,
pp.
447-488
Institutional
Constraints
on
Business
Involvement
in K-12 Education
Policy
John
W.
Sipple
Cornell
University
With ach
passing
decade,
the
U.S.
ublic
educational
ystem
has
been
under
increasing
scrutiny
and
pressure
to
change.
This
pressure
has
come
from
many
ronts--including,
the
media,
parents,government,
and
business. n
this
study,
I
examine
the
actions
of
a
group
of
business eaders
representing
severalmultinational
corporations
s
they ry
o
affecteducationpolicy
n
the
state
ofMichigan.Ifocus
special
attentionon the environments n which the
corporations
nd
K-12public
schools
operate
and
uncover
he
relationships
between
the
many agents calling
or
school
improvement.
The
act
that this
grouptook a thoughtful pproach nd had a significant mpacton education
reform
s
by
no
means an indication that other
business
groups
will do the
same. Given
enough good information
and
time to
reflect
on the
complex
issues
surrounding
chools,
t
is
possible
hat
business eadersand
educators
can reach
consensus on a
direction
or
educational
reform.
JOHN
W.
SIPPLE s
an
Assistant
Professor,
Department
of
Education,
421
Kennedy
Hall,
Cornell
University,
Ithaca,
NY
14853.
His
specializations
are
organi-
zational
studies and
educational
administration
and
policy.
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Sipple
Throughout
the
past
4
decades,
there has
been
a
notable
increase
n
the
politicization
of
K-12
public
schooling.
Whereas
early
reform
efforts
focused
narrowly
on
local school
activity,
more
recent
reformefforts
com-
monly target higherlevels of governmentand advocate new models and
templates
for
broad
segments
of the educational
system
(Cibulka,
1996;
Cohen,
1990).
This shift has served to increase
governmental
and
elite
influenceon
the
public
educational
ystem.
While he additionof new
players
into the
arenaof education
policymaking
s
undisputed,
he role and
impact
of the new
agents
is the
topic
of much debate and
controversy.
To
better
understand
movements
n
contemporary
ducational
policy,
it
is
necessary
o
carefully tudy
the
agents promoting
eform
deas,
how
they
interact
with state
government,
and
how
ideas are
advanced
in
the formal
policymakingprocess.Thepresentstudyaddresses ssuesof whowill shape
the
futureof
public
education
and
how
they
will
do it.
In
doing
so,
I
pay
careful
attention o the forces
constraining
nd
shaping
the
behaviors
of an
interest
group
of business eaders
working
o
shape
stateK-12
public
education
policy.
Centralo this
study
are
the rolesand actionsof the stateand those of
business
leaders.
Specifically,
examine the actions of a
group
of business leaders
representing
everal
multinational
orporations
s
they
try
o
affecteducation
policy
in the state of
Michigan.
focus
special
attentionon the
environment
in which the business eadersand K-12
public
schools
operate
n
Michigan.
The Role of the State
The Tenth Amendment o
the United
StatesConstitution
xplicitly
reserves
powers
not
delegated
o
the
federal
government
o individual
tatesor to the
people.
The federal
Constitution
s
silent
on
issues of
education,
although
every
stateconstitutionncludesan
educationclause.The clauses
denote
the
states'
responsibility
or and
commitmento
educating
heir
children.Further-
more,
t has been
common
practice
orstates
o further
elegate
responsibility
for
funding
and
operating
choolsto
localschool districts. or
his
reason,
early
schoolreformers-including usiness eadersandacademics-focusedprima-
rily
on the
local
level,
exerting
imited
fforton state
policy agents
and
issues.
In recent
years,
provoked
by
court
decisions
on issues of
racialand
fiscal
equality,
tate
governments
ave
increased heir
role
in
K-12
public
education
(Brown
v. Board
ofEducation,
1954;
Firestone,Bader,
Massel,
&
Rosenblum,
1992;
Mazzoni,
1993;
San
Antonio
Independent
School
District
v.
Rodriquez,
1973;
Tyack
&
Cuban,
1995).
The Role
of Business
In
addition o states
aking
a
greater ole neducationpolicy,severalnfluential
organizations
ave drawna
link
between
school
performance
nd
the nation's
economic
well-being(e.g.,
the
National
Commission
n
Excellence n
Educa-
tion and
its much
publicized
report,
A
Nation at
Risk).
Motivated
by
this
assumed
ink,
American
orporate
eaders
began
to
commit ime
and
corporate
resourcesto
education
reform n
nearly every
state in
the
union
(Business
Roundtable, 991;
Plotke,
1992).
In
June
of
1989,
President
Bush
participated
448
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Institutional Constraints on Business
Involvement
in the annual
meeting
of the Business
Roundtable
hereafter
National
Roundtable,
an
organization
of
more
than
200
CEOs
from
the nation's
largest corporations)
and
formally
challenged corporate
America
to
bring
its
expertise
and
resources
to bear on the education reform movement. Thischallenge had great symbolic
value as it served to move the
interests of business from
being
just
one of
many
voices
in the
"babble"
Cohen,
1990)
to
a formal seat at
the
policymaking
table.
The National
Roundtable
quickly
decided that
advocating
educational
change
and
improvement
at the
national level was not an
efficient use
of their
resources.
By
mid-1989,
all
of the
National
Roundtable CEOs had
"adopted"
a
state
in
which to
involve themselves
in
issues of
education reform.
Six
National
Roundtable
companies
adopted Michigan,
the
focus of this
study:
Dow,
GeneralMotors,Kellogg,Kmart,Upjohn,andWhirlpool.Joseph Antonini,CEO
of
Kmart,
was asked
by
John
Akers,
CEO of
IBM
and
leader of the
National
Roundtable's
education
initiative,
to
lead
the effort in
Michigan.
Thus,
the
Michigan-Business
National
Roundtable
(MI-Roundtable)
was
founded
in the
fall
of
1989.
The
central focus of
this article is a
case
study
of the
MI-Roundtable.
Specifically,
I
explore
the
direct and
indirect
influences
and
constraints on the
formation
and
activity
of the
MI-Roundtable s it
attempted
to alter
educational
policy
in
Michigan.
This
organization
is
but
one of
many
parties
calling
for
improved performance of the Michigan public educational system, although it
holds
a
special place
owing
to its
considerable
resources,
its
position
within the
polity,
and its
vested
interest
in
improving
the
products
of the
public
schools.
Why Study
Business
Involvement?
Attention
should
be
paid
to the
MI-Roundtable
for three
reasons.
First,
the
organization
is one
of
38
state-level
coalitions
operating today.
Little
s
known
about these
coalitions,
and
yet they
possess
great potential
for
power
and
influence. The
member
corporations'
scope
and
influence
span
local,
state,
and
nationalboundaries,and they are involved in policy networkson myriad ssues
(e.g.,
tax,
health
care,
environmental
law).
In
addition,
the financial
resources
available
to the
coalitions are
sizable.
For
instance,
the focus of
this
study,
the
MI-Roundtable,
has an
annual
budget
of
more
than
$250,000,
with
each
corporation paying
substantial
annual dues
(approximately
$20,000-$30,000
per
year).
Second,
there is
no
shortage
of
debate,
controversy,
and
skepticism
surrounding
business
involvement in
education reform.
Critics
question
the
values
and
motivations of
business as
it
tries to
alter school
policy
and
practice
(Borman, Castenell, & Gallagher, 1993; Cuban, 1992;Kearns& Doyle, 1988;
Kozol,
1991;
Ray
&
Mickelson,
1990).
Finally,
this
century
(and
specifically
the
latter
wo
decades)
has
witnessed
a
significant
shift
in
attention and
power
(e.g.,
policy
decisions,
funding,
and
legal
control)
from
local
schools
and
school
districts o
state
administratorsand
policymakers.
In the
latter half
of
the
20th
century,
the
most
dramatic
shifts
in
the
institutional
environment
of
schools
have been in
the
relationship
of
449
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Sipple
public
education to the state
(Cibulka,
1995).
Whereas
he
focus of
school
policy
had
traditionally
een
on
norms,
tructures,
olitics,
and
power
within
schools,
recent
attentions
turning
o
externalnfluences nd
demands,
namely
the relationshipwith the stateand federalgovernments, ourts,parents,and
the business
community
Cibulka,1996;
Tyack
&
Cuban,
1995).
In
addition,
current
research has
identified
institutional
ectors
within
society,
one
of
which-the
American
ublic
educational
ystem--is
of
particular
elevance
or
this
study
(Rowan
&
Miskel,
1999;
Scott
&
Meyer,
1991).
Given
the
increase
in
attention
paid
to the
forces at work
in the broad
sector,
or
"field"
of
education,
ttention o
specificorganizations
perating
n
this
sphere
s
of
great
value.
The
purpose
of
this
study
is to
analyze
the
context
in
which
an
interest
groupof business leaderssoughtto become a catalyst or state education
reform.
To this
end,
I
use data
rom
documents nd
nterviews
onductedwith
individuals
oth
in
and
outsideof the
MI-Roundtable
o
describe he
environ-
ment n
which the
MI-Roundtableormed
and
analyze
how a
variety
of
forces
influenced he
business
group's
actions.
Froma
more
heoretical
perspective,
the
MI-Roundtablentereda
complex,
though
well-established,
nstitutional
environment
f K-12
education.
This
environmentncluded
ong-term
istori-
cal
roots
and
well-established
egal
rameworksnd
power
relationshipsMeyer,
Scott,
Strang,
&
Creigton,
1988).
Conceptual
erspectives
At
first
blush,
t
would seem
to
make
sense to
study
nterest
roups
advocating
educational
mprovement
using
well-established
heories
of
interest
group
behavior.
Such
theories
(Olson,
1965;
Truman,
1951)
attempt
to
describe
when,
how,
and
why
organizations
orm
and act.
The
literature
uggests
that
the
motivationor
nterest
roup
activity
s
generally
ssumed o
originate
rom
the
innate
nterests
f
participants
r the
pursuit
f
rational
nd
personal
gain.
The
rational
ecision-making
model
in which
individuals
make
decisionsand
participaten organizationshat promoteor ensure personalgain is well
known.
However,
in
terms
of
understanding
nterest
group
behavior,
the
model
s limited
and
does
not
describeor
predict
he
bounds
placed
on
interest
group
participants.
s
recent
empirical
tudies
suggest,
neither
explanation
s
satisfying.
A
more
complete
understanding
f the
external
pressures
ffecting
interest
groups
is
necessary.
Interest
group
theories
seem
to
assume
that
participants
ave an
inherent
policy
interestor
a narrow
desirefor
functional
gain.
But
hese
propositions
o not
explain
consistent
ehavior
cross
ndividu-
als from
diverse
backgrounds
nd
experiences.
Other
orces
seemingly
must
be at work shapingand limitingchoice alternativesScott,1995).It is this
limitation f
interest
roup
theories
hat
spurred
he
present
nvestigation
nto
the
institutional
orces
acting
on the
participants
n
the
MI-Roundtable.
Critical
o the
study
of
organizational
ehavior
and
environmental
dap-
tation s a
focus on
and
understanding
f
the
relationship
etween
organiza-
tions
and
their
external
environment.
Contingent
on
the
perspective
that
organizations
re
open
systems
Katz
&
Kahn,1978;
Scott,
1992),
he
external
450
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Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement
environment
of
organizations
was once
thought
o include
only
those
formal
actorswith which
organizations
xchanged
information nd resourcesor
a
moresubtlediffusion
of
norms
Selznick,
1949).
According
o Scottand
Meyer
(1991,p. 111),"While uch views are notwrong, theyareclearly ncomplete
and limited."
n
the last two
decades,
conceptualizations
f
organizational
environments ave broadened.
One
of
the most
significant hanges
s the
view
of environments s more
complex,
rational,
nd
layered
hanhad
been
once
thought (Meyer,
1994; Scott,
1994).
Another
s that
organizationsactively
participate
n
organization-environment
elationsand do not
simply
act
as
passive
pawns
(DiMaggio,
1998;
Dimaggio
&
Powell,
1991a;Zucker,
1988).
Scott
(1995)
suggests
that no
organization
can
be
judiciously
understood
unless
the
environmentalnorms and
expectationsaccording
o which
the
organizationoperatesare understoodand taken into account.Institutional
theory
provides
a
framework
with
which
to
analyze
the
environmentof the
MI-Roundtableand can
act as a
guide
to
predict
how and
why
the
roundtable
responds
to its
environment.
In this
case,
the
MI-Roundtable
must
be viewed
as one of
many
interest
groups
working
to
improve
the
public
educational
system
or,
in
institutional
erms,
one of
many
nstitutional
gents
nteracting
n
the
sector
of
public
education.
During
such
interaction,
the
MI-Roundtable s
shaped
by
and
shapes
the formal
rules,
norms,
and belief
systems
thatmake
up
the
institutional environment.
To analyze and investigatethe formationand impactof institutions,Idraw
from
both Cibulka
(1995)
and
Scott
(1995)
in
defining
an
institution as a
socially
defined
purpose
around
which
normative,
cognitive,
and
regulative
structures
emerge
to
provide
stability
and
meaning
to social
behavior. Institu-
tionalization is
the
intentional or
unintentional
(Cibulka,
1995)
process "by
which social
processes,
obligations,
or
actualities come to
take on a
rulelike
status
in
social
thought
and
action"
(Meyer
&
Rowan,
1977,
p.
341).
The
emergence
of
institutions n a
society,
or bounded
units within a
society,
results
in
stability
and
order
through
the
creation of
socially
accepted
(according
to
some, socially constructed)practices,norms,andways of thinking.Institutions
are
understood to
result from
"institution
building"
efforts
and
strategies
on the
part
of
institutional
agents.
These
typically
include the
state,
professions,
interest
groups,
education
professionals,
academics,
courts,
and the
media,
with
institutional
changes
occurring
more
frequently
in
times of
social,
economic,
or
political
crises
(Cibulka, 1995;
DiMaggio
&
Powell,
1991b;
Fligstein
& Mara-
Drita,
1996;
Greenwood &
Hinings,
1996).
Scott
(1995)
describes
three
pillars,
or
ways
of
conceptualizing
institutions,
each
emphasizing
a
different
set of
institutional
attributes.
I
rely
heavily
on
Scott's constructs for
the
framework of
this article.
Scott's Three
Pillars
The
regulative
pillar
is
geared
toward
expedience
with institutions
proliferated
through
coercive
means in
the form of
laws or
sanctions. These
rules
are
legally
sanctioned
by
formal
authority
and
serve
to constrain
and
"regularize"
ehavior.
Enforcement
of
rules
takes
place by
monitoring
and
allocating
penalties
for
451
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Sipple
noncompliance.
When
focusing
on the
regulative
spects
of
institutions,
he
state
plays
a
prominent
role
in
both
the creation of institutions
and
the
monitoring
f rules.With
regard
o
the
impact
of
regulative
nstitutions
n
the
MI-Roundtable,he interest rouphad to followlegalrules or tsparticipation
in
the
policyprocess
as
well
as
learn
where formal
uthority
esideswithin he
public
education
system
so that it could
target
its resources
and
tactics
effectively
and
efficiently.
The normative
pillar
s based
on
the notionsof
prescription,
valuation,
and
obligation
of
normative ules in
the creation
and
maintenance
f
social
order.
Consisting
of
values
and
norms,
preferred
and
desirable
actions are
establishedwith
which
organizational
nd individual
behavior
can be
com-
pared.
Norms
provide
behavioral
rescriptions
nd limit
appropriate oals
to
pursue.Rolescanbecome internalized y theactor,be formally ssigned,or
be taken on after
requent
nteraction
with
others;
hey
can
restrict ehavior
or
grant
pecialpower
and
confer
rights
on
an
actor.
The
MI-Roundtable
ay
have been
constrained
n
its
possible
actions
by
its
role
as a
group
of free-
market
business leaders
or
by
the
expectations
nstitutional
gents
had
for
business eaders.
The third
pillar, ognitive,
s
basedon the
notion hat
ndividuals
nterpret
and
construct heirown
meaning
of the
worldaround
hem.As
noted
by
Scott
(1995),
"To
understandor
explain
any
action,
the
analyst
must
take
into
accountnot onlythe objectiveconditionsbut the actor's ubjectiventerpre-
tationof them"
p.
40).
Meanings
rederived
by
actors
hrough
nteraction
ith
other
actors
and
symbols
but are
preserved
nd
changedby
human
behavior.
Social
identities are
central
to the
understanding
f
cognitive
institutions,
particularly
s
actors
perform
similar
asks.
The MI-Roundtable
reated an
identity
n
which
it viewed
itself
as
being
distinct
rom
he
education stablish-
ment and
yet
had a
valuable
voice
in
the
education
debate.
Few
researchers ave
investigated
and
categorized
he
types
of
institu-
tions found
within
the sector of
public
education.The
complexity
of
the
institutionalnvironment laysanimportantoleinthe behaviorof organiza-
tions
operating
n
that
environment
Greenwood
&
Hinings,
1996).
Organiza-
tions
and their
deas are
rarely
he
subject
of
a narrow
et of
influencesand
pressures,
but
they
are
often
faced
with
competing
and
conflicting
pressures,
even within he same
sector
D'Aunno, utton,
&
Price,1991;
Fligstein
&Mara-
Drita,
1996;
Friedland&
Alford,1991;
Meyer,
1987).
The
U.S.
education
ector
is no
different,
and
thus the
agents
operating
within
that sector
probably
confront
multiple
and
competing
pressures.
In
the late
1980s
and
early
1990s,
herewas no
shortage
of
reform
deas
or
educational eform
rganizationsdvancinghose ideas.Thisresulted nan
increasingly
omplex
environment
s more
and
more
agents
tried
o involve
themselves
in
school reform
(Cibulka,
1995;
Cohen,
1990;
Rowan,
1990).
Given the
multiple
agents
in
the
educational
sector-including
the
state,
professional
organizations,
istorical
recedent,
and
business
nvolvement-
the
MI-Roundtable
robably
aced
multiple
nstitutional
ressures
and
pro-
cesses.
Hence,
the
first
proposition
n
this
study
s as
follows.
452
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Institutional
Constraints
n
BusinessInvolvement
Proposition
1: When
entering
into
the sector of
public
education,
the
MI-
Roundtable
will
encounter
all
three
types
of
institutions-regulative,
norma-
tive,
and
cognitive.
Organizational
Fields and Sectors
DiMaggio
and
Powell
(1991b)
observed that the
increased
rationalization
of
society-the
homogenization
of structureacross
organizational
types-is
less
driven
by competition
and
efficiency
than
by
the
structuration f
organizational
fields.
Meyer,
Scott,
Strang,
and
Creighton
(1988)
suggest
that the United States
public
educational
system
is
becoming
more structuredas a result of a
process
of
societal rationalization
(Meyer,
1994;
Meyer,
Scott,
&
Deal,
1983).
This
increased
rationalization
is
due
not to a
strong
central
state or exclusive
professional control but, rather,to the "profusion
of
professional standards,
court
decisions,
special-purpose
legislative
interests,
and a
huge
network
of
interest
groups"
(Meyer
et
al.,
1988,
p.
165).
Nearly synonymous
with
organizational
fields
are what
Scott
and
Meyer
(1991)
term societal sectors.
They
propose
this
term
to
emphasize
a common
framework of
relationships,
both
horizontal
and
vertical,
that make
up any
given
institutional
ield.
This set of
relationships
may
reach from individualunits
to
national
organizations
and
offices,
serving
to structure
he
flow of
institutions
across as well as
within
sector levels. Scott
and
Meyer
(1991,
p.
117)
define
a sector as
"a
collection
of
organizations
in
the same
domain,
identified
by
the
similarity
of their
services,
products,
or
functions,
together
with those
organi-
zations that
critically
influence
the
performance
of the focal
organizations."
Sectors
comprise
units and
agents
woven
together
in
functional
terms,
al-
though
they
may
be
geographically
distant
(Scott
&
Meyer,
1991).
Societal sectors
typically
have five levels
(Scott
&
Meyer,
1991).
At the
top
are national or
society-wide
offices
and
headquarters
for
government
and
private
officials
and
organizations.
While
plausibly
an additional level
exists
above
the national
(e.g.,
multinational
or
world
sector),
this discussion of
societal sectors is limited to sectors within nations (in this case, the U.S. public
educational
system).
Moving
down,
the fourth level is that of
regional
or
multistate
authorities,
associations,
or
organizations.
This level is
only
modestly
applicable
to the
educational
system,
since
governmental
units and
most
professional
associations
operate
at the
national,
state,
or
local
level. The
third
level consists of state offices and
associations. Formalstate
authorities,
as
well
as
many professional
associations,
operate
at the
state
level. The
second level
consists
of within-state
districtsand
councils,
frequently
representing
or
provid-
ing
services
for
multiple
local units.
Finally,
the
most basic
level is
that of the
local
unit, branch,
or
establishment,
in
this case schools.
Table
1
provides
a
summary
of
the
theoretical levels within the sector of
K-12
public
education.
In
any given
sector,
each level has
its
own
authority,
function,
and
decision-making power.
When
the sector
and
the
related
institutions-whether
flowing up
or
down-are well
established,
the
power,
the
decisions,
and the
authority
at each level are
constrained
and
shaped by
rules,
norms,
or
common
belief
systems.
In
addition,
the
direction
and
flow
of institutions
and institution-
453
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Sipple
Table
1
Sector
Levels of
the
Public Educational
System
in the United
States
Sector level" Public education
5.
Nationalor
society-wide
offices,
headquarters
4.
Regional
or multistate
authorities,
associations
3.
State
offices,
associations
2. - Substateareas,districts, ouncils
1.
Local
units,
branch
offices,
establishments
U.S.
secretary
and
Department
of
Education,NCTM,NCTE,
NBPTS,
NEA/
AFT,
NASSP,
NASB
Regional
research
abs
(e.g.,
NCREL)
nd
accreditation
gencies (e.g.,
North
Central
Accreditation
ssociation)
State
department
and board
of
education,
chief
state school
officer,
MEA/MFT,
MASSP,
MASB
District,board,superintendent,ocal
teachersunions
School,
principal,
eacher
"aScott nd
Meyer
(1991).
Note.
NCTM=National
Council
of
Teachers of
Mathematics,
NCTE=NationalCouncil
of Teachers
of
English,
NBPTS=National
Board for
Professional
Teaching
Standards,
NEA=National
Education
Association,
AFT=American
Federation
of
Teachers,
NCREL=North entral
Regional
Education
Lab,
MEA=Michigan
Education
Association,
MFT=Michigan
Federation of
Teachers,
MASSP=Michigan
Association of
Secondary
School
Principals, MASB=Michigan
Association of
School Boards.
alizationare well
understood,
as
are limitations
f
participants
t
each level
(Scott
&
Meyer,
1991).
Public
education,
like
other
sectors in the
United
States
(e.g.,
energy,
environment,
health
care),
is
inherently
decentralized nd
fragmented.
The
U.S.
Constitution
nsures that
this is so.
Our
system
of
government
was
designed
to
ensurethe
separation
f
powers
within
the national
government
and also
between the
levels of
national, tate,
and
local
governments.
Such
decentralization nd
fragmentation,
owever,
do not
necessarily
ndicatea
feeble
systemguided
by
weak
institutional ules
and norms.
On the
contrary,
the
public
educational
ystem
s
strong
n
its
commitment-legal
and
social-
to
decentralizedand
local
control
of schools.
This
includes the
fragmented
sourcesof
power
seemingly
nverselyproportional
o their
distance
rom
he
classroom.
Although
decentralized,
he
power
relationships,
esource
and
information
lows,
and
acceptable
norms of
practice
are well
established
(Meyer,
1983,
1987;
Meyer
&
Rowan,
1978;
Meyer
t
al.,
1988;
Rowan,
1982).
Given
the
well-established
sector of K-12
education,
the sector
must be
analyzed
in
light
of its theoreticaland
practical
nteractionwith the MI-
Roundtable.
I
suggest
the
MI-Roundtable as more
likely
to
operate
at the
state evel
than either
the
local or
national evel for
several reasons.
First,
he
parent
organization
the
National
Roundtable)
nstructedhe CEOs
o form
coalitions
with
their
governors
and
to
enact
change
within
theirstate.
Second,
the MI-
454
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Institutional Constraints
on Business
Involvement
Roundtable
argeted
ssues of curriculum nd assessment
as foci for reform
n
Michigan.
In
1989,
a move was under
way
in the
Michigan egislature
o
develop
a
model
core curriculumor all K-12 students.
Public
Act
25,
signed
into law in 1990, consolidated the decisions necessaryto create a core
curriculum
t
the
state level
(technicallyby
the StateBoard
of
Education).
Thus,
o effect
widespread
urriculum
hanges
n
Michigan,
he
MI-Roundtable
mustbe involved
at the
state
evel.
Similarly,
he
MI-Roundtable's
econd
major
initiative imedto raise he standards f the
Michigan
ducational ssessment
Program
MEAP)
implemented
by
the State
Department
f
Education)
and
align
the
tests
with the
core
curriculum.
Again, activity
at the state
level
seemed most
appropriate.
Proposition
:
Giventhe
institutionallymposed
evel
of involvement
by
the NationalRoundtable nd the institutionallystablished evel of decision
making
and
authority
within
he sectorof
public
education,
he
MI-Roundtable
will
engage
in the
majority
f
its
activity
at the state level.
Organizational
esponse
o Institutional
ressures
The
earlyyears
of the
"new"
nstitutional
heory
(DiMaggio
&
Powell,
1991b;
Meyer
&
Rowan, 1977,
1978)
focused
on
the
need for
institutionalized
organizations
o
adapt
o
surrounding
nstitutions o that
hey
could obtain
or
maintain
egitimacy.
he
common
mechanism
y
which
organizations
dapted
was throughthe creation of structures-often loosely coupled fromtheir
technical
core-similar
to those
found
in
moresuccessful
or
powerful
nstitu-
tional forms.The
process
by
which
organizations
dopt
similar
tructuress
called
somorphism.
Current
heorizing
n
organizational
daptation
o
institutional
ressures
views
the
process
of
isomorphism
s
incomplete
nd imited.
Today,
he
range
of
strategies
nd
tactics
with
whichto
respond
o or
resist nstitutional
ressures
is believed to be
considerably
more
complex.
In
fact,
Oliver
(1991,
p.
150)
suggests
that
organizations
espond
o
institutional
ressures
n
ways
thatare
self-serving, ncludingncreasedprestige, tability,egitimacy,ocialsupport,
internal nd
external
ommitment,
ccessto
resources,
ttraction f
personnel,
acceptance
n
professions,
nd
nvulnerability
o
questioning.
Oliver
warns hat
the
assumption
of
a
dichotomous
response-passive
or
active,
conform
or
resist-by
an
organization
o
environmental
ressures
s
far
oo
simplistic
nd
not valuable.
Rather,
Oliver
(1991)
argues
that
more
specific
organizational
responses
can
be
predicted
f
careful
attention s
paid
to
the
context of the
pressures
nd
the
organization
f
interest:
Conformity
s
neither
nevitablenor
invariably
nstrumental
n
securing
ongevity"
p.
175).
Scott
(1995)
recently
articulatedhe integratednatureof organization-environmentelations,with
each
agent
involved
nactivedecisions
based
on
the
context
of
the
situation:
Just
as
institutions
onstitute
organizations,
hey
also
constitute
what
are
their
appropriate
ways
of
acting,
ncluding
actsthat
are
responses
to
institutional
ressures.
Strategies
hat
may
be
appropriate
n
one
kindof
industry
r
field
may
be
prohibited
n
another.
Tactics hat
can
455
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Sipple
be
successfully
ursued
n
one
settingmay
be
inconceivable
n
another.
Not
only
structures ut also
strategies
re
institutionally
shaped. (p.
125)
Oliver
(1991,
p.
152)
identifies
ive
generalstrategiesorganizations
se
to
respond
to institutional
rocesses-acquiescing, compromising, voiding,
defying,
and
manipulating-and
several
actics
oreach
type
of
response.
The
responses
fall on
a
continuum rom
passive
agreement
and
acceptance
to
moreactiveand
rebelliousbehavior.
Organizations
ay
acquiesce
by
respond-
ing
out of habit
(i.e.,
"this s the
way
it has
always
been
done"),
imitating
successful
organizationalesponses,
or
simply
complying
o the
pressure.
This
strategy
has been
frequently
described
by
institutional
cholarsand
involves
littleconflictorthoughtonthepartof theorganization. rganizations ayalso
respond
n the
form
of
compromise.
This
may
be
done to
appease
or
balance
multiple
and
conflicting
environmental
pressures.
Pacifying
actics
may
be
employed
by
offeringonly
minimal
resistancewhile
allocating
a
majority
f
resources o
placating
he
agentexerting
he
institutional
ressure.Organiza-
tions
may put up
some
fight,
but
they
mustbe careful
not to
seriously
offend
a
major
ource of
revenue, nformation,
r
legitimacy.
Bargaining
s
another
formof
compromise
n
which
an
organization
ttempts
o
negotiate
conces-
sions or reduce
pressure
rom he
agent
by
adopting
portions
f
the
prescribed
practice, tructure,rnorms.
Avoidance s
another,
moreactive
organizationalesponse
o
institutional
pressures.
Oliverdefines
this
strategy
s
an
attempt
o
preclude
he
necessity
of
conformity;
rganizations
chieve
this
by
concealing
heir
nonconformity,
buffering
hemselves rom
nstitutional
ressures,
r
escaping
rom
nstitutional
rulesor
expectations.
Meyer
and
Rowan
1977)
describedhow
organizations
can
conceal
their
resistance
y adopting
ituals
nd
ceremonies r
by
buffering
and
decoupling
heir
echnical ore
(what
Elmore, 995,
calls
he
"instructional
core"
n
schools)
rom heir
organizational
tructure.
Many
chool
organizations
recentlyadopteda policyof site-basedmanagement s a symbolof progres-
sive
organizational
management,
ut
by
doing
so
school
leaders
may
conceal
the
propagation
f
traditional
lassroom
practices.
f
public
approval
s
inde-
pendent
of an
organization's
nternal
echnical
ractice,
uffering
nd
decoupling
can
be
effective
avoidance
strategies.
A
fourth
strategy
described
by
Oliver
1991)
is for
organizations
o
defy
the
external
nstitutional
ressures.
Suchan
active
approach
s
effective,
and
more
plausible,
when
enforcement f
the
institutional
ressures
s
unlikely
or
when
the
institutional
orms
and
scripts
are n
conflict
with those
of the
target
organization.Organizationsmayalsoovertlychallengeanddismiss heexter-
nally
imposed
institutional
ressures.
This
can
be an
effective
strategy
when
supported
by
an
organization's
ntegrity
r
rational
rgument.
An
organization,
for
example,may
argue
hata
given
nstitutional
ule s
harmfulo
children
nd
that
the
organization
laces
the needs
of
children
irst.
Atthe
farend of
the
passive-active
ontinuum,
n
organization
may
resist
an
institutional
ule or
norm
by
attempting
o
influenceor
control
t.
Organi-
456
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Institutional Constraints on
Business
Involvement
zations
may manipulate
he
rule
by co-opting
it for their own
purposes
or
working
o
change
the
rule
o
better
ervetheir nterests.Scott
1995)
suggests
that
this
type
of
strategy, pecifically
he
techniques
used
by organizations
o
manipulateiews of their egitimacy,sofgreat nteresto institutionalcholars.
Organizations
re
more
prone
o use such
aggressive
nd
controlling trategies
when institutional
xpectations
re
"incipient,
ocalized,
or
weaklypromoted"
(Oliver,
1991,
p.
158).
Two central onstructs
hought
mportant
n
predicting
what
organizations
do
when
confrontedwith institutional
ressures
are
dependence
and
conso-
nance
(Oliver,
1991).
Dependence
can
be
defined as the
fiscal,
social,
or
political
need for one
agent
to be associatedwith another.Oliver
1991)
posits
thatan
organization
hat
s
dependent
on
anotherwill
be less
successful hould
thatrelationshipwane. Therelativedependence mayindicatea rationale or
eitheradherence r
resistanceo the
institutional
ules,
norms,
or
belief
systems
being
advocated.The
second issue
used to
predict
organizationalesponse
s
the consonanceof
the
MI-Roundtable's
deas,beliefs,
and
agenda
with
that
of
the
pressuring
nstitution.
Oliver
1991)
suggests
hatwhen an
organization
s
in
harmony
with
institutional
pressures-similar
in
norms
and
beliefs--the
organization
will
conform
o the
pressure.
Conversely,
hould
the institution
and the
organization
have
diametrically
pposed
belief
systems,
norms,
or
ideas,
the
organization
s more
likely
o
aggressively ppose
compliance
and
activelyattempt o changethe institution dvanced.
With
regard
o the
focus
of this
study,
the
MI-Roundtable
ndoubtedly
faced
nstitutional
ressures
n
conflictwith
its
own
views
of
education eform.
For
example,
some
conservative
rganizations
hatadvocate
imited
powers
for
government
would
strongly argue
against
the state
deciding
what all
studentsshould
learn.
Other
organizations
may
want the
state to
provide
a
curriculum
ut
be
opposed
to a
rigorous,high-stakes
esting
program.
Proposition
3:
The
greater
the
dependence
of the
MI-Roundtable
n
institutional
gents
advancing
nstitutional
ressures,
he
less
likely
the MI-
Roundtable s to resistthe institutional ressuresadvancedby the agents.
Proposition
: The
greater
he
coherence
between
the
MI-Roundtable's
agenda
andan
institutional
gent's
nstitutional
ressures,
he
less
likely
he MI-
Roundtable s
to resist he
institutional
ressures.
Dataand
Research
Methods
The data
for this
study
include
participant
bservation,
extensive archival
documentation,
nd
three
waves of
structured
nterviewswith
central
igures
insideandoutsideof theMI-Roundtable.heparticipantbservationncludes
the
ongoing
involvement
of
the
author and
his
colleagues
with the MI-
Roundtable
n
the
form
of
education
consultants orthe
business eaders.
The
consultation
egan
n
1990
and
continues
oday.Throughout
he
involvement,
the
MI-Roundtableas
relied
on
the
consultants or a
variety
of
support
asks
and
technical
expertise
on
various
topics
relatedto
schools
and
education
policy.
The
consultants
ave
produced
everal ormal
documents or
the
group
457
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Sipple
detailing
he MI-Roundtable's
genda
and
policypositions
n addition
o
several
smaller,
more informal ssessments
and
reports.
My colleagues
and I
conducted hreewavesof
structurednterviews
15
in 1992, 25 in 1994, and 52 in 1995-1996)with membersof both the MI-
Roundtable
and
the
larger
policy community.
The
schedules
used
in
the
interviewswere
developed
for
purposes
other
han his
study,
but at the
same
time the data are
very
relevant and
appropriate
or use
here.
Archival
documents
were
gathered
from
a
variety
of sources
(e.g.,
letters,
e-mail,
published
and
unpublished
documents,
meeting
minutes)
and
cataloguedby
topic
and
date.
Documents
were
used
to
triangulate
nterview
nd
observation
datafor
accuracy
nd
consistencyby
providing
echnical
nformation
uch
as
dates,
membership
nformation,
nd
policy
statements.
Furthermore,
hese
dataprovideaccurateand reliableinformation n the group'sformaland
informal
olicypositions,
characteristicsf the
group
membership
nd
eader-
ship,
and
changes
in
policy
positions
and
membership.
A
case
study approach
s
used
to
carry
out this
investigation
f
the
MI-
Roundtable's
nvolvement n
state
education
policymaking.
Case
study
meth-
ods are
employed
to
structure ata
collection,
guide
the
analysis,
and
focus
conclusions.Yin
(1994)
argues
convincingly
hata
case
study
s a
"comprehen-
sive
research
trategy"p.
13),
not to be
confused
with
issues of
epistemology
or
general
qualitative
research.
Stake
(1994)
describes
three
types
of
case
studies.Intrinsic asestudiesarethosewhose sole interests a betterunder-
standing
f a
particular
ase.
Instrumentalase
studies
are
hose
in
which
a
case
is
examined
n
order o
derive
a
broader
meaning,
gain
nsight
nto
a
particular
issue,
or refine
theory.
Collective
case
studies
focus on
several
cases
that
collectively
provide
inquiry
nto a
phenomenon,
population,
or
condition
(Stake,
1994).
This
study
encompasses
the
first
two of
Stake's
case
study
types:
ntrinsic
nd
instrumental.
iven he
poor
reputation
nd
history
of
case
study
analysis
Miles
&
Huberman,
987;Yin,
1981),
I
heeded the
recommen-
dations
of Yin
and
Miles
and
Huberman n
conducting
a
systematic
and
replicable tudy hroughheuseof multiple ourcesof data,creationof acase
study
database,
development
f
a
chain
of
evidence,
convergence
among
data
types,
and
investigation
f
rival
explanations.
Finally,
my
involvementwith
the
MI-Roundtable
reates
nevitable
rade-
offs in
conducting
research
uch
as
this.On
the one
hand,
he
involvement
of
university
esearchers
ith
the
MI-Roundtable
embership
aises
questions
of
bias
in
this
analysis.
Some
skeptics
may
argue
hat
he
close
relationship
ither
clouds
the
judgment
f
the
researchers r
prohibits
he
researchers
rom
being
critical
f their
associates,
particularlyiven
the
annual
payment
rom
he MI-
Roundtableo the University f Michigan$80,000).On the otherhand,the
close
relationshipprovides
unique
accessibility
o
people,
documents,
and
events
unavailable o
persons
outside
the
organization.
n
addition,
he
close
relationship
ver
7
years
served
o
develop
a
high
degree
of
trust-and,
hence,
candid
responses-between
MI-Roundtable
membersand
the
researchers.
This
degree
of
trust
and
openness
would
not be
possible
without the
close
working
relationship.
Researcher
ias
n
collecting,
nterpreting,
nd
analyzing
458
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Institutional Constraints on Business
Involvement
the
data
was checked
in a
variety
of
ways.
First,
several
researcherswere
responsible
or
the
collectionof the dataover
the
course
of
7
years.
Second,
transcripts
with
names
removed)
were coded
by
three
researchers,
nd
results
werecomparedocheckforanadequatedegreeof interratereliability. inally,
the
editors,
reviewers, nd,
ultimately,
he reader
provide
a finalcheckfor
bias.
Findings:
Institutional
Influences on the
MI-Roundtable
The
1989
annual
meeting
of the Business National Roundtable
proved
to be
a watershed moment for
corporate
involvement
in
education
policy
in
many
states,
including Michigan,
the
focus
of
this
study.
The National
Roundtable
provided
the
leadership
to
expand
business involvement
in
education
beyond
independent, locally
based,
and
often short-term
programs
oward
more broad-
based and
long-term
involvement at the
local,
state,
and national levels. As
reported
in Phi Delta
Kappan:
Those who were
expecting
business to
sweep
in
like a rich uncle
taking
over a school bake sale and
handing
out
computers,
ndowed
chairs,
or
whateverelse is on the wish list
may
find
that this
new
version
of
business involvement s a short-term
isappointment
nd
a
long-term
hock.
(Pipho,
1990,
p.
582)
As K martand the five otherMichiganmembers of the NationalRoundtable
began
the
process
of
creating
a
state-level
coalition
with
the
governor
and
other
interested
parties,
this
new
group
faced
pressures
and influence
on
many
fronts: the National
Roundtable,
the
leadership
of the six
member
companies,
higher
education,
K-12
education,
the
broader business
community,
and the
established
networks,
power relationships,
and
politics
of
the
education
sector.
During
the summer
of
1989,
the CEOof
Kmartand two of his
senior-level
executives
began
to
coalesce the
Michigan
members
of
the
National
Roundtable.
Guiding
their
efforts were the
goals
and
general
tactics outlined
by
the
National
Roundtable, the prioritiesand interestsof the member companies' leadership,
and at least
one other
education reform
organization
representing
small
business
interests. The
individuals
participating
n the
MI-Roundtable
all
came
from
the
corporate
world.
Original
participants
included vice
presidents
and
individuals
assigned
to
public
policy
and
government
relations. Given
the
participants'high-level
positions,
they
were
obviously quite adept
and success-
ful
in
the
corporate
world. The
earliest
data
suggest
that when the
participants
looked at
schools
they
saw
inefficiency,
poor
management,
a
lack
of
account-
ability,
a
stagnating
union,
and
graduates
who
needed
remedial
(and
expen-
sive ) training before they could effectively work with the encroaching tech-
nological
advances on the
showroom
and
shop
floor.Butwhile the
MI-Roundtable
readily
identified
perceived
problems
with the
public
schools,
ascertaining
strategies
and
solutions
proved
more
vexing.
During
the
summer
of
1990,
less than 1
year
after the
group's
formation,
many
of
the
original
participants
admittedly
viewed the
MI-Roundtable
as
"confused"
and unsure
of
what
direction and
strategy
to
take in
reforming
459
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Sipple
Michigan's
K-12
schools.
Probablystemming
from
their
long-standing
involve-
ment
in
private
business,
the
group
assembled a
(wish)
list of ideas
for
altering
school
performance.
This included the
incorporation
of
free-market
mecha-
nisms in the educational system, the abolishment of the teachers' unions,
consolidation of smaller
districts,
and a
longer
school
year.
The
organization
possessed
little
capacity
to
frame
a
systemic
reform
agenda-as
called for
by
the National
Roundtable-and
struggled putting together
its
own
plan.
The
participants
had little
knowledge
outside
of
their
own
personal
K-12
experi-
ences and
so relied on their
business sense. At
this
early
stage,
the
National
Roundtable was
still
developing
its
agenda,
and the
National
Roundtable
Education Task Force
had
just begun
to meet and so
too had little
capacity
to
ensure that each
state
adopted
its
recommendations.
Hence,
in
1990
the
MI-
Roundtable had no template to guide its actions and little capacity to act as a
leader,
or
catalyst,
for
educational
improvement.
Institutional
Agents
Here
I
briefly
describe the
agents
with whom the
MI-Roundtable
nteracted.
The list was
constructed
by identifying
all
agents
with
whom the
MI-Roundtable
had
contact.
I
make
specific
note of the level
at which
the
agent
operated
and
the
messages
advanced.
Business
National
Roundtable.
The
National
Roundtable
functioned
at
the national level, but the decisions it made had a strong impact on the state
coalitions. It
sought
to
control and
direct the
state
initiatives while
continuing
to
maintain a
presence
on
the
national scene. The
National
Roundtable,
particularly
David
Hornbeck,
provided
direct
guidance
and
assessment
of the
state
coalitions,
as
evidenced
by
Hornbeck's
reading
and
commenting
on the
University
of
Michigan's
white
paper.
Its
national
presence
was
reflected
in
its
public
information
campaigns
(e.g.,
editorials)
and
lobbying
efforts
in
Washing-
ton
(e.g.,
Head
Start).
Member
companies.
The
personal
interests and
leadership
of
its
member
CEOs also prodded the fledglingMI-Roundtable.Thisstudycharacterizes he
CEOs of
member
companies
as
agents
external
to the
MI-Roundtable
because
the bulk
of the
work
on behalf
of the
MI-Roundtable
was and is
done
by
senior-
level
executives
within a
working
group,
not
by
CEOs
themselves.
The
organization
operated
with
the
endorsement,
support,
and
knowledge
of
the
CEOs,
but
the
day-to-day
actions did
not include
the chief
executives. For
this
reason,
when the
CEOs
did
act,
their
influence can
be
viewed as
external
to
the
operation
of
the
MI-Roundtable.
The
CEOsexhibited an
interest
in
developing
a
relationship
with the new
governor and in passing legislation.One CEOrevealed his perspective on what
most
needed to be
done:
"Wecan
sit
around
a
room and talk
about
what's
right
and what's
wrong
[with
schools]
but
unless
it's
really
decided
upon
and...put
into
effect
through
legislation,
[education
reform]
won't
work." The
CEOs
also
looked
for
results-evidence
that their
initiativewas
accomplishing something.
The
chief
executives
used
their'position
to
appoint
government
relations
personnel
to the
MI-Roundtableand
forge
a
relationship
with the
governor.
460
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Institutional Constraints on Business
Involvement
They
did not
meet with
local
superintendents
r
gather
nformation n
their
own.
The
only
evidence of CEO
activity
at the national
evel was
attendance
by
some
at
the annual
meeting
of the BusinessNational
Roundtable.
EconomicAllianceofMichigan.Inaddition o the NationalRoundtable
and
the member
companies,
he
only
evidence
of another nstitutional
gent
interacting
with the
MI-Roundtable
uring
he first
year
of
operation
was
an
organization
alled the EconomicAlliance
of
Michigan
hereafterAlliance).'
This
organization
onsisted
f
a
variety
f
business
organizationsncluding
abor
and trade
groups
such as the
Michigan
RealtorsAssociation nd the
Michigan
Manufacturersssociation. heAlliance ad
recently
egun
assembling
ts
own
agenda
for
reforming
Michigan
chools. It acted
by
advancing
pecific
policy
proposals
at the
state
level.
The
Alliance
planned
to affect
egislative
policy
decisions and assumed hatsuchpolicieswould filterdown to the locallevel,
influencing
eachersand schools. One
active MI-Roundtable
articipant
t-
tempted
to
engage
the two
groups, viewing
potential
collaborationas an
opportunity
or the
MI-Roundtableo broaden ts business ies
throughout
he
state and thus increase
ts
politicalcapital.
University
fMichigan.
Through
a
prior
association
with
the
president
of
the
University
f
Michigan,
he
MI-Roundtable
EOs ontacted
he
university
president
n
July
of
1990
to seek
guidance
on their
development
of a K-12
educationreform
agenda.
The
president
ubsequently
ontacted he dean
of
the university'sSchool of Education o inform him of the contactand to
recommendhe be involved.The
university aculty
had
ties to other
scholars
across
the
country,
supplementing
heir
own
expertise
on
policy
issues
of
interest o the
MI-Roundtable,
ystemic
reform,
and
public
policy.
Moreover,
the
university
professional
taff
(e.g.,
the
Government
Relations
Office)
pro-
vided
expertise
in
interacting
with
state
government
and the
media. This
bifaceted
approach
information
evelopment
and
politicalguidance)
proved
valuable
o
the
MI-Roundtable.
Governor's
ffice.
The
election
of
John
Engler
as
governor
n
November
of 1990 played a significantrole in the behavior and impactof the MI-
Roundtable.
Engler
ode
to
victory
on
a wave
of fiscal
conservatism.
A
slogan
repeated
often
by
Engler
alled
for
"new
priorities,
ot
new
taxes."
n
his
first
state-of-the-stateddress
February
1,
1991),
Engler
istedchildren s
his
"one
absolute
spending priority."
He
vowed
to
"put
education back at the
top
of
the
agenda."
The
governor
described"excellence n
every
school"as the
most
important
ational
oal.
Concurrent ith
his
top spending
priority, roperty
ax
reduction became
Engler's
number
one
method of
attracting
business
to
Michigan.
n his
first
peech
on the
topic
of
education,
Engler
mentioned he
MI-Roundtabley name andemphasized he mainpointsof itsagenda.
In
sum,
Engler
and
his staff
used a
bully
pulpit strategy
n which
they
identified and
proclaimed
goals
for
the
state,
but
they
left much of
the
implementation
nd
many
of
the details o
the local
level.
In
doing
this,
Engler
could
call
himself
the
education
governor
and
take
a
strong
eadership
role
while
not
getting
mired in
details,
regulations,
and
the
expense
of
state-
sponsored
programs.
Engler
quickly
consolidated
his
power
over issues of
461
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Sipple
education,
resulting
n broad
agreement
n who
was in
charge
of education
at
the state evel. For he
MI-Roundtable,
his
nearly pelled
disasteras
it
got
off
on the
wrong
foot
with
Engler
by
not
backing
him in
the
1990
gubernatorial
campaign.Throughpriorrelationships ndthehighstatusof MI-Roundtable
participants,
he MI-Roundtable
as able to work
to
gain
the
support
of
the
governor.
Michigan Partnershipor
New
Education. Anotheractor
in
Michigan
education
reform
was
the
MichiganPartnership
or New Education
hereafter
Partnership).
his
organization egan
at
Michigan
tate
University
n
1987
and
was funded
by
both
the stateand
private
ntities.
During
he
MI-Roundtable's
formative
ears,
he
Partnership
as
headed
by
the
dean of the
Michigan
tate
College
of
Education.2
The
primary
thrust
of
the
organization
was
to
reconceptualize he preparation f teachersand the relationshipbetween
universities nd
K-12
schools.
The main
program
romoted
by
the
Partnership
was
the
creationof
professional
development
schools in
which
university
faculty
ollaboratewith
K-12
personnel
o
improve
practice
nd
provide
a rich
environment or the
preparation
f new
teachers.
In
early
October
of
1990,
the
executive director
f the
Partnership
rote
the
MI-Roundtable
eadership.
The
letterwas
in
regard
o the
possibility
of
coordinating
he
efforts
of
the
Partnership
nd the
MI-Roundtable,
n
idea met
with
skepticism
t the
September
MI-Roundtable
orkinggroup
meeting.
The
director tressed heimportance fworking ogetherwith one voice:"Since
clear and
consistent
message
about educational
change
is
critical,
multiple,
conflicting
messages
will
encourage
business-as-usual'
n
Michigan's
chools
and
colleges."
The
director
also reminded he
leader
of
the
working group
about he
National
Roundtable
uidelines
orthe
state
coalitions,
which
stressed
the
importance
of
coalition
building.
Not-so-subtle
pressure
directed
at the
leader to
persuade
his
organization
o
join
forces with
the
Partnership
was
included
n
the
second
etter:
"Only ou
can
help
the
Michigan
artnership
nd
the
Michigan
National
Roundtable
ork
n
concert.
You
are
key
to our
building
a formidable lliance oreducational hangehere inMichigan."
Why
did
the
Partnership
antto
join
forces
with
the
MI-Roundtable?
hy
was the
MI-Roundtable
eluctant o
merge
with
the
Partnership?
he
answers
to these
questions
erveto
illuminate
he
complexities
f the
coalitions n
state
policymaking.
he
Partnership
anted
o
develop
a
close
working
relationship
withthe
MI-Roundtableo
increase ts
political apital
nd
broaden ts
resource
base.
The
Partnership
ad
only
a
single
sourceof
private
unds
(a
prominent
commercial
eal
estate
developer
n
Michigan)
nd
probably
iewed
the
large
MI-Roundtable
orporations
s
a
solid
sourceof
continued
inancial
upport.
TheMI-Roundtableas reluctant o joinwith the Partnershipecauseof the
relatively
narrow
conception
of
reform
advocated
by
the
Partnership.
How-
ever,
given
that he
developer,
Alfred
Taubman,
was also a
major
ontributor
to the
university,
he
president
ndicated hat t
was
very
important
o
include
Taubmanand
Michigan
State
University
President
ohn
DiBiaggio
n
the MI-
Roundtable
ctivities.The
deference
to
DiBiaggio
and the
developer
created
an
artificial
llegiance
to
and
inclusion
of
the
Partnership
n
MI-Roundtable
462
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