Download - Labrel
-
DIGEST POOL: Class VII LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
LABOR RELATIONS
SINGER SEWING MACHINE VS DRILON
Gr. No. 91307, January 24, 1991
DE LEON VS NLRC
Gr. No. 70705, August 21, 1989
SORREDA VS CAMBRIDGE ELECTRONICS
CORPORATION
Gr. No. 172927, February 11, 2010
CAPULE VS NLRC
Gr. No. 90653, November 12, 1990
SERRANO VS ISETANN
Gr. No. 117040, January 27, 2000
ALU-TUCP VS NLRC AND NATIONAL STEEL CORP.
Gr. No. 109902, August 2, 1994
DE JESUS VS PNCC
Gr. No. 89990, March 20, 1990
TOMAS LAO CONSTRUCTION VS NLRC
Gr. No. 116781, September 5, 1997
MARAGUINOT VS NLRC
Gr. No. 120969, January 22, 1998
VISAYAN STEVEDORE TRANS. CO. VS CIR
Gr. No. L-21696, February 25, 1967
MERCADO VS NLRC
Gr. No. 79869, September 5, 1991
BRENT SCHOOL VS ZAMORA
Gr. No. L- 48494, February 5, 1990
MILLARES AND LAGDA VS NLRC
Gr. No. 110524, July 29, 2002
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION
COMMISSION VS NLRC
Gr. No. 72222, January 30, 1989
ROBINSON'S GALLERIA VS IR RANCHEZ
Gr. No. 177937, January 19, 2011
MARIWASA MANUFACTURING VS LEOGARDO
Gr. No. 74246, June 26, 1989
MITSUBISHI MOTORS VS CHRYSLER PHIL LABOR
UNION
Gr. No. 148738, June 29, 2004
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
SINGER SEWING MACHINE VS DRILON
Gr. No. 91307, January 24, 1991
Facts:
Union filed a petition for Direct Certification as
exclusive bargaining agent but this was opposed by
respondent employer on the ground that union members
are not employees but are independent contractors.
The Med-Arbiter found that there exists an ER-EE
relationship and granted the petition. Drilon as Sec. of
Labor affirmed on appeal.
Respondent maintains that there is no ER-EE
relationship under Art. 294 asserting that to prove
there exists an ER-EE relationship, they the union
members should "perform the most desirable and
necessary activities for the continuous and effective
operations of the business of the petitioner Company"
Issue:
Whether or not respondents contention is
correct.
Held:
No. Art 294 is not the yardstick for determining
the existence of an employment relationship because it
merely distinguishes between two kind s of employees.
Art. 294 does not apply where the existence of an
employment relationship is in dispute.
The nature of the relationship between a company and its
collecting agents depends on the circumstances of each
particular relationship. Not all collecting agents are
employees and neither are all collecting agents
independent contractors. The collectors could fall under
either category depending on the facts of each case.
DE LEON VS NLRC
Gr. No. 70705, August 21, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner Moises de Leon was employed by the
private respondent at the Maintenance Section of its
Engineering Department doing painting works on
company buildings and equipments as well as other odd
jobs relating to maintenance. After more than one year of
service to the company, petitioner requested private
respondent that he be included in the payroll of regular
worker instead of being paid through petty cash voucher.
In response to the request, respondent distillery company
dismissed petitioner de Leon. The latter demanded for his
reinstatement but it was repeatedly refused. For this
reason, Moises de Leon filed a complaint of Illegal
Dismissal, reinstatement and payment of back wages
before the Office of the Labor Arbiter.
Labor Arbiter Bienvenido Hernandez finds the
complaint meritorious and rendered a decision in favor of
Moises De Leon. It ruled that the dismissal was illegal and
orders respondent company to reinstate the petitioner
with full back wages and other benefits. The Labor Arbiter
concluded that the dismissal of the petitioner from
service to the company after it requested to be treated as
a regular employee is an attempt to circumvent the legal
obligations of the employer towards a regular employee
On appeal, NLRC reversed the decision of the
labor Arbiter was REVERSED by majority decision. Motion
for Reconsideration was denied.
The Solicitor General recommends that the
petition which seeks to annul and set aside (a) the
majority decision of the NLRC; and (b) the Resolution
denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioners Argument: The Commission erred
and gravely abused its discretion in reversing the decision
of L.A. the commission did not consider the fact that the
tasks performed included not only painting but
maintenance work necessary and desirable in the usual
business of the respondent. His dismissal violates the
Constitutional and statutory protection of labor.
Respondents Argument: Petitioner was hired
only to repaint a building specifically Mama Rosa building
which task of repainting is not part of their main business
and he was informed that his engagement on the task is
on casual basis.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent is a regular
employee hence the dismissal of the respondent by the
company is Illegal.
Held:
YES. Article 281 of the Labor Code defines
regular and casual employment as follows: Art. 281.
Regular and casual employment. The provisions of a
written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and
regardless of the oral agreements of the parties, an
employment shall be deemed to be regular where the
employee has been engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer, except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been determined
at the time of the engagement of the employee or where
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature
and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is
not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That any employee who has rendered at least one
year of service, whether such service is continuous
or broken, shall be considered a regular employee
with respect to the activity in which he is employed
and his employment shall continue while such
actually exists
The provision reinforces Constitutional mandate for
protection of labor, it manifests the tenurial interest of
the worker who may be denied the rights and benefits
due a regular employee by virtue of lopsided agreements
with the economically powerful employer who can
maneuver to keep an employee on a casual status for as
long as convenient.
In the case at bar, the respondent company,
which is engaged in the business of manufacture and
distillery of wines and liquors, claims that petitioner was
contracted on a casual basis specifically to paint a certain
company building and that its completion rendered
petitioner's employment terminated. This may have been
true at the beginning, and had it been shown that
petitioner's activity was exclusively limited to painting
that certain building, respondent company's theory of
casual employment would have been worthy of
consideration.
However, during petitioner's period of
employment, the records reveal that the tasks assigned to
him included not only painting of company buildings,
equipment and tools but also cleaning and oiling
machines, even operating a drilling machine, and other
odd jobs assigned to him when he had no painting job.
It is not tenable to argue that the painting and
maintenance work of petitioner are not necessary in
respondent's business of manufacturing liquors and
wines, just as it cannot be said that only those who are
directly involved in the process of producing wines and
liquors may be considered as necessary employees.
Otherwise, there would have been no need for the regular
Maintenance Section of respondent company's
Engineering Department, manned by regular employees
like Emiliano Tanque Jr., whom petitioner often worked
with.
Furthermore, the petitioner performed his work
of painting and maintenance activities during his
employment in respondent's business which lasted for
more than one year, until early January, 1983 when he
demanded to be regularized and was subsequently
dismissed. Certainly, by this fact alone he is entitled by
law to be considered a regular employee. And considering
further that weeks after his dismissal, petitioner was
rehired by the company through a labor agency and was
returned to his post in the Maintenance Section and made
to perform the same activities that he used to do, it
cannot be denied that as activities as a regular painter
and maintenance man still exist.
The law overrides such conditions which are
prejudicial to the interest of the worker whose weak
bargaining position needs the support of the State. That
determines whether a certain employment is regular or
casual is not the will and word of the employer, to which
the desperate worker often accedes, much less the
procedure of hiring the employee or the manner of paying
his salary. It is the nature of the activities performed in
relation to the particular business or trade considering all
circumstances, and in some cases the length of time of its
performance and its continued existence.
DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
National Labor Relations Commission are hereby annulled
and set aside. The Order of Labor arbiter Bienvenido S.
Hernandez dated April 6, 1984 is reinstated. Private
respondent is ordered to reinstate petitioner as a regular
maintenance man and to pay petitioner 1) backwages
equivalent to three years from January 16,1983, in
accordance with the Aluminum Wage Orders in effect for
the period covered, 2) ECOLA 3) 13th Month Pay, 4) and
other benefits under pertinent Collective Bargaining
Agreements, if any.
SORREDA VS CAMBRIDGE ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
Gr. No. 172927, February 11, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by respondent as a
technician for a period of 5 months at minimum
wage. Five weeks into the job, petitioner met an accident
in which his left arm was crushed by a machine and had to
be amputated.
Petitioner claimed that, shortly after his release
from the hospital, officers of respondent company called
him to a meeting with his common-law wife, father and
cousin. There he was assured a place in the company as a
regular employee for as long as the company existed and
as soon as he fully recovered from his injury.
After he recovered from his injury, petitioner
reported for work. Instead of giving him employment,
they made him sign a memorandum of resignation to
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
formalize his separation from the company in the light of
the expiration of his five-month contract.
Petitioner filed in the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC a complaintfor illegal dismissal (later
changed to breach of contract).He claimed that
respondent failed to comply with the terms of the
contract of perpetual employment.
Respondent denied that it extended regular
employment to petitioner. Only words of encouragement
were offered but not perpetual employment. Moreover, it
assailed the labor arbiters jurisdiction over the case,
claiming a lack of causal connection between the alleged
breach of contract and their employer-employee
relationship.
LABOR ARBITER:
held that he had jurisdiction to hear and decide
the case as it involved the employer-employee
relationship of the contending parties.
that petitioner who had been employed on a
per-project basis became a regular employee by virtue of
the contract of perpetual employment. He stated that the
positive declaration of the witnesses (common-law wife,
father and cousin) present at the meeting and the parole
evidence rule was enough to support the petitioners
claim.
he ruled that petitioner was employed by
respondent for an indefinite period of employment (that
is, on regular status.) He ordered petitioners
reinstatement.
Respondent appealed to the NLRC and asked for
the reversal of the labor arbiters decision based on grave
abuse of discretion for assuming jurisdiction over the case.
NLRC- agreed with respondent. It found that petitioner
was not a regular employee; thus, he was neither illegally
dismissed nor entitled to reinstatement and back wages.
COURT OF APPEALS affirmed the decision of NLRC
Issue:
Whether or not the labor arbiter had the
jurisdiction to take cognizance thereof.
Held:
In Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. v. Todaro, the
Court reiterated that where no employer-employee
relationship exists between the parties, and the Labor
Code or any labor statute or collective bargaining
agreement is not needed to resolve any issue raised by
them, it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction.
Thus it has been consistently held that the
determination of the existence of a contract as well as the
payment of damages is inherently civil in nature. A labor
arbiter may only take cognizance of a case and award
damages where the claim for such damages arises out of
an employer-employee relationship.
In this instance, petitioner was clearly a per-
project employee of private respondent, resulting in an
employer-employee relationship. Consequently, questions
or disputes arising out of this relationship fell under the
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter.
However, based on petitioners allegations in his
position paper, his cause of action was based on an alleged
second contract of employment separate and distinct from
the per-project employment contract. Thus, petitioner
insisted that there was a perfected contract of perpetual
employment and that respondent was liable to pay him
damages.
While there was an employer-employee
relationship between the parties under their five-month
per-project contract of employment, the present dispute is
neither rooted in the aforestated contract nor is it one
inherently linked to it. Petitioner insists on a right to be
employed again in respondent company and seeks a
determination of the existence of a new and separate
contract that established that right. As such, his case is
within the jurisdiction not of the labor arbiter but of the
regular courts. The NLRC and the CA were therefore
correct in ruling that the labor arbiter erroneously took
cognizance of the case.
While the Constitution recognizes the primacy of
labor, it also recognizes the critical role of private
enterprise in nation-building and the prerogatives of
management. A contract of perpetual employment
deprives management of its prerogative to decide whom
to hire, fire and promote, and renders inutile the basic
precepts of labor relations. While management may validly
waive it prerogatives, such waiver should not be contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs.
An absolute and unqualified employment for life in the
mold of petitioners concept of perpetual employment is
contrary to public policy and good customs, as it unjustly
forbids the employer from terminating the services of an
employee despite the existence of a just or valid cause. It
likewise compels the employer to retain an employee
despite the attainment of the statutory retirement age,
even if the employee has became a non-performing
asset or, worse, a liability to the employer.
Moreover, aside from the self-serving claim of
petitioner, there was no concrete proof to establish the
existence of such agreement. Petitioner cannot validly
force respondent to enter into a permanent employment
contract with him. Such stance is contrary to the
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
consensuality principle of contracts as well as to the
management prerogative of respondent company to
choose its employees.
CAPULE VS NLRC
Gr. No. 90653, November 12, 1990
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAW; LABOR RELATIONS; CASUAL EMPLOYEES,
WHEN CONSIDERED REGULAR; CASE AT BAR. The
Solicitor General opines that the cutting of the cogon
grass at the back portion of the building of private
respondents may be considered to be usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of
private Respondent. The Court disagrees. The usual
business or trade of private respondents is the
manufacture of cultured milk. The cutting of the cogon
grasses in the premises of its factory is hardly necessary or
desirable in the usual business of the private respondents.
Indeed, it is alien thereto. Thus, petitioners are casual
employees who cannot be considered regular employees
under the aforestated provision of the Labor Code.
Nevertheless, they may be considered regular employees
if they have rendered services for at least one (1) year.
When, as in this case, they were dismissed from their
employment before the expiration of the one-year period
they cannot lawfully claim that their dismissal was illegal.
Facts:
Private respondent company is engaged in the
manufacture of cultured milk which is sold under the
brand name "Yakult.
Petitioners were hired to cut cogon grass and
weeds at the back of the factory building used by private
respondents. They were not required to work on fixed
schedule and they worked on any day of the week on
their own discretion and convenience. The services of the
petitioners were terminated by the private respondent.
Thus, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). After the position papers of the parties were filed,
a decision was rendered by the labor arbiter on finding
the dismissal of the petitioners to be illegal and requiring
the private respondent to reinstate them immediately to
their former position with full backwages and without loss
of seniority rights. The private respondent appealed to
the NLRC. Commissioner Conrado B. Maglaya rendered a
decision setting aside the appealed decision and issuing a
new judgment ordering private respondent to pay
petitioners one (1) months pay each based on
humanitarian considerations.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari where
petitioners allege that the public respondent NLRC
committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering the
aforestated decision. Petitioners invoke the provision of
Article 4 of the Labor Code and of Article 1702 of the Civil
Code wherein all doubts should be resolved in favor of
labor.
Issue:
Whether or not casual or temporary employees
may be dismissed by the employer before the expiration
of the one-year period of employment. No!
Held:
The petition is devoid of merit.
Article 280 of the Labor Code provides as follows:
"Article 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of
the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be performed
is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it
is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one
year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular employee with
respect to the activity in which he is employed and
his employment shall continue while such actually
exists.
The Solicitor General opines that the cutting of the
cogon grass at the back portion of the building of private
respondents may be considered to be usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of
private Respondent. The Court disagrees. The usual
business or trade of private respondents is the
manufacture of cultured milk. The cutting of the cogon
grasses in the premises of its factory is hardly necessary or
desirable in the usual business of the private respondents.
Indeed, it is alien thereto.
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
Thus, petitioners are casual employees who
cannot be considered regular employees under the
aforestated provision of the Labor Code. Nevertheless,
they may be considered regular employees if they have
rendered services for at least one (1) year. When, as in
this case, they were dismissed from their employment
before the expiration of the one-year period they cannot
lawfully claim that their dismissal was illegal.
Indeed, private respondent had shown that the
services of the petitioners were found to be
unsatisfactory, so, their termination.
The petition is DISMISSED.
SERRANO VS ISETANN
Gr. No. 117040, January 27, 2000
Facts:
Ruben Serrano was the head of the security
checkers section of Isetann Department Store. He was
charged with the task of supervising security checkers in
their jobs (apprehending shoplifters and preventing
pilfirege of merchandise). On October 11, 1991, the
management sent him a letter immediately terminating
his services as security section head, effective on the
same day. The reason given by the management was
retrenchment;they had opted to hire an independent
security agency as a cost-cutting measure. Serrano filed a
complaint for ID, illegal layoff, ULP, underpayment of
wages and nonpayment of salary and OT pay with the LA.
The LA rendered a decision in favor of Serrano.
It stated that Isetann failed to establish that it had
retrenched its security division, that the petitioner was
not accorded due process, etc. and even stated that the
day after Serranos dismissal, Isetann employed a safety
and security supervisor with similar duties to that of the
former.
The NLRC on the other hand reversed the LA but
ordered Isetann to pay separation pay equivalent to one
month per year of service, unpaid salary, and others. It
held that the phase-out of the security section was a valid
exercise of management prerogative on the part
of Isetann, for which the NLRC cannot substitute its
judgment in the absence of bad faith or abuse of
discretion on the part of the latter; and that the security
and safety supervisors position was long in place prior to
Serranos separation from the company, or the phase-out
of the Security Section.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners dismissal was
illegal.
Held:
Valid, but without legal effect / ineffectual
payment of backwages, separation pay and other
monetary claims Not illegal. The Court held that the
dismissal was due to an authorized cause under Art. 283
of the Labor Code, i.e. redundancy. However, while an
authorized cause exists, Isetann failed to follow
the procedural requirement provided by Art. 283 of the
Code. For termination due to authorized causes, the
employer must give a written notice of termination to
the employee concerned and to the DOLE at least 30 days
prior to its effectivity. This is what Isetann failed to do.
The question now arises as to whether the failure of
Isetann to comply with the procedural requirements
renders the dismissal invalid, or, in the event that it is
valid, what the appropriate sanction or penalty must be
meted out.
Prior to the doctrine laid down in the decision
rendered in Wenphil Corp. vs. NLRC in 1989, the
termination of an employee, even for just cause but
without following the requisite procedure, renders such
dismissal illegal, and therefore null and void. In the
Wenphil doctrine, this was reversed; the said rule was
unjust to employers. Instead, the dismissal was held to be
still valid but the employer was sanctioned by way of
the payment of indemnity (damages), in that case, P1,
000. The amount of indemnity will depend on the
circumstances of each case, taking into account
the gravity of the offense committed by the employer.
Now, the Court once again examines the Wenphil
doctrine. Puno says that the effect of the Wenphil
doctrine was such that there has been a dismiss now,
pay later policy where the employers were able to
circumvent the procedural requisites of termination,
which is more convenient than the compliance with the
30-day notice. Panganiban said that the monetary
sanctions were too insignificant, niggardly, sometimes
even late. Both justices are of the opinion that the
deprivation of due process which must be accorded to the
employee renders the dismissal illegal. Puno quoted that
Legislative, Executive and Judicial proceedings that
deny due process do sounder the pain of nullity.
Panganiban stated that such denial of due process
renders decisions and proceedings void for lack of
jurisdiction.
The present ruling of the Court held that the
dismissal of the employee is merely ineffectual, not void.
The dismissal was upheld but it is ineffectual. The
sanction provided was the payment of backwages
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
from the time of dismissal up to the decision of the court
finding just or authorized cause. This was thought to
balance the interests of both parties, recognizing the
employees right to notice and at the same time the right
of the employer to dismiss for any of the just and
authorized causes. The Court also responded to the
arguments of Justices Puno and Panganiban by stating
that the violation in the procedural requirement of
termination I snot a denial of the fundamental right to
due process. This is because of the following reasons:
1) The due process clause is a limitation on governmental
powers, inapplicable to the exercise of private power,
such as in this case.
The provision No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty and property without due process of law
pertains only to the State, as only it has the authority
to do the same.
2) The purpose of the notice and hearing under the Due
process clause is to provide an opportunity for the
employee to be heard before the power of the
organized society is brought upon the individual.
Under Art. 283, however, the purpose is to give him
time to prepare for the eventual loss of his job and for
DOLE to determine whether economic causes exist
to justify termination. It is not to give opportunity to
be heard there is no charge against the employee
under Art. 283
3) The employer cannot be expected to be an impartial
judge of his own cause.
4) Not all notice requirements are requisites of due
process. Some are simply a part of a procedure to be
followed before a right granted to party can be
exercised; others are an application of the Justinian
precept. Such is the case here. The failure of the
employer to observe a procedure for the termination
of employment which makes the termination
of employment merely ineffectual.
5) Art. 279 of the LC provides that only dismissal without
just or authorized cause renders such dismissal illegal.
To consider termination without observing procedural
requirements as also ID is to add another ground for
ID, thereby amending Art. 279.;Further,there is a
disparity in legal treatment, as employees who resign
without giving due notice are only liable for damages;
it does not make their resignation void.
In this case, the separation pay was a distinct
award from the payment of backwages as a way
of penalty. Petition was denied.
ALU-TUCP VS NLRC AND NATIONAL STEEL CORP.
Gr. No. 109902, August 2, 1994
Facts:
Petitioners were hired by respondent NSC in
connection with its Five Year Expansion Program. The said
program aims to expand the volume and increase the
kinds of production of respondent company. Thus, after
the completion of the project, petitioners were separated
from NSC's service.
Separate complaints for Unfair Labor Practice
were filed with the NLRC. NLRC consolidated the
complaints and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared
that petitioners were "Regular Project Employees" who
shall continue their employment as such for as long as
such [project] activity exists," but entitled to the salary of
a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the
collective bargaining agreement. It also ordered payment
of salary differentials. Both parties appealed the decision
to the NLRC. Petitioners argued that they were regular,
not project, employees. Private respondent, on the other
hand, claimed that petitioners are project employees as
they were employed to undertake a specific project
NSC's Five Year Expansion Program (FAYEP I & II).
NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's holding that
petitioners were project employees since they were hired
to perform work in a specific undertaking the Five
Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had
been determined at the time of their engagement and
which operation was not directly related to the business
of steel manufacturing. The NLRC, however, set aside the
award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed
by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis.
Petitioner's appealed to the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the NLRC is correct in finding
petitioners as "project employees". YES
Held:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment
The provisions of the written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of
the parties, and employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer, except
where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
An employment shall be deemed to be casual
if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year
service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to
the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such actually exists. (Emphasis
supplied)
The principal test for determining whether
particular employees are properly characterized as
"project employees" as distinguished from "regular
employees," is whether or not the "project employees"
were assigned to carry out a "specific project or
undertaking," the duration (and scope) of which were
specified at the time the employees were engaged for
that project.
The carrying out of the Five Year Expansion
Program (or more precisely, each of its component
projects) constitutes a distinct undertaking identifiable
from the ordinary business and activity of NSC. Each
component project, of course, begins and ends at
specified times, which had already been determined by
the time petitioners were engaged. We also note that NSC
did the work here involved the construction of
buildings and civil and electrical works, installation of
machinery and equipment and the commissioning of such
machinery only for itself. Private respondent NSC
was not in the business of constructing buildings and
installing plant machinery for the general business
community, i.e., for unrelated, third party, corporations.
NSC did not hold itself out to the public as a construction
company or as an engineering corporation.
Whichever type of project employment is
found in a particular case, a common basic requisite is
that the designation of named employees as "project
employees" and their assignment to a specific project, are
effected and implemented in good faith, and not merely
as a means of evading otherwise applicable requirements
of labor laws.
During the time petitioners rendered services
to NSC, their work was limited to one or another of the
specific component projects which made up the FAYEP I
and II. There is nothing in the record to show that
petitioners were hired for, or in fact assigned to, other
purposes, e.g., for operating or maintaining the old, or
previously installed and commissioned, steel-making
machinery and equipment, or for selling the finished steel
products.
Petitioners next claim that their service to NSC
of more than six (6) years should qualify them as regular
employees. We believe this claim is without legal basis.
The simple fact that the employment of petitioners as
project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does
not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as project
employees. 10
The second paragraph of Article 280 of the
Labor Code, quoted above, providing that an employee
who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be
considered a regular employee, relates to casual
employees, not to project employees.
DE JESUS VS PNCC
Gr. No. 89990, March 20, 1990
Facts:
Petitioner was a carpenter for the respondents
PNCP. While on duty, he vomited blood and was treated
at the company clinic after which he was sent home.
When he reported back in December, he was no longer
accepted and was informed by the General Manager of
the respondent that he had been replaced, after which he
sought reinstatement but he was rebuffed by the
company.
He instituted a complaint for initial pay first but
amended it and prayed for reinstatement for illegal
dismissal plus backwages and payment of legal benefits.
Private respondent presented petitioners 201-
file which disclosed that he had been hired as a
carpenter and among the terms and conditions of his
employment was that he was being employed only for
the period and specific work stated in his appointment,
and that as a project worker he was subject to the
provisions of Policy instructions No. 20, that his
separation was due to the completion of the project, and
that he had signed a clearance wherein he admitted
having received all remunerations due him.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. Petitioner
appealed but it was dismiss by NLRC on ground that the
appeal had been filed unseasonably. On reconsideration,
NLRC nevertheless affirmed LAs decision.
In support of this petition, the petitioner
attached thereto, among other things, certain "personnel
action forms" which showed that he was given
appointments for specific projects on several dates from
1974 to 1984 and that since January 15, 1978, he had
been a member of the CDP Employees Savings & Loan
Associations, and that, as a result, he has become a
regular, not a project, employee, who may be terminated
only for a lawful cause.
Issue:
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
Whether or not the petitioner is a non-project
employee, therefore entitled to regular employment
having rendered service for more than ten years.
Held:
SC ruled in favor of petitioner.
Basis: Article 280 of the Labor Code:
Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral
agreement of the parties, an employment shall be
deemed to be regular where the employee has been
engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer, except where the employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the
completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be
performed is (sic) seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it
is not covered by the preceding paragraph; Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to
the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such actually exists.
It is clear from the records that the petitioner is,
a non-project employee and is, hence, entitled to regular
employment having rendered service for more than ten
years. As such, he cannot be terminated unless for just
cause.
Without question, the petitioner, a carpenter,
performs work "necessary, or desirable" in the
construction business, the respondent corporation's field
of activity. The fact however that he had been involved in
project works will not alter his status because the law
requires a "specific project or undertaking the completion
or termination of which has been determined at the time
of the engagement" in order to make a project employee
a true project employee. Based on his employment
contract: Your herein Appointment Employment will be
co-terminus with the need of Structures [of North Luzon
Expressway (Stage) II] as it will necessitate personnel in
such number and duration contingent upon the progress
accomplishment from time to time. The company shall
determine the personnel and the number as the work
progresses.
we cannot say that the petitioner's
engagement has been pre-determined because the
duration of the work is "contingent upon the progress
accomplishment" and secondly, the company, under the
contract, is free to "determine the personnel and the
number as the work progresses." Clearly, the employment
is subject to no term but rather, a condition, that is,
"progress accomplishment." It cannot therefore be said to
be definite that will therefore exempt the respondent
company from the effects of Article 280.
Based therefore on the personnel action
forms,(Policy Instructions No. 20 of the Secretary of
Labor) submitted to this Court, the petitioner is either a
member of a work pool of workers, which Policy
Instructions No. 20 terms as "non-project employees," or
at the very least, a probationary worker who, after the
period of six months, has achieved a regular status.
As a regular employee, the petitioner could not
have been validly terminated by reason alone of the
completion of the project.
TOMAS LAO CONSTRUCTION VS NLRC
Gr. No. 116781, September 5, 1997
Facts:
Private respondents alternately worked for
petitioners Tomas Lao Corporation (TLC), Thomas and
James Developers (T&J) and LVM Construction
Corporation (LVM), altogether informally referred to as
the Lao Group of Companies, the three (3) entities
comprising a business conglomerate exclusively controlled
and managed by members of the Lao family. TLC, T&J and
LVM are engaged in the construction of public roads and
bridges. Under joint venture agreements they entered
into among each other, they would undertake their
projects either simultaneously or successively so that,
whenever necessary, they would lease tools and
equipment to one another. Each one would also allow
the utilization of their employees by the other
two (2). With this arrangement, workers were
transferred whenever necessary to on-going projects of
the same company or of the others, or were rehired after
the completion of the project or project phase to which
they were assigned. Soon after, however, TLC ceased its
operations while T&J and LVM stayed on.
Sometime in 1989 Andres Lao, Managing
Director of LVM and President of T&J issued a
memorandum requiring all workers and company
personnel to sign employment contract forms and
clearances which were issued on 1 July 1989 but
antedated 10 January 1989. These were to be used
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
allegedly for audit purposes pursuant to a joint venture
agreement between LVM and T&J. To ensure compliance
with the directive, the company ordered the withholding
of the salary of any employee who refused to sign. Quite
notably, the contracts expressly described the
construction workers as project employees whose
employments were for a definite period, i.e., upon the
expiration of the contract period or the completion of the
project for which the workers was hired.
Except for Florencio Gomez all private
respondents refused to sign contending that this scheme
was designed by their employer to downgrade their status
from regular employees to mere project
employees. Resultantly, their salaries were
withheld. They were also required to explain why their
services should not be terminated for violating company
rules and warned that failure to satisfactorily explain
would be construed as disinterest in continued
employment with the company. Since the workers stood
firm in their refusal to comply with the directives their
services were terminated.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal/termination were
illegal.
Held:
The principal test in determining whether
particular employees are project employees
distinguished from regular employees is whether the
project employees are assigned to carry out specific
project or undertaking, the duration (and scope) of
which are specified at the time the employees are
engaged for the project. Project in the realm of
business and industry refers to a particular job or
undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of
employer, but which is distinct and separate and
identifiable as such from the undertakings of the
company. Such job or undertaking begins and ends at
determined or determinable times. While it may be
allowed that in the instant case the workers were initially
hired for specific projects or undertakings of the company
and hence can be classified as project employees, the
repeated re-hiring and the continuing need for their
services over a long span of time (the shortest, at seven
[7] years) have undeniably made them regular
employees. Thus, we held that where the employment of
project employees is extended long after the supposed
project has been finished, the employees are removed
from the scope of project employees and considered
regular employees.
Moreover, if private respondents were indeed
employed as project employees, petitioners should
have submitted a report of termination to the nearest
public employment office every time their employment
was terminated due to completion of each construction
project. The records show that they did not. Policy
Instruction No. 20 is explicit that employers of project
employees are exempted from the clearance requirement
but not from the submission of termination report. We
have consistently held that failure of the employer to file
termination reports after every project completion proves
that the employees are not project employees. Nowhere
in the New Labor Code is it provided that the reportorial
requirement is dispensed with. The fact is that
Department Order No. 19 superseding Policy Instruction
No. 20 expressly provides that the report of termination is
one of the indicators of project employment.
The NLRC was correct in finding that the workers
were illegally dismissed. The rule is that in effecting a
valid dismissal, the mandatory requirements of
substantive and procedural due process must be strictly
complied with. These were wanting in the present
case. Private respondents were dismissed allegedly
because of insubordination or blatant refusal to comply
with a lawful directive of their employer. But willful
disobedience of the employers lawful orders as a just
cause for the dismissal of the employees envisages the
concurrence of at least two (2) requisites: (a) the
employees assailed conduct must have been willful or
intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a
wrongful and perverse attitude; and, (b) the order
violated must have been reasonable, lawful, made known
to the employee and must pertain to the duties which he
has been engaged to discharge. The refusal of private
respondents was willful but not in the sense of plain and
perverse insubordination. It was dictated by necessity
and justifiable reasons - for what appeared to be an
innocent memorandum was actually a veiled attempt to
deny them their rightful status as regular employees. The
workers therefore had no option but to disobey the
directive which they deemed unreasonable and unlawful
because it would result in their being downsized to mere
project workers. This act of self-preservation should not
merit them the extreme penalty of dismissal. DENIED.
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
MARAGUINOT VS NLRC
Gr. No. 120969, January 22, 1998
Facts:
Alejandro Maraguinot (Maraguinot) alleges that he
was employed by Viva Films (Viva) as part of the filming
crew. He was later designated as Assistant Electrician and
then later promoted to Electrician.
Paulinmo Enero (Enero) likewise claims that Viva
hired him as a member of the shooting crew. Maraguinot
and Eneros tasks consisted of loading, unloading and
arranging movie equipment in the shooting area.
They later asked the company that their salaries be
adjusted in accordance with the minimum wage law. In
response, the company said that they would grant the
adjustment provided they signed a blank employment
contract. When they refused, they were forced to go on
leave. Upon his return, the company refused to take
Enero back. As regards Maraguinot, he was dropped from
the company payroll, but was later returned. When again
he refused to sign the blank contract, his services were
terminated.
Maraguinot and Enero then sued for illegal
dismissal. VIVA CLAIMS that they contract persons called
producers/assistant producers to make movies and
contend that Maraguinot and Enero are project
employees of these producers who act as independent
contractors. Hence there is no employer-employee
relationship between them. In addition, Viva claims that
Maraguinot was hired for the movie Mahirap Maging
Pogi, while Enero was hired for the movie Sigaw ng
Puso.
LABOR ARBITER: ruled in favor of Maraguinot and
Enero and held that they were employees of Viva and as
such were illegally dismissed by the latter.
NLRC: reversed the LA and ruled that the
circumstances of the case showed that they were only
project employees of Viva.
Issues:
Whether or not Maraguinot and Enero are
employees of Viva. They were regular employees.
Whether or not they were illegally dismissed.
Yes.
Held:
ISSUE - 1
Viva claims that the producers were job
contractors.
However, under Section 8 of Rule VIII, Book III of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, to be
considered a job contractor, such associate producers
must have tools, equipment, machinery, work premises
and other materials necessary to make motion picture.
The associate producers had none of these, and that in
fact, the movie making equipment is owned by Viva.
Given that, these producers can be considered
only as labor-only contractors. As such is prohibited, the
law considers the person or entity engaged in the same a
mere agent or intermediary of the direct employer.
BUT EVEN GIVEN THAT, these producers cannot
be considered as job contractors, much less labor-only
contractors as they did not supply, recruit nor hire the
workers. In this case, it was Viva who recruited the crew
members from an available groups of freelance workers
which include the complainants.
The relationship between Viva and its producers
seem to be that of agency as the latter makes movies on
behalf of Viva whose business is that of making movies.
The existence of an employer-employee
relationship between Maraguinot & Enero and Viva is
further supported by the following: The four elements
under 4-fold test are present. CONTROL: Viva has a
Supervising Producer that monitors the progress of the
producers. Viva, in effect, controls the outcome of the
film and the means through which it is produced.
SELECTION AND SUPERVISION: Viva issued appointment
slips with their corporate name as the heading. SALARIES:
It was likewise Viva who paid the employees salaries.
ISSUE 2
While Maraguinot and Enero were possibly
initially hired as project employees, they had attained the
status of regular employees.
A project employee or a member of a work
pool may acquire the status of a regular employee when
the ff. concur: There is a continuous rehiring of project
employees even after cessation of the project. The tasks
performed are vital, necessary and indispensable to the
usual business or trade of the employer.
The length of time during which the employee
was continuously rehired is not controlling, but merely
serves as a badge of regular employment.
In this case, Enero was employed for 2 years
and engaged in at least 18 projects; while Maragunot was
employed for 3 years and worked on at least 23 projects.
Citing Lao vs. NLRC, the could held that a work
pool may exist although the workers in the pool do not
receive salaries and are free to seek other employment
during temporary breaks in the business, provided that the
workers shall be available when called to report for a
project. Although primarily applicable to regular seasonal
workers, this setup can likewise be applied to project
workers in so far as the effect of temporary cessation of
work is concerned.
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
Once a project or work pool employee has
been (a) continuously, as opposed to intermittently,
rehired by the same employer for the same tasks or
nature of tasks; (b) these tasks are vital, necessary, and
indispensable to the usual business or trade of the
employer, then the employee must be deemed a regular
employee, pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code and
jurisprudence.
As Maraguinot and Enero have already gained
the status of regular employees, their dismissal was
unwarranted since the cause invoked for their dismissal
(completion of the project) is not one of the valid causes
for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code.
VISAYAN STEVEDORE TRANS. CO. VS CIR
Gr. No. L-21696, February 25, 1967
Facts :
VISTRANCO is engaged in loading and unloading
of vessels, with a branch office in Hinigaran, negros
occidental. Under the management of Rafael Xaudaro. Its
workers are supplied by UWFA whose men have regularly
worked as laborers of the company every milling season
since the time of world war II up to the milling season
immediately preceding nov. 11 1955 when the company
refused to engage services of Venanvio Dano-og,
Buenventura, Agarcio and 137 other persons. At the
behest of the UWFA and the complainants, a complaint
for unfair labor practice was, accodingly, filed against the
company and xaudaro with the CIR which ruled that the
company is guilty of unfair labor practice hence ordered
the company to ceases and desist from such unfair labor
practice and to reinstate the compainants with back
wages.
Issue:
Whether or not VISTRANCO is guilty of unfair
labor practice
Held:
Yes. The said charge is substantially borne out by
the evidence of record, it appears that the workers not
admitted to work beginning from november 1995 were
precisely those belonging to the UWFA. And Mr. Xaudaro,
the company branch manager, had told them point blank
that severance of their connection with the UWFA was
the remedy if they wanted to continue working with the
company.
MERCADO VS NLRC
Gr. No. 79869, September 5, 1991
Facts:
The petition stemmed from the illegal dismissal,
under payment of wages, non-payment of overtime pay,
holiday pay, service incentive leave benefits, emergency
cost of living allowances and 13th month pay, filed by the
petitioner against private respondents before the NLRC.
Petitioners are agricultural workers utilized by
the private respondents. Fortunato Mercado and Leon
Santillan worked in that farm owned by the respondent
since 1949 up to 1979. Petitioner alleged that they were
illegally dismissed.
Private respondent in her answer denied that
said petitioners were her regular employees and instead
averred that she engaged their services, through Spouses
Fortunato Mercado, Sr. and Rosa Mercado, their
"mandarols", that is, persons who take charge in
supplying the number of workers needed by owners of
various farms, but only to do a particular phase of
agricultural work necessary in rice production and/or
sugar cane production, after which they would be free to
render services to other farm owners who need their
services.
The other private respondents denied having
any relationship whatsoever with the petitioners and
state that they were merely registered owners of the land
in question included as correspondents in this case.
Respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino
ruled in favor of private respondents and held that
petitioners were not regular and permanent workers of
the private respondents, for the nature of the terms and
conditions of their hiring reveal that they were required
to perform phases of agricultural work for a definite
period of time after which their services would be
available to any other farm owner.
Both parties filed their appeal with the National
Labor Relations Commissions (NLRC). Petitioners
questioned respondent Labor Arbiter's finding that they
were not regular and permanent employees of private
respondent Aurora Cruz while private respondents
questioned the award of financial assistance granted by
respondent Labor Arbiter.
The NLRC ruled in favor of private respondents
affirming the decision of the respondent Labor Arbiter.
The Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are regular and
permanent farm workers and therefore entitled to the
benefits which they pray for.
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
Held:
No. they are project employees.
A careful examination of the foregoing statements reveals
that the findings of the Labor Arbiter in the case are ably
supported by evidence. There is, therefore, no
circumstance that would warrant a reversal of the
questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by
the National Labor Relations Commission.
The contention of petitioners that the second paragraph
of Article 280 of the Labor Code should have been applied
in their case presents an opportunity to clarify the afore-
mentioned provision of law.
Article 280 of the Labor Code reads in full:
Article 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The
provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of
the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular
where the employee has been engaged to perform
activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking the completion or termination of which has
been determined at the time of the engagement of the
employee or where the work or services to be performed
is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the
duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual
if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of
service whether such service is continuous or broken,
shall be considered a regular employee with respect to
the activity in which he is employed and his employment
shall continue while such actually exists.
The first paragraph answers the question of who
are employees. It states that, regardless of any written or
oral agreement to the contrary, an employee is deemed
regular where he is engaged in necessary or desirable
activities in the usual business or trade of the employer,
except for project employees.
A project employee has been defined to be one
whose employment has been fixed for a specific project
or undertaking, the completion or termination of which
has been determined at the time of the engagement of
the employee, or where the work or service to be
performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season as in the present case.
The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as
"casual" employees, all other employees who do not fan
under the definition of the preceding paragraph. The
proviso, in said second paragraph, deems as regular
employees those "casual" employees who have rendered
at least one year of service regardless of the fact that
such service may be continuous or broken.
Petitioners, in effect, contend that the proviso in
the second paragraph of Art. 280 is applicable to their
case and that the Labor Arbiter should have considered
them regular by virtue of said proviso. The contention is
without merit.
The general rule is that the office of a proviso is
to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately
preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the
clause that it immediately follows.
Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of
Labor and Employment discloses that the concept of
regular and casual employees was designed to put an end
to casual employment in regular jobs, which has been
abused by many employers to prevent called casuals from
enjoying the benefits of regular employees or to prevent
casuals from joining unions. The same instructions show
that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 was
not designed to stifle small-scale businesses nor to
oppress agricultural land owners to further the interests
of laborers, whether agricultural or industrial. What it
seeks to eliminate are abuses of employers against their
employees and not, as petitioners would have us believe,
to prevent small-scale businesses from engaging in
legitimate methods to realize profit. Hence, the proviso is
applicable only to the employees who are deemed
"casuals" but not to the "project" employees nor the
regular employees treated in paragraph one of Art. 280.
Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project
employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal
employees, their employment legally ends upon
completion of the project or the season. The termination
of their employment cannot and should not constitute
an illegal dismissal.
BRENT SCHOOL VS ZAMORA
Gr. No. L- 48494, February 5, 1990
Facts:
Private respondent Doroteo R. Alegre was
engaged as athletic director by petitioner Brent School,
Inc. at a yearly compensation of P20,000.00. The contract
fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years, i.e.,
from July 18, 1971, the date of execution of the
agreement, to July 17, 1976. Subsequent subsidiary
agreements dated March 15, 1973, August 28, 1973, and
September 14, 1974 reiterated the same terms and
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
conditions, including the expiry date, as those contained
in the original contract of July 18, 1971.
On April 20,1976, Alegre was given a copy of the
report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor
advising of the termination of his services effective on July
16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination was
"completion of contract, expiration of the definite period
of employment." Although protesting the announced
termination stating that his services were necessary and
desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his
employment lasted for 5 years - therefore he had
acquired the status of regular employee - Alegre accepted
the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor
containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the
period May 16, to July 17, 1976 as full payment of
contract."
The Regional Director considered Brent School's report as
an application for clearance to terminate employment
(not a report of termination), and accepting the
recommendation of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give
such clearance and instead required the reinstatement of
Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former
position without loss of seniority rights and with full back
wages.
Issue:
Whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code
have anathematized "fixed period employment" or
employment for a term.
Held:
Respondent Alegre's contract of employment
with Brent School having lawfully terminated with and by
reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period
thereof, he is declared not entitled to reinstatement.
The employment contract between Brent School
and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971, at a time when
the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet
been promulgated. At that time, the validity of term
employment was impliedly recognized by the Termination
Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. Prior,
thereto, it was the Code of Commerce (Article 302) which
governed employment without a fixed period, and also
implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment
with a fixed period. The Civil Code of the Philippines,
which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became
effective on August 30,1950, itself deals with obligations
with a period. No prohibition against term-or fixed-period
employment is contained in any of its articles or is
otherwise deducible therefrom.
It is plain then that when the employment contract was
signed between Brent School and Alegre, it was perfectly
legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the
duration thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly
recognized as valid by this Court.
The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed
by fixed-period employment contracts under the Labor
Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1,
1974. The Code contained explicit references to fixed
period employment, or employment with a fixed or
definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle
of licitness of term employment began to take place at
about this time.
Article 320 originally stated that the "termination
of employment of probationary employees and those
employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such
regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe."
Article 321 prescribed the just causes for which an
employer could terminate "an employment without a
definite period." And Article 319 undertook to define
"employment without a fixed period" in the following
manner: where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer, except
where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or
service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding
employment with "a definite period" and "regular"
employment were amended by Presidential Decree No.
850, effective December 16, 1975.
Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed
period employment," was altered by eliminating the
reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and
was renumbered (becoming Article 271).
As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code,
under a narrow and literal interpretation, not only fails to
exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the
lack of a fixed period would be an anomaly, but would
also appear to restrict, without reasonable distinctions,
the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his
employer the duration of his engagement, it logically
follows that such a literal interpretation should be
eschewed or avoided. The law must be given a reasonable
interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application.
Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and
subverting to boot the principle of freedom of contract to
remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to
prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure
is like cutting off the nose to spite the face or, more
relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.
Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon
the effect of the expiry of an agreed period of
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
employment as still good rulea rule reaffirmed in the
recent case of Escudero vs. Office of the President (G.R.
No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous
case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of
termination following the expiration of the last of three
successive fixed-term employment contracts, the Court
held: Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It
loses sight of the fact that her employment was
probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a
definitive period. At the expiration of the period
stipulated in the contract, her appointment was deemed
terminated and the letter informing her of the non-
renewal of her contract is not a condition sine qua non
before Reyes may be deemed to have ceased in the
employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder
that Reyes' contract of employment was due to expire
and that the contract would no longer be renewed. It is
not a letter of termination.
Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's
employment was terminated upon the expiration of his
last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without
the necessity of any notice. The advance written advice
given the Department of Labor with copy to said
petitioner was a mere reminder of the impending
expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor
an application for clearance to terminate which needed
the approval of the Department of Labor to make the
termination of his services effective. In any case, such
clearance should properly have been given, not denied.
MILLARES AND LAGDA VS NLRC
Gr. No. 110524, July 29, 2002
Facts:
Douglas Millares was employed by
ESSO Internationalthrough its local manning agency,
Trans-Global, in 1968 as a machinist. In 1975, he was
promoted as Chief Engineer which position he occupied
until he opted to retire in 1989. In 1989, petitioner
Millares filed a leave of absence and applied for optional
retirement plan under the Consecutive Enlistment
Incentive Plan (CEIP) considering that he had already
rendered more than twenty years of continuous service.
Esso International denied Millares request for optional
retirement on the following grounds, to wit: 1) he was
employed on a contractual basis 2) his contract of
enlistment (COE) did not provide for retirement before
the age of sixty years; 3) he did not comply with the
requirement for claiming benefits under the CEIP, i.e., to
submit a written advice to the company of his intention to
terminate his employment within thirty days from his last
disembarkation date.
Subsequently, after failing to return to work after
the expiration of his leave of absence, Millares was
dropped from the roster of crew members effective
September 1, 1989. On the other hand, petitioner Lagda
was employed by Esso International as wiper/oiler in
1969. He was promoted as Chief Engineer in 1980, a
position he continued to occupy until his last COE expired
in 1989. In 1989, Lagda likewise filed a leave of absence
and applied to avail of the optional early retirement plan
in view of his twenty years continuous service in the
company. Trans-global similarly denied Lagdas request
for availment of the optional early retirement scheme on
the same grounds upon which Millares request was
denied. Unable to return for contractual sea service after
his leave of absence expire, Lagda was also dropped from
the roster of crew members effective September 1, 1989.
Millares and Lagda filed a complaint-affidavit for
illegal dismissal and non-payment of employee
benefits against private respondents
Esso International and Trans-Global before the POEA. The
POEA rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit. On appeal, NLRC affirmed the decision of
the POEA dismissing the complaint. NLRC rationcinated
that Millares and Lagda, as seamen and overseas contract
workers are not covered by the term regular
employment as defined under Article 280 of the Labor
Code. The POEA, which is tasked with protecting the
rights of the Filipino workers for overseas employment to
fair and equitable recruitment and employment practices
and to ensure their welfare, prescribes a standard
employment contract for seamen on board ocean-going
vessels for a fixed period but in no case to exceed twelve
months.
Issue:
Whether or not seafarers are considered regular
employees under Article 280 of the Labor Code
Held:
No, It is for the mutual interest of both the
seafarer and the employer why the employment status
must be contractual only or for a certain period of time.
Quoting Brent School Inc. v. Zamora, 1990, and Pablo
Coyoca v. NLRC, 1995, the Supreme Court ruled
thatseafarers are considered contractual employees. They
can not be considered as regular employees under Article
280 of the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by
the contracts they sign everytime they are rehired and
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
their employment is terminated when the contract
expires. Their employment is contractually fixed for a
certain period of time. They fall under the exception of
Article 280 whose employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of
engagement of the employee or where the work or
services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
As ruled in Brent case, there are certain forms of
employment which also require the performance of usual
and desirable functions and which exceed one year but do
not necessarily attain regular employment status under
Article 280. Overseas workers includingseafarers fall
under this type of employment which are governed by the
mutual agreements of the parties. And as stated in the
Coyoca case, Filipino seamen are governed by the Rules
and Regulations of the POEA. The Standard Employment
Contract governing the employment of All Filipino seamen
on Board Ocean-Going Vessels of the POEA, particularly in
Part I, Sec. C specifically provides that the contract of
seamen shall be for a fixed period. And in no case should
the contract of seamen be longer than 12 months.
Moreover, the Court held that it is an accepted maritime
industry practice that employment of seafarers are for a
fixed period only. Constrained by the nature of their
employment which is quite peculiar and unique in itself, it
is for the mutual interest of both the seafarer and the
employer why the employment status must be
contractual only or for a certain period of
time. Seafarers spend most of their time at sea and
understandably, they can not stay for a long and an
indefinite period of time at sea. Limited access to shore
society during the employment will have an adverse
impact on the seafarer. The national, cultural and lingual
diversity among the crew during the COE is a reality that
necessitates the limitation of its period.
INTERNATIONAL CATHOLIC MIGRATION COMMISSION
VS NLRC
Gr. No. 72222, January 30, 1989
Facts:
Petitioner International Catholic Migration
Commission (ICMC), a non-profit organization dedicated
to refugee service at the Philippine Refugee Processing
Center in Morong, Bataan engaged the services of private
respondent Bernadette Galang on January 24, 1983 as a
probationary cultural orientation teacher with amonthly
salary of P2,000.00.
Three (3) months thereafter, private respondent
was informed, orally and in writing, that her services were
being terminated for her failure to meet the prescribed
standards of petitioner as reflected in the performance
evaluation of her supervisors during the teacher
evaluation program she underwent along with other
newly-hired personnel.
On August 1983, private respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and
unpaid wages against petitioner with the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment, praying for reinstatement with
backwages, exemplary and moral damages.
On October 1983, after the parties submitted
their respective position papers and other pleadings, the
Labor Arbiter rendered his decision dismissing the
complaint for illegal dismissal as well as the complaint for
moral and exemplary damages but ordering the petitioner
to pay private respondent the sum of P6,000.00 as
payment for the last three (3) months of the agreed
employment period pursuant to her verbal contract of
employment.
Dissatisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition.
Petitioner maintains that private respondent is not
entitled to the award of salary for the unexpired three-
month portion of the probationary period since her
services were terminated during such period when she
failed to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with
the reasonable standards prescribed by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent is a
probationary employee?
Held:
The Court held, There is no dispute that private
respondent was terminated during her probationary
period of employment for failure to qualify as a regular
member of petitioner's teaching staff in accordance with
its reasonable standards. Records show that private
respondent was found by petitioner to be deficient in
classroom management, teacher-student relationship and
teaching techniques. Failure to qualify as a regular
employee in accordance with the reasonable standards of
the employer is a just cause for terminating a
probationary employee specifically recognized under
Article 282 (now Article 281) of the Labor Code which
provides thus:
ART. 281. Probationary employment.
Probationary employment shall not exceed six months
from the date the employee started working, unless it is
covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
longer period. The services of an employer who has been
engaged in a probationary basis may be terminated for a
just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular
employer in accordance with reasonable standard made
known by the employer to the employee at the time of his
engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a
probationary period shall be considered a regular
employee.
A probationary employee, as understood under
Article 282 (now Article 281) of the Labor Code, is one
who is on trial by an employer during which the employer
determines whether or not he is qualified for permanent
employment. A probationary appointment is made to
afford the employer an opportunity to observe the fitness
of a probationer while at work, and to ascertain whether
he will become a proper and efficient employee. The
word "probationary", as used to describe the period of
employment, implies the purpose of the term or period,
but not its length.
Being in the nature of a "trial period" the essence
of a probationary period of employment fundamentally
lies in the purpose or objective sought to be attained by
both the employer and the employee during said period.
The length of time is immaterial in determining the
correlative rights of both in dealing with each other during
said period. While the employer, as stated earlier,
observes the fitness, propriety and efficiency of a
probationer to ascertain whether he is qualified for
permanent employment, the probationer, on the other,
seeks to prove to the employer, that he has the
qualifications to meet the reasonable standards for
permanent employment.
It is well settled that the employer has the right
or is at liberty to choose who will be hired and who will be
denied employment. In that sense, it is within the exercise
of the right to select his employees that the employer
may set or fix a probationary period within which the
latter may test and observe the conduct of the former
before hiring him permanently.
ROBINSON'S GALLERIA VS IR RANCHEZ
Gr. No. 177937, January 19, 2011
Facts:
Respondent was a probationary employee of
petitioner Robinsons Galleria/Robinsons Supermarket
Corporation (petitioner Supermarket) for a period of five
(5) months, or from October 15, 1997 until March 14,
1998. She underwent six (6) weeks of training as a cashier
before she was hired as such on October 15, 1997. Two
weeks after she was hired, or on October 30, 1997,
respondent reported to her supervisor the loss of cash
amounting to P20,299.00 which she had placed inside the
company locker.
Petitioner Jess Manuel (petitioner Manuel), the
Operations Manager of petitioner Supermarket, ordered
that respondent be strip-searched by the company
guards. However, the search on her and her personal
belongings yielded nothing. Respondent acknowledged
her responsibility and requested that she be allowed to
settle and pay the lost amount. On March 12, 1998,
petitioners sent to respondent by mail a notice of
termination and/or notice of expiration of probationary
employment dated March 9, 1998. Respondent filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and damages.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent was illegally
terminated.
Held:
Yes. petitioners failed to accord respondent
substantive and procedural due process.
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code mandates that
subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of
tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal,
except for just and authorized cause and without
prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283
of the same Code, the employer shall furnish the worker,
whose employment is sought to be terminated, a written
notice containing a statement of the causes of
termination, and shall afford the latter ample opportunity
to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of a
representative if he so desires, in accordance with
company rules and regulations pursuant to the guidelines
set by the Department of Labor and Employment.
A probationary employee, like a regular
employee, enjoys security of tenure. However, in cases of
probationary employment, aside from just or authorized
causes of termination, an additional ground is provided
under Article 281 of the Labor Code, i.e., the probationary
employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as
a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee
at the time of the engagement. Thus, the services of an
employee who has been engaged on probationary basis
may be terminated for any of the following: (1) a just or
(2) an authorized cause; and (3) when he fails to qualify as
a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards prescribed by the employer.
-
Case Digest Class 7 LABOR RELATIONS
m meikimouse
An illegally or constructively dismissed employee,
respondent is entitled to: (1) either reinstatement, if
viable, or separation pay, if reinstatement is no
longer viable; and (2) backwages. These two reliefs are
separate and distinct from each other and are awarded
conjunctively. In this case, since respondent was a
probationary employee at the time she w