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Southeast Asia Research Centre
Federico Ferrara
Ltat, ce nest plus moi: Popular Sovereignty andCitizenship over a Century of Thai Political Development
Working Paper Series
No. 110
October 2011
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The Southeast Asia Research Centre (SEARC) of the City University of Hong
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Copyright is held by the author or authors each Working Paper.
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Note: The views expressed in each paper are those of the author or authors of the paper.
They do not represent the views of the Southeast Asia Research Centre, its Management
Committee, or the City University of Hong Kong.
Southeast Asia Research Centre Management CommitteeProfessor Mark R. Thompson, Director
Dr Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Associate DirectorDr Chiara Formichi
Dr Nicholas Thomas
Dr Bill Taylor
Editor of the SEARC Working Paper SeriesProfessor Mark R. Thompson
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Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, No. 110, 2011 3
LTAT,CENESTPLUSMOI
POPULARSOVEREIGNTYANDCITIZENSHIPOVER
ACENTURYOFTHAIPOLITICALDEVELOPMENT
FEDERICOFERRARA*
1.KINGOFTHEJUNGLECoups dtatwork by the law of thejungle, not the law of the land.That is to say, an illegal
seizureofpower isonlytrulyillegalso longasitisnotsuccessful.Decidedlymorerecent isthe
notionthatamilitarycoupstagedinThailandstandslittlechanceofbeingsuccessfulinthefirst
place,without the endorsement of King BhumibolAdulyadej. It stands to reason thatArmyCommanderinChief Sonthi Boonyaratglinwould be photographed on his knees at Chitrlada
Palace,justoveranhourafterannouncingthatthemilitaryhadseizedpowerontheeveningof
September 19, 2006. After all, by then the generals every move had been painstakingly
choreographedtoimpressuponthepublicthe ideathatthecouphadbeenstagedintheKings
name,ifnotonhisbehalf.Yellowribbonsandflowersadornedtanks,uniforms,andassaultrifles.
GiantportraitsofKing andQueen served as thebackground formajor announcements.Royal
Commandswere read in elaborate ceremoniesbroadcaston televisionbeforegarish shrines toTheirMajesties.Thejuntasstudiouslyverbosename,theCouncilforDemocraticReformunder
theKing asHeadofState,wasofficially changedmore than tendays after the coup,butnot
beforemakingsurethatthepeoplehadheardthemessage loudandclear.Thailand,tobesure,
hadseenroyalistcoupsbefore,butnoneasawash inroyalsymbolism.Thenagain,themilitary
*Assistant Professor, City University of Hong Kong, Department ofAsian and International
Studies.AnearlierversionofthispaperwaspresentedattheconferenceonFiveYearsaftertheMilitary Coup: Thailands Political Developments since Thaksins Downfall, Institute of
SoutheastAsianStudies,Singapore,September19,2011.
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hadneverremovedaPrimeMinisteraspopularasThaksinShinawatra.Aslifequicklyreturnedto
normal,itwasevidentthatroyalsanctionalonecouldhavemutedpublicoppositiontothecoup,
orstavedoffthepossibilitythatthedeposedPrimeMinistermightputupanyresistance.
Asthejuntadeployeditsarsenalofroyalsymbolstoforestallactiveoppositioninthestreets,the
centralroleplayedbyKingBhumibolinthelegalprocessthatgovernedthetransitioneffectively
thwartedanyattemptThaksincouldotherwisehavemade tochallenge the legalityof thecoup
andcontinuetopresenthimself,internationally,asThailandsrightful,dejurePrimeMinister.By
any reasonable legal standard, the generals had no authority to abrogate Thailands 1997
constitution.Inturn,intheabsenceofaconstitutionspecifyingthescopehispowers,Bhumibol
had no real legal standing to endorse the generals illegal act, grant them immunity from
prosecution,orpromulgate the interimcharterhandeddownonOctober 1,2006.At the sametime,Thaksincouldnotpossiblyhavedared topointout theobvious lackof legal foundations
besettingtheprocess.Challengingthe legalityofhisreplacementwouldnotonlyhaverequired
ThaksintoarguethattheKingssignaturewasinconsequentialtothevalidityofkeydocuments
that governed the transition, but also effectively assert that Bhumibol had enabled an illegal
(indeed, treasonous)act.That forcedThaksinandhissupporters toargueagainst themeritsof
staging the coup, a subjectwhere thedeposedPrimeMinister stoodonmuch shakierground,
giventhatmuchofwhatwassaidabouthimwasactuallytrue.
Quite aside from the strategic import of the monarchys endorsement, the broadbased
acceptanceof the legalityof the coup, and themeasures imposed in its immediate aftermath,
reveals a conception of sovereignty quite different from that undergirding any constitutional
monarchy.InThailand,thatis,themonarchysauthorityexistsquiteindependentlyofwhatthe
constitutionhappenstoprovide.Andwhilemostconstitutionsintroducedsince1932havemade
some reference to the concept of popular sovereignty, the fact that the King conserves his
authorityevenaftertheconstitutionisabrogatedindicatesthatHisMajestyreignsbysomething
moreakintonaturalrightthanpositivelaw.1NotedroyalistPramuanRuchanaseristatedasmuch
in abestsellingbookpublishedbefore thecoup,wherehe argued correctly, as amatterof
empiricalobservationthattheconstitutionisnotabovetheKinginanyway[...]thestatusof
theKingdoesnotcomeundertheconstitution(cited inPasukandBaker2009:255256).That
1Foranaccountofhowthedraftersofthe1997constitutionmanagedtheambiguity,seeConnors
(2008:150151).
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wascertainlynotthecaseinthefirstquartercenturyaftertheremovaloftheabsolutemonarchy.
Overaweekafter stagingThailands lastantiroyalistcoup, the RadioCoupofNovember29,
1951,adelegationledbyGeneralPhinChoonhavanvisitedthepalacetoinformBhumibolthat
thejuntawasreturningpowersthatwereseizedfromhimwhentheconstitutionwasabrogated
(see Bangkok Post, December 7, 1951). By 2006, no military man, much less a Muslim and a
polygamist, couldpresume to takeover anyof theKingspowers,orhave the impudence to
informhimofthejuntasdecisiontorestorehisprerogatives.Indeed,whereasthestatedintent
ofthe1932revolutionhadbeentoplacetheKingundertheConstitution,overhissixtyfiveyear
reignBhumibolhasoverseentheemergenceofasystemofgovernmentthateffectivelyelevates
theKing,andhisassociates,abovetheconstitution.
Thefiveyearssincethe2006couphaveexposedthefatalflawsofThailandsformaldemocracywiththeKingabovetheconstitution.Notonlydidthecoupsetinmotionaseriesofeventsthat
plunged thecountry intoasituationofgreatpolitical instabilityandprolongedcivil strife.The
actionsnecessarytotheremovalofThaksinandhisproxieshavegivenrisetoaseverecrisisof
legitimacymarkedby ahithertounseenmeasureof resentment for the royal family, complete
withexpressionsofpublicdisgust forthemonarchythatwouldhavebeenunthinkablejust five
yearsago.Indeed,thepoliticalcrisisthathasgrippedThailandforthelastfiveyearscouldbesaid
tobetheexpressionofacleavage2thathasvariouslydefinedpoliticalstrugglessincethedaysofthe absolute monarchy the conflict overwhether sovereignty, or constituent power, rests
withthepeopleortheKing.Thisfundamentaldisputehasimportantimplicationsformanyofthe
pressing(ifoftenunspoken)normativequestionsdefiningThailandspresentpoliticaldebate.Do
therights,duties,powers,anddecisionmakingproceduresspelledoutintheconstitutionspring
fromthepeopleortheKing?Inotherwords,totheextentthatthepeoplehaverights,dothey
enjoysuchrightsascitizens that is,as fullmembersof thecommunitywhoare equalwith
respect to the rightsanddutieswithwhich the status isendowed"3oras subjects towhom
certainfreedomsandlegalprotectionsaremerelydelegatedbyahighersovereignpower,perhaps
in measures commensurate with social status? In turn, should the King as well as the
multiplicity of individuals, organizations, and institutions claiming to speak for, or act in the
interestof,themonarchybeinanywayconstrainedbytheconstitution,oreffectivelyaboveit?
2LipsetandRokkan (1967: 10)explain that (functional)cleavages mightbenothingmore than
direct struggles among competing elites for central power, but they might also reflect deeperdifferencesinconceptionsofnationhood,overdomesticpriorities,andoverexternalstrategies.3ThisistheclassicdefinitionofcitizenshipofferedbyT.H.Marshall(1964[1949]:84).
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Anddo theseactorshave legitimateauthoritytoundo, throughextraconstitutionalmeans,the
resultsofprocessesconductedinaccordancewiththeconstitution?
E.E. Schattschneider (1988[1960]) argued that political conflicts tend to be as contagious as
streetfights.Thoughaparticularconflictmaystartoutasadisputelimitedtoasmallnumberof
activeparticipants,boththenatureandtheoutcomeofthefightchangeasalargeraudience
joinsin.Inthespecificcase,overthepastcenturyandahalftheconflictbetweenduelingnotions
ofsovereigntyandcitizenshiphasspilledoverfromahighlyexclusivecircleinthecourtofKing
Chulalongkorn to increasingly broad andvaried constituencies. The progressive contagion of
conflictcanlargelybeattributedtosocioeconomicchange,whichmadevariousgroupsexcluded
fromtheoriginaldebateincreasinglylikelytojointhefight,ofteninresponsetoappealstotheir
desireforpoliticaloreconomicempowerment.Whataccountsfortheuneven,nonlinearnature
ofthecontagion isthattheseconstituencieshadtobeawakened,galvanized,andmobilizedbyone side or the other before they could themselves turn into active participants. Given the
multiplicityof cleavages in Thai society, and the internal diversity of all major constituencies,
different groupsdidnot always enter the fray asblocks,norwere their allegiancesnecessarily
fixed.Atdifferent times,moreover,different sideswerevariously successful in theirattempt to
eitherprivatizeorsocializetheconflict.Fordecades,royalistssuccessfullyremovedthefight
oversovereigntyfromthepublicarenawhilerepressiondiscouragedpubliccallsforlimitations
in royal authority, the states propaganda enforced a false sense of unanimity that allowedroyaliststoprevailwithoutanopenconfrontation.Theconflictsexplosivereemergenceafterthe
2006coupwasdrivenbyacombinationofreasonsofbothastructuralandcontingentnature.
Accounts of the political crisis triggered by the 2006 coup are dominated by three narratives,
whichalternativelydescribetheongoingconflictasafightbetweendemocracyanddictatorship,
thejuxtaposition of twovisions of democracy, or something of a Hobsons choice between
differentformsofauthoritarianism.4Thispapersketchesoutanintegratedapproach,examining
the historical process bywhich both the royalist and populist5 positions, aswell as the
prevailingalignmentsonbothsidesofthefight,havedevelopedoverthepastcentury,drawing
onSchattschneiders logictoaccommodatethemultiplicityofmotivationsanimatingthemajor
4 For a rich sampling, see Montesano, Pavin, and Aekapol (2011). Thongchai (2008) also
demolishes a fourthnarrativeofThailandspolitical crisis,whichdescribes the2006 coupas a
coupfordemocracy.5Thewordpopulistisusedinthiscontextonlyasalabelforsupportersofpopularsovereignty,
withoutanyimplicationfortheireconomicplatformortheirrhetoricalstyle.
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playersandconstituencies involved.At theelite level,nakedpower is treatedasa far stronger
motive,forroyalistsandThaksinitesalike,thantheidealsinwhichbothsidescouchtheirappeals
forpopularsupport.Inparticular,thepropensityofkeyplayerstochangetheirpositions,switch
sides,andatdifferenttimeschoosetoeitherprivatizeorsocializetheconflict isevidenceof
thefactthatelitesseektodefinethetermsofthefightbasedoninterest,strategiccalculus,and
situational factors more than any values or ideals. At the same time, as Schattschneider
(1988[1960]:4)pointedout,eachsizable increase inthenumberofparticipantsmustbeabout
something,beyond simple elite interest, as newcomershave sympathies and antipathies that
make itpossible to involve them.While stipulatingThaksins insincerity, andhispronounced
authoritariantendencies,thisapproachrecognizesthatthereasonsforhisremovalwereothers,
and interprets the backlash against the repeated subversion of the electoral process as both
visceralandprincipled,notjustpatronagebased.6
2.FAIT(IN)ACCOMPLIThailands(thenSiam)absolutemonarchycametoanendwithapredawncoupdtatstagedon
June24, 1932byagroupofmostlyyoung, foreigneducatedmilitaryofficersandcivil servants.
Upon seizing power, the Promoters mapped out a tenyear transition to full representative
democracy.The 1932 coup,however,hadbeen less about democracy than ithadbeen aboutconstitutionalism,7 the ambition to limit royal authority and place the King under a
constitution. The six principles spelled out in the FirstAnnouncement of the Peoples Party
included freedom () and individual autonomy () aswell as the provision of
equalrights(),suchthattheroyalclassdoesnothavemorerightsthanthepeople
(). Crucially, the Promoters declared that the country belongs to the
people, not to the King, as he has fraudulently claimed ( ). The temporary constitution promulgatedwithin aweek of the coupvested supreme
power in the people (Art. 1) and specified that the King, togetherwith the legislature, the
executive,andthecourts,wouldexercisepoweronbehalfofthepeople(Art.2).
6
ForanaccountpresentingthecrisisasaconflictbetweendifferentelementsoftheThaielite,whohavemobilizedrivalpatronagebasednetworksofsupporters,seeMcCargo(2009:9).7SeeElster(1993)forgreaterinsightintothisdistinction.
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The conflict betweendueling notions of sovereignty and citizenship had emerged in the early
period of National Revolution8 set in motion in Siam by the sweeping bureaucratic reforms
enactedbyKingChulalongkorn in the latenineteenth century.Thedebateover limitations to
monarchicalpoweriscustomarilytracedbackto1885,whenelevenmembersoftheSiameseroyal
elitestudyingabroadwrotetoChulalongkorn,advisinghimtoinitiateagradualtransitioninthe
directionofconstitutionalmonarchy.BythetimethequestionwasputdirectlytotheKing,the
conflicthadalreadybeenspreading through theranksof thegreatlyexpandedcivilian/military
bureaucracy, especially the new bureaucratic bourgeoisie recruited from among commoners
whohad received aWesternor Westernstyle education.Theirgrievanceswere amixtureof
private motives and philosophical positions. On the one hand, the coexistence of a salaried,
modern bureaucracywith a system of patronage designed to preserve the privilege of the old
nobilitystifledopportunitiesforcareeradvancementforthosewhoselineagelaggedbehindtheireducational achievement.On theotherhand, the exposure that theseofficialshad received to
Westernliberalideasprovidedideologicalcontenttotheirdiscontentoverarbitraryroyalpower
andprivilege,fosteringagrowingidentificationwithanideaofthenationdissociatedfromthe
personoftheKing(seeKullada2004).
Havingonlyrecentlysucceeded inwrestingpoweraway frommoreconservativeprinceswithin
hisowncourt,Chulalongkornhadinitiallyrespondedtotherequestputtohimin1885byarguingthatlimitationstohisauthoritywouldhaveactuallycompromisedtheimplementationofreforms
necessarytoprotectSiams independence.In theensuingyears,however,theKingmoved from
reasoningexclusivelyongroundsofexpediencytosketchingoutamoreideologicaldefenseofhis
personal power aimed at cementing the loyalty of the bureaucracy. In a series of speeches,
Chulalongkorn elaborated on his opposition to liberal reforms by emphasizing (and vastly
overstating) the differences between European and Siamese conceptions of kingship, thereby
asserting the incompatibility of Western political institutions with local traditions (see
8NationalRevolutionsentailthegrowthofnationalbureaucracies,thewideningofthescopeof
governmental activities, aswell as an effort by the state to foster the emergence of a single
nationalidentitythroughcultural,linguistic,andsometimesreligiousstandardization(seeLipset
andRokkan 1967: 13).Amongother things, theprocess tends togenerateoppositionsbetween
differentgroupsofnationbuildersovertheorganizationofthestate,particularlyoverissuesof
popularsovereignty,rights,secularism,constitutionalism,anddemocracy.Innineteenthcentury
WesternEurope, theprocessushered inthedevelopmentofrepresentative institutionsandtheextensionof the franchise, amongother civil and political rights.For an earlier application to
Siam/Thailand,seeOckey(2005).
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Murashima 1988:8489).His sonandsuccessor,KingVajiravudh (r. 19101925), fleshedout this
argumentindefenseofroyalabsolutismmorefully,craftingatheoryofofficialnationalismthat
stressedtheidentificationofnationandking.Amongotherthings,VajiravudhsvisionofThai
society entailed a by now familiar distinction between phu yai, big men tasked with the
responsibilitytorule,andphunoi,littlepeoplewhoseservicetothenationwastobemeasured
intermsoftheirsubmissionandcompliance(seeBarm1993:31).
WhileKingVajiravudhs ideasprovedquite influential, in the long run, to thedevelopmentof
Thainationalist ideology, in the shorttomedium term theyhad littleeffecton shoringup the
loyaltyof thecountrysofficialdom. In fact,Vajiravudhsreignwasdistinguishedby the further
contagion of conflict. This took place as a result of the diffusion of ideas of progress and
individual equality aswell as contingent factors, particularly the growing dissatisfactionwithVajiravudhsprofligacyandtheselfindulgenceofprominentmembersoftheroyalfamily.Bythe
end of the Sixth Reign, the boom of popular newspapers catering to a bourgeois and upper
middle class readership led to the popularization ofverbal andvisual content that routinely
portrayedroyalsandnoblemenasacorrupt,debauched,parasiticelite(seeBarm2002:Ch.4).
WhenVajiravudhwassucceededbyhisbrother,Prajadhipok, in1925,threatstothemonarchys
continuedexistencefiguredprominentlyinthenewKingswillingnesstoconsiderpromulgatinga
constitution. Ultimately, the failure to enact one reflected unresolved doubts in Prajadhipokscourtoverwhetherthedelegationinsomeofhispowers,insteadofdefusingthepotentialforthe
monarchy to succumb toa rebellion,couldhave in factaccelerated theconflictscontagionby
raisingfurtherquestionsabouttheKingsstrength,competence,andcommitment.9
MuchlikeWesternEurope,wherethecompetitionbetweenliberalsandconservativesdominated
thepoliticalscene throughout theperiodofNationalRevolution, themainpoliticalcleavage in
the aftermath of Siams 1932 coup placed liberalradical proponents of popular sovereignty,
constitutionalism,andgradualdemocraticreformsagainstconservativeroyalistelementsaspiring
to restoreroyalauthority. InWesternEurope,however, liberalsandconservativesweregivena
chancetofightouttheirdifferencesintheelectoralarena,suchthatbythetimeuniversal(male)
suffragewasgranted(mostlyintheaftermathofWorldWarI),conservativepartieshadgivenup
onadvocatingforareturntotheancienrgime(seeCaramani2004:199204).Thingsturnedout
9ForanoverviewofthedebatesonconstitutionalisminPrajadhipokscourt,seeFerrara(2012).
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quite differently in Siam,where the conflictwas never resolved in the liberals favor, giving
royalistsachancetoqualifyandultimatelysubverttheprincipleofpopularsovereignty.
ThedivergenceintheoutcomesproducedbyNationalRevolutionsinWesternEuropeandSiam
canbeexplained largelybydifferencesinthesequenceandtimingoftheprocess.Perhapsmost
important,whereastheWesternEuropeanstruggleforcivilandpoliticalrightsinthenineteenth
centuryintersectedwiththeIndustrialRevolution,whichtriggeredaprogressivemassification
ofpolitics,SiamsNationalRevolutiontookplacewellbeforetheemergenceofanyworkingclass
movement,or forthatmatterany formofmassmobilization.ThecoupstagedonJune24,1932
was broadlywelcomed by Bangkoks small uppermiddle class, but much of the rest of the
country reactedwith indifference to the events in the capital.While the absence of popular
involvement,insupportoroppositiontothecoup,mayhavehelpedensurethesmoothnessoftheoperation, the masses indifference and backwardness discouraged the Promoters from
attempting tobroaden their fight against the royalist establishment.10The timingof the coup,
moreover,aidedtheroyalistsinitialcounterrevolutionaryeffort.Atatimewhengovernmentsin
manycountries inEuropeandelsewhere facedarevolutionarychallengebycommunistparties,
Siameseroyalistsexploitedthespecterofcommunismtounderminethepublicstrustinthenew
government anddriveawedgebetweenmore conservative and radical factionsof thePeoples
Party(seeNattapoll2010).ThecounterrevolutioneventuallyfailedtodislodgethePromoters,orrestore any of the Kings old prerogatives. But the resulting instability, and the authoritarian
measurestakeninresponse,createdanopeningforthesubsequentreassertionofthemonarchys
statusandpower.
Monthsbeforehisabdication,KingPrajadhipokissuedasternwarningtothegovernmentofPhya
PhahonPhonphayuhasena.Therearethosewhostillbelieveintheabsolutemonarchybecause
ofitslonghistory,hewrote,butnobodywillstandfortheabsoluteruleofthekhana.11Infact,
thePeoplesPartynevercameclosetoexercising absoluterule.But theKinghadnonetheless
correctlyidentifiedtheregimesAchillesheelinitstendencytoconferuponthoseinpowerthe
10 The fact that the countrys tiny industrial/commercialbourgeoisiewasdominatedby ethnic
Chinese,whoalsoaccounted forat leasthalfofBangkokssmallurbanworkingclass,served to
further caution the Promoters against the prospect of mobilizing these constituencies. For a
discussionofthedilemmafacedbythePromotersinthisregard,seeSkinner(1957:219).11Thesewordsappear inaRoyalNote () transmitted to thegovernment inDecember
1934(seeOfficialReportontheAbdicationofKingPrajadhipok1935:105).
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roleof soleprotectorsof theconstitutionandonly true representativesof thepeople.Still in
officebutshakenbythefailedcounterrevolutionand lessthanconfident intheirownpullwith
theelectorate,thePromotersoptedtomanagetheconflictinsteadofbroadeningit,andchoseto
controlcivilsocietyratherthantakeachanceonitsmobilization.Intheyearscomprisedbetween
Prajadhipoksabdicationin1935andtheonsetofWorldWarII,Colonel(andthenFieldMarshal)
Phibun Songkhram presided over the countrys slide into military dictatorship, aswell as the
development of avirulent form of nationalism that emphasized social conformity and state
identityoverconstitutionalism(seeChaianan2002:58).
The Peoples Partys departure from ideals of constitutionalism and democracy aggravated the
internal rifts and deficit of legitimacy that royalists successfully exploited to regain their
ascendancyinthe1940sand1950s.Indeed,whereastheconflictbetweenPromotersandroyalistshadoncejuxtaposed competingnotionsof sovereignty (popularv. royal), Thailands reversal
into authoritarianismgave rise tonew,unstablealignments.AfterPhibunsouster in 1944, the
coalition formed duringWorldWar II between civilian Promoter Pridi Banomyong and key
royalistswhojoined the antiJapanese movement Seri Thai fractured. Pridis supporters and
royalists organized in different political parties,which fought bitterly for political power. The
competition, however, was not limited to the electoral/legislative process. Outnumbered in
parliament,royalistssuchasthebrothersKukritandSeniPramojtooktheopportunitytoaccusePridiofKingAnandaMahidolsmysteriousdeath in1946,forcingthegovernmentsresignation.
Then, aristocrats and Democrat Party politicians collaboratedwith the resurgentPhibun,who
stagedacoupin1947andallowedthepromulgationofanewconstitutioncompletewithgreatly
expandedroyalprerogatives(seeKobkua2003:5054).Theensuingroyalistpowergrabwasput
toanendwiththe1951RadioCoup,bywhichthemilitaryintroducedanamendedversionofthe
1932constitution,strippingthemonarchyofthepowersithadrecentlyregained.
At thatpointPhibunwaspresentedwith twomajor threats tohispower.The first threatwas
posedbyroyalists(includingprinces,seniorcivilservants,andDemocratPartypoliticians)who,
despitediminishednumbersinparliamentandthereducedroleofthemonarchy,hadbenefited
fromtheirpostwarreorganizationaswellasthecampaigncarriedoutbetween1946and1951to
bolster the popularity ofyoung King Bhumibol. The second threatwas posed by the other
members of Phibuns new governing triumvirate, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat and Police
DirectorGeneralPhaoSriyanond.Tocounterboththreats,Phibunmadeastrategicdecisionto
socializehispowerstruggles.HerespondedtoBhumibolsgrowingappealwitheffortstoelevate
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hisown standing throughactsofconspicuous generosity,aggressivepromotionofBuddhism,
andappropriationofsomehistoricalsymbolismwithwhichhesoughttoportrayhimselfasthe
fatherofthenation(seeHandley2006: 126130).InanattempttoextricatehimselffromPhao
andSarit,moreover,Phibun introducedaskeletalPoliticalPartiesAct in1955andunexpectedly
liberalizedpoliticalspeechandpressfreedomuponhisreturnfromatriptotheUnitedStatesand
theUnitedKingdominJune1955.ContemporaneousaccountssuggestthatPhibunwasimpressed
with the degree of independence that leaders likeWinston Churchill and Dwight Eisenhower
exercisedthankstotheirelectoralpopularity(seeWilsonandPhillips1958).Itwasalsoreported
at the time that Phibun enjoyed the spectacle of cabinet ministers getting debagged by the
press, andhoped tobenefit from themedias interest in thepolices (i.e.,Phaos)many illegal
dealings(seePickerellandMoore1957).
Phibuns gambit failed spectacularly. On the one hand, the longserving Prime Minister had
underestimated the educated publics dissatisfactionwith the government, aswell as Sarits
growingpopularitywiththepress,thestudents,thedisenchantedpublic,andcertainpoliticians
(Thak2007[1979]:73).On theotherhand,PhaosdiminishedcredibilitydeprivedPhibunofan
effectiveallywithwhomtocounterSaritsrise.Withthesupportofthepalace,Saritexploitedthe
discontentwithPhibunsfraudulentvictoryintheFebruary1957electionsbyfurtherundermining
the government in parliament aswell aswith public opinion in Bangkok.When Sarit finallyseizedpower inSeptember 1957, forcingPhibun andPhao to leave the country forgood,King
Bhumibolofferedhissupport,givingthecoupimmediatelegalsanctionandpubliclypraisingits
intentions.
Sarit didnot show much of a taste for themore liberal climate fosteredby Phibuns reforms,
which had help propel his rise, and rapidly implemented measures designed to prevent any
further contagion of conflict. Deeply dissatisfied over the fact that there still existed a
parliament,politicalparties,afreepresssystemthatcouldcriticizethegovernment,andlabor
unions that could go on strikewhenever theywere unhappywith their employers (see Thak
2007[1979]:95),SaritstagedanothercouponSeptember18,1958.Politicalrightslikefreedomof
speech and association were rescinded under Sarits ironfisted dictatorship. The recurrent
election of legislative representatives was scrapped altogether. Civil liberties like those that
guaranteedcriminaldefendantsameasureofdueprocessweresupplantedbyilliberalprovisions
likeArticle17ofthe1959constitution,whichallowedthePrimeMinistertoordertheexecution
withouttrialofanyonehedeemeda threat tonationalsecurity.Theegalitarian ideals formerly
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championed by some Peoples Party officialswere superseded by the governments unabashed
attempttoperpetuateexistinginequalities.Thecountrysmostpowerfuldomesticcapitalistswere
nurturedbythestateandprotectedfromcompetition;entiresectorsofThailandseconomywere
soldofftoforeignanddomesticoligopolists inexchangeforbillions,paidontheconditionthat
thegeneralsmakelifedifficultforsmaller,localcompetitorsandrepressanylabormovementthat
mightseekbetterpayandworkconditionsforThaiworkers(seeAkira1996:179180).Meanwhile,
themilitarygovernmentinsistedthattheruralpopulationshouldremainforevercontenttoeke
out a simple existence upcountry the refusal of many to embrace their station in life
portendingthedeteriorationofThaisociety(seeThak2007[1979]:105106,122).
Mostimportantly,perhaps,asSaritsoughttoestablishtheabsoluteruleofhisownkhana,hesaw
intherestorationofthemonarchysmystique,prestige,andpowerasourceof legitimacymorepotent than thepretenseofconstitutionalismandelectionsone thatwouldaffordhim,and
many of his successors, the opportunity to dress up harsh dictatorial measures in a benign,
paternalisticattire.Withtheenthusiasticbackingof theUnitedStatesgovernment,Saritbegan
theprocessof exalting anddeifying the monarchy,whilehis ideologues conceived a modelof
governance(ThaiStyleDemocracy)thatcouldbedescribedasaformofPlatonicguardianship
withTheravadacharacteristics.12Themultitalented philosopherking satatopahierarchyof
supposedlynatural inequalitiesofwealth,power,andstatus legitimized, inplaceofPlatosnoblelie,byBuddhistsuperstitionsofkarma,merit,andcharismaticauthority().TheKings
military auxiliaries, meanwhile,were put in charge of running the country and effectively
elevatedabovethelaw.Whatwasdemandedofthepeople,onceagainequatedwithchildren,
notcitizens,wasmerereverenceandobedience.
3.AFEWGOODMENThepalacemilitaryallianceforgedunderSaritreconciledtwo institutionsthathadbeenmostly
atloggerheadsoverthepreviousquartercentury.Atleastinitially,thenewalliancedidnotfindit
especially difficult to consolidate power and manage conflict. Part of this had to dowith the
weaknessoftheopposition,deprivedofmanyofitsleadingpersonalities.PridiandPhibunwere
goneforgood.Manyotherproponentsofdemocracyandconstitutionalism,includinganumber
ofleftistpoliticiansfromtheNortheast,wereexiled,arrested,orexecuted(seeKeyes1967:5054).
12TheconceptofguardianshipiscontrastedwithdemocracyinDahl(1991:5264).
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Withthedefeatofthedemocraticopposition,someremainingdissidentsgravitatedtowardsthe
CommunistPartyofThailand.Butthoughthecommunistinsurgencyneverseriouslythreatened
totopplethegovernmentinBangkok,thethreatofcommunismtrumpedupbythemilitaryand
thepalaceinthe1960sand1970srepeatedlyservedastheexcusetoproscribeandoftenviolently
suppressdissent.
By then, moreover, most of the countrys populationwas not appreciably more involved or
politicized than it had been at the time of the 1932 coup. Writing on the heels of Sarits
conservativerevolution,Wilson(1962:5758)notedacleardistinction,basedprimarilyonthe
levelofeducation,betweenthosewhoareinvolvedinpoliticsandthosewhoarenot.Thosewho
were involved,theeducatedclasses inthecapitalcity,weresaidtoposenothreattothestatus
quo,giventheirvestedinterestinthepreservationoftraditionalnotionsofsocialhierarchy.As
for thepeasantry,estimatedas more thaneightypercentof thepopulation,Wilsondescribedthe fundamental importance of its inarticulate acquiescence to the central government and
indifference tonationalpolitics to the stabilityof thecountrys socialandpolitical structure.13
Whilemuchofthecountryhadexperiencedsignificanteconomicchangesincethesigningofthe
BowringTreatyof1855,theincreasedeconomicinsecurityproducedbythecommercializationof
the agricultural sector and explosive population growth had not been accompanied by the
emergenceofastrongpoliticalconsciousness,perhapsprimarilybecauseeconomicchangehad
failedtotriggermuchinthewayofactualdevelopmentormodernization.14
Asnoted,oneof thereasonswhy theendof theabsolutemonarchydidnot settle the issueof
popularsovereigntyisthatThailandsNationalRevolutiondidnotintersect,asitdidinWestern
Europe, with the massification of politics set in motion by the Industrial Revolution. An
economictransformationofcomparable importdidtakeplace inThailandbeginninginthe late
1950s.Once again,however, thedecouplingofThailands National and IndustrialRevolutions,
andtheoccurrenceofthelatteratatimewhenthepowerofthemonarchyandthemilitarywas
13Morecontroversially,Wilson (1962:5758)attributed thepeasantrys political inaction to a
tolerableeconomicsituationwhichprovidesastablesubsistencewithoutencouraginganygreat
hopeforquickimprovement.Othershavepointedoutthattheruralpopulationwasnotquiteas
freeofpoliticalandeconomicgrievancesasWilsonsuggested,givensignificantandlongstanding
poverty,stratification,andruralindebtedness(Bowie1997:61).14Foranargumentabout the failureofeconomicchange tobringaboutdevelopmentbetween
1850and 1950, see Ingram (1971:216217).Partof the reason is that the expansion ineconomicactivityhad largely followedanexploitative,quasicolonialmodel foundedon theextractionof
wealthfromthecountrysideanditsreinvestmentinBangkok(seeChatthip1999:5159).
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deeply entrenched, accounts for the contradictory effects exerted by the subsequent political
awakeningofnewconstituencies.
Theeconomictransformationthattookplaceinthe1960sunderminedthestructuralfoundations
ofThailandsmilitaryregime.Theboom,whichwasaccompaniedbythedramaticgrowthinthe
serviceeconomyandvastincreasesinthesecondaryandtertiarystudentpopulations,multiplied
thesizeofthepettymiddleclassandtheurbanbourgeoisieseveraltimesover.Atthesametime,
increasedlandlordismintheprovincespushyoungmentojointheranksoftheworkingclassand
the underemployed in Bangkok. These developments not only rearranged Thailands social
structure,givingrisetonewclasseswhoseaspirationswerenotmatchedbythelimitedpolitical
role reserved for them under military rule, but also generated new rivalries, resentments, and
fears.Thepotentialforupheavalincreasedasthebureaucracyapproachedsaturation,foreclosingtraditionalroutestosocialadvancement formillionsofnewgraduates,andespeciallywhenthe
economy slowed as a result ofAmerican disengagement (seeAnderson 1977: 1518). Thailands
militaryrulersmadethingsworsebycallingnewelectionsin1969,overadecadesincethedoors
ofparliamenthadlastbeenshuttered,onlytothendissolvetheNationalAssemblyandrepealthe
newconstitutioninaselfcoupstagedin1971.
In retrospect, it is somewhat ironic that the power and prestige of the monarchy reached itszenithasThailandenteredtheeraofmasspoliticsjustasmoreandmorepeopleenteredthe
systemanddemandeddemocracy,theissueofpopularsovereigntywaseffectivelymuted.Part
ofthereasonisthatbythetimeThailandexperiencedmassparticipationintheearly1970s,the
palacehadbenefitedfromafifteenyearheadstartinpromotingitsimagethroughmodernmeans
of mass communication. For most mainstream political actors, the mere appearance of a
universally revered monarchwas strong enough incentive to frame political demands in a
manner that did not challenge the palace or its extraconstitutional prerogatives. Failing that,
Thailandslsemajestlawseffectivelyrestrictedtherangeofpoliticalcontestationbypunishing,
harshly,thefewinclinedtotestthetruelimitsanddepthsoftheKingsenforcedpopularity.Itis
thusthatthe1930serafighttoplacetheKingundertheconstitutionhadmorphed,bythe1970s,
intomeredemandsforaconstitution,andthatthestrugglefordemocracywagedbyincreasingly
sizableconstituenciesbetween1973and1992neverresultedinthemainstreamingofmoreradical
critiques of the monarchys role and constitutional status. Most of the movements and
organizationsthatcameontothesceneduringthattimesawitfitnottochallengetheroleofthe
Kingassovereign,butratherchosetoframeappealsfordemocracyinroyalsymbolism.Whenever
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the palace felt that its imagewas threatened by events on the streets, moreover, Bhumibols
public and carefully stagemanaged interventions served to privatize, manage, or steer the
courseofconflictinlessmenacingdirections.TheKingsinterventionsin1973and1992,inturn,
furtherelevatedthestatusofthemonarchy,providingsomecoverforthepalacescomplicityin
themobviolenceofthemid1970saswellasmilitarycoupsin1976and1991.
Thepalacessuccess,however,wasalsoinpartafunctionofitswillingnesstoadapt,learnfrom
itsmistakes,andeventuallyallowthecountrytodemocratize,atleastinsofarastheprocessdid
not encroach on its reserve domains.While the 1973 protests definitively brought the era of
outrightmilitarydictatorshiptoaclose,thepalaceplayedamajorroleintheefforttocontainthe
rapidcontagionofconflictthatcharacterizedthe illfatedperiodofrealdemocracycomprised
between 1973 and 1976 (see Morell and Chaianan 1981). The nationalist hysteria and fears of
communisttakeoverhypedbythemilitaryandthepalaceduringthattimeintensifiedthesocialhostilitiesthathademergedasaresultoftheeconomictransformationthecountryhadrecently
experienced, securing the support of the disaffected, the insecure petty bourgeoisie, and
traditionalisteliteswhofeltthreatenedbythemobilizationofstudents,workers,andpeasantsfor
the drastic measures taken in 1976 (seeAnderson 1977: 24).After a brief period of extreme
repression following the 1976 massacre at Thammasat University, the palace remained
determined topreserve itsdominanceoverThailandspolitical system, and to secure the rural
populaces continued acceptance of a subaltern status by placing renewed emphasis on thefamilial unity between the peasantry and the monarchy (see Streckfuss 2010: 213215).15 The
premiership of General Prem Tinsulanonda (19801988), however, was also marked by the
development of functioning representative institutions, and the increased salience of electoral
participation and competition. Thailandwas allowed to transition from aversion of pseudo
democracy to electoraldemocracyuponPrems retirement in 1988,andagainafter the state
violenceofBlackMay1992.
15Perhapsmorethanthemobilizationofstudentsandworkers,mosttroublingforconservatives
hadbeen thedemonstrations stagedbypeasantgroups throughout thecountry todemand the
enforcementofrentcontrolsandlegalprotectionsfromexploitation(seeHaberkorn2011,Ch.2).
ThecultivationofBhumibols imageasabenevolent father,whollydedicated to improving the
lives of his children,was essential to the legitimacy of the social hierarchy overwhich hepresided,giventheinequalityandexploitationthesystemengendered.
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TheousterofGeneralSuchindaKraprayoon in 1992 resulted fromabotched attemptmadeby
militaryandthepalacetorestoreThailandtothedaysofPremocracy,toturntheclockbackto
atimewhenanunelectedmilitarymancouldrunthecountry, legitimizedbytheexistenceofa
functioningparliamentbutnotmeaningfullyencumberedbyanychangeselectionsmightbring
to its composition. The failure of Suchindas restoration gaveway to a new adaptation. The
military was effectively sidelined, the Thai peoples wish to elect their own governments
begrudginglygranted.Still,asaresultoftheKingsintervention,thepalacepreservedmuchofits
influenceandstanding.ThenetworkofgoodmenPremhadbuiltinmoststateinstitutionswas
leveraged throughout the 1990s to shape national policy, as well as manipulate or actively
undermineelectedgovernmentsnotorious for theirweaknessand fragmentation (seeMcCargo
2005:507515). Atthesametime,thepalaceseffortstodiscreditelectedpoliticiansandprevent
the aggregation of political forces capable of challenging its extraconstitutional authoritysoftenedthepublicsconfidence indemocratic institutions,weakenedelectedgovernments,and
favored a style of politics founded on patronage and corruption. This allowed the palace to
conservethemoralhighground,protectthelegitimacyofitsroutineinterferences,andmaintain
itsroleastheultimatearbiterofpoliticaldecisionsintimesofcrisis(McCargo2005:501).
ThoughthefightoverthemonarchysrolewaseffectivelyorganizedoutofpoliticsasBhumibol
reached theapogeeofhispowerandpopularity, theprevalenceof ideasofpopularsovereigntyaroundtheworldmadeitalmostinevitablethatthequestionwouldberevisitedatsomepointas
theKingexitedthescene.Butitwasaconstellationoffactorsofbothastructuralandcontingent
character,andtheconfluenceofhistoricalprocessesofbothalong andshorttermnature,that
accounts for therapidandexplosivereemergenceoftheunresolved fightoversovereigntyand
equal citizenship in thewake of the 2006 coup. Perhaps the most profound reason for the
systems inherent instability beyond the diffusion of new technologies that make it more
difficulttocontroltheflowofinformationwithoutresortingtoconspicuousrepressivemeasures
isthefundamentaltransformationthatThailandssocialstructurehasundergonesincethelate
1970s.
The socioeconomic transformations inquestion transcend thenumerical growthof theurban
middleclass,whichhad formed thebasis formassdemonstrations in 1973and 1992.At the top
level,continuedeconomicgrowthspurredtheriseofnewbusinesselitesfarlessconnectedwith,
andhencelessinvestedin,thepalacesnetworksofpowerinthemilitaryandthecivilservice(see
Anek 1992). This class did not exhibit any particular ideological aversion to the old order.
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Nonetheless,thecapitalavailabletothisnewbusinesselitecreatedconditionsfortheemergence
ofnetworksofpoweralternativetothosecommandedbythepalace.16Possiblymoremomentous
was the transformation that had taken place at the bottom of Thailands social hierarchy,
undermining its foundations. On the one hand, development and modernization transformed
rurallivelihoods,givingrisetoamoreeducated,moreworldly,moreconsumptionmindedmass
of middle incomepeasants (seeWalker 2010a) an increasingly largepercentageno longer
involved in agriculture at all less likely to exhibit the inarticulate acquiescence and
indifferencetonationalpoliticsthatwereonceidentifiedasessentialtothestabilityoftheold
order(seeWilson1962:5758).Ontheotherhand,thepersistenceofextremelevelsofinequality17
rendered this vast segment of the population decidedly more receptive to a discourse of
empowerment. Though neither political consciousness nor economic grievances automatically
translateintopoliticalmobilization,thestrugglesfortherighttohaverights(seeSomchai2006;seealsoMissingham2004)wagedbygroupsrepresentingfarmersandworkers inthe 1980sand
1990sofferedglimpsesofthepotentialheldbythemobilizationoftheprovincialmasses,nowfar
moreinclinedtoregardthemselvesascitizensthanchildren.
Theroyalistcampmadethingsworseinatleasttwoways.First,beginningintheearly1990s,King
Bhumibolbegantospeakintermsthatevidencedthepalacesfailuretoaccepttheimplicationsof
the countrys socioeconomic transformation. Bhumibols rejection of progress, his pleas towalk backwards into a khlong, his insistent portrayal of the desire for selfadvancement as
greed,andeventuallyhisnewtheorycenteredoneconomicsufficiency(seeWalker2010b)
offered avision of the future fundamentally at oddswith the aspirations of upward mobility
increasinglyharboredbymuchofthepopulation.Thatgeneratednoresentmentinandofitself,
giventheKingsfatherlyimageandwellintentionedpresentation,butplacedthepalaceatarisk
of fading rapidly into irrelevance, should someone ever come along with an alternative,
potentiallymoreempoweringvision.Second,intheabsenceofanimminent,majoritarianthreat
tothestatusquo,royalliberals(seeConnors2008)closetothepalacefeltcomfortableenough
tospearheadtheeffortthatculminated inthepromulgationofaconstitution, in1997,thatwas
not only more liberal than its forerunners, but also more protective of the stability of the
executive against thevagaries of Thailands fragmented legislature. This, in turn, constituted
16Forhow thisnewnetwork subsequently coalesced aroundThaksinShinawatra, seeMcCargo
andUkrist(2005:Ch.6).17ForaconciseexplanationofwhyThailandsgrowthrequiredextreme levelsof inequality,see
Montesano(2010:279).
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something of a unilateral disarmament on the part of the royalist establishment. Should a
governmenteverdeveloptheelectoralpopularityandambitiontochallengethepalacesnetworks
of power, the new rules of the game limited the ability of unelected institutions to deter,
undermine,orejectitthroughmeansotherthanbrutemilitaryforce.
4.THEWHOREOFBABYLONThereisconsiderablemerittotheargumentthatThaksinShinawatrahadsoughttoestablishan
electeddictatorshipduringhisfiveyears inoffice.WhileThaksinprovedsingularlycapableof
reducing the fragmentation of Thailands political system, that is, the unprecedentedconcentrationofpowersinthehandsofanelected,civilianleaderalsoallowedhisadministration
topursuepolicies thateroded severalaspectsof thecountryselectoraldemocracy.The ruleof
lawwasweakenedbycorruptionand,especially,bythewaveofstateviolenceunleashed inthe
contextofthe(palaceinspired)WaronDrugs in2003andthe(palaceinstigated)responseto
thesouthern insurgencybeginning in2004.Governmentaccountabilitywasunderminedbythe
attemptmadetovanquishindependentstateagencies.Andfreedomofthepressdeclinedsharply
as a result of legal measures taken against critics of the administration aswell as informal
pressuresplacedontheprintandbroadcastmediatoprovidefavorablecoverage.Afterthe2005
elections,where Thaksins party Thai Rak Thai took three quarters of the lower house seats,
Thailand seemedwell on itsway to developing a form of democracywith a much stronger
delegative(seeODonnell1994:59)thanrepresentativeorliberalflavor.
Far more determinative of his eventual removal is the fact that Thaksins electoral popularity
placed him in a position to mount a historic assault on the reserve domains of unelected
institutionssuchasthepalace,themilitary,andthebureaucracy(seeThitinan2008).And,unlike
mostofhispredecessors,Thaksinhadambitionandhubris in largeenoughsuppliestoactually
take them on, if only to maximize his own standing and power.Aside from the troubling
possibilitythatThaksinmightbeinofficeintheeventofroyalsuccession,whatappearstohave
mostthreatenedthepalacewastheprospectthatthepopularityThaksinenjoyedintheprovinces
might
have
begun
to
overshadow
the
Kings.
Such
fears
were
rendered
particularly
acute
by
the
recognitionthatThaksinsvisionofcapitalistrevolutionwerenotonlyprovingfarmoreinstep
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with theprovincialelectoratesaspirations thanBhumibolsown retrograde ideas,butalso that
theambitionsofupwardmobilitythateventhepoorestThaiswerenowencouragedtoembrace
threatenedtoscramblethesocialhierarchiesuponwhichThaiStyleDemocracyhadoncebeen
founded.18Indeed,whereascriticsoftenjustifytheirdistasteforThaksinonthegroundsthathis
supportisboughtandpaidfor,Thaksinspopularitywithprovincialvotersandtheurbanworking
classhadneverbeenprimarilyaboutthematerialbenefitshewasabletoprovide.Byand large,
Thaksin remains popular with these constituencies for reasons of a more psychological or
emotionalnatureinThaksin,thesevotersfoundanationalleaderwhodidnottellthemitwas
theirpatrioticduty to accept their station in life, but encouraged them to imagine adifferent
future for themselves and their families. In essence that iswhatmadeThaksindangerous, the
capacityhehaddemonstratedtoinvolveinhislargelyprivatestruggleforpoliticalpowerawhole
newmassofactiveparticipants.19
Given Thaksins strength and staying power, the only card his enemies had left to playwas
militaryforce,backedbythemonarchysprestige.Thetask,however,wasfarmorecomplexthan
simplyremovingaPrimeMinister.Indeed,thecomplexityofthetask,andthedeterminationwith
whichThaksinfoughtback,transformedtheattempttostampouthisinfluenceintosomethingof
a bottomless pit, down which the monarchy ended up flushing almost the entirety of the
considerable political capital it had accumulated over decades. While the junta lay the
groundwork for Thaksins prosecution, confiscated his assets, dissolved Thai Rak Thai, and
dismantled theconstitutionalprovisions thatprotectedhisdominance,all thatdidnotprevent
theThaksinbackedPeoplePowerPartyfromwinningalargepluralityinthe2007elections.Nor
didthedesperatemeasureslaunchedin2008bythePeoplesAllianceforDemocracy(PAD),the
military,and thejudiciaryaccomplishmuchmore than furthercompromise the stabilityof the
country and the legitimacy of the royalist establishment. AbhisitVejjajivawas made Prime
Minister in December 2008, on the strengthof a motley legislative coalition patched together
withtheassistanceofthemilitaryandthepalace,ifonlytosufferacrushingdefeatatthehands
18Foramoredetaileddiscussion,seeHewisonandKengkij(2010:194196).
19TheironyisthatThaksinhimselfmaynothaveinitiallyrealizedthehistoricalimportofwhathe
was doing.After all,while his policies may have been designed in part to earn the support
provincialvoters and the urban poor, the largest beneficiaries had been large corporations,
particularlythoseinhisownnetwork(seeMcCargoandUkrist2005:218).Bytheendofhisfirstterm, however, Thaksin had clearly realized the potential trump card he held, and sought to
rebrandhimselfassomethingofaplebeiantribune(seePasukandBaker2009:232233).
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ofThaksinsyoungest sisterYingluck in the2011elections.The intervening thirtymonths rank
amongthemosttumultuousinBhumibolsentirereign.
Inresponsetoaseriesofprotestsstagedagainsthisadministrationinlate2005,Thaksinboasted
thathewasimmunetotherecurrenceofahistoricalpatternthathadseengovernmentselected
bythecountrysideremovedby(orwiththesupportof)Bangkok,ashehadthebackingofboth.
Basedon theresultsof the2005elections, thatassessmentwas largelyaccurate.ThaiRakThai
dominated not only the North and Northeast of the country, but also the more prosperous
CentralregionaswellasmuchofBangkok.Thathadchangedsomewhatbythetimeofthecoup,
towhichBangkokresidentsexhibitedlittleovertopposition,andespeciallyinthe2007elections,
where thePeoplePowerParty lostconsiderableground to theDemocrats in thecapital. In the
interveningtime,itseems,royalistshadmanagedtodentThaksinssupportamongurbanmiddleclassvoters. Taking a page out of the royalist playbook from the mid1970s, the PADwas
particularlyeffective,atleastinitially,initsattempttoarousetheinsecuritiesandfearsofurban
middleclassvoters,warningthatThaksinspopulismwouldcomelargelyattheexpenseoftheir
economicwell being and social status (see Pasuk and Baker 2009: 253, 264266). The PAD,
moreover,wasjoinedby military generals, royalist academics, DemocratParty politicians, and
partsofthenationalpress inappealingtothesenseofmoralsuperiorityofmiddleclassvoters,
playingupcrudeculturalstereotypessuchasthenotionthattheprovincialelectoratesignorance,credulousness,andmoralcorruptionrequiredthederogationofmajorityrule,andtheplacement
ofthemajorityofthepopulationunderthetutelageoftheusualsetofgoodmen.Accordingto
royalist rationalizationsof the coup, theproblemwasnotjustThaksin,but thosewho elected
him.
Thisrhetoricalstrategymayhaveearnedtheurbanmiddleclasssupportfor,oracquiescenceto,
the 2006 coup and the removal of two People Power Party governments in 2008. But the
invalidationofsuchclearelectoralchoices,anditsjustificationintermssooffensive,elitist,and
occasionallydehumanizing,hadtheeffectofradicalizingasizableportionofThaksinssupporters
among provincial voters and the urban working class, making many of them receptive to
argumentsdenouncing the fundamental injusticeofThailands traditionalhierarchiesof status
and power. This, in turn, facilitated Thaksins effort to socialize the conflict by linking the
grievancesofhisconstituents tohisown, aswell asby fostering amonghisdiverse supporters
somethingofacommonidentityassecondclasscitizens.Thehostofilliberalmeasurestakenby
theroyalistestablishmenttoobliterateThaksinsinfluence,moreover,notonlymarkedaradical
-
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departure from royal liberalism, exposing a decidedly less benevolent side to the royalist
hierarchicalworldview,butalso revealed thehypocrisyofmuchof thecriticism thathadbeen
leveledagainstThaksinsownadministration.
This is thebasisof resentment and frustration that accounts for the rapidgrowthof the Red
Shirt movement in the months followingAbhisits rise to Prime Minister. There can be little
doubt that the establishment of the United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship (UDD)
reflectedanattemptbyThaksinandhisalliestosocializetheirstruggleforpowerbyinvolving
constituenciesthatcouldtipthebalance intheirfavor.Thaksinscallforapeoplesrevolution
during the Red Shirts failed uprising inApril 2009 contrasts starklywith his plutopopulist
governingphilosophyasonecommentatorputitearly inhisfirstterm,theplutocratsmake
bigmoney,and thepeopledontmakebig trouble (ChangNoi2002).For thepeople tonowmake big trouble,however,Thaksinhad tomake the fightaboutmore thanhimself.And,on
this count, recent Thai history offered a rich repertoire of issues and symbols that fit the
circumstances and mood of his supporters. It was thus that the 1930sera fight for equal
citizenship andpopular sovereigntywas unearthed, albeit now married topoliticalvision that
emphasizeselectoralismoverconstitutionalism.Ontheonehand,UDDleadersspoketothe
issueofcitizenshipbyappealingtotheirsupportersdesiretoberecognizedasfullyThaito
beconsideredfullmembersofthecommunity,irrespectiveofwealth,status,orkarmicstock,andtobetreatedasequalunderthelawwithoutdoublestandards.Ontheotherhand,bytraining
itssightsontheamartayatheKingsmandarinsandpraetorianguardsforthefirsttimein
decades the UDD combined a campaign for democracywith the demand that no unelected
institution, no matter how close its affiliationwith the palace, should have the authority to
overturntheelectoratesdecisions,orinterferewiththeactivitiesofanelectedgovernment.
As the Red Shirts stepped up their activities and mobilization, it is not altogether surprising,
giventhe issuesatstake, thatthe fightwas increasinglypresented through imageryhearkening
backtothedaysoftheabsolutemonarchy.Dismissedbypunditsasanachronistic,theadoption
ofthewordphrai()asanidentifierservedtobothredefinethenatureofthefightandbring
intosharperfocusjusthowradicalachallengetheRedShirtshadgrowntopresent,by2010,to
Thailandsentrenchedstructureofpower.Upuntil1905,thedesignationphraireferredtolowest
commoners
in
Siams
feudal
hierarchy
(sakdina)
freemen
subject
tocorve in the service of the
King,thearmy,oranindividuallandlord.Theembracementoftheiridentityasmoderndayphrai
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reflected not only the Red Shirts newfound sense of pride in their status as commoners, but
perhaps most ominously their rejection of an entire social order founded upon supposedly
natural hierarchies of status and merit. Taking pride in low social status, in particular,
highlightedthefactthatmanyamongthemnolongeracceptedthemyththathighstatusmeans
goodnessandgoodnesslegitimizesprivilegedaccesstopoliticalpower.
ThaksinitesandRedShirtshavebeenfrequentlyaccusedoftheharboringambitionstooverthrow
themonarchy.Fargreaterdamagetothelongtermviabilityofthemonarchy,however,hasbeen
donebythecontinuedexploitationoftheneedtoprotecttheinstitutiontojustifyeveryformof
prevarication and abuse that supposed royalists have carried out since the coup. The
conspicuoususeofroyalsymbolismmayhavehelpedthegeneralsoutmaneuverThaksinonthe
nightofSeptember19,2006.ButThaksinscomebackforcedhisenemiestofallbackontheneedtoprotectthemonarchysooften,andtojustifymeasuressodistasteful,astonotonlydiminish
the power of the argument, but also effectively devalue the institution itself. The airport
occupations, the censorship of the internet, the arrests for lse majest, the recourse to
emergency powers, and even the killings of Red Shirt protesters inAprilMay 2010were all
justifiedonthebasisofdefendingtheKingfromatenebrousconspiracy.AndwhileThaksin,as
most Red Shirt leaders, have continued to publicly profess their loyalty, the royalist
establishmentsconstantmisuseofthemonarchyssupposedendangermentinvitedameasureofscrutiny,bytheinternationalmediaandordinarycitizens,whicheffectivelyshatteredthepalaces
inviolateness and carefully managed image. The heavy crackdown on freedom of expression
launchedasaresulthasonlyattractedgreaterscrutinyinturn.ItdidnothelpmattersthatQueen
Sirikit tookpublic initiativeswidely interpretedassupportiveof thePAD in2008,or thatKing
Bhumibolhasyet touttera singlewordabout themurderofRedShirtdemonstrators in2010.
Withregardtothemonarchy,ThaksinandtheRedShirtsdidnothavetosayordoanythingat
all,saveforsteppingoutofthewayoftheonetimejuggernautcareeningtowardtheprecipiceof
historicaloblivion.
5.SAUVEQUIPEUTE.E.Schattschneider(1988[1960]:66)singledoutthedefinitionofalternativesasthesupreme
instrumentofpower.Thecapacitytodefinealternatives,toshapethedefinitionofwhatconflict
isabout, isamong themost significantandenduringpowersThailandspalaceacquiredunder
Bhumibols leadership.With the coup dtat of September 19, 2006, palace insiders may have
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effectivelywielded this instrument of power for the last time. Nowherewas the fight against
ThaksindefinedinmoreimpactfultermsthaninaspeechPrivyCouncilPresidentGeneralPrem
Tinsulanondadelivered at theChulachomklaoRoyalMilitaryAcademy twomonthsbefore the
coup. Soldiers are likehorses,hememorablyquipped, governments arejockeysbutnot the
owners.Asiftodispelanydoubt,Premremindedhisaudience:YoubelongtotheNationand
HisMajestytheKing(TheNation,July15,2006).Thesimpleimageryinvokedbytheoldgeneral
offersameasureoftheideologicalregressionThailandhasundergoneduringtheNinthReign.In
1932, the revolutionists of the Peoples Party had seized power by asserting that the country
belongs to the people, not to the King, as he has fraudulently claimed. Thevery claim the
Promotershaddismissedasfraudulentwasdecidedlybackinfashionseventyfouryearslater,to
thepointofservingas thecenterpieceof thepubliccasemade to legitimize the removalofan
elected government and the disposal of a democratic constitution. In Prems formulation,sovereigntyrestswiththeKing,aswellasanideaofthenationquitedistinctfromthepeople
whoselected the jockey.To the jockey,and to theoverwhelmingmajorityof theelectorate,
the horse shall pay no heed, if the owner so commands. Elections, after all,weigh each
personsvote equally, thereby distorting thewill of a nationwhosevery essence,whose main
claimtoexceptionalismanduniqueness,isahierarchyofmerit,status,andpoweratopwhichsits
HisMajestytheKing.
AsmuchasThaksinhimself, itwasthankstoroyalists likeGeneralPremthatthefightbecame,
implicitly, about theunfinished businessof the 1932 revolution.Fiveyearson, the decision to
frame the fightasachoicebetweenThaksinand theKing,groundingThaksinsremoval in the
denialofpopularsovereignty,therepudiationofmajorityrule,andtheadvocacyofhierarchical
overegalitarianunderstandingsofthenation,mightseemrecklessandshortsighted.Asidefrom
bringingback to the foreground a centuryold cleavage theyhad largely managed to suppress
over thepastseveraldecades,royalistsdisregarded thedangersofpitting the institutionof the
monarchyagainstapopularPrimeMinister,tosaynothingofthemillionsofvoterswhoelected
him.Whatevertheextent,ifany,ofBhumibolsinvolvementinthe2006coup,the2010massacre,
and the intervening manipulations of Thailandsjudicial system, themere fact that none of it
could have happened but for legitimacy borrowed from the throne inevitably turned the
monarchy intoa focalpoint for theangerand frustrationofmanyamong thosewhosechoices
hadbeenrubbishedsocontemptuously.JudgingfromtheresultsofgeneralelectionsheldonJuly
3, 2011, royalists arenotwinning the fight they helpeddefine in these terms. Notonly did an
overwhelming majority ofvoters defy instructions issued by the CommanderinChief of the
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Army,amongothers,tovotefortheDemocratPartytoprotectthemonarchy(seeBangkokPost,
June15,2011),sidinginsteadwithapartyledbyThaksinsownfleshandblood.PheuThaiinfact
went someway towards replicatingThaiRakThais success in the2005election, regaining the
supportofmanymiddleclassvotersinBangkokwhohaddesertedPalangPrachachonin2007.If
perhapsnottheKinghimself,the2011electionsareacomprehensiverepudiationoftheinformal
networkofpoweroverwhichHisMajestyhaslongpresided.
Inalllikelihood,thejuxtapositionofThaksinwiththeKingwasdesignedtoaccomplishtheexact
opposite the intent, that is,was to privatize,not socialize, the conflict, countingon the
peoples reverence for theKing, and their acceptanceof socialhierarchies that give theKings
associates the right to speak for the nation, to secure the publics acquiescence to Thaksins
removal. In this sense, the approachwas no different from previous royalist coups, exceptionmade for the heavy use of royal symbolism and ritual,whose dosagewas increased to levels
commensuratewiththePrimeMinisterspopularity.WhatPremandhisfellowtravelersfailedto
grasp, or simply chose to ignore, is the extent towhich Thai society had changed over the
previoushalfcentury, intermsofboth thepeoplesprevailingattitudesandtheirpropensity to
joinpoliticalfightsfromwhichthevastmajorityhadoncebeenexcluded.Tobesure,thehorse
effortlesslydismountedthejockey,asThaksinprovedpowerlesstoeitherpreventthecoupor
challengeitslegalityexpostfacto.Unlikemostofhispredecessors,however,Thaksinfailedtorolloveranddie,andstruckbackby leveraginghis supportersambition tobe recognizedasequal
citizens, tobeacknowledgedas thenationsrightfulowners, toturnmuchof theaudience in
the bleachers against those lounging in the owners box. The riot in the stands eventually
transcendeddemandsforthejockeysreinstatement,asthecrowdinthecheapseatswentsofar
astoclaimownershipofthehorseindeed,theentireracetrack.
Afteryearsofinstabilityandturmoil,therearesignsthatatleastsomeintheroyalistcampmay
beinclinedtoaccommodatethejockeysprivatedemands,ratherthandealwiththeriotousmob
hehelpedincite.Asothershavepointedout(seeMontesano2011),therepressivemeasurestaken
afterthedispersaloftheRedShirtdemonstrationsin2010,andthedecisiontokeepUDDleaders
locked up for many months thereafter, had the effect of maximizing Thaksins control over a
movement that had, in the meantime, developed a set of demands independent of his base
personalinterests.Indeed,thatcouldpossiblyhavebeentheobjectivedealwithThaksintofoil
amoreradicalchallengetothestatusquo.Ataminimum,theroyalistestablishmentssubsequent
consenttoanelection,evenatthecostofwalking intoahumiliatingdefeat,reflectsachanged
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strategic calculus inwhich a Thaksindominated administration has become preferable to the
backlash thatpreventingonemighthave incurred.At thispoint there seems tobe littledoubt
that Thaksin thejockey is prepared to cut any deal that might allow him to get back on the
saddle,ortakeaseatintheownersbox,evenatthecostofsacrificinghissupportersdemands
for legal accountability, freedom of expression, and real democracy. How the Red Shirt
movement might react to this eventuality remains an open question, one that may ultimately
reveal whether the Red Shirts have any potential as a transformational force, beyond the
minimumobjectiveofundoingthe2006coup.Still,whateversettlementisreached,andashard
as royalistsmight try to restore itsviability,Thailands formaldemocracywith theKingabove
theconstitutionwillnotoutlive thecurrentmonarch.CrownPrinceVajiralongkornwillnever
exercisetheberconstitutionalroleassertedbyhisfather.
Conservative thinker Sulak Sivaraksa (cited in Schiller 2011) recently speculated that the
monarchys survivalbeyond theNinthReign turnsonwhether thenewking iswilling tobea
puppet. Puppetmaybe too strongaword for it,but the fact remains thatunless thepalace
reconciles itselftoplayingaconstitutional,ceremonialrolethatwhich ithadbeen forcedto
accept,atthebarrelofagun,onJune24,1932intheendtheresultmightwellbearepublic.
Indeed, thoughThailandsroyalistestablishmentretainsmuchof itspower, ithasnow lost the
legitimacythatonceallowedittoimposeitswillwithouttheapplicationofphysicalcoercion.Therecentrecoursetobulletsandemergencyrule,aswellasthehundredsofarrestsforlsemajest,
areinthissensesymptomaticoftheincreaseduselessnessofroyalistpropaganda.Havingalready
squanderedtheauthorityrequiredtoexercisepowerwithoutforce,royalistsmaynowalsobeon
thevergeoflosingtheabilitytogettheirwaythroughforce.AfterthepassingofKingBhumibol,
theonlymemberoftheroyalfamilywhostillcommandstherequisitelevelsofsupport,respect,
andfear,thereisvirtuallynochancethatlargeorsignificantenoughsegmentsoftheThaipublic
willaccepttheoldcanardaboutprotectingthemonarchyasjustificationforthesuspensionof
their civil and political rights, or the draconian measures that currently strangle freedom of
expression.
For avariety of reasons, that itselfwill not suffice tobring about a real democracy,with or
withoutthekingasheadofstate.Ontheonehand,whetherornottheexcuseofprotectingthe
monarchyisstillavailable,themilitarywillremainathreattothestabilityofthecountryandits
democraticprospects for some time tocome.On theotherhand, ifultimatelyallowed to take
place,thereassertionofThaksinselectoraldominancemightsimplyamounttotherevivalofhis
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illiberalbrandofplebiscitarianordelegativedemocracy,possibly ina form imposingcheckson
hispowers evenmore casual than inThaiRakThaisheyday.Eitherway, themonarchysown
survival now likely hangs on its willingness to cease standing in the way of the countrys
democratization, and support aprocessof genuine reform.At present, there is no appetite in
Thailand,onany sideof thecountryspoliticaldivide, foranythingother thanaconstitutional
monarchy. Indeed, there isnocompelling reasonwhyThailand shouldhaveanyother formof
government, which in other contexts has proven quite compatible with a functioning
representativedemocracy.Thenagain,thehungerforalternativesissuretogrowrapidly,should
thenextKingrefusetomakepeacewithreality.
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