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MinorityMajorityRelationsinCanada:TheRightsRegimeandtheAdoptionofMulticulturalValues
AllisonHarellCanadianOpinionResearchArchive
SchoolofPolicyStudies,Queen’sUniversityAbstract:HowhavechangesinthemanagementofculturaldiversityandeffortstopreventdiscriminationimpactedpublicopiniontowardimmigrationandmulticulturalisminCanada?Thisarticlesetsouttoexaminehowattitudeshaveshiftedtowardimmigration,ethnicandracialdiversityandmulticulturalismsincethe1970s.DrawingonawealthofpollingdataavailablethroughtheCanadianOpinionResearchArchive,evidenceispresentedthatpublicopinionhasshifteddramaticallysincetheearly1990stowardmorepositiveattitudes.ItisarguedthatthisopinionshiftsreflectsbothsignificantpolicydevelopmentsinCanadaconcerningminorityrights,anti‐discriminationandmulticulturalismandinter‐generationaldifferencesinexperienceswithdiversity.ThepaperconcludesbyarguingthatyoungergenerationsofCanadianshavegrownupwithauniquesetofmulticulturalnorms,whichreflectunprecedentedlevelsofopennesstowardethnoculturaldiversityintheyoungestgenerationofCanadians.
PaperpreparedfortheCanadianPoliticalScienceAssociationannualmeetinginOttawa,
ON,May27‐29,2009.
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Introduction
Canadiandemocracyhasexperiencedamassivetransformationinthepastforty
years.Ithasformallyentrenchedaconstitution,withstoodtwoattemptsbyQuebecto
secedefromthefederation,andundertakenaradicalshiftinimmigrationpolicy–tripling
thevisibleminoritypopulation.Thesechangeswereaccompaniedbyapolicyframework
thatdefinedCanadiansocietyasbilingualandmulticulturalandbylegalframeworksthat
ensureallaretreatedequallybeforethelaw.Whatimpacthavethesechangeshadonthe
attitudesofCanadians?DoesCanadiansocietyreflectthevaluesespousedinthesepolicy
developments?Haveconditionsofgreaterequalitybetweenminoritiesandmajorities
facilitatedmorepositiveoutgroupattitudes?
Thispapertracesthedevelopmentofthe"rightsrevolution"inCanadaandcritically
examineshowthesedevelopments,combinedwiththerealityofamoreracially,ethnically
andreligiouslydiversepopulation,haveledtoamassiveshiftinpublicopinionsincethe
early1990s.Thisshiftnotonlyreflectsthesignificantchangesinpublicpolicyandlegal
norms,butalsotheeverydayexperiencesofmorerecentgenerations.Canadiansborn
after1970havegrownupinafundamentallydifferentnormenvironmentwhererespect
forbothrightsandpluralismplayaprominentroleindefiningCanadianidentity.They
havealsohadunprecedentedopportunitiestointeractwithpeoplefromvariousracial,
ethnicandreligiouscommunities.
TheRightsRevolutioninCanada
TheCanadianstoryoftherightsrevolutionmustbeunderstoodsimultaneouslyfor
itsuniquenessanditsrelationshiptoabroadertrendthatwasoccurring,invariousforms,
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inmanystatesaroundtheworld.Epps(1998:7)definesarightsrevolutionas“a
sustained,developmentalprocessthatproducedorexpandednewcivilrightsand
liberties."Thisprocessisreflectedinnewfoundattentionbythecourtstoquestionsof
individualrightssuchasspeech,assemblyandreligionaswellaspopularandlegislative
attentiontorightsissues.1Competingexplanationsexistforthesourcesoftherights
revolution.YetinCanada,asintheUnitedStatesandmanyotherindustrializedcountries,
thelastfiftyyearshavebeenmarkedbysuccessiveattemptsatcodifyingbasiccivil
libertiesandensuringthatindividualshaveequalaccesstotheserights.
InCanadaasinothercountries,thisprocessincludedashifttowardanti‐
discriminationlegislationandthelegalelaborationandprotectionofindividualrights.The
rightsrevolutioninCanadabeganinthe1960swiththepassingoftheBillofRights,which
wasapieceoflegislationwhichpreventedfederalagenciesfromdiscriminatingonthe
groundsofrace,nationalorigin,colour,religionandsex.2Thisbill,whilelimitedinscope,
markedthestartingpointforanti‐discriminationlegislation,andwasfollowedshortly
thereafterbythe1962ImmigrationActwhichpreventeddiscriminationbasedonskin
colour,raceorethnicoriginintheselectionofimmigrantsandwasreplacedwiththe
pointssystemin1967whichisstilllargelyinplacetoday.3
Meanwhile,asthedevelopmentofanti‐discriminationpoliciesbegantotakeshape,
anintensefocusonlanguagerightswasalsoemergingtoaddresstheunequalpositionof
French‐speakingCanadians,largelymotivatedbytheincreasinglynationalistdiscourseof
1Thereare,ofcourse,intensedebatesaboutwhetherthisincreasedattentionbythecourtsreflectsanincrease,orevenanoverstepping,ofjudicialpower.See,forexample,MortonandKnopff(2000).2ForadetailedhistoryofthedevelopmentoftheBillofRights,seeMacLennan(2003).3However,thepreferentialtreatmentprovidedtoCommonwealthcountriesmeantthatcertainimmigrantgroupswerestillprovidedsomeadvantageingainingcitizenship.Thispreferentialtreatmentwasremovedinthe1977CitizenshipAct.
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theQuietRevolutioninQuebec.4TheRoyalCommissiononBilingualismandBiculturalism
wassetupin1963,andmanyofitsrecommendationsenactedbyPrimeMinisterTrudeau
appearintheOfficialLanguagesActof1969.TheemphasisonlanguagerightsinCanada
wasalsoaccompaniedbyanincreasingfocusonotherculturalgroups,notablyimmigrant
communities.TheCommissionReportrecognizedotherculturalgroupsinbookfour,aptly
titled“TheCulturalContributionoftheOtherEthnicGroups.”Thediscourseof
biculturalisminitiallyfacedresistancefromestablishedimmigrantcommunitiesinCanada
whosoughtrecognitionoftheirroleinCanadiansociety.Thisrecognitionwasgrantedin
Trudeau’sannouncementofanofficialpolicyofmulticulturalismin1971.Pal(1993)
providesadetailedaccountofhowgovernmentinstitutionsprovidedthefoundationforan
increasingfocusonidentityandcollectiverightsinCanada,especiallyamonglanguage
communities,immigrantcommunitiesandwomen.
Theanti‐discriminationaswellascollectiverightsdiscoursefromtheCanadian
governmentwouldflourishinthe1970sand1980sinCanada,perhapsmostnotablyinthe
ConstitutionActof1982whichincludedtheCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,a
billofrightsthat,unlikeits1960scounterpart,wasentrenchedintheConstitution.The
Charteritselfhasreceivedanimmenseamountofscholarlyattention(see,forexample,
Cairns,1991;Manfredi,2004;Dobrowolsky,1999;Morton,1987,1998;MortonandKnopff,
2000;Pal,1993;Russell,2008;Seidle,1993;Hiebert,2002;Cairns,1992)andreceives
widespreadsupportamongtheCanadianpopulation(FletcherandHowe,2001).
4OnesuchexpressionofQuebeccollectiveidentitywastheChartequébécoisedesdroitsetlibertéswhichwaspassedinto1975(Morel,1987).WhiletheQuebeccharterwasasimplepieceoflegislation,itisinterestingtonotehowrightsareintimatelytiedtoasenseofcollectiveidentity,bothwithinQuebecandwithinCanadamoregenerally.
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WhiletheCharterreceivesthevastmajorityofattention,severalotherkeypiecesof
legislationreflectimportantstepsinthedevelopmentofanti‐discriminationpoliciesandin
aninstitutionaldiscoursearoundequality.TheseincludetheCanadianHumanRightsAct,
whichwasenactedin1977andprohibitsdiscriminationinallareasunderfederal
jurisdiction5,theEmploymentEquityActin1986,andtheCanadianMulticulturalismActin
1988thatcreatesalegislativeframeworkforthe1971policyofmulticulturalism.6
Inthethirty‐yearperiodfrom1960to1990Canadaexperiencedarightsrevolution:
civilrightsandlibertieswerenotonlyprotectedthroughsuccessivelegislation,butthey
wereentrenchedinthenewCanadianconstitutionandincreasinglythefocusofthecourts’
attention.7ThesechangeswerenotexclusivetoCanada.Othercountrieshavereactedto
aninternationaldiscourseonhumanrights,aswellasinterestgroupmobilizationsof
previouslymarginalizedcommunities(Epps,1998;Walker,1998;Glendon,1991).8Yet,
Canada’sexistingpluralism–andthewaysinwhichgovernmentchosetomanageit–make
itauniquecase.Thedevelopmentofarightsculturewasaccompaniedinfundamental
wayswithdiscoursesaroundaccommodatingculturalpluralismanddefiningCanadian
identity.Howhasadiscoursearoundequalityrightsandmulticulturalismimpacted
Canadianvalues?Hasitchangedthewaysinwhichminoritiesandmajoritiesrelatetoeach
other?
5ThisCanadianHumanRightsActfollowedtheenactmentofsimilarlegislationattheprovinciallevels.6ItshouldbenotedthatQuebechasdevelopedanalternativeframeworktomulticulturalismcalledinterculturalism,whichwaselaboratedbytheprovincialgovernmentin1990.Foradiscussionofthedifferences,seeKarmis(1994).7Epps(1998:172‐174)documentsthatbeginninginabout1975,andespeciallyby1980,civilrightscasesweremoreoftenexaminedbytheSupremeCourtofCanada.8Foranalternativeperspectiveonthesechanges,seeBrodieandNevitte(1993b).TheyarguethattheNewPoliticsofthe70sand80sreflectedawidervaluechangeinadvancedindustrializeddemocraciestowardmorepost‐materialistvalues.
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PoliticalValuesandInstitutionalFrameworks
MuchofthefocusontherightsrevolutioninCanadahastakenadecidedly
institutionalapproachwherethreemainactorsplaycentralroles:thecourts,parliament,
andinterestgroups.Thisliterature,ingeneral,addressestwokeyquestions.Ontheone
hand,intensescholarlydebatehasemergedaboutthesocialandpoliticalimplicationsof
judicialreviewandthedegreeofparliamentarysupremacyinCanada(Hiebert,2002;
MortonandKnopff,2000;HoweandRussell,2001).Ontheotherhand,detailedstudies
havealsoexaminedthemobilizationofinterestgroupsaroundthenewlyenshrinedrights
providedbytheCharter(Epps,1998;Pal,1993;Manfredi,2004;Seidle,1993),especiallyas
theyrelatetotheequalityclause(Section15),whichrecognizestherighttoequal
protectionandrecognitionbeforethelaw.
Thisinstitutionalapproachhasprovidedathoroughexaminationofhowthesethree
setsofactorsinteractandtheimplicationsthishashadintermsofpolicyandlegal
developmentsinCanada.However,relativelylittleattentionhasbeenpaidtohowthese
policiesreflect–andperhapsshape–publicopinion.Thisisanimportantlacunainthe
research,yettheimplicationisclearlypresentinpastresearch.Manyauthorshaveargued,
inCanadaaswellaselsewhere,thatrightsrevolutionsleadcitizenstoframeconflictsin
termsofindividualrights–often,itisargued,tothedetrimentofthedevelopmentofa
sociallycohesivesociety(Bibby,1990;Cairns,1988,1991,1992;Glendon,1991;Ignatieff,
2000;Walker,1998).Theextenttowhichpoliticalvaluesareshapedbytheseinstitutional
changesrequiresananalysisofhowpublicopinionhaschangedduringthiskeyperiods.
Tobefair,theinterestgroupliteraturedoesemergefromacivil‐societyperspective,
butlittleempiricalevidencehasrelatedthesesocialmovementstobroaderattitudesshifts
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towardamoretolerantsociety.Broadertrendsinpublicopinionarelargelyviewedas
culturalframeswhich“undoubtedlyshapethekindsofclaimsthatindividualscan
conceive,aswellasthekindsofchangesthattheyviewaswithintherealmofpossibilities”
(Epps,1998:17),buttheseso‐calledculturalframeshavebeenstudiedlargelyinisolation
fromthestudyofrightsrevolution.9Yet,thereisasensethatlegaldevelopmentslikethe
CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedomswillallowinstitutionslikethecourtsto“be
activeinshapingthecharacterofCanadiansociety”(Vaughan,2001:23).Cairnscaptures
thissentimentstarklywhenheargues,“Overtime,thecumulativeresultsofits[the
Charter’s]applicationswillreachdeeplyintoourinner‐mostbeing,manipulatingour
psycheandtransformingourself‐image”(Cairns,1991:62).
WedoknowthatCanadiansarelargelysupportiveofboththeCharterandthe
courtsmoregenerally.FletcherandHowe(2001,2000a,2000b)haveconductedoneofthe
onlystudiesthatexaminesattitudestowardtheCharteritself.10Theyfindthatthereis
widespreadsupportfortheCharteramongCanadians,asmuchin1999(87%)astherewas
inanearlierstudyconductedin1987(84%).Theyfindasurprisingamountofconsistency
inpeople’sattitudestowardthecourtatthesetwopoints.Theyalsofindlittledifferences
acrosssalientsocialanddemographiccategories,reinforcingtheviewthatthissupportis
widespread.Inshort,sinceitsadoptions,Canadiansseemtogenerallyfeelquitepositive
aboutit.
Theextenttowhichsuchinstitutions–andmorespecificallythepoliciesand
decisionsofsuchinstitutions–impactCanadianvaluesmoregenerallyremainsan
empiricalquestionthathasreceivedverylittlescrutiny(see,however,BrodieandNevitte,9AlthoughseeGlendon(1991)foradiscussionofhowarightsframehasshapedpublicdiscourseintheU.S.10ForamorepessimisticviewofCanadiansattitudestowardtheCharter,seeNanos(2007).
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1993b,1993a;Cairns,1993).ItseemstobeconventionalwisdomthatCanadiansociety
hasbecomemoretolerantinrecentdecades,althoughlittleovertimedatahasbeen
availabletosupportthisperception.Oneofthefewstudiesthathastrackedchanging
valuesovertimeisNevitte(1996).11Heexaminesattitudesfromthe1981and1991World
ValueSurveysandarguesthatCanadiansarebecomingmorepost‐materialandless
deferentialtoauthority.Thisisreflectedinlesstrustinpoliticalinstitutionsandagreater
willingnesstoengageinprotestpolitics,aswellassupportformoreegalitarianvalues.Of
particularimportanceforthispaperisevidencethatCanadianshavebecomemore
supportiveofpluralism,asmeasuredbyavarietyoftolerancemeasures,andthatthisis
especiallytrueforyoungergenerations(seealsoLambertandCurtis,1984).
Twotrends,then,aresuggestedbythiswork:first,thereseemstobeaperiodeffect
whereattitudesarechangingamongthewholepopulation.Second,theremayalsobea
generationaleffectwhereyoungergenerationsarereportingadifferentsetofvaluesthan
pastgenerations.ConsistentevidencetendstosupporttheclaimthatyoungerCanadians
tendtobemoreopentowarddiversity,althoughthisdifferenceisusuallyreportedin
singlewavesofsurveyresearchwhichmakeitimpossibletodistinguishagefrom
generationaleffects(ParkinandMendelsohn,2003;Adams,2007).Theperiodeffecthas
receivedlimitedattentionaswell(BerryandKalin,1995;Palmer,1996;Gidengiletal.,
2003).12Forexample,BerryandKalin(1995:316)findthatattitudestoward
multiculturalismhavebecomemorepositivebetween1974an1991.Inperhapsthemost
comprehensivetestofover‐timechangesinattitudestowardimmigration,Wilkesand
11SeealsoNevitte(2002)andWilkes,GuppyandFarris(2008).12Gidengiletal.(2003:395)provideevidencethatthosewantinglessimmigrationhasdeclinedoverfourwavesoftheCanadianElectionStudy(1988‐2000),bothinQuebecandintherestofCanada.
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colleagues(2008)findthatattitudeshavebecomemorepositivetowardimmigration
beginninginthe1990s.RelyingonseventeenCanadianGalluppollsfrom1975to2000,
theyfindthatinterests,ideologyandthestateofthenationaleconomyhelpexplainanti‐
immigrantsentiment.Whilenotthefocusoftheiranalysis,theyalsofindanageeffect,with
olderindividualslesssupportiveofimmigration.
Whilethesestudiessuggestincreasingopennesstowarddiversity,theydonot
directlytesttheimpactoftherightsandpluralismdiscoursesonpublicopinion.
Furthermore,sinceovertimeanalyseshaveoftenbeenlimitedtotwodatapoints,trends
acrosstimeandacrossgenerationshavebeendifficulttoassess.Evidencesuggeststhat
trendstowardmorepluralisticvalueshavespreadacrossadvancedindustrialized
democracies(Nevitte,1996;Inglehart,1998;Nevitte,2002).However,theempirical
supportforthiscontentionismorelimitedintheCanadiancase.Thisisunfortunate
becauseCanadaoffersauniquecaseforexamininghowtheselargertrendscorrespond
withactualpolicydevelopmentsinCanada,andforassessingthedegreetowhichits
uniqueapproachtoaccommodatingculturaldiversitymayhavemattered.
Cross‐nationalresearchsuggeststhatCanadiansaremoresupportiveof
multiculturalismandimmigrationthanotherindustrializedcountries(WardandMasgoret,
2008;Adams,2007)andsomeevidencesuggeststhatthereislessracialconflict(Reitz,
1988).Canadawasthefirstcountryintheworldtoannounceanofficialpolicyof
multiculturalismandhasservedinmanywaysasanexampletoothersastohowto
successfullyintegrateadiversesociety.Thereisresearchtosuggestthatpoliciesthat
promoteaninclusiveidentityareassociatedwithimprovedinterculturalrelationsand
attitudestowardimmigrants(Berry,2000;Billietetal.,2003)andthatdifferentregime
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typesimpactthetypesofvaluestowarddiversitythatcitizenshold(Weldon,2006).Given
thisresearch,itisimportanttoexaminehowattitudestowarddiversityhavechangedover
timeinCanada,andwhetherinstitutionalchangeshaveprecededorfollowedthem.Given
theemphasisonanti‐discriminationoverthepast40years,itisessentialtoexaminehow
intergrouprelationshavechangedinCanada.
Thispaperwillmakethreespecificcontributions.First,itwilltrackattitudesover
timetowarddiversityrelyingonamultitudeofattitudemeasuresatmultiplepointsin
time.Second,itwilltakeadecidedlygenerationalapproachtoexamineifthosewhohave
grownuppost‐rightsrevolutionareadoptingmoremulticulturalnormsthanpast
generations.Finally,unlikepaststudies,itwillexaminetherolethatintergroupcontact
playsinpromotingpositiveattitudestowarddiversity.Unlikeasimpleapplicationofthe
contacthypothesis(Allport,1958),suchcontactwillbeviewedascontext‐specific.In
otherwords,thechangingpoliciesanddiscoursesarounddiversitywillbearguedto
facilitatethetypeofcross‐groupinteractionthatishopedtopromotepositiveoutgroup
attitudes.
PluralistPoliciesandPluralistValues
Clearly,Canadahasexperiencedamajortransformationinitslegalandlegislative
frameworks.Thesedevelopmentshaveplacedincreasingimportanceonissuesofequality
andanti‐discrimination,whilealsosettingthestagefordramaticchangesinthe
compositionoftheCanadianpopulationitself.Yetweknowlittleabouthowthese
institutionalvalueshavetranslatedintoCanadianpoliticalculture.Thispapertakesa
decidedlyreciprocalviewofthisprocess:whiledecisionsaboutpolicyareclearlydrivenin
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partbythemobilizationofinterestgroupsandacalculationofhowpolicieswillbe
receivedbythegeneralpublic,oncepoliciesareputintoplace,theycanalsoconditionthe
wayscitizensthinkandfeelaboutvariousissues.Thisviewissimilartothethermostatic
modelputforwardbySorokaandWlezian(2005),wherepoliciesrespondtodemands
fromthepublic,whointurnreacttopolicychanges.
Figure1outlinesthegeneraltheoreticalframeworkunderpinningtheforthcoming
analysis.Asstated,substantialevidencehasbeenaccumulatedthattherightsrevolutionin
Canada,asrepresentedbycurrentlawsandpoliciesintheseareas,wasdrivennotonlyby
pastpoliciesandlegalprecedents,butalsobythemobilizationofinterestgroupsand
politicalcompetitioninCanadatogarnersupportfromspecificcommunities(Epps,1998;
Hiebert,2002;Morton,1987;MortonandKnopff,2000;Manfredi,2004;Pal,1993;Seidle,
1993).Oncetheselawsandpoliciesareinplace,theyhavetwomainoutputs.First,the
rightsrevolutionarguablyhasimpactedtheframesofdebateinCanada,withquestionsof
identityandrightsincreasinglyplayinganimportantrole(Cairns,1991;Pal,1993;Cairns
etal.,1999;Uberoi,2008;Ignatieff,2000).Second,theyhaveconcretepolicyoutcomes
relatedtodiversity,suchaschangesinschoolcurriculums,thenatureandlevelsof
immigration,andthecreationofmechanismstoensureequityinareaslikehousingand
employment.13Boththeframesofdebateandpolicyoutcomesarelikelytoimpactthe
waysinwhichthepublicfeelsaboutpluralismandhowtheyinteractwithracialized
minorities.Theseopinionsinturnfosterinterestgroupmobilizationandpolitical
competitionthatfuelfurtherpolicydevelopments.
13Forarelatedargumentbetweenimmigrationlevelsandattitudes,seeStolleandHarell(n.d.).
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[figure1abouthere]
Thismodelprovidesabasisforexpectingchangesovertime(i.e.periodeffects),but
thereisalsoreasontobelievethatthisprocesswillhaveadisproportionateimpactonthe
attitudesandvaluesofyoungerCanadians(i.e.generationeffect).Politicalsocialization
researchhasdemonstratedthatearlyexperiences,suchasinthefamilyandatschool,
contributetopoliticalattitudesandbehaviorsthataresurprisinglystableoverthelife
course(Hooghe,2004;YatesandYouniss,1999;Gimpeletal.,2003;Jaros,1973;Langston,
1969;MillerandSears,1986;Torney‐Purtaetal.,1975;Gerberetal.,2003;Greenand
Shachar,2000;Plutzer,2002).Changesintheinstitutionalcontext,andsubsequent
changesinboththeframesofdebateandtheenvironmentinwhichthesedebatestake
placeshouldthereforehaveadisproportionateimpactonthevaluesandattitudesof
youngergenerations.Theimpactshouldbeparticularlystrongforthosewhoexperience
mostdirectlytheoutcomesoftheseinstitutionaldevelopments.Whilesomeofthese
changesmayberelativelyconstantformostyouth(suchaschangesintheschool
curriculum),otherchangeswillbeexperienceddisproportionatelybycertainyouth,such
asincreasesintheethnicandracialcompositionofthepopulationresultingfromamore
openimmigrationregime.
Thus,thePolicy‐PublicOpinionModelpresentedinFigure1offerstwomajor
expectationsforpublicopiniondataovertimeinCanada.Firstofall,weshouldwitnessa
shiftinpublicopiniontowardmoreopenattitudestowardimmigrationand
multiculturalismthatproceedsthedevelopmentofarightscultureinCanada.Second,this
shiftshouldbemostacuteamongyoungergenerations,especiallythosewhohavehadthe
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opportunitytoexperiencetheeffectsofsomeofthesechanges,suchasthosewhoare
exposedtoincreasedethnoculturaldiversityintheireverydaylives.
DataandMethods
Thedatausesforthisanalysisarefrompublicopinionsurveysthathavebeen
conductedinCanadasincethe1970s.TheprimarysourceofdataistheFocusCanada
series.Thisisaquarterly,representativepublicopinionsurveyconductedbyEnvironics.
Whilethesurveyquestionsvaryfromwavetowave,anumberofquestionshavebeen
repeatedovertimetoallowforamoreaccuratetrackingofattitudetrendsthanisusually
available.AdditionaldataisalsodrawnfromtheCanadianElectionStudies(CES),Gallup
andsurveysconductedbytheCentreforResearchandInformationonCanada(CRIC).14All
resultsarepresentedinweightedformat.
TheDevelopmentofMulticulturalValues
HaveCanadiansbecomemoresupportiveofdiversityovertimeinCanada?While
thisquestionseemsrelativelystraightforward,themajorobstacletoansweringithasbeen
theavailabilityofovertimemeasuresonavarietyofquestionsrelationtodiversityand
multiculturalisminCanada.Figure2presentsthetrendsinresponsestoeightdifferent
questionsaboutimmigrationandracialminoritiesthatwereaskedaminimumofthree
timesbetween1975and2006.Thelinesrepresentatwopointmovingaveragefor
responsesthatwereconsideredpositivetowarddiversity.Inaddition,atimelineis
providedalongthex‐axisthatplotsoutmajorchangesinlegislationandkeyevents.14Thesesurveys,alongwithtechnicalinformation,areavailablethroughtheCanadianOpinionResearchArchive(www.queensu.ca/cora).
14
[figure2abouthere]
Duringthe1970sand1980s,twodifferentpollingfirms(EnvironicsandGallup)
repeatedlyaskedCanadiansabouttheirattitudestowardthelevelofimmigrationin
Canada.Theysuggestthattherewassomemovementinattitudesduringthisperiod.15
PastresearchhassuggestedthatsupportforimmigrationinCanadaislinkedtoeconomic
conditions,whichroughlymirrortheupsanddownsduringthisperiod(Palmer,1996).
However,duringthe1990s,acrossalleightquestions,whichrangefromsupportfor
immigrationtohowmuchshouldbedoneforracialminorities,thereappearstobea
significantupswinginsupportacrosstheboard.Forexample,whereasroughlyone‐third
ofCanadiansdisagreedwiththestatementthattherewastoomuchimmigrationinthe
early1990s,bytheearly2000s,thisnumberdoublewithnearlytwo‐thirdsofCanadians.16
Linkingthisshifttotheformerinstitutionalcontextdevelopedaroundpluralism
rightsinthe1970sand1980srequiresmorethansimplytemporalorder.Yettheshift
whichoccurredinthe1990sisstriking,anditfollowedaperiodrightlydescribedasa
rightsrevolutionwhichplacedimmenseimportanceontheideasofanti‐discrimination
andequality.Wasthepublicopinionshiftconsistentacrossthepopulation?InFigure3,
responsestothelongestrunningquestion(Generallyspeaking,thereistoomuch
15Thedifferenceinlevelsofpositiveresponsestothesequestionsislikelyduetodifferentquestionwording.WhereastheGalluppollaskedaquestionthatprovidedbothapositiveandnegativeresponse,theEnvironicsquestionrequirestherespondenttodisagreewithanegativestatement.Givenresponseacquiescence,itisnotsurprisingthatthisquestiontracksatalowerlevel.Whatisimportant,however,isthatthepatternovertimeislargelyparallel.16Thislevelisparticularlyremarkablebecausethequestionwordingisbiasedtowardananti‐immigrantresponse.Acquiescencebiasmayinfactmeanthislevelismuted.
15
immigration)arebrokendownbyagegrouptoaddressthisquestion.17Thepattern,not
surprisingly,mirrorstheaggregatetrends.However,differencesacrossagegroupsare
apparent.Whilenoclearagetrendappearsinthe1980s,beginningintheearly1990s
wheretheupswinginsupportforimmigrationbegins,theyoungestagecohortare
consistentlymoresupportiveofimmigrationthanoldergenerations.In2006,those
betweentheagesof18to24disagreedwiththeanti‐immigrationstatement70percentof
thetime,comparedtoonly58percentamongthoseovertheageof55(p<.01).Thegap
betweentheyoungestandoldestcohortsrangesfromfourpercentagepointsin1992to14
percentagepointsin1994and2001.Whilesupportforimmigrationhasincreasedacross
allagegroups,theyoungercohortconsistentlyreportshigherlevelsoverall.Thisage
difference,itisimportanttonote,wasnotconsistentlypresentbeforetheearly1990s.
[figure3abouthere]
Aswithpreviousresearch,thereisacleartendencyamongyoungerCanadiansto
providemorepositiveresponsestowarddiversity,andthisisconfirmedinTable1,where
responsesfroma2006Environicssurveyareprovidedforsixdifferentimmigration
questionsbyagegroup.Ineverycasebutone,youngpeopleages18‐24provideanswers
moresupportiveofimmigrationthanoldergenerations,andthesearesignificant(p<.01)in
fourofthefivecases.Theoneexceptionisresponsestothestatement:Immigrantstake
jobsawayfromotherCanadians.Inthisinstance,youthareactuallytheleastlikelyto
disagree.Thisisperhapsnotsurprising,sincethisistheagegroupwhohasorwillbe
17Notethatthe1977datapointisnotdisplayed,asanagevariableisnotincludedinthisdataset.
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shortlyenteringtheworkforce,andforwhomemploymentcompetitionmaybehighly
salient(Palmer,1996).Onthewhole,however,publicopinionamongyoungerpeople
tendstobemorepositiveaboutimmigration.Whenthesesixitemsarecombinedintoa
singlescale(alpha=.738),wherehigherresponsesindicatemoreopenattitudestoward
immigration,youngCanadians,onaverage,havethehighestscore.
[table1abouthere]
Thedatashowthatsupportforsocialdiversityhasincreasedsincetheearly1990s,
andthatyoungpeoplearemostlikelytoexpresssociallytolerantattitudes.Itisimportant
tonotethatduringthistimeCanadaexperiencedanimmensegrowthinethnic,religious
andracialdiversity,largelydrivenbyimmigration.AccordingtotheCanadiancensus,less
than5%ofthepopulationwasconsideredavisibleminorityin1981.Overthefollowing
twoandahalfdecades,thisnumbertripled.In2006,CensusCanadaestimatedthatonein
sixCanadiansisavisibleminority.Thisgrowingdiversitywasnotaccompaniedby
increasedanti‐immigrantsentiment,asithasbeeninEurope(McLaren,2003).18
ThestructureofimmigrationtoCanadaisuniqueinmanyways,partlybecauseof
thetypesofimmigrantsthatcometoCanada.Thepointsystem,whichwasputinplacein
1967,replacedtherace‐basedpoliciesthatguidedimmigrationpre‐1967.Thisattemptat
a“merit”systemprioritizeseducationandworkexperience,whichmeansthatCanadian
immigrantsoftenarrivewithcomparablybettersocio‐economicresourcesthan
18Wilkesandcolleagues(2008)haveprovidedafurthertestofthisfindingintheCanadiancontextandfindnoeffectforthelevelofimmigrationonanti‐immigrantsentiment.
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immigrantsinothercountries.19Thismaymitigatesomeoftheintergroupconflict
betweenimmigrantsandhostsocietiesthathasbeendocumentedinEurope(Quillian,
1995).Yet,researchsuggestsaswellthattheinstitutionalsupportsinCanadaprovidedto
immigrantplayanimportantroleinexplainingimmigrantintegration,beyondtherelative
differencesinstatusofnewcomers(Bloemraad,2006).
Whilethenatureofimmigrationisclearlyanimportantfactorinexplaining
immigrantattitudes,Iwouldarguethatitreflectsthebroaderinstitutionalvaluesof
equalityandpluralismreflectedintheCharterandotherlegaldevelopmentsthroughthe
1960sand1970s.ThetypesandlevelsofimmigrantsinCanadaisapolicyoutcome,which
inpartmediatestherelationshipbetweentheinstitutionalcontextandpublicopinions.
Thereisanimmenseamountofresearchthatdocumentsthatincreasedcontactbetween
minoritiesandmajoritiesfostersmorepositiveattitudes(Allport,1958;Pettigrew,1998;
Dovidioetal.,2003;PettigrewandTropp,2006).Thereisalso,however,acompeting
literaturethatsuggeststhatincreasingdiversityshouldactuallyresultinmorehostile
intergrouprelations(TajfelandTurner,1979,1986;GilesandBuckner,1993;Quillian,
1995;McLaren,2003;TolbertandGrummel,2003).Themajordistinctionbetweenthese
twoframeworksisthenatureofintergroupinteraction.Thecontacthypothesisrequires
positiveinteraction,whereasthethreathypothesissimplyrequiresproximity.Thus,
contextisthekeymechanismintranslatingexperienceswithdiversityintosocialand
politicalattitudesaboutothergroups.TheCanadiancontext,Ihaveargued,providesa
contextinwhichpositiveinteractionacrossgrouplinesislikelytotakeplace.
19Clearly,thissystemhasitsdrawbacks.ThereremainsdifficultyintranslatingtheseskillsintoemploymentinCanada,duetoalackofrecognitionofforeigncredentials.Foracritiqueoftheeconomicimperativesofimmigration,seeAbu‐LabanandGabriel(2002).Thereisalsosomeevidencethatincreasinglyissuesofracialdiscriminationarealsocreatingbarrierstofullemploymentformorerecentimmigrants(Reitz2007).
18
[table2abouthere]
Wemightexpectthatthegapinsupportacrossagegroupswillbeamplifiedamong
thosewhohavemoreexposuretodiverseothers.Totestthis,itisnecessarytoknowthe
typesofethnicandracialdiversitythatindividualshaveactuallybeenexposedto.Oneway
tocapturesuchexposureisbyexaminingcontact.The2006Environicssurvey,fortunately,
askedaboutthefrequencyofcontactwithsixdifferentminoritygroupsinCanada:Jews,
blacks,Chinese,Pakistani/EastIndians,Muslims,andAboriginals.Responseswereona
four‐pointscalefromnevertooften,andtheresponseshavebeencompiledintoan
additivecontactscalethatrangesfrom0to18(alpha=.815).Themeanforallagegroups
isabout10.1,withtheexceptionofthoseover55whoaveragean8.7onthescale.Thereis,
then,littleevidencethatyoungerCanadiansreportsubstantiallydifferentlevelsofcontact
thanolderCanadians.20Butconsiderthecorrelationsbetweencontactandpro‐
immigrationattitudesinTable2.Whilethetwoarepositivelyrelatedinallcases,notehow
therelationshipappearstostrengthenamongyoungergenerations.Youthcontactseems
tobemorecorrelatedwiththeirattitudestowardimmigrants.Thisisexpectedfroma
socializationperspective:earlyexperiencesaresupposedtobemorerelatedtopolitical
attitudes.
[table3abouthere]
20However,seeStolleandHarell(n.d.)forevidencethatyoungpeopledoreporthigherlevelsofethnicandracialdiversityintheirfriendshipnetworks.Theyalsoshowthatinamultivariatesetting,thepositiveimpactofnetworkdiversityongeneralizedtrustisonlyfoundamongyoungergenerations.
19
InTable3,therelationshipbetweencontactandagearefurtherexploredinthe
multivariatesetting.Thecontactscaleisincludedinthemodel,aswellasdummyvariables
forthedifferentagegroups.Controlsareincludedforregionofthecountry,whereOntario
isconsideredthereferencecategory,immigrantstatus(1=immigrant),visibleminority
status(1=firstmentionforethnicbackgroundotherthanEuropean/NorthAmerican),
gender(female=1),employmentstatus(1=unemployed),andimpressionsofthestateof
theeconomy(4‐pointscalewhere1=veryworriedand4=notatallworried).Theinclusion
ofthelasttwoitemsareimportant,astheyoffercontrolfortheimpactofeconomic
competitiononanti‐immigrantattitudes,amajorexplanatoryfactorinpreviousresearch
(Palmer,1996;O'Connell,2005).
TheeffectforbothcontactandagearesignificantinTable3.Thosewhoreport
morecontactwithminoritygroupsaremorelikelytohavepositiveattitudestoward
immigration(p<.01).Asexpected,theyoungestagecohort(18to24yearolds)isalsothe
mostpositivetowarddiversity(p<.10),withmorenegativeattitudesevidentwitheach
successiveagecohort(p<.01).Thesefindingsholddespitetheinclusionofavarietyof
demographiccontrols.Furthermore,theeffectsarealsopresentwhenthemodelis
examinedonlyfornon‐immigrants(resultsnotshown).Boththecontactscaleandyouth
remainpositiveandstatisticallysignificant(p<.01andp<.05respectively).
[figure4abouthere]
20
Ideally,tofullytestwhethercurrentcontactimpactsyouthattitudestoward
diversitymorethanotheragegroups,interactiontermswouldbeincludedinthemodel.
Unfortunately,theeffectofageandtheinteractiontermdisappearwhenbothareincluded
inthemodel(notshown).Thisislikelyduetotherelativelysmallsampleof18to24year
oldsinthesample.21Inanexaminationoftheyouthsamplealone,thecontactscale
remainssignificant.Infact,itisoneoftheonlyvariablesthatattainsstatisticalsignificance,
otherthanfeelingsaboutthestateoftheeconomy(notshown).Figure4highlightsthe
proposedinteractionbetweenageandcontact.Thegraphplotstherelationshipbetween
contactandpro‐immigrantattitudes,withregressionlinesshownforeachagegroup.As
expected,theoveralllevelfortheyoungestgroupishighestreflectingtheirhigherlevelsof
overallsupportforimmigration.However,therelationshipisalsostrongerforthe
youngestgroup(r‐squared=.066comparedto.028forthose55andover)andtheslopeof
thelineappearsslightlysteepercomparedtotheoldestcohort.
Whilethisisonlysuggestiveevidencethatcontactmaymattermoreforyouth
comparedtooldergenerations,itclearlydoesmatter.This,combinedwiththeconsistent
agedifferences,supportsthecontentionthatCanadiansattitudestowarddiversityhave
becomemoreopentowarddiversity,andthatthischangehasbeenfeltespeciallyamong
youngpeopleandthosewhohaveexperiencedirectlythepluralismthattherights
revolutionhasmadepossible.
21Thereare197youthrespondentsinthesample,and155ofthemprovidedvalidresponsesonallitemsinthetable3model.
21
ConcludingRemarks
ThispaperhassetouttodocumentchangesinCanadians’attitudestowarddiversity
sincethe1970s.Evidencewaspresentedthatasignificantincreaseoccurredbeginningin
theearly1990sthatproceededmajorinstitutionalchangesinCanada.Thesechanges
reflectthedevelopmentofarightsregimewhichemphasizesindividualrightsandanti‐
discrimination.InCanada,thedevelopmentoftherightsregimetookonunique
characteristicswhichreflectthepre‐existingculturaldiversitythathascharacterized
Canadasinceitsfounding,includingthepresenceoftwolanguagecommunities,
Aboriginals,andsuccessivewavesofimmigrationthatbroughtwiththemcultural,
religiousandethnicdiversity.HowsuccessiveCanadiangovernmentshavemanageda
respectforbothindividualrightsandculturalpluralismarereflectedinbothpolicy
outcomesaswellastheframesofdebatethatstructurepublicdiscussionaround
accommodatingdiversity.
Clearly,therearelimitationstotheanalysisputforthinthispaper.Thenextlogical
stepwillbetomodeltheageeffectsovertime,controllingforindividuallevel
characteristicsthatarenotcapturedbyasimplebreakdownofattitudesbyage.Theinitial
findingsfortheageeffectsinthemultivariatesettingsuggestthattheageeffectisindeed
robusttocontrolsinthe2006sample.Asecondlimitationistheavailabilityofcontextual
information.Becausetheimpactofdiversityisfeltdifferentlydependingonwhereoneis
located,futureresearchwillneedtocontrolforbothurban/ruraldynamicsandideallyfor
census‐tractlevelinformationforeachrespondent,aswellaschangesinthelevelsof
ethnicandracialdiversityovertimeandthestateoftheeconomy.
22
Despitetheselimitations,theevidencepresentedinthispaperdoesprovideoneof
thefewlooksatchangesinattitudestowarddiversityovertimeinCanada.Thisstudyhas
reliedonamultitudeofquestionsthatareaskedrepeatedlyovertime.Whileacomparison
betweentwopointsintimeisuseful,confidenceinthepresenceoftrendsisgreatly
increasedbythepresenceofmultipledatapoints.Furthermore,thispaperpresenteda
contextualizedunderstandingoftheenvironmentinwhichthesechangesweretaking
place.Whilelarge‐scale,cross‐nationalvaluechangeiscertainlypartofthestoryin
Canada,itisalsoclearthatthemultinationalandmulticulturalnatureofCanadahas
presentedauniquechallengetopolicymakersastheyhavedealtwithincreasingdemands
forindividualrightsandequalitybetweengroups.Thepolicyresponsesreflectbroader
trendsinanti‐discriminationaswellasauniquelyCanadianfocusrecognizingand
respectingculturaldiversity.
23
TablesandFigures
Figure1:PolicyPublicOpinionModel
InputsPastpoliciesLegalprecedentsInterestgroupsPoliticalcompetition
Currentlawsandpolicies
OutputsFramesofdebatePolicyoutcomes
PublicOpinion
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
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