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Note:thisisaroughdraft.Dontciteorcirculatewithouttheauthorspermission.
KaiMller
FromConstitutionaltoInternationalHumanRights
I.IntroductionPartofwhatsparksthecurrentphilosophicaldiscussionaboutinternationalhumanrightsis
amismatchbetweentheirgreatpracticalandtheoreticalimportanceontheonehandand
whatisperceivedtobeanunderdevelopedgraspoftheirmoralbasisandstructureonthe
other.Broadlyspeaking,twostrategies,towhichthispaperwilladdathird,arecurrently
employed inordertothrow lighton internationalhumanrights:1someapproachthemby
startingfromamoraltheoryofhumanrightsasopposedtospecificallyinternationalhuman
rights, and then ask to what extent a proper understanding of human rights can help
illuminate the phenomenon of international human rights.2 Others focus more on the
internationalsphereofwhichinternationalhumanrightsareapart,tryingtoderiveatheory
ofinternationalhumanrightsfromtherolethatphenomenonplaysoroughttoplayinthe
sphereoftherelationsbetweenstates.3Nothingiswrongasamatterofprinciplewiththose
approaches:afullfledgedtheoryof internationalhumanrightsmustsurelymakesenseof
both international and human rights; thus,whatwe are ultimately looking for is an
integratedtheory.Itthereforeseemsplausibletoassumethatonecanapproachtheproject
ofdevelopingacomprehensivetheoryofinternationalhumanrightsfromdifferentangles,
just asonemight reach the top of amountain from different sides. In this paper, Iwill
develop and propose a theory of international human rights, but Iwill choose another,
previously largely unexplored route, namely one via the philosophy of national
constitutionalrights.
Thereare important structural similaritiesbetweenconstitutional rightsand international
humanrights.Inbothcontexts,compliancewithfundamental(read:constitutional;human)
rightsis,looselyspeaking,oneoftheimportantyardsticksoflegitimacy,beitinthesenseof
constitutionallegitimacyorinthesenseoffallingwithinthesphereofastatessovereignty.
Furthermore,therightsprotectedbynationalconstitutionsandinternationaltreatieslook,
onthewhole,strikinglysimilar.Thissimilaritydoesnotendonthesurfacebutgoesallthewaydown.Europeanlawyerswhoareacquaintedwithbothnationalconstitutionallawofa
jurisdictionthatemploysstrongjudicialreviewsuchasGermanyinitsBasicLawandthe
lawof theEuropeanConventiononHumanRightsknow that thedoctrinal tools, styleof
reasoning,and theoutcomesproducedbynationalconstitutionalcourtsontheonehand
and theEuropeanCourtofHumanRightson theotherarevery similar indeed.As iswell
known,when theUnited Kingdom decided in the late 1990s that itwanted to set up a
systemof constitutionaljudicial review, itdidnotdesign anew,nationalbillof British
1SeeAllenBuchanan,TheEgalitarianismofHumanRights,120(2010)Ethics679,68082.2James
Griffin,
On
Human
Rights
(OUP
2008).
See
also
John
Tasioulas,
Taking
Rights
out
of
Human
Rights,
120
(2010)Ethics647.3Raz;Beitz
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rights(althoughthatisaprojectthatcontinuestobeonthetableintherespectivepolitical
discussions) but instead simply incorporated the European Convention onHuman Rights
intoUK law;4thuseffectivelyadoptingthetextoftheEuropeanConventiontogetherwith
theexistingandfuturejurisprudenceoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights5aspartofits
nationalconstitutionallaw.
Structuralsimilaritiessuchastheonesmentionedaboveaswellashistoricalandsemantic
links between the concepts of constitutional and international human rights make it
promising toapproach theprojectofdevelopingacomprehensive theoryof international
human rights via an understanding of national constitutional rights. This route becomes
evenmore appealing in light of the fact that in recent years there has been awave of
scholarship theorising constitutional rights;6 thus, drawing on this work may prevent
philosophersofinternationalhumanrightsfromhavingtoreinventthewheel.
Iwillproceedbysettingoutsomestructuralfeaturesofnationalconstitutionalrightsinthe
nextsection.Thatsectionwillshowthatitismisguidedtobelieve,asmanydo,thatnational
constitutional rights law rests to a considerable extent on contingencies specific to the
national communitywhich has adopted them. Theopposite is true: conversations about
constitutional rightsare,on thewhole,no lessglobal inappeal thanconversationsabout
international human rights. Furthermore, the section will give an overview of those
structuralfeaturesofconstitutionalrightswhichinpreviousworkIhavelabelledtheglobal
model of constitutional rights, and itwill present the basics of a theory of that global
model, focussing on the questions of the scope of rights (which interests ought to be
acknowledged as grounding rights?) and their permissible limitations (under what
conditions is a limitation of a right legitimate?). This will prepare the ground for the
subsequentsection,whichtakesthestepfromnationalconstitutionalrightstointernational
human rights. It examines the case for a view held bymany international human rights
theorists,namely thatwhatever internationalhuman rightsare, theyaremoreminimalist
thannationalconstitutional rights (call this internationalhuman rightsminimalism).Thus,
the paper will ask whether there is room to make national constitutional rights more
minimalist.Myconclusionwillbethatthere isnosuchroom:anysuchattemptwilleither
introducearbitrariness(because,aswillbeshown,reducingthescopeofinterestsprotected
asrightswillnecessarily involvethedrawingofmorallyarbitrarythresholds)orwill ignore
thefactthatconstitutionalrightsarealreadyasminimalistascoherentlypossible(because,
aswillbecome clear, they setupa reasonableness standardofjustification,and treating
policieswhichare less than reasonableas legitimate ismorallyunappealing).Thus, there
exists neither the necessity nor themoral possibility tomake constitutional rightsmore
minimalist. It follows that the moral structures of national constitutional rights and
4HumanRightsAct1998.5Section2(1)oftheUKHumanRightsAct1998:Acourtortribunaldeterminingaquestionwhichhasarisenin
connectionwithaConventionrightmusttakeintoaccountany
(a)judgment,decision,declarationoradvisoryopinionoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights ...whenever
madeorgiven[...].6SeeinparticularRobertAlexy,ATheoryofConstitutional Rights(OUP2002);MattiasKumm,TheIdeaof
SocraticContestationandtheRighttoJustification: ThePointofRightsBasedProportionalityReview,(2010)4
Law&EthicsofHumanRights141;MattiasKumm,PoliticalLiberalismandtheStructureofRights:Onthe
Placeand
Limits
of
the
Proportionality
Requirement,
in
Pavlakos
(ed.),
Law,
Rights
and
Discourse:
The
Legal
PhilosophyofRobertAlexy(HartPublishing,2007),131;KaiMller,TheGlobalModelofConstitutionalRights
(OUP2012).
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international human rights are identical. The fourth section will spell out some of the
implicationsofthisview.
II.The
moral
structure
of
national
constitutional
rights
1.Aglobalconversationaboutrights
Intermsoftheirpossiblereachandappeal,contemporarydiscussionsaboutconstitutional
rights are global. Thus, it is emphatically not the case that the moral demands of
constitutional rightsare inextricably linked and intertwinedwithaparticular constitution
with a particular interpretative history, adopted by a particular political community at a
particularpointintime.Theinsightthatconstitutionalrightsdiscourseisgovernedmoreby
freestanding moral discourse about what rights and legitimacy require than by
considerations relating to thehistoryofadocumentorpeople is,however,still relatively
young.Asrecentlyas1996,RonaldDworkinpublishedhisbookFreedomsLaw,
7
whichisacollection of essays dealing with important US Supreme Court decisions on abortion,
euthanasia,hate speech andother controversial topics. The subtitleof thisbook is The
moralreadingoftheAmericanconstitution,whichmakesclearthatDworkinperceivedhis
bookasacontribution toaspecificallyAmericandiscourse.Today, less than twodecades
later, an authorwho published a book dealingwith problems as universal as the ones
discussedbyDworkinandwhorestrictedhim orherselftoonlyoneparticularjurisdiction
wouldrightlybeaccusedofarbitrarinessinthechoiceofhisorhermaterials.Constitutional
rightsdiscoursehasgoneglobal.
Alookatthestructureofconstitutionalrightslawaroundtheworldhelpsexplainhowthis
could happen. Courts around theworld employ a twostage analysiswhen determining
whetheranactbyapublicauthorityviolatesconstitutionalrights.Atthefirststage,theyask
whether the act interferes with (limits, restricts) a right. If so, the second question is
whether the interference isjustifiable.The test that isalmost globally8employed at this
secondstage istheproportionalitytest,accordingtowhichan interferencewitharight is
justifiableifitservesalegitimategoalandisproportionatetothatgoal.Injudicialpractice,
the first stage has become less and less important, largely as a consequence of rights
inflation, that is, thephenomenon thatmoreandmore interestsareprotectedas rights.
Thus, the focus of the analysis has shifted to the second stage, and the proportionality
principle which dominates that stage has become the by farmost important doctrinal
principleofconstitutionalrights lawaroundtheworld. Interestingly,nationalconstitutions
donotgivecourtsanyguidanceastohowtoconducttheproportionalitytest.Constitutions
normallydonotevenmentionthetermproportionality.Instead,theyusephrasessimilar
to thatemployedby theCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,which stipulates that
rightsareguaranteed subjectonly to such reasonable limitsprescribedby lawascanbe
demonstrablyjustified ina freeanddemocraticsociety.9Thepointofthoserathervague
7RonaldDworkin,FreedomsLaw:TheMoralReadingoftheAmericanConstitution(OUP1996)8An
important
exception
isthe
US
jurisprudence.
On
the
issue
of
whether
the
US
Supreme
Court
applies
proportionalityunderadifferentname,seePaulYowell,...SeealsoMller,GlobalModel,...9CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms1982,section1.
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phrases is to release judges from interpretative constraints;10 thus, when courts apply
proportionality analysis, they are not usually bound by textual subtleties, nor are they
bound by the history of the particular constitution they are interpreting. Rather, they
engageinfreestandingmoralreasoningaboutwhatrightsrequire,largelyunguidedbythe
constitutionwhichtheyinterpret.
2.Theglobalmodelofconstitutionalrights11
While it is to be expected that different courtswill often come to different conclusions
whendealingwithaparticular rights issue say, thequestionofwhetherorunderwhat
conditionshatespeechmaybeprohibited,orwhetherassistedsuicidemustbepermitted
at a more abstract level, a remarkable consensus about certain structural features of
constitutionalrightshasemergedinrecentdecades.Ihavelabelledthissetofdoctrinesand
phenomenatheglobalmodelofconstitutionalrights;inthissectionIwillbrieflyintroduce
itsmainfeatures,whichwillpavethewayforpresenting,inthefollowingsectionatheoryof
constitutionalrightswhichfitsandjustifiesthesefeatures.
Theglobalmodelofconstitutionalrightsisbestintroducedandexplainedbycontrastingit
withwhat I call the dominant narrative of fundamental rights. The dominant narrative
holds (1) that rights cover only a limited domain by protecting only certain especially
important interestsof individuals; (2) that rights imposeexclusivelyorprimarilynegative
obligationsonthestate;(3)thatrightsoperateonlybetweenacitizenandhisgovernment,
not between private citizens; and (4) that rights enjoy a special normativeforcewhich
means that theycanbeoutweighed, ifatall,only inexceptional circumstances.Of these
features of the dominant narrative, the general acceptance of the second rights as
imposing negative obligations on the state has already eroded considerably, mainly
becauseofthegrowingrecognitionofsocialandeconomicrights.12Thethirdlimitationtothe relationshipbetweencitizenandgovernment,whilegenerallyheld tobe true,does
notnormallyattractmuchattentionby rights theorists.The firstand the fourth special
importanceandspecialnormativeforcearestillalmostuncontroversial.However,under
theglobalmodelofconstitutionalrightsallfourelementsofthisnarrativehavebeengiven
upandoftenalongtimeago.Thedoctrinesanddevelopmentsinconstitutionalrightslaw
whichhaveledtotheirerosionarerightsinflation,positiveobligationsandsocioeconomic
rights,horizontaleffect,andbalancingandproportionality.
a.Rightsinflation
Constitutional rights are no longer seen as onlyprotecting certain particularly important
interests. Especially in Europe a development has been observed which is sometimes
pejorativelycalledrightsinflation13,anamewhichIwilluseinaneutralsenseasdescribing
thephenomenonthatincreasingly,relativelytrivial interestsareprotectedas(primafacie)
10KaiMller, Proportionality:Challenging thecritics,10 (2012) International JournalofConstitutional Law
709at717.11ThissectiondrawsonideasdevelopedingreaterdepthinmybookTheGlobalModelofConstitutionalRights
(OUP2012).12Foratheoreticalaccountofthisdevelopment,seeFredman,HumanRightsTransformed:PositiveRightsand
Positive
Duties(Oxford
University
Press,
2008),
ch.
1.
13Letsas,ATheoryof Interpretation of theEuropeanConventiononHumanRights (OxfordUniversityPress,
2007),126.
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rights. Themost extreme approach is that of the German Federal Constitutional Court,
which has explicitly given up any threshold to distinguish a mere interest from a
constitutionalright.Asearlyas1957itheldthatArticle2(1)oftheBasicLaw,whichprotects
everyonesrighttofreelydevelophispersonality,istobeinterpretedasarighttofreedom
ofaction.14TheCourtprovidedvariousdoctrinalreasonsforthisresult, itsmainargument
beingthatanearlierdraftofArticle2(1)hadread Everyonecandoashepleases (Jeder
kanntunundlassenwaserwill),andthatthisversionhadbeendroppedonlyforlinguistic
reasons.15 Itaffirmed this ruling invarious laterdecisions;most famously itdeclared that
Article2(1)oftheBasicLawincludedtherightstofeedpigeonsinapark16andtogoriding
inthewoods.17
Whileotherjurisdictionshavenot,tomyknowledge,adoptedsuchafarreachingapproach
to the scopeof rights, thephenomenonof rights inflationand thedifficultyof findinga
principledway todistinguish rights frommere interestshavebeenwidelyobserved. It is
importanttonotethatthebroadunderstandingofrightsdoesofcoursenotimplythatthe
stateisprohibitedfrom interferingwiththeright inquestion.Rather,ashasbeenpointedoutabove,thereisanimportantconceptualdistinctionbetweenaninterferencewithanda
violationofaright:aninterferencewillonlyamounttoaviolationifitcannotbejustifiedat
thejustificationstage.Thus,thebroadunderstandingofrightsattheprimafaciestagemust
beseen inconjunctionwiththeproportionalitytestwhichpermitsthe limitationofprima
facierightswhentheyareoutweighedbyacompetingrightorpublicinterest.
b.Positiveobligationsandsocioeconomicrights
Rightsarenolongerregardedasexclusivelyimposingnegativeobligationsonthestate.But
whilemosttheoristsofrightsonlystartedtoreconsidertheirviewsonthis issuefollowing
thegrowingacceptanceof socioeconomic rights (particularly their inclusion in theSouthAfricanConstitution),constitutionalrightslawhadgivenuptheviewthatrightsimposeonly
negative obligations at least since the 1970s when the doctrines of positive duties or
protectiveobligationsbecameestablished.Theideaisthatthestateisunderadutytotake
stepstopreventharmtothe interestsprotectedby (otherwisenegative)rights.Thus,the
statemust,asamatterofconstitutionalrightslaw,putinplaceasystemwhicheffectively
protectsthepeople fromdangersemanating fromotherprivatepersons,suchascriminal
activitieswhichthreaten,forexample, life,physicalintegrity,orproperty;and itmustalso
protect them from dangerswhich do not have a (direct) human cause, such as natural
disasters.
Furthermoreandmaybemoreimportantly,thereistheaforementionedtrendtowardsthe
acknowledgementofsocioeconomicrights,whichobviously imposepositivedutiesonthe
stateandthusconflictwiththedominantnarrativeaccordingtowhichrightsareconcerned
onlywithnegativeobligations.Themostwidelydiscussedexampleofthisdevelopment is
theSouthAfricanConstitution,whichcontainsinitssections26,27and29rightstohousing,
healthcare,food,water,socialsecurityandeducation.
14BVerfGE6,32(Elfes).
15Ibid.,
36
37.
16BVerfGE54,143(PigeonFeeding).
17BVerfGE80,137(RidingintheWoods).
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c.Horizontaleffect
Constitutional rights are no longer seen as affecting only the relationship between the
citizenandthestate;rather,theyapply insomewaybetweenprivatepersonsaswell.For
example, the constitutional right to privacy may protect a person not only against
infringements of his privacy by the state, but also against such infringements by hisneighbour,landlord,oremployer.Thedoctrinaltoolwhichachievesthisiscalledhorizontal
effect of rights,where horizontal as opposed to vertical indicates that rights operate
betweenprivatepersons.ThefirstcourttoacknowledgehorizontaleffectwastheGerman
Federal Constitutional Court in its famous Lth decision of 1953.18 From Germany the
concept travelled to other parts of theworld. It has by now become awellestablished
featureoftheglobalmodelofconstitutionalrights;one indicatorof itssuccess isthatthe
newSouthAfrican constitutionexplicitlyendorseshorizontaleffect in section8(2),which
states in slightlyawkward language: Aprovisionof theBillofRightsbindsanaturalora
juristicperson if,andtotheextentthat, it isapplicable,taking intoaccountthenatureof
therightandthenatureofanydutyimposedbytheright.
d.Balancingandproportionality
Contrary to thedominantnarrative, it isnot the case that constitutional rights generally
enjoyaspecialorheightenednormative force in legalpractice.While it istruethatsome
rightsareabsoluteforexampletherighttofreedomfromtorturemostrightsincluding
the rights to life, physical integrity, privacy, property, freedom of religion, expression,
assembly and association can be limited in line with the proportionality test.
Proportionalityhasbecomethecentraldoctrineofcontemporaryconstitutionalrightslaw,
andhasbeenacceptedbyvirtuallyeveryconstitutionalcourtinCentralandEasternEurope
andisincreasinglyemployedinCentralandSouthAmericanjurisdictions.19Accordingtothetestasusedbymostscholarsworkinginthefield,theproportionalitytesthasfourprongs.
First,apolicy interferingwith the rightmustbe inpursuitofa legitimategoal;second, it
mustbeasuitablemeansoffurtheringtheachievementofthegoal(suitabilityorrational
connection); third, itmustbe necessary in that theremust notbe a less restrictive and
equally effective alternative (necessity); and finally and most importantly, it must not
imposeadisproportionateburdenon the rightholder (balancingorproportionality in the
strict sense). Some courts have adopted tests that look slightlydifferenton the surface;
however,whatall testshave incommon is thatat theircore, there isbalancingexercise
wheretherightisbalancedagainstthecompetingrightorpublicinterest,whichimpliesthat
farfromenjoyinganyspecialorelevatedstatusoverpublicinterests,rightsoperateonthesameplaneaspolicyconsiderations.
3.Theorisingtheglobalmodel:betweenminimalismandmaximalism
a)Thescopeofrights:endorsingrightsmaximalism
18BVerfGE7,198(Lth).EnglishtranslationfromthewebsiteoftheUniversityofTexasSchoolofLaw,
http://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/centers/transnational/work_new/[copyright:
Basil
Markesinis].
19StoneSweetandMathews, ProportionalityBalancingandGlobalConstitutionalism, (20089)47Columbia
JournalofTransnationalLaw72,112.
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The global model does not endorse the once uncontroversial idea that the point of
constitutional rights is to limitgovernmentandkeep itoutofour lives: that idea cannot
makesenseofthedoctrinesofhorizontaleffectandpositiveobligationsandtheincreasing
acknowledgment of socioeconomic rights. The point of constitutional rights under the
globalmodelisnottodisablegovernment;ratheritmustbetoenableeverypersontotake
controlofhisorherlife.Constitutionalrightsprotecttheabilityofpersonstolivetheirlives
accordingtotheirselfconceptions;thus,theyarebasedonthevalueofpersonalautonomy.
Forexample,constitutionalrightsprotectapersonsrighttoengageinfreespeech,believe
inandfollowthepreceptsofherreligion(importantaspectsofpersonalautonomy),control
herprivatelife(includinghersexualandreproductiveautonomy),tobodilyintegrity(partly
a precondition for, partly an element of personal autonomy), and so on. This focus on
autonomynotonlyexplainsthetraditionallyacknowledgedsetofcivilandpoliticalrightsin
theirnegativedimension,itcanfurtherjustifytheexistenceofhorizontaleffectandpositive
obligations: from an autonomybased perspective,whatmatters is notwho violates the
rightbut rather the adequateprotectionof the interest at stake. Finally, the autonomy
basedapproachmakessenseofsocioeconomicrightssuchastherightstofood,healthcare,oreducation,whichprotectthepreconditionsofautonomy.
The crucial question for present purposes is the scope of protection offered by
constitutionalrights:shouldtheycoveranarroworabroadrangeofautonomy interests?
The first feature of the globalmodel (rights inflation) suggests that an approachwhich
regards rightsasprotectingallautonomy interestsofaperson including thoseof trivial
importance,suchasfeedingbirdsorridinginthewoods(tousethosefamousGermancases
again) sits best with the practice of constitutional rights law. Thus, the picture that
emerges is that under the globalmodel, all autonomy interests are protected as rights;
however,this
protection
isnot
absolute
or
near
absolute;
rather
itcan
be
limited
as
long
as
thelimitationisproportionate.Isitpossibletomakesenseofthisarguablycounterintuitive
proposition?Itis indeedpossible,buttodoso,wemustdispenseofadearlyheldviewof
almostallphilosophers,who insistthatfundamentalrightsprotectonlyanarrowrangeof
interestswhilehavingaspecialnormativeforcewhichmeansthattheycanrarely,ifever,be
outweighed by competing considerations. That model is flatly incompatible with the
practice of constitutional rights law around the world, in particular with the global
endorsementoftheproportionalityapproach.Instead,Idefendthefollowingaccountofthe
pointandpurposeofconstitutional rights.Themainentitlement thatapersonhasunder
the globalmodel is to being treatedwith a certain attitude: an attitude that takes her
seriouslyasapersonwithalifetolive,andthatwillthereforedenyhertheabilitytoliveher
lifeinacertainwayonlywhentherearesufficientlystrongreasonsforthis.Appliedtothe
caseofhobbiessuchasfeedingthebirds,thismeansthatweshouldnotaskwhetherthe
freedom to feed birds is an aspect of a narrowly defined set of especially important
interests.Rather,weshouldaskwhetherthestatetreatsapersonsubjecttoitsauthorityin
awaywhich isjustifiabletoherwhenthestateprohibits,forexample,herparticipationin
theactivityoffeedingbirds;andthiswillbethecaseonlywhentherearesufficientlystrong
reasonssupportingtheprohibition.Thus,thepointofconstitutionalrights isnottosingle
outcertainespeciallyimportantinterestsforheightenedprotection.Rather,itistoshowa
particularformofrespectforpersonsbyinsistingthateachandeverystatemeasurewhich
affects a persons ability to live her life according to her selfconceptionmust take her
autonomyinterestsadequatelyintoaccountinordertobejustifiabletoher.Constitutional
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rightslawinstitutionalisesarighttojustification20,thatis,arighttobeprovidedwithan
adequatejustification for every state action (and omission) that affects the agent in a
morallyrelevantway.
b)Thestructureofjustification:rightsminimalism
To say thatapersonhasa constitutional right toX,whereX could stand for freedomof
religion,freedomofexpression,property,etc.,meansnotthatthestatecannot,oratleast
not normally, limit X. Rather it means that when the state limits X it must provide
sufficientlystrongreasons forthis: ifthereasonssupportingthe limitationaresufficiently
strong, then the limitationwill be proportionate and thereforejustified; if they are not
strongenough,thelimitationwillbedisproportionateandtherightwillhavebeenviolated.
Thisraisesthequestionofwhatthestandardforsufficientlystrongreasonsisandought
tobeinthedomainofconstitutionalrights.Twocandidateapproachessuggestthemselves.
Accordingtothecorrectnessstandard,whenastatelimitsaright,itisjustified indoingso
onlyifitspolicyisthebestpossiblethecorrectresponsetothesocialproblemathand.
Bywayof contrast,undera reasonableness standard, the stateacts legitimatelywhen it
choosesareasonable,asopposedtotheonecorrect,policy.
As an illustration, let us look at the problem of assisted suicide. Some peoplewho are
sufferingfroman incurablediseaseandwhodesiretokillthemselveswhentheirsituation
becomesunbearableknowthatwhentheyreachthatstage,theywillnolongerbyphysically
strongenoughtoimplementthatplanontheirown,althoughtheycouldstilldoitwithhelp
fromapartner,friend,orphysician.However, it ispreciselythisassistancewhichinmany,
though by nomeans all, countries is illegal and punishable. The reason given for such
policiesisusuallythatallowingassistedsuicidewouldleadtotheriskofabuse,whereweak
andvulnerablepatientsarebulliedintodeathorevenkilledbyrelativesorcarers.Underthecorrectnessapproach,astatewhichlimitstherighttoassistedsuicidewhichispartofthe
right toprivate lifeorprivacy isjustified indoing soonlywhere this limitation is,asa
matter of substance, the best possible policy. Under the reasonableness approach, the
limitation isjustified if it isat least reasonable (thoughpossiblynot correct).Thus, letus
stipulatethatabanofassistedsuicideisanexampleofapolicywhichlegislatorscaningood
faithbelievetobethebestpolicy(ieitisreasonable),butwhichasamatterofmoralfactis
notthebestpolicy.Underthecorrectnessapproach,weshouldconsiderthispolicyasone
which violates rights,whereas under a reasonableness approach,we should accept it as
justified.
Bothasamatterofthecurrentpracticeofjudicialreviewaroundtheworldandasamatter
ofphilosophicalattractiveness,thereasonablenessapproachispreferable.Thejustification
for this is controversial, however.Mattias Kumm points to the existence of reasonable
disagreement:wheresuchreasonabledisagreementaboutthebestpolicyexists,choosing
one of the reasonable policies must be legitimate.21 I have argued that the notion of
reasonabledisagreement,whilerelevant,cannotdoallofthemoralworkandproposedthat
itistheprincipleofdemocracywhichrequiresthatapolicywhichisreasonable,asopposed
20Kumm,
Forst
21MattiasKumm,TheIdeaofSocraticContestationandtheRighttoJustification: ThePointofRightsBased
ProportionalityReview,(2010)4Law&EthicsofHumanRights141at16870.
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tocorrect,isregardedasconstitutionallylegitimate.22Ifwerequiredthedemocraticprocess
tocomeupwiththebestpossiblepolicywheneveritlegislatesinthedomainofrights,this
would, in lightof thebroad scopeof rightsunder the globalmodel,mean thatoftenor
indeedpossiblyalwaystheoutcomeofdemocraticdeliberationswouldbepredetermined
bythemoralrequirementsofrights.Therewouldbenoroomfordemocraticdeliberation
andgoodfaithdisagreementaboutpolicies;andthismustbe flatly incompatiblewithour
understanding of democracy as a form of government where the people and their
representativesdebateand,usually,faceagenuinechoicewithregardtotheproperwayto
dealwithaparticularsocialproblem.Thus,thevalueofdemocracyrequiresthatweaccept
areasonablenessstandardasopposedtocorrectnessstandardforassessingthejustifiability
ofthelimitationofaright.
This reasonableness standard is reflected in the jurisprudence of national
constitutional courts. I do not have the space here show this point in depth; so a few
observationsmust suffice. The Canadian Supreme Court has stated that the legislature
mustbegivenreasonableroomtomanoeuvre23
,aphrasewhosepoint isto indicatethatthe legislature need not find the one right answer to the rights question at stake. The
German Federal Constitutional Court often uses a negative formulation, stating that the
proportionality test is satisfied if the interference is notdisproportionateor notoutof
proportion.24Soratherthanrequiringpositivelythatthepolicybeproportionate,theCourt
demands negatively that it not be disproportionate; the effect of this is to give the
necessary leeway to theelectedbranches.Occasionally theCourtuses formulations that
indicateevenmoreclearlythattheapproachitusesisreallyareasonablenessapproach,for
examplewhenitstatesthattheremustbearelationship[betweentheseriousnessofthe
interference and theweightof the reasons supporting the interference] that can stillbe
consideredas
reasonable
25
.
c)Theemergingpicture:betweenminimalistandmaximalistapproaches
The picture which emerges is that national constitutional rights are at the same time
minimalistandmaximalist: theyaremaximalistwith regard to the rangeof interests that
theyprotectasrights,andminimalistwithregardtothestandardofjustificationwhichthey
demandwithregardtotheprotectionofthoseinterests.Whileasaconsequenceofrights
inflation all autonomy interests, including those of trivial importance, are protected as
rights,ameasurelimitingarightisjustifiedifsupportedbyareasonable,asopposedtothe
best possible,justification. The underlying idea here is that every statemeasurewhich
affects aperson in amorally relevantway inotherwords, every statemeasurewhichaffectsapersonsabilitytolivehislifeaccordingtohisselfconceptiontriggersthedutyof
justification; and that the standardofjustificationmustbea reasonableness standard in
order to preserve ameaningful sphereof democratic debate about and choicebetween
differentreasonablepolicies.
22KaiMller,TheGlobalModelofConstitutionalRights(OUP2012),118.
23R.
v.
Edwards
Books
and
Art,(1986)
S.C.R.
713,
795.
24SeeforexampleBVerfGE65,1,54.
25BVerfGE76,1,51.
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III.FromnationalconstitutionalrightstointernationalhumanrightsWiththeaboveaccountofthemoralstructureofnationalconstitutionalrightsinmind,we
cannowapproachinternationalhumanrights.Asexplainedintheintroduction,theworking
hypothesis of this paper is that themoral structure of national constitutional rights and
internationalhumanrightswillatleastberelated.Thus,thequestiontobeaddressednowiswhatmodifications,ifany,wehavetoapplytothetheoryofnationalconstitutionalrights
presentedabove inorder tomake ita suitable theoryof internationalhuman rights.My
conclusionwillbethatweneednomodificationswhatsoever.
Therearetwoobjectionswhichatheoristof internationalhumanrightscouldhavetothis
view.Thefirstisthatnationalconstitutionalrights,unlikeinternationalhumanrights,reflect
andarebasedonnationalidiosyncrasiesandcontingenciesandarethereforenotasuitable
candidate for a theory of international human rights, which by its very nature must
transcend such contingencies. However, as I have explained above, constitutional rights
discourseisjustasglobalasinternationalhumanrightsdiscourse;constitutionsaroundthe
world containbroadly the same setof rights,and constitutionalcourtsaround theworld
employ the samedoctrinal tools to interpret them,most importantly theproportionality
testwhosepointistoenableafreestandingdiscussionofthemoraljustifiabilityofapolicy.
Theideathatconstitutionalrightsareoroughttobereflectiveofnationalidiosyncrasiesto
alargeextentissimplywrongandoughttobeabandoned.
The second andmore promising objection is that constitutional rights aremorallymore
demanding than international human rights. The idea is that constitutional rights
incorporate and reflect a comprehensive set of legitimacy conditions for a policy or
executive decision, whereas international human rights set only minimum standards.
Correlative to this perceived distance between national constitutional rights andinternationalhuman rights is aperceiveddistancebetween constitutional legitimacy and
nationalsovereignty:noteverythingthat isconstitutionally illegitimate(read:thatviolates
constitutionalrights)alsotranscendsthesphereofastatessovereignty(andconflictswith
internationalhumanrights):mostscholarswouldholdthatthereisroomforpoliciestofall
withinthesphereofsovereigntywhileatthesametimeviolatingconstitutionalrights.
Herearetwoimportantviewsfromtheliteraturewhichadoptthisbasicapproach.Thefirst
talks about the relationship between constitutional and human rights, and the second
focusesontherelationshipbetweenlegitimateauthorityandnationalsovereignty.InJustice
forHedgehogs,RonaldDworkinproposesatheoryofbothconstitutional(inhisterminology:
political)rightsandhumanrights.Hewrites:
Itseemswidelyagreedthatnotallpoliticalrightsarehumanrights.Peoplewhoallacceptthatgovernment
mustshowequalconcernforallitsmembersdisagreeaboutwhateconomicsystemthatrequiresButalmost
noneofthemwouldsuggestthatthemanynationsthatdisagreewithhisopinionareguiltyofhumanrights
violationsWhynot?Humanrightsarewidelythoughttobespecialand,accordingtomostcommentators
andtopoliticalpractice,moreimportantandfundamental.26
The secondquote,by JosephRaz,dealswith the correspondingpointof the relationship
betweenlegitimateauthorityandnationalsovereignty.Myinteresthereisnotinlegitimate
authority but in constitutional legitimacy, and I have no space here to explore the
26RonaldDworkin,JusticeforHedgehogs,???.
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relationshipbetween the two.However,Razsbasic intuition alsoworks, Ibelieve, ifwe
replacehisreferencetolegitimateauthoritywithconstitutionallegitimacy.
Wemustnot confuse the limitsof sovereigntywith the limitsof legitimate authority. The sovereigntyof
states sets limits to the right of others to interfere with their affairs. The notion of sovereignty is the
counterpart of that of rightful international intervention. The criteria determining the limits of legitimate
authoritydependon themoralityof theauthoritysactions.However,noteveryactionexceedinga stateslegitimateauthoritycanbeareasonforinterferencebyotherstates,whateverthecircumstances, justasnot
everymoralwrongdoingbyanindividualcanjustifyinterventionbyotherstostoporpunishit.27
Thus, according to the widely held view reflected in the above statements, there is a
distancebetweenconstitutional legitimacyandconstitutionalrightsontheonehand,and
internationalhuman rightsand statesovereigntyon theother.This is theview that Iwill
challenge in this section.My strategywillbenegative: Iwill show that, starting from the
theoryof constitutional rightswhich Ioutlined in theprevious section, there isneithera
morallycoherentwaytocreatethisdistance,noristhereaneedforit.Itfollowsthatifwe
wanttoprotecthumanrightsattheinternationallevel,weshouldacceptpreciselythesame
accountofrightsthatisappropriateatthenationallevel,andthatthemoralboundariesof
constitutionallegitimacyarethesameasthoseofnationalsovereignty.
Structurally,therearetwowaystotinkerwiththetheoryofconstitutionalrightspresented
intheprevioussection inordertomake itmoreminimalist.First,onecouldtrytoreduce
the range of interests protected as rights. Second, one could focus on the standard of
justification (the reasonableness standard) andmake this standard looser. Iwill consider
bothoptionsinturn,concludingthatnoneofthemcanbeimplementedwithoutmakingthe
resultingaccountofinternationalhumanrightsmorallyunappealing.
1.Limitingtherangeofinterestsprotectedasrights
I argued above that under the global model of constitutional rights, all of a persons
(autonomy) interestsareprotectedas rights.Thus,aperson can, toemploy two famous
Germancasesagain,successfullyclaimarighttofeedbirdsinaparkortogoriding inthe
woods. Theunderlying idea of this broad scope of rights is that every state action (and
omission) which affects a person in a morally relevant way requires justification. To
translate this right tojustification28 intoa theoryof rights, it isnecessary toprotectall
autonomy interestsofapersonattheprima faciestage,and toassessthejustifiabilityof
theirlimitationatthejustificationstage,usingtheproportionalitytest.
Now,an
international
human
rights
theorist
might
respond
by
arguing
that
while
itmay
be
appropriatetoprotectsuchabroadscopeofrightsinthecontextofnationalconstitutional
law, it would be inappropriate to do so at the international level. Thus, the range of
interests protected as rights ought to be drawnmore narrowly, introducing a threshold
whichdistinguishesrightsfrommereinterests.
Forthisideatosucceed,however,itwouldhavetobepossibletoidentifyathresholdwhich
pointstoaprincipleddistinctionbetweenthoseinterestswhichdoandthosewhichdonot
attracttheprotectionofrights.Afirstideamightbetodrawthelineinapragmaticway:we
27Raz,
Human
Rights
Without
Foundations
28RainerForst,TheJustificationofHumanRightsandtheBasicRighttoJustification: AReflexiveApproach,
120(2010)Ethics711.
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could say thatonly interestsof, say, fundamental importanceattract theprotectionof
internationalhuman rights.But theproblemwithpragmaticapproaches isprecisely their
pragmatic character, that is, theabsenceofprinciple.A second,morepromising strategy
would be to consider the existence of a qualitative difference between rights andmere
interests.Themostpromisingattempt inthisdirectionhasbeenmadebyJamesGriffin in
hisbookOnHuman
Rights.Heargues thatthethresholdcanbederived from the ideaof
personhood:
Human life is different from the life of other animals.We human beings have a conception of
ourselvesandofourpastand future.We reflectandassess.We formpicturesofwhatagood life
would beAndwe try to realise thesepictures. This iswhatwemean by adistinctively human
existenceAndwevalueourstatusashumanbeingsespeciallyhighly,oftenmorehighlythaneven
ourhappiness.Thisstatuscentresonourbeingagentsdeliberating,assessing,choosing,andacting
tomakewhatweseeasagoodlifeforourselves.
Human rights can then be seen as protections of our human standing or, as I shall put it, our
personhood.Andonecanbreakdownthenotionofpersonhoodintoclearercomponentsbybreaking
downthenotionofagency.Tobeanagent, inthefullestsenseofwhichwearecapable,onemust(first)chooseonesownpaththrough lifethat is,notbedominatedorcontrolledbysomeoneor
somethingelse(call it autonomy).[And](third)othersmustnotforciblystoponefrompursuing
whatoneseesasaworthwhilelife(callthisliberty).29
Griffintellsusmoreabouthowdemandingtherighttolibertyis:
[L]iberty applies to the final stage of agency, namely to the pursuit of ones conception of a
worthwhile life.Bynomeanseverythingweaimatmatterstothat.Therefore,societywillaccepta
personsclaimtotheprotectionoflibertyonlyiftheclaimmeetsthematerialconstraintthatwhatis
atstakeisindeedconceivableasmatteringtowhetherornotwefunctionasnormativeagents.30
Griffins idea is that personhood functionsboth as thebasisofhuman rights and as alimitation on their scope: only those interests that are important for personhood are
protected as human rights. However, this account does notwork. Its failure is that the
personhood approach does not offer a coherentway to delineate interests relevant for
personhoodfromotherinterests.ForGriffin,personhoodrequiresautonomyandliberty(in
myterminology,personalautonomy):basically,controloverones life.But itrequiresonly
thatkindofcontroloveroneslifethatisrequiredbythevalueofpersonhood.Thisleaves
open the question ofwhat the test is for determiningwhether some instanceof liberty
(autonomy) isrequiredforpersonhood.Mysuspicion isthat it issimplyimportance.For
example,Griffinexplainsthatthedomainof liberty is limitedtowhat ismajorenoughto
count
as
part
of
the
pursuit
of
a
worthwhile
life
31
.
At
another
point,
he
defends
a
human
righttogaymarriageonthegroundofitscentralitytocharacteristichumanconceptionsof
aworthwhilelife.32Thus,itseemsthatthethresholdofpersonhoodsimplyrefersbacktoa
slidingscaleofimportance:aninterestthatismajorenoughorcentralwillacquirethe
statusofahumanright.Butsuchaslidingscalecannot,asexplainedabove,dothemoral
work.Thethresholdwouldhavetobebetweennotquitemajorenoughandbarelymajor
enoughor notquite centraland barely central.Then,underGriffinsmodel,all that
29JamesGriffin,OnHumanRights(OUP2008)at3233.Griffinssecondpoint,omittedinthequote,isabout
minimumprovisionofresourcesandcapabilitiesthatittakestobeanagent.30Ibid
at
167.
31Ibidat234(emphasisadded).
32Ibidat163(emphasisadded).
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separatesaninterestthatisjustbelowfromonethatisjustabovethethresholdisasmall
difference in terms of importance or centrality. This small difference, however, cannot
justifythegreatnormativesignificancethatforproponentsofthresholdmodelscomeswith
oneof thembeinga simple interestand theotherahuman right. Ibelieve that this isa
generalproblemofthresholdtheoriesthatisnotlimitedtoGriffinsaccount.33Ifthatistrue,
thentheonlypossibleconclusionisthatthethresholdrequirementshouldbedroppedand
itshouldbeacknowledgedthatthescopeofinternationalhumanrights,justasthescopeof
national constitutional rights, extends to everything that is in the interest of apersons
autonomy.However,thisbeingso,wemustabandontheideathatbyreducingthescopeof
interestsprotectedasrightswecanmakesenseofthewidespreadintuitionthatthereisa
distance between themoral demands of national constitutional rights and international
humanrights.
2.Loweringthestandardofjustification
The second structural possibility to construct a distance between national constitutional
rightsand internationalhumanrights istorelaxthestandardofjustification.Asexplained
above, under national constitutional rights, a policy limiting a right will be considered
justified if it is reasonable (asopposed tocorrect).Thismeans that tobeconstitutionally
legitimate,thelegislaturedoesnothavetofindthebestpossible,oroneright,answerto
thesocialproblemitaddresses;ratheritactslegitimatelyifitsanswerisreasonable.
The importance of this point cannot be overstated.Much of the discussion about the
justifiabilityofjudicial reviewat thenational level restson themistakenassumption that
whencourts
adjudicate
constitutional
rights,
they
thereby
remove
the
choice
of
policies
from the democratically elected legislature.34 This view is however at least an
overstatement:courtsdonotremovechoiceassuchfromthelegislature;theyremoveonly
thepossibilitytochooseanunreasonabledisproportionatepolicy.Thechoicebetween
allpossiblereasonableproportionatepoliciesremainswiththelegislature.Whenacourt
declaresthatapolicyrespectsconstitutionalrights, itsaysnothingmoreor lessthanthat
thepolicyunder consideration is reasonable; itdoesnotpassjudgmentonwhether it is
correct (this is simplynot thecourts task).Conversely,whereacourtdeclaresapolicya
violationofconstitutionalrights,itdecidesthatthisparticularpolicyisoutsidethescopeof
reasonablepolicies;butitleavestothelegislaturethetaskofchoosingareasonablepolicy.
With this clarification inmind, let us turn toDworkins proposal as to how to delineate
constitutional(political)frominternationalhumanrights:
Wemust insist that thoughpeopledohaveapolitical right toequal concernand respecton the right
conception,theyhaveamorefundamental,becausemoreabstract,right.Theyhavearighttobetreatedwith
theattitudethatthesedebatespresupposeandreflectarighttobetreatedasahumanbeingwhosedignity
fundamentallymatters.
Thatmoreabstractrighttherighttoanattitude isthebasichumanright.Governmentmayrespectthat
basichumanrightevenwhenitfailstoachieveacorrectunderstandingofmoreconcretepoliticalrightsWe
33 For a similar view, cf. Joseph Raz, Human Rightswithout Foundations, in Samantha Besson and John
Tasioulas(eds),
The
Philosophy
of
International
Law(2010),
at
326;
Dworkin,
Justice
for
Hedgehogs,
34JeremyWaldron,TheCoreoftheCaseAgainstJudicialReview,(2006)115YaleLawJournal,1346at1386
1395.
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ask:Canthelawsandpoliciesofaparticularpoliticalcommunitysensiblybeinterpretedasanattempt,evenif
finallya failedattempt, to respect thedignityof those in itspower?Ormustat leastsomeof its lawsand
policiesbeunderstoodasarejectionofthoseresponsibilities,towardeitheritssubjectsatlargeorsomegroup
withinthem?Thelatterlawsorpoliciesviolateahumanright.
Thetestcannotbesatisfiedsimplybyanationspronouncementofgoodfaith.Itissatisfiedonlywhena
governmentsoverallbehaviour isdefensibleunderan intelligible,even ifunconvincing,conceptionofwhat
ourtwoprinciplesofhumandignityrequire.35
As the above quote shows, Dworkinmust believe that in the domain of constitutional
(political) rights, legitimacy requires thatgovernmentget it right, i.e. that it find theone
rightanswertotherightsissueathand.Thiscanbecontrastedwiththedomainofhuman
rightswhich, according to Dworkin, require only that government act in good faith. As
Dworkinexplains, thegood faith requirement isnota subjectivebutanobjective test: it
requires that the respectivepolicybedefensibleunderan intelligible conceptionofwhat
dignityrequires.Inlightofthis,IbelieveitisfairtoDworkinsintentionstoequateingood
faithwithreasonable: the functionof thegood faith requirement is toacknowledgea
sphereofacceptabledisagreementwhileneverthelessrequiringthatthepolicyatstakebe
objectivelyjustifiable. Thismust in substance amount to a reasonableness standard: an
unreasonablepolicy isnotdefensibleasenacted ingoodfaithoras intelligible,whereasa
reasonablepolicyisdefensibleinthisway.
CanweuseDworkins ideatocreateadistancebetweennationalconstitutionalrightsand
internationalhumanrightsundertheglobalmodel? Ibelievethatwecannot.Dworkincan
createthisdistanceinhistheoryonlybecausethestandardofjustificationinhisaccountof
constitutional(political)rightsiscorrectness.Icannotassessherewhetherthispositionis
viablewithinDworkinstheoryofrights(Ihavemydoubts).Butontheassumptionthatitis,
itisindeedastructuralpossibilityforDworkintothenrelaxthecorrectnessstandardwhichhe uses for constitutional rights and adopt a reasonableness (good faith) standard for
internationalhumanrights.Bywayofcontrast,inthetheoryofconstitutionalrightswhich
underlies the global model, the standard of review is already only a reasonableness
standard anyway; therefore any further relaxation of this standard would imply that
internationalhuman rightshavenoobjection topolicieswhichaffectpeoples rightsand
whicharenotevenreasonable.Reasonablemeanssomethinglikesupportedbyadequate
reasons. It is implausible tohold thatapolicywhich limitsapersonshuman rightsand
which isnot supportedbyadequate reasonsneverthelesscomplieswithhuman rights. In
otherwords,we cannot go below the threshold of reasonableness, and given that this
thresholdisalreadyemployedbynationalconstitutionalrights,wecannotcreateadistancebetween national constitutional rights and international human rights by relaxing the
standardofjustification.
Theaboveargument isdirectedat the relationshipbetweennationalconstitutional rights
and international human rights. We can examine the same issue by contrasting
constitutional legitimacyandnational sovereignty.RememberRazs claim,quotedabove,
thatthetworefertodifferentstandards,withnationalsovereigntybeingwiderthanwhat
he calls legitimateauthority,andwhat I call constitutional legitimacy.Why is this so, for
Raz?
35RonaldDworkin,JusticeforHedgehogs,3356(emphasisintheoriginal).
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As Isee it,thecorepoint,which istoocomplextobedweltuponhere, isthatmuchofthecontentofthe
moralprincipleswhichgovernsocial relationsand the structureofsocialorganisation isdeterminedby the
contingentpracticesofdifferent societies.Hence theprincipleswhich shouldgovern international relations
cannotjustbeageneralisation oftheprinciplesofjusticewhichgovernanyindividualsociety.Howdoesthis
bearon the issueof state sovereignty?Directly itestablishes adegreeof variabilitybetween standardsof
justice and thereby variability in the precise content and scope of rightswhich apply in different political
societies.Thisspeaksforcaution ingivingoutsidersarightto intervene intheaffairsofotherstates. Italso
suggeststhedesirabilityofallowingpoliticalsocietiesfreedomfromtoocloseexternalscrutiny,tobefreeto
developtheirownrightsaffectingpractices.36
ByRazsownadmission,thisisonlythesketchofanargument.Inwhatfollows,Iwillunpack
andinterpretthestatement,andIwillagainreplaceRazstermoflegitimateauthoritywith
constitutional legitimacy; so what follows is the critique of a position which Raz
presumably holds only partially. There is a close connection between constitutional
legitimacy and the principles of justice that govern any individual society. But those
principles of justice will vary from society to society. This is not so because of moral
relativism (whichRazrightlyrejects),orbecausewhateverprinciplesasocietyhappensto
acceptmake thoseprinciplesjust.Rather, it isbecauseofwhatRazcallsabenign social
relativism, according towhich the principles ofjusticewill be sensitive to social facts.
Applied to the issuehere,certainpracticeswillhavedevelopedwithina society,and the
principlesofjusticewhichareapplicabletothatsocietywilloratleastmaybesensitiveto
thosepractices.Henceitisnotpossibletosimplytakeonesocietysprinciplesofjusticeand
applythemtoanothersocietywithdifferentpracticesandstructures;andgiventheclose
connection between justice and constitutional legitimacy, it is not possible to equate
nationalsovereigntywithanygivensocietysstandardsforconstitutionallegitimacy.Inlight
ofthis,cautionisrequiredwhenassessingquestionsofjusticefromtheoutside,andnotoo
closeexternalscrutinyshouldbeapplied.
To illustrate this idea, letus take the exampleof the right to education,which Raz also
considersinhispaper,albeitinadifferentcontext.LetussaythatincountryA,peoplehave
amoralrightagainstthestatetobeprovidedwitheducation,butthatincountryB,people
havenosuchmoral rightbecause,say, thesocialstructuresof thatcountryaresuch that
people can have a rewarding lifewithout formal instruction, or because in that country
education isprovidedby the familyorclanand the stateneednotget involved.Thus, in
countryA,justice requires that thestateprovideeducationand incountryB itdoesnot.
Thus,aninternationaljudgewhoisacitizenofcountryAandwhoiscalledupontoassess
thehumanrightssituationincountryBcouldmistakenlybelievethateducationisahuman
right(based
on
her
experience
at
home);
in
order
to
avoid
such
mistakes
she
should
adopt
anattitudeofcaution,andadditionallysheshouldkeepinmindthefactthatsocietiesneed
freedomtodeveloptheirownrightsaffectingpractices.
Thefirstproblemwiththisapproachistheassumedlinkbetweenconstitutionallegitimacy
andjustice. Constitutional legitimacy is not about securingjustice. Rather, as explained
above, it is aboutwhether apolicy is supportedby adequate reasons:wemay say, it is
aboutwhetherapolicyreliesonareasonable,asopposedtotheonecorrect,conceptionof
justice.Inotherwords,apolicymaybeunjustbutneverthelessconstitutionallylegitimate.
Thismustbetruebecauseifconstitutionallegitimacyrequiredjustice,thentherewouldbe
36 Joseph Raz, Human Rights without Foundations, in Samantha Besson and John Tasioulas (eds), The
PhilosophyofInternationalLaw(2010),...
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noroomfordemocraticdisagreementaboutquestionsofjusticerather,onlyone,namely
theonejust,policywouldbeconstitutionally legitimate;suchanapproachwouldbeflatly
incompatible with the value of democracy which requires the people or their
representativestoengageindiscussionsandcontroversiesaboutandultimatelyholdavote
on what justice requires. This means that constitutional legitimacy leaves states a
considerableroomformanoeuvre:allitinsistsonisthatapolicybeareasonableattemptat
justice. From the point of constitutional legitimacy, states have an enormous leeway in
working outwhich conception ofjusticeworks best for them, and theymay take their
structureofsocialrelation,history,andsocialpracticesintoaccountwhendoingso.Thereis
nomoralneed,nor is there themoralpossibility, tomake this leewayevenwider in the
contextofnationalsovereigntybecausedoingsowouldimplyawardingthedignifyinglabel
offalling intothesphereofnationalsovereigntytoapolicywhich isnotonlyunjustbut
which cannot even be defended as a reasonable attempt atjustice. The pluralism and
diversitywhichrightlyoughttobecherishedintheinternationalarenamust,tobemorally
defensible, be a diversity and pluralism of reasonable conceptions ofjustice, not one of
unreasonableandthereforeunjustifiableones.
Inlightofthisclarification,letusassessRazstwoargumentsaboutwhysovereigntyiswider
thanconstitutional legitimacy.Oneofhispoints isthatsocietiesneedfreedomtodevelop
theirownrightsaffectingpractices,andthattherefore internationalsupervisionoughtnot
tobe too intrusive.This argument isunconvincing: the freedom todevelopones rights
affectingpractices issurelyvaluablewhenusedtodeveloprightsrespectingpractices.But
what if a society uses it to develop rightsviolating practices? Societies do indeed need
freedom to develop their own practices, but the only freedom they need is to choose
between different reasonable conceptions of justice, not the freedom to choose
unreasonableones;
and,
as
pointed
out
above,
policies
based
on
reasonable
conceptions
of
justicedonotviolaterightsandremainwithinthesphereofnationalsovereignty.
Razs second point is that there are certain difficulties with outsiders assessing the
requirements ofjustice in a given society. As a preliminary point, these difficulties are
reduced but do not entirely go away when we replace justice with constitutional
legitimacy:theyarereducedbecause itwilloftenbeeasier,especially foranoutsider,to
assesswhether apolicy is reasonable than to assesswhether it is correct;however, the
problems still persist to an extent because the reasonableness of a policy will still be
sensitivetolocalcontingenciestosomeextent.
IbelievethatRazhasavalidpointhere,albeitonewhichleadshimtodrawanunattractiveconclusion.Letustaketheexampleofaninternationaljudge.Itistruethataninternational
judgecannotsimplyrelyontheconceptionofconstitutionallegitimacyadoptedinhishome
countryandapply ittothesocietyfromwhichthecaseonhisdeskoriginates.Rather,he
mustask thequestionofwhetherthepolicyatstake is legitimateunder thestandardsof
legitimacyofthesocietywhosepolicyitis;andestablishingthismayonoccasionbedifficult
orevenimpossibleforhim.However,theproperresponsetothisproblemisnottoloosen
the moral requirements of sovereignty but rather to acknowledge that sometimes an
outsidersempiricaland/ornormativeknowledgeislimited,andthereforetoshowadegree
ofdeferencetowardstheoriginaldecisionmaker.
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Dealingwiththiskindofuncertaintyisthedailybusinessofinternationalcourtssuchasthe
ECtHR,whichhasdevelopedstrategiesanddoctrinestodososatisfactorily. Itsjudgments
usuallycontain longsectionssettingoutthedomesticcontextoftherights issueatstake;
this enables the Court to assess whether the policy is justifiable within the respective
domesticcontext.Furthermoreandmoreimportantly,theCourtsdoctrineofthemarginof
appreciation acknowledges and provides away of dealingwith the specific institutional
limitationsunderwhichit,asaninternationalcourt,operates.Theclassicstatementofthe
marginofappreciationwassetoutinthefamousHandysidecase:
Byreasonoftheirdirectandcontinuouscontactwiththevitalforcesoftheircountries,Stateauthoritiesarein
principle inabetterpositionthan the internationaljudge togiveanopinionon [thequestionofwhethera
restrictionoftherightisnecessary].[...][I]tisforthenationalauthoritiestomaketheinitialassessmentofthe
realityofthepressingsocialneedimpliedbythenotionof'necessity'inthiscontext.
Consequently,Article10(2)leavestotheContractingStatesamarginofappreciation.[...]Nevertheless,Article
10 (2) does not give the Contracting States an unlimited power of appreciation. The Court,which [...] is
responsibleforensuringtheobservanceofthoseStates'engagements, isempoweredtogivethefinalruling
onwhethera 'restriction'or 'penalty' is reconcilablewith freedomofexpressionasprotectedbyArticle10.
ThedomesticmarginofappreciationthusgoeshandinhandwithaEuropeansupervision.(paras48,49)
ThemarginofappreciationdoctrineenablestheCourttodefertothenationalauthoritiesof
therespectivememberstate inasituationwhere ithasdoubtsaboutthejustifiabilityofa
policy but is simultaneously unable to convince itself of its unjustifiability (because of
epistemicuncertainty).Insuchcases,theCourtwilloftenholdthatthemeasureatstakelies
withinthemarginofappreciationoftherespectivememberstate. Itshouldbenotedthat
themarginofappreciationdoctrineisnotonlyoneofthecornerstonesofEuropeanhuman
rights law,butalsooneofthemostdifficultandcontroversialpartsof it;andtheCourt is
often rightly accused of taking recourse to it too lightly. So my goal here is not to
wholeheartedlydefend theCourtsapproach; rather it is tomake themore limitedpointthat there are indeed caseswhere the doctrine is rightly invoked because of epistemic
uncertainty.
TogiveanexampleofascenariowhereitisdifficultandmaybeimpossiblefortheCourtto
establishtherightoutcome,letusconsidertheRefahPartycase.TurkeybannedtheRefah
PartywhichitconsideredextremistandathreattoTurkishdemocracy,inparticularbecause
of its rightwing Islamic agenda, which included, among other things, a proposal to
introduce aspects of Sharia law. In a nutshell, one of the important issues at stakewas
whetherTurkeywasjustifiedintakingatoughstancetowardsreligious,inparticularIslamic,
parties,in
order
to
protect
its
commitment
to
what
has
been
labelled
militant
secularism,
which in turnwas regardedbyTurkeyasacornerstoneofprotecting itsdemocracy from
beingunderminedandeventually, toput itbluntly, slipping intoan Islamicdictatorship. I
regardthiscaseasaparadigmexampleofthescenarioRazmusthaveinmind,whereitis
extremelydifficultifnotimpossibleforanoutsidersuchasaninternationaljudgetodecide
whetherTurkeysactionofdissolvingtheRefahpartywasjustified,andthereasonforthis
difficulty lies in the fact thatnormative considerationsabout the legitimacyofbanninga
politicalpartyareinextricablyboundupwithquestionsrelatingtoTurkeyshistory,culture,
andpolitics,whichmake itdifficult ifnot impossible foranoutsider to resolve the issue
satisfactorily. So, to repeat, Raz has a point. But if I am given the task to resolve a
mathematicalpuzzlewhich istoodifficultforme,theresponsetomypersonalintellectual
limitations cannot be to relax the standards ofmathematical truth. Similarly,where an
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internationalcourtisunabletodeterminewhetheracountryspolicyreflectsareasonable
conception of justice, we should not respond by relaxing the moral requirements of
sovereignty.Rather,weshouldacknowledgethattheproblemofepistemicuncertaintymay
on occasion lead international courts to defer to the respective national authorities
problematic and unsatisfactory as this may be , and at the same time insist that
sovereigntycanbeinvokedonlyinsupportofjustifiable(reasonable)policies.
3.Conclusion
Both strategies of creating a distance between national constitutional rights and
constitutional legitimacy on the one hand and international human rights and national
sovereigntyontheotherfailed.Totheextentthatconstitutionalrightsaremaximalistin
characterbyprotectingall(autonomy)interestsasrights,thiscannotbeabandonedwithout
introducing arbitrariness, and to the extent that constitutional rights areminimalist by
insisting not on a correctness but only on a reasonableness standard ofjustification, afurtherloweringofthestandardisneithernecessarynorcoherentlypossible.Itfollowsthat
national constitutional rights and constitutional legitimacy on the one hand and
international human rights and national sovereignty on the other have the samemoral
structure.Thenextsectionwillfleshoutsomeoftheimplicationsofthisview.
IV.Implications1.Analternativeexplanationofinternationalhumanrightsminimalism,anditslimits
Many scholars believe thatminimalism be it an absoluteminimalism or a relative
minimalism(minimalismofinternationalhumanrightsinrelationtonationalconstitutional
law) isbuilt into themoral structureof internationalhuman rights.However, theonly
defensiblekindofminimalismispragmaticandthereforeexternaltothemoralstructureof
internationalhumanrights.Therearegoodreasonswhymuchofinternationalhumanrights
practicefocusesonpreventingparticularlyegregiousviolationsofhumanrights.Butthose
reasonshavenothing todowith themoral structureof internationalhuman rights; they
simplyreflectjudgmentsaboutpriorities.
While it isplausibletodefendsomeformofminimalismonpragmaticgrounds,wewould
howeverpaintaonesidedpictureofinternationalhumanrightsifwearguedthatallofitis
oroughttobeminimalistforpragmaticreasons.Pragmaticminimalismcanbejustifiedonly
to theextent that it ispolitically impossibleorexcessively costly toprotect international
humanrightscomprehensively. Inotherwords,weshouldworktowardsastateofaffairs
where international human rights are comprehensively protected, and where it is not
necessary to limit theirpractical reach to thepreventionofonly theworsthuman rights
violations. In this sense the theoryof internationalhuman rightsproposedhere ispartly
aspirational.
I say partly because there exists already one instance of a legal institutionalisation of
human rights at the international levelwhichbroadly reflects themodel I advocate: theEuropean Convention onHuman Rights.Approaching thejurisprudence of the European
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CourtofHumanRightswiththeideasofhumanrightsminimalisminmindwouldbefutile:it
is about as maximalist in character as even the most expansive system of national
constitutionalrights.First,wecanidentifyrightsinflationinthejurisprudenceoftheECtHR:
theCourttendstoreadevenrelativelytrivialinterestsintotheConvention,mostofteninto
Article8(therighttorespectforprivateandfamilylife).Togivejustoneexample,inacase
involving residents near Heathrow airport complaining about the noise caused by night
flights, the Court held that Article 8 also covers the right not to be affected by aircraft
noise37dismissivelydubbedthehumanrighttosleepwell
38byGeorgeLetsas.Second,
the Court protects negative aswell as positive obligations in fact, it hasmore or less
dropped the distinction between the two.39 (It admittedly does not, at least not
comprehensively, protect socioeconomic rights,whichwere deliberately left out of the
Convention.) Third, the Court applies the proportionality test and, by and large, has no
scruplesaboutdeclaringameasureofamember statedisproportionateand therefore in
violationofhumanrights.Togive,again,justoneexample:theCourtrecentlyruledagainst
theUnitedKingdom for failing toprotect the rightof an employeeofBritishAirways to
openlywearasmallcrossduringwork,arguingthatBAs interest inmaintainingacertaincorporateimagewasoutweighedbytheapplicantsrighttomanifestherreligion.
40Whilea
comprehensiveanalysisoftheCourtsjurisprudenceisbeyondthescopeofthispaper,itis
fair to say that its approach to human rights is structurally extremely close to that of
national constitutional courts. This being so, it cannot be argued that the model of
internationalhumanrightswhichIproposeinthispapercannotworkinpractice.Itdoes,by
andlarge,workinpractice,namelyinthememberstatesoftheCouncilofEurope,andnot
onlydoes itworksomehow;rather,thejurisprudenceoftheCourt incharge iswidelyand
rightlyregardedastheposterchildofinternationalhumanrightslaw.
2.Whatsthepointofinternationalhumanrightslaw?
If,asIargue,themoralstructuresofnationalconstitutionalrightsandinternationalhuman
rightsareidenticalandifweshouldworktowardsastateofaffairswheretheinternational
orderprotectsfundamentalrightsaswellassomenationalconstitutionalcourtsalreadydo,
thenthis leadstothequestionofthepointofthisadditional layerofrightsprotection.At
firstglance,aninstitutionalisedmechanismfortheprotectionofinternationalhumanrights
whichreliesonthesamestandardsasnationalconstitutionalcourtsmayseemoddandan
unnecessarycomplicationandduplicationofresponsibilities.
Thereis,however,nothingsuspiciousaboutthefactthatunderthemodeladvocatedhere,
national constitutional courts and international human rights courts apply the same
standardsofreview.The internationalmechanismsfortheprotectionofhumanrightswill
only kick inwhen somethinghas gonewrong at thenational level.Thus, ifonewere to
adoptaminimalistapproach to internationalhuman rights, then the internationalactors
wouldonlybecomeactiveafterthenational levelhasfailedtodelivereventhisminimum
standard. Inthemodeladvocatedhere,the internationalactorswould interferewhenthe
37Hattonv.U.K.
38Letsas
39Addexample.
40Eweidav.U.K.
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respectivenationalconstitutionalcourtmadeamistakeandacceptedapolicyascomplying
withtherequirementsofconstitutionallegitimacy(whichareidenticaltothoseofnational
sovereignty)wheninrealityitviolatedthem.Thus,thepointofinternationalhumanrights
lawistopolicetheboundariesofastatessovereignty.
A further question is whether there is a moral obligation on states to create legallyinstitutionalisedmechanisms for the protection of international human rights. I believe
there are, and Iwill focus on twomoral reasons for states to sign up for a system of
internationalhumanrightsprotection.Thefirstcentresoneachstatesdutytoensureand
improveitsownlegitimacyinrelationtoitscitizens.41Oneimportantaspectofitslegitimacy
isitsrespectforitscitizensfundamentalrights.Therearegoodoutcomerelatedreasonsto
hold that an adequate institutionalisation of fundamental rightswill provide not only a
national levelof constitutionalprotectionbut includeanadditional international layeras
well.42First,theinternationallayermaystabiliseacountryslongtermcommitmenttothe
valuesofdemocracy,theruleof law,andfundamentalrights,andmaymake itharderfor
forces seeking to undermine or destroy its democratic culture to succeed. In a nationalcontext, the integrity of a constitutional court ismostunder threatwhen the governing
partiesseek toundermine itswork, forexample through theappointmentofjudgeswho
support the governments ideology, the tinkeringwithprocedural rules,or constitutional
amendments.While it is true that international courts, too, operate in an environment
which involves political pressure (this is clearly visible in the case of the ECtHR which
suspiciouslyoftenbacktracksfrom itsownjurisprudencewhen facedwithresistance from
nationalgovernments), itwillbe impossible foranyonenationalgovernmentgoneastray
and acting in isolation to do serious damage to an international court. Second and
independently, there is reason to assume that international courtswill sometimes reach
betteroutcomes
compared
to
national
constitutional
courts.
National
constitutional
courts
and international courts have their respective weaknesses and strengths. Among the
strengthsofawelldesignednationalconstitutionalcourt isthat itsjudgeswillhavemore
adequatewaysofacquiringtherelevantempiricalknowledgeonwhichthecorrectoutcome
oflegalcases,includinghumanrightscases,oftendepends,andthattheywillhaveadeeper
understanding of the principles of justice applicable to their respective society. An
internationalcourtwill find itmoredifficulttoaccesstherelevantempiricaldata;and,as
discussedabove,willalsoonoccasion find itmoredifficult toassess thejustifiabilityofa
statespracticesfromtheoutside.InthecaseoftheEuropeanCourtofHumanRights,this
oftenleadstheCourttoadoptarelativelyhighdegreeofdeferencetowardstherespective
nationalauthorities,whichpotentiallyleadstoanunderprotectionofhumanrights.There
arehoweveralso importantways inwhichan internationalcourtmaybebetterplacedto
engageinjudicialreview:thehumanmindoftenleadsustotrustwhatwearefamiliarwith,
andthereforeinthecaseofanationalconstitutionalcourt,thejudgesintimateknowledge
oftheirlegalordermayonoccasionprecludeafreshandunbiasedassessmentofthelawat
stake. Insuchsituations,an internationalcourt,asabodymostlymadeupofjudgesfrom
41OnastatesobligationtoimproveitsownlegitimacyseeDworkin,ANewPhilosophyforInternationalLaw,
(2013)Philosophy&PublicAffairs1,17.42Ileaveopenthefurtherquestionofwhetherthereareoutcomeindependentreasons(thatis,reasonswhich
donot
rest
on
the
assumed
ability
of
international
courts
to
improve
the
overall
level
of
rights
protection)
whichnecessitatetheexistenceofarighttoahearingbeforeaninternationalcourt.Forthenationalcontext,
suchaclaimhasbeenmadebyAlonHarel,...andMattiasKumm,...
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otherjurisdictions,maybemoreadequateand inabetterposition,relativelyspeaking,to
identifycertainpathologiesofthepoliticsandpoliciesofanationalcommunity.
The second reason forjoiningan international system for theprotectionofhuman rights
can be derived from a states obligations to people living in other states and can be
explained in the followingway.Human rights flow from a fundamental status of humanbeings which they possess simply by virtue of their humanity; wemay call this status
human dignity. Violations of human dignity are a moral concern for everyone; this
proposition is thebasisof theview,assumedby thispaper, that thesovereigntydefence
doesnotholdinthecaseofaviolationofhumanrights:aviolatingstatecannotclaimthat
itsviolationofhumanrightsisnotthebusinessofotherstates.Thus,everystateisundera
moralobligationtotakeadequatestepsintheinternationalarenatoensurethatthehuman
dignityofpeople living inotherstates isrespected.One importantwayofdischargingthis
moralobligation istoparticipate in internationalsystemsofhuman rightsprotection that
arelikelytoleadtoanimprovementinhumanrightscomplianceinthosestates.Thus,even
acountrywhosedemocraticand rightsrespectingculture isofsuchahighquality that intermsofimprovingitslevelofrightsprotectionathomeithasnothingtogainfromjoining
aninternationalsystemofrightsprotectionwillbeunderamoralobligationtoparticipateif
by doing so it contributes to amore effective protection of human rights abroad. For
example,thecurrentdebateintheUnitedKingdomaboutwhetherthecountryshouldleave
theCouncilofEuropecentresalmostexclusivelyonthequestionofwhattheUKmayget
outof stayingor leaving,andusuallyneglects the fact thatwhatever theanswer to that
question may be, the more important consideration relates to the UKs obligation to
contribute to making the ECHR a success across Europe and improving human rights
complianceinothermemberstateswithalessimpressivedemocraticandrightsrespecting
culturethan
that
of
the
UK.
Which steps are adequate and therefore morally required will of course be a difficult
question,andwill crucially involve strategic considerationsas to the likely successof the
schemeunderconsiderationinimprovinghumanrightscomplianceinthelongrun.Assume
thatthemeasureunderconsiderationisaregionalhumanrightstreatywhich includesthe
rightofindividualstopetitionaninternationalcourtwiththefinalauthorityonquestionsof
interpretation in otherwords, a scheme similar to the ECHR.Where the international
situation is such that itcanbeexpected that thenewlycreatedcourtwill,on thewhole,
functionwelland improvethecomplianceoftheparticipatingstateswiththedemandsof
humandignity,astatewillbeunderanobligationtoparticipate inthisschemeeven if its
rightssituationathomedoesnotneedimprovementandcanbeconsideredentirelystable
even in the long run. Itowes thisdutynot to itsowncitizensbut to thepeopleofother
stateswhose dignity is not currently adequately respected, orwho live in stateswhose
democraticandrightsrespectingcultureisnotsufficientlymatureandneedsthestabilising
effectofthistreaty inordertokeepthecountryonadignityrespectingcourse.Bywayof
contrast,wheretheinternationalsituationissuchthatitcouldbeexpectedthatthetreaty
under considerationwould not contribute tomore respect for dignity in the respective
region for example because onewould have to expect thatmany of the participating
countrieswould send incompetentorcorruptjudges to siton thenewcourt,orbecause
there is no sufficient prospect of the new courts judgments being obeyed no such
obligationwould arise. (However, in such a situation, other obligationswould of courseexist,thecrucialquestionbeingwhichstepsare likelyto improvecompliancewithhuman
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rights over time.) Thus, importantly,my argument isnot thatwhatever the state of the
world or the respective region, international human rights courts ought to be set up
everywhere.Suchcourtsareonlyoneofarangeofpotentialmeasurestostabilisearegions
respect forhuman rights in the long run,and they shouldonlybeusedwhere there isa
reasonablechanceofthemsucceedingwiththeirwork.Thatsaid,wheretheconditionsare
sufficiently favourable, there is an obligation to introduce them, for the reasons given
above.
Theaboveargumentclaimsthatstateshaveanobligationtotakeadequatestepstoprotect
humanrightsinsideaswellasoutsidetheirownborders.Thepointcanbepushedfurther:I
will claim that the creationof an international courtofhuman rightswill,under certain
conditions,itselfbeamatterofhumanrights.Theargumenttothiseffectproceedsintwo
steps and is structurally similar to, though substantively different from, establishing the
existenceofamoralrightunderRazsinteresttheoryofrights.Razhasfamouslyarguedthat
a rightexistswhereapersons interestgroundsduties inothers. Ina structurallyparallel
way, I claim that a person has a right if someone else is under an obligationwhich isgrounded in thatpersons status;and this rightwillbeahuman right if the statusunder
consideration is the status of human dignity. Thus, a person has a human right to the
creationofan internationalhumanrightscourt ifstatesareunderanobligationtocreate
such an institutional protection of human rights and if this obligation flows from that
personshumandignity.Theobligationtocreateaninternationalhumanrightscourt,where
itexists, is,asarguedabove,grounded in thestatusofhumandignityofespecially those
peoplewhosehuman rightsare at riskofnotbeing adequately respected in theirhome
states in the present or the future. This establishes the possibility of the existence of a
humanrighttothecreationofaninternationalcourtofhumanrights.
V.ConclusionThispaperhasdemonstratedthatinternationalhumanrightshavethesamemoralstructure
as national constitutional rights and, in particular, that the widespread view that
internationalhumanrightsaremoreminimalistthannationalconstitutionalrightscannotbe
maintained. As has been shown, international human rights minimalism is neither
coherently possible, nor is it desirable in the interests of a reasonable pluralism and
diversityattheinternationallevel.Itfollowsthatminimalismcan,ifatall,onlybejustified
pragmatically,asanecessarysettingofprioritiesinordertotackleatleastthemosturgent
human rightsproblems.Butweshouldtry to limittheneed for thispragmatism,and the
aspirationexpressedbythetheoryofinternationalhumanrightsendorsedhereisthatofa
worldwhere the same levelof rightsprotection that todayalreadyexistsat thenational
levelinmanycountriesisalsoendorsedandeffectivelyinstitutionalisedattheinternational
level.