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Network Security
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Where we are
•Security crosses all layers
CSE 461 University of Washington 2
Physical
Link
Network
Transport
Application
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Security Threats
• “Security” is like “performance”•Means many things to many people•Must define the properties we want
•Key part of network security is clearly stating the threat model• The dangers and attacker’s abilities• Can’t assess risk otherwise
Introduction to Computer Networks 3
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Security Threats (2)
•Some example threats• It’s not all about encrypting messages
Introduction to Computer Networks 4
Attacker Ability ThreatEavesdropper Intercept messages Read contents of messageObserver Inspect packet destinations Collect conversationsIntruder Compromised host Tamper with contents of messageImpersonator Remote social engineering Trick party into giving informationExtortionist Remote / botnet Disrupt network services
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Risk Management
•Security is hard as a negative goal• Try to ensure security properties and don’t let anything
bad happen!•Only as secure as the weakest link• Could be design flaw or bug in code• But often the weak link is elsewhere …
Introduction to Computer Networks 5
?
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Risk Management (2)
•802.11 security … early on, WEP:• Cryptography was flawed; can run cracking software to
read WiFi traffic•Today, WPA2/802.11i security:• Computationally infeasible to break!
•So that means 802.11 is secure against eavesdropping?
Introduction to Computer Networks 6
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Risk Management (3)
•Many possible threats•We just made the first one harder!• 802.11 is more secure against eavesdropping in that the
risk of successful attack is lower. But it is not “secure”.
7
Threat Model Old WiFi (WEP) New WiFi(WPA2)
Break encryption from outside Very easy Very difficultGuess WiFi password Often possible Often possibleGet password from computer May be possible May be possiblePhysically break into home Difficult Difficult
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Cryptography
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Cryptology
• Rich history, especially spies / military• From the Greek “hidden writing”
• Cryptography• Focus is encrypting information
• Cryptanalysis• Focus is how to break codes
•Modern emphasis is on codes that are “computationally infeasible” to break• Takes too long compute solution
Introduction to Computer Networks 9
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Uses of Cryptography
•Encrypting information is useful for more than deterring eavesdroppers (confidentiality)• Prove message came from real sender (authentication)• Prove remote party is who they say• Prove message hasn’t been altered (integrity)
•Designing secure cryptographic scheme tricky!• Use approved design (library) in approved way
Introduction to Computer Networks 10
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Internet Reality
•Most of the protocols were developed before the Internet grew popular• It was a smaller, more trusted world• So protocols lacked security …
•We have strong security needs today• Clients talk with unverified servers• Servers talk with anonymous clients• Security has been retrofitted• This is far from ideal!
Introduction to Computer Networks 11
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Goal and Threat Model
•Goal is to send a private message from Alice to Bob• This is called confidentiality
•Threat is Eve will read the message• Eve is a passive adversary (observes)
Introduction to Computer Networks 12
Alice Bob Eve
??I©networks
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Encryption/Decryption Model
•Alice encrypts private message (plaintext) using key•Eve sees ciphertext but not plaintext•Bob decrypts using key to get the private message
Introduction to Computer Networks 13
Alice BobEncrypt DecryptHi there
Ciphertext
Plaintext Plaintext
Key Key
Eve
Network
I©networks I©networks
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Encryption/Decryption (2)
•Encryption is a reversible mapping• Ciphertext is encrypted plaintext
•Assume attacker knows algorithm• Security does not rely on its secrecy
•Algorithm is parameterized by keys• Security does rely on key secrecy•Must be distributed (Achilles’ heel)
Introduction to Computer Networks 14
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Encryption/Decryption (3)
Two main kinds of encryption:1. Symmetric key encryption », e.g., AES• Alice and Bob share secret key• Encryption is a bit mangling box
2. Public key encryption », e.g., RSA• Alice and Bob each have a key in two parts: a public part
(widely known), and a private part (only owner knows)• Encryption is based on mathematics (e.g., RSA is based on
difficulty of factoring)
Introduction to Computer Networks 15
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Symmetric (Secret Key) Encryption
•Alice and Bob have the same secret key, KAB
• Anyone with the secret key can encrypt/decrypt
Introduction to Computer Networks 16
Alice BobEncrypt DecryptHi there
Ciphertext
Plaintext Plaintext
Secret key Secret key
I©networks I©networks
KAB KAB
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Public Key (Asymmetric) Encryption
•Alice and Bob have public/private key pairs (KB / KB-1)
• Public keys are well-known, private keys are secret
Introduction to Computer Networks 17
Alice BobEncrypt DecryptHi there
Ciphertext
Plaintext Plaintext
Bob’s public key
Bob’sprivate key
I©networks I©networks
KB-1KB
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Public Key Encryption (2)
•Alice encrypts w/ Bob’s pubkey KB; anyone can send•Bob decrypts w/ his private key KB-1; only he can
Introduction to Computer Networks 18
Alice BobEncrypt DecryptHi there
Ciphertext
Plaintext Plaintext
Bob’s public key
Bob’sprivate key
I©networks I©networks
KB-1KB
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Key Distribution
•This is a big problem on a network!• Often want to talk to new parties
•Symmetric encryption problematic• Have to first set up shared secret
•Public key idea has own difficulties• Need trusted directory service•We’ll look at certificates later
Introduction to Computer Networks 19
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Symmetric vs. Public Key
•Have complementary properties
•Want the best of both!
Introduction to Computer Networks 20
Property Symmetric Public KeyKey
Distribution
Hard – share
secret per pair of
users
Easier – publish
public key per user
Runtime
Performance
Fast – good for
high data rateSlow – few, small,
messages
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Winning Combination
•Alice uses public key encryption to send Bob a small private message• It’s a key! (Say 256 bits.)
•Alice/Bob send messages with symmetric encryption• Using the key they now share
•The key is called a session key• Generated for short-term use
Introduction to Computer Networks 21
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Message Authentication
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Goal and Threat Model
• Goal is for Bob to verify the message is from Alice and unchanged• This is called integrity/authenticity
• Threat is Trudy will tamper with messages• Trudy is an active adversary (interferes)
Introduction to Computer Networks 23
Alice BobTrudy
I©networks ????
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Wait a Minute!
•We’re already encrypting messages to provide confidentiality
•Why isn’t this enough?
Introduction to Computer Networks 24
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Encryption Issues
•What will happen if Trudy flips some of Alice’s message bits?• Bob will decrypt it, and …
Introduction to Computer Networks 25
BobTrudy
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Encryption Issues (2)
•What will happen if Trudy flips some of Alice’s message bits?• Bob will receive an altered message
Introduction to Computer Networks 26
BobTrudy
Um??yuiE#E3@
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Encryption Issues (3)
•Typically encrypt blocks of data•What if Trudy reorders message?• Bob will decrypt, and …
Introduction to Computer Networks 27
BobTrudy
12 34 5
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Encryption Issues (4)
•What if Trudy reorders message?• Bob will receive altered message
Introduction to Computer Networks 28
BobTrudy
12 34 5BUY NOW! DO NOT STOP OK!
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MAC (Message Authentication Code)
•MAC is a small token to validate the integrity/authenticity of a message• Conceptually ECCs again• Send the MAC along with message• Validate MAC, process the message• Example: HMAC scheme
Introduction to Computer Networks 29Alice Bob
Message MAC
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MAC (2)
•Sorta symmetric encryption operation – key shared• Lets Bob validate unaltered message came from Alice• Doesn’t let Bob convince Charlie that Alice sent the
message
Introduction to Computer Networks 30
Alice BobGenerate Validate
MACSecret key Secret key
I©networks I©networks
KAB KAB
Message
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Digital Signature
•Signature validates the integrity/authenticity of message• Send it along with the message• Lets all parties validate• Example: RSA signatures
Introduction to Computer Networks 31
AliceMessage Signature
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Digital Signature (2)
•Kind of public key operation – pub/priv key parts• Alice signs w/ private key, KA-1, Bob verifies w/ public key, KA• Does let Bob convince Charlie that Alice sent the message
Introduction to Computer Networks 32
Alice BobSign Verify
Alice’s private key
Alice’spublic key
I©networks I©networks
KA-1 KA
Signature
Message
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Speeding up Signatures
•Same tension as for confidentiality:• Public key has keying advantages• But it has slow performance!
•Use a technique to speed it up•Message digest stands for message • Sign the digest instead of full message
Introduction to Computer Networks 33
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Message Digest or Cryptographic Hash
•Digest/Hash is a secure checksum• Deterministically mangles bits to pseudo-random output
(like CRC)• Can’t find messages with same hash• Acts as a fixed-length descriptor of message – very useful!
Introduction to Computer Networks 34
I might be a tiny bit sick of networks…
Hashfunction
Outpute.g., SHA1 (160 bits)
Input
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Speeding up Signatures (2)
•Conceptually similar except sign the hash of message• Hash is fast to compute, so it speeds up overall operation• Hash stands for msg as can’t find another w/ same hash
Introduction to Computer Networks 35
Alice BobSign Verify
Alice’s private key
Alice’spublic key
I©networks I©networks
KA-1 KA
Signature of hash of message
Message
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Preventing Replays
•We normally want more than confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity for secure messages!•Want to be sure message is fresh
•Need to distinguish message from replays• Repeat of older message• Acting on it again may cause trouble
Introduction to Computer Networks 36
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Preventing Replays (2)
•Replay attack:• Trudy records Alice’s messages to Bob• Trudy later replays them (unread) to Bob• She pretends to be Alice
Introduction to Computer Networks 37
BobTrudy
Password?Hi Alice!
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Preventing Replays (3)
•To prevent replays, include a proof of freshness in the messages• Use a timestamp, or nonce
Introduction to Computer Networks 38
Alice Bob
OK Alice!
Message MAC
Tue 10:03:57: “sell stocks”
Freshness
Authenticity/IntegrityConfidentiality
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Takeaway
•Cryptographic designs can give us integrity, authenticity and freshness as well as confidentiality. •Real protocol designs combine the properties in
different ways•We’ll see some examples• Note many pitfalls in how to combine, as well as in the
primitives themselves
Introduction to Computer Networks 39
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Web Security
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Goal and Threat Model
•Much can go wrong on the web!• Clients encounter malicious content•Web servers are target of break-ins• Fake content/servers trick users• Data sent over network is stolen …
Introduction to Computer Networks 41
InternetServerClient
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Goal and Threat Model (2)
•Goal of HTTPS is to secure HTTP•We focus on network threats:
1. Eavesdropping client/server traffic2. Tampering with client/server traffic3. Impersonating web servers
Introduction to Computer Networks 42
ServerClient
Network
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HTTPS Context
•HTTPS (HTTP Secure) is an add-on •Means HTTP over SSL/TLS• SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) precedes TLS (Transport Layer
Security)
Introduction to Computer Networks 43
IP
HTTP
TCPSSL/TLSHTTPS Insert
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HTTPS Context (2)
•SSL came out of Netscape• SSL2 (flawed) made public in ‘95• SSL3 fixed flaws in ‘96
•TLS is the open standard• TLS 1.0 in ‘99, 1.1 in ‘06, 1.2 in ‘08
•Motivated by secure web commerce• Slow adoption, now widespread use• Can be used by any app, not just HTTP
Introduction to Computer Networks 44
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SSL Operation
•Protocol provides:1. Verification of identity of server (and optionally client)2. Message exchange between the two with
confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and freshness•Consists of authentication phase (that sets up
encryption) followed by data transfer phase
Introduction to Computer Networks 45
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SSL/TLS Authentication
•Must allow clients to securely connect to servers not used before• Client must authenticate server• Server typically doesn’t identify client
•Uses public key authentication• But how does client get server’s key?•With certificates »
Introduction to Computer Networks 46
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Certificates
•A certificate binds pubkey to identity, e.g., domain• Distributes public keys when signed by a party you trust• Commonly in a format called X.509
Introduction to Computer Networks 47
Signed by CA
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PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)
•Adds hierarchy to certificates to let parties issue• Issuing parties are called CAs (Certificate Authorities)
Introduction to Computer Networks 48
I certified the ABC website!
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I certified the ABC website!
PKI (2)
•Need public key of PKI root and trust in servers on path to verify a public key of website ABC• Browser has Root’s public key• {RA1’s key is X} signed Root• {CA1’s key is Y} signed RA1• {ABC’s key Z} signed CA1
Introduction to Computer Networks 49
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Introduction to Computer Networks 50
PKI (3)
•Browser/OS has public keys of the trusted roots of PKI • >100 root certificates!• Inspect your web browser
Certificate for wikipedia.org issued by DigiCert
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PKI (4)
•Real-world complication:• Public keys may be compromised• Certificates must then be revoked
•PKI includes a CRL (Certificate Revocation List)• Browsers use to weed out bad keys
Introduction to Computer Networks 51
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SSL3 Authentication (2)
Introduction to Computer Networks 52
Negotiate ciphers, send certificate, …
Certificate lets Alice check Bob
Switch to Alice’s session key
Real Bob can compute session key
Encrypted dataEncrypted data
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“Metadata”
• What can attacker (in the network) still learn from an HTTPS connection?
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Takeaways
• SSL/TLS is a secure transport• For HTTPS and more, with the usual confidentiality, integrity /
authenticity• Very widely used today
• Client authenticates web server• Done with a PKI and certificates• Major area of complexity and risk
• “Metadata” leaks• Use other tools (Tor or VPN) if you want to hide that
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Defenses
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Topic
•Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)• Run as closed networks on Internet• Use IPSEC to secure messages
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Internet
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Motivation
•The best part of IP connectivity• You can send to any other host
•The worst part of IP connectivity• Any host can send packets to you!• There’s nasty stuff out there …
Introduction to Computer Networks 57
Internet
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Motivation (2)
•Often desirable to separate network from the Internet, e.g., a company• Private network with leased lines• Physically separated from Internet
Introduction to Computer Networks 58
Site A
Site B
Site C
No way in!
Leased line
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Motivation (3)
• Idea: Use the public Internet instead of leased lines – cheaper!• Logically separated from Internet …• This is a Virtual Private Network (VPN)
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InternetSite A
Site B
Site C
Maybe …
Virtual link
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Goal and Threat Model
•Goal is to keep a logical network (VPN) separate from the Internet while using it for connectivity• Threat is Trudy may access VPN and intercept or tamper
with messages
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Idea
l
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Tunneling
•How can we build a virtual link? With tunneling!• Hosts in private network send to each other normally• To cross virtual link (tunnel), endpoints encapsulate
packet
Introduction to Computer Networks 61
Public Internet
Virtual linkor tunnel
Private Network BPrivate Network A
Tunnel endpoint Tunnel endpoint
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Tunneling (2)
•Tunnel endpoints encapsulate IP packets (“IP in IP”)• Add/modify outer IP header for delivery to endpoint
62
TCP
IP
802.11
App
IP
802.11
TCP
IP
802.11
App
IP
Public Internet
802.11IP
Ethernet
IPIP
Ethernet
IP
TunnelEndpoint
TunnelEndpoint
Private Network BPrivate Network A
ManyRouters!
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Tunneling (3)
•Simplest encapsulation wraps packet with another IP header• Outer (tunnel) IP header has tunnel endpoints as
source/destination• Inner packet has private network IP addresses as
source/destination
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TCP HTTPIPIP
Outer (Tunnel) IP Inner packet
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Tunneling (4)
•Tunneling alone is not secure …• No confidentiality, integrity/ authenticity• Trudy can read, inject her own messages• We require cryptographic protections!
• IPSEC (IP Security) is often used to secure VPN tunnels
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IPSEC (IP Security)
• Longstanding effort to secure the IP layer• Adds confidentiality, integrity/authenticity
• IPSEC operation:• Keys are set up for communicating host pairs• Communication becomes more connection-oriented• Header and trailer added to protect IP packets
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Tunnel Mode
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Takeaways
•VPNs are useful for building networks on top of the Internet• Virtual links encapsulate packets• Alters IP connectivity for hosts
•VPNs need crypto to secure messages • Typically IPSEC is used for confidentiality,
integrity/authenticity
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Tor
• “The Onion Router”
• Basic idea: 1. Generate circuit of routers that you know will send packet2. Encrypt the packet in layers for each router in circuit3. Send the packet4. Each router receives, decrypts their layer, and forwards based on new info5. Routers maintain state about circuit to route stuff back to sender
• But again, only know the next hop
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Other Attacks
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Topic
•Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS)• An attack on network availability
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Internet
Yum!
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Topic
•Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS)• An attack on network availability
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Internet
Uh oh!
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Motivation
•The best part of IP connectivity• You can send to any other host
•The worst part of IP connectivity• Any host can send packets to you!
Introduction to Computer Networks 71
Internet
Uh oh!
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Motivation (2)
•Flooding a host with many packets can interfere with its IP connectivity• Host may become unresponsive• This is a form of denial-of-service
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Internet
Uh oh
Hello?
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Goal and Threat Model
•Goal is for host to keep network connectivity for desired services• Threat is Trudy may overwhelm host with undesired traffic
Introduction to Computer Networks 73
Trudy
Internet Idea
lHello! Hi!
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Internet Reality
•Distributed Denial-of-Service is a huge problem today!• Github attack of 1tbps
•There are no great solutions• CDNs, network traffic filtering, and best practices all help
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Denial-of-Service
• Denial-of-service means a system is made unavailable to intended users• Typically because its resources are consumed by attackers instead
• In the network context:• “System” means server• “Resources” mean bandwidth (network) or CPU/memory (host)
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Host Denial-of-Service
• Strange packets can sap host resources!• “Ping of Death” malformed packet • “SYN flood” sends many TCP connect requests and never follows up• Few bad packets can overwhelm host
• Patches exist for these vulnerabilities• Read about “SYN cookies” for interest
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XXX
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Network Denial-of-Service
• Network DOS needs many packets• To saturate network links• Causes high congestion/loss
• Helpful to have many attackers … or Distributed Denial-of-Service
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Uh oh Access Link
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Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDOS)
•Botnet provides many attackers in the form of compromised hosts• Hosts send traffic flood to victim• Network saturates near victim
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Ouch L
Victim Botnet
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Complication: Spoofing
•Attackers can falsify their IP address• Put fake source address on packets• Historically network doesn’t check• Hides location of the attackers• Called IP address spoofing
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From: “Bob”Trudy
I hate that Bob!Ha ha!
Alice
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Spoofing (2)
•Actually, it’s worse than that• Trudy can trick Bob into really sending packets to Alice• To do so, Trudy spoofs Alice to Bob
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1: To BobFrom: “Alice”
Trudy
Huh?
Alice Bob
2: To AliceFrom Bob
(reply)
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Best Practice: Ingress Filtering
• Idea: Validate the IP source address of packets at ISP boundary (Duh!) • Ingress filtering is a best practice, but deployment has
been slow
Introduction to Computer Networks 82
From: Bob
Trudy
Nope, from TrudyDrat
ISP boundary
Internet
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Introduction to Computer Networks 83
Flooding Defenses1. Increase network capacity around the server; harder
to cause loss• Use a CDN for high peak capacity
2. Filter out attack traffic within the network (at routers)• The earlier the filtering, the better• Ultimately what is needed, but ad hoc measures by ISPs today