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Americas Extended Hand:
Assessing the Obama Administrations
Global Engagement Strategy
B Kristin M. Lord and Marc Lnch
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Cover Image
In Octobe 2007, then Senato Baack Obaa addesses a cowd of oe t han 5,000 on Haden
Lawn, in font of West Hall, at a late oning capaign stop at Aizona State Univesit .
(TOm STOry)
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank, rst, the dozens o dedicated U.S. government ocials who spoke with us, oten severaltimes, during the course o our research (and to whom we granted anonmit to encourage rank conversation). Their insightswere vital to this report and we hope our analsis serves them well, even and perhaps especiall, where we were critical. Wealso wish to thank the external reviewers who provided extremel helpul comments: Sean Ada, Bruce Gregor, Goli Ameri,James Glassman, and Nick Cull.
Finall, we received enormous and enormousl patient support rom our CNAS colleagues, especiall Patrick Cronin,Abe Denmark, Andrew Exum, Ashle Hofman, Christine Parthemore, Shannon OReill, Travis Sharp, and Lizzie Threlkeld.Richard Fontaine, Bob Kaplan, and John Nagl gave particularl detailed and helpul comments. Eugene Chow deserves specialmention or his research assistance, as does Will Rogers who laid out the report. Finall, we thank Nate Fick or editorial andsubstantive guidance that shaped and improved the nal product. CNAS is a vibrant and supportive environment or act-
based, principled, and pragmatic national securit research because o all o them.
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Americas Extended Hand:Assessing the Obama Administrations Global Engagement Strategy
About the Authors
Dr. Kritin M. Lord is Vice President and Director o Studies at te Center or a New American
Security.
Dr. Marc Lynch is Associate Proessor o Political Science and te Director o te Institute or
Middle East Studies at te George Wasington University, Elliott Scool o International Aairs, and
a NonResident Senior Fellow at te Center or a New American Security.
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I . E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y Engagement is a pillar and guiding principleo President Barack Obamas oreign policy.At the beginning o Obamas presidency, the
United States aced a global public widely angry
at America and distrustul o its motives. An
unpopular war in Iraq and a controversial war on
terror threatened Americas moral authority over
seas and divided even Americas allies. Despite
substantial reorientation during the Bush admin
istration, this sentiment lingered, providing an
all too convenient rallying point or Americas
enemies and intractable political obstacles tocooperation with the United States. Damaged
credibility constrained American power.
Barack Obama pledged to renew Americas
relationship with the world, working in concert
with other nations to address shared global chal
lenges. He signaled a strong break rom the past
and delivered an ambitious series o speeches
designed to build a strong oundation o support
or his administrations oreign policy agenda.
But while his eorts enjoyed early success -
improving oreign public opinions o America
and raising hopes globally the administration
struggled to deliver on its promises. It raised
expectations that the administration could not
ulill in the short term and is scrambling to
ulill in the longer term.
his paper assesses the administrations global
public engagement strategy and its implemen
tation to date. hough the administrations
commitment to engagement has encompassed
a range o eorts such as negotiating withadversaries as well as allies, working through
multilateral institutions, and a stronger com
mitment to diplomacy, we ocus on just one key
dimension o the presidents broader engage
ment strategy, which we term strategic public
engagement and deine as eorts to engage,
inorm and persuade oreign publics to advance
U.S. national interests. We do not address
engagement through statetostate diplomacy
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and we touch only briely upon the chal lengeo combating violent extremism, which is the
subject o a separate paper by the Center or a
New America Security (CNAS).
In conducting this assessment, the authors met
together or individually with dozens o key
government oicials (to whom we promised
anonymity to guarantee rank discussions)
across the relevant agencies, reviewed a range o
policy documents and initiatives, and analyzed
the role o U.S. public engagement in key parts
o the world. Our goals are straightorward: to
assess critically what has been done and what
remains to be done in order to maximize the
chances that the administration can succeed in
advancing Americas national security objec
tives through public engagement.
We examine, irst, the administrations over
all philosophy regarding public engagement
and show how it both diers rom those o
previous administrations and demonstrates
striking continuity with the last years o theBush administration. Second, we examine the
administrations public engagement strategy in
three key policy areas relations between the
United States and the Muslim world, combating
violent extremism and promoting democracy
and human rights - and in each o our coun
tries - Iran, China, Aghanistan and Pakistan.
hird, we discuss the Obama administrations
eorts to build the inst itutional capacity neces
sary to execute a whole o government public
engagement strategy as recommended by morethan earl ier reports that criticized Americas
capacity to engage in successul, coordinated
public diplomacy. In part icular, we ocus on
the roles o the president himsel, the National
Security Council (NSC), Department o Deense
(DOD), State Depar tment, Broadcasting Board
o Governors, and the administrations eorts to
synchronize the activities o these organizations.
In assessing the success o public engagement, it isimportant to recognize both the limits and poten
tial o this nebulous instrument o statecra.
Public engagement is no silver bullet. I policies
are unpopular, no amount o snazzy marketing
will make them beloved. I national interests are
undamentally at odds, no amount o dialogue
will align them. Practitioners o public engage
ment can aspire only to explain the motivation
behind unpopular policies (that U.S. attacks on
al Qaeda are intended to counter terrorism, not
to wage war on Islam, or instance), put themin context, and highlight the many areas where
interests and values do overlap. Public engage
ment is also used most eectively in concert
with other instruments o power, as a sort o
diplomatic orcemultiplier that can ampliy the
impact o agi le diplomacy, eective development
activities and successul military operations.
Finally, public engagement provides policymakers
with options when other instruments o statecra
are severely constrained.
We conclude that, in many ways, the Obama
administration has achieved its initial objective
o restarting Americas relationship with the
world. he administration clearly understands
the importance o dialogue and o listening to
oreign publics, and it is attempting to incor
porate a sensitivity to public opinion into its
oreign policy decision making and translate
public support into political leverage. It has
aggressively reached out to oreign populations
through mass media, embassies, and Internetbased social media. It has conronted directly
issues o major political concern abroad, such as
the ArabIsraeli conlict, while also working to
build partnerships that will advance lowerpro
ile but urgent issues o shared concern, such as
economic opportunity and education. President
Obamas personal popularity is high. His widely
admired speeches, like his Cairo address to the
worlds Muslim communities and his words
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upon accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, have
riveted people around the globe. he adminis
tration has also made behindthescenes changes
designed to strengthen interagency coordination
and improve the organizations that support U.S.
public diplomacy and strategic communication.
Tough it is challenging to discern clear instances
in which public engagement alone made an
impact, the past months suggest some tan
gible results: greater support rom NAO allies
in Aghanistan, more support or the admin
istrations policy on Iran, and an al Qaeda
organization on the deensive. Te willingness o
world leaders to convene in Washington or
the April summit on nuclear security urther
demonstrated a new receptivity to U.S. leadership.
Many actors contributed to all o these accom
plishments, o course, but more avorable public
views o the United States created a political
climate more conducive to success.
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
EU
UK
USA
China
Russia
Iran
Figure 1: Positive Views o Key Countries According to 28 Nation Poll
Source: BBC World Service, "Global Views o United States Improve Wile Oter Countries Decline" (8 April 00).
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Yet, at the same time, high expectations havegiven way to skepticism as the administration
has struggled to deliver on its early promises.
he administration has been less successul at
implementing engagement strategies to sup
port speciic oreign policy objectives and slow
to jump through the windows o opportunity
it has opened. It has grappled to ind the right
balance between building trust, credibility, and
longterm relationships on the one hand and
developing more tactically ocused engagement
strategies to advance particular oreign policyobjectives on the other. Eorts to del iver on
the promises made and expectations raised by
President Obamas speeches have been inade
quately communicated (e.g., the ollowup to the
presidents Cairo overture to the Muslim world)
or else have simply been unmet (e.g., promises
to close Guantanamo). It is not yet clear i the
administrations quieter means o promoting
democracy and human rights will ultimately
prove more successul than the Bush administra
tions more vocal approach.
Moreover, though reorms to the institutions o
public engagement are underway in the ederal
government, the ability to implement public
engagement strategies remains hampered by
limited capacity and insu icient coordination.
For all the ta lk o smart power and whole o
government strategies, bureaucratic obstacles
continue to block reorm eorts. Major positions
remain unilled, or have been illed only recently
ater long vacancies, while key oices work withskeleton stas and scanty budgets. Questions
swirl among stakeholders about leadership, strat
egy, authorities, and coordination.
While we ind some o the most vocal criticism
o the administrations engagement strategies
unpersuasive, we do identiy a number o ser ious
problems that the administration should take
into account and adjustments it should consider
in the uture.1 Speciical ly, the U.S. government
needs more consistent development and execution o public engagement strategies or issues
and regions across its oreign policy agenda; a
State Department with less diuse authority
over public diplomacy and a stronger institu
tional capacity to perorm at the highest level;
and a Pentagon with stronger oversight over
inormation operations and the public engage
ment activities o combatant commands, and a
rebalanced relationship with civilian agencies.
A comprehensive external review o U.S. broad
casting strategy and the Broadcasting Board oGovernors as an organization is also needed.
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S U M M A R Y O F K E Y R E C O M M E N D AT I O N S
Te purpose o this report is to assess rather than recommend specic policies or activities, something already
done in more than 30 recent reports. Nonetheless, we make numerous specic recommendations in the course
o our analysis. A ew o these recommendations ollow:
Develop public engagement strategies in support o all major policy initiatives , especially those identi
ed in the orthcoming National Security Strategy.
Leverage renewed U.S. standing in countries like urkey, Indonesia and Brazil, where the popularity o
the American president has not translated into greater cooperation with or changed policies toward the
United States.
Devote more attention to ollowing through on major policy speeches by the president ; lay the ground
work in advance and engage all relevant government agencies as well as the private sector.
Recognize President Obamas important role in public engagement , but build the U.S. governments
capacity or public engagement across agencies and in the eld as well as in Washington.
Do not recreate a separate U.S. Inormation Agency but do create a small, grantgiving nonprot orga
nization to empower the private sector and support U.S. strategic public activities.
Conduct a major independent review o U.S. government broadcasting and the Broadcasting Board
o Governors; develop a strategy or the uture. Make the chairmanship o the Broadcasting Board o
Governors, an agency with a million dollar budget, a ulltime position.
Coordinate mutually reinorcing global engagement and counterterrorism activities more eectively .
Rebalance the roles o the Deense and State Departments in public engagement.
Avoid the temptation to make the National Security Council an operational agency ; ocus on setting a
unied strategy and coordinating agencies across the government.
Develop, within the State Department, a more unied public engagement strategy and organization
that coordinates public aairs, public diplomacy, and countering violent extremist ideologies across the
Departments many sources o power and with other government agencies.
Strengthen oversight over inormation operations at the Department o Deense . Assess public engage
ment activities o the combatant commands and determine which public engagement unctions are best
le to civilian agencies.
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ways unairly so, and ew around the world revisedtheir views. Polls showed ew signicant shis in
oreign public opinion despite these changes in
policy. Tis reality was reected in the shrewd deci
sion by the administrations nal Under Secretary o
State or Public Diplomacy and Public Aairs, James
Glassman, who played down eorts to improve
Americas image and instead ocused on tarnishing
al Qaeda. President Obama oered an opportunity
to start over, reinorced by a unique personal story
and a oreign policy vision centered upon engage
ment, dialogue, mutual interest and mutual respect.
President Obama moved quickly to translate this
opportunity into action. His inaugural address
oered a vision o a new American approach to
the world. In his rst week in ofce, the presi
dent announced that he would close the military
prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, within a year,
and he rmly rejected the language and rhetoric
o the global war on terror. He gave his rst
televised interview to an Arab television station,
alArabiya, and later delivered a prerecorded
message directly to the Iranian people. He rmly
committed to the responsible withdrawal o U.S.
combat orces rom Iraq, oered an outstretched
hand to Iran and engaged directly and personally
on the IsraeliPalestinian conict. In addition,
President Obama delivered a series o ambitious
speeches, most notably in Prague, Ghana, Cairo,
Oslo and at the United Nations, and travelled to
more oreign countries in his rst year than any
other president in history.3 Each o these speeches
was surrounded by a largescale public engagement campaign, led by Washington but with
heavy participation rom embassy stas world
wide, aimed at engaging indigenous populations.
In a sense, then, the Obama administration
treated its rst year as a reset phase, the
beginning o the administrations eorts not the
end, in the words o Deputy National Security
Adviser Benjamin J. Rhodes.4 Tis was not only
about popularity. Te strategic logic was clear:
II. ThE OBAMA ADMINISTRATIONSPUBLIC ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY:
AN OVERVIEW
"I took oce at a time when many around the
world had come to view America with skepticism
and distrust. Part o this was due to mispercep-
tions and misinormation about my country. Part
o this was due to opposition to specic policies, and
a belie that on certain critical issues, America has
acted unilaterally, without regard or the interests o
others. And this has ed an almost reexive anti-Americanism, which too oen has served as an
excuse or collective inaction."
- President Obama, Address to the United Nations
General Assembly, September 23, 2009
Barack Obama assumed the Presidency with a
unique opportunity and a maniest intent to rebuild
Americas relationship with the rest o the world. As
argued by opinion leaders across the U.S. political
spectrum, Americas global standing was in tatters
due to an unpopular war in Iraq, a perception ounbridled American unilateralism and charges that
the United States hypocritically advanced democ
racy abroad while compromising democratic values
at home. By the close o ormer President George W.
Bushs administration, the president was personally
unpopular overseas, with only percent o urks,
percent o Pakistanis, percent o Indonesians,
percent o Germans and percent o Britons
holding at least some condence that he would do
the right thing in world aairs.2 President Obama
promised a new beginning or Americas relationship with the world, a vision or which oreign
populations seemed to yearn.
Te presidential transition created an opportunity
or a new start. Although the tone and substance
o U.S. oreign policy changed markedly between
the rst and second Bush administration, the world
seemed not to notice. George W. Bush had become a
symbol o the worlds dismay with America, in some
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create openings or new policies that mighthave been rejected i advanced by the previous
administration, leverage the Presidents personal
popularity and the resh start he oered, and lay
the groundwork or an ambitious oreign policy
agenda that would require global support. In par
ticular, the Obama administration sought to:
Enhance U.S. credibility and moral authority
in the eyes o oreign populations.
Reverse trends toward greater antiAmeri
canism and undercut eorts o adversaries toexploit that sentiment or their own purposes.
Highlight shared interests and values in ways
that would acil itate cooperation.
Build peopletopeople relationships
that would orm the basis o longterm
partnerships.
Far more than a eelgood extra, public engage
ment was considered an essential oundation or
diplomacy and a means o political leverage. Te
administrations gamble is that politics mattersin the calculations o oreign leaders, includ
ing leaders o authoritarian states, and the new
administration could leverage more avorable
views o Obama personally and the United States
generally to inuence these calculations or, at a
minimum, to head o gratuitous opposition.
Te presidents personal commitment to engage
ment is shared by the major oreign policy principals
in the administration. Secretary o Deense Robert
Gates and Secretary o State Hillary Clinton have
articulated a shared vision o smart power and
have spoken oen o the need to realize a whole o
government approach to addressing oreign policy
problems, an approach that incorporates public
diplomacy and strategic communication.5 Secretary
Clinton has made public outreach a central part
o her oreign visits, appearing on Indonesian
talk shows, in a discussion in Doha televised by
alJazeera, in Indian villages, in town hallstyle
meetings with Pakistani journalists, and at round
tables with students in Mexico, to name but a ew
examples.6 She created an ambitious social media
outreach ofce that reports directly to her. Adm.
Michael Mullen, Chairman o the Joint Chies o
Sta, is an outspoken supporter o global public
engagement and the need to rebuild American
credibility overseas. Furthermore, the President
appointed close advisors to senior strategic communications positions in his National Security Council.
More than one year into the new administration,
there are signs that the president has succeeded in
transorming at least some aspects o Americas
standing in the world. President Obamas per
sonal popularity is high, and views o the United
States have improved rapidly throughout much
o the world and, outside o the Arab world,
have largely stayed there. Between February
Te strategic logic was
clear: create openings or
new policies that might
have been rejected i
advanced by the previous
administration, leverage
the Presidents personalpopularity and the resh
start he ofered, and lay
the groundwork or an
ambitious oreign policy
agenda that would require
global support.
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and August o last year, approval o the United
States increased by percentage points in
Bahrain, in Kuwait, in Egypt, and in
Morocco.7 Outside the Middle East, avorable
views increased by points in Germany and
France, in Indonesia, in Mexico, in the
United Kingdom, in Brazil and Nigeria, and
in Argentina.8 Gallup surveys show that overall
global views o American leadership have risen by
points in the year Obama has been president.9President Obamas surprising selection or the
Nobel Peace Prize demonstrated the hopes and
aspirations placed upon him by wide swaths o
the world, even i it mystied many Americans.
Having restored a more positive image o the
United States, the administration is now embrac
ing a role as a convener and global hub as part o
its broader strategy o engagement. Te Nuclear
Security Summit showed this at the traditional
level o diplomacy, positioning President Obama
at the center o a large gathering o world lead
ers united by shared norms and institutions. Te
Entrepreneurship Summit in April similarly
saw the United States at the center o an emerging
global network, with some leading entrepre
neurs rom Muslim communities around the world
converging on Washington to exchange ideas,
build ruitul connections with each other andAmerican business people, and to plan a range o
ollowup activities ocused on shared interests
and opportunities. Tough one attendee indicated
a disappointing showing by American business
entrepreneurs (as opposed to social entrepreneurs)
at the Summit, these activities show promise.
However, i the Obama administration contin
ues to embrace its role as a global convener, it
should be careul not to repeat the past mistake
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
2000 2002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Britain
France
Germany
Turkey
Pakistan
Indonesia
Jordan
Figure 2: Global Views o the United States in Select Countries rom 2000-2009
Source: BBC World Service, "Global Views o United States Improve Wile Oter Countries Decline" (8 April 00).
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As trained social scientists, we eel bound to dene
our terms. In te area o public engagement, we do so
reluctantly. Far too muc energy as been spent over
te last ew years in arguments over terms and deni
tions. Indeed, it is emblematic o te problems wit tis
eld tat tere is still no consensual denition or its
core activities.
Plic diplomac, dened as te promotion o national
interests troug eorts to engage, persuade, and inu
ence oreign publics, traditionally ocused on longterm
relationsip building and a ew core activities suc as
broadcasting, excange programs, and publications. Many
policy makers seeking support or teir missions com
plain tat traditional public diplomacy ails to adequately
grapple wit vital, urgent callenges to American interests.
Plic afairs, wic engages bot domestic and oreign
audiences, typically ocuses on sortterm eorts to
engage te media and sape te our news cycle.1
Tese eorts attract criticism or being too tactical and
too ocused on te sort term, even wen tey are
intended to be strategic and run out o te Wite house
(e.g., te illated Ofce o Global Communications in te
early Bus administration).
Strategic commnication is an integrated process
tat includes te development, implementation,
assessment and evolution o public messages actions
in support o policies, interests, and longterm goals2.
As it is implemented in practice, owever, it generally
ocuses on tactically supporting military or counter
terrorism objectives (sometimes including inormation
operations and/or covert psycological operations
known as PSYOPS), wit an implied subordination to
sortterm policy goals suc as building support or
te war in Iraq or gting te war o ideas against al
Qaeda. As Cairman o te Joint Cies, Admiral Mullen
recently complained, te strategic communication
rubric tends to substitute messaging or interaction and
to prioritie sort term mission requirements over te
longerterm building o relationsips and credibility.3
While this is not how sophisticated plic diplomac,
plic afairs or strategic commnication proessionals
wold perceive their jos, these terms have ecome
tarnished and loaded. Te problem wit all o tese
denitions is tat in practice tey are dened more by
wo executes te mission tan by teir objectives or
metods. Public diplomacy, watever its orm, is seen as
wat te State Department does. Strategic communica
tion, watever its orm, is viewed as wat te Deense
Department does. Public aairs, watever its orm, is seen
as wat ofces carrying tat name do, wic is principallymedia relations. We tereore propose a master concept
o strategic public engagement, te promotion o
national interests troug governmental eorts to inorm,
engage, and inuence oreign populations. We preer tis
term because it leaprogs denitional debates and gets
past bureaucratic tur wars, allowing policy makers to
ocus on wat te U.S. government sould be doing and
howrater tan who sould be doing it. Strategic public
engagement incorporates all o te American govern
ments deliberate communications wit te rest o te
world.
In our view, tis term conveys te strategic and sys
tematic use o engagement to acieve a oreign policy
objective, not engagement as an end in itsel. It entails
a planned process, based on a careully researced
understanding o te audience and o its interests,
couced in language calibrated to engage te audience
in te intended manner, using te best one or twoway
metod o engagement (weter a speec, an edu
cational excange program, social networking tools,
an American Center, or a documentary produced by
nonAmerican lmmaker wo sares an aborrence or
violent extremism even i e disagrees on oter topics),as part o a larger strategy, and evaluated to determine
i it is successul in advancing te intended goals.
1. DSB Task Force on Strategic Communication report (2008), 2.
2. Ibid, 2.
3. Admiral Michael G. Mullen. Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics.Joint Forces
Quarterly, Issue 55,( Fourth Quarter), 2009.
D E F I N I N G S T R A T E G I C P U B L I C E N G A G E M E N T
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o appearing to put the United States at the centero every global challenge, ocusing too much on
us and not enough on them. And, ideal ly,
the eort to promote entrepreneurship will soon
see the U.S. government step out o the drivers
seat and shi momentum to the private sec
tor. Nonetheless, these two initiatives are well
chosen. Tey advance causes that carry tangible
benets or American security over the long term
and simultaneously emphasize the positive role
America can play in the world. Tis is the best o
public engagement positive action, in supporto American interests, that also underscores the
image America wishes or itsel, and creates an
environment more conducive to cooperation.
Shortalls and ChallengesDespite this auspicious beginning, as the admin
istration entered its second year, there was a
palpable sense that the Obama bubble had deat
ed.10 Te high expectations and hopes placed on
the new President seemed to move rom blessing
to curse as the Obama Administration struggled
to implement its ambitious agenda. A grow
ing tide o opinion questions whether President
Obamas deeds will ever match the promise o his
words, whether he tried to do too much at once,
and whether he has even signicantly changed
the Bush administrations policies. Some o these
criticisms are exaggerated. But several problems
are real and merit attention.
ThE SAY-DO GAP
Te Obama administration aces a new orm o
the wellworn saydo gap, the perceived distance
between words and deeds that bedeviled the Bush
administrations communication eorts. Large
swaths o world opinion viewed the Bush admin
istration as hypocritical, advancing standards o
democracy and human rights and the peaceul res
olution o conicts that it was unwilling to accept
or itsel.11 Tis perception became so crippling
that many oreign societies reused to listen to the
Bush administrations arguments and to assume
the worst about American intentions. Tis problemwas acknowledged in the late years by the Bush
administration, which ound that the personal
animosity toward President Bush was so deeply
embedded across much (but certainly not all) o
the world that it overshadowed admirable initia
tives like the presidents commitment to ghting
AIDS in Arica or combating human trafcking.
Te Obama administration aces a dierent kind
o saydo gap: a gap between promises and
what is actually delivered. Having raised expecta
tions on a wide range o issues, the United States
is now paying the cost or ailing to live up to its
own rhetoric. Brilliant speeches and an ambitious
policy agenda raised the hopes o the world but at
the cost o racing beyond the ability o American
diplomacy to deliver. o be clear, the problem is
notthat President Obama has ailed to transorm
the world overnight, which would prove an impos
sible test and which neither he nor his advisors
expected. It is that he has allen short o the litmus
tests he created or himsel, such as promising to
close the prison at Guantanamo within a year. It
is that he ailed to sufciently set in motion the
many bureaus, embassies, combatant commands
and other parts o the U.S. government, and the
countless private businesses, nongovernmental
organizations, media organizations, and proes
sional societies outside the U.S. government to
implement the vision he presented.12
Some conclude that the administration should not
have overpromised, and should not have gone so ar
to distinguish itsel rom the outgoing administration. Tis criticism is not warranted. Making the
most o the change rom President Bush to President
Obama to reap the strategic benets o a resh start
requiredlaying out bold markers to highlight the
dierences. On issues ranging rom arms control
and the environment to Middle East peace and
the relationship with the Islamic world, President
Obama could only ully harvest the benets o
change by staking out clear, dramatic new paths.
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Still, the administration has suered the consequences o raising expectations beyond what it
could deliver and or not responding as well as it
might have to circumstances it could not control,
but potentially could have inuenced - like the
rapidly evolving domestic politics in Iran and
Pakistan, or the grim stalemate that stymied the
push or IsraeliPalestinian peace.13 And at times,
the administration is suering rom its ailure to
take public opinion sufciently into account. In
authoritarian countries like Kyrgyzstan, protecting
American interests like the U.S. air base in Manasat the expense o not publicly criticizing an oppres
sive regime appeared a reasonable and pragmatic
policy - until the day the revolution started and
opposition orces won. In key theaters like Yemen
and Pakistan, the use o drone strikes in support o
important counterterrorism objectives has risked
inaming public opposition and undermining
support or the broader mission. Te administra
tion has sought to minimize this allout by using
ever more precise weapons and embedding more
aggressive military tactics in a more holistic strategy. Te risk remains nonetheless.
Midway through Obamas second year in ofce,
the administration now has to conront the rising
cost o this pattern o bold commitments ollowed
by limited delivery. Administration ofcials argue
that this is more a problem o perception than o
reality: as in the debate over health care reorm,
they suggest, the president sets out ambitious goals
which then are accomplished through hard work
and persistence. Te perceived pattern has undermined American credibility and limited reception
to new presidential rhetoric, which always aced
a natural limit particularly in the Arab world,
where the IsraeliPalestinian conict weighs heav
ily in local views o U.S. credibility.
Te potential temptation is to respond by upping
the ante, promising jobs in the Middle East or
an IsraeliPalestinian nal status peace agree
ment. Tis would simply deer the problem and
raise the stakes in the saydo gap, which is poi
son to credibility in any domain. People need to
see the United States delivering on its promises or
they will begin to tune out even the most stirring
rhetoric. One solution would, o course, be simply
to achieve more policy successes. Short o that, a
communications strategy should systematically
and consistently engage and explain to peopleabroad the administrations longterm strategy,
where it serves mutual interests, and any progress
made. No policy or ollowup activity will change
minds i intended audiences do not know about it.
TACTICAL ENGAGEMENT
Another challenge to the administrations
approach is striking the right balance between the
longterm building o new relationships with or
eign populations, (or instance through educational
and proessional exchanges) and the shorttermdemands o tactical strategic communication.
Te Obama administration certainly considers its
postCairo eorts to build relations in the elds
o science, education, and entrepreneurship to be
strategic, in that they contribute to building the
longterm oundation or healthier relationships
between American and Muslim societies and help
to marginalize extremists by shoring up popula
tions potentially at risk to radicalization.
Te high expectations
and hopes placed on
the new President
seemed to move rom
blessing to curse as the
Obama Administration
struggled to implement itsambitious agenda.
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Yet, the administration has at times seemed less
interested in designing tactically ocused pub
lic engagement campaigns aimed at achieving
speciic goals or engaging speci ic audiences orgeographic regions.14 It has shown little inclina
tion to leverage its popularity to gain political
advantage: in rising powers such as Brazil,
Indonesia and urkey, where the President is
popular; in Japan, where trust in the United
States to do the right thing in world aairs
jumped rom percent to percent between
and ;15 and in Israel, where the United
States ailed to reach out to the peace camp
and lost control o the presidents image to the
point where Prime Minister Netanyahu gainedrather than suered rom an open conrontation
with him. here are exceptions. For instance,
though it was slow to emerge, the administra
tion developed a careully designed interagency
public engagement strategy in Aghanistan and
Pakistan. However, this highly ocused eort
in a theater o con lict is the exception to what
seems a wider rule.
WEAK INSTITUTIONS, INSUFFICIENT RESOURCESTe administration also continues to struggle
with a more longstanding problem in U.S. public
diplomacy and strategic communication: weak
institutions, weak coordination across agencies
and inadequate resources relative to the mis
sion. While calling or a whole o government
approach has become an allpurpose mantra in
policy circles, translating it into practice remains
a challenge. As discussed in detail in section III,
ongoing problems within and between dierent
arms o the U.S. government continue to rustrateeorts at executing a wellcoordinated, eective
engagement strategy. Tough President Obama
will be an important asset as long as he remains
popular with oreign audiences, no presidents
personal popularity is sufcient to invite long
term success. President Obama, and all American
presidents who succeed him, need wellunction
ing, wellunded public engagement institutions
to advance American policy interests, both in
Washington and at embassies, consulates, com
batant commands, and other U.S. governmentoutposts overseas.
Te challenge or the administration is now to
capitalize on the new opportunities it has created
or itsel and address the perceived gap between
promise and action. I not addressed, this gap will
diminish the Obama administrations own suc
cess in restoring American credibility and carry
longterm consequences or American interests.
Te Obama administration still has time to head
o this negative perception and capitalize onthe new start it has generated or America. Te
administration has successully charted a new
course. Now it must ollow through.
Deining Strategic Plic EngagementEngagement is a pil lar o President Obamas
oreign policy. Indeed, to the extent there is an
Obama Doctrine, comprehensive engagement is
one o its guiding principles, viewed at the high
est levels as a crucial means to achieve a broader
Te administration also
continues to struggle
with a more longstanding
problem in U.S. public
diplomacy and strategic
communication: weak
institutions, weakcoordination across agencies
and inadequate resources
relative to the mission.
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set o oreign policy objectives.16 Engagement- which encompasses tools as disparate as nego
tiations, dialogue, consultation, network building
and public diplomacy - is central to the admin
istrations policy on nearly every priority issue,
whether Iran, Pakistan, arms control, or climate
change.17 Tis paper ocuses on one dimension
o this general principle: the eort to engage,
inorm, and persuade oreign publics to advance
U.S. national interests. We call this eort stra-
tegic public engagement; others preer the more
amiliar terms o public diplomacy or strategiccommunication. (See Dening Strategic Public
Engagementonpage ) It is public because it
involves reaching out to populations, not just gov
ernments overseas. And it is engagement because
it is a twoway process, an ongoing interaction,
rather than a oneway message aimed exclusively
at inuencing oreign populations. Understanding
oreign publics is a central part o strategic
communication. Crucially, it is conceived as a
ullscale interaction, dealing with a wide range
o issues o shared interest and concern (as diverseas economic opportunity and disease prevention).
his concept o strategic public engagement, by
whatever name, was not invented by the new
administration. It is the product o years o
hardearned experience and sustained thought
inside and outside the U.S. government. Because
o this gradual process, it is jarring to consider
the enormous changes between and .
he early Bush administration saw itsel engaged
in a war o ideas against radical Islam andcombating an antiAmericanism grounded in
a deep opposition to American values rather
than a political response to American oreign
policy. Its public diplomacy was perceived by
much o the world as too much lecturing and
moralizing rhetoric, ocused on message con
trol and in luencing target audiences, and too
little consultation, listening, and dialogue. his
characterization was in act something o a
caricature, but in the atermath o the war onterror and invasion o Iraq, people in many or
eign countries were primed to see the worst.
By the last years o the Bush administration,
however, this approach had changed dramati
cally. hinking on strategic communication
(as on so many oreign policy issues) matured
rapidly across the U.S. government, which
began to pay ar more attention to the ideas
and attitudes o the targeted audiences and put
ar more eort into encouraging eedback. he
last years o the Bush administration saw the
reconceptualization o public engagement to
ocus not just on oneway messaging but also
on building relationships, twoway communica
tion and the need to support credible thirdparty
voices instead o putting the United States at the
center o every dialogue.18 James K. Glassman,
its last Under Secretary o State or Public
Diplomacy, emerged as a passionate advocate o
what he cal led Public Diplomacy .. rooted in
Internetbased dialogues.19 American o icials
returned to alJazeera ater years o de acto
boycott, while public diplomacy leaders eagerly
embraced the potential o the Internet and pub
licprivate partnerships. his change has been so
widely accepted across party and organizational
lines that ew now recognize its importance or
its extent.20
he turn to this listenercentric concept o
strategic communication is rooted in practical
experience. Navigating the new global inorma
tion environment requires a concerted ocus onlistening and on conversation, rather than on
controlling messages. he administrations pri
mary statement o its strategic communication
strategy to date begins rom the assertion that
the United States must do a better job under
standing the attitudes, opinions, grievances, and
concerns o peoples not just elites around the
world.21 his attempts to appeal to audiences
in ways that resonate with them, not just us, and
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to listen and understand relevant audiences ontheir own terms. he administration built upon
its predecessors evolution into an engagement
oriented approach to strategic communication,
with a particular emphasis on understanding
oreign publics and on synchronizing words
and deeds. It also attempted to broaden engage
ment well beyond a counterterrorism ocus
to engage wider publics on a broader range o
issues, and to institutionalize the new concept
across the whole o government.
he concept o strategic public engagement that
seems to drive the Obama administration stems
rom the recognition o the rising power o or
eign populations and the dramatic shits in how
inormation lows in todays world. Mobilizing
public support abroad is not just about being
liked it can help to achieve oreign policy
objectives, or at least head o act ive opposi
tion. Publics have always been powerul; indeed,
Benjamin Franklin sought to build popular
support in Europe or the American revolution
aries. However, due to the spread o democracy,
inormation and communication technologies,
and changing global norms, the latent power o
publics has grown exponentially. New media and
inormation technologies, like social networking
and Internetcapable cell phones, have trans
ormed the dynamics o communication and
interaction across the world and opened up new
opportunities or genuine global engagement.
Coupled with hour telev ision news broad
casts, this t rend makes inormation accessible towider and wider audiences and puts world lead
ers under unprecedented scrutiny. Under these
conditions, words, tone and speed matter more
than ever beore.22
he imperative to listen and engage with
oreign publics does not mean that oreign
opinion should drive American oreign policy.
he United States must protect its own interests
and promote its own agenda. At times that wi ll
lead the United States to pursue policies thatare unpopular - and that is both expected and
proper. he goal is not simply to be liked. It is to
be more in luential and thereore more eective
at lower cost.23 In a world where oreign public
opinion has ever greater impact on the success
or ailure o vital American national interests,
it should be weighed in making policy decisions
and should shape how the United States pur
sues its policies and how U.S. leaders talk about
American policies. Listening, understanding and
engaging makes or better policy, helps to avoidunnecessary conlicts, and should ideally allow
policymakers to oresee and preempt objections
to policies that sound worse in the ield than
they do in Washington.
Tere is no contradiction between public engage
ment and hardnosed diplomacy, even with
hostile or unpleasant regimes. Te administra
tion has held up the iconic Ronald Reagan, who
energetically engaged Soviet leaders and publics
behind the Iron Curtain, to show the eective
ness o reaching out to even the most oppressive
regimes while simultaneously engaging their
people.24 It has rejected the view that the United
States should not both engage the Iranian people
and negotiate with the regime, or that it could not
both reach out to Muslims and combat al Qaeda.
Engagement should not be held hostage to the
actions o the extremist ringe or to the demands
o authoritarian regimes. Te administrations
engagement eort sought to change the terms o
the relationship, away rom exclusively ocusingon the hotbutton political issues that divide and
toward the broad swath o economic and social
interests that could unite.
he eects o strategic public engagement will
rarely be elt in a single, dramatic outcome.
Instead, they shape the environment in which
political leaders operate. When American stand
ing is high and its president and policies popular,
then political leaders will stand to gain rom
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aligning with the United States and risk politicalharm i they do not. When American standing is
low, the incentives reverse, and political lead
ers gain by distancing themselves rom America
and suer through association. hus, during
Operation Desert Storm, the irst Bush admin
istration was able to assemble an overwhelming
international coalition to liberate Kuwait and to
maintain it in support o a push or ArabIsraeli
peace. In , by contrast, the administra
tion o President George W. Bush was unable to
muster international support or the invasiono Iraq, while political leaders such as Gerhard
Schroeder in Germany scored political victories
by publicly opposing the United States. In ,
world leaders (the most since the ounding o
the United Nations) enthusiastically converged
on Washington or the nuclear summit, jockey
ing or public meetings with President Obama
that would presumably be popular with their
own publics. It is diicult to imagine a similar
gathering during the Bush administration.
In assessing the success o public engagement
strategies, thereore, it is important to recognize
both the limits and potential o this nebulous
instrument o statecrat . Public engagement is
no silver bullet. I policies are unpopular, no
amount o snazzy marketing will make them
beloved. I national interests are undamen
tally at odds, then no amount o dialogue will
align them. Public engagement can only hope
to explain the motivation behind unpopular
policies (or instance, t hat U.S. attacks on alQaeda are intended to counter terrorism not
evidence o an American war on Islam), put
them in context, and highlight the many areas
where interests and va lues do overlap. Public
engagement is also used most e ectively in
concert with other instruments o power, as
a sort o diplomatic orcemultiplier that can
ampliy the impact o agile diplomacy, eective
development activities, and successul military
operations. Battleield success may win public
support but only i those publics sense a chang
ing tide and enemies are not able to manipulate
inormation in images to challenge that percep
tion. In diplomacy, e ective public engagement
can play apreventive role, allowing the United
States to shape and articulate its policies in ways
that head o opposition beore it arises. Finally,
public engagement provides policy ma kers with
options when other instruments o statecrat are
severely constrained. Force is a blunt instrument
and can only be applied, or even threatened, to
good eect in a relatively narrow set o circum
stances. Diplomacy must conront the political
context in which oreign leaders act, a political
context that potentially can be shaped through
public engagement. Where diplomatic relations
are strained, as with Iran, reaching out directly
to a countrys people opens new opportunities to
shape the broader relationship.
President Obamas national security team has
set out to ensure that strategic public engage
ment matters in oreign policy, that it is taken
seriously in policymaking and integrated in an
anticipatory ashion to avoid preventable disas
ters. Public diplomacy veterans will recognize
this ideal - immortalized by the journalist and
I policies are unpopular,
no amount o snazzy
marketing will make
them beloved. I
national interests are
undamentally at odds,
then no amount odialogue will align them.
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U.S. Inormation Agency director Edward R.Murrows remark that he wanted to be in on
the takeos, not just the crash landings - as a
goal long sought, but never achieved.25 Te same
could be said o the administrations ambition to
bring together all relevant agencies, domestic and
oreign policy alike, to coordinate strategic public
engagement across the whole o government. As
the issues discussed below in more depth sug
gest, delivery has not yet matched the ideal. Te
administration thus ar has done much better at
policy rollouts than at either proactively shapingthe environment with an eye toward the uture
or ollowing up on the bold policy statements and
principles laid out in speeches.
In short, the philosophy behind the administra
tions approach to strategic public engagement is
sound, even i key problems remain unresolved.I sustained throughout the administration, the
payo should be greater support or a wide vari
ety o oreign policy objectives.
III. PUBLIC ENGAGEMENTAND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
o illustrate the strengths and weaknesses o the
administrations perormance, we briey assess
the strategic public engagement dimension o
several discrete areas o U.S. oreign policy. We
examine three key policy areas - U.S.Muslim
World relations, combating violent extremism
and democracy and human rights - and our
key countries - Iran, China Aghanistan and
Pakistan. It is vital to emphasize that in most
cases, it is too soon to assess the success or ailure
o these eorts. Te administration has aced a
daunting set o challenges abroad, as well as having
to manage an economic disaster while pursuing a
difcult domestic political agenda. It understands
these challenges as longterm ones, and its public
engagement reects this. No administration could
reasonably be expected to solve the ArabIsraeli
conict or the Iranian nuclear issue or reverse a
decade o tense relations with the Muslim world
in its rst months. It has demonstrated persistence in its pursuit o these objectives in the ace
o signicant resistance and limited early returns.
Yet some lessons can be gleaned rom the record to
date - and there is time or the administration to
adapt and adjust.
One-wa commnication
Speeces
Broadcasting
Media Interviews
Webpages
Print publications
Signs and advertising
Exibits
Two-wa commnication
Town halls
Internet cat and blogs
Social networking
Callin sows
Track II dialogues
Conerences
Relationship-ilding
Proessional excanges
International visitor programs
Art and cultural excanges
Speaker programs
Educational excanges
T h E T O O L S O F P U B L I C E N G A G E M E N T
U.S. government ocials have countless ways to inorm, engage, and inuence oreign publics in support o oreign policy objectives.
To be used or best efect, these tools o public engagement should be selected careully and used in concert with each. An illustrative
list ollows.
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Otreach to Mslim Societies"I have come here to seek a new beginning
between the United States and Muslims around
the world; one based upon mutual interest and
mutual respect; and one based upon the truth
that America and Islam are not exclusive, and
need not be in competition. Instead, they over-
lap, and share common principles - principles o
justice and progress; tolerance and the dignity o
all human beings."
- President Barack Obama, Cairo, June 2009
One o the Obama administrations irst cha l
lenges was to begin to rebuild relations with
the worlds Muslim populations, relations that
had deteriorated precipitously in the new mil
lennium. he rebuilding eort began rom the
belie that Americas relations with . billion
Muslims around the world could not orever be
deined by the lens o counterterrorism. he
administration sought to:
Signal a clear break with the past administration, which had become not only unpopular but
also distrusted by most o the worlds Muslims.
Develop a broader based relationship with over
one billion members o the worlds population
who, while extremely diverse, also share a com
mon religious and cultural bond.
Positively engage a bulging new generation o
Muslim young people, who are key to the long
term stability o regions critically important to
the United States.Build a oundation or addressing shared chal
lenges such as the protection o human rights,
economic development, and the ArabIsraeli
conict.
President Obamas Cairo speech to the Muslim
world epitomized t he potential o strategic pub
lic engagement. he speech itsel was a classic
piece o presidential public diplomacy, a global
spectacle that ocused the worlds attention on
a inelycrated speech ollowed by twowayengagement via social media and acetoace
interactions at embassies. It sought both to
organize a wideranging relationship with the
Muslim world across a broad spectrum o areas
o common interest such as education, jobs, and
opportunity and to pursue a keen strategic pur
pose o marginalizing al Qaeda and rebuilding
Americas standing in the Muslim world. o do
so, it illustrated the shared interests o Muslim
societies and the United States in countering
violent extremists, rhetorically uniting them inthe ight against terrorism and countering the
idea that Americans see Muslims only through
a lens o terrorism. Importantly, it also extended
the discussion o shared interests and values ar
beyond terrorism to include science, education,
and entrepreneurship - even as it acknowledged
real dierences. he speech directly addressed
the political issues o primary concern to many
Muslims it hoped to reach, including the Israeli
Palestinian conlict.
Te process o shaping and then disseminating
the speech also worked well. With the coordina
tion o the NSC and with a leading role or the
State Departments Policy Planning sta, all rel
evant government agencies contributed to shaping
its themes and language. Outside experts con
tributed their views, and input on attitudes and
opinions in the targeted countries was careully
evaluated in advance. Finally, this speech was
ollowed by a campaignlike eort to continue the
dialogue via embassyorganized sessions and onsocial media, and to implement longterm pro
grams that built on the relationships and interests
outlined by the speech. o eectively engage
young people, who make up large percentages o
their respective populations, the Obama admin
istration chose to ocus on science, technology,
education and entrepreneurship and using social
networking technologies and text messages, both
o which are widely used by young Muslims.
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Te aermath o the Cairo speech also demonstrates the limitations o the administrations
eorts to date. Many Muslims chaed at the
absence o rapid, visible ollowup.26 Muslims
abroad expected actions - not plans - in the days
and months that ollowed the speech. When they
saw little ollowthrough in the short term, and
public debate quickly turned to the stando over
Israeli settlements, views o the Cairo overture
appear to have rapidly soured. Te label o words
without deeds, once it sticks, is difcult to remove.
Te administration argues that it has in act met
many o the promises it made in the speech and,
in any event, the objective was to start building a
longterm relationship not launch a series o new
initiatives. It has adhered to its commitment to a
responsible withdrawal rom Iraq in the ace o
turbulence and some pressure to relax its time
table, and has craed an eective message on
the need to transition to true Iraqi sovereignty.
It has actively sought IsraeliPalestinian peace
negotiations, paying signicant domestic and
international political costs despite little immedi
ate progress. It ullled another o its promises by
appointing White House staer Rashad Hussain
to be the American envoy to the Organization
o Islamic Countries. Administration ofcials,
like Farah Pandith, Special Representative to the
Muslim World (a political appointee who stayed
on rom the Bush administration), have trav
eled widely as they seek to build new networks
and programs to realize the new vision. Te
administration expanded business and education exchange programs, announced a global
entrepreneurship summit, started a und to
support technological development in Muslim
majority countries, appointed science envoys
and launched health initiatives, including a new
global eort to eradicate polio. Embassies around
the world continue to emphasize reaching out to
Muslims. Finally, in April , Secretary Clinton
announced a new initiative called Partners or a
New Beginning, which will engage the considerable resources, capabilities and expertise o the
U.S. private sector to support activities laid out in
the Cairo speech. Among other components, the
new initiative will encourage companies to con
tribute equipment or technology to new centers o
scientic excellence that the U.S. government is
launching in many predominantly Muslim coun
tries or partnerships between U.S. and oreign
universities to improve business education.27
Nonetheless, ollowup activities rolled out so ar
have received little publicity and have not been
craed into, or perceived as, a coherent and per
suasive narrative o ongoing robust engagement.28
Tere has been no sustained, ongoing campaign
to inorm either Americans or oreign Muslims
o progress on these programs. Until the recent
Entrepreneurship Summit and Partners or a
New Beginning, there had been no major roll
outs o new programs to reocus attention, and it
is not clear how much attention either program,
launched in Washington, garnered overseas. It
is difcult to change perceptions when ew are
aware o the activities. Frustrated administration
ofcials complain that the administration has not
had sufcient time to undamentally change how
the government does business, and that the media
ignore their substantive accomplishments to date.
But in a undamental way, such complaints miss
the point: when the goal is to change the narra
tive, a ailure to change the narrative can only be
judged asa ailure. Te administration may still
be successul in changing the narrative over thelonger term, but it has not achieved that goal yet.
Te reception o the Cairo speech, marked rst
by hope and then by disappointment, shows
the difculty o changing the narrative and the
importance o listening to what the intended
audiences consider important. Arabs viewed
the speech through the lens o specic poli
cies, particularly the IsraeliPalestinian conict,
and watched careully or evidence that the
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administration was both credible and capableo delivering on its promises. Administration
ofcials appeared rustrated that the Cairo speech
got hijacked by the ensuing public battle over
Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Yet they
should learn rom the act that it did. President
Obama was correct to directly tackle the Israeli
Palestinian issue in the Cairo speech and to
commit the United States to a sustained, active
role. Te Cairo speech could not have succeeded
without such a clear message on how the United
States would address the Palestinian issue. Eventhough the administration correctly identies a
wide range o issues where the United States and
Muslims could cooperate to mutual advantage,
the settlements issue, rightly or wrongly, remains
a litmus test or U.S. credibility with Arab audi
ences. Tough Arabs in general and young Arabs
in particular are highly concerned with issues like
jobs and education, Arab media and the politi
cal elite are consumed by the peace process; they
treat it as an index o American credibility, and
will not allow it to be sidestepped in avor o eventhe worthiest o other programs.
he presidents Cairo speech was arguably
the highlight o his strategic public engage
ment eorts to date. However, it could have
had greater impact i the preparation had been
done in advance in order to allow new initia
tives to be introduced quickly to capture the
momentum. Similarly, the demand or an Israeli
settlement reeze in advance o negotiations
with the Palestinians was well communicatedand eectively integrated into a wider regional
strategy. However, litt le was done to engage
Israeli public opinion in advance in order to build
support or such a move, and there seemed to be no
plan B when the Netanyahu government reused
to agree. As a result, the administration lost a great
deal o credibility and goodwill on both sides o
the struggle. Finally, the disconnect between
this broadbased Muslim outreach and more
traditional counterterrorism and combatingviolent extremism eorts (see below) has proven
challenging both inside the government and in
the public debate. hough policy disagreements
will persist, the United States can hope to start a
shit in Muslim perceptions regarding American
motives and trustworthiness that will inluence
whether those disagreements are seen as discrete
points o departure or chapters in a decadeslong
story o betrayal.
Comating Violent ExtremismTe Obama administration sought to rerame
Americas relationship with the worlds Muslims,
moving away rom the Global War on error
that dened the post/ Bush administra
tion (even aer the administration itsel tried
to abandon the term, indicating the stubborn
stickiness o public perceptions). Tis meant
detaching the broadbased global engagement
eorts rom major ongoing eorts ocused on
combating violent extremism. Even as the admin
istration accelerated Predator strikes against al
Qaeda targets and escalated the military and,
to a lesser extent, the civilian commitment to
Aghanistan, President Obamas engagement with
the Muslim world explicitly aimed to broaden the
relationship and not rame it primarily in terms
o what administration oicials have cal led the
distorting lens o counterterrorism. President
Obamas team, as the Bush administration came
to accept in its inal years, understood the urgent
need to prevent the consolidation o a "clash o
civilizations" narrative that empowers extremistson both sides. o combat violent extremism, the
administration seeks to:
Undercut al Qaedas global prominence by reduc
ing its centrality in ofcial U.S. government
rhetoric while continuing or expanding concrete
actions to destroy and degrade its network.
Drive a wedge between Muslim populations and
violent Islamist extremists to deprive the latter
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o support and succor, in order to isolate andmarginalize extremists rom their own societies,
each other, and global Muslim populations.
Understand the local drivers o extremism and
tailor specic approaches to countering the
appeal o extremist ideas at the national and
local levels.
Undermine a narrative o American perdy and
Muslim victimhood that attracts money, recruits
and sympathy to extremist causes, and conclu
sively reject the narrative o an America at war
with Islam.
Support or give space to credible, indigenous
voices that reute violent Islamist narratives
and take t he United States out o the center o
such debates.
Te new approach to countering violent extrem
ism, thereore, ocused not on al Qaeda per se
but on marginalizing violent extremists while
engaging broader audiences. As White House
Countererrorism Advisor John Brennan put it,
Rather than looking at allies and other nationsthrough the narrow prism o terrorism, whether
they are with us or against us, the administration
is now engaging other countries and people across
a broader range o areas.29 Te guiding principle
was to isolate and marginalize extremists, rather
than magniy their voices, while oering a positive
American message rooted in common interests
and deating the perception o a Western war on
Islam. Te ocus on violent extremism rather
than on al Qaeda or radical Islam t comortably
in this rhetorical strategy moving away rom awar o ideas that ocused attention upon religion
and elevated al Qaedas status.
Te administration continued to counter extremist
narratives across old and new media environments,
and built on the initiatives o the last years o the
Bush administration to empower, support and
ampliy credible voices inside the Muslim world
speaking out against extremism. It also sought
to harness other oreign policy tools, like development, in support o the mission o combating
violent extremism. Te director o the National
Countererrorism Center, Michael Leiter, argues
that the single largest area o growth over the last
ew years "involves deeper causes and root causes
o radicalization and terrorism" in order to more
eectively counter extremist messaging.30
Te decision not to see the Muslim world through
the lens o terrorism has led Obama administra
tion ofcials to separate global engagement and
public diplomacy rom eorts to counter violent
extremism and the spread o terrorist ideologies.
In so doing, some argue privately that the Obama
administration has overcorrected in playing down
violent extremism and now must take steps to link
the two eorts as appropriate without undermin
ing the objective o winning broader Muslim.
Tis overcorrection is reected in government
agencies, where global engagement and counter
terrorism stas are reportedly reluctant partners.
Te determination to avoid raming relations with
Muslims in terms o counterterrorism rame led to
hesitation about linking eorts to counter violent
extremism with broader public diplomacy, despite
the obvious strategic relationship. Te problems
are undamental: aer all, though the United States
and Muslim societies around the world may share
many interests, the reason the United States is
engaging specically withMuslim communities
abroad, and not nations or regions, is a concern
about Islamist extremism and terrorism directed at
Americans in the United States and overseas.Over the last several years, the U.S. government
has taken a more disaggregated and indirect
approach to countering terrorism. Overall, this
approach appears to be succeeding in conounding
al Qaedas communications strategy, as evidenced
by the growing Muslim condemnations o its
methods and ideology.31 With the United States
government taking a less prominent role, Muslim
voices increasingly stepped orward - with or
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without support rom Western or Muslim governments - to challenge al Qaeda and other violent
extremists. Notably, al Qaeda was instrumental in
marginalizing itsel. In the last years o the Bush
administration, the carnage in Iraq and terror
ist attacks killing innocent Muslims, as well as al
Qaedas public battles with more popular Islamist
groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah, alien
ated much o the Muslim mainstream. Al Qaeda
continues to struggle in the Arab world, and shows
ew signs o regaining ground lost over the last
ew years. Meanwhile, the administrations kineticoperations are enjoying success in seriously
disrupting al Qaeda."32 An engagement strategy
bolsters this eort by peeling away support - even
i those ocused on broader public engagement shy
away rom the counterterrorism dimension.
At the same time, the extremist threat has evolved
into dierent orms - especially domestic radi
calization and recruitment in English and spread
in specic theaters like Pakistan and Somalia. Al
Qaeda afliates such as al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula and al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
began to step up as global threats in their own
right. Te administration needs to do more to gain
the initiative on countering violent extremism in
those arenas, but without surrendering its winning
strategy in the broader Muslim and Arab worlds.
Tis requires coordination and careul strategiz
ing across agencies and across groups in those
agencies that deal with both public diplomacy and
positive engagement on the one hand and counter
ing terrorism and violent extremism on the other.It is not necessary to separate these two tracks to
protect President Obamas core strategic agenda o
broadening the relationship with the Muslim world
beyond terrorism. And it could be counterproduc
tive i the two eorts work at cross purposes or ail
to take advantage o obvious synergies.
Te administrations communication strategy
has at times proved difcult to maintain. Te
ailed Christmas Day bombing and the killing
o people and wounding o others by aradicalized American Muslim at Fort Hood,
ex., generated considerable domestic pres
sure to reocus on Islamist extremism.33 Faced
with mounting domestic political criticism and
a media renzy, the administration responded
with rhetoric that seemed aimed more at assuag
ing public opinion than driving a wedge between
broad Muslim publics and violent extremists.
Ofcial communications seemed reactive and in
tension with the earlier strategy. Aer some shaky
steps, the administration reafrmed its core strategy and has restored its balance. Nonetheless, the
pressures o domestic politics and the administra
tions initial reaction demonstrate the difculty o
adhering to even a wellcraed new engagement
strategy when aced with entrenched narratives
and domestic political opposition.
Democrac and Hman Rights"I do have an unyielding belie that all people
yearn or certain things: the ability to speak your
mind and have a say in how you are governed;
conidence in the rule o law and the equal
administration o justice; government that is
transparent and doesn't steal rom the people; the
reedom to live as you choose. hose are not just
American ideas, they are human rights, and that
is why we will support them everywhere."
- President Barack Obama, Cairo, June 2009
Perhaps the one area where t he Obama admin
istration has been criticized or saying too little
in its approach to democracy and human r ights.he administration chose to deemphasize
democracy in its public rhetoric and public
diplomacy programming, even as its unding or
programs such as the Middle East Partnership
Initiative actually increased.34 A wide range
o critics rom the let and right bemoan the
administrations reluctance to oer the ull
throated calls or democracy that characterized
the Bush administrations public diplomacy.
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he critics also lament what they perceive as theObama administrations tendency to construe
national interests narrowly, in ways that mar
ginalize human r ights. o promote democracy
and human rights, the Obama administration
appears to be pursuing the ollowing objectives:
Voice support or political pluralism and
human rights, but tone down calls or democ
racy to avoid promising more than can be
delivered, as well as the appearance o meddling
and tainting dissidents as American pawns.
Promote good governance and political
reedoms through quiet, behindthescenes
diplomacy and support or civil society.
President Obamas approach to rhetoric about
democracy relects the lessons his team learned
rom the Bush administrations experience with
overpromising and underdelivering. While the
previous administration advocated or democ
racy oten and committed substantial unding
to democracypromotion initiatives, especia lly
in the Middle East, its eorts ultimately oundered. he high point o the administrations
public democracy advocacy probably came with
Secretary o State Condoleezza Rices powerul
speech to the American University o Cairo in
the spring o apologizing or decades o
American preerence or stability over democ
racy. However, the success o Islamists in
Egyptian and Palestinian elections in and
, respectively, led the Bush administra
tion to back away rom supporting democracy
in practice, at least in the eyes o Arab people.Many Arabs agreed with the need or democracy
but did not ind the Bush administration a cred
ible or attractive partner in such eorts - and
they (correctly) doubted that the United States
would actually sacriice its interests to promote
democracy. o be air, the Bush administration
promoted democracy in countries like Ukraine
consistently and with less anare. Nonetheless,
the administration ocused on promoting
democracy in the Middle East, and it is or theseactivities that it wil l be most remembered.
President Obamas team argues that both
democracy and human rights - two related
but separate agendas - can bet ter be promoted
quietly through institutional development and
diplomacy, without attentiongetting rheto
ric. he ate o t he previous administrations
Freedom Agenda is taken as an object lesson in
the k ind o overpromising and underdelivery
o which the current administration is now
accused. he Obama administration, there
ore, chose to ocus on building relationships
based on common interest and mutual respect,
emphasizing civil society, human rights and
development, rather t han on promoting democ
racy per se. Secretary o State Hillary Clintons
speech on Internet reedom - pointedly timed
ater Google accounts o Chinese dissidents
were hacked - ocused on building the ounda
tions or the ree low o inormation and her
speeches have generally played down the role o
elections. President Obamas Nobel Peace Prize
speech pointedly noted that the promotion
o human rights cannot be about exhortation
alone.35 In t hat acceptance speech, he deended
engagement with repressive regimes even i
it lacks the satisying purity o indignation
because sanctions without outreach - condem
nation without discussion - can carry orward
only a crippling status quo. As a result o this
approach, the administration has been criticized
or sotpedaling democracy.his approach oers an important test o the
power and role o strategic public engagement.
Does the Obama administrations reticence on
democracy open the space or more e ective
eorts beneath the radar, or does it orgo an
important instrument or advancing American
values and interests in the world? Will publics
ind the administrations relatively lower proile
in advocating democracy to be more appealing
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and ultimately more eective, even though itlacks drama, or see it as a sign that the United
States no longer cares about democracy and is
willing to sacriice their reedom or smoother
political relations with autocratic rulers? When
autocratic governments all, as in Kyrgyzstan,
wil l the people criticize Americas ailure to
speak out against oppression, or recal l Americas
restraint and appreciate respect or their sov
ereignty? It is diicult to judge this early in
the administration. ime will tell whether the
Obama administration has corrected or themistakes o the previous administration - or
overcorrected.
Iran"he United States does not meddle in Irans
internal aairs. Our commitment- our responsi-
bility - is to stand up or those rights that should
be universal to all human beings. hat includes
the right to speak reely, to assemble without ear;
the right to the equal administration o justice,
and to express your views without acing retribu-
tion against you or your amilies."
- President Obama, Nowruz Greeting to the
Iranian People,March 20, 2010
he Obama administration came to oice
with an ambitious plan to engage the Islamic
Republic o Iran in pursuit o an agreement on
its nuclear weapons program and cooperation to
address wider regional security challenges. his
involved a twotrack strategy, o irst attempt
ing to engage with Iran while also preparing theground with the international community to
support sanctions or even military action, should
engagement ail. he United States needed to
simultaneously change the tone o its relations
with Iran without causing Irans neighbors -
rom Israel to the Arab states o the Persian Gul
- to worry about Americas determination to
prevent Iran rom obtaining nuclear weapons.
One o President Obamas most signiicant early
acts o strategic public engagement was his eortto engage the Iranian people directly, an eort
soon complicated by a disputed Iranian election
and the rise o t he opposition Green Movement.
In its eorts to engage the Iranian public, the
administration sought to:
emper longstanding public animosity toward
the United States and create political space or
engagement with the regime.
Prevent the regime rom using antiAmerican
sentiment as a convenient excuse or rejectingcooperation with the United States.
Avoid undermining the Green Movement by
publicly aligning with protesters.
Build international support or sanctions, or
even military orce, should negotiations over the
nuclear issue ail.
As a rst major step, in March President
Obama issued a special video message wishing
the Iranian people a happy Nowruz, the tradi
tional Persian celebration o spring and renewal.36He spoke with a tone o respect and asked the
Iranian people to think about a more peace
ul uture marked by renewed persontoperson
exchanges and trade. Yet this uture, he under
scored, would require Iran to make a choice.
he United States wants the Islamic
Republic o Iran to take its rightul place
in the community o nations. You have
that right - but it comes with real respon
sibilities, and that place cannot be reached
through terror or arms, but rather through
peaceul actions that demonstrate the true
greatness o the Iranian people and civili
zation. And the measure o that greatness
is not the capacity to destroy, it is your
demonstrated ability to build and create.37
his speech was released on the White House
Web site, widely reported in the media, and
urther disseminated through Youube (which
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is blocked in Iran) and Farsilanguage televisionstations based outside Iran. he message was
then underscored by the administrations oer
to participate in direct talks wi