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and the Atlantic
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17985 18285
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Cuban
Merchants
Slave
Trade
Knowledge
and the
Atlantic W
orId
1790s-1820s
JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA
In 1794, Mariano Carbo and his associate Pedro Diago,
newcomers to the Atlantic slave trade, hired Captain Ignacio Pica and a
crew and outfitted a ship, the Nuestra Senora del Carmen with goods
and provisions for a slaving expedition. While sailing in the Caribbean,
Captain Pica found himself under siege by the French corsair
Brutus.
Outgunned, outclassed, and outmaneuvered, Captain Pica and his crew
concluded that resisting the French corsair would be futile and
surrendered to Captain Jean Garican without incident. The French
sailors set sail for Charleston, South Carolina, with their prize, the
Nuestra Senora del Carmen in tow.
As will be seen, the story
o Nuestra Senora del Carmen
does
not end with this encounter. Indeed, the connections and interactions
described above reveal the economic structural hurdles encountered by
Cuban slave merchants in the early 1800s and illustrate the
international and domestic commercial infrastructures established by
these individuals to overcome initial problems o growth related to the
Atlantic slave trade.
These aspects
o
merchant activity in the Atlantic
slave trade, largely ignored by the current historiography o the Cuban
slave trade, become closely linked with the transformation
o
slave
1 While this essay focuses on Cuban slave merchants, their activities were part o
larger social and economic transformations
on
the island. For more information, there
are a number
o
essential works on eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Cuban society
that should be consulted: Franklin
W.
Knight, Slave Society
in
Cuba during the
Nineteenth Century (Madison: University o Wisconsin Press, 1970); Franklin
W.
Knight, Origins o Wealth and the Sugar Revolution in Cuba,
1750-1850,
Hispanic
American Historical Review 57:2
(1977):243;
and Allan J. Kuethe, Cuba 1753-1815:
Crown
Military and
SOCiety
(Knoxville: University o Tennessee Press, 1986). Sherry
Johnson's work fills a huge gap in
the historiography o colonial Cuba. Sherry Johnson,
The Social Transformation
o
Eighteenth-Century Cuba (Gainesville: University Press
o
Florida, 2001), 2-3,
14 15.
Laird W. Bergad has significantly expanded our
knowledge o Caribbean slave societies. Bergad's microanalysis o Matanzas allows
him to gauge the impact that sugar had on technology, ecology, and culture. Laird W.
Bergad, Cuban Rural Society in the Nineteenth Century: The Social and Economic
History
o
Monoculture
in
Matanzas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990),49,
62.
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~ ~
~ ~
226
COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER
2006
merchants into merchant bankers
(refaccionistas)
whose presence and
influence became crucial to Cuba's economy.2
Just five days after seizing the Nuestra Senora del Carmen,
Captain Garican and the French crew of the Brutus caught sight of a far
more desirable prize on the horizon, the frigate Dos Hermanos, which
was returning from the African coast laden with 207 slaves and bound
for Havana. Refusing surrender, Captain Archibald Galbrach, a
seasoned English slave trader, briefly eluded the French before being
forced to engage them. No match for the combat-ready crew
of
the
Brutus, the Dos Hermanos was soon rendered inoperative; the French
cannons inflicted catastrophic structural damage, destroyed its food and
water provisions, and fatally wounded one
of
its captives. Ironically, by
capturing the two slaving vessels, the French crew faced a dilemma:
abandon the
Nuestra Senora del Carmen
or forsake the
Dos Hermanos
readily exchangeable and highly lucrative cargo.
3
The entrepreneurial Captain Ignacio Pica offered Captain
Garican a practical solution to his problem: sell the salvaged Dos
Hermanos and its slave cargo to him. Garican agreed and within
twenty-six hours they finalized the transaction in the middle of the
Caribbean Sea. The ships then sailed to Charleston where Captain Pica
exchanged the 207 slaves and battered ship for a note worth 25,000
pesos. Upon his return to the pOli of Havana, Captain Pica discovered
that news of his escapades on the high seas had preceded him. Felipe
Allwood, the financier of the
Dos Hermanos,
had requested an
injunction from the Merchant Tribunal, demanding that Pica return the
207 slaves.
4
2 See note 9.
3 Letter relating to Mariano Carbo and Felipe Alwood regarding the frigate Los Dos
Hermanos and a cargo of slaves guided by Ignacio Pica, [date illegilble] 1798, Archivo
Nacional de Cuba (hereinafter cited
as
ANC), Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 113, no.
6.
Cuban historians agree that the first successful slave voyage from Havana to Africa
took place on 18 September 1798. Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El ingenio: complejo
economico social cubano del azucar (La Hahana: Editorial
de
Ciencias Sociales, 1978),
1 50. For a maritime history of French privateering in Charleston, see Melvin H.
Jackson, Privateers in Charleston, 1793-1796; n Account o a French Palatinate in
South Carolina
(Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1969).
Errors due in part to phonetic spelling abound in the record. In Spanish court
documents, Captain Jean Garican, a French merchant based in Charleston, is listed as
Jean Gaillard. Jackson,
Privateers in Charleston,
69 71. Spanish merchant tribunals
were charged with reviewing commercial disputes between traders and merchants.
Litigants submitted their disputes to a jury of peers
who
reviewed the merits of each
case; see
Codigo de comercio comentado por una sociedad de abogados
(Barcelona:
Libreria
de
Ramon Pujal, 1857),24-49.
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 227
The Dos Hermanos incident goes beyond the traditional
interpretations o imperial economic and political hegemony in the
Atlantic world. While North Atlantic powers altered the dynamics
o
the slave trade through geopolitical struggles and abolitionist policies
in
the early nineteenth century, it was the sum o individual human
encounters and exchanges that formed this community. Essentially,
Felipe Allwood's financial defeat on the high seas represents the abrupt
decline o British commercial influence in the Cuban slave trade, while
Mariano Carbo's and Pedro Diago's interloping activities
as
backers o
Nuestra Senora del Carmen symbolize the steady and systematic
emergence
o
Cuban participation in a crowded and complex industry
carried out through adaptation.
With notable exceptions, the historiography
o
the Cuban slave
trade emphasizes the larger political manifestations and demographic
transformations o this commerce.
s
Few o these works focus on trade
organization and merchant development. For example, David Murray
primarily reviews British diplomatic and military efforts to suppress the
Cuban slave trade. Moreno Fraginals' classic work on the sugar
industry remarks on various significant social and economic aspects o
the slave trade, but the author's analysis is dispersed throughout three
volumes. David Eltis' exceptional study outlines
an
integrated Atlantic
world by employing quantitative evidence while Spanish imperial
control and political largesse take center stage in Pablo Tomero's text.
Sherry Johnson comments on antagonisms between elite ranks o
slave merchants in the Atlantic slave trade. However, the strength
o
her contribution rests on the discussion o the intra-Caribbean trade
carried out by petty merchants during the early stages o Spanish
liberalization o slave trade legislation.
6
5 This study follows the traditional political periodization o the early Spanish slave
trade, marked by Spanish liberalization in 1789, English abolition in 1807, and Spanish
abolition between 1817 and 1820. While recognizing the interplay between geopolitics
and society, the discourse nonetheless emphasizes the fundamental social and economic
interactions between individuals in the Atlantic world. For the periodization o the
Cuban slave trade, see Jose Luciano Franco, Comercio clandestino de esc/avos (La
Habana: Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1996), and Fraginals, El ingenio. Both Corwin
and David Murray discuss in detail the changes brought about
to
the trade by the North
Atlantic powers, including the abolition
o
the slave trade by Great Britain and the
United States, the end
o
the Napoleonic Wars, and the imposition and enforcement o
slave trade treaties upon Spain by the United Kingdom.
6
David
R
Murray,
Odious Commerce: Britain Spain and the Abolition o the Slave
rade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980). Other essential studies include
Herbert S Klein, The Middle Passage: Comparative Studies in the Atlantic Slave Trade
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228 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006
Scholars largely place Cuban slave merchants at a distinct
disadvantage vis-it-vis other Atlantic merchants. According to these
interpretations, Cuban slave merchants were either outpaced by North
American domination, dependent on North Americans, or relied
heavily on American and British carriers. ? That English, American,
and Portuguese shippers possessed a competitive advantage n this
specialized field in the early nineteenth century is undeniable.
8
However, the language employed by scholars (domination,
dependency, and reliance) implies a unilateral association that often
overlooks the more nuanced dimensions of economic and social
relationships. The interactions between Cuban and North Atlantic
merchants were not necessarily based on economic domination or
commercial dependency. Indeed, throughout this era, Cuban slave
merchants expanded their knowledge of the slave trade by manipulating
existing North Atlantic commercial and financial networks.
For Cuban slave merchants, the period between the l790s and
1820s
is
characterized by three capitalist productive phases, namely
competition, growth,
and
efficiency. Between 1789 and 1807, Cuban
participation in a highly competitive environment marked by
geopolitical instability resulting from the French Revolution, the
obstruction
of
trade brought about
by
the Napoleonic Wars, and, to a
lesser extent, the British abolitionist movement, yielded lackluster
results
for
a potentially burgeoning domestic industry. However, from
1808 to 1817, Cuban slave merchants expanded their commercial
knowledge, experience, and financial capabilities to continue the
(Princeton: University
of
Princeton Press, 1978); David Eltis,
Economic Growth and
the nd of he Transatlantic Slave Trade
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1987);
Pablo Tornero Tinajero, Crecimiento econ6mico y trans ormaciones sociales: esclavos
hacendados y comerciantes en la Cuba colonial 1760-1840
(Madrid: Ministerio de
Trabajo y Seguridad Social, 1996); Moreno Fraginals,
El ingenio;
and Franco,
Comercio clandestino. Sherry Johnson's work sheds much needed light on the early
development of the Cuban slave trade. Sheny Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Creole
Participation in the Cuban Slave Trade, 1789-1796,
Cuban Studies
(2000):52-75. For
the transformative effects of warfare and military spending on the Atlantic slave trade,
see Evelyn
P
Jennings, War
as
the 'Forcing House of Change': State Slavery in Late
Eighteenth-Century Cuba,
he William and Mary Quarterly 62:3
(2005):411-40.
7 Johnson, The Rise and Fall of Creole Participation, 52; and Franco, Comercio
ciandestino 89
Eltis' approach is slightly more neutral. Eltis,
Economic Growth 44.
8
Torres Ramirez asserts that despite royal privileges, Spanish commercial efforts
w r hampered by a general lack of organization and the inability to establish direct
trade with western Africa in the eighteenth century. Bibiano Tones Ramirez, La
compafiia gaditana
de
negros
(Sevilla: La Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos,
1973),111-18.
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 229
process
o
growth and development. Despite British enforcement
o
the
slave treaty ending Spanish participation in 1817, by the 1820s, Cuban
slave merchants were fully entrenched in the Atlantic slave trade and
linked their activities
to
the domestic production
o
sugar. While
political shifts looming in the background altered the Atlantic world, it
was
the sum
o
individual human encounters that propelled the
expansion o the Cuban slave trade.
Cuban slave merchants anchored their successes in the Atlantic
world
by
developing vertical integration and by establishing
supplemental commercial services such as shipping and insurance.
Indeed, as a social identifier the term slave merchant is limiting and
misleading, since these individuals performed multiple functions in
Cuban society and the economy; they could have easily been labeled
merchant bankers or landowners hacendados) as well. The term slave
merchant is a misnomer popularized by the British abolitionist
movement, which was 'later adopted by historians. As a result
o
its
longevity and its usefulness in comparative historical articulation, the
terrn will be retained as appropriate for the task at hand.
9
When
describing specific economic functions, however, other labels will be
employed to reflect such distinctions. For example, a well-established
Cuban slave merchant
o
the 1820s could finance slave voyages to
Africa, export sugar to North Atlantic economies, finance sugar mills,
and acquire plantations and urban real estate. Immediately following
the limited successes o Cuban slave merchants in the 1790s, this new
group ascended in the early 1800s and consolidated a clear economic
and social presence in Havana by the early 1820s.
When analyzing the Atlantic slave trade, the paradigm o
peninsular-creole is especially limiting and oftentimes implies a clear
division
o
interests between regional groups. t cannot fully describe
the intricate social and economic relations among individuals in the
9 For the period under study, Cuban slave merchants identified themselves
as
merchants, or
comerciantes,
not as slave merchants or
negreros.
In nineteenth
century Cuba, the term
comerciante
was a generic term applied to any individual
associated with the import-export trade; this included merchants exporting sugar,
importing slaves, and
refaccionistas.
A
refaccionista
provided landowners with
revolving credit accounts and financial services for a mill's yearly operation. The term
mercader
was reserved for retail merchants. For an overview
o
the historiography on
Spanish American merchants,
see
James Lockhart, The Merchants o Early Spanish
America, in f
Things
of
the Indies: Essays Old and New
n
Early Latin American
History
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000),158-82. For linguistic mutations o
the terms mercader and comerciante, see Fred Bronner, Urban Society in Colonial
Spanish America,
Latin American Research Review
21: 1 (1986): 15
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230 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006
Atlantic setting. In general, then, this work utilizes the term IISpanish
merchant
when discussing the larger commercial interests of
individuals, vis-a-vis other Atlantic traders. This designation is
especially useful when elaborating on commercial activities in the
Atlantic Ocean and the African coast, where the regional origins of
Spanish captains, sailors, and slave factors agents who procured
slaves and advised those interested in the business were often blurred
because
of
the transient nature
of
their occupations. The term
IICuban
merchant
is applied herein to merchants who, regardless of origin, not
only conducted business on the island but also established economic
and social roots in Cuba.
As will be seen, the origin
of
a given merchant within the
Spanish empire had little to
do
with social integration in Cuba. Instead,
t was a combination of economic functions and associations that
defined
an
individual s place in society.
n
1814, the House
of
Inglada
hired Captain Miguel Moran on consignment for a series of voyages to
West Africa. Moran, along with Ignacio Inglada, Gabriel Lombillo, and
Jose Marfa Zequeira, were among the six significant investors. Despite
the fact that all four individuals were close associates and slave
merchants by trade, a clear socioeconomic division existed between
them. Lombillo arrived in Havana from the Spanish province
of
Malaga
in
the early 1800s and in due course acquired the title of Count of the
House of Lombillo. Zequeira was a Catholic priest from a well
established family that had arrived in Cuba in the mid-1600s. Inglada
was a merchant from Barcelona who eventually returned to Spain in
1821 after amassing a fortune. Compared
to
his business partners,
Moran s socioeconomic background was rather ordinary. Arriving in
Cuba
in the early 1800s from Jij6n, Moran married, established
permanent residency in Havana, and purchased a modest home. n spite
of assimilating into Cuban society, his occupation
as
the captain of a
slave ship eclipsed his financial activities and served as his main
identity
for
his close associates. 10
While Moran s commercial dealings were similar if not
identical
to
those of his cohorts, the group did not consider Moran
to
be
one of them. To Inglada, Zequeira, and Lombillo, Moran was an
adventurer, a mere mercenary. When a dispute over profits and
commissions arose, the claims and contentions between the different
members exposed distinct social tensions. For instance, regarding
10 Isidro Inglada against Miguel Monin regarding slave expeditions, 26 February
1821, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, first section, leg. 260, no 1
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 23
Moran's assertions that he was
an
investor in the voyage and not an
employee of the firm, Inglada and his associates acrimoniously
declared the following:
What truly causes indignation
is
that Moran comes to us
wanting more, but it was Inglada who sacrificed his
personal industry and capital. Now he (Moran) is
complaining that he exposed his life to the dangers ofth
seas and the deadly climates of the ports and roads
of
Africa and that
he
struggled and navigated them with the
help of his African assistants? He wants more for such
considerations? Why, because we enjoyed the bosom
of
our families? He received his fee and he got what he
deserved. How can
he
call himself a partner without
actually being one?
While Moran invested matching shares in several voyages,
Inglada, Zequeira, and Lombillo did not regard him
as
a financier or
capitalist like themselves. Yet it
is
apparent that Moran rightfully
considered himself
an
equal investor of the enterprise, stating: "I came
into this enterprise with cash
in
hand, and from the beginning I owned
one-sixth
of
the expedition. But Inglada never respected my interests
and went against my explicit orders." lnglada argued that
Moran "was
not an equal partner because
he
served
as
a tr nsporter and was not
involved in the subsequent sale
of
the cargo." He continued by adding
that Moran simply enjoyed a "few leisurely outings"
in
the Atlantic and
that "he has gained enough income
to
make his family happy." 2 By
emphasizing Moran's commercial activities in West Africa,
downplaying his role on the domestic side of the business, and directly
linking these pursuits with his social standing and income potential in
Havana, the other members of the company delineated clear-cut
socioeconomic boundaries within the group.
In a vigorous Atlantic society like Havana, a merchant could
neutralize the effects
of his
humble beginnings or render his geographic
origins irrelevant by following an established commercial career
Isidro Inglada versus Miguel Moran regarding accounts and slave expeditions, 22
April 1823, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, third section, leg. 261, no. 4, fol. 452. Unless
otherwise indicated, all translations are the author's.
2 Isidro Inglada versus Miguel Moran regarding slave expeditions,
8
December
82 and
4
February 1822, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, first section, leg. 260, no. 1;
emphasis added.
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232 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006
trajectory-trading slaves, exporting sugar, financing voyages and/or
agricultural estates thus transcending the matter of initial regional
connections, whether in the Iberian Peninsula or Spanish America.
Regardless
of
regional locality, Inglada (peninsular), Lombillo
(peninsular), and Zequeira (creole) all shared a common socioeconomic
identity
by
financing and provisioning slave voyages and linking these
commercial activities with the Cuban part of the trade. However,
notable social nuances between slave merchants established a
discemable hierarchical order. While Moran was also a financier, his
direct link to Africa, where he continued trafficking and physically
handling slaves, reduced his socioeconomic status among other
merchants in Havana.
This particular case also demonstrates some
of
the commercial
variations found within the general designation of slave merchant.
From Inglada's perspective, who sought to elevate his own position in
the company, Moran was a common trader involved in some of the
least attractive aspects
of
the business, such as extended absences
in
the
Atlantic Ocean, constantly facing the perils of the seas, exposure to
extreme environmental elements along with the possibility
of
disease,
and contact with the African continent. Zequeira was an investor who
participated in the Atlantic slave trade on a casual and indirect basis. As
the director of the merchant house, Inglada, like many other merchants,
began his career
as
a slave factor for an affiliated firm before he
branched out independently, reinvested, collected his profits, and then
returned to the Iberian Peninsula. 'Lombillo at first shared several
socioeconomic characteristics with Inglada, such as operating the
business through partnerships, determining the market value of slaves
in Havana, overseeing transactions with planters, and arranging the
terms of payment or credit. But unlike Inglada, who kept his
commercial activities situated within the Havana harbor, Lombillo
expanded even further into the economy and society by vertically
integrating every aspect of the business, establishing roots on the island
and becoming a Cuban merchant. However, completion of this process
often took a generation.
Despite the unbridled enthusiasm of merchants on the island,
transitioning from general maritime commerce into a highly specialized
business occupied by more experienced North Atlantic powers proved
difficult for Cuban merchants. Without a doubt, island merchants not
only lacked practical experience and technical knowledge for
participation in such a complex venture, but also the necessary social
and economic infrastructure in the Atlantic world. As Havana
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 233
merchants soon discovered, entering the Atlantic slave trade was not a
simple matter
o
provisioning a vessel and sailing it to West Africa.
The process involved a number o intricate and interrelated
stages on both sides o the Atlantic in which Cuban merchants were not
competitive during the initial liberalization
o
the slave trade. As will
be
seen, several limitations, including a dearth
o
marketable goods,
trained sailors, and slave factors, vague trading regulations,
underdeveloped commercial contacts in West Africa, and the absence
o Spanish slave factories (discussed below), held back the growth o a
stable trading apparatus for two decades following Spain's 1789 decree
liberalizing the slave trade.
Specifically, the residual effects o centuries-old mercantilist
traditions hampered the initial expansion
o
the Cuban slave trade.
Cuban merchants lacked the necessary trading goods to purchase slaves
in
West Africa due to antiquated commercial networks. While the
Spanish Crown declared free trade in 1778 with much pomp and
circumstance, the concept o free trade was far from the classic
nineteenth-century definition
o
the phrase. Instead, the royal decree
continued
to
safeguard mercantilist principles. While Cadiz merchants
lost their legal stranglehold on trade with the Americas, they
maintained a de
facto monopoly with New Spain. Regulations lacked
the institutional incentives to encourage Spanish merchants to seek
other markets. For the merchants o Cadiz, Havana continued to
represent a commercial backwater o the Spanish empire with limited
market appeal vis-a-vis Mexico.
3
The required commodities for
exchange in West Africa were unavailable in Cuba or were relatively
more expensive than those found in other North Atlantic ports.
Frustrated by the Crown's flawed approach to the liberalization o slave
trade laws, Cuban merchants organized and advocated change.
4
Along
with hacendado groups, Cuban merchants proposed a political and
economic framework based on sugar and slavery that would ultimately
3 For Spanish merchants, New Spain continued to be their most lucrative market
well into the 1800s. Indeed, between 1797 and 1819, Cadiz averaged 77 percent
o
all
Spanish exports
to
the Americas. For the same period, 55.2 percent
o
Cadiz exports
were shipped to New Spain, while the West Indies absorbed a mere 6.5 percent o total
exports. John Fisher, Imperial 'Free Trade' and the Hispanic Economy, 1778-1796,
Journal
o
Latin merican Studies 3:
(1981):22-23, 39, 45; and John R. Fisher,
Commerce and Imperial Decline: Spanish Trade with Spanish America, 1797-1820,
Journal o Latin merican Studies 30:3 (1998):462, 470, 473, 476.
4
For
an
analysis
o
the administrative inconsistencies in Spanish commercial policy
at the tur o the nineteenth century, see Fisher, Commerce and Imperial Decline,
478.
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234 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006
transform the island. Swayed by active lobbying efforts, the Crown
tacitly recognized the growing commercial potential o its citadel
colony. 5
In the wake
o
Cuban merchant demands and political upheaval
in Saint Domingue, the Crown introduced a number o administrative
incentives designed to stimulate the Cuban sugar economy, and the
liberalization o the slave trade n 1789 formed the cornerstone o such
efforts. 6 Nevertheless, despite the expansive trading concessions
introduced by the Crown in the 1790s, Cuban slave merchants did not
immediately capitalize upon imperial policies. For at least ten years
after the 1789 edict, merchants
o
various nationalities supplied the
island with slaves from readily available secondary markets in Jamaica,
Dominica, New Providence, and Charleston. Even so, the number
o
Havana-based expeditions and imports from these destinations were
relatively inconsequential compared to the combined French, Dutch,
English, and American efforts. Smaller domestic carriers, trading an
assortment o goods and foodstuffs besides slaves, led most o these
expeditions,l?
A high proportion o intra-Caribbean expeditions arriving in
Havana transported fewer than five slaves per voyage. In all likelihood,
these merchants were profiting from newly enacted Spanish trading
provisions granting export tax exemptions on colonial goods shipped to
foreign ports for the purpose o importing slaves into Cuba.
8
American
merchants adopted a similar commercial pattern, selling shipments
o
5 Dale Tomich, The Wealth o Empire: Francisco Arango y Parrefto, Political
Economy, and the Second Slavery, Comparative
Studies
in
Society and History
45:1
(2003):4-28. Arango y Parrefto held that technology and innovation would modernize
Cuba's sugar industrial complex and establish a competitive edge against foreign
producers. Francisco de Arango y Parrefto, Discurso sobre la agricultl.lra de la Habana
y medios para fomentaria, in Obras de D
Francisco
de
Arango
y
Parreno
(La
Habana: Direcci6n de
Cultura, Ministerio
de
Edl.lcaci6n, 1952), 1:137-38.
6 Albeit with minor restrictions, the slave trade was now open to all foreigners and
Spaniards alike, thus eliminating a long tradition o granting monopolies to a few firms.
By
expanding the docking rights in Havana's harbor for foreign vessels from eight to
forty days, the Spanish Crown enabled merchants to fully negotiate fair market prices
for
their slaves while potentially reducing the number o illicit sales on the island. In
tum, Crown concessions
to
Spanish merchants authorized the exportation o any
commodities deemed necessary for the successful completion
o
African expeditions.
Royal Decree regarding the sale o l.Illseasoned slaves, 2 April 1804, ANC, Real
Consulado, leg. 74, no. 2836.
7 Johnson, The Rise and Fall o Creole Participation, 55.
8
James Ferguson King, Evolution o the Free Trade Principle in Spanish Colonial
Administration, The Hispanic
merican Historical Review
22: I (1942):54-55.
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 235
flour in Havana with four or five slaves imported from the nearby
Dutch islands to circumvent the Spanish ban on direct trade with its
colonies. 9 The cargoes o the petty Cuban slave merchants were
similarly mundane, consisting
o
foodstuffs from New England and St
Agustine, and lumber from New Orleans.
20
More than a decade after
the liberalization o the slave trade, Cuban merchants were failing to
meet domestic demand
for
slaves on the island, prompting individuals
newly entrenched in this industry to assess their own shortcomings and
institute methods to address them.
A relative newcomer to Havana, Santiago de la Cuesta y
Manzanal represented the second wave o slave merchants who, as a
group, consolidated a domestic commercial apparatus by the 1820s. His
critical treatise
o
1803
outlines the structural difficulties still haunting
Cuban slave merchants in the early nineteenth century. Although
clearly frustrated with royal indifference to long-standing demands by
Spaniards in Cuba for the liberalization
o
the slave trade, Cuesta y
Manzanal stopped ShOli o blaming the Crown for the general lack
o
domestic experience in transatlantic commercial ventures. According to
Cuesta y Manzanal, Spanish political indifference to merchant
demands, combined with foreign monopolies, impeded the
development
o
a Havana-based slave trading system? Moreover, new
royal regulations establishing quotas for Spanish sailors aboard Cuban
slaving vessels actually produced unintended consequences. By
discouraging Cuban merchants from exclusively hiring foreign
nationals, the decrees reduced the free exchange
o
commercial
information and thereby diminished the overall growth
o
the industry.
Yet several Cuban slave merchants circumvented imperial legislation.
Regardless
o
royal regulations, individuals such
as
Cuesta y Manzanal
maintained close ties with British and American slave traders.
22
19 Linda K Salvucci, "Atlantic Intersections: Early American Commerce and the
Rise o the West Indies (Cuba)," Business History Review 79:4 (2005):803; and
Murray, Odious Commerce 14
20 Jolmson, "The Rise and Fall
o
Creole Participation," 57.
2 Observations made by Cuesta Manzanal and Company regarding the slave trade,
23
November 1803, ANC, Real Consulado, leg. 74, no. 2836. Seeking a dynamic
Spanish Royal commercial policy, Francisco Arango y Parrefio and the Havana-based
Royal Consulate actively sought the perspectives
o
Havana slave merchants to bolster
their demands for an expansion o slave trade. Franco, Comercio clandestino 92-93.
22 Cuesta y Manzanal and his close associates, Francisco Hernandez and Martin
Tarafa, maintained active commercial ties with foreign slave merchants for the
plU1Jose
o trade knowledge acquisition. Observations made by Cuesta Manzanal and Company
regarding the slave trade, 23 November 1803, ANC, Real Consulado, leg. 74, no. 2836;
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 237
commercial duplication
of
Liverpool merchant houses. Indeed, these
merchants were actively seeking guidance
from
their English
counterparts.
26
The proposed method
of
absorption centered on the
creation
of
Spanish merchant houses in London and Liverpool to
transmit credit and provisions and coordinate direct voyages to Africa
from Cuba. Merchants in Havana proposed the formation of floating
slave factories anchored off the coast to compete with Portuguese,
French, English, and American slave factories in Africa. Each floating
slave factory would consist
of
a principal ship warehousing general
merchandise purchased in England. Spanish slavers would rendezvous
with the primary ship, exchange information on the current state of the
trade, and acquire the necessary goods to trade with African merchants.
As part
of
the floating slave factory complex, smaller and faster ships
would sail to London and Havana, communicate with financiers, and
report on the status
of
their dealings. The entire commercial apparatus
was billed as a floating slave trade school, where the Spanish would
gain valuable experience in the Atlantic slave trade.
27
Throughout most
of
the 1810s the social and economic ties
established between British and Spanish slave traders in previous
decades continued. Yet the nature of such relations began to change;
Spanish merchants were no longer juni0r partners. Increasingly,
merchants directly financed expeditions to Africa from Cuba.
Additionally, the ships were now regularly staffed with Spanish crews
and officers. However, despite continued growth, companies in Havana
persistently encountered commercial and structural bottlenecks that
impeded their unrestrained progress.
Acquiring technical knowledge for the Atlantic slave trade was
not particularly difficult in itself, and Spanish merchants were no less
capable than their European counterparts in matters
of
commerce.
Nevertheless, experience
of
the pitfalls
of
conducting business on the
African coast, including notable human losses on the high seas, marked
Johnson, The Rise and Fall
of
Creole Participation, 62; and Tomero, Crecimiento
econ6mico transformaciones sociales 54-55.
26
Document relating to the formation
of
a national company for the purpose
of
establishing the slave trade directly with the coast
of
Africa, 12 January 1803, ANC;
Asuntos Polfticos, leg. 106, no
9
The proposal stated: We should precisely gain
knowledge under the auspices
of
the slave trading nations, and by this we
me n
the
English, adding, Both the English and the French have actively maintained the
requisite knowledge and the best establishments in Africa with a great deal
of
p r e ~ o n d e r n c e and without interruption.
2 General prospectus
of
the first operations proposed by the African Company
of
Havana, 15 February 1803, ANC, Asuntos Politicos, leg. 106, no. 9
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238 COLONIAL
LA
TIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006
the second major phase
of
Spanish participation in the Atlantic slave
trade.
The topographical complexities
of
the West African coastline
placed a premium on excellent seamanship. High surfs from December
to April made landings difficult and often dangerous, sometimes
resulting in significant losses, injuries, and death. Avoiding such
hazards required that a vessel seek the safety
of
deeper waters rather
than anchoring near the shore.
28
Nevertheless, at times inexperienced
crews anchored too close to the shore, hoping to facilitate the loading
of
their human cargo. Sometimes such shortcuts came at a high price.
Strong winds and violent waves could batter, shove, and relocate
vessels onto bars or reefs. Despite some losses, y the 1810s Spaniards
had acquired the specialized nautical skills from British and American
crews.
29
Obtaining the practical knowledge for the maintenance of
human health during the voyage
to
the Americas was somewhat of an
elusive task for Spanish and foreign merchants alike in the early
nineteenth century. Typical prerequisites for a successful voyage
included a seasoned crew with prior experience in slave trading, a
doctor with a familiarity
in
caring for captives on long journeys, and a
captain with a general concern for slave nourishment and hygiene. The
development of health regulations and standards for human cargo came
about relatively late in the Atlantic slave trade. With the passage
of
the
Dolben s Act in 1788, British legislators established guidelines that
became the industry s standard. In short, the Dolben s Act emphasized
28
George
E
Brooks,
Yankee
Traders
Old Coasters and African Middlemen; A
History o American Legitimate Trade with West Africa in the Nineteenth Century
(Brookline, Mass.: Boston University Press, 1970),
80
29
Brooks,
Yankee Traders Old Coasters and African Middlemen
80. Poor
seamanship and leadership
on one
Spanish vessel resulted
in
fatal consequences.
Amidst conflicting advice from crew members, Captain Juan Agustin Conill sailed the
polacre San
Francisco de Paula
up the Bight of Biafra, anchoring near the Port of
Calabar. Soon after loading
301
slaves, winds and fierce waves thrashed the vessel,
positioning
it
on top
of
a sandbar. Anchored and failing to employ
its
sails, the
San
Francisco
took the brunt
of
the tumultuous storm. Unable to sail, the vessel capsized
and began its steady descent into the sea. Most of the crew members abandoned the
ship and were rescued by nearby vessels. However, the slaves remained imprisoned for
six hours as the ship continued
to
sink.
All 301
slaves perished. Ranking officers,
including the captain, were of
Spanish origin. The harbor pilot was English. Merchants
based in Cuba had funded the expedition and the ship had originally set sail from
Havana. Juan Agustin Conill, captain of the polacre
San Francisco
de
Paula
regarding
a shipment of slaves, [date illegible] 1817, ANC Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 134, no. 3
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 239
health and hygiene, mandated a fixed ratio
o
five slaves per three tons,
and compelled ship owners to hire trained surgeons.
D
Paralleling the English experience o the previous century,
heavy human losses in the Atlantic characterized the Spanish slave
trade o the early l810s. After several well-publicized maritime
disasters, administrative officials in Havana feared that sea-borne
illnesses would infect the general population. As modem bureaucrats,
Havana officials focused their attention on the general disregard
o
maritime regulations by domestic merchants. Although slave merchants
were not beyond reproach, early Spanish slave trade regulations, unlike
the British codes o 1788, lacked specific guidelines for slave welfare
during the voyage to the Americas. The general maritime codes o the
Royal Regulations
o
the Council
o
Cadiz
o
1791 suggested staffing
all commercial voyages with a surgeon or barber ( bleeder ) when
ferrying passengers. However, most Cuban ships bound for Africa
never met the required surgeon-to-passenger ratio. Ship owners
violated the spirit
i
not the letter o the commercial codes when their
returning vessels, loaded with hundreds o
slaves, lay beyond the reach
o Spanish bureaucrats.
3
Like their British counterparts, merchants and officials in
Havana hypothesized that a direct correlation existed between
excessive slave deaths and the availability
o
on-board surgeons.
Following a disproportionate number
o
seemingly preventable deaths
o both slaves and crew members on the frigates Dos Amigos
Consejero Brillante Rosa
and
Amistad
in the early 1810s, the Havana
municipal council established an investigative committee led by Tomas
Romay, the director o Surgery and Medicine.
32
.
Dr. Romay's medical report contrasted modemity and
barbarity, juxtaposing advancements in law and logic with the
30 The effectiveness
o
mandating surgeons on slave ships is questioned by Richard
H. Steckel and Richard A. Jensen, New Evidence on the Causes o Slave and Crew
Mortality in the Atlantic Slave Trade, The Journal
o
Economic HistOlY 46:1 (1986):
57 -77. In discussing the cubic displacement o maritime vessels, the terms ton and
tonnage are often employed. Tonnage refers to either the size
o
the vessel or the
amount
o
the ship's cargo. Timoteo Q'Scanlan, Diccionario maritimo espanol (Madrid:
ImRrenta Real, 1831), 526-28.
1
Document related to the health and well-being
o
slaves crossing from the coast
o
Africa to Havana, 9 July 1811, ANC, Junta de Fomento, expo 752, leg. 150, no. 7409,
fols.5-8.
32 Document related to the health and well-being
o
slaves crossing from the coast
o
Africa to Havana, 1 April 1811 ~ U d 17 July 1811, ANC, Junta de Fomento,
expo
752,
leg. 150 no. 7409, fo1s. 1-2.
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240 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUl\1MER 2006
immorality, greed, and ignorance
o
Cuban slave merchants. Dr.
Romay chastised two ship owners in particular for their tight-fisted
approach
to
an already depraved business by declaring, As a result o
a complete disregard o stated regulations, or perhaps because o the
miserly economy and stinginess o two individuals, 192 have
perished. ,33
t
seemed incomprehensible to Dr. Romay that slave
merchants could not grasp the logic
o
spending 1,000 pesos for a
surgeon's salary i the outlay would have been recovered by saving
three slaves. To emphasize his position Dr. Romay added the following
to his harangue:
Argiielles and Alcocer participate
in
an unjust, depraved,
and barbarous commerce. Is the agricultural
development
o
the island and the prosperity
o
a few
individuals preferable to the life o even one
man?34
While Romay's tone certainly echoed the British abolitionist rhetoric o
the era, it did not actually call for a cessation o the slave trade. In fact,
Romay
was
an ardent supporter
o
the purported civilizing aspects o
slavery. Although Romay may have sympathized with the wretched
state o slaves during their voyage to the Americas and the manner in
which Africans were ripped from their homes and entombed in the
abyss of the sea, he nonetheless displayed the typical European
condescension toward African culture. For Dr. Romay, Africans
wander
in
the jungle, without a home, without laws and without
religion. Nevertheless,' Dr. Romay believed that the moment they
entered a slave ship Africans became royal vassals, subject to Spanish
legal protection and the benefit o religion. ,35
Romay's mission
led
him to Captain Jose Pereira Sira o the
Portuguese brigantine Buen Amigo which had docked in Havana
before saj1jng to Pernambuco. The 130-ton Buen Amigo sailed from
Africa with 319 slaves on a 34-day voyage, losing one captive. The
33
Document
related to the health and
well-being
of slaves crossing
from
the coast of
Africa
to Havana,
12
July
1811,
ANC, Junta
de Fomento, expo
752, leg. 150,
no.
7409,
fo .
5.
34
Document
related to the health
and
well-being
of slaves crossing from the coast of
Africa
to Havana,
12
July
1811,
ANC, Junta
de Fomento,
expo 752, leg. 150, no. 7409,
fo . 5.
35 Document related to the
health
and
well-being
of slaves crossing from the
coast
of
Africa to Havana,
12 July
1811, ANC, Junta
de Fomento, expo
752, leg.
150,
no. 7409,
fol.
5.
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA
241
vessel conspicuously lacked a surgeon but nevertheless managed a
survival rate far superior to similar Spanish ships o
the
time. When
queried about his success, Captain Sira responded that the key
to
his
high survival rates was his fair and moral treatment o slaves.
Apparently, Captain Sira adopted measures for their relative comfort
below deck and permitted the slaves to regularly walk the deck and
breathe the pure air. Sira added that he kept l l treatment and terror
to a minimum. However, Sira's most important recommendations
concerned the quantity and quality
o
food and the abundant supply
o
drinking water administered to slaves during their
captivity.36
Based on empirical investigations, Romay's conclusions
emphasized the general neglect and poor treatment slaves received
from Spanish crews during their voyage to Cuba. Romay especially
believed that tight packing was economically inefficient because it
resulted in high death rates. For example, the
Amistad
which lost 545
o its 733 captives at sea, exceeded the recommended tonnage
requirements outlined by the British regulations
o
1788. The doctor
hypothesized that because the vessel left the African coast during the
rainy season, the weather generated squalid living and foul breathing
conditions, resulting in respiratory problems for all onboard. Romay
discounted the idea that providing slaves with ample provisions would
have reduced the number o deaths. Romay's conclusions, however,
contradict the extensive historiography on the topic of tight packing,
which does not find any correlation between overloading and death
rates.
7
Regardless
o
the validity
o
its conclusions, Romay's
committee and the investigative apparatus it employed point to a
discemable exchange
o
slave trade knowledge among Atlantic
merchants. Overall, the information that the committee gathered and
presented sought to improve the efficiency o this rapidly expanding
but loosely regulated Spanish
industry.38
36 Document related to the health and well-being o slaves crossing from the coast
o
Africa to Havana,
12
July 1811, ANC, Junta de Fomento, expo 752, leg. 150 no. 7409,
fo1. 5. Smith argues that as African intermediaries, Portuguese merchants played a vital
role
in
the Spanish Atlantic slave trade. Smith's second assertion, that the Portuguese
financed slave voyages to Cuba, is not as convincing. Gervase Clarence-Smith, The
Portuguese Contribution to the Cuban Slave and Coolie Trades in the Nineteenth
Century, Slavery
nd
Abolition
5:
I (1984):24-33.
7
The
Middle Passage by Herbert Klein is still the most authoritative account on
matters
o
life and death on the high seas.
38
The report was submitted to the Royal Consulate, a commercial committee
occupied by Spanish merchants and planters. For an overview on the importance o
Spanish Royal Consulates, see Robert Smith,
The
Spanish Guild Merchant: A History
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4
COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006
Indeed, Romay's findings provide clues that may be relevant to
the excessive death rates on the
Consejero
and the
Brillante Rosa.
nUke their Portuguese counterpart, the Buen Amigo the length of the
voyages of both Spanish frigates surpassed that
of
the Portuguese
vessel by twenty to thirty days. Scholars have indicated that death rates
among slave ships varied between points of embarkation, suggesting
that epidemics played a relatively small role and that food and,
specifically, water supplies were
far
more important considerations.
The
daily ration of a pint
of
water for slaves proved to be physically
debilitating. Inadequate water supplies and the Spanish approach to
slave purchases in Africa may have been the primary causes
of
high
death rates on Cuban vessels.
39
Throughout the
181Os,
Spaniards lacked national slave
factories in AfHca; thus, captains were compelled to sail along the coast
and purchase slaves on a piecemeal basis. This commercial reality
inadvertently extended the duration
of
the voyage. Additionally, as
captains sailed the coast to complete their cargo, previous slave
purchases were kept below deck, where temperatures reached up
to 13
degrees, increasing perspiration and dehydration. Such commercial
procedures compromised foodstuffs and water supplies, consequently
challenging the immune systems of slaves and crew members alike.
Additionally, the necessity of avoiding the hurricane season
in
the
Caribbean (between July and September) compelled Spanish
expeditions to sail for the African coast between November and May,
the
hottest months in Africa.
o
Thus, the provision
of
foodstuffs and
water and the coordination of departure and travel times to and from
West Africa proved to be causal factors in human mortality.
The height of the African wet season may also have exposed
trading ventures to unnecessary economic risks. One particular incident
in
1815 illustrates how poor planning and inexperience hampered a
Cuban expedition to West Africa, which ultimately resulted in
o
he
Consulado
1250-1700
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1940). Peter Lampros
argues that planters in Havana controlled the Royal Consulate during the early
nineteenth century. Peter Lampros, Merchant-Planter Cooperation and Conflict: The
Havana
Consulado, 1794-1832 (Ph.D. dissertation, Tulane University, 1980),
19.
39 Kenneth F. Kiple and Brian
T.
Higgins, Mortality Caused by Dehydration During
the
Middle Passage,
Social Science History
13:4 (1989):422.
40
David Eltis, Mortality and Voyage Length in the Middle Passage: New Evidence
from
the Nineteenth Century,
The Journal
of
Economic History
44:2 (1984):301-08;
James
C. Riley, Mortality on Long-Distance Voyages
in
the Eighteenth Century,
The
ournal of
Economic History
41:3
1981
):651-56; and Kiple and Higgins, Mortality
Caused by Dehydration During the Middle Passage, 424.
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 243
contagion. Primarily financed by Isidro Inglada, the Spanish schooner
Restauradora
an-ived in Port Bonny in the middle o the African wet
season. This season, approximately between June and October
depending on the coast, presented a number o commercial and
practical problems that increased the likelihood o illness among the
crew and slave cargo. Due to impassable roads, the number o slaves
available for purchase in Africa decreased during the rainy season,
which, in effect, extended the duration
o
slaving expeditions.
41
The administrative investigation o the
Restaurada
illustrates
these points. Pounded by ton-ential rains, Captain Santiago Valdez
failed to meet his consignment obligations. Compounding matters, the
crew and the slave cargo became seriously ll soon after setting sail. n
onboard epidemic resulted in the deaths
o
fifty-two slaves, the captain,
and
the
boatswain. A lack o provisions and medical assistanoe further
debilitated the health o everyone onboard. The general disan-ay proved
to be so
severe that a British naval crew who boarded the Spanish
vessel abandoned efforts
to
capture the prize, allowing the
Restaurada
to
sail for Havana unimpeded. However, the ship never reached
Havana; instead, it lumbered into Santiago de Cuba. Suffering from
serious bouts o fever and dysentery, the remaining slaves were sold at
a discount to slave traders dealing
in
unhealthy slaves.
42
The consequences o not having a network
o
Spanish slave
factories
on
the African coast became especially apparent for merchants
from the mid- to late-l 8 IOs During this period, Spanish captains
reported significant slave shortages in Africa, a fact that forced them to
alter their purchasing patterns. Instead o purchasing one or two large
contingents o Africans, Spanish merchants now had
to
acquire them in
41
Isidro Inglada against Miguel Moran regarding slave expeditions, 1 March 1819,
ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, first section,
leg
260, no
1;
Brooks,
Yankee Traders 9;
and Kiple and Higgins, Mortality Caused by Dehydration, 425. B.K. Drake does not
find a correlation between seasonality
o
departure and climatic considerations with
Liverpool-based slave voyages. Utilizing four separate analyses
o
voyages from
Liverpool to Africa in the years 1791-1794, 1798, 1799, and 1804-1807, Drake
demonstrates that between 48-60 percent
o
all voyages left during the defined wet
season, implying that the season
o
departure played a minimal role in the planning
o
Liverpool slave expeditions. Drake, The Liverpool-African Voyage, 130-32.
42 Francisco de Paula Moreno de Mora substantiating the death o 52 slaves on the
schooner
Restauradora
originating from the coast
o
Africa,
21
February 1819, ANC,
Tribunal de Comercio,
leg
287,
no
4 For a description
o
the effects
o
dysentery on
slaves during the Middle Passage and a discussion
o
the varieties
o
this ailment, see
R B Sheridan, The Guinea Surgeons on the Middle Passage: The Provision
o
Medical Services in the British Slave Trade,
The International Journal
o
African
Historical Studies
14:4 (1981):3-4.
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244 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORlCAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006
groups
o
less than ten. Sailing the entire coast to purchase slaves
gradually was not uncommon, but such an inefficient method prompted
noticeable shipping delays 43 Par example, the brigantines Anti/ope and.
Noticioso traveled the African coast for six months, each purchasing
approximately two hundred slaves. Captain Moran counted thirty-three
major vessels waiting for slaves in the Rio Pongo during this time.
On these new commercial circumstances, Moran remarked: I am
convinced that this voyage will be exceedingly long and take no
comfort in saying that the [slave] cargo has reached its upper limit.
Moran purchased a total o sixty-one slaves in just over a three-month
period. His previous five expeditions for the House
o
Inglada averaged
552 slaves per voyage. As supplies
o
slaves fluctuated on the African
coast in the late 1810s, slave factors proved to be highly valuable
contacts.
44
Another facet influencing the growth
o
any Cuban firm was its
degree o association with foreign intermediaries on the African
continent.
45
While access to national slave factories may have increased
the profitability
o
the Spanish slave trade in the long run, merchants
adapted
to
logistical and spatial shortcomings o the 1810s by dealing
with foreign slave factors directly. In 1816, for example, Juan, Antonio
and Jose O'Parrill, descendants
o
Ricardo O'Farrill y O'Daly,
an
eighteenth-century slave merchant, formed a company with Jacob
Faber, an American, and a Mr. Goss, an Englishman, for the purpose o
directly importing African slaves to Havana.
46
Both Faber and Goss
4 Ramon de Bustillo and Mariam de Mendive accrediting insurance losses as a result
o ship seizures,
23
October 1815,23 May 1816, and
23
April 1818, ANC, Tribunal de
Comercio, leg. 32, no
10
44 Isidro Inglada against Miguel Moran regarding slave expeditions, I March 1819
and 8 November 1821, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, first section, leg. 260, no. 1
45 Joan Fayer, African Interpreters in the Atlantic Slave Trade, Anthropological
Linguistics 45:3 (2003):284, 286, 288; and Paul E Lovejoy and David Richardson,
Trust, Pawnship, and Atlantic History: The Institutional Foundations
o
the Old
Calabar Slave Trade, The American Historical Review 104:2 (1999):334-36.
46 For a genealogical history o the O'Farrill clan in Cuba, see Francisco Xavier de
Santa Cruz y Mallen, conde de San Juan de Jaruco, Historia defamilias cubanas (La
Habana: Editorial Hercules, 1942), 3:334-49. Ricardo O'Farrill's involvement in the
illicit slave trade is often celebrated by Cuban historians but details o his career and
contributions are few. Jose Luciano Franco, Comercio clandestino 22. For statistics on
Havana slave imports in the eighteenth century, see Colin A Palmer, Human Cargoes:
The British Slave Trade to Spanish America 1700-1739
(Chicago: University o
Illinois Press, 1981), 104-06.
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 245
were seasoned traders with well-established social and economic ties to
African slave traders at Gallinas River, Sierra Leone.
47
Faber and Goss owned slave factories in Rio Pongo, near
Guinea, and maintained active personal relationships with two local
African leaders, Charles and William Gomez, sons of a Portuguese
slave trader. Biracial and multi-cultural, both Charles and William were
educated in England and were fluent in three languages, in many ways
following the classic career pattern of African intermediaries. Faber
and Goss benefited handsomely from socio-political unrest in western
Africa and transmitted their good fortune to their associates in the
Americas.
48
Commercial networks with African slave factors increased
efficiency and profitabil ity for Cuban firms because direct contact with
foreign merchants brought financiers increased accountability and
detailed market information. Trust was at a premium at this juncture
because the opportunity for embezzlement was relatively high. Indeed,
the O'Farrills quickly discovered the penalties of dealing with unproven
factors on the African coast.
Despite providing Faber with 34,082 pesos worth of
merchandise to exchange for slaves, the enterprise failed to yield steady
returns for the O'Farrills. Initially, the thirty- to ninety-day shipping
delays engendered concern among the O'Farrills, but their anxieties
were mollified as slaves started trickling into Havana. However, as the
two-year association with Faber matured, the O'Farrills' earlier
apprehensions were validated. The 01Farrills discovered that Faber h d
sold their slave shipments to other traders. Based on an investigation
of
the company's financial records, the Havana Merchant Tribunal
concluded that Faber embezzled well over 100,000 pesos and 108
slaves.
49
The fact that the incident illustrates the failure of a Cuban firm
in the Atlantic slave trade is incidental. More importantly, this episode
exemplifies that as Cubans increasingly financed direct voyages to
47 Jacobo Faber and Martin Zavala regarding the founding
of
a slave factory (est.
1816), [date illegible] 1827, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 467,
no
3.
48
George Howland, Captain George Howland's Voyage to West Africa, in
New
England Merchants
in
Africa: A History hrough Documents 1802
to 1865, ed.
Norman
R
Bennett and George E Brooks (Brookline, Mass.: Boston University Press,
1965),87.
49
Jacobo Faber and Martin Zavala regarding the founding
of
a slave factory (est.
1816), [date illegible] 1827, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 467, no. 3; Jacobo Faber
and Martin Zavala regarding accounts and insolvency of the former, ANC, Tribunal de
Comercio, leg. 166, no. 9, fols. 1-3; and Jacobo Faber and Martin Zavala
as
partners
of
a firm involved in the slave trade, ANC, Reales Cedulas y Ordenes, leg. 83, no. 45, fol.
1
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246 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006
Africa, the commercial and social ties between merchants on both sides
o the Atlantic expanded as well.
Despite economic bottlenecks in the 18l0s, Havana slave
merchants did manage to master many o the commercial techniques
that made their Liverpool counterparts so successful in the Atlantic
world during the eighteenth century. While smaller slave merchants
continued investing
in
slaving expeditions, individuals or firms such as
Cuesta Manzanal y Hermano, the O'Farrills, the Lombillos, Joaquin
G6mez, and Pablo Sarna occupied extensive segments o the Cuban
slave trade by integrating other related commercial enterprises. In
essence, these individuals represented the highest tier o Cuban
merchants. Although still directly involved in the slave trade late in
their lives, they nevertheless reached a level in their careers where it
was no longer necessary
to
deal personally with slaves. At this juncture,
these merchants served
as
administrators or directors who facilitated
and financed almost every aspect
o
the Atlantic sugar commercial
complex. As directors o merchant houses, they offered a multitude o
services which were directly or indirectly related to the slave trade,
including purchasing vessels, provisioning ships, paying customs
officials, exporting sugar, leasing royal slave barracks, providing credit
for domestic slave purchases, and financing sugar mills 50
The Spanish Commercial Codes referred to these individuals as
ship owners
or
provisions merchants
armadores);
however, such titles
were not commonly used through the 1820s. People serving multiple
economic and social functions still referred to themselves generically as
merchants. While ship owning among larger merchants was not
uncommon, ownership was incidental
to
the aforementioned interests
and activities. Strategies
o
vertical integration on the Atlantic side o
the business were not unusual, but they involved providing services
that supplemented shipping cargo such
as
ship brokering, consignment,
and stevedoring. The merchant in charge, or the merchant house he
directed, was responsible for hiring a captain and crew, a doctor, and
interpreters, as well as advancing their salaries. Still, it was not
uncommon for a merchant house to hire a captain and his ship on a
consignment basis. Doing so insulated the company from additional
costs and risks, such
as
slave shortages
on
the African coast and the
50
Antonio Bocalandro requesting that Joaquin Gomez sunender accounting books
relating to Bocalandro's sugar mill, 29 August 1824, 2 September 1824, 4 September
1824, 6 September 1824, 25 November 1824, and 2 December 1824, ANC,
Escribanias, Ponton, leg. 143, no. 7
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 247
growing threat
o
capture and condemnation by the British Navy after
1817.
51
Certainly, the notoriety that larger slave merchants achieved
late
in
their careers implies a highly specialized field; however, the
slave trade remained interconnected with other related commercial
activities such as buying and selling sugar and insuring African
expeditions.
Incorporated in 1795, the Maritime Insurance Company o Havana
(MICH) was part
o
a burgeoning Cuban commercial and financial
infrastructure utilized by merchants to gradually consolidate the sugar
and
slave industries by the 1820s.
52
The company's charter, like other
European insurance firms o the period, indemnified against the usual
perils o the seas including fire, thieves, and pirates, as well as seizures
and restraints from friends and enemies. Typical coverage included the
total loss
o
the vessel, goods, freight, and current market value o
slaves.
53
Bolstering its business portfolio beyond the port o Havana,
the
company dispatched agents to several Spanish ports including
Cadiz, Barcelona, Santander, Coruna, Tenerife, Veracruz, New
Orleans, Cartagena, and Buenos Aires.
54
51
One o the main points
o
contention between Isidro Inglada and Miguel Moran
was
determining whether the latter was
an
equal partner in the finn or whether the
former hired him on
a consignment basis, The outcome o the decision determined the
monetary value each individual would collect from the slaving expedition. Isidro
Inglada against Miguel Moran regarding slave expeditions,
30
October 1821 and 8
November 1821, ANC, Tribunal
de
Comercio, first section, leg. 260, no.
1.
52
Turnbull notes that while initially conceived by Cuban slave merchants as a
parallel commercial service, MICH eventually diversified its portfolio. David Turnbull,
Travels in the
West
Cuba: With Notices
o
Porto Rico and the Slave Trade (London:
Printed for Longman, Onne, Brown, Green,
and
Longmans, 1840),
141.
For MICH
losses to the British abolitionist campaign, see Ramon de Bustillo and Mariam de
Mendive accrediting insurance losses as a result o ship seizures, 23 October 1815, 24
October 1815,3 February 1816,5 March 1816, and
23
April 1818 ANC, Tribunal de
Comercio, leg. 32, no. 10.
53 A,D.M. Forte, Marine Insurance
and
Risk Distribution in Scotland before 1800,
Law and History Review 5:2 (1987):393-412; Solomon Huebner, The Development
and Present Status
o
Marine Insurance in the United States,
Annals
o
the American
Academy
o
Political and Social Science
26 (1905):241-72; and John G. Clark, Marine
Insurance in Eighteenth-Century La Rochelle, French Historical Studies 10:4
(1978):572-98. For Cuban examples
o
qualification and justification
o
anticipated
profits attributed to total losses
o
slave cargo for insurance purposes, see Jaime
Vilardebo y Ferrer substantiating and qualifying losses on a slave expedition to Africa,
15
November 1820, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 513, no.
29;
and Yriarte, Lasa,
and Company ascertaining certain information regarding slave values in 1814, [date
illegible] 1818, ANC, Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 260, no.
5.
54
Calendario manual y gufa deforasteros de la Isla de Cuba para el ano
de
1795
(Havana: la Imprenta de la Capitanla General, 1795), 69.
i
I
I:
Ii
I,
[i
I :
. ,.
.
I.:i
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248 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006
In the early 1800s, the primary office and meeting place
of
MICH
was
the home
of
Mariano Carbo, located near the commercial district
of Havana. For Carbo, underwriting voyages formed one of many
commercial functions he
performed in Cuba. In addition to his
underwriting and slaving activities, he owned two
of
the largest sugar
mills in western Cuba.
55
This career pattern was not unlike many of the
other investors in MICH who described themselves as either
hacendados or merchants but at times possessed facets
of
each social
type. The board
of
directors included Joseph Manuel Lopez, Gabriel
Raymundo de Azacarte, Bonifacio Larrifiaga, Bernabe Martinez de
Pinillos, and Pedro Diago; all were prominent members of Cuban
society and were involved in a number
of
sugar commercial activities
such as slave imports, financing plantations, or landowning. Indeed, the
structure and organization of MICH reflects the lack
of
specialization
in Spanish commerce in the early nineteenth century.
56
The list
of
common investors was a veritable who's who of
Cuban society at the tum of the nineteenth century. Aside from the
usual counts and countesses, the individuals represented a cross-section
of the different social groups within the sugar mill complex, including
petty merchants, merchant bankers, established import-export firms,
slave factors, slave merchants, the patrician landed elite, and newly
established peninsulars, such as Cuesta y Manzanal. In essence, MICH
included almost every major type
of
individual in Cuban slave society,
with the obvious exception
of
slaves. While not organized in the classic
corporate structure, MICH provided an important venue for the
collection and dissemination of
information related to shipping and
commerce and served as a vital nexus for social and economic
associations in Cuban slave society.
57
Slave merchants were also part of a larger financial network that
invested heavily in the domestic sugar industry. As slave merchants
gained capital, many became merchant bankers. Merchant bankers
were critical components
in
the development
of
the Cuban sugar
55
Meeting regarding sugar and debts between Mariano Carbo and Multra, Carbonell,
and Company, 9 April
1799 31
May 1799, 14 June 1799, and
15
June 1799, ANC,
Tribunal de Comercio, leg. 116, no 12
56
Compania
de
Seguros
Maritimos
establecida
en
la ciudad
de
la
Havana
en
1795
Jose Marti Cuban National Library; and Jesus Maria Valdaliso, The Rise of Specialist
Firms in Spanish Shipping and Their Strategies of Growth, 1860
to
1930, usiness
History Review 74:2 (2000):267-300.
57 Compania de Seguros Maritimos establecida
en
la Giudad
de
la Havana en 1795
Jose Marti Cuban National Library.
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JOSE GUADALUPE ORTEGA 49
industry because rapid economic growth outpaced the expansion
of
formal banking institutions.
58
Throughout the first decades of the
nineteenth century, merchant houses based in Havana developed and
maintained financial links with hacendados in rural Cuba. Among the
few members in Cuban society with surplus liquid capital, slave
merchants positioned themselves as the primary creditors
of
sugar
mills. The refacci6n contracts between merchants and hacendados
included financing for almost every aspect
of
the sugar production
process. Simpler agreements consisted of direct loans permitting
hacendados ultimate discretion in the credit's disbursement. Typically,
however, sugar contracts consisted of advances against future crops
including specific stipulations addressing the quantity and quality of
sugar and agreements on final market prices. Far more complex
arrangements included supplying hacendados with agricultural tools,
machinery, clothing, food, and slaves for one or several succeeding
harvests.
59
As
mediators between domestic and world markets, Cuban
merchants acquired the necessary knowledge to exploit the price
fluctuations through sugar mill contracts.
60
The provision of
comprehensive goods and services oftentimes compounded the roles
of
merchant bankers, transforming them into de facto administrators
or
trustees of the sugar mills under contract. While not necessarily
in
charge
of
the day-to-day operations of the sugar mill, their overarching
responsibilities placed merchant bankers in positions of significant
influence over their clients, especially those with smaller and medium
sized sugar mills. By serving as a broker between hacendados
suppliers, and sugar exporters, the merchant banker wielded significant
58 The first Royal Bank of Ferdinand VII was not established in Havana until 1827;
however, its value
as
a public lending institution remains in question. Primarily
discounting promissory notes and issuing bills of exchange, the bank's three-month
credit terms and a low ceiling on loans severely limited its usefulness to hacendados
who required financing for a year
or
more. The harvest season for sugar lasted nine
months and much longer for coffee; thus, a three-month loan was inadequate for
most
planters. Turnbull, Travels
in
the
West
96-98. The Spanish Bank of Havana,
the
Society of Industrial Credit, and the Society of Territorial Cuban Credit were
established in 1854, 1856, and 1857, respectively. Jacobo Pezuela,
Diccionario
geogrijico estadfstico historico de la isla de Cuba
(Madrid: Impr. del Estab. de
Mellado, 1863),3:317-33.
59
Documents relating to the sale of the sugar mill San Jose to Bonifacio Gonzalez
Larrinaga, 7 February 1804, 30 July 1814, 3 October 1814, and
25
September 1834,
ANC, Escribanias, Guerra, leg. 500, no. 6564, doc. no. 6 no. 9.
60 Creditor meetings regarding debts incurred by Nicolas de Menive, July 1824, 4
November 1824, and 16 August 1824, ANC, Escribanias, Daumy, leg. 804, no.
1.
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250 COLONIAL LATIN AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW SUMMER 2006
economic influence over his clients. Ultimately, the manipulation of
credit structures enabled merchant bankers to dispossess landowners
of
their sugar mills.
61
As their careers developed, many slave merchants
followed a pattern
of
becoming merchant bankers and eventually
landowners themselves. The objective among merchants of increasing
their social significance vis-a-vis patrician
hacendados
partially
explains the aforementioned development. However, the merchant
acquisition
of
land also formed part of the initial process
of
vertical
integration
or
for that matter, the result of simple investments
of
I
. 1
6
surp us capIta.
Economic growth driven by rapid expansion in international trade,
particularly in sugar exports, transformed the fortunes of many
individuals on the island. However, since plantation owners, regardless
of the size of their sugar mills, relied on merchant bankers for a steady
influx
of
slaves, goods, services, and financing, the social influence
held by Cuban merchants increased disproportionately. With such
comprehensive roles, slave
merchants -now
turned into merchant
bankers-became the most dynamic social group of the Cuban
economy, rapidly acquiring wealth, privilege, and status.
Within a generation, Cuban slave merchants mastered and
improved the commercial techniques utilized by British and American
slave merchants in the Atlantic world. Slave merchants however, not
only maintained
an
Atlantic perspective but also acted within the
imperial system by investing their slave trade profits domestically.
Cuban slave merchants established a viable and competitive economic
presence on the island. As a result of executing almost every aspect of
the slave trade, including provisioning, insurance, and finance, Cuban
merchants developed a commercial and financial infrastructure in
Havana that propelled the island's economic growth. By and large,
Cuban merchants abandoned mercantilist philosophies and the
commercial monopolies in favor of practical-knowledge exchanges
with their Atlantic counterparts. Indeed, cooperation between Cuban
slave merchants and French privateers, as exemplified in the os
ermanos
incident, was not isolated but rather part of a larger
commercial network that merchants constructed in the 1790s. Lacking
61
Administration
of
the sugar mill San Francisco, 30 June 1832, ANC, Audiencia
de La Habana, leg. 267, no.
11.
62
After Carbo's bankruptcy proceedings, Ramon Hano y Vega purchased the sugar
mill Jestls Nazareno, in the early nineteenth century and his cousin, Joaquin G6mez,
subsequently acquired San Ignacio several years later. Liquidation of the House of
Mira Pie and Company, 4 March 1830,