DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 1
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
206/622-5306 FAX: 206/622-0354
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA
PAMELA S. OWEN,
Plaintiff,
v.
FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY;
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE
CORPORATION; MTC FINANCIAL, INC.,
D/B/A TRUSTEE CORPS; BISHOP
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.; CHUCK E.
ATKINS, in his official capacity as Clark
County Sheriff,
Defendants.
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE Noting Date: September 4, 2015
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELIEF REQUESTED
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Defendant Bishop, Marshall & Weibel, P.S.
(“Bishop”) moves to dismiss the Complaint against it by Plaintiff Pamela S. Owen with
prejudice. After a nonjudicial foreclosure of Ms. Owen’s real property was completed,
Bishop represented the current property owner, co-Defendant Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), in an unlawful detainer proceeding to evict Ms.
Owen from the premises. Ms. Owen’s claims against Bishop are premised on her
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 1 of 12
DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 2
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
206/622-5306 FAX: 206/622-0354
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misunderstanding of Washington’s Civil Rules, and the incorrect and insufficient
assertions that Bishop acted under color of state law in prosecuting the eviction suit for
Freddie Mac and conspired with the co-Defendants to violate her constitutional rights.
Because as a matter of law Ms. Owen has not and cannot state any claim against
Bishop upon which relief may be granted, this action against it should be dismissed with
prejudice and without leave to amend, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
Bishop incorporates by this reference the Statement of Facts section of Defendant
MTC Financial Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 11, pp. 2-3] as if fully set forth herein.
Representing Freddie Mac, Bishop served an unfiled Summons and unfiled
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer dated March 3, 2015, on Ms. Owen (the “U.D. Case”).
[Dkt. 2-3, ¶¶1.5.10-11, and Exs. 12-13 thereto.]
All of Ms. Owen’s allegations against Bishop are contained in a mere ten
paragraphs of her 25 page Complaint. After describing Bishop’s identity [id., ¶¶1.16,
3.33], Ms. Owen asserts Bishop:
created an unfiled Summons and Complaint in the U.D. Case [id., ¶1.5.10-11];
mailed her an unfiled Response to her Motion to Quash Service of Summons in the
U.D. Case [id., ¶1.5.9];
“acted under color of State in law in causing the deprivation of [her]constitutional
rights” when it filed the U.D. Case against her [id., ¶3.35];
“engaged in ex parte communications with the trial court in obtaining the issuance
of a Writ [of Restitution]” [id., ¶1.17];
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 2 of 12
DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 3
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
206/622-5306 FAX: 206/622-0354
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“caused to be filed with the trial court an Order … untruthfully claiming the Court
had ‘reviewed’ [two unfiled pleadings]” [id., ¶1.18];
was aware that the Assignment of her Deed of Trust and Appointment of Successor
Trustee “were null and void” [id., ¶3.34];
“intentionally failed to scrutinize its legal practices to avoid aiding and abetting
Defendants Freddie Mac and BANA in violating State laws” [id., ¶1.16]; and
“joined the conspiracy of Defendants Federal Housing Finance Agency and Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation to manipulate Washington’s Deed of Trust Act”
by filing the U.D. Case and obtaining an ex parte Writ of Restitution [id., ¶6.10].
III. AUTHORITIES AND ARGUMENT
A. Standard for Ruling on Dismissal Motion.
Bishop incorporates by this reference the “standard governing motions under Rule
12(b)(6)” section of Defendant MTC Financial Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. 11, pp. 3-4]
as if fully set forth herein.
B. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to State a CPA Cause of Action Against Bishop.
Ms. Owen’s Complaint asserts two causes of action, the first for violation of
Washington’s Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86, et seq. (“CPA”). To prevail on a
CPA claim, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant’s act or practice: (1) is
unfair or deceptive; (2) occurs in the conduct of trade or commerce; (3) affects the public
interest; (4) causes injury to the plaintiff’s business or property; and (5) caused the specific
injury suffered. Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wn.2d
778, 780, 719 P.2d 531 (1986). The failure to establish any one of these elements is fatal
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 3 of 12
DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 4
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
206/622-5306 FAX: 206/622-0354
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to a CPA claim. Nguyen v. Doak Homes, Inc., 140 Wn. App. 726, 733, 167 P.3d 1162
(2007); Bavand v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., 176 Wn. App. 475, 503, 309 P.3d 636 (2013).
As against Bishop, Ms. Owen’s CPA cause of action does not meet the pleading
standards established by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949-
50, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). Initially, it is unclear whether Plaintiff’s CPA
cause of action is even intended to be pleaded against Bishop. There is not a single
reference to Bishop in the entire 10 pages devoted to the CPA claim. [Dkt. 2-3, pp. 12-22.]
To the extent Ms. Owen may claim her allegations against Bishop elsewhere in the
Complaint sufficiently plead an unfair or deceptive act or practice, she is wrong. First,
there was nothing unfair or deceptive about Bishop serving Ms. Owen with an unfiled
Summons and Complaint in the U.D. Case. Such actions are expressly allowed by
Washington statutes and Civil Rules.
Under Washington law, a civil action is commenced by service of a summons and
complaint or by filing a complaint. RCW 4.28.020; CR 3(a); Seattle Seahawks, Inc. v.
King County, 128 Wn.2d 915, 917, 913 P.2d 375 (1996). Ms. Owen could have demanded
the suit be filed within 14 days of serving a written demand on Bishop. CR 3(a). She did
not. An attorney’s actions in prosecuting litigation which are expressly allowed by statute
and Civil Rules can hardly be deemed “unfair and deceptive.”
Second, there was nothing unfair or deceptive about Bishop serving Ms. Owen with
an unfiled Response to her Motion to Quash Service of Summons in the U.D. Case.
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 4 of 12
DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 5
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
206/622-5306 FAX: 206/622-0354
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Nowhere in all of Washington’s Civil Rules appears a requirement that only file-stamped
copies of pleadings be served. See, e.g., CR 4-16.
Third, Ms. Owen had already defaulted in the U.D. Case by the time Bishop
allegedly engaged in ex parte communications with the trial court to obtain the Writ of
Restitution. A defaulted party is not entitled to notice of proceedings. CR 55(a)(3) (“Any
party who has not appeared before the motion for default and supporting affidavit are filed
is not entitled to a note of the motion [for default.]”). The exhibits to Ms. Owen’s
Complaint establish she did not appear in the U.D. Case until 10 days after the default
order and Writ of Restitution were issued. [Dkt. 2-3, p. 26, Ex. 1.]
Fourth, even if Ms. Owen’s assertion that Bishop “caused to be filed with the trial
court an Order … untruthfully claiming the Court had ‘reviewed’ [two unfiled pleadings]”
[id., ¶1.18] could be read as alleging an unfair or deceptive act (which Bishop expressly
denies), Ms. Owen has not alleged and cannot satisfy other elements of her CPA claim.
The state Court either did or did not review Bishop’s allegedly unfiled pleadings in the
U.D. Case – it is a distinction without a difference. The Court’s entry of the Order
containing “untruthful” information denied Ms. Owen’s requested relief regardless
whether the Court reviewed the listed pleadings. [Id., pp. 62-63, Ex. 10.] That Order was
entered by the Court as its own act – not Bishop’s.
Thus Bishop’s preparation of an allegedly erroneous proposed Order as a matter of
law could not be the proximate cause of any CPA damages to Ms. Owen. Whether the
Order was accurate is irrelevant to Ms. Owen’s alleged damages. The inaccuracy – or not
– of the listed pleadings did not cause Plaintiff any CPA injuries; rather, she suffered such
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 5 of 12
DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 6
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
206/622-5306 FAX: 206/622-0354
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injuries because she failed to pay her mortgage and restrain the Trustee’s Sale before it
occurred.
Similarly, Ms. Owen’s allegations that the Assignment of her Deed of Trust and
Appointment of Successor Trustee “were null and void” [id., ¶3.34] and Bishop
“intentionally failed to scrutinize its legal practices to avoid … violating State laws” [id.,
¶1.16] are not allegations of unfair and deceptive practices because they are premised on
incorrect assertions of law.
Washington does not recognize a cause of action for a borrower’s claims relating to
any Assignments of his Deed of Trust and/or Appointments of a Successor Trustee. See,
Brophy v. JPMorgan Chase Bank Nat’l. Ass’n., 2013 WL 4048535, *3 (E.D.Wash. Aug. 9,
2013). The Brophy court specifically held that even if a Successor Trustee Appointment is
somehow fraudulent, void, or invalid, the plaintiff borrower does not have standing to contest
it. Id. The borrower cannot be injured by the allegedly fraudulent document because he is
neither a party to it, nor an intended beneficiary of it. See, Brodie v. Northwest Trustee
Services, Inc., 2012 WL 6192723, *2 (E.D.Wash. Dec. 12, 2012).
“The critical fact from the standpoint of later purchasers or mortgagees is notice the
earlier mortgage exists, not that it has been assigned.” Kim v. Lee, 145 Wn.2d 79, 100, 31
P.3d 665, as amended (Dec. 12, 2001), opinion corrected, 43 P.3d 1222 (2001) (citing, 18
William B. Stoebuck, Washington Practice, Real Estate: Transactions § 17.21, at 311
(1995)). Further, to establish a claim based on an alleged “fraudulent” assignment, a plaintiff
must prove that: (1) he knew about the assignment; (2) relied on it to his detriment; and (3)
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 6 of 12
DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 7
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
206/622-5306 FAX: 206/622-0354
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suffered damages. Gossen v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 819 F.Supp.2d 1162, 1170
(W.D.Wash. 2011). Ms. Owen’s Complaint contains no such allegations.
Because Ms. Owen’s assertion that the Assignment of her Deed of Trust and
Appointment of Successor Trustee “were null and void” [id., ¶3.34] is incorrect, she cannot
claim Bishop engaged in an unfair and deceptive act or practice by “fail[ing] to scrutinize
its legal practices to avoid … violating State laws” [id., ¶1.16].
Having failed to plead all elements – or any at all – of a CPA cause of action
against Bishop, Ms. Owen’s Complaint should be dismissed. And because her CPA claim
is based on incorrect and erroneous assertions of law and misunderstanding of
Washington’s Civil Rules, amendment would be futile; accordingly, the CPA cause of
action should be dismissed against Bishop with prejudice.
C. Plaintiff’s Complaint Fails to State a 42 U.S.C. §1983 Claim Against Bishop.
Unlike her CPA cause of action, Ms. Owen’s second claim for violation of 42
U.S.C. §1983 – deprivation of her constitutional rights committed under color of state law
– mentions Bishop in a single allegation: “Defendant Bishop … joined the conspiracy of
Defendants Federal Housing Finance Agency and Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation to manipulate Washington’s Deed of Trust Act by filing a complaint and
summons and obtaining an ex parte Writ of Restitution.” [Id., ¶6.10.] This sole allegation
is insufficient, and the §1983 cause of action should be dismissed for filing to state a claim
upon which relief against Bishop may be granted.
It is black letter law that §1983 claims must be specifically plead. “Vague and
conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 7 of 12
DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 8
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
206/622-5306 FAX: 206/622-0354
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withstand a motion to dismiss.” Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1343 (9th Cir.
1986) (quoting Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.1982)). When the
complaint’s allegations “do not define the scope of any conspiracy involving [the
defendant], what role he had, or when or how the conspiracy operated … [t]hey are
insufficient to implicate [the defendant.]” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 937-38
(9th Cir. 2012). Where the plaintiff only uses “the words ‘conspired,’ ‘conspiracy’ and
‘conspiratorial’ the complaint does nothing to inform the court regarding any agreement or
meeting of the minds between the … other defendants to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional
rights.” Walters v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 578 F.Supp.2d 1310, 1313 (W.D. Wash. 2008).
Ms. Owen’s Complaint suffers from these precise flaws. Nowhere in its 97 pages
is there any assertion that Bishop communicated with any of the multiple defendants (other
than, presumably, its client Freddie Mac) at all. Nor are there any allegations of a meeting
of the minds among the alleged co-conspirators, let alone an agreement to deprive Ms.
Owen of her constitutional rights. And to the extent Ms. Owen’s claim is premised on
Bishop’s communications with Freddie Mac, she will never be able to prove it. Those
communications are protected by the attorney/client privilege.
The main elements to state a §1983 cause of action are: (1) a person has deprived
the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right, and (2) that person acted under
color of state law. Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.1989); Brower v. Wells,
103 Wn.2d 96, 104–05, 690 P.2d 1144 (1984). “Property rights, in addition to personal
liberties, are within the protection of 42 U.S.C. §1983.” Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 8 of 12
DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 9
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
206/622-5306 FAX: 206/622-0354
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Wn.2d 34, 55, 830 P.2d 318 (1992) (citing Gibson v. Seattle (Wash.) Dep’t. of Police, 472
F.2d 1220 (9th Cir.1973)).
Ms. Owen’s §1983 claim cannot stand against Bishop as a matter of law for two
reasons. First, a privately-retained attorney does not act under color of state law for the
purposes of a §1983 claim. Hunter v. Ferebauer, 980 F.Supp.2d 1251, 1263 (E.D. Wash.
2013) (citing, Briley v. State of Cal., 564 F.2d 849, 855 (9th Cir.1977)). Even the great
majority of court-appointed attorneys are not considered state actors. See, Tower v.
Glover, 467 U.S. 914, 919–20, 104 S.Ct. 2820, 81 L.Ed.2d 758 (1984) (public defenders);
Taylor v. First Wyo. Bank, N.A., 707 F.2d 388, 389 (9th Cir. 1983) (guardians ad litem);
RCW 2.42.120 (interpreters); RCW 64.55.120 (mediators); Sutton v. Llewellyn, 288
Fed.Appx. 411, 412 (9th Cir. 2008) (conservators).
Second, Bishop took no action “under color of state law.” It is true that action
taken by private individuals may be “under color of state law” where there is “significant”
state involvement in the action. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmunson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922,
941, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2756, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982); Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802, 804
(9th Cir.1976); Scott v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110, 1113 (9th Cir.1975). At some
point as police involvement increases, repossession by private individuals assumes the
character of state action. Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1983).
However, Ms. Owen does not allege that she in fact was evicted from her home
such that there may have been extensive police involvement in “repossessing” her home.
And the mere filing of an unlawful detainer action cannot be attributed to the state. See,
Lugar, supra, 457 U.S. at 941. Further, the fact that Bishop was representing Freddie Mac
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 9 of 12
DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 10
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
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does not automatically convert Bishop’s actions into state actions, because Freddie Mac is
not a governmental actor:
It is well-established that Plaintiffs cannot maintain their §1983 and
constitutional claims against Freddie Mac absent state action. See
Rubin v. Fannie Mae, No. 12–cv–12832, 2012 WL 6000572, at *2
(E.D.Mich. Nov. 30, 2012) (citing Northrip v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg.
Ass'n, 527 F.2d 23, 25 (6th Cir.1975)). Plaintiffs argue that, by
virtue of FHFA’s conservatorship, Freddie Mac is a government
actor that can be held liable for constitutional violations. This Court
disagrees and follows the rationale and result reached by the federal
courts addressing similar claims, applying the Supreme Court’s
decision in Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S.
374, 115 S.Ct. 961, 130 L.Ed.2d 902 (1995), holding that Freddie
Mac, and similar entity Fannie Mae, were not governmental actors
post-conservatorship, and dismissing claims alleging a
constitutional violation as a matter of law. See Herron v. Fannie
Mae, 857 F.Supp.2d 87, 95–96 (D.D.C.2012); Lopez v. Bank of
America, N.A., No. 1:12–CV–667, 920 F.Supp.2d 798, 800–01,
2013 WL 150460 at *2–3 (W.D.Mich. Jan. 14, 2013); Kapla v.
FNMA (In re Kapla), 485 B.R. 136, 145–153, 2012 WL 6569739, at
*8–16 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.2012); Rubin v. Fannie Mae, No. 12–cv–
12832, 2012 WL 6000572, at *2–3 (E.D.Mich. Nov. 30, 2012);
Syriani v. Freddie Mac Multiclass Certificates, Series 3365, No. CV
12–3035–JFW, 2012 WL 6200251, at *4 (C.D.Cal. July 10, 2012).
Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Shamoon, 922 F.Supp.2d 641, 644 (E.D. Mich. 2013),
appeal dismissed (Sept. 5, 2013) (emphasis supplied).
Because on the facts alleged Bishop performed no acts “under color of state law,”
and Ms. Owen’s allegations are insufficient to establish communications and a meeting of
the minds to form a §1983 conspiracy against her, Plaintiffs claims should be dismissed.
As a privately-retained attorney for a non-governmental entity, Bishop was not a state actor
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 10 of 12
DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 11
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
206/622-5306 FAX: 206/622-0354
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as a matter of law; consequently, Plaintiff’s §1983 claim should be dismissed with
prejudice and without leave to amend.
IV. CONCLUSION
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and in consideration of the foregoing points,
authorities, and arguments, Defendant Bishop, Marshall & Weibel, P.S., respectfully
requests the Court dismiss all claims of Plaintiff Pamela Owen against it, with prejudice,
for her failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
DATED this 7th day of August, 2015.
/s/ Barbara L. Bollero
Barbara L. Bollero, WSBA No. 28906
David A. Weibel, WSBA No. 24031
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 Olive Way, Suite 1201
Seattle, WA 98101-1801
Phone: (206) 622-5306, ext. 5918
Email: [email protected]
Email: [email protected]
Attorneys for Defendant Bishop,
Marshall & Weibel, P.S.
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 11 of 12
DEFENDANT BISHOP, MARSHALL &
WEIBEL, P.S.’ FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)
MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S
COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE - 12
No. 3:15-cv-05375-BHS
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
720 OLIVE WAY, SUITE 1201
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101-1801
206/622-5306 FAX: 206/622-0354
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DECLARATION OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 7, 2015, I electronically filed the foregoing with the
Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all
registered CM/ECF participants in this case.
Dated this 7th day of August, 2015, at Seattle, Washington.
MARSHALL & WEIBEL, P.S.
/s/ Tamorah L. Burt
Tamorah L. Burt, Legal Assistant
Case 3:15-cv-05375-BHS Document 21 Filed 08/07/15 Page 12 of 12