Download - Political Law - Accountability 1-35 (Digest)
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L1. ABAKADA PARTY LIST v PURISIMA 562 SCRA 251
Facts: This petit ion for prohibition seeks to prevent respondents from
implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transforms the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as
they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of
rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally
mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency which is under Section of Article XI of
the Constitution (Accountability of Public Officers).
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and
incentives only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the
constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for
classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix
revenue targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter.
While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be
dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at
least 7.5%, the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved.
Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has been delegated to the President without
sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic
and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on
the ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the
legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment
and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee
permits legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
Issue: Whether or Not RA 9335 which was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) is constitutional.
Held: Petition has no merit. RA 9335 is Constitutional.
Rationale: The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of RA 9335, the Attrition
Act of 2005 on the following basis:
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial
controversy by the mere enactment of the law even without any further overt act,
petitioners fail either to assert any specific and concrete legal claim or to
demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show
a personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this
account, their petition is procedurally infirm.
On the issue on Accountability of Public Officers, Public officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption
necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335
operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a system of rewards
and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation
capability and collection. Petitioners' claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will
turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is
not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.To invalidate RA 9335 based on
petitioners' baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the
legislature that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Public Accountability-Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers
may by law be rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of
incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to
the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication
to duty, industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government
personnel.
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L2. Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan
DOCTRINE:
The concept of holdover when applied to a public officer implies that the office has
a fixed term and the incumbent is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually
provided by law that officers elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in
office not only for that term but until their successors have been elected and
qualified. Where this provision is found, the office does not become vacant upon
the expiration of the term if there is no successor elected and qualified to assume
it, but the present incumbent will carry over until his successor is elected and
qualified, even though it be beyond the term fixed by law.
NATURE: Review of Sandiganbayan Decision
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco M. Lecaroz was the Municipal Mayor of Santa Cruz,
Marinduque, while his son and co-petitioner Lenlie Lecaroz, was the outgoing
chairman of the Kabataang Barangay (KB) of Barangay Bagong Silang, Santa Cruz,
and currently a member of its SanguniangBayan (SB) representing the Federation of
Kabataang Barangays. In the 1985 election of the Kabataang Barangay Jowil Red
won the KB Chairman of Barangay Matalaba, Santa Cruz. Red was appointed by
then President Marcos as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Santa Cruz
representing the KBs of the municipality. However, Mayor Lecaroz informed Red
that he could not yet sit as member of the municipal council until the Governor of
Marinduque had cleared his appointment. When Red finally received his
appointment papers, President Aquino was already in power. But still Red was not
allowed to sit as sectoral representative in the Sanggunian. Meanwhile with the
approval of the Mayor, Lenlie continued to receive his salary for more than a year.
Finally Red was able to secure appointment papers from the Aquino administration
after three years and nine months from the date he received his appointment paper
from President Marcos. Red was finally able to secure from the Aquino
Administration a confirmation of his appointment as KB Sectoral Representative to
the Sanggunian Bayan of Santa Cruz. Subsequently, Red filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman several criminal complaints against the Mayor and Lenlie arising from
the refusal of the two officials to let him assume the position of KB sectoral
representative. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the
Sandiganbayan thirteen (13) informations for estafa through falsification of public
documents against petitioners, and one (1) information for violation of Sec. 3, par.
(e), of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against the Mayor
alone. The Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the two accused guilty on all
counts of estafa. However, with respect to the charge of violation of RA No. 3019,
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Mayor Lecaroz. The Sandiganbayan, having denied
their motion for reconsideration, the accused, elevated their case to the Supreme
Court.
ISSUES:
1) WON Red had validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation
President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assemblywoman Reyes;
NO. Red had not validly and effectively assumed the office of KB Federation
President by virtue of his oath taken before then Assemblywoman Reyes on 27
September 1985. Under the provisions of the Administrative Code then in force,
members of the then Batasang Pambansa were not authorized to administer oaths.
It was only after the effectivity of RA No. 6733 that members of both Houses of
Congress were vested for the first time with the general authority to administer
oaths. Clearly, under this circumstance, the oath of office taken by Red before a
member of the Batasang Pambansa who had no authority to administer oaths, was
invalid and amounted to no oath at all.
2) WON the tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his
coterminous term of office as KB representative to the SB had accordingly expired;
If yes - WON Lenlie could no longer occupy the office despite the vacancy therein, in
a holdover capacity;
The tenure of accused Lenlie as president of the KB and his coterminous term of
office as KB representative to the SB had expired. However, Lenlie could occupy the
office as president of the KB and his coterminous term of office as KB
representative to the SB in a holdover capacity. The concept of holdover when
applied to a public officer implies that the office has a fixed term and the incumbent
is holding onto the succeeding term. It is usually provided by law that officers
elected or appointed for a fixed term shall remain in office not only for that term
but until their successors have been elected and qualified. Where this provision is
found, the office does not become vacant upon the expiration of the term if there is
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no successor elected and qualified to assume it, but the present incumbent will
carry over until his successor is elected and qualified, even though it be beyond the
term fixed by law. It is thus clear in the present case that since Red never qualified
for the post, petitioner Lenlie remained KB representative to the Sanggunian, albeit
in a carry over capacity, and was in every aspect a de jure officer, or at least a de
facto officer entitled to receive the salaries and all the emoluments appertaining to
the position.
3) WON under Sec. 2 of the Freedom Constitution and pursuant to the provisions of
the pertinent Ministry of Interior and Local Governments (MILG) interpretative
circulars, accused Lenlie was legally entitled and even mandated to continue in
office in a holdover capacity; if not WON accused Lenlie acted in good faith and
committed merely an error of judgment, without malice and criminal intent;
The pertinent provisions of the Freedom Constitution and the implementing MILG
Circulars confirmed the right of incumbent KB Federation Presidents to hold and
maintain their positions until duly replaced either by the President herself or by the
Interior Ministry.
4) WON the accused had committed the crime of falsification within the
contemplation of Art. 171 of The Revised Penal Code, and in not holding that the
crime of estafa of which they had been convicted required criminal intent and
malice as essential elements.
Prudence and good faith impelled Mayor Lecaroz to take the necessary steps to
verify the legitimacy of Red's appointment to the Sanggunian.
HELD:
Petition is meritorious.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and acquitted both petitioners of all the
thirteen (13) counts of estafa through falsification of public documents. The court a
quo used as indication of conspiracy the fact that the accused Mayor certified the
payrolls authorizing payment of compensation to his son and as a consequence
thereof the latter collected his salaries. These are not legally accepted indicia, for
they were the very same acts alleged in the informations as constituting the crime
of estafa through falsification. They cannot qualify as proof of complicity or unity of
criminal intent.
L3. CUENCO v FERNAN 158 SCRA 29
Facts: Complainant Atty. Miguel Cuenco, a former Member of the House of
Representatives from the province of Cebu, prayed for judgment ordering the
disbarment of Mr. Justice Fernan, Chairman of the Third Division of this Court.
Complainant Cuenco, who had represented a group of heirs in the Vito Borromeo
intestate estate proceeding, makes the ff. allegations in his complaint for
disbarment:
1. That Mr. Justice Fernan, appeared as counsel for the three (3) institutedheirs and despite having already accepted his appointment as an Associate
Justice of the Court, continues to be counsel for the instituted heirs.
2. Influence the decision or the outcome of the Vito Borromeo proceedings.3. Has operated his Office in Cebu City as a Star-Chamber to fabricate fake
and fictitious heirs of Vito Borromeo.
4. Practically abolished and crippled the legitimate functions of the Court ofAppeals.
5. Collecting big sums of money in payment of his legal services rendered tohis clients.
6. Had willfully, persistently, stubbornly and systematically violated his Oathof Office as a lawyer which imposes upon him the duty not to delay any
man for money or malice.
Issue: WON complainants charges against Mr. Justice Fernan provide a factual
basis.
Held: Complaint for disbarment must be dismissed for totally lack of merit and
failure to provide evidences for the complaints against the respondent.
Complainant Cuenco vehemently denies acting in bad faith in filing the present
administrative complaint against Mr. Justice Fernan and suggests that his acts have
been "misunderstood" by the Court. Complainant, however, has failed to present a
shred of evidence to support the very serious charges he has made against Mr.
Justice Fernan. In his untitled pleading, complainant Cuenco has not only declined
to prove the accusations he has made against Mr. Justice Fernan but has also
chosen to make additional statements and charges so extravagant and so clearly
uninformed as to require no discussion. Because the Court cannot assume that
complainant Cuenco is totally unaware of the nature and gravity of the charges he
has made against Mr. Justice Fernan and which he has completely failed to support
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with anything but his own bare assertion, the Court is compelled to conclude that
those accusations were made in bad faith.
Rationale: Members of the SC may be removed from office only by impeachment
for conviction of certain offenses. (Art. XI (2), Constitution). To grant a complaint for
disbarment of a Member of the Court would in effect be so circumvent and hence
to run afoul of the constitutional mandate. The Ombudsman and his deputies,
majority of the members of the COMELEC and COA who are not certified public
accountants, all of whom are constitutionally required to be members of the
Philippine Bar.
L4. IN RE: RAUL M. GONZALES 160 SCRA 771
Facts: Honorable Gonzales forwarded a letter-complaint to Mr. Fernan which
brought to the attention of the Court en banc in view of the important implications
of policy raised by said Indorsement. It has two (2) attachments. First, an
anonymous letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez (as Tanodbayan/Special; Prosecutor) referring to charges for
disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against Mr. Justice Marcelo B. Fernan
and asking Mr. Gonzalez "to do something about this." The second attachment is a
copy of a telegram from Mr. Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez,
where Mr. Cuenco refers to pleadings he apparently filed with the Supreme Court in
Administrative Case No. 3135 entitled "Miguel Cuenco v. Honorable Marcelo B.
Fernan" in which Resolution, the Court Resolved to dismiss the charges made by
complaint Cuenco against Mr.Justice Fernan. The Court treated this pleading as a
Motion for Reconsideration.
Issue: Should a fiscal or other prosecuting officer forthwith and dismiss any charges
brought against a Member of this Court? The remedy of a person with a legitimate
grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.
Ratio: There is a fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed
before such liability may be determined and enforced. A public officer who under
the Constitution is required to be a Member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification
for the office held by him and who may be removed from office only by
impeachment, cannot be charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such
public officer. Further, such public officer, during his incumbency, cannot be
charged criminally before the Sandiganbayan or any other court with any offence
which carries with it the penalty of removal from office, or any penalty service of
which would amount to removal from office.
It is important to make clear that the Court is not here saying that it Members or
the other constitutional officers we referred to above are entitled to immunity from
liability for possibly criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics or other supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a
fundamental procedural requirements that must be observed before such liability
may be determined and enforced. A Member of the Supreme Court must first be
removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2
and 3 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court
Justice be thus terminated by impeachment, he may then be held to answer either
criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any wrong or
misbehavior that may be proven against him in appropriate proceedings.
The above rule rests on the fundamental principles of judicial independence and
separation of powers. The rule is important because judicial independence is
important. Without the protection of this rule, Members of the Supreme Court
would be brought against them by unsuccessful litigants or their lawyers or by other
parties who, for any number of reasons might seek to affect the exercise of judicial
authority by the Court.
L5. FRANCISCO v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 415 SCRA 44
Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives
adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings,
superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th
Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution,
which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in aid of
legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003,
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first
impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by
House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5
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August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance. Four months and three weeks since the
filing of the first complaint or on 23 October 2003, a day after the House Committee
on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the
Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiryinitiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme
Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend
that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "no
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than
once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether the power of judicial review extends to those arising from
impeachment proceedings.
Held: The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial branch of the
government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present 1987 Constitution. The
"moderating power" to "determine the proper allocation of powers" of the
different branches of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the
judicial power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable." As indicated in
Angara v. Electoral Commission, judicial review is indeed an integral component of
the delicate system of checks and balances which, together with the corollary
principle of separation of powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of
government and insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves. The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in
our system of government. It obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court
as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its
power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts
void if violative of the Constitution.
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme Court
and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial review is only
impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is discretionary in nature, that
granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for
in the Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion
on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. There are also glaring
distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the Philippine Constitution with
respect to the power of the House of Representatives over impeachment
proceedings. While the U.S. Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to
the House of Representatives without limitation, our Constitution, though vesting in
the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment cases,
provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as embodied in
Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These limitations include the manner
of filing, required vote to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of
one and the same official. The people expressed their will when they instituted the
above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution. This shows that the Constitution
did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of
Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or "judicially
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such
discretion, through the power of judicial review. There is indeed a plethora of cases
in which this Court exercised the power of judicial review over congressional action.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks
and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components of
the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no
branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
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L6. GUTIERREZ v HOUSE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTTEE ON JUSTICE
Doctrine: We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere. As pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated
when the House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee,
because something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is
already a further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred tothe Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow.
Facts: On July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, et.al.
(Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner. On August 3,
2010, private respondents Renato Reyes et.al. (Reyes group) filed another
impeachment complaint. Both impeachment complaints were endorsed by
different Party-List Representatives.
On August 10, 2010, House Majority Leader Neptali Gonzales II, as chairperson of
the Committee on Rules, instructed the Deputy Secretary General for Operations to
include the two complaints in the Order of Business, which was complied with by
their inclusion in the Order of Business for the following day.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 1, 2010, found both
complaints sufficient in form, which complaints it considered to have been referred
to it at exactly the same time.
Meanwhile, the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 15th
Congress was published on September 2, 2010.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the September
1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent refused to accept the
motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised petitioner to await the notice
for her to file an answer to the complaints, drawing petitioner to furnish copies of
her motion to each of the 55 members of public respondent.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of September 7, 2010, found the
two complaints, which both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust, sufficient in substance. The determination of the sufficiency
of substance of the complaints by public respondent, which assumed hypothetically
the truth of their allegations, hinged on the issue of whether valid judgment to
impeach could be rendered thereon. Petitioner was served also on September 7,
2010 a notice directing her to file an answer to the complaints within 10 days.
Issue: When is impeachment deemed initiated? (Does the present impeachment
complaint violate the one-year bar rule under the Constitution?)
Held: The one-year bar rule. Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution
reads: No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.
Petitioner reckons the start of the one-year bar from the filing of the first
impeachment complaint against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the
opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th Congress. She posits that within one year from
July 22, 2010, no second impeachment complaint may be accepted and referred to
public respondent.
Following petitioners line of reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the
endorsement by a member of the House steps done prior to the filing would
already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
Contrary to petitioners emphasis on impeachment complaint, what the
Constitution mentions is impeachment proceedings. Her reliance on the singular
tense of the word complaint to denote the limit prescribed by the Constitution
goes against the basic rule of statutory construction that a word covers its enlarged
and plural sense.
The Court, of course, does not downplay the importance of an impeachment
complaint, for it is the matchstick that kindles the candle of impeachment
proceedings. The filing of an impeachment complaint is like the lighting of a
matchstick. Lighting the matchstick alone, however, cannot light up the candle,
unless the lighted matchstick reaches or torches the candle wick. Referring the
complaint to the proper committee ignites the impeachment proceeding. With a
simultaneous referral of multiple complaints filed, more than one lighted
matchsticks light the candle at the same time. What is important is that there
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should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle
starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle.
Under the Rules of the House, a motion to refer is not among those motions that
shall be decided without debate, but any debate thereon is only made subject to
the five-minute rule. Moreover, it is common parliamentary practice that a motion
to refer a matter or question to a committee may be debated upon, not as to the
merits thereof, but only as to the propriety of the referral. With respect tocomplaints for impeachment, the House has the discretion not to refer a
subsequent impeachment complaint to the Committee on Justice where official
records and further debate show that an impeachment complaint filed against the
same impeachable officer has already been referred to the said committee and the
one year period has not yet expired, lest it becomes instrumental in perpetrating a
constitutionally prohibited second impeachment proceeding. Far from being
mechanical, before the referral stage, a period of deliberation is afforded the
House, as the Constitution, in fact, grants a maximum of three session days within
which to make the proper referral.
As mentioned, one limitation imposed on the House in initiating an impeachment
proceeding deals with deadlines. The Constitution states that *a+ verified
complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution or endorsement by any
Member thereof, which shall be included in the Order of Business within ten
session days, and referred to the proper Committee within three session days
thereafter.
We ought to be guided by the doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere. As
pointed out in Francisco, the impeachment proceeding is not initiated when the
House deliberates on the resolution passed on to it by the Committee, because
something prior to that has already been done. The action of the House is already a
further step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred to
the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step which triggers the
series of steps that follow.
Allowing an expansive construction of the term initiate beyond the act of referral
allows the unmitigated influx of successive complaints, each having their own
respective 60-session-day period of disposition from referral. Worse, the
Committee shall conduct overlapping hearings until and unless the disposition of
one of the complaints ends with the affirmance of a resolution for impeachment or
the overriding[ of a contrary resolution (as espoused by public respondent), or the
House transmits the Articles of Impeachment (as advocated by the Reyes group), or
the Committee on Justice concludes its first report to the House plenary regardless
of the recommendation (as posited by respondent-intervenor). Each of these
scenarios runs roughshod the very purpose behind the constitutionally imposedone-year bar. Opening the floodgates too loosely would disrupt the series of steps
operating in unison under one proceeding.
L7. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. COURT OF APPEALS
The enumeration in the Constitution of the impeachable officers is exclusive. The
Ombudsman is only one man, not including his Deputies. Thus, only the
Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
On 29 December 1999, twenty- two officials and employees of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, led by its two directors, filed a complaint with
the Office of the Ombudsman requesting an investigation on the basis of
allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, herein private
respondent Arturo Mojica, committed (1) sexual harassment against Rayvi Padua-
Varona, mulcting money from confidential employees: James Alueta and Eden
Kiamco and (3) oppression against all employees in not releasing P7,200.00 in
benefits of OMB- Visayas employees on the date the said amount was due for
release.
Fact-finding investigation was conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman and
thereport was referred by the Ombudsman to a constituted Committee of Peers
which initially recommended that the investigation be converted into one solely for
purposes of impeachment. However, this recommendation was denied by the
Office of the Ombudsman and following the stand of the Office of the Ombudsman
that the Deputy Ombudsmen and The Special Prosecutor are not removable
through impeachment.
On 18 December 2000, despite the expiration of private respondent Mojica's term
of
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office, the Court of Appeals nevertheless rendered the assailed Decision on the
grounds of
public interest. CA ruled that the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable officer.
Thus, OMB's
appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Ombudsmans Deputies are impeachable2. Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman may be held criminally and/or
administratively liable
HELD: Order of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaints in Criminal Case
No. OMB-0-00-0616 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-00-0316 are
REINSTATED
and the Office of the Ombudsman is ordered to proceed with the investigation
relative to the
above cases.
Ombudsman's Deputies Not Impeachable
The Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution states that The President, the Vice- President, the members of the
Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of,
culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other
high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may
be removed from Office as provided by law, but not by impeachment . Records of
the Constitutional Commission, as well as the opinions of leading commentators in
Constitutional Law reveal that the term Ombudsman in Sec. 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution refer to the rank in itself. The Ombudsman is only one man, not
including his Deputies. Leading legal luminaries on the Constitution are one in their
opinion as to whether or
not the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree that the
enumeration impeachable officers in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution,
is exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable.
How then to explain our earlier pronouncement in Cuenco v. Fernan, as later cited
in In Re: Raul M. Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Lastimosa-Dalawampu v. Dep.
Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella which reads: To grant a
complaint for disbarment of a Member of the Court during the Members
incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence to run afoul of the
constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed from office
only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in Article XI [2] of
the Constitution. Precisely the same situation exists in respect of the Ombudsman
and his deputies (Article XI [8] in relation to Ar ticle XI *2+) all of whom are
constitutionally required to be members of the Philippine Bar?
A dictum is an opinion that does not embody the resolution or determination of the
court, and made without argument, or full consideration of the point. Mere dicta
are not binding under the doctrine of stare decisis. The succeeding cases of In Re:
Raul M. Gonzales and Jarque v. Desierto do not tackle the impeachability of a
Deputy Ombudsman either. Nor, for that matter, does Lastimosa-Dalawampu v.
Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and Graft Investigator Labella, which, as previously
mentioned, is a minute resolution dismissing a complaint for disbarment against the
herein private respondent on the basis of the questioned obiter in Cuenco v.
Fernan and the succeeding cases without going into the merits. Thus, where the
issue involved was not raised nor presented to the court and not passed upon by
the court in the previous case, the decision in the previous case is not stare decisis
of the question presented.
Criminal and Administrative Liability of Deputy Ombudsman As to whether or not
the private respondent, then Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, may be held
criminally and/or administratively liable, we likewise resolve the issue in favor of
the petitioner. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted
for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his
continuance in office.
Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or
permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the courts.
Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding against
the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the formers
retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of Sections
12 and 13 f the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
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L8. PEOPLE v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Two separate informations for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 (Anti
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Efren L.
Alas. The charges emanated from the alleged anomalous advertising contracts
entered into by Alas, in his capacity as President and Chief Operating Officer of the
Philippine Postal Savings Bank (PPSB), with Bagong Buhay Publishing Company
which purportedly caused damage and prejudice to the government.Sandiganbayan ruled that the PPSB was a private corporation and its officers like
Alas, did not fall under its jurisdiction. Dissatisfied the people through the Office of
the Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed this petition.
ISSUE: Does the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government- owned or controlled corporations organized
and incorporated under the Corporation Code for purposes of the provisions of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
HELD: Petition Granted, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
RATIO: The Philippines Postal Savings Bank PPSB is a government owned or
controlled corporation organized and incorporated under the corporation Code as a
subsidiary of the Philippine Postal Corporation (PHILPOST). More than 99% of the
authorized capital stocks of PPSB belongs to the government while the rest is
nominally held by its incorporators who are themselves officers of the PHILPOST.
The creation of PPSB was expressly sanctioned by Sec. 32 of the Postal Service Act
of 1992.
Article IX Sec. 4 of the 1987Constitution, which provides that the present anti-graft
court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law, in effect retained the
jurisdiction of the anti-graft court a s d efined under Art. XII I, Section 5 of the 1973
Constitution.
It is not disputed that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over presidents, directors,
or trustees, or managers of GOCCs with original charters whenever charges of Graft
and corruption are involved. However , a question arises whether the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the same officers in GOCCS organized and
incorporated under the Corporation code. Article XI , Sec. 4 of the 1987 Constitution
which provides that the present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law . This provision in effect retained the jurisdiction of the anti-graft
court as defined under Art XIII Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution which mandated
its creation thus: Sec. 5 . The batasang Pambansa shall create a special court known
as the sandiganbayan , which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offense commited by publicofficers and employees including those in GOCCS in relation to their office as may be
determined by law.
The fact that the legislature, in mandating the inclusion of presidents, directors, or
trustees , or managers in GOCCs within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, has
consistently refrained from making any distinction with respect to the manner of
their creation clearly reveals its intention to include such officials of GOCCS with
original charters and those organized and incorporated under the Corporation Code
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan whenever they are involved in graft
and corruption.
When the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
L9. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
Facts: It appears that Carandang and Clemente were in the meantime conferred
with CSE Eligibility pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 03-0665 dated June 6,
2003.Petitioner subsequently reclassified several positions by Resolution No. 02-03
dated August 18, 2003 including Graft Investigation Officer III which was reclassified
to Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer III. The Ombudsman thereupon
requested the approval of the proposed Qualification Standards for the reclassified
positions. With respect to the reclassified Graft Investigation and Prosecution
Officer III position, the Qualification Standards were the same as those for Graft
Investigation Officer III.Subsequently, the CSC, by the challenged Resolution of
August 28, 2003, changed the status o f Carandangs and Clementes appointments
to permanent effective June 6, 2003, but not with respect to De Jesus on the
ground that he has not met the eligibility requirements.
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Issue: Wether or not that there are independent offices specifically authorized by
the constitution to appoint their officials ,does this imply that their appointment
will not be subject to civil service law and rules?
Ruling: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 030919 of
the Civil Service Commission dated August 28, 2003 is hereby SET ASIDE. The
appointment of Jose Tereso U. de Jesus, Jr., as well as those of Melchor Arthur H.Carandang, Paul Elmer M. Clemente, is hereby ordered made permanent effective
December 18, 2002.
L10. UY v SANDIGANBAYAN 312 SCRA 77
Facts: George Uy filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme
Court to set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan which denied his motion to
quash the six informations charging him with violation of Section 3(e), RA 3019, as
amended. He argued, among others, that Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
the person of the petitioner accused because his rank of Lieutenant Commander of
the Philippine Navy is a rank lower than naval captains and all officers of higher
rank as prescribed under sub par. (d) of Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law (RA
8249). Hence, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner was vested in the regular courts.
Held: Resolution of the Sandigan is hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE.
Doctrine/Rationale: The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over petitioner, at the
time of the filing of the informations, and as now prescribed by law. Republic Act
No. 8249, the latest amendment to PD1606 creating the Sandiganbayan (otherwise
known as the Sandiganbayan Law), provides the
prevailing scope of the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
The pertinent portions of the Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law read: Sec. 4.
Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving: a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission
of the offense: (d) Philippine army and air force colonel, naval captains, and all
officers of higher rank; It can be deduced from said provisions of law that both the
nature of the offense and the position occupied by the accused are conditions sine
qua non before the Sandiganbayan can validly take cognizance of the case. The
Supreme Court ruled that since petitioners position did not fall within the rank
requirement stated in Section 4, exclusive jurisdiction over petitioner is vested in
the regular courts. The Supreme Court then went further to clarify that it is the
prosecutor, not the ombudsman, who has the authority to file the correspondinginformation/s against petitioner in the regional trial court. The ombudsman
exercises prosecutorial powers only in cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. On
Motion for Clarification by the Ombudsman, the Supreme Court categorically
declared:
The Officers of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor seem to suggest that they
still retain the power to re-file the information and prosecute the petitioner before
the regional trial court despite our finding that it is the regional trial court which has
jurisdiction over the case. The clear import of such pronouncement is to recognize
the authority of the State and regular provincial and city prosecutor under the
Department of Justice to have control over prosecution of cases falling within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. The investigation and prosecuto rial powers of the
ombudsman relate to cases rightfully falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan under Section 15 (1) of RA 6770, (An Act Providing for the
Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for
other purposes) which vests upon the ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan
L11. CASTRO v DELORIA 577 SCRA 20
Castro was charged by the Ombudsman before the RTC with Malversation of public
funds. The information alleged that Castro was a revenue officer of the BIR who
misappropriated 556K+ of collections. Castro pleaded NOT GUILTY on arraignment.
On Aug 31, 2001,Castro filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction and lack of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary
investigation and file the Information since it failed t to allege her salary grade --a
material fact upon which depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, petitioner further argued that as she was a public employee with
salary grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the RTC and may be
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investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the
Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.
The RTC denied & held that the (1) jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not
depend on the salary grade, but on the penalty imposable upon the latter for the
offense charged. It also (2) sustained the prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman
since in the cited case the court later overturned their decision in a clarificatoryresolution. Finally, it said that the (3) Motion to Quash was contrary to Sec. 1, Rule
117, for it was filed after Castro pleaded not guilty under the Information.
Castro contends that the prevailing jurisprudence from Aug 9, 1999 until May 20,
2001 was that the Ombudsman had no prosecutorial powers over cases cognizable
by the RT and since the investigation and prosecution against Castro was conducted
by the Ombudsman beginning April 26, 2000, then the August 9, 1999Decision in Uy
was applicable, notwithstanding that the decision was set aside in the March 20,
2001Resolution. So, the Information that was filed against petitioner was void for at
that time the Ombudsman had no investigatory and prosecutorial powers over the
case.
Castro filed an MR which was denied so filed a petition for certiorari w/ CA also
dismissed. Filed 65 with SC.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Ombudsman had the authority to file the information in light of the
ruling in the First "Uy vs.Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited tocases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan.2. W/N the clarificatory Resolution in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan casecan be made applicable to the Castro, without violating the constitutional provision
on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process.
RULING:
YES to BOTH.
In the case of Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc, similar grounds were raised and
the SC held that the Ombudsman has powers to prosecute not only graft cases
within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable by the
regular courts. It held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted bylaw to the Ombudsman is
plenary and unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or
employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that theclause "any illegal act or omission of any public official" is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan,
particularly in Section 15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and Section 11(4)granting the Special Prosecutor
the power to conduct preliminary investigation and prosecute criminal cases within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as confining the
scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated
with the limited authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor is merelya component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control and upon
authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary investigation and to
prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and prosecutor
power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by
law to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and
to enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the
evidence warrants. To carry out this duty, the law allows him to utilize the
personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the
government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the
investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to
assist him work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to
direct the Special prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans
jurisdiction in accordance with Section 11(4c) of RA6770.
In the case of Office of Ombudsman v. Hon. Breva, court held that the March 20,
2001 Resolution, that the Ombudsman has prosecutorial powers in cases cognizable
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by the RTC, extends even to criminal information filed or pending at the time when
its August 9, 1999 Decision was the operative ruling on the issue.
L12. DOJ V. LIWAG
FACTS:
Alleging that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics
Group, Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against PNP
General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B. Aquino, officials of the PNP,
and several private individuals.
Her complaint-affidavit gave rise to separate cases involving different offenses
imputed to respondents Lacson and Aquino. The Ombudsman found the complaint-
affidavit of Mary Ong sufficient in form and substance. It required the respondents
to file counter-affidavits on the charges. Respondents submitted counter-affidavits
and prayed that the charges against them be dismissed.
Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the NBI. NBI
Director Reynaldo Wycoco, in a letter to then Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez,
recommended the investigation of the respondents:
a.) kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao, Zeng Kang Pang,
James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;
b.) murder of Wong Kam Chong; and
c.) kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming.
A panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to the
respondents. Subpoena directed them to submit their counter-affidavits and
controverting evidence at the scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint
filed. Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter that the DOJ panel of prosecutors
should dismiss the complaint filed.
The DOJ construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and deny the dismissal of the
cases before it through an Order that stated the following as basis of the denial:
It appearing that the subject letter is essentially a motion to dismiss which is not
allowed under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure[;]
Respondents rank and/or civil service classification has no bearing in the
determination of jurisdiction as the crimes charged herein do not involve violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Unlawfully Acquired Property [or]
Bribery,nor are they related to respondents discharge of their official duties;
Offenses committed not in relation to office and cognizable by the regular courts
shall be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the Provincial/City
Prosecutor which shall rule thereon with finality;
DOJ issued Order, the Solicitor General received a copy of a petition for prohibition
filed by respondents before the RTC of Manila. --> Lacson and Aquino maintained
that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation. They argued
that by conducting a preliminary investigation, the DOJ was violating the
Ombudsmans mandate of having the primary and exclusive jurisdiction to
investigate criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Judge Liwag issued the Order prohibiting the Department of Justice from
conducting the preliminary investigation. A Writ of Preliminary Injunction was
likewise issued by the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation
despite the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same
accused, facts, and circumstances. The addition of other names in the second
proceedings does not alter the nature thereof as being principally directed against
the respondents herein in connection with substantially the same set of facts
alleged.
HELD:
Petitioners came to this Court without filing a motion before the trial court to
reconsider the assailed Order. They maintain that it was imperative for them to do
so for the sake of the speedy administration of justice, considering that this involves
the high-ranking officers of the PNP.
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Court finds that time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may not only be
the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb, but also the rights of the
respondents, who may need to clear their names and reputations of the
accusations.
The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the
provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV:
Section 1. Declaration of policy. It is the declared policy of the State to provide
the government with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal counsel
and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice system in accordance with
the accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes,
prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system; . . .
Section 3. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Department
shall have the following powers and functions: (2) Investigate the commission of
crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system;
Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275 provides:
Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of
the Secretary of Justice. There is hereby created and established a National
Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the Secretary of Justice,
to be composed of the Prosecution Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice
and such number of Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City
Fiscals Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily responsible for
the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving violations of penal laws.
Respondents claim that the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over the cases
filed against them, to the exclusion of any other investigatory agency of
Government pursuant to law and existing jurisprudence. They rely on the doctrine
in Uy v. Sandiganbayan.
Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its
own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the
Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or
non-feasance of public officers or employees. The Office of the Ombudsman waslikewise envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the principal and primary
complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic
maze of procedures. For this purpose, it was granted more than the usual powers
given to prosecutors. It was vested with the power to investigate complaints
against a public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal
complaint lodged before it.
Clearly, therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation of cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general
jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers
and employees. The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In
contrast, the DOJ is an extension of the executive department, bereft of the
constitutional independence granted to the Ombudsman.
Petitioners cannot seek sanctuary in the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. While
the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the
same subject matter, the settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes
cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
others. Thus, assuming there is concurrent jurisdiction between the Ombudsman
and the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary investigation, this concurrence is not to
be taken as an unrestrained freedom to file the same case before both bodies or be
viewed as a contest between these bodies as to which will first complete the
investigation. In the present case, it is the Ombudsman before whom the complaint
was initially filed. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the preliminary
investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the DOJ in the conduct of preliminary
investigation over the cases filed against the respondents would not promote an
orderly administration of justice. Although a preliminary investigation is not a trial,
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it is not a casual affair either. A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding
for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. To allow the same complaint to
be filed successively before two or more investigative bodies would promote
multiplicity of proceedings. It would also cause undue difficulties to the respondent
who would have to appear and defend his position before every agency or body
where the same complaint was filed. This would leave hapless litigants at a loss asto where to appear and plead their cause or defense. There is the distinct possibility
that the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time would come up with
conflicting resolutions regarding the guilt of the respondents. The second
investigation would entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use
of valuable and limited resources of Government, in aduplication of proceedings
already started with the Ombudsman.
From all the foregoing, it is clear that petitioners have not shown any grave abuse
of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by the
respondent Judge.
Petition is DISMISSED.
L13. TAPIADOR V. OMBUDSMAN
Petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman
in dismissing the petitioner from the government service for grave misconduct and
denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The incipience of the case could be traced to the complaint-affidavit by Walter H.
Beck, a U.S. citizen, against the petitioner, Renato A. Tapiador, BID SpecialInvestigator and assigned as Technical Assistant in the office of the then Associate
Commissioner.
Complaint alleged in substance that petitioner Tapiador demanded and received
from Walter Beck P10,000.00 in exchange for the issuance of an alien certificate of
registration which was subsequently withheld deliberately by the petitioner despite
repeated demands by Beck, unless the latter pay an additional amount of
P7,000.00. Accompanying the complaint was the affidavit executed by a certain
Purisima C. Terencio which essentially seeks to corroborate the alleged payment of
P10,000.00).
The petitioner denied in his counter-affidavit that he demanded nor received any
amount of money from Walter Beck. Petitioner alleged that Beck and his wife,
Monica Beck, came to the BID office in Manila on to follow-up his visa application.
When the petitioner advised the couple to accomplish first all the requirements for
a visa application, Beck and his wife shouted invectives at him and charged the
petitioner with having demanded money from them. This incident prompted the
petitioner to file a criminal complaint for oral defamation before the Office of the
City Prosecutor in Manila. The petitioners allegations were corroborated byRosanna C. Vigo, a BID employee.
BID Resident Ombudsman Ronaldo P. Ledesma found the petitioner liable for
violating existing civil service rules and regulations as well as penal laws and thus,
recommended that criminal and administrative charges be filed against the
petitioner.
Criminal charge was dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of evidence but
Ombudsman found the petitioner liable for grave misconduct in the administrative
aspect of the case and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the government
service. Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
I. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF GRAVE
MISCONDUCT DESPITE LACK OF SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT IT.
II. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
ONLY AFTER ALMOST 3 YEARS, IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONERS RIGHT TO SPEEDY
TRIAL.
III. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
WITHOUT CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY CONFERENCE AND ACTUAL HEARING INVIOLATION OF ITS OWN RULES, THUS CONSTITUTING A VIOLATION OF
PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
IV. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN CONTRADICTING ITS OWN FINDING RELATIVE
TO THE CRIMINAL ASPECT OF THIS CASE DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF
EVIDENCE.
V. OMBUDSMAN GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DISMISSAL AGAINST PETITIONER, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS HIS FIRST
OFFENSE IN HIS THIRTY YEARS IN THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE.
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HELD:
The Office of the Ombudsman maintains that the petitioner was accorded due
process of law inasmuch as he was duly informed and furnished a copy of the
complaint against him as evidenced by his letters addressed to the investigating
officer requesting for a copy of the case records to enable him to prepare for his
defense. T
There was no undue delay in the conduct of the administrative proceedings since
the preliminary investigation was conducted immediately after the complaint was
filed and that after the criminal aspect of the case was resolved, the administrative
proceeding was conducted shortly thereafter. That no preliminary conference had
been conducted, primarily due to the petitioners manifestation to dispense thereof
and submit the case for resolution inasmuch as he has already filed his
memorandum of evidence. Ombudsman opined that the petitioner was absolved of
criminal liability during the preliminary investigation. However, the Ombudsman
asserts that the sworn statements of Walter Beck and his witness, Purisima
Terencio, substantially established the administrative liability of the petitioner for
grave misconduct by demanding from complainant Beck a sum of money in
exchange for the issuance of the latters ACR and for that offense, peti tioner should
be imposed the corresponding penalty of dismissal from the government service.
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the allegations in the complaint. In dismissing the petitioner
from the government service the Office of the Ombudsman reasoned out, as
follows:
Evidence for the complainant clearly established that respondent Tapiador
unlawfully received the amount of P10,000.00 from spouses Walter and MonicaBecker, which act was personally witnessed by complainants witness, Purisima C.
Terencio. Witness Terencio states That said spouses paid the full amount of
P10,000.00 to Mr. Tapiador as payment for the Alien Certificate of Registration with
the promise for the immediate release of the same. The said declaration of
Terencio was aptly corroborated by complainant Walter Becker, a foreigner, who in
his desire to stay permanently in the Philippines became a victim of such
irregularity.
The only basis for the questioned resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the
petitioner from the government service was the unverified complaint-affidavit of
Walter H. Beck and that of his alleged witness, Purisima Terencio.
Review of the records showed that the subject affidavits of Beck and Terencio were
not even identified by the respective affiants during the fact-finding investigation.
Neither did they appear during the preliminary investigation to identify their
respective sworn statements despite prior notice before the investigating officerwho subsequently dismissed the criminal aspect of the case upon finding that the
charge against the petitioner was not supported by any evidence. Becks affidavit
is hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. On this basis, Ombudsman should have
dismissed the administrative complaint against the petitioner in the first instance.
Although Beck claimed to have paid P10,000.00, his affidavit is silent as to the
identity of the person who actually received the said amount. The pertinent portion
of his affidavit reads, thus: (1.) That a certain Terencio informed us that I could be
granted an ACR and will be allowed to stay in the Philippines permanently thru Mr.
Tapiador and Mr. Angeles and the fees was agreed. (2.)After completing all the
requirements and the amount of P10,000.00 was given I waited but no ACR was
given. (3.) My wife went to see Mr. Tapiador and was informed that he will hold my
passport while I have my ACR, which I refused. (4.) We transferred our residence to
Negros Occidental we arranged with Mr. Tapiador to pick up the ACR before we will
leave and when my wife went again to pick up the ACR he was not in the office.
Walter Beck could have easily stated in his affidavit that he paid the said amount
directly to the petitioner if it were indeed the latter who actually received the same,
but he did not. Ombudsman gave full faith and credit to Terencios statement that
the spouses paid the full amount of P10,000.00 on to Mr. Tapiador as payment. On
the assumption that there is no apparent reason for her to impute false statements
against the petitioner who is employed with the government for more than 30
years. On the contrary, the rule that witnesses are presumed to tell the truth until
proven otherwise does not apply to the case at bar for the reason that Terencio had
the motive to impute falsities to avoid the inevitable wrath of the Beck spouses for
reneging on her promise to send them by mail the subject ACR. The Ombudsman
should have been more prudent in according credence to the allegations of
Terencio coming as they do from a supposed fixer.
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The complainant clearly failed to present the quantum of proof necessary to prove
the charge in the subject administrative case, that is, with substantial evidence.
Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the
Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the
government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section
13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can
only recommend the removal of the public official or employee found to be at
fault, to the public official concerned.
Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman dismissing the
petitioner from the government service are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner is hereby ordered REINSTATED immediately to his position in the
government service more particularly in the Bureau of Investigation and
Deportation, Manila, without loss nor diminution in his salaries and benefits.
L14. LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint filed by Augusto Somalio with the Office of the Ombudsman,
Atty. Ronaldo, then Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special Inquiry of
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, was alleged to have committed the
following illegal acts: (1) irregularly granting Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs)
beyond the prescribed period; and (2) using recycled or photocopied applications
for a TRV extension without the applicants fixing their signatures anew to validate
the correctness and truthfulness of the information previously stated therein. In a
joint resolution, Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn Reyes recommended for the
suspension of the petitioner for 1 year for conduct prejudicial to the interest of the
service. The Ombudsman approved the said resolution. Petitioner filed a motionfor reconsideration but was denied, instead, the period of suspension was reduced
from 1 year to 9 months without pay. Petitioner filed a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the formers suspension reducing it from9
months to only 6 months without pay. Petitioner filed an instant petition for review
with the SC.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Ombudsmans finding is merely advisory or not.
2. Whether or not Ombudsmans resolution finding petitioneradministratively liable constitutes an indirect encroachment into the
power of the Bureau of Immigration over immigration matters.
HELD:
Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually
mandatory. Also, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute
cases involving public officers and employees.
The petition was denied and the resolution of CA was affirmed.
RATIO/DOCTRINE:
Under Sec 13(3) of the Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the
removal of the public officer or employee found to be at fault, to the official
concerned. On the other hand, Sec 15 of RA 6770 states that, to wit:
Sec 15. The office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions
and duties: (3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a
public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a
duty required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Sec 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by
any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who
is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law
shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
The provisions of RA 6770 and Sec.13 of Art XI of the Constitution which provides
for the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman qualify the order to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee akin
to the questioned issuances in the case at bar. That the refusal, without just cause,
of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman to penalize an erring
officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, a strong indication that the
Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually
mandatory within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation
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by the Ombudsman of the authority of the head of office or any officer concerned.
It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an exclusive
authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. By
stating therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken
against an erring officer or employee, the provisions in the constitution and in RA
6770 intended that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper
officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.
L15 Estarija vs Ranada
Facts:
Respondent Edward F. Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc.
(DPAI) and Davao Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an administrative
complaint for Gross Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,
against petitioner Captain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao City.
The complaint alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the necessary
berthing permit for all ships that dock in the Davao Port, had been demanding
monies ranging from P200 to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing
permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution from the DPAI.
On August 6, 1998, the NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000 marked
money used by the NBI to entrap Estarija.
The Ombudsman ordered petitioners preventive suspension and directed him to
answer the complaint. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case docketed as Criminal
Case No. 41,464-98, against Estarija for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In his counter-affidavit and supplemental counter-affidavit, petitioner vehemently
denied demanding sums of money for the approval of berthing permits. He claimed
that Adrian Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, called to inform him that the DPAI
had payables to the PPA, and although he went to the associations office, he was
hesitant to get the P5,000 from Cagata because the association had no pending
transaction with the PPA. Estarija claimed that Cagata made him believe that the
money was a partial remittance to the PPA of the pilotage fee for July 1998.
On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative
case, finding Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Estarija filed a motion for reconsideration. Estarija claimed that dismissal was
unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to
remove government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not
removable by impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsmans administrative authority is merely recommendatory, and that
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989", is
unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers
that are not provided for in the Constitution.
The Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration. Estarija filed a Petition for
Review with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction before the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, on February 12, 2003, dismissed the petition and affirmed the
Ombudsmans decision.
Issues:
1. Is there substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for dishonesty andgrave misconduct? YES
2. Is the power of the Ombudsman to directly remove, suspend, demote, fineor censure erring officials unconstitutional? NO
Reasoning:
1. Estarija was caught red-handed in an entrapment operation. When Estarijawent to the office of Adrian Cagata to pick up the money, his doing so was
indicative of his willingness to commit the crime. In an administrative
proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only
substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
2. Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organizationof the Office of the Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress
deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute
offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more
active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public
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office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad
powers to enable him to implement his own actions.
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, we held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with
the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. They gave Congress the
discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in
character. Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and
conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with
the power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his
authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants. He was likewise
given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members of
Congress and the Judiciary.
Intent of the framers of the Constitution- Based on the record of the Constitutional
Commission, they clarified that the powers of the Ombudsman are not exclusive.
They are not foreclosing the possibility that in the future, the Assembly may have to
give additional powers to theOmbudsman.3. The Constitution does not restrict the
powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987Constitution, but
allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the
Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section 15,
par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials
and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
Petition denied.
L16. Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera (2005)
Petitioner: OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and DENNIS M. VILLA-IGNACIO
Respondent: ATTY. GIL A. VALERA and COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Valera was appointed Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs byPresident Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on July 13, 2001. He took his oath of
office on August 3, 2001 and assumed his post on August 7, 2001. He is in
charge of the Revenue Collection Monitoring Group.
The Office of the Ombudsman received the Sworn Complaint filed by thenDirector Eduardo S. Matillano of the Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG).
Director Matillano charged respondent Valera with criminaloffenses involving violation of various provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019,the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines
(TCCP), Executive Order No. 38, Executive Order No. 298, andR.A. No. 6713
as well as administrative offenses of Grave
Misconduct and Serious Irregularity in the Performance of
Duty. Likewise subject of the same sworn complaint was
respondent Valeras brother-in-law Ariel Manongdo for violation
of Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019.
a. Violation of EO No. 156 & EO No. 38
A. Valera had compromised the case against the Steel Asia Manufacturing
Corporation while in the performance of his official functions without proper
authority from the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and without the
approval of the President which caused undue injury to the government by having
deprived the government of its right to collect the legal interest, surcharges,
litigation expenses and damages and gave the Steel Asia unwarranted benefits in
the total uncollected amount of P14,762,467.70 which is