PRESIDENTIALISM AND REPRESENTATION
RESHAPING POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
READING
Smith, Democracy, chs. 5-6
OUTLINE
1. Democratic challenges: survival and consolidation
2. Presidentialism or parliamentarism?
3. Proposals for reform
4. The legislative arena
5. The plight of political parties
6. The judicial branch
7. Sources of disenchantment
DEMOCRATIC CHALLENGES
Survival and consolidation of democracyAvoidance of the past (and military coups)Questions: Would institutional changes help? Did prior
crises result from institutional problems? And could they be repaired?
PRESIDENTIALISM OR PARLIAMENTARISM?
Presidentialism:Head of government (president) is directly electedFixed term in officeCannot be removed by legislature (except through
impeachment)Selects cabinet ministersHead of government is also head of stateSeparation of legislative-executive powers
PRESIDENTIALISM OR PARLIAMENTARISM?
Parliamentarism:Voters elect MPs MPs select head of government (PM)MPs approve cabinet appointmentsPM (and cabinet officers) dependent on continuing
confidence of parliamentHead of government (PM) is not head of stateFusion of legislative-executive powers
PRO-PARLIAMENTARY ARGUMENTS
Avoid “temporal rigidity,” so crises of government would not become crises of regime
Avoid polarization from zero-sum gameAvoid paralyzing deadlockThus superior durability of parliamentary regimes
PRO-PRESIDENTIALIST ARGUMENTS
Clarity of fixed time horizonChecks and balancesDemocratic election of head of governmentNot the cause of immobilism (PR the cause)Empirical findings result from “selection bias”
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
BrazilArgentinaChileWhy not?
Insistence on election of chief executive Advent of polling, reduction of uncertainty Low esteem for congress, parties Politics of nostalgia
ENGINEERING PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEMS
Electing presidents:Plurality vs. MROMRO a “magic bullet”Reelection or not?
Power domains:Constitutional or partisan?Bureaucracy, judiciary, militaryDecree authority
THE LEGISLATIVE ARENA
Electoral Systems:SMDs and two-party politicsPR and multi-party politicsEffects of district magnitudeClosed-list vs. open-list ballotsThe problem of term limits
Institutional Performance:Essentially “reactive” legislaturesRemoving presidents?
LEVELS OF POPULAR TRUST (1996-2007)
Church ~ 70%Armed Forces ~ 50%Media (TV+print) ~ 40%Congress ~ 30%Parties ~ 20%
THE PLIGHT OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Diversity of party systems
Levels of popular confidence
Figure 6-1. Average Number of Political Parties: Selected Countries, 1940-77 and 1978-2000
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Venezuela
Uruguay
Peru
Ecuador
Costa Rica
Colombia
Chile
Brazil
Bolivia
Argentina
Number of Parties1978-2000
1944-1977
Counting Political Parties:
N = 1 / (Σ pi2)
Where pi is the proportion of votes earned by the i-th party (or, alternatively, the proportion of seats in the legislature)
Figure 6-3. Levels of Confidence in Political Parties, 1996 and 2000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Venezuela
Uruguay
Peru
Paraguay
Mexico
Ecuador
Colombia
Chile
Central America
Bolivia
Brazil
Argentina
Percentage responding "a lot" or "some" confidence
1996
2000
THE JUDICIAL BRANCH
Authoritarian Regimes Control of courts Emphasis on legalities Rule by law ǂ rule of law
Advent of Democracy Deference to executive authority Weak checks and balances Extrajudicial killings (meta bala)
A Continuing Challenge Mexico: 1994 reforms, drug trafficking threats Venezuela: packing of courts Strong in Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica; 12/18 countries in bottom
one-third of all (World Bank on “rule of law”)
THE POLITICS OF DISENCHANTMENT
Weakness of representative institutions + judiciary branch (i.e., rule of law)
Constraints on modern-day democracyInadequate policy performance Tendency toward “delegative” or “illiberal” democracyThus 55% would support authoritarian government if it
could improve economic situation (2004)
AND THE RISE OF THE LEFT
Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998)Lula, Brazil (2002)Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005)…
Reliance on democratic electionsVote as popular protestPossibilities of winningChallenge of governing