Public-Private Partnerships in Education
Contracting Forms
Harry Anthony PatrinosThe World Bank
2010
75 Million Children Out of School Low Academic Achievement
Private Enrollment 1991-2003Returns to Education by Level
26.6
18.917.0
13.119.0
10.8
05
101520253035
Primary Secondary Higher
Private Social
Latest estimates (97 countries)
113% 109%
12%1%
76%
21%
52%
15%
-13%
-1%
18%
-5%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
120%
Africa ArabStates
LatinAmerica
Pacific South &East Asia
CentralAsia
PrivatePublic
Premise
Government’s Role• Externalities• Capital market
imperfections• Agency concerns• Equity• Information asymmetries
Variety of Instruments• Ownership/Delivery• Funding• Regulation/Information
PPPs can be defined as a contract that a government makes with a private service provider to acquire a specified service of a defined quantity and quality at an agreed price for a specified period
Provision Finance Private Public Private
Private schools Private universities Home schooling Tutoring
User fees Student loans
Public
Vouchers Contract Schools Charter schools Contracting out
Public schools Public universities
Framework
Nascent IntegralEmerging EngagedLacks
Public provides, finances, regulates education services
Vouchers, Loans, Scholarships. Funding follows student.
Moderate
Subsidies to private schools
Contracts with private schools to provide a portion of education.
Private schools
Low PPP High PPP
100% Public 100% Private
Private Management of public schools
PPP Continuum
PPP Continuum and Coverage
0102030405060708090
100
Bangladesh Philippines United States Netherlands
Emerging Moderate Engaged Integral
Cove
rage
69%
9%5%
100%
Benefits of PPPs
• Efficiency• Service delivery• Specialized skills• Overcome public service restrictions• Quicker response
Concerns
• Contracting out services is controversial– Privatization– Socioeconomic segregation– Poorer students left behind
But these are empirical questions• Base decisions on facts, not opinions• How to evaluate
Issues
• Resistance from certain stakeholders– Teachers and other employees– Civil service
Can block, severely delay, stifle reforms…• Consultation• Quality of contract design, implementation→ Create credible evidence
Empirical strategy
Country & study Outcome variable
Result
Randomization Colombia (Angrist, Bettinger & Kremer 2006)
Test scores 0.2 SD
Colombia (Angrist et al 2002)
Test scores 0.2 SD
Korea (Kang 2007) Test scores; peer effects
1 SD increase in quality of peers enhances math scores at 0.25 & 0.50 quantiles by 0.47 & 0.42 SD
Instrumental variable
Chile (Hsieh & Urquiola 2006)
Test scores Sorting, through peer effects
Chile (Gallegos 2004)
Test scores
0.20 SD
Chile (Contreras, Bettinger & Sepulveda 2008)
Test scores 0
Sweden (Sandström & Bergström 2004)
No failing grades Competition improves public schools
Netherlands (Himmler 2007)
Test scores Competition promotes achievement
Denmark (Andersen & Serritzlew 2006)
Test scores Competition does not improve scores
Heckman correction
model
Chile (McEwan 2001) Test scores Catholic voucher outperform Chile (Sapelli and Vial 2004)
Test scores 0.5 SD
Chile (Elacqua Contreras & Salazar 2008)
Test scores Franchise schools 0.20 - 0.50 SD > private independent schools
Evidence on Private School Choice
Education Service Contracting:The Philippines
Concession Schools:Bogotá, Colombia
Private Education Provision and Public Finance: The Netherlands