ReasonofStateandPredatoryMonarchyintheDutchRepublic,1638‐1675
TheLegacyoftheDucdeRohan
MarianneKlerk
ReasonofStateandPredatoryMonarchyintheDutchRepublic,1638‐1675
TheLegacyoftheDucdeRohan
StaatsraisonenRoofzuchtigeMonarchieindeNederlandseRepubliek,1638‐1675
DeerfenisvanDucdeRohan
MarianneKlerk
i
ReasonofStateandPredatoryMonarchyintheDutchRepublic,1638‐1675
TheLegacyoftheDucdeRohan
StaatsraisonenRoofzuchtigeMonarchieindeNederlandseRepubliek,1638‐1675
DeerfenisvanDucdeRohan
THESIS
ToobtainthedegreeofDoctorfromtheErasmusUniversityRotterdam
Bycommandoftherectormagnificus
Prof.dr.H.A.P.Pols
AndinaccordancewiththedecisionoftheDoctorateBoard
Thepublicdefenseshallbeheldon
Thursday27Octoberat11.30hours
By
MarianneBarbaraKlerk
BorninMiddelburg,theNetherlands
ii
DoctoralCommitte:
Promotor:
Prof.dr.R.C.F.vonFriedeburg
OtherMembers
Prof.dr.H.J.M.Nellen
Prof.dr.L.vanBunge
Prof.dr.K.vanBerkel
Co‐promotor:
Prof.dr.C.Condren
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HawkRoosting
Isitinthetopofthewood,myeyesclosed.
Inaction,nofalsifyingdream
Betweenmyhookedheadandhookedfeet:
Orinsleeprehearseperfectkillsandeat.
Theconvenienceofthehightrees!
Theair'sbuoyancyandthesun'sray
Areofadvantagetome;
Andtheearth'sfaceupwardformyinspection.
Myfeetarelockedupontheroughbark.
IttookthewholeofCreation
Toproducemyfoot,myeachfeather:
NowIholdCreationinmyfoot.
(…)
byTedHughes(1930‐1998),Lupercal(London:FaberandFaber,1960).
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TableofContents
Chapter1Introduction 1
1.1Thecrisisoftheruleoflawandthestruggletorestoreorder 31.2Restating‘statebuilding’:dynasticagglomerate,societyofprincesand
monarchytransformed 61.3Theearlymodernfashionofreasonofstate 81.4Predatorymonarchy 141.5ApproachandContents 16
Chapter2Del’interest(1638)byHenrideRohan:satirethroughinterestanalysis 19
2.1HenrideRohan:Huguenotwarrior,nobleprinceandfamousauthor 23 2.2ThebackdropofRohan’sreasonofstate 26
2.2.1Frenchreasonorinterestofstate? 272.2.2MonarchyincrisisandRichelieu’scrisismanagementofreasonofstate 312.2.3Betweenfactandfiction:thethreatofthe‘newmonarchy’ 33
2.3Satirebyinterestanalysis:SpanishunrestrictedtyrannyandFrenchpatrioticunity 37
2.3.1‘TheinterestofSpaine’ 382.3.2‘TheinterestofFrance’ 432.3.3Failedinterestmanagement:argumentfromhistory 47
Chapter3Republicanismrevisited:reasonofstateand‘wardespotism’byPieterdelaCourt 53
3.1‘Wardespotism’ 57 3.2PieterdelaCourt:textilemerchant,aspiringregentandcontroversialauthor 60 3.2.1Intellectualbackground:self‐interest,reasonofstateandharmonyofinterests62 3.2.2‘Wardespotism’inHetwelvarenderstadLeyden(1659) 67 3.2.3TheOrange‐Republic 69 3.2.4Thestadholderlessregime:warfare,taxation,debating‘interest’and‘freedom’ 71 3.2.5TheOrangistrevivalof1660‐1661 74
3.3Reasonofstateand‘wardespotism’inInterestvanHolland 77
3.3.1‘Holland’unifiedinan‘interest’ 783.3.2The‘interest’of‘wardespotism’ 793.3.3The‘interest’ofHollandinEurope 873.3.4Freedomoftrade,religionandgovernment 90
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Chapter4LisolaandLouisXIV’sFrenchmonarchy:universalmonarchyandreasonofstate 99
4.1Illustriousdiplomatandanti‐FrenchpamphleteerduringtheriseofLouisXIV101
4.1.1High‐profilediplomat 1024.1.2Polemicalpublicist 1054.1.3Bouclier:reasonofstateandlegalargumentation 1064.1.4TheriseoftheFrenchmonarchy:expansionistand‘absolute’ 109
4.2Bouclier:reasonofstate,EuropeanlegalorderandtheFrenchhazard 112
4.2.1Preface:agentleattackonLouisXIV 1124.2.2Firstfivearticles:legalrebuttalandtheimageofapredatorymonarchy 1154.2.3Sixtharticle:interestofstate 1194.2.4TheinterestofSpain:goodgovernmentversusFrance’spredatorymonarchy 1224.2.3TheinterestofFrance:‘Robberies’,‘Conquerors’,‘absolute’,‘MastersofEurope’ 124
Chapter5PetrusValkenier’s‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675):reasonofstatetorestoreorder 131
5.1Valkenierand‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675):anti‐Frenchdiplomacy,crisisoforderandLisola’slegacy 134
5.1.2PetrusValkenierandhisanti‐Frenchandpro‐Protestantdiplomacy 1355.1.3TheCrisisofOrderandthe‘YearofDisaster’,1672 1395.1.4Lisola’slegacy:universalmonarchy,balanceofpowerandreligion 151
5.2‘tVerwerdEuropa:theruleoflawandreasonofstate 154
5.2.1FivepillarsofeveryPoliticalState 1565.2.2FrenchinterestsofstateandPredatoryMonarchy 1665.2.3InterestanalysisofEurope 1725.2.4Dutchinterestofstate 175
Chapter6Conclusion 181
SourcesandBibliography 187
Archivalmaterial 187 Primaryprintedsources 187 Secondaryliterature 194Summaries 209
CurriculumVitae 219
Acknowledgements 221
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Thisresearchwas fundedbytheNetherlandsOrganisation forScientificResearch(NWO).Thestudy is part of a larger research project ‘Reason of state’ or ‘reason of princes’? The ‘newmonarchy and its opponents in France, Germany and the Netherlands, during the seventeenthcentury (2011‐2016). The research was supervised by prof. dr. R.C.F. von Friedeburg andcomprisedfourprojectsofwhichthepresentstudyisone.IngmarVroomenexaminedtheuseoffatherland rhetoric in Dutch pamphlets (1618‐1672) as a response to foreign threats andinternalstrife.AnnemiekeRomeinstudiedtheemploymentoffatherland‐terminologyinestatedebates in Jülich and Hesse‐Cassel between 1642‐1655, and in Brittany France in the period1648‐1652. Jesper Schaap examined the use of the idiom of reason of state in the politicalwritingsofHenriDucdeRohan(1579‐1638)andGabrielNaudé(1600‐1653).
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Chapter1Introduction
A common view among historians has been that in there was a disintegration of the late
medievalandrenaissanceregimenpoliticumetregale,basedonChristianhumanism,ruleoflaw
(divine,divinelynaturalandpartlypositive),andonvirtueessentiallybasedonChristianity,as
illustrated by Erasmus’ Institutio principis christiani (1516); and that in its place arose the
polarities of absolutism and republicanism, with France and Spain versus England and the
Netherlands as foremost examples.1 This view has slowly collapsed: the historiographical
conceptofabsolutismhasbeenrathererodedordemythicized,atleastinthesenseofamonarch
being free from law–Louis XIV scrupulously followedpositive law and ruledwith consent or
consultationoftheEstatesandparlements;2andrecentlythenotionofrepublicanismhasbeen
challenged –Helmer Helmers has convincingly argued that the Dutch were full‐heartedly
‘RoyalistRepublicans’ after the execution of Charles I; or it has beenqualified as entailing by
degrees a monarchical element, as is suggested by Patrick Collinson’s notion of the English
‘monarchicalrepublic’.3Andrepublicsmightbeno lessshyofassertingaprincipleofabsolute
1SeeinparticularHelmutG.Koenigsberger,‘MonarchiesandParliamentsinEarlyModernEuropeDominiumRegaleorDominiumPoliticumetRegale’,TheoryandSociety5:2(1978),191‐217.2 See for instanceRobert vonFriedeburg and JohnMorrill (eds.),Monarchy transformed:princesand theirelites inearlymodernWesternEurope(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2017,forthcoming),inparticularintroductionand conclusion; Nicholas Henshall, The Myth Of Absolutism: Change And Continuity In Early Modern EuropeanMonarchy (London: Longmann, 1992); Ronald G. Asch andHeinz Duchhardt (eds.),DerAbsolutismus‐‐einMythos?:Strukturwandel monarchischer Herrschaft in West‐ und Mitteleuropa (ca. 1550‐1700) (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna:Bölhau,1996);JohanSommerville,‘EarlyModernAbsolutism’,inCesareCutticaandGlennBurgess(eds.),Monarchismand Absolutism in EarlyModern Europe (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012), 117‐130. Sommerville (re)definesabsolutist political thought in line with revisionist socio‐economic historical research as a model of ‘socialcollaboration’betweentheCrownanditselites.3HelmerHelmers,TheRoyalistRepublic.Literature,Politics,andReligionintheAnglo‐DutchPublicSphere,1639–1660(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 2015).Helmers persuasively explained the staunch support amongst theDutch for Stuart royalism under the ‘republican’ (stadholderless) regime of 1650‐1672 after the regicide; PatrickCollinsonhasstressedtherepublicancharacter(highlevelofsocialcollaborationbetweenCrownanditselites)oftheEnglish monarchy for Elizabethan England. Patrick Collinson, ‘The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I’, inBulletin of the John Rylands Library LXIX (1987), 394‐424. Mark Goldie stressed this republican character of theEnglish monarchy on a more general level. Mark Goldie, ‘The Unacknowledged Republic: Officeholding in EarlyModernEngland’, inTimHarris(ed.),ThePoliticsoftheExcluded,c.1500‐1850(London:PalgraveMacmillan,2001),153‐194.SeeSommerville’scriticalremarkontheoverlappingdefinitionofrepublicanismandabsolutismintermsofthe social collaboration model. Sommerville, ‘Early Modern Absolutism’, 118‐119. See also in the same volumeMichael J. Seidler’s comment that the contestation of ‘absolutism’ as political language ‘has also undermined thecounterpart language of “democracy” or “republicanism” (…) the opposition assumed in such discussions ismisconceived.’ Michael J. Seidler, ‘Monstrous’ Pufendorf: Sovereignty and system in the Dissertations’, in CesareCutticaandGlennBurgess(eds.),MonarchismandAbsolutisminEarlyModernEurope(London:PickeringandChatto,2012),159‐176,p.159;SeeforinstancePerez’sZagorinreviewofthetwovolumesfrom2002onrepublicanismbyMartinvanGelderenandQuentinSkinner,inwhichhestressedthevarietyofunderstandingsof‘republicanism’andthesubsequentconfusionofwhatrepublicanismentails; itmaybereadasageneralcritiqueon theconcept.PerezZagorin, ‘Republicanisms’,BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy11:4(2003),701‐712;RobertvonFriedeburg,‘RepublicsandRepublicanism’,in:HamishScott(ed.),TheOxfordHandbookofEarlyModernEurope(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2015),538‐559.
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sovereigntyasamonarch.ForwriterslikeHobbessovereigntywasaprincipledefiningapolity
beyondthevagariesofparticularform.Inaddition,enlightenedthoughtasthatofPufendorfor
Montesquieu is perceived as monarchy constrained by law rather than absolutism or
republicanism.4PerhapsweshouldkeepinmindthatearlymodernEuropeanssharedamuch
broaderconsensusabout thenecessityof theaccountabilityofgovernment than thenotionof
‘republicanism’ as a subversive ideology suggests, so helping to create an exaggerated
dichotomybetweenitandtheconceptof‘absolutism’.TherupturesinconfessionalChristianity
oftheReformationandthegrowingscaleofEuropeanwarfarebroughtforthaperceivedcrisis
of the rule of law beyondmodern ideological divisions. Authors struggled to reconstruct and
defend a rule of law, while its own basis, confessional Christianity and Aristotle, slowly
dissolved.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore changes in understandings of ‘interest’ and
‘reasonofstate’;notasabstractandcoherent theoriesaboutmodernisationandasecularised
conceptionofthepolitical,butasresponsestoverypracticalandimmediatepoliticalproblems,
challengesandcrises,producingquiteunintendedconsequences.Itdoessothroughtheadaptive
referencetoandrelianceuponHenriDucdeRohanwhoprovided,asitisargued,avocabulary
organisedintoawayofseeingthepoliticalworldthatwasitselfstimulatedandconstrainedbya
perceived crisis, both national and ‘international’, secular as well as religious. Through the
subsequent use of Rohan and the employment of his vocabulary of interest we can see
somethingoftheingenuityofargumentunderdirectpressures.Theresultwasbothtoestablish
Rohanasanauthority,providingaseminalandpersuasively inescapable text thatshapedand
constrainedargument;andasresourceforadaptation.Inallthecasesdiscussedandcoheredby
reference toRohan, the stimulus to argumentwas a sense of immediate anddire threat, best
summarised by the notion of a predatorymonarchy, sometimes deemed despotic, sometimes
tyrannical,usuallyarbitraryinitsactionsoranticipatedconduct,sometimesallthree,butalways
endangeringafragilepeace,andasenseofacceptableorder.Suchapostulatedorderwasoften
takenasinvolvingaruleoflaw,sometimesamoralregimeshieldedfromcorruption,sometimes
a putative balance of power between competing interests. In all cases what mattered was
specifyingandanalysingthedanger,thepredator.What itthreatenedcouldoftenberelatively
unspecific,evenopentothereadertoidentifyforhimself.Thisfocusontheevilsofapredatory
monarchywascentral toRohan’swholeunderstandingof interest—interestwasthemeansof
casting light on its dangers. But having set the tone in demonising Habsburg‐Spain with the
concomitantimperativetoFrancetostandopposedinitsowntrueinterest,Rohan’sperspective
wascomplimentedbythewealthofevidenceprovidedbytheimperialdiplomatFrançois‐Paul 4 Seidler, “Monstrous” Pufendorf’; Paul A. Rahe, Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty:War, Religion, Commerce,Climate,Terrain,Technology,UneasinessofMind, theSpiritofPoliticalVigilance,and theFoundationsof theModernRepublic(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2009).
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deLisola,who turned the forceofargumentagainstFrance.Thenotionsof interest, reasonof
stateandpredatorymonarchycouldbegivendifferent,evenopposingcontent,asisclearfrom
the contrasts between Rohan and Lisola, the Dutch authors Pieter de la Court and Petrus
Valkenier.5
The result is a textual history through crises that adds a different dimension to
expressionsof‘reasonofstate’and‘interest’,establishedlawasasocialnorm,politicalsocietyas
morethandependentonthemoralityofaruler,andtheambiguitiesofsecularisation, insome
waysaprocessthatwastheunintendedconsequenceofdeeplyheldreligiousbeliefs.
Thisgeneralpictureofasecularisingchangeinthetermsthroughwhichtheruleoflaw
couldbe reformulatedwill bediscussedmorebelow. Immediately, however, it shouldbe said
thatitprovideslessadirectcontextthanabackgroundforthisstudy.Thatis,thetextsstudied
did not share a preoccupationwith a crisis in the rule of law. Rather, by their concernwith
predatory monarchy, with arbitrary conduct and tyranny, that knows no boundaries, they
presupposed theexistenceof lawsandnorms that couldbeviolatedandemphasised thedire
consequencesofdoingso.Thusasanunintendedconsequenceofparticularandevenopposing
concernswiththepredatory,theyhelpedestablishaspaceinwhichattemptstoreconceptualise
theruleof lawcouldbeplayedout. Inotherwords, thegeneralpictureconcernswhatoverall
was happening, this concerns what people were doing, responding to what worried them in
waysthatfacilitatedsuchchanges.
1.1 Thecrisisoftheruleoflawandthestruggletorestoreorder
Theruleof lawintheseventeenthcenturywasahighlyevocativeexpressionandentailednot
necessarily a conceptual contentwithwhichwe are familiar, not least the independence of a
judiciary and an agreement on constitutional ground rules; it rather amounted to a variable
topos, sustaining authority, directly or indirectly fromAristotle’s insistence that lawmade for
betterrulethanmen(Politicsbk3).6MedievalcommentatorsmouldedfromancientGreekand
5HenrideRohan,Del’interestdesprincesetestatsdelaChrestienté(1638);François‐PauldeLisola,Bouclierd'EstatetdejusticecontreledesseinmanifestementdécouvertdelaMonarchieUniverselle,souslevainprétextedespretentionsdelaReynedeFrance([Brussels:FrançoisFoppens],1667);V.D.H.,InterestvanHollandoftedeGrondenvanHollands‐Welvaren (Amsterdam: ‘Cyprianus van der Gracht’, 1662); Petrus Valkenier, ‘t Verwerd Europa ofte politieke enhistorischebeschrijvingederwaarefundamentenenoorzakenvandeoorlogenenrevolutieninEuropavoornamentlijkinen omtrent de Nederlanden zedert den jaare 1664. Gecauseert door de gepretendeerde UniverselenMonarchie derFranschen(Amsterdam:HendrikenDirkBoom,1675).6See for instanceMartinKrygier, ‘TheRuleofLaw:Legality,Teleology,Sociology’, inGianluigiPalombellaandNeilWalker(eds.),RelocatingtheRuleofLaw(Oxford:HartPublishing,2009),45‐69.Krygierstressesthedifferencewitharulebylaw,whichreferstopoliticalpowerexercisedbylegalmeans,butrequirementsoftheruleoflawarelacking;forexample, the ruler isnot reliablyandeffectively constrainedby law,or lawsare secret, impossible toknow, tounderstand,toperform;Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,13;Aristotle,Politics,Politics:BooksIIIandIV,translatedwith
4
Romansourcesand fromRomanLawadivineanddivinely inspirednatural law.Althoughthe
Fall obscured it to some extent, commentators such as Thomas Aquinas argued that God
imprintedonmankindvirtuesandknowledgeonhowtolivetogetherinsociety.Allmenhadto
operate under divine natural law. During the second half of the sixteenth century scepticism
arosetowardstheextremelybroadAristotelian‐Christiannotionoftheruleoflaw,ofrulebound
society.7 From the late sixteenth up to the end of the seventeenth century incessantwarfare,
confessional strife, civil wars and coercive princely politics gave rise to a perceived crisis of
order,muchofwhich focussedon the absenceor erosionof reliable law. The ‘crisis of order’
culminatedinthenumerousrevoltsthroughoutEuropeinthe1640sand1650s.InEngland,for
instance, thekillingofKingCharlesIandArchbishopLaudrupturedandevensubvertedbasic
assumptionsabouthierarchy,disciplineandorder,aboutsocialandpolitical legitimacy.8From
the last third of the seventeenth century onwards authors, such as Pierre Bayle, increasingly
blamedconfessionalpropagandaandclergy(insteadofpoliticalactors)forthestrangeupsurge
ofconflictsandcivilwarsfromthe1620until1650s.Moreover,contemporariesmoreandmore
underlined thedangerofpoliticaldisintegrationunder therisingburdenof taxationanddebt,
broughtforthbytheintensificationofwarfare.9
Thepicturewasasconfusedasitwasenrichedthroughtheprintingpress,butMichael
Stolleis has suggested a general trend that makes sense of much that was written: ‘As the
foundations of Christianity were increasingly undermined in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuriesbytheformationofdifferentconfessionsandbysuccessivewarsofreligion,sotoodid
modern politics and the rule of law determined by principalities become increasingly
emancipatedfromprescribedreligiouscontent.’Heobservestwoshiftsaccordingly.Therewas
an increasing stress on experience and observation to examine the nature of the political
(temporal) world. The historical example functioned to determine natural law or to predict
behaviour of political actors as in interest analyses. Second was ‘an erosion of the Christian
element in the justification of law.’ The growing practice of ‘communal and territorial laws’
anintroductionbyRichardRobinsonandasupplementaryessaybyDavidKeyt(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),BookIII,1287a‐1278b,p.58‐63.7RichardTuck,PhilosophyandGovernment,1572–1651(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),31‐64.8RobertvonFriedeburg,‘How"new"isthe"NewMonarchy"?ClashesbetweenprincesandnobilityinEurope'sIronCentury’,inLeidschrift.Aanhethof.Rivaliteit,legitimiteitensuccessiestrijdaandeEuraziatischehoven,1250–175027(2012),17‐30;JustinChampion,"Religion'sSafe,withPriestcraftistheWar":AugustanAnticlericalismandtheLegacyoftheEnglishRevolution,1660‐1720’,TheEuropeanLegacy5:4(2000),547‐561,‘crisisoforder’onp.548‐549;BlairWorden,‘MarchamontNedhamandtheBeginningsofEnglishRepublicanism’,in:DavidWootton(ed.),Republicanism,Liberty,andCommercialSociety(Stanford:StanfordUniversityPress,1994),45‐81,a‘crisisofmonarchy’1640s‐1650sonp.72;GlennBurgess,ThePoliticsoftheAncientConstitution:anIntroductiontoEnglishPoliticalThought1603‐1642(Basingstoke:Macmillan,1992),fortheidealofthe‘pacifiedpolity’p.159‐164andforthecrisisofthattheideal,the‘crisisofthecommonlaw’chapterVIIandVIII.9 Heinz Schilling, ‘Confessional Europe’, in Thomas A. Brady, Heiko Augustinus Oberman, James D. Tracy (eds),Handbook ofEuropeanhistory,1400‐1600: lateMiddleAges,Renaissance,andReformation,Volume2 (Leiden: Brill,1995),641‐682,p.667‐670;RobertvonFriedeburg,‘How"new"isthe"NewMonarchy"?’,17‐30;MichaelSonenscher,Before theDeluge.PublicDebt, Inequalityand the IntellectualOriginsof theFrenchRevolution (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,2007).
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underminedtheinvocationofGodanddifferentiatednotionsoflegality.10Asaresult,theruleof
law survived as a basic normative issue despite the breakdown of the major religious
foundationsithadinconfessionalChristianity.Thetwoshiftshenotesarecertainlypertinentto
thewritersdiscussedhere.Theydoputfaithinthedetailsofempiricalexperience;andalbeitfor
very different reasonsmarginalise confessional divisions. In the case ofRohan, this has given
risetothemythofobjectivityinhisconceptionofinterest; inthecaseofPetrusValkenier,the
distinctionbetweentheuniversalcontentofreligionfrominstitutionalisedconfessions,(derived
verymuch fromHugo Grotius)was ameans bywhich he could assert a genuine pietywhile
isolatingreligioussectsaspartofacrisisoforder.
Atdifferent levelsof formalitywriters in the lateseventeenthcenturywereconcerned
withacrisisoforder,moreorlesssystematicallyfocussingonconceptionsof law.Atthemost
sustained level of philosophical coherence Samuel Pufendorf remains the most significant.
Pufendorf’snaturallawargumentwasaconsciouslylaunderedversionofHobbes’sargumentsin
Decive;the‘state’aslegalpersonasguardianoflawwasthesolutiontodisorder;thestateheld
undivided sovereignty and was likewise represented by the ruler. Unlike Hobbes, however,
Pufendorfstressedthefacultyofapeaceablesociabilitythatenableshumanslivinginthestate
ofnaturetoassociateandestablishastateforathoroughprotectionoflifeandproperty,choose
a form of government and be subject to the ruler, ‐a situation that could be reversed if the
sovereign subverted the fundamental laws, or theoverriding purposes forwhich societywas
instituted.11Pufendorf’s empirical‐historical analysisof interestofEurope inEinleitungzuder
HistoriedervornehmstenReicheundStaatenso itzigerZeit inEuropasichbefinden(1682)was
rooted in his natural law theory.12 Pufendorf stated that rulers had their (natural law)
obligations,particularly toprovidesecurity, for theirsubjects.Tothisend, itwasnecessaryto
analyseandadapttothe ‘true’ interestsofstateasdeterminedbyitsparticularcharacteristics
10MichaelStolleis,‘TheLegitimationofLawthroughGod,Tradition,Will,NatureandConstitution’,inLorraineDastonandMichaelStolleis(eds.),NaturalLawandLawsofNatureinEarlyModernEuropeJurisprudence,Theology,MoralandNaturalPhilosophy(Farnham:Ashgate,2008),45‐55,p.46.11HansErichBödeker,Debatingtherespublicamixta:GermanandDutchPoliticalDiscoursearound1700, inQuentinSkinner andMartin van Gelderen (eds.),Republicanism:A SharedEuropeanHeritage.Volume I,Republicanism andConstitutionalism in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 219‐246, p. 229‐237;RobertvonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy.TheThirtyYearsWarandtheModernNotionof'State'intheEmpire,1530sto1790s(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2016),315‐317.12MichaelSeidlerpointstootherwritersbeforePufendorf,whohadstudiedthehistoriesofEuropeanpolitiesorhadwrittencontemporaryinterestanalysesofEuropeexemplifiedbyoneoftheauthorsofthisthesis,PetrusValkenier.SeidlerarguesthatPufendorf’sinnovationwashisanalysisofinterest(stressonmodernhistory)rootedinhisnaturallaw theory; ‘The latter is an internal, constitutivematter involvinga state’s legitimate claim to sovereignauthorityover itsmembers,whiletheformerisexternallyorientedandconcernstheeffectiveperformanceof itsnatural lawobligations (particularly security) in an international context, onwhich the claim to internal sovereignty rests. Inshort, a state’s raisond’état is rooted in its raisond’etre.’Michael J. Seidler, ‘Introduction’ toSamuelPufendorf,AnIntroductiontotheHistoryofthePrincipalKingdomsandStatesofEurope,translatedbyJocodusCrull(1695),editedbyMichaelSeidler(Indianapolis:LibertyFund,2013),ix‐xl,quotedfromp.xxxiiandfortheassociationwithValkenierp. xvii; See also FriedrichMeinecke for the positioning of Petrus Valkenier’s ‘tVerwerdEuropa in the tradition ofPufendorf’s interestanalysisofEuropeanregimes.FriedrichMeinecke,Machiavellism:TheDoctrineofRaisond’Étatand Its Place in Modern History, translated by Douglass Scott, introduction by Werner Stark (New Brunswick:TransactionPublishers,1997),287‐288.
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and circumstances, as well as relations with other rulers. He distinguished a real from an
imaginaryreasonofstate,suchasthepretendedinterestof‘universalmonarchy’towhichstates
wereinclined;andaperpetual interest(geography,characterofthepeople)fromatemporary
one(externalrelations).13Interestingly,inthetraditionofLisolaandValkenier,heassessedthe
predatory nature of the French monarchy that ruled a densely populated territory with a
passionately warlike people given to robbery by conquest and threatened the survival of
neighbouringpolities. Foreignpolicy implieda careful considerationof external affairs,which
couldeasilytransformintodomesticconflictsandviceversa,anddemandedaconstantadaption
tochangingcircumstances.However,insuchaworldofchangeandconflicttheChristianmoral
dutyofmentowardstheirfellowmenremainedthebasisofsecuritywithinsocieties.14
Perhaps because he did not pretend to the sort of philosophical coherencewe find in
Pufendorf,Valkenier offered his readers no explicit conception of the rule of law; but he did
share contemporary concerns for the consequences of expanded warfare and fractured
confessional religion:mob rule,meddling priests, power‐hungry regents and plunder princes,
for all of which the imperatives of divine law and the order that might stem from it was
inadequateprotection.ForValkenier,theevocationoftheruleoflawwasameansofcombining
a reassuring appeal to justicewith reason of state, and of urging the necessity of a powerful
prince(withprerogativesofaction)whilecastigatingthearbitrarinessofpredatorymonarchy.
1.2 Restating‘statebuilding’:dynasticagglomerate,societyofprincesandmonarchy
transformed
HistorianshavearguedthattheintensificationofwarfareinearlymodernEuropepressedrulers
to develop standing armies and administrations eventually leading to the establishment of
modern bureaucratic tax states. This transformation was defined as early modern ‘state
building’inwhichrulersbuiltuptheirstateapparatusbycoerciveextractionofresources,e.g.
throughtaxationoftheirunwillingsubjectsandinsubordinateelites,whichincreasedtheruler’s
means to coerce themevenmore. 15Historianshave also claimed that the growinguseof the
13Pufendorfthirdlydistinguishedbetweenaprivateandpublicinterestconcerningthedangerofthepursuitofthepersonal interests of domestic factions or the ruler in opposition to the common welfare. Samuel Pufendorf, AnIntroductiontotheHistoryofthePrincipalKingdomsandStatesofEurope,translatedbyJocodusCrull(1695),editedbyMichaelSeidler(Indianapolis:LibertyFund,2013),5‐9.14SeeforthisassessmentVonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,324:‘Tobesure,Pufendorfstressedthatmonarchyandtheestablishmentofunityina‘state’wereindispensablegiventhepredatorynatureofkingdomslikeFranceandSpain’;Seidler,‘Introduction’,xxv‐xxxii.15SeeinparticularCharlesTilly,Coercion,CapitalandtheRiseofthestate(Oxford:BasilBlackwell,1990);Regardingtheconceptofthe‘coercion‐extractioncycle’readSamuelE.Finer,‘State‐andNation‐BuildinginEurope:theRoleoftheMilitary’,in:CharlesTilly(ed.),TheFormationofNationalStatesinEurope(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1975),84–163.
7
vocabularyofreasonofstatemirroredtheearlymoderntransformationofChristianEuropeinto
aEuropean systemof sovereign ‘states’.16Regarding thehistoryof political thought,Maurizio
Virolihasrightlypointedtotheseventeenth‐centuryshift fromthenotionofpoliticsbasedon
consentanddivinelaw,to‘reasonofstate’,i.e.governmentbasedoncoercion.17However,when
discussing‘reasonofstate’,authorsaddressedthenotionofrulerspursuingtheirinterests,not
‘states’pursuing‘nationalinterests’.
Since the 1950s the received notion of ‘state building’ as an intentional or strategic
activity has come under question.18 Institutionalised ‘states’with self‐conscious knowledge of
their ‘reason’ did not develop. First, historians have increasingly stressed the heterogonous
nature of European principalities.19 John Morrill recently coined the term ‘dynastic
agglomerates’ to address that dynasties ruled overmultiple landswith each polity having its
own customs, laws and societal power structures.Morrillwants to underline particularly the
unstablenatureofdynasticruleandtheinstabilityofhowtheseagglomerateswereformedor
rather collected by the ruling dynasties, and how they constantly changed form through
marriage politics, warfare, and inheritance; the success of modern states should not be
interpreted as an inevitableproductof their earlymodernpredecessors.20 Furthermore, early
modernruleentailedprimarilysovereignactsbyrulersasbearersofsovereignty(excludingthe
fewrepublics).Assuch,Europewasa‘sociétédesprinces’21morethanasystemof‘states’inthe
modernsenseofaunityof law,territoryandnation.Rulersbelongedtothesocietyofprinces
throughboundsofkinshipandmarriage;anditdeterminedlargelythemotivationsandaimsof
rulers’ ‘foreign’ policy in relation to the struggle over territories, resources and status.
Therefore,theadministrationofthedifferentagglomerates,therelationwiththelocalelites,was
ofvital importance forrulingdynasties.Moreover, thenumberofmembersof thissocietyhad 16 As one of the firstmodern historians, FriedrichMeinecke addressed earlymodern commentaries on ‘reason ofstate’asproductsoftheassumedriseofthemodernstate.Meinecke,Machiavellism.TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,1‐22;See for instanceWilliamF.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState, (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1970),13‐101, who wrote: ‘For this reason, his [Richelieu’s] massive program of state‐building was accompanied by anunremittingefforttoarticulatetheconceptofreasonofstate.’Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,101.17Viroliarguesthatthelatesixteenthandseventeenthcenturywitnessed‘arevolutionofpolitics’,i.e.‘thetriumphofthelanguageofreasonofstate’.Thisrevolutionarytriumphwasbasedonanideologicaltransitionfromthenotionof‘politicsastheartofpreservingarespublica,inthesenseofacommunityofindividualslivingtogetherinjustice’to‘politicsastheartofthestate‐theartofpreservingastate, inthesenseofaperson’sorgroup’spowerandcontroloverpublic institutions’.MaurizioViroli,FromPolitics toReasonofState.TheAcquisitionandTransformationof theLanguageofPolitics1250–1600(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1992),2‐3.18 For an early commentary seeKordulaWolf, ‘Il XCongresso Internazionaledi Scienze Storiche,Roma, settembre1955. Un bilancio Storiografico, Convegno Internazionale’, accessed May 7, 2016, http://dhi‐roma.it/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf‐dateien/Tagungsberichte/2005/tagung_1955.pdf.19Within thehistoriographya transition inaddressingearlymodernpolities isobservable, from RichardBonney’s‘dynasticstates’,viaJohnElliot’sterm‘compositemonarchies’,toMorrills‘dynasticagglomerate’.Thislatercoverstheorigins aswell as the nature of these polities: Richard Bonney,TheEuropeanDynastic States, 1494‐1660 (Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1991); ‘Compositemonarchies’was first formulated byH. G. Koenigsberger in 1975, see:JohnH.Elliott,‘AEuropeofCompositemonarchies’,Past&Present,No.137,TheCulturalandPoliticalConstructionofEurope (1992), 48‐71; JohnMorrill, “Uneasy lies thehead thatwearsa crown”.Dynastic crises inTudorand StuartBritain1504–1746TheStentonLecturefor2003(Reading:UniversityofReading,2005),11.20JohnMorrill,“Uneasyliestheheadthatwearsacrown”.21LucienBély,LasociétédesprincesXIVe‐XVIIesiècle(Paris:Fayard,1999).
8
decreased after the1650s as theEuropeanmilitary competition took its toll in respect of the
defeatofmanysmallpolitieseffectivelysubjectedbythepowerfuldynasticagglomerates.22
What is more, the true innovation brought forth by the growing scale of European
conflict was governmental debt on an unprecedented scale, which consequently transformed
monarchies intowar‐driven and debt‐ridden regimes. Since the 1490s, European rulerswere
sucked intoamaelstromofmilitarycompetition,not least fuelledby thedynasticcompetition
betweenHabsburg‐SpainandValois/Bourbon‐FrancefoughtintheEuropeanarena.Tofinance
theircostlywarfare,rulershadtofindnew,substantialresourcesbeyondrevenuetaxes:saleof
landsandoffices,suchastaxfarming,andborrowinghugeamountsofmoney.Thisresultedin
new collaborations with old and new elites, which took up the financial restructuring ‐
governmentbecameincreasinglyreliantonitselites.However,thesenewresourcesneverfilled
therapidlygrowinggapsinthebudgetsandbankruptcywasarecurringissueforearlymodern
monarchies.Monarchieswere transformed, based on a necessarily successful participation in
thewarcompetition.Withinthesemonarchiesthepoliticsofsellingofflandsandofficesresulted
indebatesaboutsuchpractices:aboutthefavouringofnewinvestorsovertheoldelites;about
themisuseofoffices;aboutthebestcourseinforeignpolicy;abouttheprinceunderminingthe
rule of law and endangering the rights and properties of the elites and subjects.23 At last,
controlling rising ‘opinion’, especially amongst those who ought to be persuaded to supply
resources,becameanothercrucialissuefordynasties.24Insuchdebatesargumentsofreasonof
statetookcentrestage.What,inshort,hasbeenseenasstatebuilding—thebusinessofstriving
towardstheconsummationofamodernstate,waslargelythecontingentoutcomeof tryingto
dealwithsuchawelterofspecificissuesandcrisesconfrontinggovernmentalcontinuity.Thus
ratherthanreflectinganintentiontobuildstates,reasonofstatemustbereconsidered.
1.3 Theearlymodernfashionofreasonofstate
The success of ‘reason of state’ was indebted to the prior, European‐wide acceptance of the
terminology of ‘state’. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, Italian authors began 22VonFriedeburg,'How'new'isthe'NewMonarchy'?’,22‐23;Confessionalisationcontributedtopoliticsofreasonofstate, not chiefly in accordancewith dynastic interests, butwith the interests of the different agglomerates.HeinzSchilling, Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen. Internationale Beziehungen 1559‐1660 (Schöningh: Paderborn,2007).23VonFriedeburgandMorrill(eds.),Monarchytransformed,inparticularintroductionandconclusion.24 Successes in the military competition were of grave importance for ruling dynasties as it contributed to theirpositioninthesocietyofprincesaswellastheirstatusofbeingafavorable investment.SeeinparticularTimC.W.Blanning,TheCultureofPowerand thePowerofCulture.OldRegimeEurope1660‐1789 (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002).Oneimportantaspectwerethenewmanifestationsofpoliticallegitimations,especiallythatof‘nationalidentity’ in the sense of the monarchy as useful and vital for the nation. He argues that Prussian and Britishmonarchieseventuallysucceededinthis,whiletheFrenchCrownwasunabletolegitimiseitself.ForhisargumentontheFrenchRevolutionseechapter8,pages357‐427.
9
discussing the ways to maintain the ‘state’ of the parvenu ‘new princes’ such as the Medici,
withoutrelyingonmore traditional idiomsof legitimationprovidedbyappeals tocivicvirtue.
From the1550s authors in Spain, France and theUnitedProvinces andEngland accepted the
terminologyof‘state’inallitsambiguousrangeofmeaningsfromprincelystatustoregime,and
wouldadopttheterminologyofreasonofstateintheextraordinarycircumstancesofreligious
civil strife from the end of the sixteenth century onwards.HarroHöpfl argues that ‘reasonof
state’becamepartofthe‘vocabularyoffashionablepoliticalcynicism’aboutthe‘true’motivesof
rulersspurredbytheexperiencesofreligiouswars,especiallyintheLowCountriesandFrance.
This vocabulary encompassed popular aphorisms and maxims such as necessitas non habet
legem andoderintdummetuant, andwas closely associatedwith the terminology of ‘politics’
(politics, policy, politica, politicus, politique), ‘statecraft’, ‘statism, ‘Machiavellism’, ‘interest of
state’, the Tacitist term arcana imperii, ‘secrets’ and ‘mysteries’. All these terms were fluidly
related and often interchangeable. Moreover, ‘reason’ and ‘state’ could mean many different
things.‘Reason’couldrefertoreasoning,ortheoutcomeofsuchargumentation,theintellectual
capacitytoreason,plainknowledge,arationaleorpurpose,andlegitimationofcertainactions.
‘State’couldmeanstatus,aconditionofsomething,princelystatus,anoffice,regime,respublica,
commonwealthanddominion.25Höpflarguesthat‘reasonofstate’hadaprecariousidentityand
was a highly suggestive term of art; and, therefore, it ought not to be seen as a theory or
concept.26
Yet, exactly because of its opacity reason of state became fashionable. Reason of state
wasemployedandtheorisedbydifferent,mostlyItalianauthorsearlierinthesixteenthcentury
andbecameapopularphrase fromthe1590sonwards. In1589 theex‐JesuitGiovanniBotero
publishedhisfamousworkDellaRagiondiStato,inwhichhedefinedreasonofstateas:‘Stateis
a stable dominion over people, and Reason of State is knowledge of the means suitable for
founding, conserving and augmenting a dominion established in this way. (…) Although
everythingdonewiththeseendsinviewissaidtobedoneforReasonofState,neverthelessthis
termisusedratherabout thingswhichcannotbereducedtoordinaryandusualragione.’27 In
this sense,politics concerned themanagementof thestate that is createdandbuild further,a
25HarroHöpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,HistoryofPoliticalThought23:2(2002),211‐237,p.216–219.26Höpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,215;LikewisearguedbyConalCondren,‘ReasonofstateandsovereigntyinEarlyModernEngland:aquestionofideology?’inParergon28:2,2011,5‐27;IwanttothankHarroHöpflforallowingmetousehispaperon‘reasonofstate’givenattheconferenceMonarchyTransformedinWesternEurope:its"reasonofstate"anditsopponents(1620s‐1720s)inRotterdam,May11‐14,2016.27Citedfrom(andtranslatedby)Höpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,213.GiovanniBotero,Dellaragiondistatoedellecausedellagrandezzadellecittà(Venice,1598)was the firstwritingwith the term in its titleandestablishedreasonofstateasaEuropeantopos. Itquicklywentthroughseveraleditionsandtranslations intoGerman,French,Spanish andLatin; PeterBurke, ‘Tacitism, scepticism, and reasonof state’, in J.H.Burns /MarkGoldie (eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryofPoliticalThought1450‐1700 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 199), 479–498,p. 479‐480;Höpfl points toBotero’s explanationof ‘ragione’ as equivalent tonotizie,whichhis translators took tomeanknowledge;hemostlyused it tomean ‘reasons’, i.e. reasonswhy thingshappened, causes,butalso reasons in thesenseofgoodreasons,i.e.justifications.Papergivenattheconference‘Monarchytransformed’.
10
resourceonlyotherrulershad.28AccordingtoTrajanoBoccalini(1556–1613),eventheporters
atthemarketplacediscussed‘reasonofstate’.In1621,LodovicoZuccolowrotethatbarbersand
otherhumbleartisansthoughtthemselvesfittodeliberateon‘reasonofstate’.29Authorsallover
Europebegantoemploythis‘vogueterm’,adaptingittotheirownspecificcontexts.30
Beforethevogueofreasonofstatetookoff,‘Machiavellian’or‘Machiavellist’wasalready
employedonagrandscaleinFrance,notablybyInnocentGentillet.InhisfamousAnti‐Machiavel
(1576) Gentillet blamed ‘Machiavellian philosophy’ for the Bartholomew’s Day Massacre of
FrenchProtestantsin1572,andexplaineditasasetofpracticesequaltotyrannyandaboveall
against three foundations of a commonwealth: religion,morality and legality. Neither he nor
Machiavelli actually used the expression reason of state, but nevertheless contemporaries
associateditwiththemtowhichwasaddedtheaccusationthatreasonofstatemeanttheuseof
religionforpoliticalends;andpolitica,sostronglylinkedtoTacitus,couldalsobecollapsedinto
reasonofstate.31Attheendof thesixteenthcentury,religiouslyorthodoxwriters(e.g.Botero,
Ribaneira, Possivino) began to theorise reason of state to cope with its, as they understood,
Machiavellian andpolitiquesperspectives of politics. Its canonical author, the ex‐JesuitBotero
condemned its popularmeaning, i.e. political actions, executedwith a complete disregard for
moral, legal and religious constraint, as Botero believed to be prescribed byMachiavelli and
Tacitus. However, due to Machiavelli’s controversial reputation, Tacitus was often used, as
Boteroalreadyobserved,asasupplementaryorevenalternativeauthoritytoMachiavelli.Most
authorsasBoteroandJustusLipsiusmightpursueanti‐Machiavellianarguments,yetwerefully
28DavidWootton,‘MachiavelliandtheBusinessofPolitics’,inTimothyFuller(ed.),Machiavelli'sLegacy:‘ThePrince’AfterFiveHundredYears(Philadelphia:UniversityofPennsylvaniaPress,2015),87‐104,p.92.29Meinecke,Machiavellism.TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,78;TrajanoBoccalini,RagguaglidiParnassoescrittiminori,ed.LuigiFirpo,3vols. (Bari:Laterza,1948);LudovicoZucculo,ConsiderazioniPoliticheeMoralisopracentooracolid’illustripersonaggiantichi(Venice,1621).30Guicciardini’sunpublishedworkDialogodelRegimentodiFirenze fromtheearly1520s is tobebelievedthe firstrecordeduseoftheterm.AlthoughHöpflarguesthatGuicciardini’susedoesnotsuggest thatthetermwasalreadyestablished,by1547GiovannidellaCasausedtheterminorationtoCharlesVwithoutfeelingtheneedtoexplainit,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,214;Boterowrotethat,aftervisitingseveralEuropeancourtshehad‘beengreatlyastonished to find Reason of State a constant subject of discussion’, quoted from Noel Malcolm, Reason of State,Propaganda,andtheThirtyYears’War,anunknowntranslationbyThomasHobbes(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),92;seefortheGermanintroductionoftheterminologyof‘reasonofstate’HorstDreitzel,‘ReasonofStateandtheCrisisofPoliticalAristotelianism:anEssayontheDevelopmentof17thCenturyPoliticalPhilosophy’,inHistoryofEuropean ideas 28 (2002), 163‐187 and Michael Stolleis, ‘Arcana imperii und Ratio status. Bemerkungen zurpolitischenTheoriedesfrühen17.Jahrhunderts’,VeröffentlichungderJoachimJungius‐GesellschaftderWissenschaftenHamburg 39 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1980), 5‐12; for the English reception of ‘reason of state’ seeMalcolm, Reason of State, Propaganda, and the Thirty Years’ War, especially on Hobbes and ‘reason of state’argumentationandCondren, ‘ReasonofstateandsovereigntyinEarlyModernEngland;foritsintroductioninearlymodernFrancereadChurch,RichelieuandReasonofState,ÉtienneThuau,Raisond’étatetpenséepolitiqueàl’époquedeRichelieu(Paris:ArmandColin,1966)andLaurieCatteeuw,Censuresetraisond’État.Unehistoiredelamodernitépolitique(xvie‐xviiesiècle)(Paris:AlbinMichel,2013).31JanWaszink,‘LipsiusandGrotius:Tacitism’,inHistoryofEuropeanIdeas39:2(2013),151‐168,p.158;Seeforthefact that thePoliticawasplacedon the Index categorised as ‘reasonof state’, JanWaszink, ‘Introduction’ to JustusLipsius,Politica.SixbooksofPoliticsorPoliticalInstruction,ed.,transl.andintrod.byJanWaszink(Assen:VanGorcum,2004),120‐122,173‐187;Höpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,223;[Gentillet,Innocent.]DiscoursesurlesmoyensdebiengouverneretmaintenirenbonnepaixunRoyaumeouautreprincipauté[…]ContreNicholasMachiavelFlorentin(1576).
11
familiarwith thecontentsofThePrince, sincerefutationsdemandeda textand therewereno
existingtextsforreasonofstateotherthanMachiavelli’sThePrince.32
Onethingcansafelybeclaimedaboutreasonofstate:itwaspresentedasrelevanttothe
practiceofpolitics(unlikethe‘mirrorforprinces’literature).Reasonofstatetakennegatively,it
was a matter of evil advice, positively, it offered prudence, a means to practice politics
intelligently to therulerandhisadvisorsandamatterofwisecounsel taken fromexperience
andhistory.Initsmorenarrowunderstanding,reasonofstateentailedthe‘Machiavellian’claim
that in cases of necessity rulers had room tomanoeuvre beyond the bounds of normal legal,
moralandreligiousconstraints.Thepracticalreflectionwasoftensummarisedin‘maxims’and
frequentlyaccompaniedbyfashionabletermssuchas‘interest’.Acrucialdifferencewithmirror
forprincesliteratureisthat,becauseofconfessionalstrifeandincessantwarfare,reasonofstate
could no longer rely on the premise that the ruler could enhance the common good and the
virtueandpietyof thesubjectsbyupholding the truereligionwithoutendangering the ‘state’.
Thus, authors could reason for a merciless restoration of confessional unity, but when it
endangeredthe‘state’religioustolerationbecameanecessaryoracceptableevil.Furthermore,
argumentsonthemoralresponsibilityoftherulertoexecutequestionedconductinemergency
circumstances, frequently resulted in downplaying of the traditional princely virtues (e.g.
clemencyandliberality).33
Conal Condren argues that to understand reason of state properly, historians have to
dissect this casuistic reasoning in regard to the stress on a devilish/bad reason of state
distinguishedfromatrue/goodone.Thelatterwasmostlydefinedasservingthecommongood
andvirtuousrule,itcouldbecalledprudenceandwasbasedon‘tenuousandhighlyfragmented’
evidence. Whereas authors usually paraded a bad reason of state in ‘detailed, graphic and
unreliable’termsofarulerfollowinghisownprivateintereststhatledtothedestructionofthe
common good. Expressing a bad reason of state was ‘a means of mobilisation and
encouragementintimesofdeepdivision’.34Reasonofstatewasmostoftentoucheduponinthe
context of accusations against certain factions or officeholders in terms of neglecting or
subvertingtheprincelydutiestowardsthedivineandnaturallaw.However,asVonFriedeburg
stresses,suchargumentscouldcontributetothecrisisoftheruleof law.Furthermore,certain
authors indeed attempted to overstretch the licit scope for room tomanoeuvre to free rulers
32Höpfl, ‘Orthodoxy and Reason of State’, 216‐217; Harro Höpfl, ‘Reason of State’, in Henrik Lagerlund (ed.),Encyclopedia ofMedieval Philosophy (Dordrecht/Heidelberg/London/New York: Springer, 2011), 1113‐1115; JanWaszinkunderlinestheattractivenessofTacitism,andthatofJustusLipsiusforcontemporaries;itofferedthe‘true’causesand(self‐interested)motivesoffamouspoliticalactorsinhistoryandthehistoricalworkingsofpowerpolitics,whichencompassedprudenceutilisableforpoliticalpractice.Waszink,‘LipsiusandGrotius:Tacitism’,156‐158.33Höpfl,‘ReasonofState’,114:‘Intheseconflictsreligion,reliedonbyallknownpeopleastheprincipalsocialcement,wasinitselftheforemostcauseorjustificationofdivisionandinsubordination.’;ConalCondrenwrites:‘thepersonaeoccupying any office, as a sanctioned realm for responsibility, might claim a “reason” for it in order to justifyquestionedconduct.’Condren,‘ReasonofstateandsovereigntyinEarlyModernEngland’,13.34Condren,‘ReasonofstateandsovereigntyinEarlyModernEngland’,16‐17.
12
from the constraints of confessional religion, law, and collaboration with elites.35 Appeals to
reasonofstatecouldbothseeminoppositiontoandsupportofaruleoflaw.
From the late sixteenth century onwards, ‘interest (of state)’ became a term thatwas
more or less synonymous or associative to ‘reason of state’. Already in the course of the
sixteenthcentury‘interest’wasdepictedasthedrivingforcebehindprincelypolitics,basedona
pessimisticviewofpoliticsandhumannatureoftenwithreferencetoAristotleandAugustine.
AsDavidWoottonarguedtheidiomofragiondistatowasderivedfromcommerce,takenfrom
merchant’sbalancesheetsthattriedtoestablishprofitandlosswithregardtothestato(estate)
ofprinces;politicsconcernedthebusinessofmaximizing‘interest’,makingprofitandavoiding
loss.36InhisDiscourseof1516thatdiscussedthemeansfortheMedicitomaintaintheir‘stato’,
Guicciardini assumed that ‘particular interest is the true motive of men’s actions.’37 The
justifiable notion of profit or utility for reason of state became increasingly integrated in the
term‘interest’.ThetermoriginatedinItalyandmovedmoreslowlythan‘state’or ‘politics’to
the northernparts of Europe –inEngland itwas only established in the 1640s.38 In 1588 the
French ambassadorRene de Lucingewrote that princesweredrivenby honour or profit and
becauseprofitwasprevailing,heclaimedthat: ‘Weshallthereforeconcernourselvesonlywith
profit, which we may call “interest”.’39 Botero likewise defined interest as the leitmotiv for
princelypolitics.Claimingthatprudenceandvalourwerethetwopillarsofgovernment,Botero
remarkedthatconcerningthefirstandbasicmaximofprudence:‘itshouldbetakenforcertain
thatinthedecisionsmadebyprinces,interestwillalwaysoverrideeveryotherargument;and
thereforehewhotreatswithprincesshouldputnotrust in friendship,kinship, treatynorany
othertiewhichhasnobasisininterest’.40InaslightlymoredisgruntledmannerBoccaliniwrote:
‘It isself‐interestthat inspiresthetongueofprinces,not justiceandnota loveof thecommon
weal.’However,Boccaliniassertedthat‘Theprince,whorulesaccordingtonecessityandnotas
35VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,199‐201.36Unaragionwasalsoatermforanaccountbookaswellasbusinessenterprise,inwhichonecaninvest.Inthissense,reasonofstatetranslatesinthebusinessofpoliticsandwasconcernedwiththepursuitofinterest:makingprofitandavowingloss.Wootton,‘MachiavelliandtheBusinessofPolitics’,96‐97.37 Quoted from Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State, 140; Whereas Guicciardini underlined the Aristotelianargumentof the legitimacyof self‐interestwhen it served thecommongood,hisuseof vocabularyof interestwas‘quitenovel’accordingtoLionelA.McKenzie.Guicciardiniborrowedthisvocabularyfromcommerciallanguage,andtherefore defined interest as ‘the material advantage that a political agent could expect to gain from adopting aspecifiedcourseofaction,whetherindomesticorinforeignaffairs’.L.A.McKenzie,‘Naturalrightandtheemergenceoftheideaofinterestinearlymodernpoliticalthought:F.GuicciardiniandJ.deSilhon’,HistoryofEuropeanIdeas2:4(1981)277‐298,279.38Malcolm,Reasonof State,Propaganda,and theThirtyYears’War,94;Wootton, ‘Machiavelli and theBusiness ofPolitics’,95.39QuotedfromMalcolm,ReasonofState,Propaganda,andtheThirtyYears’War,94.40QuotedfromQuentinSkinner,TheFoundationsofModernPoliticalThought.Volume1:TheRenaissance,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1978),249.
13
hisspiritwills,isobligedtodothingswhichhehatesandabominates.’41Boteroclaimedinalater
workthatreasonofstatewaslittlelessthanreasonofinterest.42
Rohanpopularised the term ‘interest’ inhisDe l’interest thatbecame theblueprint for
writings on ‘the (true) interest of states of Europe’. Rohan’s famous interest analysis
complimentedcriticalanalysisofthemoralpersonoftherulerwithcloseattentiontothenature
of the societies he ruled (e.g. the present geographical position, political structures, religious
make‐up,military prowess and relationswith other rulers), so adding a further dimension to
interest as reason of state. According toMeinecke, these interest analyses resulted from ‘the
spiritofmodernhistoricalresearch’emergingwithinreasonofstatewritings.43Morerecently,
Richard Devetak has similarly traced back the foundations of the late seventeenth‐century
notion of European ‘states‐system’ in Renaissance humanist history writings, which attacked
claimstouniversalauthorityoftheChurchorEmpireaswellaslegitimisedapoliticalruleand
its ‘state interests’ by historical analysis. Such critical historical analyses ‘allowed for the
internationaldimension(…)tobemoreclearlydistinguished’,andmeticulouslyexplainedand
analysed.44 Starting in the 1630s, authors likeRohan, began to consider the characteristics of
variousdynasticagglomerates,fromwhichallegedlyobjective‘trueinterestsofstates’ofEurope
were derived. In doing so, they could defend one political faction asmost likely to pursue a
certain ‘foreign’ policy, consequently delegitimising another.What ismore,Rohandiminished
theguidingimportanceoftheethicsofofficebyprimarilyfocusingontheruledsocieties.45
Fromthe1650sonwards,suchinterestanalysesoftenwerecomplementedwithexplicit
criticismofprincelycoercionandsovereignauthorityanddefencesoftheruleoflaw,aswewill
see in the chapter on De la Court. Historians have underlined the fundamental influence of
Rohan on English civil war debates, but his influence on popular Dutch debates on the true
41QuotedfromMeinecke,Machiavellism.TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,82.42Boterowrote:‘Intheirfriendshipsandenmities,princesareguidedbywhatisadvantageoustothem.Justastherearefoodswhich,thoughunpalatablebynature,aremadepalatablebytheseasoningthecookgivesthem;sotheyareturned, by their nature or their emotions, to this side or that, according as self‐interest directs their minds andemotions; because in the last resort ragione di stato is little less but ragione d’interesse.’ Quoted fromMeinecke,Machiavellism.TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,68–69.43ItschaptersixMeineckediscusses‘TheDoctrineoftheBestInterestoftheStateinFranceatthetimeofRichelieu’’.Meinecke,Machiavellism.TheDoctrine ofRaison d’État, 146‐195.Meinecke believed that interest of statewritingsfounditsoriginsinRenaissanceVenetianrelationereportsestimating‘theinnermotivesofitsrivals’bylookinginto‘theparticularsituationofaparticularindividualcountry’,butgaineditsfullpotentialunderRichelieu’sgovernment,whenFrancere‐enteredtheEuropeanwarcompetition;SeealsoChristianLazzeri,‘Introduction’toHenrideRohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté(Paris:PressesuniversitairesdeFrance,1995),87forlocatingtheoriginsofinterestanalysesinVenetianrelationereports.44RichardDevetak,‘HistoriographicalFoundationsofmodernInternationalThought’,HistoryofIdeas41:1(2014),62‐77, quote on p. 64. Notably, by ‘international dimension’ Devetak means ‘the external interactions of sovereigns,republics,empiresandprincipalitieswithothersuchpublicandprivateactors.’45ConalCondren,ArgumentandAuthority inEarlyModernEngland(CambridgeUniversityPress:Cambridge2006),344:‘thisambivalentrelationshipwithanddevelopmentfromnotionsofficeallowedofficeandinteresttorubalongalmost in as complementary a fashion as honestas and utilitas. But it also allowed for forms of explanationindependentofanyethicsofoffice.’;RyanWalter, ‘SlingsbyBethel’sAnalysisofStateInterests’,HistoryofEuropeanIdeas41:4(2015),489‐506,495.
14
interest of state is hardly researched.46 This thesiswill suggest his legacy for Dutchwritings
intertwinedwith theEnglishdebates and re‐workedby authors such as Lisola andValkenier,
whichprovidedafoundationforanti‐Frenchwritingsinthelateseventeenthcentury,notleast
indepictingLouisXIV’smonarchyasapredatorymonarchy.
1.4Predatorymonarchy
For all the writers discussed in this work, the very real fears of a breakdown of social and
political order, of there being no effective legal constraints, focussed on the threat of violent
militaryactivity,a fearofcatastrophicandexorbitantlyexpensivewarfare.Central to thiswas
the fearof thepredatorymonarch: forRohan theHabsburg‐Spanishruler; forDe laCourt the
internalthreatoftheHouseofOrange;forLisola,andValkenier,LouisXIV.Analysesofinterest
ofstateenabledauthorstostressthespecificnatureofapolityandbythatanexplicitsystemof
government. In all cases the predator’s circumstances, interests and use of reason of state
explained and heightened a sense of immediate danger. The specific characterisation of the
demonisedenemyvaried fromwriter towriterand indeedwithineachof the textsdiscussed.
Sometimes theenemy’s actionswere tyrannical ordespotic, sometimesarbitrary; expressions
such as ‘arbitrary rule’, ‘tyranny’, ‘war‐tyranny’, ‘the utmost tyranny’, ‘new monarchy’,
‘conquest’, ‘Turkish rule’, and ‘slavery’ are freely distributed throughout the texts and many
others in their idiom. Accusations of despotic rule were favoured by many during the
seventeenth century, as it was activity explicable in terms of a type of rule, the rule over a
household of slaves, and also because it enabled easy comparison with the feared and
unchristian Ottoman Turks. Sometimes despotism amounted to tyranny, which also, by its
46 Rohan’sDe l’Interest was the likely source of this influential ‘maxim’ for English authors during the Civil WaraccordingtoGunn.AccordingtothehistorianJ.A.W.Gunn,Rohan’smaxim‘interestwillnotlie’,‘emergingnearthemiddleoftheseventeenthcentury,wasofgreaterimportinEnglandthanthewell‐knowndictaaboutprincelyvirtue,theartsofwar,orthemanagementofcourtfactions’.JohnA.W.Gunn,“Interestwillnotlie”,Aseventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalMaxim’, in: JournaloftheHistoryof Ideas29:4(1968),551–564,552.TwoEnglisheditionsofDe l’InterestwerepublishedinLondonin1640and1641andreprintedin1663,AtreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,translatedbyH.Hunt.;AlanHouston,‘Republicanism,thepoliticsofnecessity,andtheruleoflaw’,inAlanHouston and Steve Pincus,ANationTransformed.Englandafter theRestoration (CambridgeUniversity Press:Cambridge,2001),241‐271;ForliteratureonDutchusagesoftheidiomofreasonofstateseeJohanC.Boogman,‘Deraisond’etat‐politicusJohandeWitt,’inJ.C.Boogman,Vanspelenspelers(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1982);ErnstH.Kossmann, ‘Somelate17th‐centuryDutchwritingsonRaisond'Etat’, inRomanSchnur(ed.),Staatsräson:StudienzurGeschichte einespolitischenBegriffs (Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 1975), 497‐504; For an comparison betweenDutch and English expressions of interest see Jonathan Scott, ‘Classical Republicanism in Seventeenth‐CenturyEnglandandtheNetherlands,’inMartinvanGelderenandQuentinSkinner(eds.),Republicanism:ASharedEuropeanHeritage.Volume I,RepublicanismandConstitutionalism inEarlyModernEurope (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002);JanHartmanandWeststeijn,‘AnEmpireofTrade:CommercialReasonofStateinSeventeenth‐CenturyHolland’, in Sophus Reinert and Pernille Røge (eds.), The Political Economy of Empire in the EarlyModernWorld(Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2013),11‐31;HansW.Blom,‘TheRepublicanMirror,TheDutchIdeaofEurope,’inAnthonyPagden(ed.),TheLanguagesofPoliticalTheory inEarly‐ModernEurope (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999),91‐115.
15
natureknewnoboundsandalsocreatedaworldofslaves.Arbitrarinesswasoftenthefirstsign
oftyranny.Theexpression‘wardespotism’(explainedinchapter3)hasbeencoinedrecentlyto
cover critiques of the range of policies and practices thatwere somuch feared, but although
valuable,itcanobscurethefluidityofthevocabularyofaccusation,andwhererulersalienated
orsoldofftheirassets,partofthehousehold,toraisemoneytofight,despotismhardlyseems
appropriate.47Predatorymonarchyisusedhereasamoregeneraltermthatcapturessomething
ofthebestialimageryofthetyrant,withoutexcludingthetyrantasdespotandthearbitrariness
ofthepassionateandlawless.
In itsmostwelldevelopedexamples, the imageofpredatorymonarchywasacomplex,
partiallyexplanatorybutultimatelycondemnatorysocialconstruction.Thepredatorymonarchy
hadadefininginterestinwagingwarinordertosupressanddeludeitspeople,toextractmoney
andtopursuefurtherwarfare,asVonFriedeburghasshownforPufendorf’sinterestanalysisof
the ‘predatory nature’ of Rome, Spain and France.48 To unmask such informing interestswas
also to reveal a cohesive reason of state, negatively understood. Particularly in the case of
Valkenier, the promotion of Louis XIV’s nefarious interest was facilitated by a barbaric
householdrulebasedonthenatureofslavishsubjects,whocarriedthewarburdenswillingly,
onpower‐hungerpriests,whoinstrumentalisedreligionforpoliticalgain,onFrance’srelentless
soldiers,who plundered and raped the conquered peoples, and on the favourites at court, as
beneficiariesofwarprofit. ForDe laCourt, thepredatoryHouseofOrange requireda similar
network of facilitating minions, but whose existence corrupted citizens rather than simply
exploited the slaves of an existing polity as household. In short, regardless of specifics the
posited interest and reason of state of the demonised predatorymonarch provided away of
redescribingawholesociety,somagnifyingthedangerstothethreatened.
47 JeanMarieConstantusedthetermforFrenchcritiquesagainstallegedly ‘despotic’practicesof theCrowntakingmoney,propertyandprivilegestofundwarfare.Jean‐MarieConstant,‘DerAdelunddieMonarchieinFrankreichvomTode Heinrichs IV bis zum Ende der Fronde (1610‐1653)’, in Ronald Asch (ed.),Der europäische Adel im AncienRegime.VonderKrisederständischenMonarchienbiszurRevolution(1600‐1789)(Cologne/Weimar/Vienna:Böhlau,2001),129‐150, thetermp.146;This termis furtheredbyRobertvonFriedeburg inhisLuther’sLegacy inamuchmoresystematicdefinitionusedforFrenchandGermansourcesasanewinterpretativeheuristictool(ratherthanaparadigm).48VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,322‐324.VonFriedeburgarguesagradualshiftinaccusationsoftyrannybasedonthemoralpersonoftheruler,i.e.hislackofvirtuesandneglectorevensubversionofthedivineanddivinely‐inspirednatural law as a piousprince, to political delegitimations basedon analyses of a particular systemof government,whichhasbeenassertedforcritiquesofdespotismasexaminationsofsocietaldevelopmentsdeprivingpeople,bothwithin a country and outside, of their property. The argument by Pufendorf on necessary predatory behaviour ofthesekingdomsseesVonFriedeburgin linewithearlierGerman(chapter6‐7)andFrenchsources(chapter8);SeealsoJoan‐PauRubiés,‘OrientalDespotismandEuropeanOrientalism:BoterotoMontesquieu’,JournalofEarlyModernHistory 91/2 (2005),109‐180,whereinheexplainsdespotism (byexaminingMontesquieuandearlier critiquesofdespotism) as ‘a system of rule, and that it should be therefore (unlike tyranny) be seen as a structural feature ofcertain polities.’ Rubies, ‘Oriental Despotism’, 169; For the seventeenth‐century tendency to conflate tyrannywithdespotismseeMarioTurchetti, 'Despotism' and “Tyranny”Unmasking aTenaciousConfusion’,European JournalofPoliticalTheory7:2(2008),159‐182.
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1.5 Approachandcontents
Thisthesisexaminesfourinterestanalysesrichinsuchaccusations.Itaims,aswesawabove,to
explore changes in understandings of ‘interest’ and ‘reason of state’ as arguments under
pressure responding to verypractical and immediatepoliticalproblems.Each chapter studies
the function of reason of state in the respective source against the background of its specific
context(s)ofcrisisandcontemporaryusagesoftheidiomofreasonofstate.Butthetextsarenot
as disparate or isolated as it might seem. On one level, they each employ much the same
conceptual, explanatory vocabulary to pinpoint the nature and extent of the problem of the
predatory monarch. More specifically as all rely on and in different ways use Rohan, and
Valkenieralsoengagedwithor isdependentupon theotherauthorsdiscussed,wehavewhat
mightamounttoatraditionofspeculation,orasub‐genreofpoliticalthought.Asthereferences
inthechaptersmakeclear, thesewerenot lonevoicesandsothegenrerequiresconsiderably
morework.
In the second chapter, the famous book De l’Interest (1638) by Henri de Rohan is
examined.Ithasbeenassessedasasecular,rationalandobjectivework.However,thischapter
reinterpretsitasaworkbelongingtothe‘genreofcriticalcurrent‐affairscommentary’emerging
during the Thirty Years’ War in which a satiric employment of reason of state (in terms of
implicit criticism) was combined with reports on current affairs. It is studied against the
backdropofpressing factionaldebates inFranceover thepursuitofwarfare intertwinedwith
debatesaboutmuchneededfinancialreformandtheissueofFrenchProtestantism,andRohan’s
dire need for a prestigious office as an exiled ex‐Huguenot leader. From this follows that the
seeminglyobjectiveandsupra‐confessionalinterestanalysisenabledRohan,firstly,toimplicitly
accuseSpainofpursuingunrestrictedanduniversal tyrannical control,while correspondingly
sidesteppingreligiouspolemics;and,secondly,toenvisageapatrioticFrenchunityinwhichthe
formerHuguenotrebelcouldre‐claimanoffice.
Pieter de la Court’s successfulwork InterestvanHolland (1662)will be treated in the
following chapter. This chapter reassess his alleged ‘republicanism’ or ‘anti‐monarchism’ in
termsof‘wardespotism’.TodiminishthethreatofanOrangerestoration,DelaCourtvigorously
attacked the Orange dynasty by identifying the interest of the plunder prince, who pursued
foreignwarfare toextractexorbitant taxes,supress the fundamental lawsandtheauthorityof
thecivicassemblies,subjectthelegalsubjects,consequentlyenslavingthemall.Hisargumenton
theneed to harmonise the interests between rulers and ruledwas at onewith contemporary
EnglishargumentsoninterestgroundedonRohan’sideathattheprincemayrulethepeople,but
that interest ruled the prince. From this follows the second argument, that the Interest van
Holland isbetterseenasadistinctvariationonthethemesenunciatedbyRohan.Althoughhe
preferred the republican constitution for theDutchRepublic, kingship in itselfwas legitimate
17
andinotherpolitiesmonarchywassimplyacceptable.DelaCourtsuggestedanidealorderfor
Holland where the privileges and properties of citizens were protected against raids of the
plunderprinceandthepower‐hungrymembersofhishousehold(priests,soldiers,favourites)in
ordertopromoteeffectivelythefoundationofthetrueinterestofHolland:commerce.
In the fourth chapter the international bestsellerBouclier (1667) by François‐Paul de
Lisolawillbeexamined.Historianshaveshownitssignificanceforlateranti‐Frenchwritingsin
rejuvenatingthenotionofuniversalmonarchypowerbyturningitagainstFranceandstressing
thenecessarymaintenanceoftheEuropeanbalanceofpowerresultinginasecularandmodern
notion of Europe. However, this chapter proposes a reinterpretation of Lisola’s argument. It
arguesthatitrestedonadeliberatereversionofRohan’sinterestanalysisofSpainandFrance.
The imperialdiplomatrequiredasupraconfessionalargument forpersuading foreignrulersof
various confessions to assist in the battle against Louis XIV. He literary copied arguments of
Rohan, but turned thesewith a great flair for irony against France as the blueprint for Louis
XIV’suniversalmonarchy.Theresult iseffectively,perhapsself‐consciouslyasatiricparodyof
Del’interest.InamoresystematicmannerheassessedtheFrenchsystemofrule,notonlybased
on the rule of conquest, but, echoing De la Court’s argument, on the slavish nature and its
inherenthouseholdrule,robbingtheprivilegesandpropertiesofpeoplesathomeandabroad,
to finance warfare for universal dominion. Against this, the European legal order should be
guardedbyamutualpursuitofreasonofstateandjustice.
PetrusValkenier’s ‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675)willbescrutinised in the fourthchapter.This
book is a response to the ‘Year of Disaster’ 1672 inflicted upon the Dutch Republic by the
invasionofLouisXIVresultinginmassivecivilriotsandtherestorationofOrange.Hisworkhas
been (dis)credited as a mere anti‐French pamphlet and his thought qualified as ‘Orange
republicanism’, but this chapter will re‐evaluate his argument against the background of the
perceivedcrisisoftheruleoflawandwithintheinternationalcontextoftheidiomofreasonof
state.Heused and transformed the arguments ofRohan,De laCourt andLisola. This chapter
pinpoints two continual problems in Valkenier’s work: how to support Orange princely rule
deeplyrooted in thearmyyetattackingthebelligerentprincely interestofFrance.Valkenier’s
preoccupation was with the French despotic beast. It necessitated the prince of Orange as
supremecommander,yetconstrainedbytherepublicanconstitutionandwithoutinterferenceof
confessionalreligion.OrangeprincelyrulecouldsteertheRepublicinamiddlecourse,between
anarchy and oligarchy, between libertine tendencies and priestcraft, and between plunder
princes and power‐hungry regents, and effectively represent the Republic within the fierce
dynasticcompetitionofEurope.Assomanyofhiscontemporaries,hestruggledtorestoreorder.
Finally,theconclusionassessesthesignificanceoftheseinterestanalyses.Theuseandreuse
of the exactmethod and type of argument for different, even opposing objectives shows the
18
highly polemical function of interest analysis and its European context rather than solely
localised context. Furthermore it suggests that the modern constructions of absolutism and
republicanismmaydistortthecoreofitsargument.Aboveall,itdemonstratesapreoccupation
with predatory monarchy, painted with Rohanesque maxims and concerted interest in
dominance and destruction, tyranny and despotism. In this way this thesis expands our
understandingofearlymodernusageof the idiomofreasonofstateand inconclusionushers
thatmuchmoreresearchisnecessaryonthistraditionofspeculation.
19
Chapter2Del’interest(1638)byHenrideRohan:satirethroughinterestanalysis
Althoughgenealogiesholdnoexactbeginnings,onecansafelyarguethatValkenier’sworkonreason
ofstate ishugely indebtedtothebookDe l’interestdesPrinceset lesEtatsChrestienté(1638)bythe
HuguenotleaderHenriDucdeRohan(1579‐1638).49Del’interestwasoneofthefirstwritingsinwhich
Europewasanalysedasan interdependentpoliticalorderofrivalling ‘states’,eachpursuing itsown
specific‘interests’.Rohan’sinterestanalysisfunctionedasaprimeexamplefornumerousseventeenth‐
centurywritingson‘interestsofstates’.50Hisopeningstatementwasfrequentlyquoted:
‘The Princes commaund the People, and the Interest commaunds The Princes. The
knowledgeofthisInterest isasmuchmoreraisedabouethatofPrincesactions,asthey
themselvesareabouethePeople.ThePrincemaydeceiuehimselfe,hisCounsellmaybe
corrupted,buttheinterestalonecanneuerfaile.Accordingasitiswellorillvnderstood,
it maketh States to liue or die. And as it allwaies aimeth at the augmentation, or at
leastwisetheconseruationofaState,solikewisetogetthither,itoughttovarieaccording
tothetimes.SothattoconsiderwelltheinterestofthePrincesofthistime,weeneednot
remountveryhigh,butonelytakethestandingofthepresentaffaires.’51
Almostfortyyearslater,PetrusValkenierimitatedRohan’sinterest‐analysisandliterallycopied
wholepassagesfromDel’interest.TheDutchjuristdidnotevenfeeltheneedtomentionRohan’s
49ItsfirstpublicationwasanonymouslyintheMercureFrançois,nr20(Paris,1937),46–126(fortheyears1634–1635).De l’Interest was posthumously republished togetherwith anotherwriting of Rohan, LeParfaitCapitain in1638en1639.ThesetwoeditionsincludeadedicationtoRichelieusignedbyRohan.JohnHearseyMcMillanSalmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,inRomanSchnur(ed.),Staatsräson:StudienzurGeschichteeinespolitischenBegrifss(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1975)121‐140,p.132.50 Rohan’sDe l’Interest was the likely source of this influential ‘maxim’ for English authors during the Civil WaraccordingtothehistorianJohnAlexanderWilsonGunn,“Interestwillnotlie”,Aseventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalMaxim’,JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas29:4(1968),551‐564,p.552.51HenriRohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome.WritteninFrenchbythemostnobleandillustriousPrince,theDukeofRohan.TranslatedintoEnglishbyH.H.(Paris,1640)2‐3.Inthisthesisallreferencesare to the English edition translated byHenryHunt and published in 1640, exceptwhen differences between theEnglish and French versions occur; The French text reads: ‘Les princes commandent aux peuples et l’intérêtcommande aux princes. La connaissance de cet intérêt est d’autant plus relevée par‐dessus celle des actions desprincesqu’eux‐mêmeslesontpar‐dessuslespeuples.Leprincesepeuttromper,sonconseilpeutêtrecorrumpu,maisl’intérêtseulnepeutjamaismanquer.Selonqu’ilestbienoumalentendu,ilfaitvivreoumourirlesEtats.Etcommeilatoujourspourbutl’accroissementou,pourlemoins,aconservation,aussipourparvenirfaut‐ilqu’ilsechangeselontetemps.Desortequepourbienconsidererl’intérêtdesprincesd’aujourd’hui,iln’estpointbesoinderemonterforthaut,maisseulementdeprendresur lepieddesaffairespresents.’Quoted fromthemoderneditionandannotatedversion by Christian Lazzeri of Henri de Rohan, De l’intérêt des princes et les Etats chrétienté (Paris: PressesUniversitaires de France, 1995), 161. Lazzeri used the edition of 1646, published in Paris, andwhich contained adedication to Richelieu with the note ‘Dernière édition’, ‘jouxte la copie imprimée’. It was bound with five otherwritings,asRohan’sMemoirs,LeparfaitCapitaineandDiscours thatdescribed issueshappenedafterRohan’sdeathandentailedalongintroductionbyJeanSilhonorDanieldesPerreau.ChristianLazzeri,‘Introduction’toDel’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,byHenrideRohan(Paris:PresseuniversitairesdeFrance,1995),154.
20
name in echoing his famous sentences: ‘Of this Interest a certain very wise and experienced
militaryofficerattemptedtosay;thatitrulesoverthePrinces,aliketheyoverherSubjects(...).’52
As explained in the introduction, the dynastic rivalry between Habsburg‐Spain and
Valois/Bourbon‐France triggered the early modern military competition between European
rulers as theywere forced to participate for their survival. From this conflict, the Habsburg‐
Spanishdynastic agglomerate emerged,with lands scatteredoverEurope, evenoverdifferent
continents,bringingnewriches,peoplesandpolitiesunder its rule.Rohanreflectedupon this
volatile situation and offered counsel to the French monarchy, and specifically to Cardinal
Richelieu,ontworelatedfronts:tofollowananti‐Spanishandpro‐Protestantcourseabroad,and
indirectlytoaccommodateHuguenotsathome.Eachwaspresentedandanalysedasamatterof
‘interest’,aconcepttakenoverandrefinedfromearlierwritings(seebelow)thatheheldtobe
central to understanding all counsel and policy. Rohan claimed that every ruler and regime,
whether Catholic or Protestant, should fear the ‘secret design’ or ‘true interest’ of Habsburg‐
Spain to establish a ‘newmonarchy’, i.e. a political andmilitary hegemony in Europe, which
couldonlybeeffectivelyopposedbytheFrenchmonarchytakinguparms.The‘trueinterest’of
eachindependentEuropean‘state’dependedonacarefulmanagementofthefragileequilibrium
of power between Habsburg‐Spain and Bourbon‐France or as Rohan wrote: ‘there be two
PowersinChristendome,whichareasthetwoPoles,fromwhichwhencedescendtheinfluenceof
peaceandwarreupontheotherstates,towit,thehousesofFranceandSpain.’53
CommentatorsonDe l’interesthaveemphasised itsgreatsignificance for thehistoryof
political thought. Historians have described Rohan’s writings as essential for the (modern)
analysisofforeignpoliticsintermsof‘interestsofstates’.54Del’interestis‘oneoftheearliestand
ablest’writingsontheinterestsofstatesaccordingtoWilliamFarrChurch.55FriedrichMeinecke
regardedRohanasoneofthe,butmostinfluential,foundersof‘theDoctrineoftheBestInterest
of the State’ and in his elaborate study of reason of state under Cardinal Richelieu, Étienne
52Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,24.Theentirepassage:‘OfthisInterestacertainverywiseandexperiencedmilitaryofficerattemptedtosay;thatitrulesoverthePrinces,aliketheyoverherSubjects;AndhowmuchhigheraPrinceisaboveher,somuchgreaterbecomestheknowledgeofStatedemandedofhim[theprince,MBK],asofallhisotherissues.APrincecanbedeceived,andhiscouncillorscanbemisguided,thetrueInterestcanneverdeceiveorbefalse;becauseasmuchastheInterestiswronglyobserved,somuchwilltheStatedecreaseorincrease.’; ‘VanditInterestpleeg seeker seer wijs en ervaren Veld‐Oversten te seggen; dat het regeert over de Princen, gelijk die over hareOnderdanen;EnhoeveelhoogereenPrinsbovenhaaris,soveelgrooterkennisvanStaatwordinhemvereyst,alsvanalsijneanderesaaken.KaneenPrinsaltemetbedrogen,ensijneRaads‐luydenverleytwarden,hetwaareInterestkannoytmissenofbedriegen;wantvoorsoveelhetInterestwelofqualijkwordwaargenomen,voorsoveelneemtdenStaatdaardoorafofaan.’53Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.54NoelMalcolmstatedthat‘bythe1630s,whentheeminentHuguenotHenri,ducdeRohan,madeit[‘interest’]thebasisofhisinfluentialtreatiseL’Interestdesprinces(...),theanalysisofgeopoliticswasunthinkablewithoutit.’NoelMalcolm,ReasonofState,Propaganda,and theThirtyYears’War(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),95; Inanrecent,introductoryoverviewofthehistoryofinternationalpoliticalthought,EdwardKeenewrote:‘Rohancapturedthecentralthrustofanewwayofthinkingaboutinternationalpoliticswhichtookthe“interest”or“reasonofstates”asitscentralconcept(...)’,InternationalPoliticalThought,andintroduction(Cambridge:PolityPress,2005),107.55WilliamF.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState(Princeton,NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1972),352.
21
ThuaucalledRohan’sbookthe‘chef‐d’oeuvre’ofthisnew‘genre’inpoliticalliterature.56Besides
Rohan’svalue for themodernanalysisof foreignpolitics in termsof ‘interestsof states’,he is
praisedforhisallegedlyobjectiveandrationalanalysisofthepracticeofforeignpolicy,cleansed
fromconsiderationsofmoralityandreligion.ForMeinecke‘pureempiricismhastriumphed’57in
Rohan’s examination of foreign power politics. Albert Otto Hirschmann and Quentin Skinner
creditRohantobethefirstauthorwhoopposedpassiontointerest,since,accordingtoRohan,
theinterestisinterpretedbytruereasonindependentlyoferraticpassions,prejudicesandother
human defects.58 Nannerl Overholser Keohane writes that for Rohan ‘interests of state are
objective facts thatcanbediscernedormisunderstood’.59Thuau followsMeinecke inclaiming
that De l’interest ‘vise à être un tableau objectif de la situation en Europe’, although his
‘objectivitéadeslimites’becauseitisviewedfromaFrenchperspectiveandattemptedtojustify
direct warfare against Spain in the Thirty Years’ War.60 Church states that ‘Rohan’s book is
significant,notforitspositiveinfluencebutforitsfranklysecularandpragmaticviewofFrench
stateinterestsandtheappropriatemeansofimplementingthem.’61AccordingtoHeinzSchilling,
De l’interest is a token of the notion of state’s interests as ‘säkulares Prinzip und oberste
HandlungsmaximederPolitik’,executedprogrammaticallybyRohan.62Inhisannotatedversion
ofDe l’interest,ChristianLazzeriaddressesa ‘momentRohan’,echoingPocock’s ‘Machiavellian
moment’, by arguing that Rohan redefined the concepts of interest as a rational category,
withoutanyconsiderationsofmoralor legalobligations.63 InarecentbiographyontheRohan
familiy,JonathanDewaldwritesthat‘Rohanpresentsaradicallysecularvisionofpoliticallifeas
centeringonself‐interestandrationalcalculationratherthanpiety,tradition,ormorality.’64
56Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État, 162‐196;ÉtienneThuau,Raisond'Etatetpenséepolitiqueà l'époquedeRichelieu(Paris:ÉditionsAlbinMichel,2000[re‐editionof1966]),312.57 ‘When one reads Rohan, it is as if one were stepping over from the sixteenth to the seventeenth century. Theprincipleofpureempiricismhastriumphed,andthereisafundamentalrejectionoftheoldtendencytofollowfamousexamples and cling on to the past. He accords importance only to the fresh spring of life around him, constantlygushinganew.’MeineckecomparedRohanwithMachiavelli,Bodin,BoteroandHugoGrotius,theimportantauthorson ‘statepower’whoall ‘still’usedhistoricalexamplesandtheauthoritativeauthors fromantiquity.Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,166,19.Seefootnote60forMeinecke’scritiqueofRohan’sempiricistcapabilities.58AlbertOttoHirschman,ThePassionsandtheInterests:PoliticalArgumentsforCapitalismBeforeItsTriumph,20thed.(Princeton,NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1997),42.59NannerlOverholserKeohane,PhilosophyandtheStateinFrance.TheRenaissancetotheEnlightenment(Princeton,NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1980),174.60Thuau,Raisond'Etat,313;Meinecke,almostdisappointedly,had toadmit thatRohanwas ‘incapableofcompleteobjectivity’, sinceheanalysed the interestsofother rulers fromaFrenchperspective.Besides, theunderdevelopedstage of ‘historical knowledge at his time’ did not benefitted Rohan’s analysis according to the German historian.Moreover,hedirectlycriticisedRohan‘forthewayinwhichthese[Rohan’sbasicideasandintentions]arecarriedoutandappliedinconcreteinstances.’Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,170,169,170.61Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 354. Church rejected Meinecke’s treatment of Rohan’s and Richelieu’sperspectivesoninterestasonesingularconceptofreasonofstate.Richelieu’swritingswereincontrasttoRohan’s,imbuedwithhisreligiousandmoralbeliefs,accordingtoChurch,RichelieuandReasonofState,352.62HeinzSchilling,KonfessionalisierungundStaatsinteressen.InternationaleBeziehungen1559‐1660,vol.2(Schöningh:Paderborn,2007),152.63Lazzeri,‘Introduction’,145‐146.64 JonathanDewald,Status,power,and identity inearlymodernFrance:theRohan family(1550‐1715) (Philadelphia:PennStateUniversityPress,2015),71.
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Theargumentofthischapteristhattheseassessmentsneedtobereconsidered;Rohan’s
emphasis on examining current political affairs in order to determine the interest of states
appearsmuchlesstoinvolveprinciplesofobjectivityorpoliticalautonomywhenplacedinthe
context of, what Noel Malcolm calls, ‘a genre of critical current‐affairs commentary’.65 This
extremely popular body of propagandistic literature evolved during the Thirty Years’ War,
claimingtopublicisethetruth,thesecretadviceofprincelycouncilsandtounveilevilcounsel,
the arcana imperii of inter‐princely actions or ‘mysteries of state’, the ‘reason of state’ or
‘interest’ofprinces,whilesimultaneouslycriticisingopponentsinasatiricmanner.BysatiricI
amalluding toa conventional styleofmoral critique familiar in theearlymodernworld from
Roman culture, rather than to more recent understandings that have taken it as a largely
humorousliterarygenre.Satiricwritingasrelevanttotheargumenthereinvolvedexaggeration
andevenfabricationinordertocreateanimageofatargetdesignedtodiscredit,andexposingit
toridiculeanddistrust.66Asexplainedintheintroduction,thevocabularyofreasonofstatewas
usednotonlytodefendacertainpolicyorrule,butalso,andperhapsmoreso,tocondemnone,
often satirising the alleged enemy asMalcolm shows. Machiavelli’sThe Prince would also be
calledasatireinthissenseofunmaskingofevil,asHenryNevilleinaprefatoryletter(allegedly
writtenbyMachiavelli) tohis translationofMachiavelli’sworks from1675writes that itwas
‘both a Satyr against them, [tyrants] and a true Character of them.’67 Although some
commentatorspoint rightly toRohan’spropagandistic aim to justify anoffensive anti‐Spanish
foreignpolicy,68theyhaveoverlookedthesatiricexaggerationanddemonizationinhisinterest
analysisofSpain.
Thisseeminglyobjectiveandsupra‐confessionalinterestanalysisenabledRohan,firstly,
to implicitly accuse Spain of pursuing unrestricted and universal tyrannical control, while
correspondingly sidestepping religiouspolemics; and, secondly, to envisageapatrioticFrench
unity in which the former Huguenot rebel could re‐claim an office. This chapter aims at
elucidatingthistwofoldfunctionof‘reasonofstate’terminologyinDel’interest.Tobeginwith,it
presentsabiographicalsketchsuggestingthathismisfortunesprovideapartialcontextforthe
writingofDe l’interest.At thevery least,aworkofpoliticaladvice thatstudiouslyavoidedthe
predictable and conventional recourse to religiouspolemicwas ideally suited toRohan’sown
difficult position and confessionally uncertain history. This section is followed by an short
65Malcolm,ReasonofState,34.66 On the difficulties involved in defining satire read Conal Condren, ‘Satire and definition’,Humor: InternationalJournalofHumorResearch25:4(2012),375‐399.Onpage389Condrenwrites:‘Whathasbeendesignatedsatirehasnotalwaysbeenintendedasinanywayhumorousorjoking.(…)Itmaywellbethecasethatoveritslonghistory,thehumorous has become increasingly important in satire beyond the Mennipean, yet to read humour back as anessentialfeatureofanythingcalledsatire,letalonedefinesatireintermsofit,isboundtodistort.’67TheWorksoftheFamousMachiavell,CitizenandSecretaryofFlorence(London:JohnStarkey,1675);FelixRaab,TheEnglishFaceofMachiavelli:aChangingInterpretation,1500‐1700(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1964)219‐221,267‐272.68AsThuau,Raisond'Etat,313;Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,163,170.
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outlineof theuseof reasonof state terminology inFrance in the firsthalf of the seventeenth
century,thepoliticaldebatestriggeredbytheEuropeanwarcompetitionandconfessionalstrife
inFranceduringthe1620sand1630s,thegenreofcriticalcurrent‐affairscommentary,andthe
propagandistictraditionofaccusingtheopponentofaspiringto ‘universalmonarchy’. Inthese
contexts,thefunctionofreasonofstateinDel’interestwillbeanalysed.
2.1HenrideRohan:Huguenotwarrior,nobleprinceandfamousauthor
Rohan’smisfortunes as a noble prince, losing the patronage of KingHenry IV after the king’s
assassinationin1610,andasamilitaryofficerinhisultimatelyfailedHuguenotrebellionagainst
LouisXIII inthe1620s,relatetohisseeminglyobjectiveandsecular,orasthischapterargues,
hissatiricalandsupra‐confessionalaccountoftheinterestsofSpainofFrance.
Rohanpickeduphispentoinfluence‘opinion’inFrance,i.e.tosteeropiniontowardsan
anti‐Spanish and pro‐Huguenot policy while simultaneously applying for a position to help
furtherthispolicy.Del’interestwaswrittenontheeveofthedirectmilitaryinterventionofthe
French monarchy in the Thirty Years’ War against the Habsburgs dynasty in 1635.69 After
Sweden’sdevastatingdefeatatthebattleofNordlingenon5and6September1634,theFrench
pawnonthechessboardoftheThirtyYear’sWarwasseverelyblocked.FromJuneuntilOctober
of 1634,Rohan stayed at the royal court inParis, hoping to convinceRichelieu toofferhim a
militaryoffice and,perhapsnot coincidentally, incitehim toundertakeadirectmilitary stand
against Spain.70 As an eminent Huguenot military leader, Rohan was Richelieu’s former
antagonist in the threeHuguenot rebellions (1620‐1622,1625,1627‐1629).After thedecisive
Huguenotdefeatin1629andRohan’ssubsequentexiletoVenice,Rohansoughtthepatronageof
Richelieu and although receiving several military assignments, Richelieu had never entirely
trustedtheambitiousRohan.71DuringhisstayatcourtRohanfinishedhisbook,probablyadded
adedicationtotheCardinalandpresentedittoRichelieu.72Inthisdedication,Rohanwrotethat
although Richelieu was not expressly present in the entire treatise, it would speak of the
69Lazzeriarguesthattheeditingoftheworkbeganin1630,whichRohanfollowedthroughindifferentphasesuptill1634. He gives an overview of the difference in opinion amongst historians about the period of writing. Lazzeri,‘Introduction’,153–154.70RichelieudidnotfollowRohan’scounselandexhaustedallotheralternativesbeforeenteringtheThirtyYears’War.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,354.71Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,164.72ThehistorianPetitotreportedoftheexistenceofamanuscriptofDel’InterestintheroyalLibraryinPariswiththedateofParis,1August1634,attheendofthededication.Lazzeri,introduction,154.Meineckewrote:‘Rohanwantedtoinfluencehimbymeansofthebook,toestablishhimselfasamanwhocouldbetrusted,andatthesametimeincitethecardinal.’Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,165.
24
cardinal, to whom Rohan exclaimed his eternal loyalty as Richelieu’s very humble, very
affectionateandobligedservant.73
BesidesaniconicHuguenot,Rohanwasafamousnobleman.Hewashonouredpublically
inGeneva,VeniceandParisafterhisdeathin1638.DucdeSaintSimonpraisedRohan:‘whomall
Europeadmiredforhiswisdomandhonouredforhisvirtue’.74 TheRohanfamilybelongedto
thehighnobilityofFrance,withtheirestatespredominantlybasedinBrittany.Theyturnedto
Protestantism in the 1550s and became a highly visible Protestant noble family after the
Bartholomew’sDayMassacre1572,whenagreatnumberofhighProtestantnoblesconvertedto
Catholicism.TheRohanshadimportantconnectionstotheroyalcourt,e.g.FrançoisedeRohan
was a permanent dame d’honneur of Cathérine de Médicis in the 1550s and the family was
related, close cousins, to the later King Henry IV (1553‐1610) through the female line.75
ThereforeitisnotsoremarkablethatHenrideRohandreamtofbecomingamilitaryleaderlike
Caesarandanindependentprince,asJonathanDewaldargues.76
Unfortunately forRohan,his life tookadifferent turn.Under theHuguenotKingHenry
IV, he enjoyed royal patronage and favouritism, beingmadeDuc de Rohan, andwas strongly
supportedinhisunsuccessfulmarriageplanswiththesisteroftheSwedishkingandlaterinhis
marriagetothedaughterofHenry’sprincipaladviserMaximiliendeBéthune,DucdeSully.After
the assassination of Henry IV in 1610, however, Rohan lost his high and beneficial position.
Whereas the Huguenot nobility had profited from their newly formed collaborationwith the
Crown under Henry IV, now their standing was severely diminished. Within the Protestant
nobility, factions arose between thosewhowanted collaborationwith, and amoremoderate
policytowardstheCrown,andthoseexpressingtheneedforamoreradicalandoffensivepolicy
as Rohan supported. Simultaneously, the regency of Maria Medici brought forth several
aristocratic factions inwhichRohanwasvariously involved.Hefirst foughtagainst theregent,
but with her after her exclusion and imprisonment by her son King Louis III in 1617. One
consequence of these shifts in allegiance was the nickname ‘Catiline’ for his intrigues and
ruthless ambition. 77 After 1610, the Huguenot’s religious freedom and property rightswere
severely reducedby the FrenchCrown.Over the course of the 1620s civilwars broke out, in
which Rohan switched sides between the divided Huguenot power groups on a number of
occasions. Within the Huguenot camp Rohan was mistrusted and accused of treachery for
73Theclosingsentenceswereasfollowing:‘Vousvousverrezdoncdanspeudelignesreprésentétoutentier:entoutce traité, il ne sera parlé que de vous, bien qu’il n’en soit jamais parlé. Votre modestie et ma franchise ne mepermettentpasdem’exprimerenautrefaçon,tenantqueleslouangesordinairesfonttortàceuxdesquelslesactionsparlentsiclair.Cen’estpasaussiparlàquejemeveuxrendredignedevosbonnesgrâces.Maisbienpardesservicesproportionnésauxobligationsquevousavezacquisessurmoi,quiseraitoutmavie,Monsieur,Votretréshumble,trèsaffectionnéetobligéserviteurHenrideRohan.’HenrideRohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,160.74QuotationfromDeWald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,35.75Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,17‐19.76Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,38.77Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,123.
25
negotiatingtrucewiththeCrownofFrance.InSeptember1629RohansignedthePeaceofAlès,
agreeingontherestorationoftheRohanfamilyproperties,asacompensationforhiswartime
losses and for his exile to Venice. Here he started writing the De l’interest amongst other
treatises.
Perhaps it is not surprising that Richelieu mistrusted Rohan when he sought a
prestigiousofficeafter1629.Nevertheless,at theendof1631,hewassentasaFrenchenvoy
and lieutenantgeneral toassist thecantonofGrisons inexpelling theSpanish forces fromthe
Valtellinepasses.Thesepassesformednotonlythestageofseveralbrutalconfessionalconflicts
between the Catholic inhabitants and their Protestant rulers, but also a strategic passage
between theHabsburgs’ Austrian and Spanish territories, important to the competing parties
within theThirtyYear’sWarand accordinglymuch foughtover.78There,hewas suspectedof
being a spy by another French envoy and subsequently lost his post in 1632. A year later he
resumedhispost,butlosthisambassadorialstatus.Inthesummerof1634hestayedattheroyal
court in Paris, where he finished and presented De l’interest. Soon after his visit, he was
recruitedfortheFrenchcampaignsagainsttheHabsburgsandachievedsomegreatsuccesses,
butheconstantlyclashedwiththeroyalcounciloverfinancesandfurthermilitarysupport.After
hisforcescollapsedintheValtellineinthebeginningof1637andCondé’sattempttoarresthim
in1637,RohanjoinedtheforcesofBernardofSaxe‐Weimarasagentleman‐ranker.Hediedon
thebattlefieldinRheinfeldenin1638.79
IntheyearsofhisexileinVenicebetween1629and1634,Rohanwrotehisthreemost
famous treatises: De l’interest, Le parfait capitaine (1638) that embodied admiring
commentariesonJuliusCaesarandreflectionsonmilitarypractice,dedicatedtotheFrenchking,
andhisMémoirs (first threebooksprinted in1644)of theHuguenotrebellionsof the1620s.80
The first publication stream ofDe l’Interest occurred from 1637 to 1639,when after Rohan’s
defeat, the issue of control over the Valtelline passes rose again in France.81 In 1637, it was
anonymouslypublishedwitha royalprivilege in theMercureFrançois for theyears1634and
1635.MosttreatisesinthiseditiondealwithcurrentpoliticalaffairsregardingtheThirtyYears’
War,butthevolumealsocontainsnewsofroyalpolitics,andevenmentionsRohan’sreturnto
78AftertherevoltoftheCatholicinhabitantsagainsttheGrisonsProtestantrulers,Habsburg‐SpanishforcesoccupiedtheValtelline.In1623FranceHabsburgs‐SpainturnedittothePapalforcesunderpressureofFrance.ThefollowingyearanallianceofFrenchandSwisstroopsexpelledthePapalforces,butthepeacetreatyofMonzonin1626betweenFranceandSpainforcedthewithdrawalofFrenchtroopsinthevalley.However,in1631Rohan’stroopsrestoredtheFrenchcontroluntil1637,whenasubstantialpartofthemilitaryforcesoftheGrisonsrebelledandsteppedovertotheHabsburgside.79David Parrott, Richelieu’s Army: War, Government and Society in France, 1624‐1642 (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),489‐490.80Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,70.81Dewald,Status,power,and identity inearlymodernFrance,37‐84;Salmon, ‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,104–107;DavidParrot,Richelieu’sarmy:war,governmentandsociety,114–122.
26
court in1634andthesubsequentroyaldecisiontosendhimtotheSwissCantonofGrisons.82
AfterRohan’sdeathin1638,Del’interestwasre‐published,butnownamed,andboundupwith
the Parfait capitaine. Dewald and Meinecke both argue that Rohan intended to publish De
l’interest.83 Dewald explains that in 1632 Rohanwrote to his friend, the theologian Théodore
Tronchin, inGenevathathewasworriedaboutpublishinghiswritingsonthestateofpolitical
affairsinEurope.Hesuggestedforgingastoryofaccidentalpublicationtoavoidproblemswith,
asRohanwroteinhisletter,theEstatesoftheLowCountriesandotherauthoritiesandpersons
whomight be offended. After his death, an edition (bound upwith LeParfait capitaine) was
introducedbystatingthatitwasnotintendedforpublicationandthatitreachedthepublisher
byaccident.However,notonlyhadRohansuggestedthis,buthealsowrotetoTronchinthathe
hadalreadypresentedacopytothekingofSwedenandinhisfollowingletters,heoversawthe
publicationprocessclosely.84Dewaldconcludes: ‘hewantedtoreachawideaudience,without
regard to its social contours.’85 It is alsoworthnoting,however, that the fictionof accidental
publication and the initial anonymitywas entirely appropriate to the genre of propagandistic
writingthatunmaskedsecretdesigns.ItwouldberesortedtoagaininHenryNeville’sspurious
letterbyMachiavelliconcerninghissatiricintentionstoexposeevilanditsinventedprovenance
byhisprinterJohnStarkey.86Regardlessofthispossibility,allthreeexilewritingsbecamehuge
successesinthecourseoftheseventeenthcentury.De l’interesthadmanyeditionsandseveral
lateradaptionsorimitations,whichare,asSalmonstates,oftenconfusing,becausetheydonot
resembleRohan’soriginaltreatiseatall.87
2.2ThebackdropofRohan’sreasonofstate
Rohan’s interest analysis on a European scale enabled him to criticise implicitly Habsburgs‐
SpainandtoforgeapatrioticunityforFrancebysidesteppingthedivisivenessthataccompanied
assertions of confessional integrity. To explain this, we have to sketch the backdrop against
whichRohanproducedhisinterestanalysis.Acloserlookwillbetakenattheuseofreasonof
statevocabularyinearlyseventeenth‐centuryFranceandthepoliticaldebatesinFranceduring
the1620sand1630s.ThenwewilllookintoRohan’sinterestanalysisinrelationtothegenreof
critical current‐affairs commentary, and propagandistic accusations of ‘universal monarchy’,
revolvedaroundtheFranco‐Spanishrivalryintheearlymodernmilitarycompetition.
82MercureFrançois(Paris1637),forRohanatcourtread220‐222.83Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,72;Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,174.84Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,72‐73andfootnote149onpage209.85Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,73.86TheWorksoftheFamousMachiavell,CitizenandSecretaryofFlorence(London:JohnStarkey,1675).87Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,132.
27
2.1.2Frenchreasonorinterestofstate?
DewaldregardsRohan’spoliticalthought,includinghisinterestanalysis,asMachiavellian,88but
itreflectsamuchbroader,contemporaryvocabularythatHarroHöpfldefinesas,a‘fashionable
politicalcynicism’aboutthe‘true’motivesofrulersspurredbytheexperiencesofreligiouswars,
especiallyintheLowCountriesandFrance.Asexplainedintheintroduction,theidiomofreason
of state became integrated from the late sixteenth century onwards in this broad vocabulary
resulting in several synonyms for ‘reason of state’ such as ‘interest of state’, the Tacitist
expression arcana imperii, ‘secrets’ and ‘mysteries’.89 Before the reception of reason of state
vocabularyinFranceinthelatesixteenthcentury,theterms‘Machiavellism’and‘Machiavellist’
werealreadyestablishedandinpopularuse.90DuringthereligiouswarsinFrance(1562‐1598),
accusationsof ‘Machiavellism’ thrivedamongstall factions involved.91 In the1570s, Italiansat
the Parisian court defended themonstrosities of the religiouswarswith a cynical outlook on
politics, using Machiavelli, Guicciardini, and Tactius or Tacitean language.92 The reading of
Tacitus’accountsofthemisdemeanoursofRomanemperorsbecameextremelypopularamidst
thenoblefactionsandcourtlypoliticsofthewars.Theancienthistorianwasusuallyusedasa
supplementary or even alternative authority to the extremely controversial Machiavelli.93
According to Jacob Soll, Justus Lipsius created an ‘accessible version of political prudence for
casuistically Christian monarchs’, i.e. prudentiamixta, which became an essential element in
Frenchpoliticalthought,illustratedbyPierreCharron’sDelasagesse(1601).94However,Tacitist
88Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,47‐49.89HarroHöpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,inHistoryofPoliticalThought,23:2(2002),211‐237,p.216‐217.90 JanWazink, ‘Introduction’ toPolitica:SixBooksofPoliticsOrPolitical Instruction,by JustusLipsius(Assen:RoyalVanGorchum,2004),45.91ThepreacherBoucherclaimedthatHenryIIIcarriedacopyofThePrinceinhispocketandattemptedtointroduceMachiavelli’s policies in France. The Catholic League accused the politiques of Machiavellism by allegedlysubordinating theCatholiccause topoliticalconsiderations. In turn, thepolitiquesaccused theLeagueofconveyingtheirpersonalinterests,drivenbypowerpolitics,underthecloakofappealingtothe‘bienpublic’.InhisfamousAnti‐Machiavel (1576) the Huguenot Innocent Gentillet blamed Machiavellian philosophy for the Bartholomew’s DayMassacreofFrenchProtestantsin1572.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,47‐50;HarroHöpfl,‘ReasonofState’,inHenrikLagerlund(ed.),EncyclopediaofMedievalPhilosophyPhilosophybetween500and1500(Dordrecht:SpringerNetherlands,2011),1113‐1115,1113;Notably,Rohan’sbookinventorylistsincludedacopyoftheAnti‐MachiavelaswellasaFrenchtranslationofMachiavelli’sThePrince.SvenStelling‐Michaud,‘LeDucdeRohanetseslivres’,inRevueduVieuxGenève14(1984),18‐27.92JanWaszink,‘Introduction’,45.93WhileaprosperousmarketforMachiavelli’seditionsexistedinFrance,readingthemwasstillforbidden.JacobSoll,‘ALipsianLegacy?Neo‐Absolutism,NaturalLawandtheDeclineofReasonofStateinFrance1660‐1760’,inErikdeBom,MarijkeJanssens,ToonVanHoudt,andJanPapy(eds.),(Un)maskingtheRealitiesofPower:JustusLipsiusandtheDynamicsofPoliticalWritinginEarlyModernEurope(Brill,Leiden2011)307‐323,309;ReadforashortdiscussionofMachiavellinismandreasonof state inFrance,MarcelGauchet, ‘L’Etataumiroirde la raisond’Etat: laFranceet lachrétienté’,inYvesCharlesZarka(ed.),Raisonetdéraisond’Etat.Théoriciensetthéoriesdelaraisond’EtatauxXIVeetXVIIesiècles(Paris:PressesUniversitairesdeFrance,1994),193‐244.94 Pierre Charron outlined prudence as the legitimate scope for rulers to act freely from legal and/or religiousconstraints for the common good, which in his opinion ought to be analysed by reading Lipsius. Soll, ‘A Lipsian
28
writings often were (dis‐)qualified as reason of state, and associated with Machiavellism for
recommending the use of religion forpolitical gain.95Most readers on ‘reasonof state’would
have been appalled by such recommendations,96 which we ought to keep in mind when
discussingRohan’s counselof religiousdissimulation forSpain.Tacitism(and reasonof state)
offeredcontemporariesthe ‘true’causesandself‐interestedmotivesoffamouspoliticalfigures
inhistoryandthehistoricalworkingsofpowerpolitics.Suchcriticalpoliticalhistorybecamea
tool of early modern governments to legitimise their rule in external and internal power
struggles,asSollillustratesbythe‘FrenchRoyalTacitism’,i.e.theroyalpromotionofeditionsof
TacitusandpublicationsofTacitistpolitico‐historicalstudiesstartingfromKingHenryIVupto
the1660s.97
Another important aspect of French reason of state is the transition in French official
politicalvocabularyfromthe1560sonwardsandcompletedunderKingHenryIV’s,whichJames
Collins has described as a linguistic shift from the ‘monarchical commonwealth’ to the
‘monarchicalstate’.Inthecontextofthedisastrousandtraumaticreligiouswars,royalofficials
searchedforalternativestothetraditionalvocabularyofthe‘respubliquefrançoyse’intermsof
appealing to the ‘bienpublic’, adhering the ‘true religion’ and following thepreceptsof ‘piety’
and ‘justice’.ThenotionofaFrenchrespublicaasonepoliticalcommunityofcitizens,ruledby
lawandconsent,strivingtoobtainthe‘bienpublic’,hadbecomeseverelydiscredited,notleast
due to the extensive use of appeals to the ‘bien public’ by the Catholic League.98 First the
politiques and then the juridical elite increasingly promoted ‘le bien de l’Estat’ (and the
intermediate‘lebienduserviceduroi’).The‘state’servedasaconceptualsolutiontounifythe
shatteredFrenchsocietyandthetermbecamesynonymouswiththepoliticalcommunityitself
aswellaswiththegovernment.Thekingwasaddedtothe ‘state’,consideredasthesourceof
thisunityandbyhis‘puissanceabsolue’,theultimatesourceofthelaw.Notably,Collinswritesof
‘discourse confusion’ inmanyFrenchdocuments in the first thirdof the seventeenth century,
since‘state’mostoftenmeantthegovernmentortheking’sadministration,besidesaddressing
order, disposition or policies.99 The ‘commonwealth’ gradually became the ‘state’ and rulers
could henceforth claim to actas, rather than for the commonwealth. Appeals to the common Legacy?’,309‐311andcitation from310; JanWaszink, ‘LipsiusandGrotius:Tacitism’,Historyof Ideas39:2(2013),151‐168,158;ParticularlyinFrance,‘LipsianTacitism’flourished,forexamplesseeJacobSoll,PublishingThePrince.History,Reading,&theBirthofPoliticalCriticism(AnnArbor:TheUniversityofMichiganPress,2005),36‐37.95Höpfl, ‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,223;Politicawascategorisedasreasonofstateonthe Index. JanWazink,‘Introduction’,120‐122,173‐187.96Malcolm,ReasonofState,97.97Waszink,‘LipsiusandGrotius:Tacitism’,157‐158;Soll,PublishingThePrince,38‐40.98 This definition of political order developed from the middle of the fourteenth century until the late sixteenthcentury, influencedbyAristotle,PolybiusandCicero.Collins,TheState inEarlyModernFrance 2nd ed. (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009),3‐4.99Thevocabularyofthe‘respubliquefrançoyse’continuedtobeusedespeciallyfortownsineconomicmatterssuchascorporationsasguilds incharters.Collins,Republicanismand theState in latemedievalandearlymodernFrance(forthcoming). 74; Rohan’s memoirs shows this discourse confusion in using both elements of the vocabulary(commonwealthaswellasstate),accordingtoCollins.PersonalcorrespondencewithJamesCollins.
29
good,basedonideasoftheAristoteliangoodlife,shiftedtojustificationsinthe‘interestofstate’
or‘reasonofstate’,definedbynotionsofutilityandnecessity.100
Theterminologyofreasonofstatewasincidentallyusedinthe1590s,buttwodecades
later Antoine de Lavall exclaimed that reason of state, this novel language from Rome and
Venice, had become so popular that everyone, great as well as small men, discussed it
everywhere. Even newspapers could speak of nothing else, according to Lavall.101 The French
term ‘raisond’état’wasa translationof the Italian ‘ragiondistato’andtheLatin ‘ratiostatus’,
bothsixteenth‐centuryneologisms.102At thecloseof thesixteenthcentury,Botero’sandmany
other Italian writings discussing reason of state became popular in France.103 Similar to
religiouslyorthodoxwriterssuchasBotero,LavallandmanyotherFrenchauthorscondemned
reason of state as Machiavellian immorality and indifference to law, while simultaneously
elucidatedandjustifiedreasonofstateundertheauspicesofprudenceandnecessity.104
Rohan’susageofthephrase‘the(true)interestofstate’wasbuiltuponexistingideasof
interest.As clarified in the introduction, the justifiablenotionofprofit orutility for reasonof
statebecameincreasinglyintegratedintheterm‘interest’,manifestedinargumentsof interest
asthedrivingforcebehindprincelypoliticsandanincreasingusageof‘interestofstate’asmore
or less synonymous with ‘reason of state’. The closely related, even sometimes synonymous
expressionsofinterestandraisond’estatprovidedawellestablishedcurrencyofdebatebythe
timeRohanwrote.In1588,RenedeLucinge(afriendofBotero)wrotethatprincesweredriven
by honour or profit and because profit was prevailing, he claimed that: ‘We shall therefore
100 Collins,TheState inEarlyModernFrance, xxiii;Malcolm,ReasonofState, 94. This transition in Frenchpoliticalvocabularyoverlapsthelate‐sixteenthcenturyshift,arguedbyMaurizioVirolianddescribedintheintroduction,fromalanguageofunderstandingpoliticsaspreservingtherespublica(acommunityofcitizensruledbylawandconsent)to maintaining the state, (a ruler’s dominion over political institutions and peoples, ruled by force) the latterexpressedbyreasonofstatevocabulary.Viroli,FrompoliticstoReasonofState;Lazzeriunderlinesthissubstitutionofrespublicaby‘Estat’inFrenchpoliticalthoughtandperceivesRohan’snotionof‘Estat’asinlinewiththeaccountsofRichelieu,Naudé,Silhon,astheyemphasisethenecessityofsovereigntyintegratedinthestateinordertomaintaintheruleoflaw.Lazzerigivesasimilaroverviewofthechangingdefinitionsof‘state’inFrenchpoliticalthought,fromthe thirteenthcenturydescriptionsof ‘state’as thesocietyoforders (socialand legal conditionof certaingroupascorporation) and the state of the prince as the condition by which he exercised his royal power via certaincorporations,tothesubstitutionofrespublicaby‘state’inthesecondhalfofthesixteenthcenturyby‘constitionalist’writersasClaudedeSeyssel,TheororedeBèzeandFrançoisHotman.Theseauthors, thoughsomewhatdifferently,defined ‘state’ as a corporate bodywhere the union ofmemberswas superior to the head, i.e. the king. This newunderstandingof‘state’wasfurthertransformedthroughtheincorporationofthenotionofsovereigntyintosuchanideaofbodypoliticbyBodin,andtakenupbyauthorsasCardinleBret,JeandeSilhon,CardinalRichelieuandGabrielNaudéinthetimeofRohan.Lazzeri,‘Introduction’,120‐125.101Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,126;AntoinedeLavall,Desseinsdeprofessionsnoblesetpubliques(Paris,1605,1612);Theeditionof1612encompassedasectiononreasonofstate,inwhichLavallreviewedseveralwritings,wasonlytosomeextentpleasedwithAmmirato’scommentaryonTacitusbecauseitarguedthatreasonofstatehadalwaysbesubordinatedtoreligion.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,78‐80;Gauchet,‘L’Etataumiroirdelaraisond’Etat’,195‐196.102Höpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,215‐216;Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,44‐47,seefootnote94onpage45forexamplesofearlyuseofthephrase‘raisond’état’inFrance.103ThefirsttranslationofDellaRagiondiStatowasmadebyGabrielChappuysandpublishedasRaisonetgouvermentd’estatinParisin1599.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,62‐72.104Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,78‐80.
30
concernourselvesonlywithprofit,whichwemaycall“interest”.’105Duringtheturbulentperiod
of theregencyofMariadeMedici from1610to1617, the term ‘interest’wasmorecommonly
usedthan‘raisond’estat’.HuguenotwritingsfromColignyin1572similarlyarguedintermsof
interest and reason of state, with perhaps increasingly, interest being the notion to which
greater attentionwasgiven.106Richelieu’spublicistsmade intensiveuseof the terminologyof
‘interest’andbythetimeDel’interestwaspublished(1638)itwaswellestablished.107
TostatethatRohan’sinterestanalysisshouldbeseeninlightofhyperbolicexaggeration
(central to theThirtyYears’Wargenreofcriticalcurrent‐affairscommentary), isnot toargue
thatDel’interestcannotbeseenasablueprintforwritingsontheinterestofstatesofEurope.As
explainedintheintroduction,Rohan’sfamousinterestanalysisrepresentsthecomplementation
inreasonofstatewritingsasexaminations(andcriticisms)ofpredominantlythemoralperson
oftheruler,withcriticalanalysesofthesystemofgovernment, i.e.thefeaturesofhisland,his
rule vis‐à‐vis his subjects and relations with other regimes. These interest analyses resulted
from the increasing employment of historical analysis, which enabled authors to indicate the
circumstances and characteristics of the societies of the rulers and to distinguish these from
‘foreign’polities.108
Moreover, in claiming that interest ruled rulers, he indeed diminished the guiding
importance of the ethics of office. Conal Condren and Ryan Walter have pointed to Rohan’s
contribution to a gradual dissociation of ‘interest’ from ‘notions of office’.109 By primarily
105QuotedformMalcolm,‘“ReasonofState”andHobbes’,94106 Salmon, ‘Rohan and the interest of state’, 102‐103, 108, 126‐127, footnotes 44 and 45; Maria’s regency waspesteredbyrebellionsofmajornoblesandendedwiththemurderofMaria’sfavouriteConcinoConcini,executedbyLouisXIIandhismen.Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,xxix;Inseveralwritingsofthe1610s,Rohanlikewiseargued for a pro‐protestant foreign policy against France’s belligerent Spanish neighbour. The Huguenot leadersimilarlypointedtothe(mis‐)useofreligionaspoliticalpretextasit,accordingtohim,hadbeenutteredintheFrenchWars of Religion and byHabsburgs‐Spain in itswars against foreign princes and peoples. See Salmon, for a shortsummaryforeachspecificwriting.Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,100‐103.ForatotaloverviewofRohan’swritings and editions of De l’interest read Lazzeri, ‘Introduction’, 153‐156; Étienne Thuau points to a particularcollectionof anonymouspamphlets from the1610s and1620swherein the advancementof theHabsburg‐SpanishmonarchywasperceivedasagravethreattotheexistenceofFranceandtherestofEurope,andthat,consequently,the Frenchmonarchy should rise up against Spain. Thesediscourseswereboundup in a bookpublished in 1632.Thuau,Raisond'Etat,309‐311.107Malcolm,ReasonofState,94.108Meineckediscussesinchaptersix‘TheDoctrineoftheBestInterestoftheStateinFranceatthetimeofRichelieu146‐195’.InterestofstatewritingsfoundtheiroriginsinRenaissanceVenetianrelationereportsestimating‘theinnermotives of its rivals’ by looking into ‘the particular situation of a particular individual country’, but gained its fullpotential under Richelieu’s government,when France re‐entered the Europeanwar competition.Meinecke arguedthattheWarsofReligionfosteredthe‘recognitionofthetruecollectiveinterestofthewholeofFrance’:anti‐Spanishandreligioustoleration.TheseideaswereputintopracticeundertheruleHenryIV,butduringtheregencyofMariadeMedici, Franceneglected this interestuntil thegrowthofHabsburg‐Spanishpower, theHabsburgsgeographicalenclosureoftheFrenchmonarchyandthemarriagenegotiationsbetweentheSpanishinfantandtheyoungCharlesproducedsubstantialfearamongstFrenchpoliticians.Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,146,147,151;Lazzeri‘Introduction’, 87 for origins of interest analyses in Ventian relatione reports; Richard Devetak, ‘HistoriographicalFoundations of modern International Thought’, History of Ideas 41:1 (2014), 62‐77, quote on p. 64. Notably, by‘internationaldimension’Devetakmeans‘theexternalinteractionsofsovereigns,republics,empiresandprincipalitieswithothersuchpublicandprivateactors.’109ConalCondren,ArgumentandAuthorityinEarlyModernEngland(CambridgeUniversityPress:Cambridge2006),344‘thisambivalentrelationshipwithanddevelopmentfromnotionsofofficeallowedofficeandinteresttorubalongalmost in as complementary a fashion as honestas and utilitas. But it also allowed for forms of explanation
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focusing on the nature of societies of rulers, e.g. the present geographical position, political
structures,religiousmake‐up,militaryprowessandrelationswithotherrulers,hewasableto
marginalise well‐established questions concerning princely virtue, piety and confessional
integrity. For an ex‐rebellious Huguenot prince living under a Catholic ruler and desiring an
office,anyreligiouspolemicoughttobeavoided.
2.2.2MonarchyincrisisandRichelieu’scrisismanagementofreasonofstate
MostoftheresearchintoFrenchusagesofreasonofstatevocabularyfocusesontheperiodof
Richelieu’sministry(1624‐1642),his‘monopolisation’ofthisterminology,and,subsequentlyon
writingsofhishiredpensasGuezdeBalzac,JeandeSilhon,PhilipdeBéthune,GabrielNaudéas
wellasRichelieu’sownmemoirs.110Duringthefirstdecadesoftheseventeenthcentury,Tacitist
andItalianreasonofstatewritingsasbyBoteroandBoccaliniwereusedtocriticisethekingand
his advisers and ‘unveil’ their secretive political schemes. Richelieu turned this dangerous
criticismintorathersuccessfulpropagandafortheCrownbypublicationstrategiesandasystem
of censorship, reaching a relatively large readership.111 Laurie Catteeuw argues that these
outburstsonreasonofstatesubsequently transformedtheassociatednotionofnecessitas: the
extraordinary became ordinary. Under the auspices of the terminology of reason of state, the
ancient maxim of ‘necessity knows no law’ gradually transformed into an argument that
‘necessity makes law’.112 Nonetheless, in the context of crisis, reason of state became quite
openly andheavilydebated, andRichelieucouldnotprevent critics fromdiscussing reasonof
independentofanyethicsofoffice.’;RyanWalter, ‘SlingsbyBethel’sAnalysisofStateInterests’,HistoryofEuropeanIdeas41:4(2015),489‐506,495.110Meinecke,TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,164‐204;Church,RichelieuandReasonofState;Gauchet,‘L’Etataumiroirdelaraisond’Etat’;Thuau,Raisond'Etat.111JacobSoll,‘EmpiricalHistoryandtheTransformationofPoliticalCriticisminFrancefromBodintoBayle’,JournalofHistoryof Ideas64:2(2003),297‐316, inparticular306,309;LaurieCatteuw, ‘L’inacceptable faceauxnécessitéspolitiques : les relations entre censures et raisonsd’état à l’époquemoderne’ inLesDossiersduGrihl [online], Lesdossiers de Jean‐Pierre Cavaillé, Les limites de l'acceptable, (14 juin 2013), accessed January 17 2016. URL :http://dossiersgrihl.revues.org/5978.112Talkingaboutanunacceptablereasonofstateformedaframeworkinwhichcertainactionscouldbeacceptedandfinallywereaccepted.Catteeuw,‘L’inacceptablefaceauxnécessitéspolitiques’;LucFoisneau,‘SovereigntyandReasonofState:Bodin,Botero,RichelieuandHobbes’, inHowellA.Lloyd(ed.),TheReceptionofBodin (Brill;Leiden2013),323‐342, p. 333; The most famous or notorious example of Richelieu’s promotion of reason of state is probablyConsidérations politiques sur les coups‐d'état (1639) by the Cardinal’s librarian, Gabriel Naudé, who, inspired byCharronandLipsius, extended the legitimatescopeofprudenceorpolitical fraud toeverymemberof governmentinsteadofsolelytotheprince,anddistinguishedbetweenan‘ordinary’andmoralprudenceand‘extraordinary’andopenly immoralprudence.The latterpolitical fraudwasnotmerelypersonaldissimulationof theprincebut couldinvolveboldandintervenientaction,overstretchingordinarymoralandlegalboundaries,justifiedforthesakeofthecommongood.Itwashoweverimperativeforitssuccessthatsuchactionwasexecutedintheutmostsecrecy,asheassessed the Bartholomew’s Massacre as ‘very just’ but unfortunately ‘done by halves’. Peter Burke, ‘Tacitism,Scepticism andReason of State’, in J. H. Burns andMarkGoldie (eds.),TheCambridgeHistoryofPoliticalThought,1450–1700(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1991)479‐498,p.496‐498;Soll,‘ALipsianLegacy?’,312‐315.
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state.113
Instead of mirroring policies of ‘statebuilding’ or ‘absolutism’ of the Bourbon
monarchy,114 French use of reason of state vocabulary largely reflected pressing political
problems,broughtforthbywarfareanditsfinancialconsequences.Inthelate1620s,concerns
abouttherise inpowerofHabsburg‐Spain,coincidedwithdomesticpoliticaldebates,wherein
two ill‐defined factions could bedistinguished. Thedévots, led by theQueenRegentMarie de
MédicisandthekeeperofthesealsMicheldeMarillac,favouredthesuperiorityoftheVaticanin
domesticecclesiasticalmattersandapro‐Habsburg,non‐belligerentforeignpolicythatensured
timeandmoney to initiatemuchneeded internal reformsand toannihilate theProtestantsat
home.OntheothersidestoodthebonsFrançais,headedbyCardinalRichelieu,whoarguedfor
therelativeautonomyoftheFrenchChurchand,aboveall, thedireneedforanoffensiveanti‐
Habsburg war and, therefore, a postponement of domestic reforms. This debate dominated
FrenchpoliticsuntilthepeaceofthePyreneesbetweenSpainandFrancein1659.Accordingto
Collins,thedévotsreflectedarenewedstressonpersonalpietyandamorerigorousreligionin
France.WilliamChurcheven claims thatunderhisministry,Richelieudealtwitha revitalised
Catholicism ‘which was stronger than any similar religious movement in the three earlier
reigns.’115
Other crucial issues that pressured the Crown were dynastic fragility (the later King
LouisXIVwasbornnotuntil 1638), thepowerfulgrandees, aswell as thegrowinggap in the
government’sbudget,illustratedbythepartialbankruptcyof1634.BythetimeDel’interestwas
published, France’s involvement in the Thirty Years’War had severely affected its society by
massivelyincreasingtaxation,introducingnewtaxesandsellingofficesastaxfarmingandlands,
whichledtoincreasingcriticismofabuseofsuchoffices,widespreadnon‐paymentoftaxesand
constantinternaldisorderasrebellionsoccurredinprovincesandtowns,eventuallyspreading
toParis,explodinginaseriesofrevoltsbyofficersandgreatnobilityduringtheFrondeof1648‐
113MarcelGauchetarguesatransitionfromtheideaofthesecrecyofpolitics,mysteriesofstatedecipherablesolelybyrulers and their advisors, to the notion of openly debating reason of state, analysed by rulers and ruled, andconsequently reason of state developed into a weapon against the Crown. Gauchet, ‘L’Etat aumiroir de la raisond’Etat’;JacobSolldemonstratestheCrown’srejectionoftheidiomofreasonofstatefromthe1660sonwards,largelysetupbyfinancialminster,JeanBaptistedeColbert,whoexclaimedtheineffectivenessanddangerofNaudé’spoliticalviews, and promoted a panegyric, more eloquently Ciceronian history‐writing instead of a critically political andTacitistone.Soll,‘Alipsianlegacy?’.114 See for instance Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, ‘Part III Internal Affairs, State‐Building, and AttendantControversies,1624‐1632’,p.173‐282;Soll,PublishingthePrince,seepages7,58onabsolutismandreasonofstate;Thuau,Raisond'Etat,11.115Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,35;Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,41,93;TheCardinalintroducedmilitaryandadministrativereformsandcreatedavastclientnetworkinFrance,whichwasresentedbymanynobles,asthedévots,especiallybyMariadeMédicisandGaston,theKing’sbrother.Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,59‐68;AccusationsofMachiavellism,allegedlyfanaticallypractisedbyRichelieu,werenotuncommon,e.g.theabbédeChoisyclaimedthattheCardinalhadacopyofthePrinceonhisbedsidetable.Soll,PublishingthePrince,47.
33
1653. Collins even speaks of ‘the twenty years crisis 1635‐1654’.116 These crisis years fuelled
debates on reason of state, discussing and stretching the legitimate scope for the regime to
execute extraordinary measures against domestic political agitators and competitors, and
againstforeignregimesgenerally.117
Church states that under Richelieu foreign affairs were more frequently discussed in
Frenchreasonofstatewritingsthandomesticones,however,suchmattersweremostoftenthan
not intertwinedaswitnessed indebatesbetween thedévotsandbonsFrançais.118Themarket
was floodedwithpublicationsdefending anti‐Habsburgpolicies in the ‘interest’ of theFrench
‘state’ and, often added, in the interest of Catholicism.119 The FrenchCrown’s return to costly
anti‐Habsburg foreign policy received massive criticism, but because the growing financial
pressureswereaccompaniedby resurgentCatholicism, itwas farharsher than attackson the
anti‐HabsburgpoliciesofthereignsofFrancisI,HenryIIandHenryIV.Afterenteringdirectly
thewaragainstSpain,theCardinalwaswidelyaccusedofplacingthe ‘interestsofstate’above
theCatholicfaith.InhisdefenceRichelieuemphasisedaconfessionaldimensiontohisusageof
reasonofstateinclaimingthatpursuingwarfareagainstthegrandCatholicmonarchyofSpain
was thedivinemissionofCatholicFrance, itsultimate interestofstate,becausedefending the
balanceofpowerbetweenEuropeanprincesmaintainedtheautonomyoftheCatholicChurch.120
2.2.3Betweenfactandfiction:thethreatofthe‘newmonarchy’
Apartfromitsdomesticcontext,Del’interestmaybeunderstoodasanextensionofthegenreof
criticalcurrent‐affairscommentary,fuelledbytheThirtyYears’,inwhichreasonofstatewasa
favourite subject, aroundwhich exaggeration and lurid accounts of dubiousmotivation easily
116Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,chapter2pages71‐99,whichendswiththecoronationofLouisXIVatReimsin1654,sincetheperiodoftheregencyofhismotherAnneofAustriafrom1643‐1651againproducedinternalpowerplaysdisastrouslyaccumulatingintheFronde.117GeneralfunctionofreasonofstatedevelopedduringreligiouscivilwarsaccordingtoHöpfl,‘ReasonofState’,1114.118Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,38;ReadChurch,RichelieuandReasonofState,197‐282onreasonofstatewritings triggered by the power struggle between Richelieu, and Maria de Medici and her third son and heir‐presumptiveGastond’Orléans,escalating in theDayof theDupes(±10November1630)andLouisXIIIsubsequentdecision in favourofRichelieuandagainstGastonandhis followers,declaringthemguiltyof lèse‐majesté,ofwhichseveralhighnoblesweretrialledandexecuted.119ReadforvariousexamplessuchasRichelieu’sownwritingsThuau,Raisond'Etat,308;EarliestexamplesfromtheValtelline episode of 1624‐1626. For pamphlets defending Richelieu’s anti‐Habsburgs policy in terms of reason ofstatevocabularyduringthisepisodeseeChurchchapteron‘theValtellineepisode’,RichelieuandReasonofState,103‐172,especiallypaged126‐173.Notably,thesedefenceswereratherforaforeignreadershipthanadomesticonesincethedévots initiallysupportedFrenchintervention in the Italianvalley.A famousexampleofa treatisedefendingananti‐Habsburgspolicyas the interestofFranceandof theVaticanaswell: [Ferrier, Jérémie.], Catholiqued’estatouDiscourspolitiquedesalliancesduroytrès‐Chrestiencontrelescalomniesdesennemisdesonestat(Paris1625).Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,128‐141.120ChurchrejectedMeinecke’streatmentofRohan’sandRichelieu’sperspectivesoninterestasonesingularconceptof reason of state. Richelieu’s writings were in contrast to Rohan’s, imbued with his religious and moral beliefs.Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,352;Foisneau,‘SovereigntyandReasonofState’,333‐338;
34
gathered.Regimesstrovetocontrolrising‘opinion’andreadersdemandednewsfromthechaos
of the many involved parties, interdependent conflicts and ever‐changing alliances. Malcolm
distinguished threegroupsof readers: the largestpartmayhave readpopular satire for their
amusement,theelitemayhaveratherreadofficialdeclarationsofbothsidesinordertovalidate
the legalityof thedemands,andthemajorpartof theeducatedreadingpublicmayhavebeen
fascinated, evenexhilaratedby reasonof state.This lattergroupwasalreadyacquaintedwith
many writings on the subject and could now, as the war evolved, delve deeper into the
seemingly secretive princely politics of reason of state, which appeared to be tested and
demonstrated in the,asMalcomwrites, ‘hugepublic laboratory’of theThirtyYears’War.121A
famousexampleofthisgenreisMysteriapolitica(anonymouslypublishedin1625),writtenby
MaximilianofBavaria’spublicistandJesuitAdamContzen,whichcriticisedRichelieu’sexpulsion
ofPapaltroops,supportedbySpain,intheValtellineof1624byofferingeight‘genuine’letters
revealingsecretivepoliticalaffairsatforeigncourts,satirisingFrenchpoliticsthatwerefoolish
and damaging to Catholicism, while displaying Spain as defenders of the religion. Counter‐
pamphlets were published in the Mercure français, suggesting the Crown’s approval, and
accused Spain by the commonly used argument of instrumentalising religion to expand their
dominion,inthiscaseintheValteline,122asRohandescribedtheSpanishinterestaswell.
ThepropagandisticpurposeofthisgenredoesnotimplythatRohanmeanthisinterest
analysisnot tobetakenseriouslyortorejectreasonofstate,northathisdisplayofEuropean
political affairs is false. Malcolm claims that this genre ‘hovered somewhere between the
publicationsofgenuinedocumentsontheonehand,and,ontheother,thefanciful(andinthis
period, novel and entrancing) political fiction of Boccalini’s Raguagli di Parnasso, with their
shrewdlyargueddiscussionsbetweenkings,philosophers,andotherfamousfiguresofboththe
presentandthepast.(...)[I]twasagenrethatpermittedsomeblurringofthebordersbetween
factand fiction,betweengenuineanalysisandsatiricalexaggeration.’123Theunmaskingof the
opponent’s dissimulations and simulationswas evenmore effectivewhen it told the truth, as
MalcolmpointstoRohan’sadvicethattheFrenchmonarchyoughttoexposeSpanishandPapal
misusesoftheCatholicreligion‘tomaketheCatholickesperceiuethevenomehiddenvndes(sic.)
the same’.124 Reason of state could be used ‘to build on its credibility and exploit its
disreputability’.125 Insomeextremecasesapurelyparodicversionof reasonof statecouldbe
presented, but one should be aware that contemporary readers familiarwith reason of state
argumentswould not be shocked bymany of the details, e.g. by recommendations to stir up
conflictamongtheenemies.TheTacitistandMachiavellianpreceptofinstrumentalisingreligion 121Malcolm,ReasonofState,30‐34,quote31.122Malcolm,ReasonofState,32‐33;Church,RichelieuandReasonofState,121‐126.123Malcolm,ReasonofState,34.124Malcolm,ReasonofState,109;Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.125Malcolm,ReasonofState,34,107‐108.
35
forpoliticalgainremained,however,acontroversialissue.Moreover,thereexistedadegreeof
argumentbyimplicationinthismaterial.Whatwasfearedandmustbetakenseriouslywerethe
implications and extremes to which policy might lead, often attacked through urgent
exaggeration as if theywere alreadypracticed.Thus,writingswithin this genre could involve
satiricelementswhilesimultaneouslytheywere‘meanttobetakenseriously’.126Theintegration
of current political affairs granted such writings a sense of authority that accompanied the
hyperbolicallydesignedaccusations.127
Inthelightofthisintricatecontextofargumentoninterestandreasonofstate,itisnow
possibletosuggestwhatpreciselyRohanmeantbycallingSpaina‘new’monarchy,foritwasnot
recognition of modern state building in the sense of an institutionalised fiscal‐military state.
Rohan’shostileimageofSpainastheaspiring‘newmonarchy’resteduponalongertraditionof
propaganda on ‘universal monarchy’, which in early modern Europe was shaped by the
intensificationofwarfarefromwhichpowerfuldynasticagglomeratesemerged.Bythetimeof
Charles V the notion of universal monarchy has lost its predominant theoretical nature in
conflicts between the pope and the emperor and had been transformed into a subject for
politicaldebateregardingtheorganisationofEuropeanpolitics.Moreover,thenotionwasused
prejudicially, suggesting that one power within Europe acted by ‘illegal power politics’, and
occurredmoreoften thannot indebates about theFrench‐Spanish rivalry.The associationof
universalmonarchywiththeimperialdignityoftheHolyRomanEmpirevanished,becausethe
Spanish kings had taken over the original imperial duty to protect the Catholic Church and,
subsequently,asimilarclaimovertheotherEuropeanrulers.InthecontextoftheThirtyYears’
War, the use of the universal monarchy argument exploded in pamphlets against Habsburg‐
Spain; its aspiration for universal monarchy seen as the prime cause of the war. Universal
increasinglyreferredtoafearedmilitaryhegemony.128
Rohan’s hyperbolic portrayal of the Spanish interest, i.e. seeking ‘new monarchy’ by
dissimilatingpietyandpoliticalandmilitaryoppression,illustratesthisnegativeconnotationof
‘universal monarchy’. Since propaganda against Charles V, universal monarchy was often
delegitimisedasanunjustrule,motivatedsolelybytheruler’spersonaldesireforgloryandgain.
Thiswasconsideredtobe,inthewordsofthehistorianFranzBosbach,‘ameretyranny,because
the subjects were kept in unchristian slavery and treated as the personal property of the
126Malcolm,ReasonofState,106,34.Besides,asMalcolmstresses,thesatiriceffectcouldonlyworkwhenreadersatleastcouldimaginethatrulersandtheiradvisorsdeliberatedsuchMachiavellianpoliticsofreasonofstate.127Malcolm,ReasonofState,51.128Bosbach, ‘TheEuropeanDebateonUniversalMonarchy’, inDavidArmitage(ed.),Theories inEmpire,1450‐1850(Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 81‐98, p. 84‐92; It should be noted that Philip II likewise endorsed propagandalegitimisinghis claim foruniversalmonarchy, for instance to justifyhis inclusionofPortugal.MartinvanGelderen,‘UniversalMonarchy,theRightsofWarandPeaceandtheBalanceofPower.Europe'sQuestforCivilOrder’inHans‐ÅkePersson,BoSträ(eds.),ReflectionsonEurope.DefiningaPoliticalOrderinTimeandSpace(Brussels:P.I.E.PeterLang,2007),49‐71,55.
36
universal ruler.’129 English literature on tyranny followed a similar pattern. A subordinate
allegation to such charges of tyranny was rapacity creating slavery, a rule by accumulative
conquest of each European polity.130 Recent historical research has even qualified Habsburg‐
Spainasamonarchybasedonviolentconquest.131Famousexamplesaretobefoundintheso‐
called ‘Black Legend’ pamphlets, which usually conveyed accusations of Spanish universal
monarchy through religious‐apocalyptic imagery demonizing the Habsburgs rulers and the
Spanishsoldiers.132Furthermore,theaccusationofSpain’s(andlaterFrance’s)usageofreligion,
a zeal for Catholicism to cover their desire for universal dominion instead of defending the
societaschristiana,wasarecurrentargumentinsuchpropaganda.133 Chargesoftyrannywere
central toreligiouspolemics,whichcanexplainwhyRohan,notwishingtoexciteconfessional
differences within France, refrained from overtly using this language. However, since the
legitimating language of tyrannywas extremely slippery, relating to a vast number of terms,
therewasnoneedtobeexplicit.134
Overall, Ihave suggestedan inter‐related setof contextsdirectly relevant toL’interest.
Rohan grew up during the tumultuous period of civil wars, confessional strife, rebellious
princely factions, and dynastic crisis. This fuelled the popularity of ideas on the utility and
necessityof(princely)practicalprudence,ondissimulationandsimulation,onreadinghistoryto
discover the ‘true’causesandself‐interestsofrulers,onthe ‘state’asaanabstractunity,and,
subsequently,broughtforththevogueterminologyofreasonofstate,ofwhichhemadefrequent
129SuchaccusationsremainedpartofuniversalmonarchypropagandaagainstPhilip IIand lateragainstLouisXIV.Bosbach, ‘TheEuropeandebateonuniversalmonarch’,89,95‐96;Lazzeri,168 footnote1examplesofdefences forFrench anti‐Habsburgspolicy inFrenchpublications from the1620s, but also theFrench translationofBoccalini’sfamouswork,Lapierredetouchepolitiqueof1626andGabrielNaudé’sconsiderations.130 Conal Condren has reported the wide range of accusations of ‘tyranny’ for seventeenth‐century England andpointedtoacertainsubordinateaccusation, tracingbacktoPlatonicpleonexia,whichmeantenslavingoneself to ‘adisorderingofthesoul,manifestedbyalicentiousgrasping,rapacity’thatultimatelyleadstoviolenceandcrueltyandthe enslavementofothers, i.e. unrestricted corruption.This fearof ‘licentious rapacity and systematic interferencewith others’ became embedded in the literature triggeredby the French religiouswars and in debates concerningCharles I’s shipmoney taxof the1630s.ConalCondren, ‘TheUsesofTyranny, andLiberty inSeventeenth‐CenturyEngland’ Louis Green Lecture on IntellectualHistory and the Social history of Ideas for 2013 (Melbourne, MonashUniversity:AncoraPress,2014),1‐31,quotedfrom10,11.131 JoséJavierRuizIbáñezandGaetanoSabatini, ‘MonarchyasConquest:Violence, SocialOpportunity, andPoliticalStabilityintheEstablishmentoftheHispanicMonarchy’,TheJournalofModernHistory81:3(2009),501‐536.132 In the Black Legend‐literature, the Spanish were depicted as heathen and demonic, and King Philip II wasportrayedassinful,ambitiousandgreedy,asatyrantenslavingsubjectswhereverheruled,evenmorecruellythantheOttomans.InbothFrenchandDutchpamphletstheconfessionaldifferencesbetweentheProtestantandCatholicpartieswere camouflaged. Conversely, the Spanishwere depicted as non‐Christian and demonic derivatives of thebarbaricMoors. The universal claim of the Spanish tyrannywas dramatically portrayed by their dealingwith theAmericanIndiansinthebooksofLasCasas,especiallypopularintheDutchRepublic,wheretheyweretranslatedThemirroroftheSpanishtyrannyintheWestIndiesorAshortaccountofthedestructionoftheIndies(1606).OnFrenchBlack Legend literature Judith Pollmann, ‘ Eine natürliche Feindschaft: Ursprung und Funktion der schwarzenLegende über Spanien in den Niederlanden, 1560‐1581’ in Franz Bosbach (ed.), Feindbilder: die Darstellung desGegners inderpolitischenPublizistikdesMittelaltersundderNeuzeit (Köln [etc.]: Böhlau 1992), 73‐93. For FrenchBlack Legend literature read pages 84‐87, and for Dutch pamphlets read pages 88‐92; Van Gelderen, ‘UniversalMonarchy’,56.133 Lazzerri,De l’intérêt des princes et les Etats chrétienté, 168, footnote 1 examples of defences for French anti‐HabsburgspolicyinFrenchpublicationsfromthe1620s,butalsotheFrenchtranslationofBoccalini’sfamouswork,Lapierredetouchepolitiqueof1626andGabrielNaudé’sconsiderations.134ConalCondren,‘TheUsesofTyranny’.
37
use in his writings. During the 1620s and 1630s, Rohan faced resurgent Catholicism, the
incredible rise inpowerof theSpanish‐Habsburgs, thedebatesbetween thedévots andbonne
Françaisoverforeignpolicy,domesticreformandthepersecutionofhisco‐religionists,andthe
subsequentfocusonthe‘true’reasonofstatebehindtheprincelypoliticsinthecontemporary
constellationofEuropeanwarfare.Againstthisbackground,exiledandinneedforaprestigious
office, Rohan wrote De l’interest and handed it over to Cardinal Richelieu in 1634. The ex‐
military Huguenot leader proposed costly, grand scale warfare against Habsburg‐Spain,
defendingtheconstructionofawarmachineforFrance,whileimplicitlycriticisingtheSpanish
monarchybyaccusationsofunrestrictedtyrannicalcontrolinthenameofreligion,hiddenunder
hisseeminglyobjectiveinterestanalysisofEuropeanprincesandtheirsocieties.
2.3Satirebyinterestanalysis:SpanishunrestrictedtyrannyandFrenchpatrioticunity
Directlyafterhisassertionof interest rulingprincesand the irrelevanceofclassicalhistory to
interpret interest of state, Rohan declared that the Bourbon‐French and Habsburg‐Spanish
dynastieswere the two great powers in Christendom. They functioned as opposite poles and
consequentlydecidedthefaithoftheotherprincesintheEuropeantheatreofwar.Accordingto
Rohan, the secret design of Habsburg‐Spain was to further their advancement towards
establishingasupremelypowerfulandgrandnewmonarchy.However,Rohanstated that this
designcouldnolongerbehidden:
‘This[Power]ofSpainefindingitselfeaugmentedallatonce,hathnotbeeneable
toconcealethedesignesheehadtomakeherselfeMistresse,andcausetheSunne
ofanewMonarchietoriseintheWest.’135
Being the opposite pole of Spain, Bourbon‐France attempted to counterpoise this Spanish
design,butasitbecomescleartothereader,thiswasnotundertakeneffectively.Rohanclaimed
that ‘interest (as it hath beene well or ill followed) hath caused the ruine of some, or the
greatnesseofothers’136and,therefore,hewoulddescribethe‘trueinterest’ofBourbon‐France
andHabsburg‐Spainand thoseof theother rulerswhoseemed tobedependenton these two
greatdynastiesfortheirprotection.Inthesecondparthewouldshowthroughrecenthistorical
caseshowrulershadbadlymisunderstoodordepartedfromthetrueinterestoftheirstatesby
followingtheirpassions,superstition,prejudiceorpersonalinterests,orhadbeenmisguidedby
135Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.136Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.
38
their corrupted ministers. Behind this seemingly objective and secular interest analysis of
European ‘states’ lieshissatiricaccountof the interestof theSpanishmonarchy: itsdesire for
establishing a ‘new monarchy’, a tyrannical control predominantly by dissimulating piety,
backedbyahighlydevelopedmachineryofwarandintelligence.Thisinterestanalysisenabled
him to implicitly criticise Habsburg‐Spain and to forge a patriotic unity for France by
sidesteppingpotentiallydivisivequestionsofconfessionalintegrity.
2.3.1‘TheinterestofSpaine’
OnthebasisofhisinterestanalysisofeveryEuropeanrulerandregime,Rohanclaimedthatthey
allshouldfeartheconcealed‘designe’ofHabsburg‐Spaintoestablisha‘newMonarchie’,which
only could be opposed by the French monarchy taking up arms.137 Consequently, he starts
l’Interestwith ‘the interestof Spaine’.Heopenedwithemphasising theexcellent geographical
position of the Spanish monarchy, being ‘the head of Europe’ and protected by its natural
boarders(theOcean,theMediterraneanSeaandthePyrenees)while‘somanyStatesspreadin
diversepartsoftheworld’depended‘uponthisgreatCountrysowellsituated.’Hecontinuesby
referring to the late King Philip II, who ‘attempted to extend this vast power to the top of
greatnesse.’HeironicallypraisedPhilip’sstatesmanship:
‘Philip King of Spaine (…) (finding himselfe lesse fitt for warre then ciuill
businesses)judgedthatMonarchiesgotasitwereinpost,bythevalourofwarlike
Princes,arenotoflikecontinuanceasthosewhichtheygetbyestablishinghagood
Counsell,andwhicharefoundedvpongoodmaximes.’138
Rohanused,withoutreference,Machiavelli’sfamousargumentthatconqueredpolitiesthatare
accustomedtolivingundertheirownlawsaredifficulttomaintainbecauselesscourageousmen
often succeed ‘these great Conquerrours’ and the conquered citizens tend not to forget their
oncebeloved‘libertie’.139Machiavellistatesthattheconquerorcouldsetupanindirectruleand
allowthemto liveunder theirown laws,butbelieves itmoreefficient to live therehimselfor
destroy thesepolities, scatter the inhabitantsorcreate internaldivisions.140Rohanunderlined
137Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.138Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,4.With‘asitwereinpost’Rohanreferstomonarchiesfoundedbythebelligerentspiritoftheruler.139Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,5.140NiccolòMachiavelli,ThePrince,ChapterV,‘Howcitiesorprincipalitiesshouldbegovernedthatlivedbytheirownlaws before theywere occupied’ [translated and edited by Peter Bondanellawith an introductionMaurizio Viroli](OxfordUniversityPress:NewYork2005),19‐20;‘Forinfact,thereisnosecuremeansofholdingontocitiesexceptbydestroyingthem.Anyonewhobecomesmasterofacityaccustomedtolivinginlibertyanddoesnotdestroyitmay
39
this counsel in believing that the once free citizens ‘are easily carried to any change, seeing
themselues deliuered from the feare of him that had subjected them’.141 However, Rohan
emphasisedthatPhilipwasperhapsnotawarriorprince,buthewasatruestatesmanandsohe
‘chooseacoursemostagreeabletohisimpenetrablehumour,thatis,toprosecutehisdesignes
vnderaprofounddissimulation.’142MostcontemporaryreaderswouldhaveunderstoodRohan’s
implicitreferencetoinfamousMachiavellianpowerpoliticsandtheimperativeofconcealingthe
truth.143ThereadermayconcludethattheSpanishrulewasestablishedbyconquest,oppositeto
the rule of law, seeing ‘that these great Conquerrours, (…) thinke onely of vanquishing, and
extendingtheirdominions,andnotof foundingLawesfortheirsubsistence’,144andthat itwas
maintainedthroughacalculateduseofdissimulation,andthereforeencompassedanunjustrule.
RohancontinuedthissatiricpictureofPhilipIIbystatingthat
‘he fixed the seatofhisdominion inSpaine, thathemight from thence conuiegh
warmth to the members loosened from his body, and might with more ease
(conseruingpeacebyhispresence)troublealltherestofEurope.’145
Furthermore,Philip’sstatecrafthadresulted in thegrowthof theSpanishmonarchy tosucha
greatextentthathissuccessorshadeasilycarriedonhisplansforuniversalhegemony.146This
picture functions as awarning for France, not only against the dangers of being absorbed by
Spanishrapacitybutalso,onceconquered,ofnotbeingabletooverthrowtheSpanishuniversal
tyrant. Rohan’s use of ‘domination’ (also in original French text) may refer to ‘rule’, but is
additionally suggestive of the Latin dominatus, a term in the ambit of tyranny and universal
monarchy.147 This negative association of ‘dominion’ with universal aspirations, seeking an
unrestrictedmastershiporlordshipoverothersovereigns,stoodincontrastwithRohan’soutcry
to protect the ‘liberties of Christendome’. This argumentation of ‘liberties’ endangered by an
aspiringuniversalmonarchwasanintegralpartinaccusationsofuniversalmonarchyfromthe
timeofCharlesVtotheageofLouisXIV.Furthermore,aswewillseeinthefollowingchapters,
expecttobedestroyedbyit,becausesuchacityalwayshasasarefugeinanyrebellionthenameof libertyanditsancientinstitutions,neitherofwhichiseverforgotteneitherbecauseofthepassingoftimeorbecauseofthebestowalof benefits. And it matters very little what one does or foresees, since if one does not separate or scatter theinhabitants,theywillnotforgetthatnameorthoseinstitutions.’141Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.142Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,4,5.143Rohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,164.144Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,5.145Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,5.Notethathere,Rohanacknowledgedthepotentialdifficultlyrulingsuchadynasticagglomerate,underlinedtheheterodoxcharacterofearlymodernSpain,i.e.‘tothemembersloosenedfromhisbody’,whatJohnMorrillhasdescribedas‘dynasticagglomerate’.146Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,5.147Bosbach, ‘TheEuropeandebateonuniversalmonarch’,92;DominatuswastheLatinrenderingfortheNeoLatin‘despotism’.Ontheseventeenthcenturyreappearanceoftheterm‘despot’anditsderivativesinattacksonprincelyruletoindicateahouseholdrule,readthefollowingchapteronDelaCourt.
40
particularlywithDelaCourtandValkenier,thisargumentationwouldbedevelopedintoattacks
onprincelyruletoindicateahouseholdrulemodelledonrobberybyconquest;princeswho,to
finance their endless desire for warfare, robbed their subjects of their lives, livelihoods and
liberties,eventuallyenslavingthem.
Rohandistinguishedfive‘maximes’whichtheSpanishinterestembodied:1)religion,i.e.
falselyupholdingagreatzealfortheCatholicfaith;2)acquiringsecretintelligenceaboutcurrent
affairs in other ‘states’ by ambassadors, monks and priests and by bribery of counsellors of
foreignprinces;3)signing(secret)treaties,feigningstrivingforpeace,strikingotherdynasties
when they least expect it, and acting as mediator between other princes in conflict; 4)
maintaining a constant state of armament to repress their own subjects, to intimidate other
princes, to oppose enemy plans and to surprise enemy princes; 5) carefully sustaining its
reputation,whichisdependentuponthefirstfourmaxims.148Thesefivemaximswerepresented
asrecommended techniques, carefullyanalysed,bywhichHabsburg‐Spaincouldmaintainand
extenditsdominion.Eachofthesemaximshasexplicitreferencetodissimulationoroppression,
andby the applicationof them,Rohanwas able to construe allHabsburg‐Spain’s policies and
conductasonegreatevilstrategy,consequentlyhyperbolepassesforsimpleanalysis.
Religionwas Spain’s firstmaxim, its key principle in obtaining universal dominion by
politicsofdissimilation.Rohanunderlined thecontroversialMachiavellianandTacitist ideaof
the instrumentaluseof religion.Without anydisclaimerormoral justification thatonewould
expect,Rohanstated:
‘ThefirstisgroundedvponReligion,asthatwhichforconsciencesakedoesmake
peoplevndertakeanything.’149
Under their proclaimed zeal for Catholicism, Spanish rulers and their agents ought to seek
supportfromthePopetostrengthenitspowerandstirupconflictsinothercountriestodestroy
them from within. Rohan counselled that the Spanish monarchy should incite civil war by
stimulatingopenly theFrenchcrowntopersecute itsProtestantsubjectsbutat thesametime
secretly supporting the rebellious groups amongst the Protestants.With the English King he
ought tomake peace in order to protect his possessions in the Indies and to infiltrate in the
realm by setting up Jesuits schools, giving free education to boys in the Catholic religion and
training themtobecomemartyrs for theSpanishmonarchyagainst theirownEnglishking. In
the Holy Roman Empire, with its powerful Protestant princes, the Spanish ruler ought to
maintain the Austrian branch of the Habsburg dynasty ‘as the sole bullwarke against the
148Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,7‐12.149Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,6.
41
Protestants, and he should augment it from their spoyles, vnder pretence of Religion, and a
desire thereby todefendChristendomeagainst theTurks.’150 In theSwiss cantons, theSpanish
ruler ought to keep Catholics in such a high distrust of their Protestant neighbours that
differencesmightmorereadilybeexploitedtoSpain’sadvantage.IntheUnitedProvinces,Spain
oughttoprovokeasocietalschism.
AlthoughRohanconstantlywrote‘heought’,forthereaderitwasimmediatelyclearthat
hewastalkingaboutactualrecentevents,suchastheSpanishsupportfortheHuguenotgroups
duringtheFrenchReligiousWarsand likewise forCatholicgroups incertainSwisscantonsas
themuchfoughtoverValtellinepasses.Similarly,thiscounselcouldbewitnessedintheSpanish
involvement in the Thirty Year’sWar on the side of theHabsburgs emperors and during the
religious and political upheavals of the Twelve Year’s Truce in the Dutch Republic (1609–
1621).151Theunstatedbackgroundofeventsmarshalledthroughtheuseofmaximswouldhave
been familiar to readers; it constitutes a form of aposiopesis ‐leaving silent an obvious or
inevitableconclusion,a rhetorical restraint froma totalunmaskingof theenemy.At thesame
time,Rohan’spreferenceforanimperativeidiom,whatoughttobedoneinthetrueinterestsof
Habsburg Spain, was a less objective analysis than a form of Devil’s advocacy ‐a pretence of
honestcounselinordertoexposeandcondemn.
RohandevotedfewerpagestotheotherfourmaximsoftheSpanishinterest,intelligence,
negotiation of treaties, permanent armament and reputation. Compared to the maxim of
religion, thesedescriptionswerenotclarifiedby indirectexamplesofpolitiesthattheSpanish
monarchy recently had disrupted. Nevertheless, these four recommended techniques all
encompassed, although not explicitly stated, calculated political action of dissimulation, by
which, andagainRohan let the reader conclude this, theSpanishmonarchywould attempt to
bring down the European polities, and force themunder its tyrannical rule. The thirdmaxim
(negotiation of treaties) dictates that the Spanish ruler ‘must allway shewe a desire of peace,
therebytocastothersasleepe,andinthemeanetimepreparehimselfetowarre,fortosurprise
thevnprouided.’152Furthermore, theSpanishmonarchyought toactas ‘IudgeorArbitrator’ in
conflictsbetweenotherprincesforthesolereasontodividethem,andconsequentlytoconquer
themall;‘incensingthem(ifhecan)insteadofappeasingthem,consentigwiththeonetodiuide
thespoilesoftheother,andvponthediuisiondispossessebothtwo.’153Aconstantstateoffull
armament, i.e. the fourth maxim, was to construct a reputation of invincibility towards the
Spanishsubjectsaswellalneighbouringprincesandtoattackthelatterbysurprise.Rohanalso
recommended evil secret strategies in Spain’s second maxim on obtaining intelligence ‘by
150Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,8.151Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,6‐9.152Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,9‐10.153Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,10.
42
meanesofEmbassadours,aspersonstowardswhomrespect isborne.LikewisebyMonkesand
Preachersthathauegreatpowerintheirpulpitsandalsoinparticularfamilies’.Anothermeans
wasbuyingconfidentsandbribingforeignministersorprinces.Forthosewhowerefoundtoo
faithfultobebought,theSpanishmonarchyoughtto‘ruinetheminanywisehowsoeuer.’154The
(unstated)Spanishunrestrictedtyrannicalrulewaspractisedbydivide‐and‐conquerstrategies
hiding behind a careful constructed reputation as guarantor of peace and defender of the
Catholicfaith.
Rohan added ‘reputation’ as the lastmaxim that depended on the first four, but as he
stated ‘neuerthelesse being simply considered, it establisheth a fifthmaxime,wherebySpaine
gainethasmuch,asbyanyoftherest.’155Asmostreasonofstateauthors,156Rohanunderlined
theimportanceforarulerofmanaging‘opinion’amongstsubjectsaswellasforeignprincesand
theirsubjects,becauseitcouldcommandaweandfear,andthereforemaintainandexpandtheir
‘state’.Thefirstmaximofreligion,oftheSpanishrulerpresentinghimselfasthetrueprotector
oftheCatholicfaith,isfurtheredbyarepresentationofdevoutpietythatconstructsapowerful
reputation,recommendedinthisfifthmaxim;
‘Consideringthattheopinionconceiuedofthegreatzeale forthemaintenanceof
theCatholickeReligion,couerswiththecloakeofpietie,allherotherdesignes,and
holdsthepeopleinawonderfullawe.’157
BesidesSpain’spromotionofpietyandtheCatholicfaith,otherprincesandtheirsubjectsfeared
theSpanishmonarchyfortheir‘profoundintelligences’,their‘prudentdexteritie,(knowinghow
to advantage herself in Treaties)’ and ‘estate of her armes’.158 The Spanish rulers built their
reputationupontheseprudentmaxims.RohanconcludedhisaccountoftheSpanishinterestby
warning the readerof thenatureof the Spanish reputation; ‘Fromall these things results the
reputationofSpaine.Herinterestis,tomanagewellthispietie.’159ThedesignsofHabsburg‐Spain
weremuchgreaterthanthoseofotherrulersandthereforetheSpanishrulershadtobeextra
careful inmanaging their reputation, counselledRohan ironically.160The readerhad toderive
from this counsel that the Spanish monarchy illicitly treated religion as a mere political
instrument to cover up its rapacity in acquiring universal domination. Rohan ended his
discourseontheSpanishinterestwithhishopeforconvincinglyunveilingtheSpanishdesignsto
154Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,9.155Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,11.156Malcolm,ReasonofState,104;Höpfl,‘OrthodoxyandReasonofState’,234.157Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,11.158Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,11.159 Rohan,ATreatiseof the Interestof thePrincesand StatesofChristendome, 12;Henri de Rohan,De l’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,18,‘sonintérêtestdebienménagercettepiété.’160Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,12.
43
aidthedownfallof itsmonarchy: ‘Thishuge framecomposedofsomanyparts,andas itwere
incumberedwithitsowneweight,mouesbyitssecretsprings,whichloosetheirforceeuenas
theyarediscouered.’161
Thatisnottoarguethat‘interest’wasmerelyofinstrumentalvalue.Asexplainedabove,
Rohanwroteoninterestbeforeandhisoeuvrewasimbuedwith‘interest’ascategorytodiscuss
political action.162 This disregard ofmoral, religious and legal considerations in unveiling the
‘trueinterest’oftheSpanishruler(dissimulatingpietyandazeal forCatholicism),exemplified
bytrueevents,istoturninteresttosatiriceffect:inlinewiththegenreofcriticalcurrent‐affairs
commentary, he simultaneously seeks to build on the credibility and exploit the disreputable
connotationsofreasonofstate.
2.3.2‘TheinterestofFrance’
Rohandeliberately and explicitlydefined the true interestofFrance in opposition toSpain. It
followsthattherightcourseforFrance’sdynasticpolicywasabelligerentanti‐Spanishandpro‐
Protestantpolicy.RohanstartedhisanalysisoftheFrenchinterestwithageographicalposition
ofthelandsoftheFrenchmonarchy.HeclaimedthatSpainwasthenaturalenemyofFrance:
‘FrancebeingseatedbetweenetheAlpesandthePyreneanmountaines,andflanked
by two seas, seemes to be inuited by nature to oppose it selfe against the
proceedings of this puissant Neighbourhood. For shee appeares like a banke
against this torrent, and the opportunitie of her situation is such, that sheemay
hinder thedistributionof thehead to themembers of theMonarchiewhichdoes
oppugneher.’163
France dispatched the head of the Spanish political body from its members by which Rohan
indirectly referred to the Spanish Low Countries, its Italian possessions and the dynastically
related lands of the Holy Roman Empire. The hindrance of France for the Spanish dynastic
agglomerate was, however, ‘not sufficient’ to oppose the Spanish design to universal
monarchy.164ThereforeRohanstatedthat‘theinterestofFranceis,totakeallthecounter‐course
161 Rohan,ATreatiseof the Interestof thePrincesand StatesofChristendome, 12;Henri de Rohan,De l’intérêtdesprinceset lesEtatschrétienté,19, ‘Cettegrandemachine composéesde tantdepartieset commeempêchéede sonproprepoidss’émeutparcessecretsressortsquiperdentleurforceàmesurequ’ilssontdécouverts.’162Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,121‐140;Dewald,Status,power,andidentityinearlymodernFrance,73.163Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,13.164Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,13.
44
(toimpeachallsheemayherdesignes)bymaximes,whichweecomenowdeliueruntoyou.’165
In stark opposition to his ironic praising of Philip II, Rohan heralded the lateHuguenot King
HenryIVfor‘havingbettervnderstoodthem[maximes]thenanyotherbeforehim,(…)hefirst
confirmed the true interest of France, which is to thwart or counterpoint Spaine in all these
points.’166 From all this, the reader should conclude that the current French King, Louis XIII,
should oppose Habsburg‐Spain by its own maxims. Citing Henry as an exemplum for Louis
personifies thediminutionof confessionaldifferenceandsuggestsadynastic thread to tie the
‘trueinterest’oftheFrench ‘state’together,asCollinsarguedthattheFrenchkingbecamethe
source of the newly constructed fictive unity of the French ‘state’, justified in terms of its
‘interestofstate’.167
Regardingitsfirstmaxim,theFrenchmonarchyoughttoshowallCatholics‘thevenome
hidden vndes the same’, i.e. under the Spanish zeal for Catholicism the Spanish monarchy
persecutedProtestantsforitsownadvantage.SimilarlytoRichelieu’sinterestargumentationfor
ananti‐Habsburgpolicy,Rohanclaimedthat theauthorityof thepope ‘neverhasmore lustre,
thenwehen thepowerof theChristianPrincesandstates isballanced’.168Thegreatdifference
betweenRohan’sandtheCardinalRichelieu’defencesforananti‐Habsburgpolicywasthefact
thatRohandidnotpresentitasaprincipalCatholicduty;andfurthermore,hepaintedratheran
evil picture of the Spanish motives for persecuting Protestants: ‘to let the Court of Rome
vnderstand that the hopes which Spaine giues her to augment her treasures by the ruine of
Protestants, is not but to further her designe towards theMonarchie’.169 From this the reader
might infer that not only did the Spanishmonarchy persecute Protestants solely for political
gain,butthatalsothePopehadbeendupedintoservingSpain’sinterest.AsRohanwarned:‘the
PopemustbecomeherServant’.170ThustheSpanishdesireforuniversalmonarchyconstituteda
political and military hegemony, and not at all a spiritual one. Secondly, the reader would
understandthattheFrenchmaximofreligionconstitutedessentiallyanecessarydefenceofthe
ruleoflawinallChristianpolities,CatholicandProtestant.BesidesconvincingotherCatholicsof
Spain’s religious pretexts, the Frenchmonarchy should assure Protestant rulers and regimes
that it was not intent on persecuting their Protestant subjects, but rather converting them.
Moreover, the French monarchy should communicate its willingness to support Protestant
rulersandregimes‘freelyagainstallthosethatwouldtroubleorchangeanythingintheirStates
165Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,13.166Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.167Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,xxii‐xxiii.168Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.169Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.170Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.
45
andliberties.’171Withoutnamingtheseenemies,thereaderwouldhaveknownimmediatelythat
RohanmeantHabsburgSpain.
Interestingly, the following three maxims of France, i.e. intelligence, diplomacy and
armament, constituted the equivalent of the Spanish ones in terms of contents. However, the
language throughwhich theFrenchmaxims areput forward ishardly asnegativenordoes it
containsinstructionsofdeepdeceitandoppressiveviolence,butratherdoesitstatedefensive
violence,tofightviolencewithviolence.RohanadvisedFrancetoinvestinastrongnetworkof
‘spiesandpensioners’toattaindetailedandaccurateknowledgeofthecurrentpoliticalaffairs
across Europe, to construct new alliances and ultimately to block the Spanish methods of
intelligence at everyEuropean court. Rohanoffered the same advice for the thirdmaxime: ‘it
oughtnottobesuffered,thatSpainemeddleinanyTreatie,butthatFrancealsostepbetweenon
herpart.’ He stressed thegrave importanceofmeddling in Italianaffairs to counterpoise the
almostprevailingstandingofSpainthere.Heindirectlyreferredtothenecessityofmaintaining
theAlpinepassesoftheValtellineforsurvivalofthewholeofEurope: ‘oneport toenterthere
[Italie],whichsheeought tokeepe,euenso longassheewillopposetheothersgreatnesse’.172
LikewiseconcerningthefourthmaximofFranceRohanwrote:‘Thereoughttobeopposedforce
toforce.Forneitherperswasions(sic.),northeIusticeofarmswillawehimthatsarmed.’173
Especially the last maxim shows a rather cynical and pessimistic view of politics
presentinghisbelief that to survive theEuropeanmilitarycompetition,oneshouldbeheavily
furnishedwithtroopsandarms.Thus,theCrownoughtnottofinancetheenemiesofHabsburg‐
SpainnortoattempttocontrolthepassagesbetweenthedifferentpartsoftheSpanishempire,
but,inlinewiththeargumentofthebonsFrançais,shouldinvestaswellinheavilyarmedFrench
troopstoopposeHabsburg‐Spainonthebattlefield;
‘So as that France ought to cutt off all vnnecessarie expences, and be allwaies
powerfully armed, hauing sufficiently to doe the same, without borrowing
elsewheresoldiers,munitionandmoney.’174
UnfortunatelyRohandidnotfeeltheneedtoexplainexactlywhichbudgetcutsFranceoughtto
implement,buthemayhavebeenalluding tocrippling interest rates fromwardebts thathad
weakenedtheFrenchCrowninthe1620s.175HeendedhisaccountoftheinterestofFranceby
arguing that the first fourmaximswould harm the reputation ofHabsburg‐Spain and elevate
thatofFrance.So,whilesatirisingSpainforitsMachiavelliantechniques,heofferedtheFrench 171Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14.172Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,15‐16.173Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,16.174Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,16.175Collins,RepublicanismandtheStateinlatemedievalandearlymodernFrance(forthcoming).
46
monarchyacounselon‘statecraft’ofalmostthehighestlevel,convincedthatFrancecouldonly
survive the European war competition in this way. This would lead to France opposing the
Spanishinterestofcarefullymanagingitsreputationofthemostpiousmonarchy,bygainingthe
reputation‘asthebullwarkeofChristianlibertie.’176
In presenting a ‘true interest of France’ in fierce opposition to the ‘interest’ of the
Spanishmonarchy,Rohanattemptedtocreateasenseofcollectivelysharedpoliticalaims.Such
aninterestoverruledconflictinginterestsofHuguenotsandCatholicswithinthe‘state’.Bythis,
Rohan,theHuguenotnoblemanandex‐militaryofficer,couldpresenthimselfasafully‐fledged
memberoftheFrenchmonarchy,defendarelativetolerationtowardsHuguenotsandattackthe
Catholic Spanishmonarchy. InRohan’sDe l’Interest the ‘state’ as apersona ficta is not clearly
witnessed, yetwedo find themore commondefinition for state as the political standing of a
ruler. Thepolitical actionswere still undertakenbyprinces, notprinces as representatives of
statesaslegalpersonsasbecomesclearintheintroduction:‘toconsiderwelltheinterestofthe
Princesof this time’, that is ‘thehowses (sic.) ofFranceandSpaine’ and the ‘otherPrinces’.177
Moreover as argued in the introduction, speaking of a ‘Spaine’ and a ‘France’ was a useful
shorthand for rulers and did not symbolised the existence of institutionalised bureaucratic
states.For instanceRohanwrote: ‘AndthoughallPrinceshold forageneralmaxime, that they
should carefully conserve their reputation, Spaineought to (..).’ ‘Spaine’ refers to the Spanish
king.YetRohanrecognisedtheexistenceof,whatJohnMorrilhascalled,dynasticagglomerates
composedofdifferentmemberseachwithitsownlegalandpoliticalsystem.178Consequently,he
alsowroteaboutthetrueinterestsofprincesandstatesofEurope:‘whenthepowerofChristian
PrincesandStates isballanced’; ‘and theotherChristianPrincesandStates’.179 It couldbe that
here Rohan rather referred to princes and other prevailing regimes or particular forms of
governmentasrepublics.Moreover, itseemsthatRohanalsoreferredtostatesasthepolitical
dominionof the ruler in linewithBotero: ‘in their [‘ProtestantPrinces]States and liberties.’180
Apartfromstateasthepoliticaldominion,Rohanmayalsohaveusedthewordstatetoreferto
areasoverwhicharulerought toexercisecontrol,combinedwithmeansof thiscontrol.State
canevenrefertoabodypolitic,inwriting:
‘WilliamofNassauPrinceofOrange,whoalone in thisAgehad thehonour to founda
State, [..]wasconstrained toassemble thepeeces for tocomposeabodie thereof,with
176Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,16.177Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,2.178Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,12;JohnMorrill,‘ThinkingabouttheNewBritish History’, in David Armitage (ed.), British Political Thought in History, Literature and Theory (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),44‐45.179Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,14,16‐17.180Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,15.
47
suchconditionsaseachTowneandProuincerequired.Forhauingmetwithpeoplethat
haue euer affected their libertie more then their very liues, he could not alter the
conditionswhereupontheyfirstjoynedthemseluesvntohim.’181
Over all, the variation in Rohan’s usage provides little evidence to justify toDe l’interest the
notionofthestateasalegalpersondistinguishablefrombothrulerandruled.
AfterunveilingthetrueinterestofSpainthatRohanstatedoughttobeopposedinevery
maximbyFrance,hetreatedthe interestsof ‘states’ thatwere linkedtotheSpanish‐Habsburg
dynastyeitherbyalliancesorbywarfare.SoFrance’sinterestwasfollowedupby‘theInterestof
the Princes of Italie’, ‘the interest of the Sea of Rome’ and ‘the Interest of Germanie’, and he
ended his first partwith ‘the interest of the Swisses and of the United Provinces of the Low
Countries’and‘theinterestofEngland’.182Fortheargumentofthischapteritsufficestosaythat
Rohan presented England as the balancing party between Spain and France, a counsel that
recurred inmany later interest analyses such as the one by Valkenier. Every interference of
SpainintheItalianpolitiesoughttobehinderedforfearofFrance’sencirclement.Inlinewith
Richelieu’sreasonofstateargumentsRohanbelieved thePapalStates tobe thebeneficiaryof
anti‐Habsburgs policy; and he treats them in a way at one with the Gallican defence of an
independentFrenchChurchasapoliticalentity.RegardingtheHolyRomanEmpire,thegreatest
threat to its ‘libertie’,183 was the Austrian branch of the Spanish‐Habsburgs, who made the
imperial crown de facto hereditary and was determined to usurp the entire empire under
Habsburg rule. The Swiss Confederation and the Dutch Republic served as two arms of the
Empire,bothwerefearedbyothers,andweredefendersofliberty(theSwissasmercenariesfor
othersand theDutchasdefendersof theirown liberty).Bothareprosperous, since theSwiss
haveenriched themselvesbypeaceand theDutchby thecontinuanceofwarfare.Eachshould
therefore ally itselfwith France against Spain. Rohan underlines the importance ofmoderate
confessionalpolicieswithinpolities, suchas theHolyRomanEmpire, theSwissConfederation
andtheDutchRepublic,forthesakeofsheersurvival.
2.3.3.Failedinterestmanagement:argumentfromhistory
181Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,85.182Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,‘oftheinterestofSpain’4‐12,‘ofFrance’13‐17,‘ofthePrincesofItalie’18‐21,‘oftheseaofRome’22‐25,‘oftheDukeofSavoy’22‐25,‘ofGermanie’26‐30;‘ofthe Suisses and of the united Prouinces of the Low‐Countries’ 31‐33, ‘of England’ 34‐37. Note that in the FrenchoriginaltexttheinterestoftheDukeofSavoyisdealttogetherwiththeinterestofthePope.183Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,26.
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Thesecondpartofhisbookincludesasimilarsatiricalexaggerationofpoliciesandconductby
sidesteppingconfessionaldispute,tohidehiscriticismagainstSpainandtorefrainfromdirectly
criticisingFrenchpersecutionof theHuguenots.AsSalmonremarks,historianshavepaid less
attention to this second and larger part of the book.184 Herein, Rohan presented seven
discourses,whichrepresented‘principallaffairesagitatedinChristendomeforthespaceoffiftie
yeares past’ to illustrate the neglect of interest, established in the first part of the book. It
encompassesa‘mirrordevice’,185showingrulersthat‘inmatterofState’,theyshouldnotbeled
by‘inordinatedesires’,‘violentpassions’,norby‘superstitiousopinions’butbe:
‘guidedbyreasonaloe(sic.),whichoughttobetheruleofouractions,totheendthatby
suchexamples,weeseeing (as inamirrour) the faultesofothers,may therebybenefit
ourselues.’186
Thesediscoursessharplyshowcasethesymbioticrelationbetweendomesticpoliticaleventsand
foreignaffairsandviceversa,orhowforeignprinces,toprotecttheirinterestofstate,meddlein
domesticaffairsof,oraffairsbetweenothers.Historicalanalysisenabledadistinctionbetweena
domestic and international level, as Meinecke and Devetak argued. Moreover, instead of
disqualifying these princes by their lack of listed virtues (as inmirror‐of‐prince literature or
reason of state writings focusing on the moral person of the ruler), Rohan examines recent
historicalconflicts/crisesandclearlyoutlinesthefailedinterestmanagementoftheprincesand
factions involved. Princely success is founded upon following the ‘true interest’ of the entire
‘state’,insteadoftheprince’sprivatepassions,hislackofcertainvirtuesortheadvicegivenby
hiscouncillors.Byfocusingonthefeaturesoftheruler’ssocieties,hisrulevis‐à‐vishissubjects
and relationswithother regimes,Rohancouldarguehispro‐Protestantandanti‐Spanishcase
independent of the ruler or ‘any ethics of office’, as Collins and Walter have argued,187 and
consequentlytorefrainfromopenlycriticisingtheSpanishCrownaswellastheFrenchCrown
whilesimultaneouslypresentinghimselfasasupporteroftheFrench‘state’.
Thereaderwasofferedseeminglyneutralhistoricalanalyses,butineverydiscourse,the
Spanish monarchy emerged as the instigator or at least the supporter of conflicts, that had
damaged or brought down the European polities from within. The illustrative material was
designedtosupportthenecessityofanti‐HabsburgpolicyandofastablecivilorderforFrance
184Salmon,‘Rohanandtheinterestofstate’,139.185TermbyRyanWalterreferringtothemirror‐of‐princesliteraturefromwhichreasonofstatewritingsdeveloped.Walter,‘SlingsbyBethel’sAnalysisofStateInterests’,5.186Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,39.187 Condren, Argument and Authority in Early Modern England, 344; Walter, ‘Slingsby Bethel’s Analysis of StateInterests’,495.
49
acrossconfessionallines.188Anexcellentexampleofthistwofoldargumentisthefirstandoneof
thelongestdiscourses,abouttheformationoftheCatholicLeague.189Rohanexplainedthatthe
religiouswarsundertheruleoftheFrenchKingsFrancisII(1559‐1560)andCharlesIX(1560‐
1574)wereprincipallycausedbydynasticfragilityor‘theyouthofthesetwoPrinces’,190which
ledtorivalling interestgroups, i.e.QueenCatherinedeMediciagainsttheprincesof theblood
andsecondly,betweenthenoblehousesofDeGuiseandDeMontmorancy,seekingcontrolover
theCrown. Rohan led the reader to believe that confessional differenceswere subordinate to
these power struggles. As he summed up the series of confessional conflicts and monstrous
eventsinasinglediminishingsentence:
‘Likewise there was amongst them difference of Religion. The warres about Religion
weregreatandbloodie,andlastedeuentothedeathofCharlestheninth,andhisbrother
Henry the third succeeded him. He was of age capable to gouerne, he had goodly
qualities,andgauehopesofahappyReigne.’191
However, Henry III preferred to ‘plunge himselfe in idlenesse and pleasures, [rather] then to
reignewell.’ImmediatelyhereafterRohanintroducedthesecondHenry,DucdeGuise:‘aPrince
endowed with great qualities, and full of loftie thoughts’.192 Since Henri III and his brother,
FrancisdukeofAnjouandAlençon,didnotprovideanheirtothethroneand‘thefirstPrincesof
the blood’ professed Protestantism (referring to Henry de Bourbon), Henry de Guise saw
opportunity to ‘aspire vnto theRoyaltie, and to get thither,makes himselfe Protecteur of the
Catholikes, and thePersecutourof theProtestats’.193DewaldqualifiesRohan’sanalysisof (and
praisefor)HenrideGuiseas‘toshockeveryseventeenth‐centuryreader’andunderstandsitasa
productofhisMachiavellianpoliticalviews,194but it ratherconstitutesacriticalexaggeration,
188Moreover,mostdiscourses explicitly emphasised that since the Spanishpowerhad rose considerably, itwas inevery ruler’s interest, whether Catholic or Protestant tomaintenance of the balance of power between Spain andFrance,asRohancounselledfor‘Italie’andthePopeintheseconddiscourse,inthefourthandfifthdiscoursefortheDutchUnitedStatestocontinuetheirwarfareagainstSpainandforFrance,EnglandandtheGermanprincestoassisttheDutchtherein,andforFranceintheseventhdiscourseontheWaroftheMantuanSuccession(1628–31)againstHabsburg‐Spaindescribed‘TherevolutionofFrance’andconcludedinthelastsentenceofthebook‘thattheglorieoftheKing,thegreatnesseofhisState,andtheeminentreputationthathenowenjoyeth,willcontinueaslongasheshallremaineconstantinthisresolution.’Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,citedfrom127,firstdiscourse40‐57.189 Under the title ‘upon the affaire of the League.’ Rohan, A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and States ofChristendome,40‐57.190Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,40.191Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,40‐41;Ladiversitédereligions’ymêla.Lesguerresdesreligionsfurentgrandesetsanglantesetdurèrentjusqu’àlamortdeCharlesIXetHenriIII.’192Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,41.193Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,41.194 Dewald, Status, power, and identity in earlymodern France, 75. Rohan’s analysis ‘treated plans of regicide andusurpation as expressions of lofty ambition and greatness of spirit; it praised a likely organizer of the St.Bartholomew’sDaymassacreofFrance’sProtestantnobles,aneventthathadtouchedRohan’sownfamilyandstillfrightenedProtestants throughoutEurope; and it presentedaCatholichero asmovedbypersonal ambition ratherthansincerefaith.TheaccountcriticizesGuiseonlyforhesitancyinexecutinghisplan.’
50
presenting Henry de Guise as the Machiavellian prince who evilly used religion for his own
personalgainandunscrupulously‘stirredupdiuerswarres’againsttheProtestants’195.Rohan’s
praiseforHenry’sgoodqualitiesshouldbeunderstoodasutterlyironic,whilehispraiseforhis
formerpatronHenrydeBourbon,thelegitimateheirofHenryII’s,wassimpleandclear:‘Kingof
Navarre, firstPrinceof theblood,Chiefof theProtestantspartieandaPrinceadornedwithan
heroïquevertue,successfullywageddiuerswarresinfauouroftheProtestants.’196
Themainsubjectofthisfirstdiscourse,theWaroftheThreeHenry’s(1587‐1589),was
explainedbytheirconflictinginterests:
‘TheKing tomaintaine his lawfull authoritie. TheDukeofGuise to possesse the Kings
place,andtheKingofNavarretohindertheKingofFrancehisruine,whichwasindeed
hisowne,andofhispartiewhichwasmadehimsubsistinreputation.’197
Hedescribes theevents, theassassinationsofHenrydeGuise,Henry IIIand thecoronationof
Henry IV,whoby the changing situationofhisoffice,quitshis formerly followed interestand
embraces the interest of the French ‘state’, which the reader should understand as proper
interest management, by placing his own factional interest under the interest of ‘state’ once
crownedKingofFrance.HenryIVwashoweverstillthwartedbytheLeague,butespeciallyby
the Spanish King Philip II, who did not acknowledge Henry’s kingship on the grounds of his
Protestant confession. The following pages Rohan devoted to Philip’s strategies to obstruct
Henry IV by supporting the League and Henry’s other enemies with subsidies and troops,
inciting the Pope to excommunicate Henry, even not stopping when Henry IV converted to
CatholicismandthePope,althoughformerelypoliticalreasons,acknowledgedHenryasKingof
France. Eventually Henry declared war against Philip, obtaining many successes for France,
which ended in the peace of Vervins signed in 1598, afterwhichPhilip soondied.198Again, a
seeminglysimpleinterestanalysiscoversRohan’scriticism,andthereadermustconcludethat
Philip’sactionsweresolelymotivatedbytheSpanishdesignforuniversalmonarchy,toconquer
the French monarchy by inciting civil war and factional conflicts. Rohan leaves silent this
inevitable conclusion, even when he writes quite cynically that Philip’s support for Henry’s
enemieswasmotivated‘nottoruinetheoneinsuchsort,asthattheothermightsubsistwithout
him,willingtoweariethemwhomhemaintained,totheendthattheyshouldbeconstrainedto
giuethemseluesvptohim’,or,regardingPhilippersuadingtheLeague‐noblestochooseanew
195Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,41.196Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,41‐41.197Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,42.198Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,43‐48.
51
Kingtowhomheofferedthehandofhisdaughter,‘SothatPhilipthoughtbythisdiscordtodraw
themtomakechoiceofhim.’199
InthelastpartofthediscourseRohanofferedthereaderinsightinto‘theinterestofthe
Princesinuelopedinthisaffaire,whatfaultestheythereincommitted,andwhatweretheeuents
thereof.’200 The princes involved in the War of the Three Henry’s were naturally the three
Henry’s,however,PhilipIIwasalsogivenaleadingrole.FirstRohanironicallypraisedPhilipfor
calculatinghisadvantageinchangingcircumstanceswhilecontinuing‘courageouslyhisdesigne’
almostasapredatorenclosingitsprey:
‘Nootherconsiderationdiuertethhimfromhisprofounddesigne,heholdsthatallwaies
couered vnder the vaile of Pietie, and of his great zeale to the Catholike Religion. He
trauelles there stepby stepwithoutbeing impatient through the lengthof theway, or
precipitatedthroughanyaccident.’201
Again,theanalysisofPhilip’sinterestmanagementsatirisedtheSpanishkingasapower‐hungry
tyrant,whose fault itwaswanting France entirely, instead of dividing themonarchy amongst
factionalLeague‐noblesafterthedeathofHenrydeGuise.Bysuchadistribution,Philip
‘couldmore easily reduce them [League‐nobles] to his ownewill. […] And afterwards
vpon thedifferences thatarewont tohappenbetweeneusurpers, itwouldhauebeene
farre more easie for him to gett by peece‐meale, what he would haue carried all at
once.’202
Rohan concluded this discourse by stressing the danger of letting in the Spanish enemy by
divisionwithintheFrenchmonarchy: ‘todiuidethismightieKingdome,thewhichbeingVnited,
doeseuerywhereimpeachtheamplificationofSpaine.’203
Theexperienceoftheshatteringsocietalconsequencesofthereligiouswarsandthesubsequent
establishmentofamainconfessionalidentityinpolitiesbroughtforth‘interestofstate’writings
from the1630s, such asRohan’spivotalDe l’interest, notper se reviewing suchmatters. This
should not be interpreted asmodern secularization or a diminution of religious controversy.
Rohansidesteppedconfessionalargumentsnotbecauseoftheirirrelevance,butbecauseoftheir
dangerous potency, especially in times of resurgent Catholicism. With De l’interest Rohan 199Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,44,46.200Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,48.201Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,55.202Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,56‐57.203Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,57.
52
participated in contemporaryFrenchdebates about foreignpolicy anddomestic affairs, about
the extent of warfare (defensive or offensive), which enemy to fight and who was the best
candidatetoleadthetroops.Mostprobably,Rohan’spersonalinterestwastoreclaimanoffice
asamilitary leader,awishthatmightberealizedthroughdecisivewarfareagainstHabsburg‐
Spain.HepresentedEuropeasconsistingofrulersandtheirlands,fightingeachotherinawar
competition driven by understandings of their interests. A ruler’s standing in the military
constellationdeterminedpoliticalactions,certainlynotreligion,whichwasusedonlyasamere
political instrument as by Habsburg‐Spain, or could shape a certain political faction as the
Huguenots under Henry IV, being attacked by the noble house of De Guise in its search for
controlovertheCrown.
ThepraiseaccordedtoRohanforhisobjectivityisone‐dimensionalandmisleading,
overlookinganumberoffactorsashiscircumstancesandidiomofinterestreveal—notleasthis
own interest in not stirring confessional dispute in France, and assimilating that of Spain to
establishedpatternsofsatiricdenigration.
53
Chapter3Republicanismrevisited:reasonofstateand‘wardespotism’byPieterdelaCourt
In 1662, therewas outrage in TheNetherlands at the publication of Interest vanHollandofte
Hollands‐Welvaaren [Interest of Holland or Holland’s Wellbeing] that stated: ‘the people of
Holland[sc.theprovince,MK]couldnotencounteragreaterevilthantoberuledbyaMonarch,
PrinceorHead.’204ThisstatementwasdirectedagainsttheHouseofOrange,itsprincesbeingthe
historicalofficeholdersofthestadholderateintheRepublicoftheSevenUnitedProvinces.From
1650 until 1672 they were, however, excluded from this office by Holland and most other
provinces during the ‘First Stadholderless Era’, or the epoch of ‘True Freedom’ as some
contemporaries celebrated it.205 The anti‐Orangist polemic of Interest of Holland produced a
vigorous political controversy.206 Its blunt anti‐Orangism and fierce anti‐clericalism attracted
ridicule and rebuke; its author was condemned for his ‘false calumnies and adorned lies’,
‘hazardouswritings’,anddescribedasa ‘newbornDutchCromwellaliasLeidenQuaker’anda
mere‘favorite’ofJohandeWitt,thedefactoleaderofthecontestedstadholderlessregime.207
Pieter de la Courtwrote Interest vanHollandduring an Orangist revival in the Dutch
Republicat thebeginningof the1660s.TheStuartRestorationacross theNorthSeaandKing
Charles II’s support for his young nephewWilliam of Orange gave rise to high expectations
among the Dutch about the future prospects of an Orange‐stadholderate, backed by the
Stuarts.208
ThisimmediatecontextprovidesastarkcontrasttoPieter’shostilitytotheveryideaofa
statdholder;andindeed,thehistoriographyofthepoliticalthoughtoftheDelaCourtbrothers
has predominantly focused on their ‘republicanism’, representing it as ‘the first unequivocal
204V.D.H.,InterestvanHollandoftedeGrondenvanHollands‐Welvaren(Amsterdam,1662),Voor‐Reede[preface].205See Jonathan Israel,TheDutchRepublic ItsRise,GreatnessandFall,1477‐1806 (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1998),700‐726.206 Gerrit O. Klashorst, ‘ “Metten schijn vanmonarchie getempert” de verdediging van het stadhouderschap in departijliteratuur’1650–1686’, inHansW.Blomen IW.Wildenberg (eds.),Pieterde laCourt inzijn tijd (1680–1685)aspectenvaneenveelzijdigpublicist (Amsterdam:APA‐HollandUniversityPress, 1986), 93–136;ArthurWeststeijn,CommercialRepublicanismintheDutchGoldenAge.ThePoliticalThoughtofJohan&PieterdelaCourt(Leiden:Brill,2012),56‐58.207IngmarVroomen,TaalvandeRepubliek‐hetgebruikvanvaderlandretoriekinNederlandsepamfletten,1618‐1672(PhD dissertation, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2012), 203; Weststeijn, Commercial Republicanism, 3, 58‐59;HaeghsHof‐Praetje,ofte ’t samen‐spraeck tusscheneenHagenaer,Amsterdammer,endeLeyenaar.Op ende tegensdevalschecalumnienendeversierdeleugenenvanPieterlaCourt,gesteltinsijnalsoogenoemdeIntrestvanHollandendegronden van ’tHollandswelvaren (Leiden, 1662);Hollands Op‐Komst, of Bedenkingen op de schaadelyke Schriften,genaamtGrafelykeRegeeringeenInterestvanHollanduit‐gegevendoorV.D.H.tendienstevanalleliefhebersdiehetwareInterestvanHollandbeminnen(Leden,1662);J.C.,Deganschedistructievandennieuw‐geboorenHollantschenCromwelaliasLeydtschenQuaker,genaemt t’Intrest vanHollandt,oftegronden van ‘sHollantswelvaren (Schiedam, 1663); 'tLevenenbedrijfvanmr.JanvanOldenbarnevelt,over‐eengebraghtmetdatvanmr.JandeWit(1672).208SeeinparticularHelmerHelmers,TheRoyalistRepublicLiterature,Politics,andReligionintheAnglo‐DutchPublicSphere,1639–1660(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015),233‐258.
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expression’ofDutchrepublicanism,209as‘commercial’210and‘radical’211republicanism,orclear‐
cut ‘anti‐monarchism’212 (unlike other, moderate defences of an Orange‐stadholderate). This
chapteraimstoshiftscholarlyattentiontoDelaCourt’suseoftheterminologyofreasonofstate
inarguingagainstmilitarybelligerenceandfinancialexpropriation.Indoingso,itquestionsthe
commonimageoftheexplicitorextremerepublicanismoftheDelaCourts.
This chapter argues the alleged ‘republicanism’ or ‘anti‐monarchism’ of De la Court
needs to be reinterpreted in terms of the new interpretative heuristic tool ‘war despotism’,
contemporarypolemicsattackinga systemof rule thatbypursuingcostlywarfare robbed the
citizens of their property and privileges, effectively enslaving them, polemics aswitnessed in
FranceandtheHolyRomanEmpire.213Aswillbemadeclear,Pieterarguedthatnewmonarchies
weredrivenbyaninterest,namelythepromotionofwarfareandthenecessaryimpoverishment
oftheirpeoples,contrarytotheinterestofasocietylikeHolland.
Fromthisfollowsthesecondargument,thattheInterestvanHollandisbetterseenasa
distinctvariationonthethemesenunciatedbyRohan.AsIhaveargued,Rohan’sunderstanding
of ‘interest’was developedwithin and from the casuistic and legitimating idiomof ‘reason of
state’.Reasonofstateentailedtheclaimthatincasesofnecessityrulershadroomtomanoeuvre
beyond the bounds of normal legal and moral constraints. This particularly applied to the
emergency circumstances brought forth by the intensification ofwarfare, that in the name of
interest allowed the rule of law to be put aside and finances raised by extraordinarymeans.
Starting in the 1630s, authors like Rohan, began to consider the characteristics of various
dynasticagglomerates, fromwhichallegedlyobjective ‘true interestsofstates’ofEuropewere
derived. Indoing so, theycoulddefendonepolitical factionasmost likely topursuea certain
‘foreign’ policy, consequently delegitimising another. From the 1650s onwards, such interest
analyses oftenwere complementedwith explicit criticism of princely coercion and sovereign
authority anddefences of the rule of law. For theEnglish case, the researchbyAlanHouston
209 Eco Haitsma Mulier, ‘The language of seventeenth‐century republicanism in the United Provinces: Dutch orEuropean?,’ in Anthony Pagden (ed.), The Languages of Political Theory in Early‐Modern Europe (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999),179‐195,p.188.210Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism.211JonathanIsrael,Monarchy,Orangism,andRepublicanismintheLaterDutchGoldenAge,SecondGoldenAgeLecture(Amsterdam:AmsterdamsCentrumvoordeStudievandeGoudenEeuw,2004). Israelarguesonpage6thatDutchrepublicanism compared to the English variant was ‘more coherently radical, (…) more emphatically anti‐monarchical,anti‐hierarchicalandmoreconcernedwithequalitythanEnglishrepublicanism’.212WygerVelema,‘“ThataRepublicisBetterthanaMonarchy”:Anti‐MonarchisminEarlyModernDutch Political Thought’, in Martin van Gelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Republicanism: A Shared EuropeanHeritage.Volume I,RepublicanismandConstitutionalism inEarlyModernEurope (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),9–25.213RobertvonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy:TheThirtyYearsWarandtheModernNotionof‘State’intheEmpire,1530sto1790(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2016),354‐380;ThehistorianJeanMarieConstantsummarizedthiscritique as attacking ‘war despotism’. Jean‐Marie Constant, ‘Der Adel und die Monarchie in Frankreich vom TodeHeinrichsIVbiszumEndederFronde(1610‐1653)’,inRonaldAsch(ed.),DereuropäischeAdelimAncienRegime.VonderKrisederständischenMonarchienbiszurRevolution(1600‐1789) (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna:Böhlau,2001),129‐150,thetermp.146.
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underlinesthis,butresearchonDutchexpressionsofreasonofstateisthin.214
It is, as Hans Blom has argued, ‘easy to overlook’ the influence of the vocabulary of
reasonofstateoncontemporarydebates,sinceDutchauthorsweredividedoverthepositionof
the prince of Orange, but ‘united’ in ‘an interest‐based conception of politics’.215 Moreover,
historians tendtoexamineDutchpamphletwarssolelywithinanational framework; ‘Noneof
themrefertothefactthatthemajorpoliticaldebatesoriginatedinthecontextofinternational
warfare.’216ThefiercelycompetitiveconflictsofEuropeanrulersthatproducedwar‐drivenand
debt‐ridden regimes isprecisely thehistorical context inwhichwewill examineDe laCourt’s
usageofthelanguageofreasonofstateinInterestvanHolland.Itisimportanttonotethatthe
small Dutch Republic participated in this competition.217 Due to almost incessant warfare, it
experienced an unprecedented level of public debt, and consequently an unparalleled rise of
taxation, sale of public loans and annuities. Taxation per head was considerably higher in
HollandthaninotherEuropeanpolitiesandthisprovincepaidformorethanhalfoftheUnion’s
warbudget.218Consequently, thecentral issueforDutch ‘opinion’ inthe1650sand1660swas
214AlanHouston, ‘Republicanism,thepoliticsofnecessity,andtheruleof law’, inAlanHoustonandStevePincus,ANationTransformed.EnglandaftertheRestoration(CambridgeUniversityPress:Cambridge,2001),241‐271;SeeforthereceptionofRohan’sunderstandingofinterestinEnglishCivilWardebatesalsoGunn,“Interestwillnotlie”;ForliteratureonDutchreasonofstateseeJohanC.Boogman, ‘Deraisond’etat‐politicusJohandeWitt,’ inJ.C.Boogman,Van spel en spelers (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982) and Ernst H. Kossmann, ‘Some late 17th‐century DutchwritingsonRaisond'Etat’,inRomanSchnur(ed.),Staatsräson:StudienzurGeschichteeinespolitischenBegriffs(Berlin:Duncker & Humblot, 1975), 497‐504; For an comparison between Dutch and English expressions of interest seeJonathan Scott, ‘Classical Republicanism in Seventeenth‐Century England and the Netherlands,’ in Martin vanGelderen and Quentin Skinner (eds.), Republicanism: A Shared European Heritage. Volume I, Republicanism andConstitutionalisminEarlyModernEurope(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002);Boogman,andtoagreaterextent, HansW. Blom andWeststeijn have underlinedDe la Court’s use of ‘reason of state’ terminology and haverepresented it as a special type of republicanism, i.e. reason of state adjusted to the mercantile Dutch Republic.Boogman,‘Deraisond’état‐politicusJohandeWitt’,382.Scott, ‘ClassicalRepublicanism’,63.Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism, 205–283. Jan Hartman and Weststeijn, ‘An Empire of Trade: Commercial Reason of State inSeventeenth‐CenturyHolland’,inSophusReinertandPernilleRøge(eds.),ThePoliticalEconomyofEmpireintheEarlyModernWorld (Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2013),11‐31,p.12.H.W.Blom,MoralityandCausality inPolitics.TheRiseofNaturalisminDutchSeventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalThought(PhDdissertationUniversityofUtrecht,1995),157–182 and Hans W. Blom, ‘The Republican Mirror, The Dutch Idea of Europe,’ in Anthony Pagden (ed.), TheLanguagesofPoliticalTheoryinEarly‐ModernEurope(Cambridge;CambridgeUniversityPress,1999),91‐115.215Blom,‘TheRepublicanMirror’,quotationp.110;HistoriansoftenpresentthisdivisioninDutchpoliticaldebatesastwo strands of ‘republicanism’ (a respublica mixta one including an Orange‐stadholder and a anti‐monarchical,stadholderlessrepublicanism);BothArthurWeststeijn,CommercialRepublicanismandJonathanScottexaminedDelaCourt’s political thought regarding the language of ‘interest’, but predominantly through the looking glass of‘republicanism’. Jonathan Scott, ‘Classical Republicanism in Seventeenth‐Century England and the Netherlands,’ inMartinvanGelderenandQuentinSkinner(eds.),Republicanism:ASharedEuropeanHeritage.VolumeI,RepublicanismandConstitutionalisminEarlyModernEurope(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),61–81.216Blom,‘TheRepublicanMirror’,113.217SeeforinstanceMaartenPrakTheDutchRepublicintheSeventeenthCentury:TheGoldenAge,translatedbyDianeWebb(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2005),especiallythechapteron‘Aworldpower(1650‐1713)’,45‐60.218 Oscar Gelderblom, ‘Introduction’, in Oscar Gelderblom (ed.), The political economy of the Dutch Republic(Surrey/Burlington: Ashgate, 2009), 1‐18; Wantje Fritschy, ‘The efficiency of Taxation in Holland’, in in OscarGelderblom,Thepoliticaleconomyof theDutchRepublic (Surrey/Burlington:Ashgate,2009),55‐84; JanLuitenvanZanden and Maarten Prak, ‘Towards and economic interpretation of citizenship: The Dutch Republic betweenmedieval communes andmodern nation‐states,’EuropeanReviewofEconomicHistory10 (2006), 111‐145, p. 130;Marjolein ‘tHart, Joost Jonker and JanLuiten vanZanden, ‘Introduction’, inMarjolein ‘tHart, Joost Jonker and JanLuitenvanZanden(eds.),AfinancialhistoryofTheNetherlands(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1997),1‐10;Marjolein ‘tHart, ‘Themeritsofa financialrevolution:public finances1550‐1700’, inMarjolein ‘tHart, Joost Jonkerand Jan Luiten van Zanden (eds.),A financial history ofTheNetherlands (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1997),11‐36,especiallythesection‘theburdenofwarintherepublicanexpenses’,16‐17.
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thestadholderate linked to thepursuitofwarfare:whether topursuecostlyoffensivewarfare
againstthegrandEuropeandynastiesunderthemilitaryleadershipoftheprinceofOrangeand,
by implication, tosustain large land forcesandhightaxes,or tostrive forpeacewithastrong
fleet toprotect theprosperous tradewithout theneed for anOrange‐Stadholder and ‐captain
general.ThesedebateswereinformedbythepopularEuropeanidiomof‘interest(ofstate)’.219
De laCourtwroteprincipallyas a citizenof theDutchRepublic,whichwas ruledbya
minority regime. Johan De Witt estimated that only 0.1 per cent of the common populace
supportedthestadholderlessregime.220TheprovinceofHollandconstitutedaclosedoligarchy
ofregenten, controlledbycertain families,whohadmade their fortunes throughcommerce in
theearlyseventeenthcenturyanddividedamongstthemselvesoffices inurbanandprovincial
councils, in boards of trading companies and minor offices. These offices were viewed as
negotiableprivateproperty.Themagistratesevenassertedtheirpoliticallegitimacyintermsof
divinerightandabsoluteentitlement.221TheDutchRepublicbecamea true ‘RoyalistRepublic’
after the regicide of King Charles I for a diverse range of reasons, as Helmer Helmers has
convincingly argued recently.222 Civil disorder, especially the violent and enduring nature
witnessed in the English CivilWars,was greatly feared and in the Interest vanHolland De la
Courtpersistentlyexpressedacontemptfortheignorantrabbleeasilyincitedtorebellion.The
dynasticpretentionsof theHouseofOrangeand thepursuitofglory in theEuropeanmilitary
competition,gravelytroubledtheregents,especiallythoseinHolland.223DeWittwassupported
amongsttherulingelitesinceitsafeguarded,asKossmannwrites,‘itsmonopolyofpower(..)for
thetimebeing.’224However,intimesofemergencylargepartsofsocietycouldsuddenlyriseup
against the regime for a complexnumber of reasons, but often conveyed through support for
Orange. Thiswas the republican reality ofDe laCourt. ThehistorianHerbertRowen stressed
that Organist pamphleteers used ‘the familiar theories of kingship’ in defence of an Orange‐
stadholderate, which led to counterattacks on the royal aspirations of Orange. He writes:
219 Blom, ‘The Republican Mirror,’ 91‐115; J. C. Boogman, ‘De raison d’état‐politicus Johan de Witt’, Bijdragen enMededelingen betreffende deGeschiedenis derNederlanden. Deel 90 (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 379‐407,380;MurkvanderBijl,‘Pieterdelacourtendepolitiekwerkelijkheid’,inH.W.BlomenI.W.Wildenberg(eds.),Pieterde laCourt inzijntijd(1680–1685)aspectenvaneenveelzijdigpublicist (Amsterdam:APA‐HollandUniversityPress,1986), 65‐93, p. 67; Klashorst, “Metten schijn van monarchie getempert”, 135–136; Weststeijn, CommercialRepublicanism,42–50.220JohandeWitttoVanBeverninghon11July1653,BrievenvanJohandeWittvolume1,R.FruinandG.W.Kernkamp(eds.),(Amsterdam:Müller,1906),96.221 Ernst H. Kossmann, ‘The Dutch Republic’, in F.I. Carsten (ed.), The New Cambridge History Volume 5: TheAscendancy of France (1648‐1688) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 275‐300, p. 275‐276; Ernst H.Kossmann,Politieke theorie engeschiedenis.Verspreideopstellen en voordrachten (Bert Bakker: Amsterdam, 1987),136‐138.222Helmers,TheRoyalistRepublic.223 Kossmann, ‘The Dutch Republic’, 276‐281; The historian Herbert H. Rowen calls the princes of Orange ‘quasi‐dynasts’.HerbertH.Rowen,JohndeWitt.Statesmanofthe“TrueFreedom”(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1986),7.224Kossmann,‘TheDutchRepublic’,279.Furthermore,theUnion’sgovernmentwasweaksinceeachprovincesentitsdelegatestoStatesGeneral,whocouldonlydecideovermilitary,federalandforeignaffairsunanimously,andwhichwasdominatedbyHolland.
57
‘Because the participants in the debate knew all too clearly what was intended, no one was
disturbedby this twisting of terms, and it is later generations of historians and their readers
whohavebeenledastray.’225
ThischapterwillelucidatethefunctionofthelanguageofreasonofstateinDelaCourt’s
critiqueof‘wardespotism’inInterestvanHolland.Wewillsetouthisbackground,sketchingout
hisbiography,theintellectualclimateandanearlierversionofhisargument.Then,wewilllook
into thehistorical contextof theOrangeRepublic, the stadholderless regimeand theOrangist
revival of 1660‐1661. But first, it is important to clarify the critical current against ‘war
despotism’.
3.1‘Wardespotism’
Theterm‘wardespotism’isanewinterpretativeheuristictool,coinedbyJeanMarieConstantto
describe complaints of the assemblies and thepublishedpolemics in France against allegedly
coercive practices by the regime, which through the pursuit of costly warfare, purportedly
suppressedandeffectivelyenslaved the subjects. Itwas thendefinedandusedbyRobertvon
Friedeburg for interpreting French and German sources with a rather more systematic
definition in mind.226 Before explaining this further, we must take note of the actual
developmentsthatwereaddressedandtheuseoftheterminologyinthesecritiques.Aswehave
seenintheintroduction,duringthesixteenthandseventeenthcenturies,Europeangovernments
were transformed under pressure of the intensification of warfare and the consequent
unprecedented level of government debt. Regimes were forced to find new resources, for
example, selling offices (as tax farming) and taking out high‐interest loans. While new
officeholdersandcreditorsbenefittedfromthepursuitofwarfare,others,suchastheoldlanded
gentryandurbanmerchantelites,feltexcludedbythesechangesingovernment.
In France, the Crown was forced to take desperate financial measures to meet the
immediate problems raised by the wars with the Habsburgs. From the 1570s, especially the
unparalleled creation and sale of offices andmounting governmental debtwere addressed in
estate assemblies and structural reformdemanded.227KingHenry IV couldnot reorganise the
Crown’s financial infrastructure, and, as mentioned in the chapter on Rohan, even had to
225Rowen,JohndeWitt,54‐55.226 Jean Marie Constant, ‘Der Adel und die Monarchie in Frankreich’, 146; Von Friedeburg, Luther’s Legacy, inparticular chapter 8 ‘Readings ofDespotism:TheAttack on “War‐Despotism” betweenBodin andMontesquieu’, p.336‐36.227 Mark Greengrass Governing Passions: Peace and Reform in The French Kingdom, 1576‐1585 (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2007);Collins,TheState inEarlyModernFrance;RobertvonFriedeburg, ‘How“new” is the “NewMonarchy”? Clashes between princes and nobility in Europe’s Iron Century,’ Leidschrift. Aan het hof. Rivaliteit,legitimiteitensuccessiestrijdaandeEuraziatischehoven,1250–175027:1(2012),17–30.
58
undertake new loans with exorbitant interest rates and other actions to raise ready money.
France’sdirectinvolvementintheThirtyYears’Warendedallhopesforfinancialreforms.The
Frenchnobilityresentedthesocietalriseofnewofficers,butlessprosperousnoblesadditionally
facedincreasingnon‐paymentsbytheirtenantswhowereburdenedbynewmeasures.France’s
participation inwarfarewasdeemedthecauseforthegravestateof themonarchy. Invarious
assemblies the nobility voiced its concerns and appealed for the restoration of ancient
constitutional agreements that safeguarded the common good, the privileges and property of
elitesandsubjects,andthepoliticalparticipationofnobility.228
The concerns generated a substantial polemical literature, typical of which was Jean
Bourgoin’sLaChasseauxLarrons[TheHuntfortheThieves.],itstitleproclaimingtheimperative
to hunt down the rapacious financiers who were doing so much damage.229 Von Friedeburg
stressesthatinparticularthepolemicsareaddressedwiththisterm.Although,thepracticesthat
generated the polemics might be seen as directly despotic, i.e. taking money, property and
privileges; others, such as the sale of offices and out‐sourcing, might have disastrous effects
were not even slightly ‘despotic’. From the 1630s, the adjective ‘despotic’ reappeared in
polemics delegitimising a certain system of rule that undermined the property rights and
privilegesofitssubjects.Authorsconveyedtheirattacksthroughcomparisonswithahousehold
governmentthattreateditssubjectsasslavesexemplifiedbyspecificpracticesofOttomanrule,
to which the example of Christian Moscow was often added. They recapitulated sixteenth
century tropes of ‘Turkish tyranny’ and applied them to Habsburg‐Spain, thus depicting it as
unchristian and illegitimate, with no regard for its subjects or the rule of law.230 In the
seventeenthcenturythevoiced fearofdominationandthe lossofprivilege,becamecentral to
certain practices of princely rule. Quentin Skinner has taken this to involve the defence of a
specifically neo‐Roman liberty, revolving around the stark contrast between free citizens (sui
iuris)andslaves,thosewhoaresubjecttothejurisdictionofanotherandsowithinthepowerof
someoneelse(alieniiuris).231
Irrespective of whether there was a distinctly neo‐Roman concept of liberty, the
polemicalfocuson‘slavery’contributedtotheerraticseventeenth‐centurypracticeofconflating
‘tyrannical’ with household i.e. ‘despotic’ rule. Aristotle had distinguished both notions. He
designated tyrannyaspolitically illegitimate,pointing to the situationwhenaparticular ruler
pursued his own interests instead of the common good and against the will of the citizens,
228VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,346‐349.229Lachasseaux larronsouavantcoureurde l'histoirede lachambrede justice.Des livresdubienspublic,&autresoeuvresfaitspourlarecherchedesfinanciers&deleursfauteurs(Paris,1618).Thetitlepagehasatellingquotefromthe Book of Isaiah (33:1): ‘Malheur sur toi qui pille: car tu seras pillé’ [Woe to youwho plunder: for youwill beplundered];VonFriedeburg,Luther’slegacy,348.230VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,339‐345.231QuentinSkinner,Libertybeforeliberalism(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),40‐41.SkinnerreferstothestatushominiintheDigest.
59
against their nature. Despotic government constituted an arbitrary rule, but was legitimate,
since it ruled according to the nature of the people, which in the case of the Persians, was
inherently slavish.232 Although medieval authors sometimes echoed this argument, the term
‘despotic’ almostdisappeared in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Its seventeenth‐century
reappearancewasnot intended to restore itsprecisemeaningbut servedpolemicalpurposes,
often supplemented attacks on tyranny and underlined the illegitimate system of rule, rather
thanillicitcircumstancesthatturnedarulerintoatyrant.Attheendoftheseventeenthcentury
the noun ‘despotism’ appeared with its qualifications of ‘arbitrary’, ‘absolute’, Turkish’,
‘Tyranny’,whichwasoftenemployed inpropagandaagainstLouisXIV’s regime, and found its
quintessentialreflectioninMontesquieu’sDel’espritdeslois(1748).233
DuringtheFronde,severalpamphletsappealedtothehistoricallyestablishedprivileges,
and thus the rightofparticipationof certaingroups inFrance’s constitutional frameworkand
distinguishedthisconstitutionfrom‘despotic’rule,asallegedlyfoundintheOttomanEmpireor
Spain. Von Friedeburg stresses that these critiques did not entail a systematic critique of the
institutionofmonarchyassuch.ThedisintegrationofcivilorderexemplifiedbytheBritishWars
ofReligionandtheexecutionofCharlesIin1649wasfearedamongallinFranceandtheHoly
RomanEmpire(aswellasintheDutchRepublicaswewillseebelow).AlthoughinFrance,such
critiquesfocusedpredominantlyontheinvolvementofagroupofroyalofficialsandfinancers,
Germancritiquesagainst‘wardespotism’,e.g.byRamslaandSeckendorff,directlyattackedthe
princes.234
PieterdelaCourt’sinterestanalysisreflectsthenatureofthesecontemporarycritiques
and illustrateshowFrenchwritingwasapartial context forDutch reflection.Todiminish the
threat of an Orange restoration in Holland, De la Court needed to go to extreme lengths. He
warnedthereaderagainsttheprinceofOrange,whowouldbuildupahouseholdgovernment
with ‘leechesofstate’235 thatsucked theresourcesoutof thepeopleofHolland,especially the
merchants who create Holland’s prosperity. An Orange‐stadholderate would systematically
resultinthelossoffreedomsand,ultimately,intheenslavementofsubjects.TheDeWittregime,
although its high taxation policies agitated De la Court, safeguarded the interests of the
merchantsbest:‘freedomofreligion’,‘freedomoftrade’and‘freedomofgovernment’.Notethat
232Aristotle,Politics:Books Iand II, translatedwithacommentarybyTrevor J.Saunders (Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),1252a31,1256b23.However,Aristotledoesaddsnuancestothisdistinctionastyranny,andevenpolity,canturnintodespoticrule.Politics,1279b15‐19,1292a4‐36.IowethisnuancetoPaulA.Rahe.233 Mario Turchetti, 'Despotism' and “Tyranny” Unmasking a Tenacious Confusion’, European Journal of PoliticalTheory7:2(2008),159‐182,p.169‐171;Joan‐PauRubies, ‘OrientalDespotismandEuropeanOrientalism:BoterotoMontesquieu’, Journal of EarlyModern History 9 1/2 (2005), 109‐180, p. 115 and 169; Von Friedeburg, Luther’sLegacy, 336‐340; Paul A. Rahe,Montesquieu and the Logic of Liberty:War, Religion, Commerce, Climate, Terrain,Technology,Uneasiness ofMind, the Spirit of Political Vigilance, and the Foundations of theModern Republic (NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,2009),95‐98.234VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,346‐358.235V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden[preface].DelaCourtusestheDutchterm‘BloedzuigersvandenStaat’.
60
in De la Court’s view, the latter essentially means a regime without an Orange‐prince as
stadholderandcaptaingeneral and containsneither a systematic rejectionofmonarchynor a
pleaforpoliticalparticipation.DelaCourtevenwritesinhisprefacetoInterestvanHollandthat
Louis XIV’s monarchy and other northern European monarchies are legitimate governments
opposed to the ‘absolute Monarchies’ that ruled the Asian, African and southern European
peoples.236Moreover, his argument against the closed trade companies and the closed regent
officesismoreconcernedwithattackingoligarchictendenciesthandefendingdemocraticones
andsupportshisownsocialaspirationsasatextilemerchantandthesonofanimmigrant.
3.2PieterdelaCourt:textilemerchant,aspiringregentandcontroversialauthor
In1618, in the year of the so‐called coupd’état of stadholderMauriceofOrange, Pieterde la
Courtwasborn inLeiden.His fatherhadmigrated fromFlanders to theDutchRepublicat the
beginningofthecentury,andbecameasuccessfulentrepreneurinLeiden’stextilebusinessby
which hewas able to buy citizenship rights. After finishing the Latin School in Leiden, De la
CourtwentonaGrandTour throughEurope,visitingEngland,France, theSwissConfederacy,
theRhinecitiesandtheSpanishNetherlands.Hisdiaryrevealsakeeninterestindisplaysofthe
differentconfessionalbeliefsand‘foreign’politicalpractices;hedescribeswithscepticismbelief
inthedevil,‘Thedivilwasheeverseene?,’237anddisplaysacertaincynicaldelightattherichly
embellished royal entry of Charles I in London inNovember1641.238Afterwards, Pieterde la
Court joinedhisbrother Johan,studying theology,atLeidenUniversity,whereProtestantLate
Humanism prevailed. He followed in his father’s footsteps after his studies and established a
prosperoustextilebusinesstogetherwithJohaninLeiden.However,Johandiedin1660andleft
Pieterhisunfinishedmanuscripts.239
AgainstthewishesofJohan,PieterpublishedJohan’sworks,editedandaddednewpassages
and sometimes even made substantial changes. Consequently the exact authorship of the
differentwritingsofthebrothersDe laCourt iscontested.Twenty‐fiveeditionsofsixdifferent
titleswere printed in 1662.240 The bestseller Interest vanHollandwas part of this publishing
campaignandreceivedatleasteightfurthereditionsinthesameyear.Pieterpublishedin1669
236V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden[preface].237 Willem Frijhoff, ‘De reisnotities (1641‐1643) van Pieter de la Court. Uit het manuscript bezorgd en vancommentaarvoorzien’, inHansW.Blom&IdoW.Wildenberg(eds.),Pieterde laCourt inzijntijd.Aspectenvaneenveelzijdigpublicist(Amsterdam&Maarssen:APA‐HollandUniversityPress,1986),11‐34,32.238Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,28.239 Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,30‐31,51. 240SeethefulloverviewofthebrothersDelaCourt’publicationsinIdoW.Wildenberg,Johan(1622‐1660)&Pieter(1618‐1685)delaCourt:bibliografieenreceptiegeschiedenis(AmsterdamAPA‐HollandUniversityPress,1986),andpp20‐24forthehistoriographicaldebateabouttheauthorship.
61
arevisionoftheInterestvanHollandunderanewtitle:AanwysingederheilsamepolitikeGronden
enMaximenvandeRepublikevanHollandenWest‐Vriesland [Demonstrationsof theBeneficial
PoliticalFoundationsandMaximsoftheRepublicofHollandandWest‐Friesland].241
TheparadoxofthebrothersDelaCourt’slifewastheirdifficultstandingasWalloons(a
despised minority) while at that the same time they owned a flourishing textile business in
Leiden, the centre of Europe’s textile industry. Not surprisingly, they advocated unlimited
immigrationandeconomicfreedomintheirwritings.242Apart fromcommercialsuccess,Pieter
pursued an office in the urban government, but hewould never succeed. Blom describes the
brothersas‘sociallyaspiring.’243ThroughhistwomarriagesandhiswritingsPieterestablished
contactswiththegovernmentalelite.Hissecondmarriageof1661withCatharinavanderVoort
fromaninfluentialAmsterdamfamilyconnectedhimtothegroupofregentssurroundingJohan
deWitt.ThecouplemovedtoAmsterdamin1662,wherePieterlinkedhiseconomicactivitiesto
hispoliticalaspirations. Fromthenon, the familynamewouldbe ‘De laCourtvanderVoort’
withafamilyestate‘Meerburg’,situatednearLeiden.In1670Pieterobtainedadoctorateinlaw
at the university of Orleans and two years later he took the oath as lawyer of the court of
Holland.Sadlyforhim, itwastoolatetofillsuchanoffice, fortheregimeofDeWittcollapsed
undertheinvadingarmiesofLouisXIVandthesubsequentrevoltsinthecitiesofHollandand
Zeeland. Four days after the first attempted assassination ofDeWitt, Pieter fled to Antwerp,
wherehewastostayformorethanayear.244Thereisalong‐standingbutunconfirmedrumour
thatitwasadeaththreatthatpromptedDelaCourttoflee.Inthesummerof1672agroupof
rebelliousOrangists gatheredatPieter’shouse inLeiden.When theydidnot findDe laCourt,
theytiedadog,withitsbellycutopen,toatree.Inthedog’sstomachtheyputacandlewitha
notestating:‘LaCourtifyoudonotshutyourmouth,wewilltreatyoulikethisdog.’245
Alreadyduringhis lifetimeDe la Court’swritingsmetwith harsh criticismand strong
opposition. The anti‐stadholderate perspectives in the Interest produced a vigorous political
controversyandafloodofpamphletswerepublishedindefenceoftheHouseofOrange.Itwas
241AanwysingderheilsamepolitikeGrondenenMaximenvandeRepublikevanHollandenWest‐Vriesland(LeidenandRotterdam, 1669), whichwent through a second edition in 1671 andwas translated in GermanAnweisungen derheilsamenpolitischenGrundeundMaximenderRepublicqenHollandundWest‐Friesland(Rotterdam,1671)followedbyanEnglishandaFrenchtranslationatthebeginningiftheeighteenthcenturiesthatattributedtheworktoJohandeWitt,contributingtothecontestationofauthorship.TheTrueInterestandPoliticalMaximsoftheRepublickofHollandandWest‐Friesland.WrittenbyJohndeWitt,andOtherGreatMeninHolland(London,1702),andMémoiresdeJeandeWit,GrandPensionairedeHollande,trans.M.de***[Mme.VanZoutelandt](TheHague,1709).242Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,25.243 Hans W. Blom, ‘Democratic Tendencies in Anglo‐Dutch Republicanism’, in Dirk Wiemann and Gaby Mahlberg(eds.),EuropeanContextsforEnglishRepublicanism(Farnham:AshgatePublishing,2013),121‐135,p.125.244Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,25‐57;C.‐E.Levillain,‘L’AngleterredelaRestaurationaumiroirdela“vraieliberte” (1660–1672).Larencontreentrerepublicanismesanglaisethollandais a travers les ecritsdePieterde laCourt’, E‐rea [En ligne], 1.2 j 2003, mis en ligne le 15 octobre 2003, consulte le 08 mai 2014. URL:http://erea.revues.org/205;DOI:10.4000/erea.205,5;Blom,‘DemocraticTendenciesinAnglo‐DutchRepublicanism’,125.245 ‘La Court zoo je niet snoert Uw mond, Doen we je als deezen hond.’ Cited from Weststeijn, CommercialRepublicanism,4;Wildenberg,Johan&PieterdelaCourt,45.
62
not only supporters of the House of Orange that disputed the writings of the brothers De la
Court.EvenJohandeWittwasconcernedbyitsintransigenttones.246
FurthermoretheorthodoxLeidenconsistorystartedaninvestigationintothecontentsof
InterestandalsothePoliticalDiscourses,alsopublishedin1662.Rumourswerecirculatingthat
Pieterwastheauthorofbothworks,writtenbyananonymousauthor,V.D.H,theinitialsfor‘Van
denHoven’, theDutch translation ofDe laCourt.After two interrogationsbydelegates of the
consistory,severalattemptstobanpublicationofbothbooksandDeWitt’srefusingtohelphim,
DelaCourtclaimedbeforethecourtoflawthathewastheauthoronlyofInterest.Infact,ithas
beenshownthatseveralimportantregentswereimplicatedinwritingInterest,suchasPieterde
Groot and the Leiden regentHendrick vanWillighen.But JohandeWitt especially intervened
substantiallybycorrectinglargepartsofthework.Historicalresearchhasshownthathetoned
down De la Court’s criticism of the oligarchic rule of Holland and its cities, deleted certain
passagesandthatheevenaddedtwochaptersjustifyinghisrule.Yet,soonafterthepublication
ofInterestvanHollandDeWittdistancedhimselffromDelaCourt.247
3.2.1Intellectualbackground:self‐interest,reasonofstateandharmonyofinterests
ItiscrucialtopresentabriefsketchoftheimmediateintellectualbackgroundagainstwhichDe
laCourtwrote,mostimportantly,theinfluenceoftheso‐called‘newphilosophy’onhispolitical
thought.248 First of all, scholarship stresses the brothers’ fierce criticism of Political
Aristotelianism. De la Courts’ writings, however, often employed Aristotelian traditions of
structureandvocabulary,andwerepartofthetraditionofpolitica.249Yet,bothbrothersdidnot
assertnatural sociabilityor thehuman facultyof reason.Theywereprofoundly influencedby
the new theories of the passions that dominated Dutch mid‐seventeenth‐century philosophy
providingacrucialroleforDescartesLesPassionsdel’âme(1649).250DelaCourtevenexplicitly
referred toHobbes inarguing thatman followedhispassionswithnoeffectively constraining
roleforreasonprovided,leadingtoastateofnaturewithawarofallagainstall.Theinevitability
246Wildenberg,Johan&PieterdelaCourt,11‐12.247JohannesHermanKernkamp,‘Pieterdelacourt,zijnaansprakelijkheidvoorhetInterestvanHollandendePolitikeDiscoursen’,inHetboek22(1933/34),191‐196;Wildenberg,Johan&PieterdelaCourt,37;DanielVeegens,“JohandeWittalspublicist,”inDeGids31(1867),1‐31;HerbertH.Rowen,JohndeWitt,55‐56.248WiepvanBunge,FromStevintoSpinoza.AnEssayonPhilosophyintheSeventeenth‐CenturyDutchRepublic(Leiden:Brill,2001),34‐64.249MartinvanGelderen, ‘Aristotelians,MonarchomachsandRepublicans:Sovereigntyandrespublicamixta inDutchandGermanpoliticalThought, 1580–1650,’ inVanGelderen and Skinner (eds.),Republicanism:ASharedEuropeanHeritage.Volume I,RepublicanismandConstitutionalism inEarlyModernEurope (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000)195‐218,p.214;Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,37,62‐65.250 Velema, ‘”That a Republic is Better than aMonarchy”’, 14; Eco HaitsmaMulier, TheMyth of Venice andDutchRepublicanThought intheSeventeenthCentury(Assen:VanGorcum,1980),131;VanBunge,FromStevintoSpinoza,85–88;ErnstH.Kossmann,PoliticalThoughtintheDutchRepublic.ThreeStudies(Amsterdam:KNaW,2000),62–63.
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ofself‐interestandself‐preservationwasthedrivingforcebehindallactionsofgovernment.251
Furthermore, thebrothersDe laCourtwere inspiredbywritingsonreasonofstate,as
thosebyGuicciardini,Botero,Boccalini,aswellasRohan.Throughouttheirwritings, theDe la
Courts referred to Francesco Guicciardini’s works, one of the first authors on interesse del
stato.252Theeconomicfoundationofacity’swell‐beingwasalreadyunderlinedinBotero’sDelle
causedellagrandezzadellecittà,oftenpublishedtogetherwithDellaragiondistato.253Although
Boterohadpredominantlyfocusedonhowaprinceandhiscourtmightmaintainandexpandthe
grandezza of cities, unlikeMachiavelli he favoured commercial rather thanmilitarymeans to
thisend.254Boccalinisimilarlyarguedfordefensiveforeignpolicytoprotectcommerce,buthe
conveyedhisviewoncontemporarypoliticsthroughasatireofpower‐hungryrulersandtheir
Tacitist courts in his Ragguagli di Parnaso (1612‐1613). In the Dutch Republic Boccalini’s
writingswerehighlypopular,especiallyinthe1660s.ScholarshaveoftenunderlinedBoccalini’s
praiseforcontemporary‘Germanic’republicssuchastheDutchrepublic255,butitishisaversion
tothetransformationofEuropeangovernmentthatismorerelevantforDelaCourt’sargument
of thebellicoseplunderprince.Boccaliniwroteabout the contemporarynoveltyofHabsburg‐
Spain,whichwasruledbyprinceswhoweredrivenbyself‐interestandpassions,seekingtheir
gloriousadvantage in ruinouswarfare, collecting lands to integrate into theirmonarchiesand
pursuingdivisionamongsttheirsubjectsandotherprincestomaintainpower.256
Inaddition,DelaCourtwasacquaintedwithRohan’swritings.257Thesewereextensively
re‐printedinProtestantEuropeandinpartsoftheHolyRomanEmpireduringthesecondhalfof
the seventeenthcenturyandElsevierwasparticularlyactive in theirpromotion;but although
their impact in England has been extensively studied, Rohan’s influence on Dutch political
thought has received comparatively little attention. However, editions of De l’interest and
updatedversionsbyotherauthors flooded theDutchbookmarket;258and in thesameyearof
251 Malcolm perceives De la Court’s political thought as intermediary between that of Hobbes and Spinoza. NoelMalcolm,“HobbesandSpinoza,”inNoelMalcolm,AspectsofHobbes(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),27–52:42–44;HansW.Blom,MoralityandCausalityinPolitics.TheRiseofNaturalisminDutchSeventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalThought(PhDdissertationUtrechtUniversity,1995),170‐182.252SeeforinstanceV.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,183; ‘Namely,thatallSupremepowers,andespeciallytheMonarchs,also inEurope,playwiththeiralliances, likechildren’sgames,andestablishandnullifytheseastheyseeplease’astoldin‘thehistoriesofFranciscoGuicciardini’.253 Giovanni BoteroOn the Causes of theGreatness andMagnificence of Cities, 1588, translated and introduced byGeoffreySymcox(Toronto/Buffalo/London:UniversityofTorontoPress,2012).254HartmanandWeststeijn,‘AnEmpireofTrade’,14.255 Van Gelderen, ‘Aristotelians, Monarchomachs and Republicans’, 195; Hartman and Weststeijn, ‘An Empire ofTrade’;Velema,‘”ThataRepublicisBetterthanaMonarchy”’,15‐16.256 Meinecke, The Doctrine of Raison d’État, 74‐75. Meinecke wrote on page 74: ‘Boccalini had a sense that theabsolutistandcourtlymonarchy,whichhaddevelopedinrecenttimes,did,withitsmortallyruinouseffects,representsomethinghistoricallynew.’257Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,54,174,207,221,346.258SeeinparticularJ.A.W.Gunn,“Interestwillnotlie”,Aseventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalMaxim’,JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas29:4(1968),551‐564; JesperSchaaphas listedalleditionsofDe l’interest inhisPhDdissertation(ErasmusUniversity,forthcoming).ThefirstseparateeditionoftheworkwasprintedbyElsevierin1639(2editions),in1641twofurthereditionswerepublished,in1645aLatineditionprintedbyJustusLivius,andtheyears1648,1649and1659allwitnessedanedition.In1654theonlyDutchtranslationwasprinted,Deninterestderprincenendestatenvan
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publicationofInterestvanHolland,apamphletwaspublishedechoingRohan’sinterestanalysis:
Den tegenwoordigen interest der Christen princen [The present interest of princes of
Christendom].ItsheadingsweresimilarbutitwasmuchshorterthanDel’interest,itreflected
on recent events and addedan emphasis on commercial interests. Thus, an importantpart of
Spain’sinterestwastoavoidoffensivewarfarenowthatthebalanceofpowerwithFrancehad
shifted.FranceoughttoentangleSpainincostlywarfaretoexhausttheSpanishresourcesand
thekingdomshouldpromoteitsseafaringandfishery.TheDutchinterestwastomaintainand
promote seafaring, commerce and fishery, which De la Court likewise argued. But secondly,
unlikeDelaCourt’sargument,thepamphleturgedtheformationofdefensiveallianceswithall
neighbouringpolitiesagainstoffensivewarsand‘otherBanditries’.259
Moreover, the influence of contemporary English interest debates on contemporary
Dutch analyses of the ‘national’ interest have not been examined, although several historians
have pointed to notable similarities, most often in terms of their supposed ‘republicanism’,
betweenDe la Court’s interest analysis and English ones byMarchamontNedham, Algernon
SidneyandSlingsbyBethel,260whoallwentintoexileinHollandaftertheStuartRestoration.261
Inparticular,Nedham’sinterestanalysiswasexplicitlyindebtedtoRohan’sDel’interest.262The
parallelsbetweenInterestvanHollandandNedhams’sInterestwillnotlie.Or,aViewofEnglands Christenrijck.In’tFrancoysbeschrevendoordenHertogvanRohan(Amsterdam,1654),arguablytosatisfyabroaderdemandofRohan’s interestanalysis,whichperhapswasbrought forthbyrisingpublicationson the interestof theDutchRepublicinthere‐instalmentoftheStuartmonarchyin1653.Seeinparticular:L’interestdesProvincesUniesduPaysBasdans le restablissementde samajestede laGrandeBretagne (1653) and itsDutch translationHoe veeldeVereenigde Provintien behoort gelegen te zijn, de her‐stellinge van den coninck vanGroot‐Britangie (The Hague: H.Cornelsz., 1653). Updated versions or writings echoing Rohan’s interest analysis were for instance: Dentegenwoordigen interest der Christen princen (Enkhuizen: Dirk Klaer‐Oogh, 1662); Maximes des princes et estatssouverains (Cologne, 1665 [Amsterdam: Daniel Elsevier, 1665]), which underwent further editions in 1665, 1666,1667,1670,1676and1683.259 It encompassed eight pages and did not treat the interest of the Swiss cantons and of the Italian ‘states’.Dentegenwoordigen interest der Christen princen (Enkhuizen: Dirk Klaer‐Oogh, 1662), quoted from p. 8 [‘andereRooverijen’].260 Jonathan Scott, England's Troubles Seventeenth‐Century English Political Instability in European (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),300‐301,371‐372;JonathanScott,AlgernonSidneyandtheEnglishRepublic1623‐1677 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 207‐216, 301;Weststeijn, Commercial Republicanism, 352;RyanWalter, ‘SlingsbyBethel'sAnalysisof State Interests’,HistoryofEuropean Ideas41:4 (2015),489‐506,p.280,459; Charles‐Édourard Levillain, ‘L’Angleterre de la Restauration au miroir de la “vraie liberté” (1660‐1672). LarencontreentrerépublicanismesanglaisethollandaisàtraverslesécritsdePieterdelaCourt’E‐rea1.2(2003)fromhttps://erea.revues.org/205;JonathanScotthasevendescribedNedhamas‘DelaCourt’smostimportantpredecessor(…)adecadeearlierontheothersideofthechannel.’JonathanScott,‘ClassicalRepublicanisminSeventeenth‐CenturyEnglandandtheNetherlands,’inMartinvanGelderenandQuentinSkinner(eds.),Republicanism:ASharedEuropeanHeritage.Volume I,RepublicanismandConstitutionalism inEarlyModernEurope (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),61‐81,p.68;However,NedhamalsorespondedtoDutchwritingson‘interest’,e.g.inTheCasebetweenEnglandandtheUnitedProvinces(1652)hecounteredtheJustificatievoordevereenichendeNederlandstenProvincienthat justified the Dutch refusal to ally with the English ‘rebels’ in terms of the law of nations and interest. Blom,‘DemocraticTendenciesinAnglo‐DutchRepublicanism’,129:261 Nedhamwent into exile in Holland after the restoration of Charles II from April 1660 until September 1660.SidneyandBethelsharedexileintheDutchrepublicduringthemid‐1660s.262ContemporariescloselyidentifiedNedham’suseof‘reasonofstate’withRohan’swritings.‘Hewasin1647alreadyknownasthe‘chief“interest‐mongers”intheland’,writesJ.A.W.Gunn,“Interestwillnotlie”,Aseventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalMaxim’,JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas29:4(1968),551‐564,555;However,Nedham‘brazenlychampionedraisond’etataspreachedbytheducdeRohan,arguingthatitismaterialinterest,notjustice,honour,orreligionthatmakestheworldgoround.’PaulA.Rahe,AgainstThroneandAltarMachiavelliandPoliticalTheoryUndertheEnglishRepublic,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),181–182.
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True Interest of 1659 are striking. Nedham examined the specific ‘interests’ of the different
‘domestic’powergroups,notablytheroyalists,parliamentandthearmy,andconcludedthatitis
in ‘the InterestofeveryParty (exceptonly thePapist) tokeephim[CharlesStuart]out.’263As
severalhistorianshavestressed,AlgernonSidney’sCourtMaxims(manuscriptwrittenin1664‐
1665)andSlingsbyBethel’sThePresentInterestofEnglandstated(1671)inturndrewheavily
fromDelaCourt’sinterestargumentation.264
TheinterestanalysesofDelaCourtandthoseoftheabovementionedEnglishauthors
allurgethe importanceofaharmonyof interestsbetweenrulersandruled.AlanHoustonhas
claimed that this emphasis on harmonization was a means of freeing interest from dynastic
considerations, effectively delegitimizing Stuart rule. Royal government, argued Sidney and
Nedham,unbalanced theconstitutionbypursuingonly the interestof theruler.265De laCourt
likewisearguedthattoacquire‘free’governmentwastoensurethatrulersandruledsharedthe
same interests, as the merchant‐regents ruled mercantile Holland. These interest analyses
facilitated attempts to reconstruct the rule of law, i.e. government conceived under divine
(natural) law, as Houston writes: ‘Despite its modern association with conflict, discord and
struggle, the languageof interestwasprized for itsability to illuminatenewbasesofpolitical
order and social cooperation.’266 Amongst these was an emphasis on commerce and co‐
operationbetweenthoseengagedintradeasapivotalsourceforthecountry’swelfare.Inthis
sense,interestanalysescametoserveadvocacyoftheruleoflawagainstthebackgroundofthe
transformationsinearlymoderngovernments,mostnotablytheso‐called‘crisisofmonarchy’in
mid‐seventeenthcenturyEurope.267
263 Marchamont Nedham, Interestwill not lie.Or, a View of Englands True Interest in reference to Papist,Royalist,Presbyterian,Baptised,Neuter,Army,Parliament,CityofLondon[…](London1659).264Sidney,Algernon.CourtMaxims[manuscriptwrittenin1664‐1665],editedwithanintroductionbyHansW.Blom,EcoHaitsmaMulierandRonald Jansen (eds.) (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996);SlingsbyBethel,ThePresentInterestofEnglandStated(1671)andalsoBethel’sTheWorld’sMistake inOliverCromwell(1668);HartmanandWeststeijn evenconclude: ‘Muchmore researchcanandshouldbedoneon thede laCourts’ influenceon thisWhigeconomicandpoliticalthought’,in‘AnEmpireofTrade’,24‐25.265AlanHouston, ‘Republicanism,thepoliticsofnecessity,andtheruleof law’, inAlanHoustonandStevePincus,ANationTransformed.EnglandaftertheRestoration(CambridgeUniversityPress:Cambridge,2001),241‐271,p.255‐256.Infootnote255AlanHoustonalsostressestheneedforfurtherresearchoninterestanalyses:‘Thehistoryofthisprocess[interestofstateanalyses: it facilitatedthereconsiderationofanumberofpostulatesortheoremsthathadlonggovernedtheconductofstates’]hasyettobewritten.’266Houston,‘Republicanism,thepoliticsofnecessity,andtheruleoflaw’,255,256;SeealsoJohnA.W.Gunn,PoliticsandthePublicInterestintheSeventeenthCentury(London:Routledge&KeganPaul,1969)andGunn,“Interestwillnotlie”.267 To outline Nedham’s context, BlairWorden writes: ‘Since 1640s an epidemic of revolutions, from Portugal toSweden,hadproducedacrisisofmonarchy,inwhichcontemporaries(Harringtonamongthem)sawthehandofGod.’Blair Worden, ‘Marchamont Nedham and the Beginnings of English Republicanism’, in: David Wootton (ed.),Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 45‐81, p. 72. Thisepidemic receded in 1656.Worden refers to Nedhams’s newspaperMercurius Politicus, where he warned for theoverthrowofthetyrannies‘abroad’,followingtheEnglishoverthrowofthemonarchyinthe1650s‐editions;ThomasPoole,ReasonofState:Law,PrerogativeandEmpire(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2015),127‐131;StevePincus,‘Fromholycausetoeconomicinterest:thetransformationofreasonofstatethinkinginseventeenth‐centuryEngland’, inHoustonandPincus(eds.),ANationTransformed.EnglandaftertheRestoration(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 2001), 272‐298; Victoria Kahn, ‘The metaphorical contract in Milton’s Tenure of Kings and
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Finally,theteachingsoftheDelaCourts’professorofrhetoricandfrom1648ofhistory
atLeidenUniversity,MariusZuerisBoxhorn(1612‐1653),areworthnoting.268Boxhornrejected
the Aristotelian notion of human sociability and instead claimed fear and self‐interest as the
mechanismsbehindtheestablishmentofpoliticalgovernment.Hedisputedthecommonbelief
in the viability of a mixed constitution, wherein the different elements, the stadholder
(monarchical), the States (aristocratic), and the sometimes added town councils (democratic)
naturally balanced each other.269 Instead, Boxhorn based his interpretation of the mixed
constitution on the notion of self‐interest. Because stable government is based on the love of
subjects for the ruler, he advocated involvement in governmentby each section of society. In
practice,however,Boxhornbelievedadministrativeofficesshouldbeassigned to theelite, the
noblesandthewealthy,fortheyarelikelytobemoredevotedtothecommongood,whenit(and
theirownproperties)wouldbeharmed.IncaseoftheDutchRepublic, theprivate interestsof
the rich merchants of the province of Holland corresponded to the greatest extent to the
common interest, and thereforeHolland’s formof governmentwasanaristocracy.Yet, due to
theriseofcommercialcapital,revoltsofpoliticallyexcludedmerchantscouldbeexpectedandso
he advised shifting to amore open aristocratic government.270Boxhorn echoedHugoGrotius’
argument about the capacity of the principal assemblies to restrain the stadholder. Grotius
famouslytheorisedinDeAntiquitateReipublicaeBatavicae(1610)thatsinceBataviantimesthe
States possessed the sovereignty, which in day‐to‐day politics was sharedwith the prince of
Orange with the States retaining the highest authority and power to command in times of
disagreement. 271 In the literature Grotius’s ‘Batavian myth/model’ is often taken as the
dominant idea of Dutch republicanism, which eroded after 1650, not least because of De la
Court’srejectionofthemixedconstitution.272
Thethemesofthe‘newphilosophy’outlinedabovewereclearlyapparentinDelaCourt’s
Magistrates’, in David Armitage, Armand Himy and Quentin Skinner (eds.),Milton andRepublicanism (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),82‐105,p.103.268 His posthumously published Institutiones politicae (1657) reflect his lectures on the traditional politica genrecombined with new topics such as reason of state, which he applied to Dutch current affairs. Jaap Nieuwstraten,HistoryandPoliticsinSeventeenth‐CenturyDutchPoliticalThought.TheCaseofMarcusZueriusBoxhorn(1612–1653)(PhDdissertationErasmusUniversityRotterdam,2012),245‐247;Moreover,historianshavepointedtotheinfluenceofHeereboord,professorofphilosophyatLeidenUniversity,whoechoingDescartesmethods,attempted to forma‘newphilosophy’freedfrominterferenceoftheology.Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,32.269Thisisoftenarguedintermsofthestadholderconstitutingthemonarchicelement,theprovincialassembliesthearistocratic and, sometimes added, the city councils the democratic elements. M. van Gelderen, ‘Aristotelians,Monarchomachs and Republicans’, 201‐204. However, Justus Lipsius described monarchy as the best form ofgovernment inhisbook IIofPolitica. JustusLipsius,Politica.SixbooksofPoliticsorPolitical Instruction, introducedandtranslatedbyJanWaszink(Assen:RoyalvanGorchum,2004).270Boxhorncriticisedasmall,closed‐offaristocracyaseasilycorruptibleandpronetooligarchictyranny.ThegrowthofprivatewealthofthecitizensofHollandformedamajorpillarofHolland’swelfare.Nevertheless,arevoltcouldbeexpected, because the rich segment of the citizenry would no longer tolerate that they were excluded fromgovernment.271 Grotius stressed that in cases of disputes the individual provincial assemblies held the supreme power. HugoGrotius,TheAntiquityoftheBatavianRepublic,introducedandtranslatedJanWaszink(Assen:VanGorcum,2000).272IvoSchöffer,‘TheBatavianMythduringtheSixteenthandSeventeenthCenturies,’inJ.S.Bromley&E.H.Kossmann(eds.),BritainandtheNetherlands.Volume5:SomePoliticalMythologies(TheHague:Nijhoff,1974),78‐101.
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attackonearlymodernprinces.AsErnstKossmannstates:‘UnlikeBoxhorn(…)lateseventeenth
centurywritersofHuber’sorDe laCourt’snaturewere far fromamusedat theviciousnessof
politicalaffairs.(…)Unwarrantedcynicismwasanoutcomeofaprofoundlypessimisticviewof
thehumancondition.’273Reasonwasneitherthebasisofpoliticalvirtuenor the instrumentto
acquiretheknowledgeofthetrueinterestofstate.Rather,legitimategovernmentwasfounded
uponharmonizingof the (self‐)interestsof ruledand rulers. In thisway,De laCourtarguably
contributed to the so‐called ‘crisisofPoliticalAristotelianism’.274But first and foremost,De la
CourtemployedthevocabularyofreasonofstateinInterestvanHollandtodefendthepolitical
and military exclusion of the House of Orange. This brings to the fore De la Court’s
preoccupationwith‘wardespotism’thatpre‐datesInterestvanHolland.
3.2.2‘Wardespotism’inHetwelvarenderstadLeyden(1659)
Interest van Holland was actually based on an early work of the De la Court brothers, a
manuscripttitledHetwelvarenderstadLeyden[ThewellbeingofthecityofLeiden],finishedin
1659.275JohanmostprobablywrotetheinitialtextthatPieterexpandedintoasharpcritiqueof
the municipal government that allegedly constrained the economic, religious and political
libertiesofthecitizens.Itwas,however,notpublished,butviahiswife’sbrother‐inlaw,Johan
Eleman,themanuscriptcirculatedintheregenten‐factionsurroundingDeWitt.Itfoundakeen
audience amongst these powerful regents and so Pieter de la Court expanded the interest
analysistotheentireprovinceofHolland.InthesummerofJohandeWittreceivedafirstdraftof
InterestvanHolland.276
Hetwelvaren der stad Leyden has been considered as part of the tradition of Italian
ragiondistatoliterature,appropriatingItalianreasonofstatetotheseaborne,mercantileDutch
Republic constructing a ‘commercial reason of state’. 277 The brothers explicitly stated in the
introductionofthistreatisethattheywouldanalysethewell‐beingofthe‘republic’ofLeiden,i.e.
ofrulersandruledcombined,‘sopralaraggiondiStato’.278HetwelvarenderstadLeydenstated
thatthepreservationandadvancementoftheinhabitantsdependedonunrestrictedtradethat 273ErnstH.Kossmann,‘Somelate17th‐centuryDutchwritingsonRaisond'Etat’,inRomanSchnur(ed.),Staatsräson:StudienzurGeschichteeinespolitischenBegriffs(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1975),497‐504,quotationon499.274HorstDreitzel,‘ReasonofStateandtheCrisisofPoliticalAristotelianism’,JonathanScottqualifiesitasa‘scepticalDutchreasonofstate[that]eliminatedthemoralbasisofAristotle’stheory’.JonathanScott,‘ClassicalRepublicanism’,61‐81,quotedfromp.69.275FirstversionwastitledAenmerkingeophetwelvarenenIntrestderStadLeyden[CommentsontheWell‐beingandinterestoftheCityofLeiden].Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,54‐55.276Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,54‐55.277Inthissense,WeststeijnandHartmanviewthebrothersDelaCourtastheoristsof‘jealousyoftrade’ratherthanofaprototype‘politicaleconomy’.HartmanandWeststeijn,‘AnEmpireofTrade’,12.278 [De la Court],Hetwelvaren van Leiden.Handschriftuithet jaar 1659, edited F. Driessen (The Hague:MartinusNijhoff,1911),3.
68
neededfavourabletaxationandrulesofimmigrationandadefensiveforeignpolicy.
Alreadyinthistreatisewecanobserveelementsofcontemporarycritiques,whichhave
been defined as attacking ‘war despotism’. In chapter 64, the De la Courts exclaim: ‘a furore
monarcharum libera nos Domine’ [Save us from the fury of monarchs, oh Lord].279 While a
monarchic formofgovernmenthas theadvantageofeffectiverule, for itconcernedonesingle
man, ‘nogreaterdisastercanbethought, ifa freeCityorRepublicwouldfall intoaMonarchic
government, because generally all sciences, arts, virtues, Prosperity and commerce would be
destroyed, yes the inhabitants would be devoured like bread.’280 Interestingly, the brothers
underline the contemporary transformations of European governments, appealing to ancient
rightsofcertainpartsofsocietytoparticipateinpolitics,ascontemporaryFrenchandGerman
authorslikewiseargued.Theywrite:‘InoldtimesEuropewasruledsatisfactorilybyRepublics,
andwhichhave leftsomanyremnantsofpowerto thesubjects,CitiesandProvinces’ that the
monarchscouldnotsubvert.281Monarchicalgovernmenthadfunctionedperfectlywellwhenit
waspartofalayeredsystemofgovernmentbyconsentthroughcityandprovincialassemblies
(arepublicansystem/monarchicalcommonwealth),butconverselyallpresentmonarchs,theDe
la Courts write, follow the examples of ‘Tartars, Turks, Persians, Muscovites, and all other
countries, where a personwithout any contradiction rules and is obeyed’.282Without further
explanation they assert that ‘Spain, France, Sweden, the German rulers and the Netherlands’
transformed into such illegitimate systems of rule, and instead concentrate on showing ‘how
disadvantageoustheslaveryorcoercionofthesame[absolutegeneralfreedomofinhabitants]
fortherulersofLeidenis.’283
Herewewitnessthenatureof theDe laCourts’argument, intheirattackon,allegedly,
new practices of rulers. They make the standard comparison with Oriental regimes deemed
despotic.LiketheOrientals,therulersofChristendomcoerceandsubverttheruleoflaw,they
plunder the polity, effectively enslaving the subjects. For theDe la Courts, these propensities
characterisedearlymodernrule;itsnewnesslayintheshiftfromconsentandtheauthorityof
lawservingtherespublicatoarbitraryruleandenslavement.Ratherthanrejectingmonarchyas
such,itisthenewdespotismsthatareattacked.LikeRohanbeforethemonthe‘new’monarchy
of Spain, the De la Courts treated newness prejudicially. Indeed, the negativity surrounding
innovation was entirely conventional, yet has been overlooked by modern commentators in
their search for republicanism; the result has been amisplaced emphasis: it is not that new
monarchy is a recent illustration of illegitimate rule, but thatmonarchy is evil insofar as it is
newlytransformed.InInterestvanHolland,Pieterexpandedontheearlierargument. 279HetwelvarenvanLeiden,143[Chapter64].280HetwelvarenvanLeiden,143‐144[Chapter64].281HetwelvarenvanLeiden,144[Chapter64].282HetwelvarenvanLeiden,144[Chapter64].283HetwelvarenvanLeiden,144[Chapter64]
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3.2.3TheOrange‐Republic
De la Court’s severe criticism of certain corrupt practices of princes, in Interest vanHolland
essentially entailed anti‐Orangism. It reflected a long‐term constitutional crisis of the
stadholderateintheDutchrepublic,whichusuallyeruptedunderforeignpoliticalpressures.284
ThestadholderatewascreatedbyEmperorCharlesVtoreplacetheabsentHabsburgrulerand
retained by the Union of Utrecht from 1579 onwards.285 This office comprised a hybrid
collectionofpowers,privilegesandinformalinfluences.SinceinpracticetheprincesofOrange
successivelyoccupiedtheoffice,thestadholderatewasalsoadynasticinstitution.Theprovincial
estates chose the stadholder independently from each other. The States General awarded the
stadholderwith thehighestmilitaryofficeofcaptain‐general in thecontextof thewaragainst
Spain. Formally, the stadholderate was a civil office, which had developed de facto into an
importantmilitaryone.286Rowencallsthestadholderatetherefore‘animprovisation’andstates
that ‘it was difficult for contemporaries to fit it into the standard categories of political
analysis’.287
The joint Orange‐office of stadholder and captain‐general proved to be a danger for the
States of Holland in the crisis years of 1618 and 1650, when respectively the Stadholders
Maurice andWilliam II of Orange pressured successfully the provincial assembly bymilitary
force.Duringreligiousdisputesin1610s,aconflictrosebetweentheStatesofHollandandthe
StatesGeneralaboutthelegalpowertoorganizemilitaryforcestoquellinternalreligiousriots.
On theauthorityof theStatesGeneral, StadholderMauricepressured theStatesofHollandby
militaryforceandarrestedtheGrandPensionaryofHolland,JohanvanOldenbarnevelt,in1618,
whowastriedandexecutedin1619.In1650,Maurice’snephew,StadholderWilliamIIandthe
States of Holland were involved in a conflict about reduction of the army, which resulted in
William’sattempttotakeoverthecityofAmsterdambyforceandthearrestofeightmembersof 284Klashorst, “Metten schijnvanmonarchie getempert”, 99;Rowen stated that from the1650suntil the fall of theDutchRepublic in1759, ‘thecentralconstitutionalquestionbecamethestadholdership, itsdesirabilityand itsveryexistence. It was not whether the country should be a republic or a monarchy, as in nineteenth‐century France.’Rowen, JohndeWitt, 54;WygerVelemaunderlines this: ‘anti‐monarchismwas theoutcomeof adomesticpoliticalneed.’Hestressesthatitwouldbe‘incorrecttoequateOrangismwithmonarchism’.However,Velemabelieves‘anti‐monarchism’tobetheessentialaspectofatypeofDutch‘republicanism’thatencompassedasystematicrejectionofmonarchy,asheobservesinDelaCourt’swritings.Velema,‘“ThataRepublicisbetterthanamonarchy”’,12.285 Actually Charles V installed three stadholders corresponding to the three administrative parts of the northernNetherlandsin1543.AccordingtoJonathanIsrael,theUnionofUtrechtextendedthepowersofthestadholderateforitwasdecided thathemust takeup themediatorpositionbetweenprovinces in the absenceof a king. Israel,TheDutchRepublic,301;ForfurtherinformationontheUnionofUtrechtreadJohanChristiaanBoogman, ‘TheUnionofUtrecht:itsGenesisandConsequences’,BMGN–LowCountriesHistoricalReview94:3(1997),377‐407.286Israel,TheDutchRepublic, 305; Levillain, ‘L’Angleterrede laRestauration’, 4;Velema, “That aRepublic is betterthanamonarchy”,11–12. 287HerbertH.Rowen,ThePrincesofOrange.TheStadholdersintheDutchRepublic(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1988),ix,1.
70
the provincial assembly of Holland.288 His premature death, however, paved the way for the
stadholderlessregime.
RohanconsideredthatitwasMaurice’sparticularinteresttopursuecontinuouswarfare.289
Interestingly, the princes of Orange themselves even argued that their aspirations benefitted
fromastrongarmyandanOrange‐militarycommand,astheirmostimportantpowerplaywas
participatingintheEuropeanwars.In1674StadholderWilliamIIItoldtheambassadorGabriel
Sylvius that ‘Hewas right and itwas inhis interest (…) to favour thepursuit ofwar inorder
therebytoestablishhisauthority.’290Afterthemeltdownofthestadholderlessregimein1672,
hewasofferedarangeofnobletitlesbutheconstantlydeclined.AccordingtoCharles‐Édouard
Levillain, he preferred to stretch the stadholderate to its full capacity; ‘Better awarrior king
without a kingdom than awarrior kingwithout an army.’291 His father,William II of Orange,
however, had severely overstretched the legitimate scope of the stadholderate in 1650. The
peace with Spain was an utmost nuisance forWilliam II as he tellingly wrote to the French
ambassador d’Estrades: ‘Iwish that I could break the necks of all the villains that signed the
peace.’292HestressedtheimportanceofwarfarefortheDutchnobilityandtheutteregoismof
Hollandmerchant‐regents: ‘TheMerchants never think of anything other than commerce and
how topromote it, theydonot lookout for the restof the countryand theNobility.’293Leslie
PricearguesthatWilliamIIhadactedratherrashlyfromsheerfrustrationatHolland’sattempts
to limit thenumberofhis troops.294Thestadholderless regimebuilton the recentmemoryof
William’s 1650 subversion of the rule of law, in the light ofwhichMaurice’s actions of 1618
lookedalotmoresinister.295
288 Itwasan ‘attempt’, forhis landforceswerespottedbyamessengeronhisroutetoAmsterdam.Themessengerwarnedthecityandsodefensivemeasurescouldbetaken.Israel,‘TheStadtholderateofWilliamII,1647–1650’,TheDutchRepublic,595‐609.289However,Maurice’sinterest‘wasjoinedwiththetrueinterestoftheStates’,becausetheUnitedProvinces‘flourishby thecontinuationofwarre.’Rohan,ATreatiseof the Interestof thePrincesandStatesofChristendome,84‐85,32;Dutchpoliticaldebatesregardingwarandpeaceshiftedafter1648, fromanemphasison theprofitofwarfaretoastressofthebenefitsofpeace.HansW.Blom, ‘Oorlog,handelenstaatsbelanginhetpolitiekdenkenrond1648’,Dezeventiendeeeuw13(1997),89‐96.290Quoted fromCharlesÉdouardLevillain, ‘WilliamIII’sMilitaryandPoliticalCareer inNeo‐romanContext,1672–1702,’TheHistoricalJournal48:2(2005),213–350,p.322.291Levillain,‘WilliamIII’sMilitaryandPoliticallyCareer’,327and333.292 Roeland Harms, De uitvinding van de publieke opinie: pamfletten als massamedia in de zeventiende eeuw(Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress,2011),92: ‘Ikwoudatikallenschurken,diedenvredegeslotenhebben,denneklatenbreken.’293 Harms,Deuitvinding vandepubliekeopinie,92; ‘De Coopluyden denkcen nievers op als op de trafyc en die tebeneficieren,voorderestvanhetlandtendenAdeldaersijnse[zienze,RoelandHarms]nietnaerom.’294 The States of Holland only overstretched its authoritywhen theypaid off troops assigned to them in order toreduce thewarbudget and toblockplannedwarfare againstHabsburg‐Spain. JohnL. Price,Hollandand theDutchRepublicintheSeventeenthCentury:ThePoliticsofParticularism(Clarendon:OxfordUniversityPress,1994),159,163‐164.Pricestatesonp.159:‘Inanycase,hewasverymuchanexceptionamongthestadhouders,whoingeneralwerenomorelikelytowant,ortobeable,todestroythepoweroftheregentsthancontemporarymonarchswereabletocontemplaterulingwithoutnobilities.’295Price,HollandandtheDutchRepublic,170.
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3.2.4Thestadholderlessregime:warfare,taxation,debating‘interest’and‘freedom’
All this isnottosaythatamilitaristicaggrandisementwasexclusivetotheprincesofOrange.
Therepublicanregimeof JohandeWitt feltno lessobligedtoparticipate inthewarsbetween
European rulers. During the 1650s the Dutch Republic fought the English in 1652‐1654,
intervenedintheBalticareaagainstSwedenandEnglandin1656‐1659,plannedtointervenein
Münsterlandin1657andpursuedwarfareagainstPortugalin1657‐1660.296Duringthe1660s,
apart fromtensionswithEngland leadingupto theSecondAnglo‐DutchWar(1665‐1667),De
Witt’smain concern regarding foreign affairswas to keep a safe distance from the ascending
Frenchmonarchy.ShortlyafterthePeaceofPyreneesin1659,Spainhalvedthesizeofitsarmy
in the Spanish Netherlands, leaving the south of the Dutch Union vulnerable to a potential
French invasion. Nonetheless,many Dutch regents shared scepticism about the usefulness of
SpainasanallyagainstFranceandviewedthelatterasaprofitablebusinesspartner.297In1662
a Franco‐Dutch defensive alliancewas signed. A famousDutch sloganwas: ‘Gallia amica, non
vicina’[ratherFranceasfriend,thanneighbour].298
War related burdens brought great pressure to the Dutch inhabitants during the
stadholderless regime. After the peace of 1648, Dutch war expenses fell drastically, but rose
againduetothenaval interventionintheBaltic in1658andpeakedduringtheSecondAnglo‐
DutchWar (over30million guilders in1665 compared to22million guilders annually in the
1630s). Moreover, after 1648 debt charges, especially Holland’s, rose, even though De Witt
managedtolowertheminthebeginningofthe1650suntilDutchwarfareincreasedattheendof
the decade.299 The subsequent rise in taxation, sale of loans, annuities and new short‐term
obligationsproducedamountingdiscontentamongstDutchinhabitants.300
ScholarshavestressedtheexistenceofaDutch ‘discussionculture’thatcouldmobilisethe
population, largely through pamphlets.301 Gert Klashorst remarks that particularly during the
epochof ‘TrueFreedom’(1650‐1672)pamphletdebatesragedoutsidegovernmentalbodiesin
the Dutch Republic and the regime attempted to influence Dutch ‘opinion’.302 The minority
296Israel,TheDutchRepublic,637‐638:in155870,000men,in166133,000menandsoonafter20,000men.Between1667and1712FrancerepeatedlyinvadedtheSpanishNetherlands,whichwillbediscussedinthefollowingchaptersonLisolaandValkenier.297Israel,TheDutchRepublic,744.298 Rowen, Johan de Witt, 115‐124; Gijs Rommelse, The Second Anglo‐Dutch War (1665‐1667) Raison d’état,mercantilismandmaritimestrife(Hilversum:Verloren,2006),73‐75.299ThegovernmentaldebtoftheUnionhadrisenfrom923000guildersin1596toalmost14millionguildersin1650,anamountthatsteadilygrewduringthe1650s.Provincialdebtlikewiserose,andHolland’sdebtwaseventenfoldtheamountoftheUnion’sdebtin1700(200millionguilders).Marjolein‘tHart,‘Themeritsofafinancialrevolution’,16‐20.300LucPanhuysen,DeWareVrijheid.DelevensvanJohanenCornelisdeWitt(Amsterdam:Atlas,2005),296.301WillemFrijhoffandMarijkeSpies,DutchCultureinaEuropeanPerspective:1650,hard‐wonunity(Assen:RoyalvanGorcum, 2004), 220;Michel Reinders,PrintedPandemonium:PopularPrintandPolitics in theNetherlands1650‐72(Leiden:Brill,2013).302Klashorst,‘Mettenschijnvanmonarchiegetempert’,157.
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regimeofDeWittwasfragileintimesofforeignthreatandeconomicdistress.Asstatedbefore,
DeWitthimselfevenestimatedthesupportforthestadholderlessregimeasonly‘one‐tenthof
onepercentofthecommonpeople’.303LucvanPanhuysenarguesthattheprimaryreasonforDe
WitttoaddtwochapterstoInterestvanHollandwas‘specificallytodefendtheplagueofexcise
duties,customsduties,tenth,twentieth,hundredsandtwo‐hundredspennies’.304
Thus, the stadholderless regime was stuck between intensified European warfare and
growing hostility to high and new taxation,whichwas exacerbated by an Orangist revival in
1660‐1661.Aswiththeconstitutionalcrisisof1618,thatof1650fuelledpamphletwarsabout
whopossessedthesupremepoweroverforeignpolicyandtheUnion’sarmy.305Fromthe1650s
onwards,animportanttropeinthesepamphletswas‘interest’,i.e.theself‐interestoftheprince
orregents,asopposedtothe‘true’interestofthedifferentprovincesortheUnitedProvinces.306
Against the claim that the princes of Orange were driven by self‐interest to harm the ‘true
interest’, many defenders of the stadholderate argued that in the ‘mixed constitution’ the
passionandself‐interestweresubordinatedtothecommoninterestbythebalancingdynamics
of themonarchicandaristocraticelements.Asstatedabove, thecentral issue inthese interest
debateswastheroleoftheprinceofOrangeconveyedthroughforeignpolicy,whethertopursue
anoffensivewarfareagainstthegreatEuropeandynastiessuchasFrance,orresumewaragainst
Spain,andthereforenecessarilytosustainlargelandforcesandhightaxes;ortostriveforpeace
supportedbyastrongfleettoprotecttheprosperoustrade.SupportersoftheHouseofOrange
generallyadvocatedthe firstoption,arguingthatonlytheprinceofOrangewithhiscombined
politicalandmilitaryofficescouldprotecttheinterestoftheUnitedProvinces.Authorsopposing
anOrange‐stadholderateoftenpromotedthesecondoption,reasoningthatgiventheirwarlike
castofmind, theprinceswouldonly further their self‐interestandruin theDutchRepublic.A
303JohandeWitttoVanBeveringhon11July1953,BrievenvanJohandeWittvolume1,R.FruinandG.W.Kernkamp(eds.),(Amsterdam:Müller,1906),blz96.304Panhuysen,DeWareVrijheid,297.Penniesweredifferenttaxationsonmovableandrealgoods.305Theyears1650,with1618and1672werethethreepeakyearsoftheGoldenAgeforbothquantityandvehemenceofpoliticalandtheological‐politicaltractsissuingfromtheDutchpresses.’Israel,TheDutchRepublic,608.306Althoughwritingsonreasonofstate,thearcanaandTacitismwerepreviouslyavailableintheDutchrepublic,thelittle scholarship there is on this topic observes a popular use of the idiom of ‘interest’ from the 1650s onwards,largelyinfluencedbythepeacenegotiationsatWestphaliaandtheconsequentpublicationof‘critical‐currentaffairs’writings,filledwithforeigntractsandtreatisesusingthisidiom,suchasthediplomatLieuwevanAitzema’spolitical‐historicalSakenvanStaetenOorlogh(1657‐1671).Blom,‘Oorlog,handelenstaatsbelanginhetpolitiekedenkenrond1648’, 89. Blom points especially toMunstersPraetie:DeliberantDum fingerenesciunt (1646) inwhich the use ofreason of state terminology takes center stage in explaining that solely ‘personal benefit’, which the French callInteresse’determinessuchnegotiations;Otherpamphletsaretobefound:PierredeTouche.DesveritablesInterestsdesProvincesUniesduPaïs‐bas:etDesIntentionsdesdeuxCouronnes,furlestraittezdePaix.SecondeEdition(Dordrecht,1647);LettreescriteparvnGentilhommeFrancoysfaisantprofessionde laReligionReformée,avnamyHollandois,ausujetdeslibellesdiffamatoiresquisepublientenHollandecontrelesFrancois,&purfairevoirquel’InterestetseuretédelavrayeReligiontantdehorsquededanslesProvincesUnies[…]dePaixsanselle(Hamburg,1647);Foraspecificpamphlet as part of ‘critical‐current affairs’ genre see: Staet representerende de generale affairen, midstgadersd’hoedanicheden ende gestalenis van alle koninckrijcken, prinsdommen ende republiquen van Europa. Vanden Jaren1654.Totden jaere1655(TheHague,1655);Notably, the influenceof the1648‐negotitationsshouldberesearchedfurther, as well as the earlier discussed similarities between 1650s‐1670s English and Dutch interest analyses,whereinRohan’sDel’interestappearstohaveakeyposition.
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famous early exampleof theuse of ‘interest’ isDeWitt’s ownDeductie,oftedeclaratievande
StatenvanHollandtenWest‐Vrieslandtof1654,justifyingtheexclusionoftheHouseofOrange
laiddowninthehighlycontroversialActofExclusion,signedwiththeCromwellianregime.307
IntheDutchRepublictheterm‘freedom/liberty’washighlycontestedandusedbymany
authors of different factions to state their respective claims.308 Klashorst examined a diverse
rangeofofficialdocumentsandpamphlets from theperiodof ‘True ‘Freedom’, andconcluded
thatpolitical‘liberty’meantprimarilythesecurepossessionandtheunthreatenedenjoymentof
one’sownspecial ‘liberties’, i.e.propertyandprivileges.WhiledocumentsofZeelandstressed
OrangeasthedefenderoftheancientprivilegesagainstSpanishservitudeandviewedtheUnion
ofUtrechtof1579astheconstitutionalrestrictiononHolland’sprovincialsovereignty,Holland’s
official papers argued for an absolute provincial sovereignty that chiefly entailed the right to
refuseanyfinancialrequestfromotherparties.Moreover,Klashorstsuggeststhattheterm‘free
republic’inHolland’sofficialpapers,primarilymeantfreedomfrominterferenceoftheHouseof
Orange. In the pamphlets he investigated, Klashorst observed similar patterns. ‘Orangists’
usuallyapplied‘freedom’totheentireDutchRepublicoftheSevenUnitedProvinceswhilepro‐
DeWittpamphleteersargued for theabsolutesupremepowerofHolland.309Moreover,within
thecommercialDutchRepublic‘liberty’wasalsoregardedastheruleoflawthatfosteredcrucial
protectionoftradeandcommerce.310
307Apartfromdefendingprovincialsovereignty,DeWitt,similarlytoDelaCourt,warnedforcoerciveprincelyrule,forcefullyoverthrowingregimesruledbyconsentandlaw,illustratedbymanyrecenthistoricalexamples,especiallyWilliamII’scoupd’étatof1650.Deductie,oftedeclaratievandeStatenvanHollandtenWest‐Vrieslandt(TheHague,1654);Alreadyduring the firstAnglo‐DutchWar (1652‐1654), but especially after thepublication ofDe la Court’sInterestofHollandin1662andtheFrenchinvasionin1672,anexplosiveriseofDutchpublicationswith‘interest’intheir titles is detectable, used in political and religious issues. See for instance:Hoe veel deVereenigdeProvintienbehoortgelegentezijn,deher‐stellingevandenconinckvanGroot‐Britangie(TheHague:H.Cornelsz.,1653);HollandsOp‐Komst, of Bedenkingen op de schaadelyke Schriften, genaamt Grafelyke Regeeringe en Interest van Holland uit‐gegevendoorV.D.H.tendienstevanalleliefhebersdiehetwareInterestvanHollandbeminnen(Leiden,1662);I.N.D.P.[JeanNicholss de Parival],Ware interest vanHolland;gebouwd opde ruïnen vanden Interest vanHolland, onlangsuitgegevendoorD.V.H.(Leiden:JanPrincen,1662);DentegenwoordigeninterestderChristenprincen(Enkhuizen:DirkKlaer‐Oogh, 1662); Johan Corbet,Het interest vanEngelandt, in dematerie van religie (Amsterdam: Steven Swart,1663); Gelasius Mullens [Guilielmus Saldenus],Neerlands interest, tot vrede der kercke, enwegh‐neminge van alleopkomendemisverstandenindeselve(Middelburg:YemantHendricksz.,1664);L’interestdel’Allemagne,engeneraletenparticvlier (Cologne:PierreMarteau,1668 [printed in theNetherlandsbyWeller]); WillemGuthry,Hetgrooteinterest van een christen; ofteHet deel van een geloovige getoetst […]wie heeft ende hoe te krijghen, […] En in ‘tNederlandts vertaaldtdoor JacobusKoelman (Vlissingen; Abrahamvan Laren, 1669);DavidMontanus,Stemmedesgejuygs endesheilsover’tgroote interest van een christen […] ingezangen vervat (Vlissingen: Abrahamvan Laren,1672);Holland’s interest, gestelt tegen dat van Jan deWitt; voor‐gevallen tusschenHans, raedts‐heer, enArent, eenborger (1672); Engelands interest, ofte tegenwoordich waerachtig belangh. By een trouwhertigh lief‐hebber vanEngelands eere desselfs en gantsch christen‐rijcks vrede, uit D’Engelsche spraeck in de Neder‐duytsche overgeset[Translated from English] (1672); Discoursen over den tegenwoordigen interest van het landt. Tusschen een Zeeu,Hollanderenraedsheer(Amsterdam,1672);[JosephHill],TheinterestoftheseUnitedProvinces.BeingadefenceoftheZeelander choice.Byawellwisherof the reformed religion,and thewellfareof these countries (Middelburg: ThomasBerry,1672);Deschoolenderprince,eninterestdervoornaemstepotentatedeswerelts(Cologne,H.Albedeuyt,1673).308Blom, ‘TheRepublicanMirror’,97;For long‐termDutch intellectual traditionofarguing libertyseeEcoHaitsmaMulierandWygerVelema,and(eds.),Vrijheid:eengeschiedenisvandevijftiendetotdetwintigsteeeuw(Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress,1999).309Klashorst,‘Mettenschijnvanmonarchiegetempert’,165‐176.310 Ida Nijenhuiswrites, ‘civil liberty –the rule of law‐ became an essential feature of commercial society’ for thesimplereasonthattradeneededthebasicjudicialprotectionofpropertyandperson.‘Republicanliberty’inthissense,promoted‘wealthandnumbers’.IdaNijenhuis,“ShiningComet,FallingMeteor”.ReflectionsontheDutchrepublicasa
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Constitutionaldebatesonthe ‘freerepublic’311overlappedwithdebatesabout freedom
of consciencewhich, asMartin van Gelderen states, ‘was the core of all Dutch debates’.312 In
1618theologicaldebatesbetweenorthodoxCounter‐RemonstrantsandmoderateRemonstrants
ledtodiscussionsaboutwhoheldsupremeauthorityinconfessionalmatters,theChurchorthe
States General, or perhaps the individual provinces or towns? Hugo Grotius had provided a
strong defence of freedom of conscience and for governmental authority over church affairs,
deeming the church an intrinsic member of the res publica. However, Maurice of Orange
successfully intervened on the side of orthodox Counter‐Remonstrants.313 Echoing these
troubles,duringthe1650s‐1660sa‘Voetian‐Cocceiancontroversy’ragedintheDutchRepublic.
ItinitiallyinvolvedtheologicaldisputesaboutSabbathobservance,butdevelopedintopolitical
debates. TheorthodoxCalvinist ‘Voetians’, strict anti‐Cartesians and in favourof anti‐Catholic
legislation,attemptedtoenforcestricterreformedmannersinsociety,regardedgovernmentas
aninstrumentforthis,andassociatedwithOrangismtocounterthepoliticalprimacyofHolland.
Orangist pamphleteers had practically monopolised the claim of being the ‘protector of the
fatherland’andDutchCalvinism,bothallegedlyfreedfrom‘Spanishtyranny’bythecourageous
princes of Orange.314 The ‘Cocceian’ adherents, affiliated with De Witt‐faction and against
orthodoxCalvinistprimacy in society,proposedmoremoderateworship, andstressedcareful
readingbyskilledphilologistsofthecomplexBible.Pro‐DeWittpamphleteersfrequentlyargued
alongGrotianlines,defendingtheregents’powertomediateinchurchaffairs,thesebeingaffairs
oftherespublica,andpleadedforgreaterfreedominworship.315
3.2.5TheOrangistrevivalof1660‐1661
De la Court wrote Interest vanHolland at the height of an Orangist revival in 1660‐1661, in
defence of the stadholderless regime (1650–1672). After Stadholder William II of Orange
suddenlydiedofsmallpox in1650, themajorityofprovinces, ledbyHolland,decidedto leave
theofficeofstadholdervacant,adecisionthatlastedforjustovertwodecades.TheStadholder’s
son, princeWilliam, was born eight days after his father’s death. The presence of the young
Princeremainedaconstantthreattotheregime,especiallyintroubledtimesoppositiontothe
CommercialPowerduringtheSecondStadholderlessEra’, inJ.A.F.deJongsteandA.J.Veenendaal(eds.),AnthonieHeinsiusandtheDutchRepublic,1688‐1720:Politics,War,andFinance(TheHague:InstituteofNetherlandsHistory,2002),115‐129,p.120.311Blom,‘TheRepublicanMirror’,97‐98.312 Martin van Gelderen, ‘Arminian trouble: Calvinists debates on freedom’, in Martin van Gelderen and QuentinSkinner(eds.),FreedomandtheConstructionofEurope(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009),21‐37,p.22.313VanGelderenpointstotheironythattheinterventionofOrangestressedthedefactopowerofcivilgovernmentinchurchmatters.VanGelderen,‘Arminiantrouble’,31‐36;314IngmarVroomen,TaalvandeRepubliek.315Israel,TheDutchRepublic,661‐666;Klashorst,“Mettendeschijnvanmonarchiegetempert”,165‐166.
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regimeoftenturned into fierceOrangism. In thebeginningof the1660sDe laCourtsetout to
diminishthisthreat.Inthisperiod,thefortunesoftheHouseofOrangewererevivingbecauseof
the restoration of the English King Charles II and his favouring of the interests and political
prospects of the young Orange‐Prince William, his nephew. Furthermore, Princess Mary,
William’smother and Charles’ sister, promoted her son’s cause to each province. During this
periodofOrangistresurgence,DelaCourtsentpartsofhismanuscripttoDeWitttobereadand
correctedbeforepublishingitatthebeginningof1662.
However,DutchRoyalismwasnot co‐extensivewithOrangism,asadherentsof theDe
WittfactionalsosupportedtheStuartcause.Manyregentswerewillingtosupportthehouseof
Orange now that its fortunes were reviving. When in the spring of 1660 Charles spent two
monthsintheDutchRepublicbeforesailingtoEngland,provincialassembliesandtowncouncils
competedwitheachotherintheireffortstopleasetheking,culminatingintheexorbitant‘Dutch
Gift’: this included severalRenaissancepaintings and a yacht. Jonathan Israel speaks ofmany
opportunistsamongtheregents,whowereimpressedbytheadvantages,politicalandeconomic,
of better relationswith Englandmore than they feared any Orangist revival. 316 In 1661, the
provincesofZeeland,Friesland,OverijsselandGelderland,andeventheHollandcitiesofLeiden
and Haarlem proposed the re‐instalment of the Prince of Orange. In February of that year,
William wrote to his uncle that ‘there will never be a better opportunity to secure that
designation’.317At theendof1661,DeWittwassavedbyrenewedAnglo‐Dutch tensionsover
tradeespeciallyintheCaribbeanandWestAfrica.TheprovinceofZeelandhadhugeinterestsin
these markets, which outweighed support for the Orange‐Stadholder. Similar priorities were
evident inHollandandsowith theresurgenceofAnglo‐Dutch tensions therewasadecline in
Orangism.318
Recently, Helmer Helmers has explained the seeming paradox of a Dutch ‘Royalist
Republic’ by researchingadiverse rangeof sources frompamphlets topaintings.Widespread
StuartsupportintheDutchRepublicwasformedfromthelate1640sonwards,whenbothsides
in the civilwar issued ferociouspropagandacampaigns to influenceDutch ‘opinion’,but after
theexecutionofCharlesI,theDutchclosedranks.Royalistpropagandaappealedtoawiderange
ofDutchmen,notonlytotheOrangists,butalsotomoremoderateRemonstrantbelievers,who
identified with the Church of England and the struggle against the political fanaticism of
orthodoxProtestants.Furthermore, theregicide, the totalcollapseofcivilorderandsustained
316Israel,TheDutchRepublic,751‐758.317WoutTroost,Stadhouder‐koningWillemIII:eenpolitiekebiografie(Hilversum:UitgeverijVerloren,2001),44.318Duringthecourseof1662,Anglo‐DutchnegotiationsinLondonstagnated(fortheDutchamajorstickingpointwasCromwell’sprotectionistNavigationAct).DeWittandhissupporters,backedbytheprovincesofZeelandandUtrecht,evenpreferredwarwithEngland.Israel,TheDutchRepublic,751‐758.
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civilwarwerestronglydislikedbyalmostallDutchmen.CharlesIwaswidelyseenasapolitical
andreligiousmartyr,whereasCromwelllargelyemergedasatruetyrantinDutchopinion.319
Moreover,Helmerunderlinesthat‘monarchistandabsolutistmodesofthoughtwereas
deeply embedded in the United Provinces as anywhere else in Europe.’ He also stresses the
dominance of mixed constitution‐arguments in Dutch political thought as a cause for Dutch
resistance to English ‘republican’ arguments. Because of the Orangist revival of 1660 and its
powerfuldynasticconnectiontotheStuartmonarchy,DelaCourthadtocomeupwithafierce
attackonthemixedconstitution,butnotablyavoidingreferencestoEnglishrepublicansandthe
EnglishCommonwealth that, in theeyesofmanyDutchmen,hadturnedout tobeacorrupted
kingdominallbutaname.320ThismayexplainthelackofexplicitreferencestoEnglishinterest
analyses, suchasNedham’s, in InterestvanHolland.321Theallegation thatakinglesspolity ‐as
theDutchRepublicwasfirstandforemostanaristocracy‐musthavehadastructuralaversionto
kingshipmighttrulydistortourunderstandingofcomtemporarybeliefsandpractices.
Insum,DelaCourtwroteInterestvanHollandinclosecooperationwithJohandeWittin
ordertocounteranOrangistRevivalandmountingdiscontentwithhightaxation intheDutch
Republic.De laCourtused the languageof interest, influencedbynewphilosophicalviewson
humannature,andcomplementedwithelementsofcontemporarycritiquesof ‘wardespotism’
to counter the public clamour for the re‐instatement of theHouse of Orange in the offices of
stadholder and captain general. The fact that the DeWitt‐regime ruledwithout the House of
Orangemadeitnolessa, thoughperhapsmorereluctant,participant intheEuropeanmilitary
competition. Its inhabitantswereoppressedbywar‐related taxburdensandcalledout for the
illustrious House of Orange, by the Stuart Restoration even more illustrious, to defend their
economic, political and religious liberties against the oligarchic regents. De la Court
counterattacked with the argument that princes, courtiers, priests, nobles and soldiers with
their lust for warfare, power and luxuries would destroy Holland from within, robbing
319AsHelmers concludes: ‘TheRestoration symbolizedmany restorations atonce. (…)Charles II’s restorationwasalso the restoration of his father, whose fate had made such a profound impression in the Dutch Republic. (...)Secondly,friendandfoeintheDutchRepublicagreedthattherestorationoftheStuartsinEnglandwouldleadtotherestorationoftheHouseofOrangeintheDutchRepublic.(...)DutchobserversalsoreadanotherrestorationinCharlesII’sreturntograce:thatofJohanvanOldenbarnevelt[symbolforRemonstrantviews](…)TheRestorationofCharlesII, they believed, would bolster the Anglo‐Dutch opposition to Anglo‐Dutch‐Scoto Puritanism (…). Lastly, theRestorationofCharlesII,asasignofGod,alsosymbolizedageneralrestorationoforder.’Helmers,RoyalistRepublic,259‐261.320 Helmers, Royalist Republic, cited from 262, 313. Helmers points to the ‘absolutist tendency in Dutch“republicanism”, as some political writers such as Dirck Graswinckel applied divine right theories to regents andothersarguedaHobbesiannotionofsovereignty.Helmers,RoyalistRepublic,132.321 Helmers’ argument –because of the widespread Dutch support for Stuart, Dutch authors needed to avoidreferencestoEnglish‘republicanrebels’‐appearsmoreconvincingthanthatofArthurWeststeijn,whoclaimsthatDelaCourt‘didnotlookwestwardsforanymajorinspiration.’Bycomparingwritingson‘republicanism’inEnglandandthe United Provinces between 1650 and 1670,Weststeijn argues that De la Court radically differed from English‘republicanwritings’becauseDe laCourt categorically rejectedanymonarchical element in themixedconstitutionanddefendeda republicanself‐containedcity‐state insteadofa centralizedmonarchical republic, asHarrington.A.Weststeijn, ‘Why the Dutch Didn’t Read Harrington: Anglo‐Dutch Republican Exchanges, c. 1650–1670’, in GabyMahlberg/DirkWiemann(eds.),EuropeanContextsforEnglishRepublicanism(Aldershot:Ashgate,2013),105‐120.
77
inhabitantsoftheirliberties,livelihoodsandlivesandenslavingthemall.Hisargumenthowever
entailednorejectionofmonarchyassuch,sincehisattackwasdirectedspecificallyatasystem
ofdespoticrulethathadonlyrecentlyemergedinEurope,aswesawinhisHetwelvarenderstad
Leyden. InInterestvanHollandDelaCourtevendeemedthemonarchyofLouisXIVandother
northern monarchies legitimate. He wrote against a hereditary kingly rule and office in the
handsoftheOrangedynasty.Heproposedaharmonyofinterestsbetweenrulersandruledthat
wouldupholdtheruleoflawandsocouldprotectthefreedomoftradeandofreligion.Buthow
didthevocabularyofinterestfunctioninthistreatise?OnwhatgroundsdidDelaCourtattack
the House of Orange? And how precisely did he perceive the relation between church and
government?Furthermore,inwhatwayshouldHollandfunctionwithintheDutchRepublicand
howshouldit,withouttheHouseofOrange,actintheEuropeansocietyofprinces;whatspecific
foreign policies should it follow?And, lastly, howdidDe la Court visualise ‘true freedom’ for
Holland?
3.3Reasonofstateand‘wardespotism’inInterestvanHolland
Interest of Holland consists of a long theoretical preface, in which De la Court’s critique of
certainprincelypracticesiselaborated,andforty‐sevenchapters.Firstheanalysestheinterest
of Holland, arguing that the foundations of Holland’s splendour are fishery, commerce and
manufacture(ChaptersI‐XII).Itshouldbeprotectedbythe‘FreedomofallReligions’,freedomof
immigration and trade, and above all by a reduction of taxation (XIII‐XVI). This splendour,
however,isthreatenedbyclosedtradecompanies,byrestrictionsonimmigrationandreligious
worship,byheavytaxesandespeciallythehighconvoyburdens(XVII‐XXI).Thefundamentsof
Holland’sinterestarecurrentlynotmaintainedandcertainlynotenhanced,aboveallduetothe
pursuitofwarfarebytheUnion(XXII‐XXV).TheanalysisofHolland’sinterestisfollowedupwith
aprofoundcritiqueofwarmongeringandrobbingprinces,explicitlycondemningtheprincesof
Orange as having robbedHolland of its liberties in their quest formilitary glory. De la Court
backs this critique by stressing the fortunes the ‘free government’ (government freed from
Orange)hadproducedbyprotectingthelibertiesofHolland’sinhabitants(XXVI‐XXI).Afterthat,
he offers his counsel on foreign policy andmilitary affairs. Since externalmilitary invasion is
very unlikely, the costly land forces are to be reduced. Military protection at sea, from a
commercialviewpoint,isvital.Hewarnsofalliances(defensiveandoffensive)withotherrulers,
since they contain a risk of being dragged into expensive and extremely destructive warfare
(XXXII‐XXXVIII). De la Court includes the other Dutch provinces in his anti‐alliances view.
HollandhasnoneedfortheUnionofUtrechtsinceHollandisinvinciblewithitsfortifiedcities
78
andwillnolongerbeforcedintoawarduetothedynasticambitionsandrelationsoftheHouse
ofOrange,orbedividedbyinternalriftsbytheschemingofOrange(XXXIX‐XLIV).Heendswith
threeconcludingchaptersclaiming thatHolland’s interest isbestpromoted through ‘freedom,
protectionoftheseaandpeace’.322ThroughouttheentirecontentsofInterestvanHollandDela
CourtidentifiesandunderlinesthegreatestdangertoHolland’ssplendourandinhabitants:the
HouseofOrange.
His anti‐Orangism in Interest van Holland can be divided into three parts conveyed
throughtheterminologyof‘interest’.Firstly,DelaCourtrepresentedtheprovinceofHollandas
a single political and societal entity, with its own ‘interest’. In this way, he could present
‘Holland’ as a strong opponent of the House of Orange, and to a lesser extent of the other
provinces, within the United Provinces. For his attack on the House of Orange, De la Court
neededaproperprotagonist,ratherthansomeindividualregents.Likewise,onaEuropeanlevel
hepresented‘Holland’asaforcetobereckonedwith,withouttheneedforaprinceofOrange
leadingtroopsintobattle.Secondly,theauthorprovidedacritiqueofthenatureofmonarchical
rule,whichfunctionedasatheoreticalframeworkforhisrejectionofthestadholderate.Thirdly,
he analysed the interest ofHolland in relation to the three ‘super powers’: Spain, France and
England.HeconcludedthattheonlyconsiderableexternalthreattoHollandwasStuart‐England,
duetoitsdynasticconnectionswiththeHouseofOrange.
3.3.1‘Holland’unifiedinan‘interest’
Inthefirstchapter,DelaCourtquitesurprisinglywrotethatbecauseHollandwas‘notoneland,
it cannot have one Interest.’323 According to the author, historically the province of Holland
consisted of multiple republics, by which he meant the cities, poleis. In line with Grotius’
argumentaboutHolland’sancientconstitution,Holland’sheadofstatewasinitiallyacountand
thisofficewaslaterfilledbyastadholder,whowastobecontentedwithhisowndomains,and
asanadministratorshouldacceptthefactthateveryareaandcityoughttoberuledaccordingto
itsownhistoricallyestablishedlawsandcustoms.Itwasimmediatelycleartothereaderthatthe
stadholder, however, had overstretched these legal limitations to his rule as the Spanish‐
HabsburgsCountshaddonebeforehim.Strategically,DelaCourtexcusedhimselfforhislimited
knowledge of all themultiple political bodies,whichwith ‘diversity ofRulers, Subjects, lands,
andsituationcausednecessarilyadiversityofinterests’.324Soforthesakeofargumenthewould
goon todiscuss all the specific interests of the different cities and areasunderone title: ‘the 322V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,265.323V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,1.324V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,2.
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interest of Holland’.325 Viewing Holland as consisting of multiple republics was far from
innovative,buthis interestconceptionofHollandwasarecent instrumentinDutchdebatesof
the1650sand1660s,whichDelaCourtpresentedindetailedanalysis.Notcivicvirtues,butthe
interestofHollandformedthecrucialanalyticalapparatusforassertingtheprovince’ssupreme
power.
Based on a geographical, demographic and historical analysis of Holland, De la Court
arguedthatthefoundationsofHolland’ssplendourarefishery,commerceandmanufacture,as
well as extremely powerful and densely populated cities. From official documents, often
appended to current affairs literature such as Aitzema’s326, he took various figures about
Holland’s population, economic activities and situation, such as fertile morgens of land
(400,000),yearlyincome(11millionguilders),volumeofsaltedfishorherringcaughtandsold
(300,000 ‘lasten’), and men in whale trade traveling to the North (12,0000).327 De la Court
calculated the population of Holland, employment and profit rates in various sectors and
concludedthatHollanddependedonfishery,commerceandmanufacture(agriculturealonewas
insufficienttosustainitspopulation).Fisherystimulatedcommerceandtogethertheypromoted
manufacture, such as the fabrication of fishing nets, ships, salt, silk, flax, wool, which bound
together the inhabitants of Holland. Furthermore, he explained in detail the historical rise of
Hollandasthemostmercantilepolityoftheworld.328HedefinedtheinterestofHollandas‘the
conservationandexpansionoftheinhabitantsoftheLand,consistingofregentsandsubjects’.329
Therichtextilemerchantdescribedthissplendourindemographicaswellaseconomicterms,
indeed,stressingacommercialinterestforHolland.Thissplendour,however,wasthreatenedby
closedtradecompanies,byrestrictionsonimmigrationandreligion,byheavytaxes,butabove
all,bywarmongeringprinces,accordingtoDelaCourt.
3.3.2The‘interest’of‘wardespotism’
ThesecondpartofDelaCourt’sattackontheHouseofOrangewasafiercecritiqueofcertain
coercive princely practices, i.e. his variation on attacks of ‘war despotism’. This critique
functionedasatheoreticalframeworkforhisrejectionoftheStadholderateandtheoccupancy
of thehighestmilitaryofficebyaprinceofOrange. Inhispreface,heprovidedamoregeneral
argumentagainstbellicosepoliciesofmonarchiesdrivenbyself‐interest.Thereaderwasoffered
adetailedreasoningtoshowthatHollandwasbetteroffwithoutaprinceofOrangeincharge.De 325V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,2.326V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,6,65.327V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,5,6,10.328V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,[Chapters2–12],2‐56.329V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.
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La Court described the interests ofmonarchies and republics or as he called the latter: ‘free
governments’.330Interestmeantthewellbeingoftherulersandsubjectscombined.Heassumed
that allmen always preferred self‐interest in all societies. Therefore he believed that a good
governmentdemandedthattherulersandtheruledhadthesameinterests;
‘While any country’s true interest consists of the welfare of the Rulers and Subjects
combined, and that in turn it evidently depends on a good government, somustmen
knowthatagoodgovernmentisnotwherethewellorill‐beingofthesubjectsdepends
onthevirtueorvicesoftherulers;but(whichisworthyofobservation)wherethewell
or ill‐being of the Rulers necessarily follows or depends on thewell or ill‐being of the
Subjects.’331
To follow the interest of state ought to be the object of government, as Rohan had
argued, but for the Dutch textile merchant this explicitly meant the conservation and the
numerical expansion of the inhabitants ofHolland rather than the ruler’s standing. Following
recently articulated conceptions of human nature, De la Court regarded self‐interest as an
effectivemechanismforconstitutinggovernment,sinceherejectedRohan’sclear‐cutopposition
betweenerraticpassionsandguidingreason.332Therefore,DelaCourtarguedforharmonising
these interests of the rulers and ruled. Moreover, he reconstructed the Ciceronian notion of
reconcilingtheself‐interestsofcitizenswiththegeneralinterest,notbystressingtheprimacyof
thegeneral interest,buttakingprivateinterestsorself‐loveasthefocalpointtoprocuregood
government.
The harmony of interest argument, already present in the writings of Boxhorn and
several English contemporaries, functioned primarily as a counter to the core Orangist
argument. In theOrangistpamphlets threeexplicit taskswereemphasised for the stadholder.
The first and most importantwas maintaining unity within the United Provinces; secondly,
representingthemajestasofthestate;thirdly,supportingeffectivegovernmentbyspeedingup
theexecutionofgovernmentaldecision‐making.Thestrongestcounterargumentofanti‐Orangist
pamphletswasthattheprinceisdrivenbyself‐interest.Bymeansofacomparableperspective
ofcommoninterestversusself‐interest,thestadholderlessregimeisjustifiedandpresentedas
necessary in thesepamphlets.333 InDe laCourt’s case,under theruleofone, theprince’s self‐
interest prevails over the self‐interests of his subjects,making aharmonisingof interests and
therefore good government impossible. In this way, he radicalised Boxhorn’s argument in 330V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.331V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.332Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,39;Seepage48ofthisthesisforfurtherexplanation.333Klashort,‘Mettendeschijnvanmonarchiegetempert’,111‐112.
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categoricallyrejectingthestadholderateorthecommandoverthearmyfortheprinceofOrange
withintheDutchconstitutionalframework.
Anti‐Orangistargumentsalsoexpressedthefearthatthepre‐eminenceofthestadholder
would result in a monarchy; one way of making this point was to compare the office of
stadholder andmonarch, treating them as essentially the same. For De la Court the effective
collapseoftheseofficesintoonewasameanstoaccentuatethedifferencebetweenamonarchy
and a republic in the starkest of terms. Thewell‐being of the people differed greatly in these
forms of government. More importantly, the language of interest allowed him to frame his
criticism of monarchical rule reflecting commentaries of ‘war despotism’. De la Court
delegitimiseditbylistingthespecificmechanismsofaprincelysystemofgovernmentthathad
deleterious effects on its subjects. According to De la Court, the first and true interest of all
sovereignswastobuilduptheir lands,empireorcitiestosuchapowerfulposition,thatthese
were protected against external violence. He contended that monarchs, lords and ‘heads,’ by
their evil upbringing and living in splendour, followed their own lusts and handed over the
government to favourites and courtiers,whowould neglect this first interest. The interest of
monarchs, and their favourites and courtofficials,was tomaintain thepowerlessnessof their
subjects. He defined the interest of church officials, courtiers and soldiers as follows: ‘by
corruptionofgovernment,enrichingtheirselves,orseekinggreatness,elevatingthemonarchic
governmenttoheavenfortheirownprofit’.334Subjectsofamonarchweredeliberatelydeprived
ofknowledgeand judgmentby these ‘leechesof the state’.335 In contrast, the interestand ‘the
seconddutyofallRulersofRepublics andgreatCities’was to build and tomaintain large and
denselypopulatedcities,inorderthatallgovernors,magistratesandinhabitantswouldseetheir
profitsrising.DelaCourtreferstoexistingandearlierEuropeanrepublics,whereart,commerce
andthepopulationflourishedextremely.WithregardtotheinterestofHolland,hewritesthat:
'thepeople of theprovinceofHolland couldn't encounter a greater evil than tobe ruledby a
monarch,princeorhead.'336
De la Court promised the reader that he would conclude his preface with
counterarguments against the commonly accepted view that a monarchy is the best form of
government.337Actually,heaimedat rejecting thenotionof thenecessityof thestadholderate
for the province ofHolland, by explicitly questioning it.De la Court dismissed the idea of the
blunt, factional and bad‐tempered nature of Holland’s men, which was often used as an
argument for the necessity of an ‘eminent head’ backed by the rule of the Counts of Holland
(KingPhilipIIofSpainbeingthelastofficeholder)andtheirsuccessorstheOrange‐stadholders
334V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.335V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.336V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.337V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.
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ashistoricalproof.De laCourtreversed thisargument.SinceHollandersdependedon fishery,
manufactureandcommerce, theywerepeaceful.Only intimesofcoercionandsuppressionby
aneminentheadwouldtheyriseup,andhereferredtotheperiodoftheCountsaspredecessors
of the stadholders: ‘The times of the previous Counts were very horrifying times […] with
permanent abhorrent wars, revolts and atrocities caused by and solely to the benefit of the
eminent Head’.338 He continued this fictive debate by stating that one could argue that times
have changed over the last century and so could ask himself if under the Orange‐
stadholders/captain‐generals times were much happier than under the Counts. De la Court
achnowledgedthetransformationofHollandbyclaimingthathundredyearsagointheperiodof
theCountsHollandlargelydependedonagricultureanditscitiesweremilitarilypowerful,while
theCountshadnogreatsoldiers,fortifiedcitiesandfinances,andcouldonlyrelyonconsentfor
troopsandmoney.However,DelaCourtcynicallyfollowedthisupbystating
‘thatHollandnowadaysdependsoncommerce,andthataneminentHead,Captain
General, or Stadholder, here would have a bodyguard in the Hague, place of
Summons, as well as the favour of a heavily financed army, of all Priests, and
throughthem,thefavourofallcommoninhabitants.Andthathe,moreover,bythe
DeputiesoftheGeneralities,coulddisposeashepleasesofthoseinvinciblefrontier‐
cities of non electing Lands [Generality Lands under direct control of the States
General,MBK],providedthathewouldenforcehispowerbynoforeignAlliances.
In thiswayhe could inpassingoverpowermostofHolland’scities,whichnow lie
open, and therefor one could truly say: that theHollanders, by choosing such an
eminentHead,wouldberuledas ignorant lambsbyan irresistible [absolute,MBK]
Sovereign.’339
With military and clerical support, the princes of Orange could easily conquer and coerce
Holland’scities.Heendswith theclaimthat ‘agenerationofpeople in freedommuststruggle,
beforemencanjudgerightfully;inthiswaymenmustgivethesametoGodandtime,thereafter,
if these slavishadversaries [Orange supporters,MBK]will be survived, to pass judgementpro
and con.’340 Freedom in this sense is simply defined as government without an Orange‐
stadholder and captain general and stands in strict opposition with servitude. The stark
distinction he has drawn betweenmonarchies and republics, is used above all to isolate the
HouseofOrangeasalien toHolland’s interest.Rather thansystematically rejectingmonarchy,
De la Court attacked the rule of the princes of Orange as necessarily enslaving peace‐loving 338V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.339V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.340V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.
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Hollanders through military ambitions aided and abetted by religious indoctrination. It is a
clear‐cutexampleofwhatMarieConstanthascalled‘wardespotism’.
An important part of De la Court’s critique of the House of Orangewas stressing the
dangerof thecombinedofficesof captaingeneralandstadholderbeingheldby theprincesof
Orange. Opponents of Interest van Holland condemned him for this: ‘under the pretence of
politicaldiscourses,[DelaCourt]stirsupthestateagainsttheprinceofOrangesothattheywill
notmake him captain general’.341 De la Court regarded the offices of stadholder and captain
generalasincompatible,onthebasisofatheoreticalframeworkreiteratingGermanandFrench
critiques of ‘war despotism’.He stated that even an ‘eminent head’would always strive for a
situationof continuouswarfarewithhimselfassupremecommanderof thearmy.De laCourt
elucidatedthisstatementinchapter26,entitled:‘Todisintegrateintoamonarchyofone‐headed
government would mean an irreversible death.’ First of all, De la Court sardonically wrote:
‘Giventhatkingsandcaptaingeneralsaresounnecessaryintimesofpeaceandthattheirvirtue
isonlyobviousintimesofwar,sotheyforevercausestrifethroughouttheworld.’342Secondly,
De laCourtarguedthatwhenagreat lordpossessedanarmy,everyone’spropertieswouldbe
endangeredevenwhenhisofficewasconstitutionallyrestrained.Togetherwiththesoldiers‘the
ignorantpeoplewill choose thesideof agentle,politeandcourageous tyrant.’343Theregents,
includingthewisestandmosthonestamongstthem,wouldeventuallyhavetoacceptviolation
oftheseconstitutionalrestraintsandeventuallyacceptsubjection.
Followingthisargument,DelaCourtstatedthatthroughhiscourtandhisarmy,aruler
wouldputa financialstrainonallhissubjects,butespeciallyon itsprosperousmerchants.He
made it clear that by ruler, hemeant allmonarchs, princes, dukes, counts, earls, but also and
moreimportantly, ‘stadholdersandcaptaingenerals’.Theirloveformoneywasbasedontheir
love for luxuriesandwarfare.344Ashehadalreadysaid,warfarewasanecessarymeans fora
monarchtoremainfirmlyonhisthrone.Interestingly,DelaCourtunderlinesthegraveneedfor
moneyofthesewar‐drivenregimes:
‘Rulers, their favourites, and soldiers, as being evilhouseholders, continually seek
money;at leasttoenrichthemselves,atmosttospendittoabundanceandcrazy
warsandnowherecould they find thatmoreeasily, thanwith themerchants,who
havemanymoveable goods, and are not part of government, these [goods/cash
moneyMBK]are generallydemanded tobe loaned, orby refusal takenby force,
341CitedfromHarms,Deuitvindingvandepubliekeopinie,155.342V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,70–71.343V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,71.344V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,71‐72.
84
andinbothcasesthemerchanthascertainlylosthisproperty.’345
Moreover,France,Spain,England,Denmark,SwedenandPolandalsoplunderthemerchantsat
seabytheirexcessivetollsandtheirfleets,
‘without protecting seaborne affairs, because the respective Rulers will not
command the Fleets themselves, and thusmust trust it to others;which neither
they,northeirfavourites,couldbecommittedto,exceptthatallcrewandwarfare
atseamustbepaidwithcash;andalsobecausethefavouriteswouldratherplunder
thetreasuriesofmonarchstoenrichthemselves,thantousethisforthegreatergood
ofthecountry.’346
Inchapters29and30attributedtoDeWitt,theGrandPensionarymakesacasefor,respectively,
‘why the inhabitants of Holland, by the government of the princes of Orange, are no longer
ruinedby[theterminationof]thegovernmentoftheprincesofOrange,’and‘whatgoodfruitthe
principlesofa freegovernmenthavealreadyyielded’.DeWittpresentsrecenthistoricalcases
thatdemonstrate thewar‐despotic practices of the House of Orange. He states that the First
Anglo‐DutchWarandthewarsintheBalticregion,whichallhappenedduringhisregime,were
theconsequencesofthedynasticrelationsoftheHouseofOrangewiththeEnglishkingCharles
IIandtheElectorofBrandenburgFredricWilhelm.ThelatterwasmarriedtoLouiseHenriettaof
Nassau,daughterofFrederikHendrikofOrange.AfterthedeathofthestadholderWilliamII,De
WitthadpetitionedtheEnglishCommonwealthforrenewalofthe1459‐TreatyofEntrecoursto
protectDutchcommerceandfisheryagainstthedamagingActofNavigation.Healsoaskedthe
RumpParliament fora friendship treaty.Butaccording toDeWitt, thiswasblockedby ‘those
whoattachedthemselvesasslavestothehouseofOrange’andtheyinstigatedthe‘dumbrabble’
againsttheambassadors.
Inchapter30DeWittgivesafewexamplesofthestadholders,drivenbyself‐interestand
passions and applying a divide‐and‐conquer policy in order to enhance their authority in the
face of Orangist arguments about the necessity of the stadholder. The princes of Orange
intervenedmilitarilyininternalconflictsnotwiththeinterestofHollandinmind,butpurelyon
thebasisofself‐interest,producingchaos,civildisorderandbloodshedtosubjecttheDutchto
their despotic rule. He states that ‘the greatest rupture happened recently in the United
Netherlands,[with]thesaddivisionoftheProvinceofOverijssel’in1654.Thestadholderofthe
northern provinces (Friesland, Groningen and Drenthe)William Frederick, Prince of Nassau‐
345V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,71‐72.346V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,72.
85
Dietz and related to theHouseofOrange, had accepted theoffices of stadholder and captain‐
general, offered to him by only a part of the provincial States of Overijssel. It led to extreme
violencethat lasted fouryears.Luckily, the interventionof ‘theGrandPensionary’broughtthe
conflicttoanend,ashepraiseshisownactions.WorthyofobservationisDeWitt’sreferenceto
theendingof internalconflicts inHolland,whichwere inhisopinioncausedbytheprincesof
Orange;
‘all issues and disputes,which since the death of the late Prince of Orange have
erupted in greatnumbers everywheremostly by stirringup thedesire for slavery,
havebeensoothedandstoppedwithmuchbetterorderandeffectthan inthepast;
(…) whereas (…) the Stadholder often caused disputes, [and] always cherished
[disputes],inordertofurtherhisinterestandresources;(…)itbeingthemaximof
allGrandees,divide&impera,divideandproduceruptures,sothywillrule’.347
Moreover,DeWittaddsif theyoungprincehadhadthechancetostageacoupd’état in1650,
‘whocoulddoubt, that the lust for revengewouldhave shivered theentireState [ofHolland],
andgreatquantitiesofChristianbloodwouldhavebeensacrificedforthatpassion.’348
BesidescounteringOrangistarguments,DeWittalsoaimstojustifytheheavytaxburden
ofhisregime.This,heargued,wasalegacyoftheruleoftheOrange‐princes,withtheirdynastic
ambitionsandlustforglory.Again,weencounterattacksonwar‐despoticpracticesofprinces.
TheFrenchpiracyonDutchcommercialenterprisesintheLevantduringtheyearsof1650‐51
had cost tonsof gold.Nearly the entire treasury ofHollandwas spent on the ambitionof the
captaingeneral toraise large land forces,amongstother things.Theresourcesweresqueezed
from the Holland inhabitants uncompromisingly. As DeWitt writes so powerfully: ‘accepting
thatthesweatandbloodofthegoodinhabitantsofthesameProvinceweresqueezed.’349Under
the pretext of peace with Spain parts of the fleet had been sold and the remaining fleet put
towardsfightingtheRumpParliamentofEnglandbythecaptain‐general,toserveOrangefamily
interestswith the Stuart kings. To conclude the Grand Pensionary disqualifies the stadholder
WilliamIIasonewho isnot interested inhispolitical responsibilities.Hedescribesmonarchs
suchasWilliamasmostlyspendingtheirtimein‘hunting,bowling,dancingandotherinfamous
debaucheries’.350TheresultwasamassivetaxburdenforHollandamountingtothirteenmillion
guildersinrunningdebtandfortymillionininterest.
347V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,127‐128.348V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,129.349V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,100.350V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,101‐102.
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The stadholders andhis flatterers financed large land forces, garrisons and citadels in
ordertothreatenandeventuallysubjectHolland.DeWittwrites:
‘And firstly, what concerns the aforesaid negotiated hundred and forty million
guilderswiththerunningdebts,isitwellknown,andalsoeasytounderstand,that
the same burden by the Captain General and his flatterers, strangles the good
Regents, because the aforementioned Capital has been wasted in the pursuit of
ambitionandglorybythissaidCaptainGeneral,inordertosetuplargearmies,and
surprisesieges,whicharestill today,assaidbefore,aheavyburden forHolland;
and the thing to complain about the most was that when the abovementioned
FrontiercitieswereplacedatthedispositionoftheCaptainGeneral,withregardto
theappointmentoftheGovernors,orCommanders,andtheplacementofgarrisons
inthesame[cities,MBK],whenineveryrespect,thisonlyservedtocreatesomany
citadels,inordertomaintainHollandinshackles.’351
DeWittwritesabout‘usignorantpoorHollanders,whomayrightlybecalledstupidHollanders’.
Hemakesacomparisontoorphanedchildrenwhoareunawareoftheburdenstheycarryand
havecarriedfortheoutrageousexpendituresoftheHouseofOrange,andevencryoutforthe
experienceofwealthundertheirpreviousguardian.Heaskshimself:
‘howlongshallweremaininourinfancy,inoursillyyouth,withoutnoticingthatthe
splendour,thatweexperiencedthen,onlycameforthfromtheevilprofligacyofthat
overspendingguardian,whonegotiatedthatCapitalofhundredandfortymillionas
our burden? After all, we should understand, that we firstmust be valued and
trimmed, to yieldandpay the interests of thatCapital: from taxation only by our
presentwardens,otherwisetheentirehouseholdwouldfalldown.’352
DeWitt constantly referred toHolland’s subjects underOrange as slaves or children, as legal
possessionorminorsunderamasterorpatriarch.Notethathedefinedthestadholderlessrule
asthatofawarden,ofamereadministratorofthehousehold.
InterestvanHolland is filledwithreferences toslaveryunderOrange,with theRoman
Law status of a slave, i.e. alieni iuris or being under the control and jurisdiction of another
person, in contrast to the status of a free‐men sui iuris, with the power over one’s will and
actions.DelaCourtequatedthehighpolitico‐militaryofficesoftheprincesofOrangewiththe
351V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,96‐97.352V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,99.
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monarchicalformofgovernment,definingthelattersimplyasaone‐headedrule.Hisargument
wasthattheinterestofallrulerswastocoercetheirsubjectsintopowerlessness,inorderthat
theywould bear thewar related burdenswillingly as slaves. The combined offices of captain
generalandstadholderhadproven tobe thegreatestdanger to theprivileges,propertiesand
livesofHolland’s inhabitants.TheHouseofOrangehadrapaciously taxed,stolenandextorted
money.Butwhattheyamassedwasalwaysinadequateandsotherewereeverincreasingdebts.
Orangist rule in thepasthadbeena system inwhichcourtiers, flatterers, soldiersandpriests
hadplayedtheirdestructiveparts;andthestadholdersnowhadtocopewiththedisasterthat
hadresulted.DelaCourt’spersonalprofitwasmadethroughcommerce,which,heheld,could
providetheonlyjustificationforwarfare.Theintensityofthediatribewaspartlydrivenbyhis
own desire for office and partly by his knowledge that Orangist fortunes were reviving. He
wishedtocometotheaidofanendangeredshipofstateandtoalertwideropiniontothecrisis
ofrulethatmightevenseethere‐instatementofadynastyofOrangeprinces.
3.3.3The‘interest’ofHollandinEurope
ThethirdpartofDe laCourt’santi‐Orangismwasbasedonan interestanalysisof ‘Holland’ in
relationtootherEuropeanrulers.Inchapter17oftheInterestvanHollandDelaCourtexplains
that it is not his intention to analyse the interest of Holland in relation to the neighbouring
countries for that ‘will entail an endless knowledge and very great labour to develop and to
devoteto,whichIfindmyselfineveryrespectincapableof.’353Thisstatementmustbeseenas
an excuse, for he does try to sketch an interest analysis of Holland on a European level. In
general, he discussed the desirability of forming alliances with neighbouring rulers, and in a
moredetailedmannerheanalysedtheconsequencesofformingpactswithwhatheregardedas
the greatest contemporary powers of Europe: ‘France’, ‘Spain’ and ‘England’.354 De la Court
arguedthatnoalliances(defensiveandoffensive)shouldbeformedwithanyEuropeanruler,to
avoid theriskofbeingdragged intoexpensiveandextremelydestructivewarfare.De laCourt
considerspeacepactsacceptable,fortheycontainamutualpromisenottoharmeachother.But
again,heemphasizesthedisloyaltyofprinces,whowouldonlyusepeacepactstoplayfortime
beforerecommencingwar.DelaCourtexplains:‘becauseKingsfeelnevercommittedtoanyone,
only to theirowngreatness and lusts,which they try toacquire [always]’.355Hestated thatby
their nature, men pursue the improvement of their own position without regard for oaths,
written pacts and seals. This Machiavellian maxim would not have shocked many readers 353V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,145‐146.354V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,145‐146.355V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland151.
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familiarwithreasonofstateliterature.356Rathercynically,heconcluded:‘theState[has]neither
bloodnorreligion’,so‘trustnot,thenyouwon’tbedeceived.’357
ToprotecttheinterestofHollandi.e.,itsfishery,manufactureandcommerce,peacewith
other European rulers should be pursued at all times, and at almost any price.358 Military
protectionof thesea, fromacommercialstandpoint,wasveryremote.Land forcesweretobe
reducedtoanecessary,butsmallernumber,forthecostsaretoohighandthepossibilityofan
externalmilitaryinvasionwasveryunlikely.DelaCourtincludedtheotherDutchprovincesin
hisvision.ThedefensiveUnionofUtrechthadprovedtobehighlyunprofitablefortheprovince
of Holland, it paid the largest part of the Union’s finances and received hardly any support,
especially from the land provinceswhen Holland’s interest was threatened.359 Holland under
(what he calls) the ‘Free Government’ can easily dealwith external threats given its fortified
cities, andwill no longer be forced into awar by the dynastic ambitions and relations of the
House of Orange. Internal conflicts cannot occur, because the princes of Orange with their
combinedofficesofstadholderandcaptaingeneralwillnolongerplaytheroleof instigator in
internalaffairs.
Since the monarchies of Spain, France and England maintained a constant state of
armament,theydidnotfearHolland.AsRohanhadalsostressed,aconstantstateofarmament
was a primal feature of the interest of every monarchy that wanted to thrive in European
warfare.However,DelaCourtbelievedthatHollandshouldnotfearthem.Hollandcouldpursue
its true interest in relation to the French monarchy, for France depended largely on the
commercewithHolland.WithregardtoHolland’sinterestintheSpanishmonarchy,DelaCourt
triedtodemonstratewhyawaragainstSpain,muchdesiredbytheOrangist faction,wouldbe
mutuallydamaging.So inthe interestofHolland,noallianceshadtobemadewiththeFrench
andtheSpanishmonarchy.360
De la Court considered England to be the greatest threat to Holland. He warned the
reader: ‘Such an England now with Scotland, with extensivemanufacture and shipping and
greatlyaugmentedinpowerwillbeformidablethroughoutEurope,especiallyasunlikeFrance
and Spain it is not ruled by favourites but by a king able to exert much force against his
neighbours.’361However,justlikeSpainandFrance,EnglanddependedontheDutchtrade,soit
would be reckless to declare war against Holland. Furthermore, the Dutch naval force could
considerably damage the English fleet. Secondly, the treasury of Charles II could not support
such warfare, and the Parliament would not easily grant him the necessary finances.
356NoelMalcolm,ReasonofState,Propaganda,andtheThirtyYears'War,51357V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,151.358V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,151.359V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,145‐159.360V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,60‐164,164‐167361V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,170.
89
Nonetheless, De la Court concludes that although Holland could significantly harm England,
EnglandcouldentirelyruinHolland.SothegovernmentofHollandshouldusesoftandfriendly
wordsintheircommunicationwithCharlesII.Cynically,DelaCourtaddsthatHollandshouldlay
inwait,becauseitis,accordingtoDelaCourt,onlyamatteroftimebeforethenewlyrestored
Englishmonarchywilldegenerateduetothecorruptionoftheking’sfavourites,andpassions,or
otherwiseduetointernalconflictandcivilwar.362
InPieter’sanalysisoftheEnglishthreat,thedynasticrelationsbetweenKingCharlesII
andhiscousintheyoungPrinceofOrange,aretreatedasanevengreaterdanger.
‘Andaboveall,considerthatwe,topreventawarwithEngland,mustnotletourselvesbe
pushedintochangingtheState‐wiseGovernment[ofprovincialsovereignty,MBK]intoa
Monarchy, because Leo vinciri liber pernegat. The free lionmust not be bound, is the
motto Holland endeavours to live by. And if we,with a freeGovernment, were to find
ourselves compelled to meet the king in his wishes, (…) he would for his own self,
desiring absolute Sovereignty, make us themostwretched nationwhich could ever be
governedbyaMonarch.’363
Interestingly, De la Court judged the French monarchy and other northern European
monarchiesaswellgovernedbyexcellentrulers,underfreedomaccordingtothenatureofthe
peoples.WehaveseenthatinhisprefaceDelaCourtgavecounterargumentsagainstthe,byhim
asserted,commonbeliefthatasingleruleshouldbepreferredtoarepublicangovernment,but
actuallyhewasconcernedonlywithdiscreditingthenotionthatastadholderwasnecessaryfor
Holland.Butheprovidedno systematic rejectionofmonarchy.Hequestioned theAristotelian
ideathatbytheirnaturesomepeoplemustberuledbyamonarch,i.e.‘thepeoplesofAsiaand
Africa,aswellasallEuropeanpeoplessituatedtowardtheSouth’.364Sincedefendersofthisidea
hadalsotoconfessthat‘thepeoplessituatedmoretotheNorth,weremoreadequatelygoverned
by an excellentHead and enjoyedmore freedom, likewise from France onwards to theNorth
luckily all absoluteMonarchicalGovernments ceased to exist’.365 By this argument De la Court
intendedtodiscreditthenotionof thenecessityofanOrange‐stadholderateandnottostatea
casefor‘republicanism’,assuch.Remainingspecific,hewentontorejecttheOrangist‐argument
that the allegedly factious nature of the people of Holland necessitated the rule of ‘a very
excellent Head’. i.e. an Orange‐stadholderate. To the contrary, De la Court argued that the
factiousnaturewasthehistoricallycontingentresultofthehorrifyingruleofthestadholdersof
362V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,168‐179.363V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,176‐177.364V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.365V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reeden.
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Orangeandtheirpredecessors,theCountsofHolland.
Thisargument,whichaccepts,theexistenceofwellgovernedmonarchiesandexcellent
monarchs is striking, for he claimed that ‘freedom’ could be pursued by subjects within a
monarchy; for therewasanessentialdifference inaccountabilitybetweensouthern ‘absolute’,
illegitimateandnorthernlegitimatemonarchicalgovernments.Remarkably,aswehaveseenin
Het Welvaaren van Leiden, De la Court had stressed recent developments of European
monarchies, including France, Sweden and German princes, into barbaric and despotic
governments,whichisabsentfromInterestvanHolland.WhydidPieterleavethisargumentout
ofInterestvanHolland?PerhapsJohandeWittregardeditastoodiplomaticallysensitivetobe
associatedwithsuchopenlyhostilecritiquesofneighbouringregimes,especially inviewofDe
Witt’s carefully defensive policy towards France; or perhaps it was the hands of his brother
JohandelaCourtintherespectivetreatises.ThePoliticalBalanceevendevotedalargesectionto
the Turkish system of rule as ‘the bestmonarchical government’, although this praise is best
seenasanironiccritiqueofadespoticsystemofrule.366Inanycase,DelaCourtacknowledged
differences in the systems of government ruled by one person, but above all underlined the
illegitimacy of bellicose despotic regimes. First and foremost, De la Court wrote Interest van
HollandwiththeconstitutionalspecificsoftheDutchRepublic inmind;hewantedtodiminish
theOrange‐threatandtojustifythestadholderlessregime,nottodefendthemoralsuperiorityof
republicsoverprincipalities.
3.3.4Freedomoftrade,religionandgovernment
AccordingtoDelaCourttherewerethreepoliciesnecessarytosustainHolland’s ‘trueliberty’.
Firstly, the government had to improve commerce and reduce the land army, redeploying
resourcestostrengthenthefleet.Secondlyitshouldguaranteeabsolutefreedomofconscience
and private worship in order to stimulate the economy and temper the dangerous political
influence of the clergy. The common people were blinded and stirred up by the preachers
againsttheirlawfulgovernment.Moreover,inlightoftheirpower‐hungryambitions,heclaimed
thattheReformedChurchclergy,alliedwiththeHouseofOrange,desiredtooverthrowthe‘free
government’ofHolland.Thirdlyandmost importantly,allmeansmustbeused toexclude the
stadholderandtoprotecttheprivileges,propertyandpersonsundertheruleoflaw.
366V.D.H.,ConsideratienvanStaat,oftePolitykeWeeg‐schaal(Amsterdam,1662),[Book2]172‐229.ThissectionwasfollowedbyBook3 onmonarchical government inEurope, in particular in France, explaining its highpotential todisintegrateintoaTurkishhouseholdrule,whichhadlongbeenobscuredbyfactionalconflictsatcourtsanddynasticfragility.
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De laCourtdevotedvarious chapters to restrictions, imposedbyDutch regents,which
harmedthepillarsoftheinterestvanHolland:closedtradecompaniesandguilds(chapterXV),
high taxation (XVI), restriction of freedom of conscience (XVII), constraints on freedom of
fisheryandtradebythemonopoliesofthetradecompanies(XVIII),freedomofmanufactureby
restrictionsoncitizenshipandmembershipofguilds(XIX).Inviewofhisownsocialaspiration,
his critique of Holland’s regents who imposed limitations on citizenship to protect their
monopolyofpower,standsout.
However, given the present focus on De la Court’s argument against destructive war
policiesofmonarchswewillexaminehiscritiqueoftaxation.Thiswasmainlydirectedagainst
regents within Holland and other Dutch provinces who advocated military expenditures of
Hollandto theUnion. Inchapter12heexclaims: ‘against these fundaments [fishery, tradeand
manufacture]many have erred’.367 Taxation has been unreasonably increased over the past
decades,so‘placingastraparoundtheneckthroughwhichallfoodshouldenterthebody’.368He
stresses that warfare maybe an excuse for raising and introducing taxes, as during the war
againstHabsburg‐Spain.ThentaxationonHolland’smercantileandmanufactureactivitieswas
legitimatedbythequintessentialreasonofstatemaxim,‘necessityhasnolaw’.369However,‘itis
nowagreat follytomaintainthis(hightaxation)whennecessityhasended’,whenpeacewith
Spain was concluded more than a decade ago.370 Because the land provinces of Groningen,
Overijssel,Friesland,GelderlandandUtrechthavealwaysproperlydefendedthemselvesagainst
externallandtroops,theyhavenotbeenpressuredheavilybyinternalrifts.DelaCourtwrites:
‘as such there is no pretext of reason, to believe that these provinces, by Holland’s money
provided with bastions, artillery, weapons, and ammunition‐buildings, now cannot protect
themselvesinfullpeace,withtheirownpowerandinhabitantsagainstanattackbytheirmuch
weakerneighbours.’371 Onthecontrary,thelandprovincesdonotwanttocontributetonaval
forces, obstructing the much‐needed defence for Holland’s seaborne trade. And thus, he
exclaims,nowthetimehascome
‘forHollandtomanageitsowninterest,tounburdenitselfofallexpensesonthose
Provinces, and to spend that amount on its own defence on land, but
predominantly at sea; because indeed, if thatmaximofotherProvinces, that the
seamust support itself, is true; (…) then (...)Hollandmustalwayscarry itsown
367V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,52.368V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,53369V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,54(LiterallyDutchoriginalexpression:‘necessitybreakslaw’)370V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,54.371V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,55
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burdens, and those of the other Provinces; and in peace‐time they should
converselyfattenthemselveswithHolland’smoneyinlazinessandexcess.’372
TodefendHolland’sreductionof land forces fromthe late1640sonwards,De laCourt
alsodirectshiscritiqueofcoercivewar‐taxpoliticsagainsttheotherprovincialStates.Notethat
forthesakeofargument,heconvenientlyleftouttheseabornemercantileprovinceofZeeland.
DelaCourtsetsupanargumentforHolland’sabsoluteauthoritytodecideovermilitarymatters
and foreignpolicy interventions.Ashesayssomewhat later in the text: ‘Hollandcanperfectly
maintain its own interest, [and] couldmake a State on its own here inEurope, without being
dependentonanyoneelse’.373
RemarkableinhisattackonthehouseofOrangeishisextremeanti‐clericalism.Priests
incite the common people in order to promote their own interests. He uncompromisingly
advocates guaranteed freedom of religion as a counter to their power and it will attract
immigrantsnolessthaneconomicliberties.374HeelaboratesthisinchapterXIItitled‘Amongst
the means to maintain this prosperous blessing of God, the first is the Freedom of all
Religions’.375 In this chapter he gradually intensifies his attack on Dutch orthodox Calvinist
ministers.FirsthewritesthattheReformedreligion‘couldnotmakeupbyfarahundredthpart
of the peoples’ of the entire world and consists merely of one twentieth of all Europeans.376
Moreover,hardlyhalfofHolland’sinhabitantsarereformed,andfollowingthecontrarymaxim
of maintaining just one strictly exclusive denomination, the other half would have to be
banished. Secondly, and more aggressively, he compares the Calvinist orthodox clerics and
regents in the Dutch Republic to the Catholic Church and the Spanish Crown. Rome and the
Spanish kings drove out adherents of other faiths and supported Catholic believers during
uprisingsinotherpolities.Thechasingawayoftenant‐farmers,farmersandnoblesisnotonly
damaging, but cruel andunreasonable. This applies likewise for the regents and clergy of the
ReformedChurch:
‘who always assert that they have fought for the freedom; that in one country
variouspublicReligionscanbepractisedpeacefully;(…)andthatthere[couldbe]no
biggersignofafalseReligion,(…),thantoprosecutedissenters:Andthatbystrict
meansofeducationthepeoplearemadeaverse,andobstinateintheirownReligion.
PersecutioestsemenEcclesiae:persecutionisalwaystheseedofthechurchthatis
prosecuted;butafterbeingpersecutedbecauseofreligionthecompliantattitude 372V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,55‐56.373V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,188.374V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,35.375V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,35.376V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,36.
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of thepeoplegenerallychange intopowerandviolence,whentheyhavebecome
masterthemselves[overthereligiousaffairswithinapolity,MBK].’377
DelaCourtarguesexplicitlyagainsttheVoetianpositionofenforcingfurtherorthodoxreformof
manners in society and of establishing one exclusive public church. He ties these hard‐line
arguments to the previous persecution of Protestants by Rome and the Spanish overlords in
Holland, suggesting their tyrannicalbeliefsandactionsandexplicitly calling ita false religion.
Cynically, he reasons that intolerant orthodoxy usually springs from suffering persecution as
cruelty and violence could only bring forth the same rotten fruits. He ends this chapter
condemning the clergy: ‘Nothing pressures them, and they are free from inconveniences that
plague other persons; to such an extent they [are] obsessedwith arrogance, and violence. As
covered with a garment.’ 378 Here he refers to Psalm 73, echoing the jealousy towards the
advantagesandwealthofthesenon‐believers. NotonlydoesheequatetheorthodoxCalvinist
clericswithnon‐Christians,healsocallsthemconceited,power‐hungryandviolentbarbarians.
Inoneofhisletters,PieterhadevenwrittenthatVoetianswere‘godlessmen,muchworsethan
atheists',whointheirlustforpowerhadruinedthefruitsoftheReformationandScripture.379
DelaCourtexplainsthatthelibertiesuponwhichtheinterestofHollanddepend,suchas
the freedom of privateworship, are being violated. In chapter 17, titled ‘That in Holland the
freedomofReligionistroubledagainstallreason’,hestressesthatthegreatleveloffreedomof
conscience inHolland, famously fought forduring theRevolt and the focal attractionofmany
immigrants, is gradually diminishing. Along these lines, he sets himself in the tradition of
Remonstrants likeGrotius,who had famously argued for absolute freedomof conscience and
governmentalauthorityoverchurchaffairs(insteadofchurchofficialsdangerouslydividingthe
commonwealth by denominational disputes). Alluding to Maurice of Orange’s interventionist
actionsinthereligioustroublesof1618;
‘since the year 1618 [government] gradually deferred from this praiseworthy
maxim. (..) First by persecuting the Remonstrants, and banishing them to other
Countries.AfterwardsmoreandmorethwartingtheCatholicsintheirgatherings,
that to enjoy this liberty, a heavy yearly taxation was imposed on the same
[Catholics] in favour of the Bailiffs and Sheriffs; which is not less unreasonable
thandamagingtotheCountry;becauseincasewemaynotlosetheadvantagesof
377V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,36‐37.378V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,37.379CitedfromIsrael,TheDutchRepublic,673;LetterfromPieterdelaCourttoW.enJ.vanderVoort,Leidenon27September 1663, ‘Brieven uit de correspondentie van Pieter de la Court en zijn verwanten (1661‐1666)’, J.H.Kernkamp(ed.) inBijdragenenMededelingenvanhetHistorischGenootschap. 70(Groningen–Jakarta:J.B.Wolters,1956).
94
their residence and commerce,why shouldweprohibit thatwhichwithout they
cannotlivehere.’380
Thus,firstlyMaurice’sinterventiononthesideoftheorthodoxCounter‐Remonstrantsandthen
the gradual imposition of restrictions on Catholic worship undermined the freedom of
conscience. Note that De la Court is not speaking of Catholicworship in public, but of ‘small
gatherings in the homes of known Citizens under the guidance of Clerics, dedicated to the
Rulers.’381Thislastpartunderlinestheimportance,inDelaCourt’sopinion,ofpriestsloyaltoDe
Witt‐regime, insteadofVoetiansattackingthestadholderlessregimewith theirdangerousmix
of exclusive Orangism and orthodoxy. Finally, it is important to note that De la Court (like
Hobbes) stresses the dangerous influence clergymen have on people’s thoughts and actions
through the pulpit and education. In his preface De la Courtwrites that the common people,
‘barredfromknowledgeandjudgment’,isblindfoldedandstirredupagainstthelawfulregents
by‘ClericswhostriveforDominion,ofwhomlikewisesomeinHollandaswell(Godforbid),and
thesurroundingProvincesarefound.’382
ThetitleofchapterVIIIgrandlyasserts:‘ThatallInhabitantsofHollandliveinfreedom,
magnificentlyboundtoeachotherbyasharedwell‐beingandill‐being.’383Butitannouncesnot
smugself‐satisfactionbutananalysisintermsoffearandself‐interest.AccordingtoDelaCourt,
thesedominatehumannatureandprovidethedrivingforcebehindallactionsofgovernment,as
Hobbeshadargued.But it isnot thesovereignthatunifiessociety,butrather, theharmonyof
interestsbetweenrulerandruled.Goodgovernmentexistsinsuchawaythatthewelfareofthe
subjectsdeterminedthewelfareofthegovernors.Inparticular,fishing,manufactureandtrade
bindtogethertheinterestsoftheinhabitantsofHollandinaneconomicchain.ThereuponDela
CourtdeliberatelymisquotesHobbestoopposefreegovernmenttoanoppressiveprincelyrule,
oractuallytoopposethestadholderlessregimetoanOrange‐princelyrule.Hewrites:
‘Homo homini Deus in statu Politico, man is a God to man under a good
Government,whichisforthisCountryaninexpressibleblessing,thatheresomany
peoplearefedbyhonestwork,andprimarilythatthewellbeingofallInhabitants
(excludingtheNoblesandsoldiers)fromtheleasttothemost[fortunate,MBK],is
380V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,43.381V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,43382V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,Voor‐Reede.Hobbeslikewisewarnsforthecontrolpriestshaveoverthedistributionof ideas, which can easily cause societal disintegration and opposition against governmental authority. JohanSommervillestatesthatinLeviathan,hismainpracticalcounsel isarguablythesovereign’scontroloftheeducationanddistributionofideas.JohannP.Sommerville,‘EarlyModernAbsolutisminPracticeandTheory’,inCesareCutticaandGlennBurgess(eds.),MonarchismandAbsolutisminEarlyModernEurope(London:PickeringandChatto,2012),117‐130,p.122‐123.383V.D.H.,InterestvanHolland,15
95
socloselylinked:andaboveall,thatnoonetrulyismorecommittedtothecountry’s
wellbeing,thantheRulersofthisAristocraticgovernment.’
DelaCourtbelievedthattheinhabitantsofHollandweremutuallyinterdependentand
thattheburdenswerereasonablyequallyshared.RegentsprofitfromthesplendourofHolland’s
enterprises.Farmerscansellall theirgoods, fora largepartofthepopulationconsistsofnon‐
agrarians.Toprocuregoodgovernmentwastoensurethattherulersandruledsharedthesame
interests. He concludes this chapter, again, with the greatest threat Holland’s harmony of
interestscanencounter:re‐installationoftheHouseofOrange.
‘Nevertheless this praiseworthy harmony could, and accordingly, will be broken,
ruining all Inhabitants, none excluded, than courtiers and soldiers, by only one
mistake,namelychoosingasupremeHead,becausegiventhattheLords,courtiers,
nobles and soldiers necessarily prey upon the hard‐working Inhabitants, they
would use all their power to their own benefit and to the disadvantage of the
common[people];andinorderthattheywouldnotbeblockedbythegreatmighty
Cities; they would obviously make all Cities small, and the inhabitants poor, in
orderthattheywithoutcontradictionwillobey.Suchasmenherealwayshaveto
praytoGod,àfuroreMonarcharumliberanosDomine,ohGodsaveHollandfroma
Head.’
The last sentencewehavealreadyencountered regardingHetwelvaarenvanLeyden,wherein
thebrothersDelaCourtunderlinedthechangesinearlymodernrulefromrulebyconsentand
law to a ruleby coercion anddomination aswitnessed. In InterestvanHolland Pieterdidnot
stressthischange,butsimplyequated suchabelligerentandcoerciverulewith ‘monarchical’
rule,probablytofurtherthepolemicalovertonesofhisanti‐Orangistargument.
Like French debates during the 1630s, in the Holland pamphlet wars of the 1650s‐1660s
discussionwasintermsoftheinterestofstate,whichcoursetofollowinforeignpolicy,howthis
should be financed,which faction promoted it best, often in combinationwith a confessional
allegiance.AgreatdifferencebetweenRohanandDelaCourtisinthehandlingofthenexusof
aggressive war, wealth and oppression. Whereas Rohan delegitimised Habsburg‐Spain as a
tyrannicalrulebyconquest,arapaciouswarmachine,DelaCourtdirectlyconstructstheruleof
Orangeasahouseholdgovernment,robbingthe inhabitantsof theirpropertiesandprivileges,
effectively enslaving them all.With bothwriters interest (and the reason of state that comes
withit),shapesanenemy,asithelpsdefineapotentialvictim.Rohan,however,hideshisattack
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againstSpainbehindtheformofsatiriccounsel.HestressedthemisuseofreligionbySpain.De
laCourtdirectlyattackstheprincesofOrangebyassertingtheirdespoticsystemofrulethatis
inherentlydestructivetothe interestofHolland. JustasRohanwantstolerationofProtestants
withinFrance,De laCourtgoes furtherbuildingon the tolerationistexperimentofHollandby
arguinganti‐clericallibertyofconscienceaspartofHolland’sinterest.
Furthermore, De la Court presents a harmony of interests argument formulating his
understanding of ‘True Freedom’ in Holland as the unspoiled possession and pursuit of
privileges andpropertyprotectedby the rule of lawagainstwarmongeringprinces, scheming
priestsandoligarchicregents.HenriDucdeRohanhadsomewhatdisassociated‘interest’from
dynastic consideration, analysing the particularities of the lands of the ruler, which the ruler
oughttoconsiderinhispolicymaking.Yet, theHuguenotmilitary leaderprimarilyfocussedon
thestandingoftheFrenchCrowninrelationtoitsforeigncounterpartsandontheimportanceof
amilitarilystronganti‐Spanishpolicy.Bycontrast,PieterdelaCourtwasextremelyconcerned
withaninternalthreat.
TheOrangistrevivalatthebeginningofthe1660sdangerouslypressuredtheminority
regimeofDeWittregime.Pieterhadtomakeanexceptionallystrongcaseforthestadholderless
regime. Infusedwithnew ideasof thepassions, and theharmonisingof interests,De laCourt
build up the case why Holland did not need an Orange‐prince. The argument of Holland
consisting of a nexus of great citieswhere themerchants controlled the political powerwas,
however,conventional.Theinnovativepartofhisargumententailsthecombinationoftheidiom
of interestwithelementsofcontemporarycritiquesof ‘wardespotism’,whichtransformedhis
caseintotheissueofwhytheHouseofOrangewasHolland’snaturalenemy.
Already present in the earlier work of the brothers De la Court (HetWelvaaren van
Leyden),‘monarchy’seemstobeequatednotsomuchwith‘tyranny’aswithaspecificsystemof
government,which robbed its subjects of their property and rights in order to pursue costly
warfare. In InterestvanHolland the features of this system are elaborated and applied to the
Orange‐Princely rule. Apart from the ruler, other important actors in this system are the
‘courtiers’, ‘clergymen’, ‘soldiers’ and ‘favourites’ and ‘flatterers’. Because of the clergy, the
ignorantrabbleholdstheprinceinawe.Soldiersliterallycoercesubjectsandtogetherwiththe
courtiers and the favourites, who practically run monarchical governments, they form the
stakeholdersofthewar‐despoticcorporation.
The changes in earlymodern governmentwere stressed and fiercely criticised, aswe
haveclearly seen inDe laCourt’s InterestvanHolland.De laCourt’s attackonprincely rule is
extremelyvicious,leavingoutearlierviewsoftheriseofanewtypeofmonarchiestoaccentuate
his anti‐Orangism argument. However, Pieter does underline differences in monarchical
governments,consideringthewesternEuropeanmonarchiesaslegitimategovernments,where
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subjects can enjoy their freedoms. His direct and open criticisms of certain coercive princely
practicesarenotprincipally‘anti‐monarchic’or‘republican’.Theevilsarecommontodifferent
regimes;newandhighertaxes,saleofandaccesstooffices,stateloans,statedebts,andpursuit
ofwarfaremakethedifferencesbetweenrepublicsandmonarchiesfarlessimportantthanthey
haveappearedinmoderndiscussionsofhiswork.Howmuch,andforwhatpurposewemight
extrapolateauniversalisedrepublicanismfromhiswork,isthen,amootpoint;buttherelentless
hostilitytothe‘new’monarchyofOrangeisevidentenough.
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Chapter4
LisolaandLouisXIV’sFrenchmonarchy:universalmonarchyandreasonofstate
Givenhissignificanceduringthelateseventeenthcentury,François‐PaulLisola’sBouclierd’Estat
(1667)hasbeenrelativelylittlestudiedbymodernscholars.Thereare,however,severalmore
specific reasons for his inclusion in this thesis. First, thework exhibits an extensive use and
criticismofRohan’sseminalDel‘interest.AsitusedtobeurgedthatMarxwasHegelstoodupon
hishead,soLisolainvertedthewholethrustofRohan’sunderstandingofinterestandreasonon
state. It is a relationship that has hardly been explored, and indeed it displays the polemical
dexteritywithwhichthetopoiofinterestandreasonofstatecouldbedeployed.Second,Lisolais
asimportanttoValkenier’srejectionofDelaCourt’sunderstandingofDutchinterestasRohan.
Third and more generally, an account of Bouclier illustrates how an international context of
argumentisimportantforunderstandingworkswithaDutchdomesticfocus.
François‐Paul de Lisola (1613‐1674) was one of the first authors to warn Europeans
about the French dangerous desire to erect a ‘universal monarchy’. In 1667 his book was
published (anonymously) with the telling title Bouclier d'Estat et de justice, contre le dessein
manifestementdécouvertde laMonarchieUniverselle,sous levainprétextedesprétentionsde la
ReynedeFrance. ItwasaresponsetoFrenchpropagandajustifyingLouisXIV’s invasionofthe
SpanishNetherlandsin1667.Themilitaryoffensivewasprecededbyapropagandacampaign,
wherein Frenchpublicistsandlawyersclaimedaterritorialcompensationforthenon‐payment
of QueenMaria Theresa’s dowry, Louis XIV’swife and daughter of Philip IV of Spain. Due to
incessantwarfare,Spainwasbankrupt,asMazarinhadalreadypredictedatthetime.TheFrench
pamphleteersdugupaprivateinheritancelawfromtheprovinceofBrabant,theso‐called‘right
ofDevolution’ to nullify theQueen’s renunciation of all rights to her deceased father’s estate,
renounced at themarriage of 1660. This ‘War of Devolution’was a clear proof that after the
PeaceofthePyranees(1659)thebalanceofmilitarypowerbetweenRohan’spolesofEuropean
politics, France and Spain haddecisively shifted towards Louis andhis expansionarypolicies.
The fear generated by what was increasingly seen as an attempt to establish France as a
universal monarchy helped make Bouclier an immediate bestseller. It was translated in six
languages, includingDutchandEnglish,andunderwenttwentyeditions.384Bouclierturnedout
384Bouclier d'Estat et de justice contre le desseinmanifestement découvert de laMonarchieUniverselle, sous le vainprétexte des pretentions de la Reyne de France ([Brussels: François Foppens], 1667); Verdedigingh van staet engerechtigheyt:tegenshetbaerblijckelijckontdecktvoorneemendergantschemonarchye,onderd'ydeledeckmantelderpretentien,ofeysschingenvandekoninginvanVranckrijck.MitsgadersDerechtenderkoninginvanVranckrijck,doordeFranschengepretendeert,&c.vanhenselvenkrachteloosgemaeckt,envernietight.AllesuytdeFranscheTaelvertaelt.(Amsterdam [1667]); The Buckler of State and Justice Against The Design manifestly discovered of the Universal
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tobethestandardworkforanti‐FrenchpamphletliteratureinEuropeduringthelatermilitary
conflictswiththeSunKing.385InFranceitwasacrimetoreadthework.386
As I shall show, much of Lisola’s attempted refutation relied upon reason of state
arguments he took directly from Rohan but gave them added force by turning them against
France.Recentresearchhasarguedthatduringtheseventeenthcenturytherewasanincreasing
stress on the ‘economic (national) interest’ at the expense of arguments reliant onnotions of
natural law;with this apparent shiftwent a fear of universal, effectively predatorymonarchy
and theneed tomaintainabalanceofpower.387Remarkably,Bouclier is largelyoverlooked in
this dominantly Anglophone research. The historian Charles‐Édouard Levillain, however, has
studiedLisolaandBouclieras‘theintellectualoriginsoftheAnglo‐DutchAllianceof1677.’The
historian remarks that the scholarship on early modern anti‐French polemic is caught in
nationalwebs, asDutchhistoriansmay claimDutchProtestants founded thisdiscourse,while
EnglishauthorswillsayEnglishProtestantsoriginatedit.Instead,Levillainstresses,‘thefuelfor
anti‐French,anti‐catholicand,byextension,anti‐Stuartpropagandawasprovidedbyapublicist
calledFrançois‐PauldeLisola,whowasnoProtestantbutoriginallythecatholicservantofthe
catholic Holy Roman Emperor.’388 In his recent book Levillain even underlines an intellectual
correlation between Lisola and Slingsby Bethel, both of whom were involved in the London
radical underground. As we have discussed in the chapter on De la Court, Bethel’s famous
interest analysiswas indebted toDe laCourt’s one; and it appears that heprobablywas also
inspiredbyLisola’stext.389ThefewreferencestoLisolaencompasshisrevitalisationofRohan’s
MonarchyUnder the vainPretext of theQueen ofFranceherPretensions.Translated out ofFrench. (London: JamesFlesher,1667).AllfurtherreferencesaretothisEnglishedition;Lisolawrotethisworkanonymously,butintheyearofitspublication,hisauthorshipwasalreadyknown.ThisappearsfromletterswrittenbyLisolaandlaterreferencesof authors. Markus Baumanns,Das publizistischeWerk des kaiserlichenDiplomaten Franz Paul Freiherr von Lisola(1613‐1674). Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Absolutistischem Staat, Öffentlichkeit undMächtepolitik in der frühenNeuzeit (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1994),165. Read there p. 357‐381 for an overview of every edition andtranslationofBouclierandotherwritingsbyLisola.385 MartinWrede,Das Reich und seine Feinde. Politische Feindbilder in der reichspatriotischen Publizistik zwischenWestfälischemFriedenundSiebenjährigemKrieg(Mainz:PhilippvonSabern,2004),48‐49,330‐333,379‐381.386AcaseisknownofCharlesPatin,thesonofthecelebratedphysicianandmemorialistGuyPatin,whohadtofleeParisbecause thebookwas found inhishome.HerbertH.Rowen,Theking'sState:proprietarydynasticism inearlymodernFrance(NewBrunswick,N.Y.:RutgersUniversityPress,1980),107.387StevePincus,‘Fromholycausetoeconomicinterest:thetransformationofreasonofstatethinkinginseventeenth‐century England’, in Houston and Pincus (eds.), ANation Transformed. England after the Restoration (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),272‐298;RichardDevetak,'Thefearofuniversalmonarchy':balanceofpowerasan ordering practice of liberty’, in Tim Dunne and Trine Flockhart (eds.), LiberalWorld Orders (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2013),121‐137;SlingsbyBethel,TheWorld’sMistake inOliverCromwell(London,1668);SlingsbyBethel, The Present Interest of England Stated (London, 1671); Slingsby Bethel, The Interest of Princes and States(London,1680);388Charles‐ÉdouardLevillain,‘TheintellectualoriginsoftheAnglo‐DutchAlliance,1667‐1677’,Séminairederecherchésur les îles Britanniques, XVIIe & XVIIIe siècle, accessed February 9, 2016, URL http://britaix17‐18.univ‐provence.fr/texte‐seance5.php.389 Charles‐Édouard Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV.Diplomatie etdiscoursd’oppositionà l’époquemodern.Le casFrançois‐PauldeLisola (1667‐1674) (Paris,Tallandier, 2015), 183‐184.With ‘radical’ Levillain refers to restorationradicalism; Londonwas ahotbedofdissenters.RichardGreaves,DeliverUs fromEvil:TheRadicalUnderground inBritain,1660‐1663(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1986).
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notionofuniversalmonarchyandtheideaofthebalanceofpower.390Theimportanceofbothof
whichareemphasisedbyLevillainandMarkusBaumans.391
ThischapterproposesareinterpretationofLisola’sBouclierpreciselybyexamininghow
he employed De l’interest of Rohan. It argues that Lisola deliberately used Rohan’s interest
analysistoturnitagainsttheFrenchmonarchyitself;theimperialdiplomatpresentedthetext
as the blueprint of the French war machine. From this follows that he indeed rejuvenated
Rohan’saccusationofuniversalmonarchybyreversingitsapplicationfromSpaintoFrance.Asa
corollary,FrancebecamethepredatorythreattoChristendom,Spainthepeace‐lovingdefendant
of law and balance. In Spain lay the image of good government. Throughout irony was the
principal tropeused to invertRohan’s satiric condemnationofHabsburgSpain.Theargument
would form the basis for later anti‐French polemics in the Dutch Republic and England, and
would contribute to subsequent attempts to reconstruct the ruleof law, suchas in ‘tVerwerd
EuropabyValkenier.
Before examining Bouclier in detail we will look into Lisola’s diplomatic and literary
career, then into the nature of the French pamphlet campaign leading up to the War of
Devolution, which provoked his response. Thereafter we will discuss the rise of the French
monarchyfromthe1650sonwardsand‘themythofabsolutism’,asLisolaaccusesLouisXIVof
rulingasan‘absolute’monarch.
4.1Illustriousdiplomatandanti‐FrenchpamphleteerduringtheriseofLouisXIV
Three issues stand out when reviewing the biographical literature on Lisola. First his anti‐
French standpoint seems to be a thread common to his career as a publicist and imperial
diplomat. Most of his diplomatic activities at several European courts are characterised by
attempts toraiseoppositionand/or to formalliancesagainst the increasing influenceofLouis
XIV, hisministers, diplomats and publicists in Europe. However, Lisola often instigated these
anti‐FrenchactivitiesonhisowninitiativeandignoredordersfromtheimperialcourtinVienna.
As a result, hemade a lot enemies. French diplomats, as well as prominentmembers of the
390Amongstothers,HerbertH.Rowen,TheAmbassadorPreparesforWar:TheDutchEmbassyofArnaulddePomponne1669–1671 (The Hague:Martinus Nijhoff, 1957), 108;Michael Sheenan,TheBalance ofPower.History andTheory(London/New York: Routledge, 2004), 40‐41; Tony Claydon, Europe and the Making of England, 1660‐1760(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007),177;JohnRoberston, ‘Empireandunion:twoconceptsoftheearlymodernEuropeanpoliticalorder’,inJohnRobertson(ed.),AUnionforEmpire:PoliticalThoughtandtheBritishUnionof 1707 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3‐36, p. 21; Wrede, Politische Feindbilder, 375; Charles‐EdouardLevillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,5.391Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,198;Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,61,177;Moreover,anineteenth‐centurymonographonLisolaexists:AlfredF.Pribram,FranzPaulFreiherrvonLisola(1613‐1674)unddiePolitikseinerZeit(Leipzig:VerlagVonVeit&Comp.,1894).
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imperialcourtandevenDutchandEnglishofficialswereoftenfrustratedbyhisrelentlessanti‐
Frenchmanoeuvring.
4.1.1High‐profilediplomat
FrançoisPauldeLisolawasborntoawealthyfamilyinSalinsin1613.Hisfather,JeromeLisola,
wasofItalianoriginandreceivedcitizenryofBesançonintheSpanishFranche‐Comtéin1592.
JeromeLisolaworkedhiswayupfromaclerkoftheArchbishoptothehighestmagistrateatthe
representative Spanish‐Habsburg court in Besançon. On 20 December 1633 François Paul de
LisolareceivedadoctorateinlawatDôleandbeganpractisinglaw.392Duringthistimeaconflict
rose between the Spanish King Philip IV and the city council over newly introduced taxes to
finance the construction of fortifications in the battle against France. Lisola emerged as the
leader of the city’s faction that resisted these taxes by invoking the city’s autonomous status,
establishedundertheHabsburgEmperor inthe fourteenthcentury.Theconflictescalatedand
theSpanishGovernordecidedtopresenttheissuetotheEmperorFerdinandIII.Consequently,
LisolatravelledtoViennatodefendhiscaseattheimperialcourt.TherehewasnoticedbyCount
MaximilianTrautmannsdorf,whorecommendedLisolatotheemperor.393
Lisolabecameanhigh‐profilediplomat,developedthereputationofa‘trouble‐maker’,394
struggledwithpro‐FrenchfactionsatforeigncourtsaswellasinVienna,andparticipatedasan
intermediary in many famous diplomatic issues, executing ‘shuttle‐diplomacy’395 in the
complexityofEuropeannegotiations.OnhisfirstmissionLisolawassenttoLondontoattempt
to persuade Charles I to take a neutral stand in the Franco‐Spanish conflict. Yet due to the
powerful French influence at court he was unsuccessful. The governor of the Spanish
Netherlands,Manuel Castel‐Rodrigo invited him to take part in the negotiations amongst the
opponents of France in the Thirty Years’ War. During his stay in Brussels, Lisola’s London
residencewas looted, allegedly initiatedbyFrenchenvoys. In that sameyear,Trautmansdorff
sent him to the negotiations in Münster, where he tried on his own instigation to forge an
alliance between Brussels and Vienna, which Trautmansdorff forbad him in several letters.
Moreover, the French diplomats complained about Lisola’s hostile attitude towards their
monarchy. After a quiet stay at the Polish court in 1648 and 1649, Lisola resumed his anti‐
FrenchstandandsupportedCastel‐Rodrigoinhiseffortto‘free’thecitiesofBreisach,Strasburg,
Freiburg andBasel fromFrench influence.At the peacedealings of the SecondNorthernWar
392Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,3.393Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,127‐128.394Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,5.395Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,3.
103
(1655‐1660),Lisolaachievednotablesuccess,astheEmperorwasseenastheprotectorofpeace
and France as the war‐monger. As a reward for his efforts, Lisola was granted the title of
‘Freiherr’in1659.
Throughout the 1660s, he faced fierce opposition at several courts, as in 1660‐1661
whenthePolishKingrequestedViennatorecallLisola;andhisdesireddiplomaticappointment
in Regensburg was blocked by his enemies in Vienna several times. In particular Lisola
encounteredFrenchobstruction,suchasattheCourtinMadridin1664,and,duringhisjourney
fromMadridtoLondonin1666.Inthisperiod,relationsbetweenthetwoHabsburgsbranches
wereseverelycooledandtheSpanishcourtwasdominatedbyastrongpro‐Frenchfactionthat
successfully thwarted Lisola’s attempts to revitalise the Habsburgs connection. During the
journeytoLondon,LisolahadtakencautiontosailaroundFrance,however,severalattemptson
hislifeweremade,supposedlyorganisedbytheFrench.396
In 1666 and 1667 Lisola stayed in London, from where he visited Brussels at the
beginningof1667,topromotepeacetalksbetweenEnglandandtheDutchRepublic,designedto
conclude the Second Anglo‐Dutch War (1665‐1667). In April and May he held several
unsuccessfultalkswithJohandeWitt.InMay,LouisXIVdeclaredwaronSpainandinvadedthe
Spanish Netherlands. The emperor and his councillors were hesitant to take action, and the
princesoftheHolyRomanEmpire,especiallythoseinthe,so‐called,‘LeagueoftheRhine’with
Louis XIV, were reluctant to intervene, which rather frustrated Lisola and Frederico Castel‐
Rodrigo (the new governor of the Spanish Netherlands). Eventually Lisola succeeded in his
missionastheRepublicandEnglandsignedapeacetreatyon31July1667.Duringthatsummer,
while Louis and his troops took city after citywith little opposition, LisolawroteBouclier. In
August1667itwasprinted,whichmarkedthestartofhisanti‐Frenchpublicationstream.
In that month, he travelled back to London. The Under Secretary of State, Sir Joseph
Williamson, received various anonymous warnings about his ‘noxious underground
influence’.397However,LisolastoodindirectandgoodcontactwiththeSecretaryofState,Henry
Bennet,1stEarlofArlington,whowasheadoftheSpanishfactionatcourtandwhosponsored
thepublicationofLisola’sbook.BesidesArlington,theimperialdiplomatassociatedwithGeorge
Villiers,2ndDukeofBuckinghamwithwhomheengaged(togetherwithBethel) intheradical
circles of London. Through them he attempted to set up a pro‐Habsburgs faction at court.
AlthoughEnglandwastechnicallyatwarwithFrance(supporting itsally theDutchRepublic),
the courtwas predominantly pro‐French and, thus, Lisola’s officialmission, i.e. to promote a
coalitionbetweenEngland,theemperorandotherEuropeanpowers,provedextremelydifficult.
WhatLisoladidnotknow,wasthaton19January1668theEmperorLeopoldIsignedasecret
396Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,3‐4;Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,129‐131.397Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,5.
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agreement with Louis for the partition of Spanish‐Habsburg possessions expecting daily the
death of the sickly five‐year old Spanish King Carlos II. Moreover, Charles II was extremely
reluctant to form a Habsburg alliance when he had already committed himself to France.
France’smilitarysuccessesintheSpanishNetherlands,however,forcedEuropeanregimesinto
action.TheDutchRepublicandEnglandhadalreadysignedthePeaceofBredainJuly1667and
further negotiations between the two regimes resulted in a coalition treaty in January 1668,
whichSwedenjoinedsoonafterwards.LisolacontributedprofoundlytothisTripleAlliance(that
promisedmilitary intervention against French aggression),which eventually led to the peace
treatyofAacheninMay1668.398
Lisolahad tried to include theemperor in thealliance,butLeopoldwasunwilling,and
thepro‐FrenchfactionattheViennacourtintensifiedtheircampaignagainstLisola’sdiplomatic
manoeuvres.LisolaseemeduntouchedbythisandafterhisunauthorisedstayinAachenhewent
to TheHague to discussmatters of the alliance, especially subsidy payments. Although Lisola
was called back to Brussels, his efforts for a strong anti‐French alliance were not entirely
unfruitful, because in January 1670 England, Sweden and theDutchRepublic signed a treaty,
which assuredmilitary support should France violate the Treaty of Aachen. Spain joined the
coalition in May 1670. Although the French occupation of Lorraine greatly concerned the
Emperor,hewaspressured,due tohis fragilerelationshipwith theprincesof theEmpireand
severelackoffunds,tosignatreatywithLouisinNovember1671,bywhichhepromisednotto
intervene in conflicts outside theHabsburgdominion. In the run‐up to theFranco‐DutchWar
(1672‐1679),FrenchdiplomatslockedinEuropeanrulersbyvarioustreatiesandalliances,such
asthesecretTreatyofDover(1670)withKingCharlesIItoleavetheTripleAllianceinexchange
forsubstantialfinancialsupport.Moreover,LouissignedtreatieswiththeSwedishKingCharles
XI and thePrince‐Bishopric ofMünster andArchbishop‐Elector of Cologne.At the timeof the
French invasion in theDutchRepublic in thesummerof1672,Lisolastayed inTheHague.He
discussed the Dutch defences with the reinstalled Stadholder William III of Orange and
negotiatedanalliancewiththeEmperor(militaryaidinexchangeforconsiderablesponsorship),
whichwassignedinOctoberofthatyear.Yet,thetreatystillgaveLeopoldroomtomanoeuvre
towards France, against Lisola’s counsel. The imperial military advance encountered many
obstacles and Leopold was ready to join the peace negotiations in Cologne, organised by
Sweden.399FromJune1673peacetalkswereheldinCologne.Lisolagainedafewsuccesses, in
convincingthelastreluctantGermanprincesto jointheanti‐Frenchcoalition,butnegotiations
provedtobedifficult,sinceFrancewantedtosignpeacewitheachpartyindividually,especially
398Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,144;Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,7.399PerhapstherehemetPetrusValkenier,suggestedbyEcoO.G.HaitsmaMulier,‘DiePolitisch‐historischenIdeenvonPetrusValkenier’,inAlbertdeLangeandGerhardSchwinge(eds.), PieterValkenierunddasSchicksalderWaldenserum1700(Heidelberg:VerlagRegionalkultur,2004),108‐122,p.118.
105
theDutchRepublic.Inthesummerof1674,LisolahadtoreturntoViennabecauseofill‐health.
Hebecameoneof the intimates surroundingLeopoldandwas finally givenanoffice at court,
whichhehadlongdesired.Hediedthereon9December1674,butevenonhisdeathbedLisola
triedtoconvinceLeopoldthatheoughttoallywiththeSwedishKing.400
4.1.2Polemicalpublicist
Accordingto thehistorianKennethHaley,Lisola’s ‘greatnesswasasapublicistrather thanan
ambassador;Bouclierd’Estatwasonlythemostfamousofseveraldirectlypropagandistwritings
whichdidmuchtoinfluenceEuropeanpoliticalopinionagainstFrance’.401AlthoughLisolawas
oneof themostnotableambassadorsofhis time,byhisunabashedandpolemicalanti‐French
actionsandwords,hewasscoldedforhisundiplomaticfrancophobiabypeople,suchasJohan
deWittandtheEnglishambassadorinTheHague,SirWilliamTemple.402AfterBouclier,Lisola
wrotemanyotherpamphlets,allincludinganti‐FrenchpolemicsandacallforaEuropeanwide
coalition against the rise of France. The historian Markus Baumanns remarks that his later
worksaremore refined;Lisoladevelopedhis ironic tone, and the ratherobscure structure in
Bouclier was replaced by more direct and clear argumentation.403 Furthermore, Baumanns
clarifiesproblemsconcerningthesupposedauthorshipofLisola’stexts,which,heargues,have
two causes. Firstly, printers and book traders often published under false names and feigned
printingplaces.Manyanti‐Frenchpamphletswerehoweverprinted in theDutchRepublic, for
example by the printing house of Elsevier. Secondly, Lisola’s fame led to contemporaries
assigning randomly anti‐French texts tohim. Lisola complained about this practice and about
the fact that printers andpublishers falsifiedhiswritings or bound them togetherwith other
writings, attributed to him. 404 While many attributions to him are questionable, Lisola’s
authorship of Bouclier is certain and was established very early. Soon after its publication
contemporariesknewthathewroteit.405
During thepeace talks inAachen in1668LisolawroteRemarques sur leProcedéde la
France,TouchantlaNegociationdelaPaix.Headdedtothetextauthenticdocumentsandletters
fromtheSpanishandFrenchsides,inwhichhecriticisedFrenchpoliticsofconsensusregarding
theoccupiedpartsoftheSpanishNetherlands.LisolastatedthatthetalksinAachenfunctioned
400Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,149‐157.401 KennethH.D.Haley,AnEnglishDiplomat in theLowCountries:SirWilliamTempleand JohndeWitt,1665‐1672(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1986),317.402Haley,AnEnglishDiplomat, 317‐318. Temple and Lisola stayed in TheHague at the same time and negotiatedabouttheTripleAlliancein1668inBrussels.403Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,197‐198.404Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,165;Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,4.405Valkenier,’tVerwerdEuropa,68en71.
106
asapretextforLouisandhisministers.InrealityFrancewantedtoobstructthenegotiations.406
On several occasions the imperial diplomat responded to current political affairs. The French
advance in Lorrain of 1670 was discussed by Lisola in Esclaircissements sur les affaires de
Lorrainepour tous lesprinces chrestiens (1671). Thepositive attitude of theDuke of Lorraine
towards the Triple Alliance allegedly frustrated Louis. Lisola likewise warned about the
consequencesoftheseizureofLorrainefortherestofEurope,beingafirststeptowardsFrench
universal dominion.407 In various pamphlets Lisola tried to influence European opinion that
France attempted to set a precedent by annexing the Spanish Netherlands, Lorraine and the
DutchRepublicinordertotakeEuropeinitsentirety.408
4.1.3Bouclier:reasonofstateandlegalargumentation
FrenchauthorsattemptedtojustifytheneworientationofLouis’sforeignpolicyfromthemid‐
1660sonwardsbypresenting itasanecessity inamassivepropagandacampaign.Theyoften
opposed the traditional image of the Spanish hegemony in Europe against the French
monarchy.409 Inaddition, theyemployed legal arguments tobuttressLouis’s claimson certain
partsbelongingtobothbranchesoftheHabsburgsdynasty.Theselegalclaimshadalreadybeen
createdbyCardinalRichelieu’sjurists,basedonfeudalpropertyrights,privatelawandnatural
law,andtookcentrestageintheWarofDevolution.410Notably,Lisolareadmostoftheseauthors
attheuniversityofDole,arenownedlawuniversity.Afterthedeathin1665oftheSpanishKing
406Remarques sur leProcedéde laFrance,Touchant laNegociationde laPaix (1667);Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,360.407Esclaircissements sur lesaffairesdeLorrainepour tous lesprinces chrestiens (Strasbourg, 1671);Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,363.408SuitedudialoguesurlesdroitsdelareineTrès‐Chrétienne.ParoùsedécouvrelavanitédesprétentionsdelaFrancesurlesPays‐Bas(Brussells:FrançoisFoppens,1668);ConférenceinfructueusedeWindisgrats,ouViolencedelaFranceàobtenir laLorraineavec cequi s’estpassé là‐dessusd eplus remarquable (Charleville, 1671); La SauceauVerjus,Strasbourg, 1674. Entretien sur les affaires du temps (Strasbourg, 1674); L’orateur français ou harangue del’archevêqued’Embrun, interprétéepar lesévénementsdenotretempset l’étatdesaffairesprésentes(Cologne:MartinLambert, 1674); L’apologiste refuté ou response aux calumnies de certain prétendant justifier les guerres de Francecontre lesmouvementset la justicedesarmesdeSaMajesté Imperiale (Cologne,1674);see forarecentoverviewoftextsbyorattributedtoLisola,Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,373‐374.409Wrede, Das Reich und seine Feinde, 327‐328; Collins, The State in Early Modern France, 118; Levillain, ‘Theintellectualorigins’,3.410 For example the jurists Pierre Dupuy and his co‐author Denis Godefroy had to list all foreign polities andprincipalities,whichtheFrenchCrownmayclaim.Traiteztouchantlesdroitsduroytrès‐chrestiensurplusieursestatsetseigneuriespossedéespardiversprincesvoisins:etpourprouverqu’iltientàjustetitreplusieursprovincescontestéesparlesprincesestrangers(3editions:Paris,1631;3editions:Paris,1655;2editions:Paris,1670);ThejuristJacquesdeCassanwrote in1632a legalargumentof therightsof theFrenchking tocertainHabsburg‐Spanishdominions.RecherchesdesDroitsdesRoisdeFrancesurlesRoyaumes,Duchés,Comtés,VillesetPaysoccupéparlesPrincessurlesRoyaumes,Duchés,Comtés,VillesetPaysoccupésparlesPrincesEtrangers(Paris,1632;Rouen,1634;Paris,1646,1649and1663).Cassanalsowroteapamphletin1665basedontheBrabantlawofdevolutiontosubstantiatetheFrenchclaimontheSpanishNetherlands.DeductioExquaprobaturclarissimisArgumentisnonesseIusDevolutionisinDucatuBrabantiaenecinallisBelgiiProvinciisRationePrincipumearum,proutquidemconatisuntasserere(1665).Baumanns,Das publizistische Werk, 83‐84. Notably, Baumanns considers Rohans De l’interest as belonging to Richelieu’scampaignaswell.Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,84.
107
Philip IV, leaving the throne to the sickly minor Carlos II, Louis XIV seized the opportunity.
However, he did not simply stake his claim by military force, but, first of all, attempted to
persuade European rulers of his entitlement to parts of the Spanish Netherlands through a
massive pamphlet campaign. Louis’s lawyers presented the War of Devolution as no French
invasion,butasreclaiminghiswife’srightfulinheritance.411
LisolarespondedspecificallytotwoofsuchFrenchpamphlets.ThefirstwasTraitédes
droits de la Reine Tres‐Chrestienne sur divers Estats de laMonarchie d’Espagne by the jurist
AntioneBilain,commissionedbytheFrenchminsterColbertandpublishedbytheroyalprinter
in Paris in various editions and translations including German, English and Spanish.412 Bilain
declaredtheQueen’srenunciationofherinheritancerightsnullandvoid,basedonnaturallaw,
droit divin and various other legal categories to defend the inalienability of these rights.
Secondly,helegitimisedMariaTheresa’srightsbytheBrabantlawofdevolutionthatproperty
‘devolved’ upon the children of a firstmarriage,whether female ormale.413 Bilain’s tractwas
handed to the English ambassador in Paris by the foreign minister, Hugues de Lionne, to
circulatethelegaltextinEngland.CopieswereapparentlyfoundateverycourtinEurope.414
The second pamphlet waswritten Antoine Aubery’sDes justes Prétentions duRoy sur
l’Empire. This pamphletwas not authorised by the Crown for its strongly polemical contents.
Aubery did not only claim the imperial throne for Louis XIV, but the entire Empire itself.
According toFrenchSalicLaw,Auberyargued that theMerovingian,CarolingianandCapetian
dynasties formed the ‘present’ French monarchy and thus their possession belonged to the
FrenchCrown.Notably,hedefendedtherighttonewlyconqueredlandsbyreasonofstatethat
subjects juridical considerations. He demonstrated Louis’s direct descent from Charlemagne,
thus deemed theEmperorship of no valuewithout the rule of France.Moreover, the imperial
titlewaschosen(unliketheFrenchkingship),andconsequentlynotsovereignbynature.French
kingship was therefore of a supreme and stable quality compared to the German ‘kingship’.
AuberyconcludedthateveryEuropeanruler, includingtheEmperor,weremerevassalsof the
Frenchkings,asthetruedescendantsofCharlemagne.Francewas,accordingtoAubery,thefirst
and most sovereign monarchy of Christendom. To reduce the potential for conflict with the
Germanprinces,hewasput in theBastille.Yet, fiveweeks laterhewasreleased.TheSpanish
411Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,81‐83,166‐167; JohnA.Lynn,TheWarsofLouisXIV1667‐1714 (Routledge;NewYork2013),105‐106.412 AntoineBilain,Traitédesdroitsde laReineTres‐Chrestienne surdiversEstatsde laMonarchied’Espagne (Paris,1667).413MariaTheresawas theyoungestand theonly livingchild fromthe firstmarriageof theSpanishKingPhilips IVwith Elisabeth of France. FromhismarriagewithMariaAnna ofAustria, two children lived in 1667, ofwhich theyoungestchildbecameKingCarolusII.Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,88‐91.414Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,4.
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Governor apparently confronted Lisola with these French pamphlets at Lisola’s arrival in
BrusselsinMay1667.415
The‘guerredeplume’escalatedwithLisola’spublicationinAugust1667.Frenchtroops
enteredtheSpanishNetherlandsinMay1667.HewroteBouclierbetweenMayandJulyandin
August it was published.416 Herbert H. Rowen as well as Levillain state that, although Lisola
rebuttedthedevolutionclaimonlegalgrounds,Louismadeastronglegalcaseforhisrightsto
the SpanishNetherlands.417 Previous commentaries onBilain’s case of the right of devolution
haddeemedit ‘plausible’,asthediplomat‐historianLieuwevanAitzemavalidatedit,or,asthe
juristPeterStockmans,whohadtoadmitthepatrimonialcharacteroftheLowCountries,which
CharlesVhadwillinglygivenawayatthemarriagetreatybetweenPhilipIIandMaryTudorin
1554, favouring their children over Philip’s son, Don Carlos, of his firstmarriage.418 Lisola’s
reponse was preceded by the Deductie (1667) of Stockmans stating that customs in private
property were not applicable to dynastic succession. However, Bouclier became the most
importantrebuttalofthedevolutionclaim.GottfiedWilhelmvonLeibniz,forinstance,wrotein
1696thatLisola’s legalwas infinitelysuperiortothatofStockman’s,andPierreBaylethought
thatBouclierwasunmatchedinitsfireandrhetoric.419
As we saw in the chapter on Rohan, under Richelieu’s ministry, reason of state was
appropriated by the government to justify certain political actions deemed illegitimate, but
argued as necessity in extraordinary circumstances. The extensive debates on reason of state
made the extraordinary ordinary and, furthermore, it became a popular tool to criticise
government.420 As a result, from the 1660s onwards the Crown began sponsoring ‘royal
panegyric’ historywriting celebrating the gloryofLouis first and foremost, insteadofTacitist
‘critical political history’.421 The French minister Colbert placed numerous historians, poets,
scholars and artists on the payroll, such as the Jesuit René Rapin, who in his Instruction sur
l’histoire(1677)attackedTacitusandcriticisedtheuseofreasonofstatein(political)writings.
415AntoineAubery,DesjustesPrétentionsduRoysurl’Empire(1667).TheextremityofthisisinterestinginitselfandwouldcertainlyhaveencouragedaparanoiaaboutFrance’sexpansionistintentions—presumablywhyhewaslockedupforawhile. Itwasafeatureof latemedievalreligiouspolemic‐papalapologistswouldclaimforthepopedirectcontrolovereverythingpreciselywhenRomewashavingtroublegettingitsowncandidatesappointedtobishoprics‐italertsustothefactthathyperbolicmismatchofrightandrealitywasitselfapartofpolemics;Wrede,DasReichundseineFeinde,328;Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,95‐100,165.416Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,97.417Rowen,Theking’sState,106;Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,4.418Rowen,Theking’sState,104;[PierreStockmans],Deductie,waaruytmetklareendebondigebewijsredenengetoontenbeweesenwordt,dattergeenrechtvandevolutieis,inhethertogdomvanBrabandt(Amsterdam1667).419Rowen,Theking’sState,105;OnLeibniz,Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,307;PierreBayleinhiscorrespondencetoMinutolion1Mai1675,citedfromLevilain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,306‐307:‘J’enailuquelques‐unsquim’ontparubien frivoles.Onn’yvoitquedes lambeauxde feumonsieurdeLisola, cousus fortgrossièrementavecquelque lieucommun,etdesreditesperpétuelles.’[‘Ireadafewwhichseemedtomeveryfrivolous.WeonlyseeshredsofthefireofLisola,veryroughlystitchedwithsomecommonplaces,andperpetualrepetition.’]420Catteeuw,‘L’inacceptablefaceauxnécessitéspolitiques’;Gauchet,‘L’Etataumiroirdelaraisond’Etat’.421 Jacob Soll argues, ‘to promote purely eloquent historical propaganda,while outlawing critical political history’,PublishingThePrince,50‐51.
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Colbert revitalised the royal Gallican tradition of collecting archival documents for
propagandistic uses, legitimising military offensives and territorial claims by historical legal
documentsinsteadofreasonofstate.422LisolatriedtobeattheFrenchontheirowngroundsin
Bouclier by countering French reason of state and legal argumentation. There exists no exact
evidenceonitssources.LevillainbelievesthatthetitleofBouclier[‘shield’]wasmostprobably
inspiredbytheFrondepamphletLaraisond’ÉtatetBouclierduParlement(1649).423Itdefends
theparliament’sactionsintermsreasonofstate,as ‘qu’ilsn’avoientrienentreprisquepourle
biendupublic,&pourl’intérêtdeleurRoy.’424Theterm‘bouclier’,however,wasusedbyvarious
authorsandthisspecificpamphletdoesnotpresentanimageofaFrenchpredatorymonarchy,
unlike many other Fronde pamphlets as discussed in the chapter. Yet Lisola was probably
acquaintedwith these polemics as hewaswith anti‐French propagandawritten in the Dutch
Republicduringthepeacenegotiationsofthe1640s.425Theidiomofreasonofstatecombined
with the image of awar‐driven French regime entered in Dutch debates partly through such
pamphlets.426 For instance, the famous Munsters Vrede‐Praetje [Munster’s Peace‐Talk] from
1646discussedwhetherthecountry’swelfarewasfoundedonpeaceorwar; itexclaimedthat
theFrenchgrandeesnecessarilypursuedwarfaretoempowerandenrichthemselves,andthat
thesolerationaletomaintainalliancesandtreatieswasone’s‘ownAdvantage,whichtheFrench
call Interest.’427 The function of reason of state inBouclier, and its specific relation to French
writings,inparticulartoRohan’sDel’interesthas,however,notyetbeenstudiedanditneedsto
bereadagainstthebackgroundof‘absolutism’sooftenseenaspersonifiedbyLouisXIV.
4.1.4TheriseoftheFrenchmonarchy:expansionistand‘absolute’
NicolasHenshall speaksof a ‘zenithofEuropeanmonarchy and its elites’meaning theperiod
after the mid‐seventeenth crisis of monarchy that was tempered by newly restored and re‐
strengthened power structures between the Crown and its elites (estates, church, land
propertied nobles). However, as we have discussed in the chapter of De la Court, certain
developments disadvantaged the old elites, especially the rise of lower social groups in the
422 Soll, PublishingThe Prince, 41‐55, on p. 51 on René Rapin, Instruction sur l’histoire, (Paris: SebastienMarbre‐Cramoisy,1677).423Levillain,LeProcèsdeLouisXIV,28.424Laraisond’ÉtatetBouclierduParlement(Paris;JeanHénoult,1649),p.6.425Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,100‐101.426HansW.Blom,‘Oorlog,handelenstaatsbelanginhetpolitiekdenkenrond1648’,Dezeventiendeeeuw13(1997),89‐96.427Munsters Vrede‐Praetje. Vol alderhande Opinien/ off d’AlgemeeneWel‐vaert deser Landen in Oorlogh off Vredebestaat.Deliberantdumfingerenesciunt(1646).QuotationfromC3leftpageandonwar‐drivenFrenchgrandeesseeC2 rightpage: ‘omonderdiepretextdenOorlogh te continueren.WantdeGroote inVranckrijck soeckenhaer selfdeurderOorloghnoodtsaeckelijckbesaemt,rijck,endemachtichtemaecken.l’Appetitvientenmangeant.’
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abundantly sold or newly created offices. This should, nevertheless, not be interpreted as a
triumph of the monarch over its elites, but rather as a relative re‐stabilisation of European
monarchies. The revitalised co‐operation and consensus resulted in the capacity to maintain
larger armies and pursue prolonged warfare. Stable monarchies were based on the secure
relationship between its rulers and elites, i.e. negotiated power‐sharing with churches
(‘confessionalisation’),withnobles(armyoffices)andwithnewpowergroups(creditors).428
In the combination with the urge for dynastic acquisition and the European war
competition, these revitalisedmonarchies couldattractaccusationsof ‘despotic’or ‘absolutist’
rule,andLouisXIV’sreignformedthepivotalexample.However,scholarshiphasdebunkedthe
the modern notion of ‘absolutism’ and underlined that while Louis presented himself as an
‘absolute’ ruler and the Sun King (although most images represented Louis as Mars not
Apollo429), in practice he did not rule without consent or consultation of the Estates and
parlements (provincial high courts). ‘Absolutism’ (a late‐eighteenth century coinage), or
‘absolute’ rule was executed in theory.430 After periods of severe civil conflicts and political
factions,not leastby the regenciesof the1610s and1640s, the imageof theLouis’sBourbon
monarchywasmarketedonanunprecedentedlevelfromthe1660sonwards.Yet,stressingthe
absolutenatureofmonarchywasnonewargumentnorarchetypal fortheBourbons.Itserved
the restoration of the ‘natural’ order of society, an obsession for Louis and many of his
contemporaries.431 At the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries,
‘absolute’ was used as a legitimate adjective, meaning the Crown had no superior within or
withouttherealm,asingleultimatesourceoflaw(neverthelesssubjectedtodivineanddivinely‐
inspired natural law), but in the course of the seventeenth century under polemical
manipulation itbecamedefinedasarbitrary,andthusas illegitimaterule,often inconjunction
with ‘tyranny’ and ‘despotic’ rule.432 It is then, important to keep distinct the negative use of
terms in the ambit of absolute from claims actually made in the name of sovereign, legal
authority. It is confusion on this score that construes recognition of co‐operation between
monarchs and elites as exposing amyth of absolutism. Co‐operationhardly compromised the
principleofanultimatesovereignauthority,itwasratherameansbywhichitcouldbeexercised
428Henshall,TheZenithofMonacrhy.429Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,104.430NicholasHenshall,TheMythOfAbsolutism:ChangeAndContinuityInEarlyModernEuropeanMonarchy(London:Longman,1992);RichardBonney,TheLimitsofAbsolutisminAncienRégimeFrance(Aldershot,1995);RonaldA.Aschand Heinz Duchardt, Der Absolutismus‐‐ein Mythos?: Strukturwandel monarchischer Herrschaft in West‐ undMitteleuropa (ca.1550‐1700) (Bölhau, 1996); S.J. Barnett,TheEnlightenmentandReligion:TheMyths ofModernity(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003); Collins, The State in EarlyModern France; William Beik, ‘TheAbsolutismofLouisXIVasSocialCollaboration’,PastandPresent188:1(2005)195‐224;Sommerville,‘EarlyModernAbsolutism’.431Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,101‐102.432GlennBurgess,‘Tyrants,AbsoluteKings,ArbitraryRulersandTheCommonwealthofEngland:SomeReflectionsonSeventeenth‐Century English Political Vocabulary’, in Cesare Cuttica and Glenn Burgess (eds.), Monarchism andAbsolutisminEarlyModernEurope(London:Pickering&Chatto,2012),147‐158.
111
or expressed, especially in a world in which bureaucratic apparatus of the state was
rudimentary,erraticorhardlyexistent.Co‐operationwas,however,somethingthatsat illwith
absolute rule construed as tantamount to tyranny. But it is equally important not to take the
legitimatingclaimsofabsolutesovereignruleatfacevalue.
Thetwentyyears’crisisoftheFrenchmonarchy(1635‐1654)wasfollowedbyaperiod
of restoration in which the government was restructured from the late 1650s onwards, a
relativepeacewasreturned, taxdeclined,andcommercialactivities increased tonewheights.
The year 1661marked supposedly a sharp discontinuity inwhich Louis XIV seized ‘personal
rule’.However,whatwasattackedby theFrondepamphlets in1648‐1652,wasnotLouisXIV
himself,but theearlier influenceof the firstMinisterRichelieuandnowMazarin. Inawaythe
personal rule from1660s onwardswaswhat these pamphleteers hadwanted. Louis XIV did
makehimselfchiefministerafterMazarin’sdeathinthatsameyear,andformedanewcouncilof
state, cleansed frompotential factions of the princes of the blood, theQueenMother and the
chancellorofFrance.ThenewCouncilofStatehadfourmembers:Fouquet,quicklyfollowedup
by Colbert (finances), Michel Le Tellier (war), Hugues de Lionne (foreign affairs) and Louis
himself. Financial reorganisation entailed replacement of the older council of finances and a
reduction the number of intendants. However, Louis could not run government without the
cooperationofthemanyestablishedofficesheldbythelocalelitesoftherealm.TheCrownruled
not by a supposed build‐up of the standing army and bureaucracy, but through collaboration
with thevarioussocietalgroups inorder to respondmoreadequately to immediateproblems
raisedbywarfare.433
Althoughwe shouldnot overstate Louis’s power inmilitary appointments (in practice
arrangedbythelocalrulingmilitaryelitethroughfamilyconnections),underLouisthemilitary
wasfurtherreformed,rootedinLouisXIII’sabolitionorcurtailmentofsomeindependenthigh
military offices.During the1660s and1670s Francehad amore efficient andbetter supplied
armythanintheThirtyYears’War,whichservedLouis’smajorwars,i.e.theWarofDevolution,
theFranco‐DutchWar (1672‐1679), theWarof theLeagueofAugsburg (1689‐1697),and the
WaroftheSpanishSuccession(1702‐1714),ofwhichthefirsttwowarsresultedinconsiderable
advantages for the Frenchmonarchy. After the Peace of Pyrenees in 1659 the French forces
werereducedtoasizeofaround50,000men,butafter1665Louisincreaseditandby1667he
had massed an army of 80,000.434 The death of his father‐in‐law, King Philip IV, the heavy
reductionofarmytroopsintheSpanishNetherlandsandthefavourablecircumstancesofother
European regimes locked in warfare or in France’s diplomatic schemes, paved the way for
Louis’squicksuccesses, insixthmonthscapturing themost importantcities, suchasofDouai,
433Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,100‐115.434Lynn,TheWarsofLouisXIV,106.
112
Lille, Courtai, and Tournai. The signing of the Triple Alliance between the Dutch Republic,
EnglandandSwedenobstructedLouis’splans,forthetimebeing.
Louis gained the conquered northern cities, but had to return Franche‐Comté. As his
successes in the war were not matched by the territorial gains, his ministers prepared for
furtherwarfare, against the Dutch Republic. Thismarked a change in France’s orientation in
foreign affairs from aligning with the Dutch Republic since the 1560s and with the German
Princesagainstitsnaturalenemy,theHabsburg.CollinsdistinguishedthreeelementsofFrench
thinking on foreign policy,which reflected the change in European order after the decline of
Spain: the reduced Spanish threat, the domination of Dutch commerce, and the need for
expansionandstabilisednorthernfrontierstoprotectParis.ThemainthreattoLouis’sclaimsto
theSpanish‐Habsburgestateswas formed,notbySpain,butby theDutchRepublic(especially
Holland)andtheGermanprinces,whoannulledtheLeagueoftheRhinewithLouisin1668.435
4.2Bouclier:reasonofstate,EuropeanlegalorderandtheFrenchhazard
Thepresent analysis ofBouclierwill unravel Lisola’s specific reversal ofRohan’sDeL’interest
thatledtoarevitalisationofaccusationsofuniversalmonarchyanddefencesofthebalanceof
power in lateseventeenth‐centuryanti‐Frenchpropaganda.Secondly, itwillscrutinizeLisola’s
negative image of France; how he complemented Rohan’s portrayal of Spain, as a predatory
monarchybasedontheruleofconquestwithimplicitaccusationsofadespoticrule.However,
thisreversaloccurspredominantlyintheculminatingsixthandlastpartofthebook,inwhichhe
presentshisinterestanalysisofSpainandFrance.So,firstwewilldiscussthepreface,wherein
theformerlawyercolourfullyoratesabouttheFrenchlegaltractsdefendingLouisXIV’sclaimon
theSpanishNetherlandsandverygentlybuildsuphiscase that theallegedgloriousandmost
ChristianKingLouiswasinfacttheinstigatorofthesedefamatorybooklets.Thenwewill look
intoapartofLisola’slegalrebuttalthatoutlineshissupposeddesignforuniversalmonarchy.
4.2.1Preface:agentleattackonLouisXIV
Lisola opened Bouclierwith a vivid image ‐which we observed in Rohan’s depiction of the
Spanish interest436 and we will see later revived by Valkenier‐ of rulers lulled into sleep by
seemingly assured alliances and treaties. The imperial diplomat spoke about ‘we’ meaning 435Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,116‐118.436Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,9‐10:‘sheweadesireofpeace,therebytocastothersasleepe,andinthemeanetimepreparehimselftowarre,fortosurprisethevnprouided.’
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Habsburg‐Spain, ‘rested quietly under the shade of Peace’ (of the Pyrenees) but awakened by
Frenchwarpreparationsandby‘diverseLibells’.Theselibelswere:‘theusualfore‐runnersofWar
(…)spredupanddownpromiscuouslyamongsttheNobilityandtheCommonpeopletoseducehis
Majestie’sfaithfulSubjects,undercolourofsomePretensionsofthemostChristianQueenuponall
these Provinces.’437 And he immediately named three titles, one of which we have discussed
above,TraitédesdroitsdelaReineTres‐ChrestiennesurdiversEstatsdelaMonarchied’Espagne
by Antoine Bilain and yet another by Bilain titled Dialogue sur les droits de la reine Très‐
Chrétienne (1667) and the anonymousSoixante‐quatorze raisonsquiprouventplusclairque le
jourquelarenonciationfaiteparlareineMarie‐Thérèsed'Autricheensoncontratdemariageaux
couronnesetEstatsde feuPhilippe IV,sonpère,estnulle(1666).Lisolausedtheseprimarily to
sumupthe‘Pretentions’oftheFrenchCrown,whichwerearguedbytheallegedinvalidityofthe
Queen’s renunciationof her rights to theHabsburgpossessions, and towarnof the extensive
territorialcompensationFranceclaims.438
WithsustainedironyandconsiderablerelianceonthetropeoflitotesLisolaarguedthat
‘themostChristianKing’couldhaveneverauthorisedthepublicationof‘suchWritings’.Notethat
henot oncenamedLouisXIVbutpersistently calledhimby this traditional French royal title
purportedly accorded by the Papacy to the Frankish King Clovis. Lisola built up this case so
colourfully that in theend the readerwouldhaveassumed that theoppositewas in fact true;
Louis XIV authorised thewriting and distribution of these texts and the French kingwas no
guardian of peace, justice or religion. First of all Lisola argued that the pamphletsweremere
‘passe‐volants’,and‘theeffectsofsomeidlePens’,theircontents‘irregular’and‘brittle’andtheir
style ‘unhandsome’.439Besides, arguing from the standpoint of justice, and the ties andbonds
betweentheFrenchandSpanishKings,itispurelogictobelievethatLouiswouldfirstexhaust
allmeansbeforepursuingwarfare.Moreover,theFrenchKinghadguaranteedthepreservation
of thesignedpeacebetween the twodynasties.Thus,Lisola reasoned that theSpanishCrown
couldonlybelievethegoodintentionsofFrance,addingtheinfancyoftheSpanishKingCarolus
II,Louisbrother‐in‐law,asafurtherreasonnottoexpectanyintendedharmfromFrance.Asthe
FrenchinvasionintheSpanishNetherlandswasalreadyinprocessbythetimeofpublicationof
Bouclier the reader would definitely know that the French indeed pursued warfare in
contradiction to theirpeace treaties.Lisola restated thatbypointing to theFrenchsupport to
PortugalinitsrevoltagainstHabsburg‐Spain(1640‐1668).Thisprovedthat‘FaithofTreatiesof
Oath were much inferior to the Interest of State’ in (as the reader would have to conclude)
Frenchpolitics.ButthebeliefthatLouisdidnotauthorisethesewritingscrumbled,whenword
437[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.[italicsinoriginalquotes]438[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.439[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.
114
wasreceived that these libelswerepresentedat theStatesGeneralof theDutchRepublic, the
ImperialDietandeventosomeprincesoftheHolyRomanEmpire.
He ventured on by claiming his patriotic duty towards: ‘myKing,my Country and the
Publick’ to rebut ‘false impressionswhich theartificeofa slightEloquence,muchmore then the
solidityofReasons,mightproduceintheopinionofcredulousspirits,notthoroughlyversedinour
LawsandCustomes.’440 By analysing the primary legal tracts, such as the peace andmarriage
treaties, he allegedly discovered factual ‘Falshoods’, ‘malicious Artifices’ and ‘hyperbolic
Exaggerations’ in these legal analyses of the French publicists, especially slander towards the
personof thepreviousSpanishKingPhilip IV.Thereaderhadtounderstand itas treacherous
propaganda ‘to castdust in the eyesof theneighbouringPrinces’ and ‘topervert thepeople’.441
Conversely, but surely most deliberately, he ended his preface with several hyperbolic
exaggerationsregardingLouisXIV’sdemeanour. Insteadofdisplayingsomerespectandcredit
forLouisXIV,LisolamockedLouisXIVthroughembellishedpraises:
‘Thoughwe cannot doubt of theApprobationwhich themost ChristianKing hath
given to those injuriousWritings, I cannot yetbepersuaded thathe ever took the
pains to reade themover,andwill ratherbelieve (tohishonour) thathisweighty
Affairs,andhisgreatapplicationtothisloftieArming,havesotakenupallhistime,
thathehadnonetosparetocasthiseyesuponworkswhichhavesolittlesympathy
withhisgeniusandQualitie.(…)hehastoomuchGenerosity,andLovefortheQueen
his Consort, to suffer that any should so unworthily defame theReputation of his
Father‐in‐Law (…)hehath toomuch Justice, topermit that they shouldmake the
mosttenderFatherandbestofKingspassforaTyrant,constraininghisDaughter,by
a barbarous Disinheriting her, or a Cheater (…) he hath too great a minde, to
approve of triflingupon Jewels, or todesire thatanaccompt byway of Inventory
shouldbegivenhimofall theKnackswhichbelonged to theQueenhisMother‐in‐
Law,andthatalltheEarthshouldbealarmedaboutaDomestickconcernment(…)
hehathtoomuchPrudenceandloveforTruth,evertoconsenttothepublicationof
somany falseAllegations so inconsideratelypacked togetheroneupon thebackof
another;notquestioningatall,but ifthathehadattentivelyconsideredthem,they
wouldhavetouchedhimwithjustindignationagainstthosewhohavesoimpudently
abusedhisName’.442
440[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.441[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.442[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.
115
Theseconsiderations,Lisolaclaimed,weremucheasiertobelieve,leavingthereadertoassume
thattheoppositeisactuallytrue.HeevenwrotethathisrebuttalmightconvincetheKing: ‘the
soliditieofourreasonswillnotonelyconducetofortifiethePeople,andpersuadetheneighbour‐
Princes,butevenpiercetheheartofthemostChiristianKing;(…)andhavingovercomebyReasons,
wehopethattheArbiterofSovereignsandsupremeProtectorofJusticewillnotletussinkunder
theweight of his arms.’443 The indirect criticism of Louis in the preface ended with a rather
incredible disclaimer, but traditional in the sense of not blaming the ruler but his advisors
instead:‘IpretendthemostChristianKing’sSacredPersontobeexcepted;andthatIdoascribeall
theEvilswhichareintendedtowardsusonelytothosemeanIncendiarieWriters’.444
Oneotherissueoftheprefacedeservesourattention,i.e.theuseofthevocabularyand
imageryofreasonofstate.AfterclaiminghispatrioticdutyLisolaexclaimedthathehasafurther
obligationtowardstheneighbouringrulersto‘letthemevidentlyunderstand,thatallthePretexts
withwhichtheFrenchdolabourtodisguisethevastDesignsthattheyhaveinhand,arebutfalse
colourstomaskthetrueSpringwhichgivestheMotiontothisMachine,andtomakeanAmbition
whichgoesatagreatpace to theUniversalMonarchiepassunder the veilof Justice.’445 Aswe
witnessedinthechapteronRohan,acommontoposofreasonofstatewritingswastheunveiling
of the malicious motives and actions of rulers and/or his advisers, hidden behind masks or
coveredunder cloaksofmorality, legality and religion.More interestingly, in this exclamation
LisolausedtheconclusivephraseofRohanregardingtheSpanishinterest:‘Thishugeframe[the
French original text states ‘machine’, MBK] composed of so many parts, and as it were
incumberedwithitsowneweight,mouesbyitssecretsprings,whichloosetheir forceeuenas
they are discouered.’446 Butwhereas Rohan’s argumentwas to unveil Spain’s vast designs of
universalmonarchyhiddenbehindaCatholiczeal,LisolamadehiscaseofunveilingtheFrench
cloakoflegality,oftheirlegalclaimswhichwereamerecoverupfortheirplanstoestablishan
universalmonarchy.
4.2.2Firstfivearticles:legalrebuttalandtheimageofapredatorymonarchy
Painstakingly Lisola subjected Louis’s legal claims to forensic legal analysis in the first five
articles. He integrated the legal arguments of French writers as Bilain and Aubery and then
rebuttthese.Thetitlesrevealwellthecontent:
443[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.444[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.445[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.446Rohan,ATreatise of the Interest of the Princes and States of Christendome, 12; Henri de Rohan,De l’intérêt desprinceset lesEtatschrétienté,19; ‘Cettegrandemachine composéesde tantdepartieset commeempêchéede sonproprepoidss’émeutparcessecretsressortsquiperdentleurforceàmesurequ’ilssontdécouverts.’
116
(1)‘Of theEndswhichFRANCEdothproposeunto it self in thisWar,and in these
Libells’; (2) ‘That theEntryof theKingofFrance into theEstatesof theCatholick
King in the Low‐Countries is a evidentRupture’; (3) ‘That thisRupture is unjust,
admittingthattheRight[s]ofthemostChristianKingwerewellfounded’;(4) ‘That
theRenunciationof theFrenchQueen is just, irrevocable,necessary,andusefull to
thePublickgood,norcontainsinitselfanycauseofNullitieorLæsion;andthatthe
QueenofFrancehathbeendulyDoted’;(5) ‘ThattheSuccessionoftheSoveraigntie
of theDutchyofBrabant,andotherProvinces,whichare specified in theseLibells,
oughtnottoberegulatedbyparticularCustoms.’447
SincewearemoreconcernedwithLisola’suseofthelanguageofreasonofstateandhisimageof
theFrenchmonarchy,wewillconcentrateonthefirstarticleinwhichheoutlinesLouis’sdesign
foruniversalmonarchy.
Immediately Lisola attacked ‘the dull conceit’ of the writers of the French libels, and
indirectlycondemnedLouisXIV’sdouble‐dealings:
‘TheauthoroftheseLibells(…)extollsthelovewhichhisMasterhathforPeace,at
the very instantwhen he is breaking it; (…) he requires Peace, and bringsWar;
attaques without Rupture, forces without constraint, and plaies with so much
contempt upon the Ignorance and Credulity which he supposes to be in the
JudgmentofhisReaders,thathewillneeds(sic.)havethewayofFacttopassfor
Justice,ViolenceforModeration,UsurpationforTitle,andDefenceforaCrime’.448
ThepurposeoftheFrenchpropagandawasnotonlytosoftenthe‘ugliness’and‘Scandal’ofthe
militaryoffensive,butalsotolegitimisewarandmis‐usethepromotionofpeaceasameansto
erectan ‘AbsoluteEmpire’.449With ‘absolute’,Lisola referred touniversaldominion,andaswe
willseebelow,intermsofarbitraryrule, inparticularahouseholdrule.Lisolaarguedthatthe
promisesofFrance, that theyonlypursuedanhonesttreatywithSpainandthattheypursued
warfareagainsttheirwill,werecontraryto‘ActionsandMotions[which]tendtowardavastand
deepDesign’:toestablishanuniversalmonarchy.450
Lisola’s casedependson the useof paradiastole, or subdistinctio, that is re‐describing
the evidence of his opponents to mean the opposite of what they claim; and by this he is
447[Lisola],TheBuckler,1‐19;20‐41;42‐84;85‐173;173‐273.448[Lisola],TheBuckler,1‐2.449[Lisola],TheBuckler,4.450[Lisola],TheBuckler,6.
117
continuing the established idiomof criticismby unmasking secret designs and evil intent.He
referred to the considerable armature, the excessive expenditures in their foreign relations,
forming alliances, instigating conflicts between other rulers, exemplified by their support for
Sweden in the Thirty Years War and the French intermeddling in the issue of the Polish
succession.451Thesewere:
‘proofs capable to convince the darkest understandings, that all this immense
PreparationofArmsandIntrigueshathsomethinginitofgreaterextentthenthe
bareConquestofsomeProvinces,(whichourover‐muchCredulityhathexposedto
themas aprey) andendsnot in a simpledesireof tearingaway a fewpiecesof
thembyaTreatie.ThesehugeMountainsarenottobringforthMice,buttovomit
outFlamesastheVesuve,tosetthewholeneighbouringCountriesonfire.’452
Time and again Lisola put forth the image of France as a predatory monarchy, driven by
rapaciousconquest,nottobestoppedafteritsviolentplunderoftheSpanishLowCountries.
Furthermore, Lisola discredited the person of the King. Louis XIVwas spoon‐fedwith
desires for conquest and military glory. Colbert supposedly educated him by virtue of the
historiesoftheBishopofRhodes453inthespiritofLouis’sgreat‐grandfatherHenryIV,thefirst
BourbonKing;
‘Hehath,inimitationofhim,takengreatcaretoaccumulatemuchTreasure,sought
forAlliances abroad, and at lengthhath raisedmost powerfullArmies.Wemust
thereforeconclude,thatheactsupontheverysameDraughts;andthatallwesee
atpresentarebutrenewedProjects,andtheeffectsofthoseImpressionswhichhe
hathsuckedinwithhismilk.’454
Louis XIV set up similar war efforts to those of Henry IV: accumulation of money, external
warfare,andcontrolling largearmies.However,Lisolawarnedthereader thatbecauseLouis’s
reignentailedalongerperiodandamorepowerfulstandthanthatofHenryIV,andthedesireof
gloryhadnobounds, ‘sowecannot reasonablyexpect that theswiftnessof theRihneshallbe
abletostophim’.455Moreover,Louis’swritershadnourishedhiminthesethoughtsofmilitary
gloryandconquestswithgreatdiligence,asLisolareferredtothepreviouslydiscussedAubery’s
DesjustesPrétensionsduRoysurl’Empire. 451[Lisola],TheBuckler,6.452[Lisola],TheBuckler,6‐7.453PaulPhilippeHardouindeBeaumontdePéréfixe,HistoireduroyHenryleGrand(Amsterdam1661).454[Lisola],TheBuckler,7.455[Lisola],TheBuckler,8.
118
The imperial diplomat presented evidence that in fact France pursued no peace with
Habsburg‐Spain. The French support to the Portuguese in their revolt against Spain and,
secondly,invalidatingMariaTheresa’srenunciationdestroyedtheentirePeaceofthePyrenees
betweenFranceandSpain.ThepeacetreatythattheWarofDevolutionwouldbringforthwould
onlyserveasapretextforfurtherconquests;
‘Thepeacewhich shall bemade cannotbebut the seedof a newWar; itwill be
impossible to cut the evil by the root. ‘Tis here were the Mediators shall find
themselves puzzled: and if all their Pretensions be granted, then will they be
absoluteMastersof theNetherlands,and inaconditiontotakepossessionbythe
same Title not onely of that part of Brabant of which the States of the United
Provincesstandpossessed,butalsoofalltherestoftheirCountreys’.456
He concluded the first article with an exclamation to all European politicians: France ‘aims
absolutelyattheentireDestructionofaMonarchywhichistheBulwarkofalltherest(...)Itis
lefttowisePoliticianstomakenecessaryreflexionsuponamatterofsuchhighconcernment.’457
In his legal rebuttal Lisola pinpointed the illegitimate rule of conquest by France. He
emphasised the French breach of law, French war crimes, which would become recurrent
themes in lateranti‐Frenchpolemics.Lisola likewisestressedFrance’s threat to theEuropean
legalorder.Theinvasionwascontrarytothe‘LawofNations’,tothe‘customsandpracticeofthe
CivilandMunicipalLaws’.Moreover,nottocallitawar,accordingtoLisola,wastodenythatthe
militaryoffensivecouldbejudgedbythe‘LawofWar’and,consequently,renderedit:
‘… aDepredation andPiracie; and if it be not an infringing of thePeace, it is an
unjustAttempt,whichgivesa shock toallLawsandForms. (...) theydestroy the
principal Foundation of it, and take from themselves the means of establishing
theirConquestupontherightofWar,bydeclaringthattheywillConquerwithout
breakingthePeace.’458
ThroughoutBouclierLisolawarnedaboutuniversallossoflegalityifLouisdevolutionclaimsand
hisinvasionoftheSpanishNetherlandsweregrantedvalidity: ‘IfSovereigntieswereregulated
byLocalCustoms(…)TheorderoftheWorld(…)mustbeabsolutelyoverthrown’.459
456[Lisola],TheBuckler,16.457[Lisola],TheBuckler,19.458[Lisola],TheBuckler,24‐25.459[Lisola],TheBuckler,175.
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4.2.3Sixtharticle:interestofstate
The sixth article of Bouclier is ourmain object of inquiry, since here Lisola puts forward an
interestanalysisofSpainandFrance,andpresentsthereaderwithhispoliticalargumentagainst
theillegitimacyofFrance’smilitaryoffensiveandinfavourofanalliancebetweenthedifferent
authorities of the Holy Roman Empire and Habsburg‐Spain against Louis XIV.460 Lisola
understoodwellthepowerofthelanguageofreasonofstatetoinfluencetheopinionofabroad
public,moreinfluentialthanhislegalrebuttalandtouchinguponaEuropean‐widereadership.
Ashewrotetellingly‘InterestofState(…)ismoreuniversall,andmoreconsideredatthisdayin
theWorld’than‘thestrictObligationofJustice.’461Thelawyerexplicitlydistinguishedthisarticle
fromthepreviousfiveones,claimingto‘resolvetoshakeoffallmannerofinteressedthoughts
whichImayhaveformyparts;(…)IwillfoundmyDiscourseonnootherPrinciplesbutthose
whichIshalldrawoutofFrenchAuthors.’462
ItunderlineswhatwealreadyhavediscussedinthechapteronRohan,thattheidiomof
reasonofstatewasappropriatedbytheFrenchCrownunderRichelieubutincreasinglyturned
intoaweaponagainstgovernmentduring,whatCollinscalls, ‘thetwentyyears’crisisof1635‐
1654’.463 As has also been noted, from the 1660s the French Crown sponsored writings of
panegyricshistoryprincipallycelebratingLouisXIVandofarchivally‐basedclaimstoHabsburg
possessions, instead of employing reason of state.464 Through ironic inversion, Lisola turned
these features of French public discourse against France, just as he exploited and redirected
Rohan’sunderstandingofSpanishinterest.Asheasserted,‘theydarenolongermakeuseofthat
ridiculousscarecrowoftheUniversalMonarchieaimedatbytheSpaniards.’465Aswereadinthe
chapter on Rohan, interest analysis was a means to address the true chaos of interrelated
Europeanwarfareandcivilconflicts,andsimultaneouslytosatirisecertainpoliticalactions.We
findbothelementsinBouclier.Asalreadystated,perhapsthepureironyforusisthatRohanalso
employed the language of reason of state in a satiric way, and that, furthermore, later anti‐
French polemics by Dutch and English authors were indebted to a French Huguenot author
defendingtheBourbondynastyandaSpanishCatholiclawyeradvocatingtheHabsburgdynasty.
ItistothespecificinversionofRohan’scasethatwecannowturn.
460[Lisola],TheBuckler,273‐311.461[Lisola],TheBuckler,274,273.462[Lisola],TheBuckler,276.463Collins,TheState inEarlyModernFrance, 71;Catteeuw, ‘L’inacceptable faceauxnécessitéspolitiques’;Gauchet,‘L’Etataumiroirdelaraisond’Etat’.464Soll,PublishingThePrince.465[Lisola],TheBuckler,299.
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First,Lisolare‐employedRohan’simageofthe‘commonBulwark’againsta‘vastdesign
for conquest’,466 an image that later anti‐French writings often reiterated as the entity to be
protected against the barbaric Frenchmen.467 However, he enhanced the image of the rule of
conquest with addressing its consequence for the liberty of Europe: slavery. He states in
hyperbolicterms:
‘ItisourpurposetodefendthecommonBulwarkagainstavastDesign,whichhath
for its cause nothing but the predominant desire of Conquests, for its end
Dominion,foritsmeansArmsandIntricacies,norforitslimitsanythingbutwhat
Chancewillprescribe.Infine,weareheretodecidethefortuneofEurope,andto
pronouncetheSentenceeitherofitsFreedomorSlaverie.’468
‘CommonBulwark’ referred to theHabsburg estates in the SpanishNetherlands, aswell as a
more abstract notion of fencing off the European legal order against France’s. Apart from
slavery,LisolacomplementedRohan’simageofthepredatorymonarchybystatingthatFrance
threatenedtosubvertthe‘LawofNations’,‘PublickFaithoftreaties’, ‘LawofArms’established
bythe‘UniversalConsentofallNations’,andto‘destroythewholeCommerceofmankind’and
‘render humane Societies as dangerous as the company of Lions and Tigers.’469 The French
invasion in the Spanish Netherlands meant the first step towards their design of universal
monarchy.ThisisalsowitnessedinhiscomparisonoftheFrenchthreatwiththeTurkishthreat
toEurope.With‘bulwark’RohanhadmeanttheFrenchdefenceofthelibertiesofChristendom
againstSpain’srapacioustyranny.Lisolaviewedthe
‘UnionoftheempiretothepowerofSpaininthepersonofCharlestheVthwasrathera
step to the design of becoming greater, then any addition to his power (…) this
powerfulMonarchieseemstohavebeenraisedbyGodtobe theBulwarkof therest,
againsttheTurkinHungarieandinItalie,againsttheMoorsinSpain,andagainstFrance
bothintheLow‐CountreysandItalie’.470
466BothFrenchoriginalsuses‘boulevard’;Lisola,Bouclier,317;Rohan,Del’interest,17;Rohan,‘commonbulwark’:ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,16andSpanishdesignforuniversalmonarchy:2,5,7,9(aselection).467TonyClaydon,‘Protestantism,UniversalMonarchyandChristendominWilliam’sWarPropaganda1689‐1697,inEsther Meijers en David Onnekink, RedefiningWilliam: the impact of the King‐Stadholder in international context(Aldershot:Ashgate,2007),125‐142,p.140.468[Lisola],TheBuckler,275.469[Lisola],TheBuckler,274.470[Lisola],TheBuckler,281.
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The ‘rest’ signifies the Freedom of Europe that was threatened with slavery by these
Conquerors,includingtheFrenchdespoticmonarchy.NotethatLisoladidusethetermEurope
as an intellectual and political entity in danger of France’s universal monarchy, as well as,
althoughtoalesserextent,theword‘Christendom’.
Spain’sascendancyhadcaused‘Envy,wehaveseengrowingintheheartofFrance the
lamentableseedsofthisunjustEmulation,whichforsomanyyearstogetherhathproducedall
theMisfortunes&TroublesofChristendom.’Therefore,hearguedthat theprincipalmotiveof
French publicists was ‘to diffuse this Jealousy everywhere’ rendering Habsburg ‘a fearfull
Phantasm’andFranceas‘theonelyPerseus’sabletodeliverfetteredEuropefromthefuryofthis
ChimericalMonster’,butthat in factFrancedidnotwanttoprotect theEuropeansagaisntthe
allegedSpanishenemy,butaimed‘tobecometheirMasters,andmakethemtheInstrumentsof
theirEnds.’Lisolacontendedthat:
‘ThisArtificewassosuccessfull,thatapartofEuropeputitselfinArmsagainstthe
Valour and Good fortune of Charles the Vth, and the profound Wisedom of his
Successour:andallthisCommotionwasfoundedupononeonelyPrincipleofState
which the FrenchWriters have establishedwith an extraordinary diligence, and
uponwhich theDukeofRohanhadmade [run] allhisTreatiseof the Interestof
Princes;ThattherearetwoPowersinChristendomwhichbelikethetwoPoles,from
whencealltheInfluencesofPeaceandWardodescendupontheotherStates.From
whencehedrawsthisMaximetoregulate theConductofallotherPrinces, [t]hat
theirprincipal Interest is tohold theBalancesoequallybetwixt these twoGreat
Monarchies’.471
Thus French publicists stirred up European rulers against Spain keeping all European rulers
lockedincombatwhiletheysecretlysetuptheirdesignforuniversalmonarchybytheprinciples
ofinterestofstate.Rohan’sDe l’interestwastheexplicitblueprintofFrance’sdesign.Although
the imperial diplomat found that Rohan ‘doth applie thisMaxime [tomaintain the balance of
powerbetweenSpainandFrancethrougharmsornegotiations]veryilltotheparticularuseof
France’,472hebelievedthatitentailedacertaintruth.Yet,theeffectivepropagandaofFranceled
EuropeanrulersintobelievingthatSpainfunctionedastheunbalancingfactor‘andthatbythis
very reason of State they were obliged to put the Counterpoise into the French Scale of
Balance.’473LisolareferredtothebalanceofpoweronlywithdirectreferencetoRohaninorder
totransmitthethreatoftheimpendinguniversalmonarchyfromSpaintoFrance.Therefore,to 471[Lisola],TheBuckler,277‐278.472[Lisola],TheBuckler,278.473[Lisola],TheBuckler,279.
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persuade theEuropeanrulersof theerror theyhadmade inabandoning ‘their trueReasonof
State’474hecomparedthesystemsofruleofFranceandSpainbytheirgeographicalsituation,the
nature of the rulers andpeoples, themaximsof government and the specific history for each
regime up till now. As we have discussed earlier, Rohan’s interest analyses of the two
monarchies contained exactly the same variables, but now Lisola had added an important
componenttotheequation:thenatureoftherespectiverulersandpeoples.Thiswillservetoset
forththemonarchiesassystemsofruleaccordingtothenatureofthepeoples:peacefulandlaw‐
abiding(theSpanish) inoppositiontoaggressive,rebelliousandsavage‐like(theFrench),asa
resultrenderingtheFrenchregimedespotic.
4.2.4TheinterestofSpain:goodgovernmentversusFrance’spredatorymonarchy
Lisola turned Rohan’s image of Spain’swarmachine around, by claiming that its situation ‘is
advantagious (sic.) for its own Defence, being compassed with the Sea and the Pyrenean
Mountains: but it is inconvenient for invading other States, because of the defect of a nearer
conjunctionbetwixttheMembersthereof’.475TheSpanishdynasticagglomeratewasanuisance
fortheHabsburgs,butgivenbyGodtoactasthe‘Bulwarkoftherest’againstthebarbaric,brutal
and bellicose Turks, Moors and French. Furthermore the Habsburg rulers ‘are naturally
Courteous, and inclined to Vertue’, and more importantly not belligerent by nature at all.
AlthoughCharlesV‘lovednobleGlory’,he‘hadsolittleAmbition,thatheresignedtheEmpireto
his Brother, and all his Kingdoms to his Son’. Lisola directed his pen against Rohan’s
‘inconsistent’ representation of Philip II.476 The Huguenot warrior had written that Philip
‘finding himselfe less fit for war than civille businesses (…) prosecuted his design under a
profounddissimulation’477,bywhichRohanindirectlyreferredtoMachiavelli’sargumentabout
thedifficultiesofmaintainingconqueredpolitieswhen‘greatConqeurrours’weresucceeded,as
Rohanarguedwasoften the case,by less courageous rulers.478 Sohowcould itbe thatRohan
wasable ‘to representhim [Philip II] inoneand the same timeas anenemie toWar, andyet
ardenttoobtainConquests.’WehavereadRohan’srepresentationofPhilipassatire,describing
himasashrewdMachiavellianconqueror,notasapeacefulprince,butthelatterisexactlywhat
Lisola attempt to underline, as he writes, ‘according to the confession of the Duke of Rohan
himself,[PhilipII]hadnoinclinationatalltoArms,norevertookthemupbutforhisDefence’.479
474[Lisola],TheBuckler,279.475[Lisola],TheBuckler,280.476[Lisola],TheBuckler,282.477Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,4478Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,4‐5.479[Lisola],TheBuckler,282.
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The same ‘rare Clemency’ applied to Philip’s successors, states Lisola.480 Moreover, whereas
RohanspeaksoftheSpanishpeoplesononlyoneoccasion,whenpointingtotheSpanishmaxim
of maintaining a constant state of armament ‘to keepe his Subjects in obedience’481, Lisola
reversedthisimage;‘ThepeopleofSpain,andoftheotherKingdomswhichliveunderthesame
Dominion,arenaturallyfriendstoQuietness,enemiestoNovelties,satisfied,withtheirpresent
Condition,andhavenottheleastpropensionoritchingtotroubletheirNeighbours.’482
In Rohan’s interest analysis themaxims (methods of government to achieve universal
monarchy)ofSpainstoodinoppositiontoFrenchrule;inLisola’saccounttheSpanishmaxims
‘opposethoseoftheConqerours’, i.e. theBourbon‐Frenchdynasty.However,Lisolawasnotso
muchinterestedintheSpanishmaxims,whichusuallytookupasinglesentence,butratherin
makingimplicitcomparisonswiththeFrenchmaximsandsoindirectlyassertingFrenchdesigns
of universal monarchy. The first Spanish maximwas ‘to keep inviolably the Faith of publick
Treaties, which are powerful bridles to the Ambition of a Prince who desires to extend his
Limits,anddoputgreatobstaclestohisDesigns,bymakinghimaSlavetohisWorld.’483Lisola
claimedthatnotoneHabsburgrulerhasever‘brokenorprevaricatedinanyTreatie,norbegana
War for the inlargingof theirLimits.’484The reader couldhaveeasily guessed thatLisolawas
talkingoftheFrenchdynasty,especiallyLouisXIV’sactionsconcerningtheWarofDevolution.
Louisappearsasarapaciousconqueror,justasRohandescribedPhilipII,butLisolaaddedthe
componentofahouseholdrulethatLouisasMasterwantedtoimposeonEurope.Spain’ssecond
maximwas‘[t]opreferReligionalwaysbeforeReasonofState;whichisdirectlycontrarytothe
Rule of Conquerors,who do dexterouslymake use of all sorts of Sects to compass their own
Ends.’485AsLisolahadalreadystatedbefore,Franceruledsolelybytheprincipleof interestof
state, and religionwould only be used to serve their design, as also Rohan accused Spain of
hidingtheirplansofuniversalmonarchyunderthepretextofdefendingCatholicism.Thethird
Spanishmaximwas‘NottomakeuseoftheirVictories,andtheAdvantagesoftheirArms,norof
thoseoftheirAllies’.486Yetagain,thereaderhadalreadyreadthatthiswastheexactlycasewith
France.
ThefourthmethodofSpanishgovernmentwas:
‘[t]oruleaccordingtotheLaws,andleavetheirPeopleinthepeaceablepossession
oftheirPrivileges;whichamongstConquerourswouldpassforanessential fault,
480[Lisola],TheBuckler,282‐283.481Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,10.482[Lisola],TheBuckler,283.483[Lisola],TheBuckler,283.484[Lisola],TheBuckler,283‐284.485[Lisola],TheBuckler,284.486[Lisola],TheBuckler,284.
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againstthefirstPrinciplesoftheirPoliticks,whichrequirebeforeallotherthings,
thattheymakethemselvesabsoluteandindependentathome,andthattheybreak
alltheChainsofDomestickLawswhichmighthindertheiractingsabroad.’487
Herewe finda goodexampleof implicit accusationsofwar‐drivendespoticmonarchy turned
now against Louis’s monarchy, that his rule undermined the rule of law by taking away the
privilegesofitspeoplessubvertinginternallawanddestroyingallinternalobstaclestopursue
its war politics. As we will see below, under the heading of France’s interest of state Lisola
discussedtheprocessofmakingLouisXIVan ‘absolute’rulerinordertoimposeitshousehold
ruleonEurope.ThefifthmethodofSpanishgovernmentwasagainanindirectattackonFrance’s
implicitlyputativedespoticrule:
‘Never to admitneither League, norAlliance, norCommerce, norpeacewith the
common Enemie of Christendom. This is a bad undertaking of the Design of
rendring(sic.)themselvesMastersofEurope,whentheydrawuponthemselvesthe
emulationandthehatredoftheTyrantofAsia.’488
Lisolareferredto theFranco‐Ottomanallianceof theearlymodernperiod, famouslyendorsed
by Henry IV and later by Louis XIV, andmore often than not directed against the Habsburg
dynasty.489HeexplicitlypointedtotheresultsofFrenchforeignpolicy,commerceandconduct
of war, relying on comparisons with and insinuations of Turkish tyranny: French rule was
unchristian and illegitimate, particularly cruel towards its subjects and had no regard for the
ruleoflaworprivateproperty.AsweknowfromthechapteronDelaCourt,GermanandFrench
authors shaped their accusations of ‘war despotism’ through comparisonswith a household
governmentthattreateditssubjectsasslavesexemplifiedbyspecificpracticesofOttomanand
Muscovite rule, comparisons that contributed to the erratic seventeenth‐century practice of
conflating‘tyrannical’withanhouseholdrule,i.e.‘despotic’.
4.2.5TheinterestofFrance:‘Robberies’,‘Conquerors’,‘absolute’,‘MastersofEurope’
LouisXIV’smonarchyhadtheadvantagethatit:
487[Lisola],TheBuckler,284‐285.488[Lisola],TheBuckler,285.489 Benjamin Kaplan, Divided by Faith: Religious Conflict and the Practice of Toleration in Early Modern Europe(CambridgeandLondon:HarvardUniversityPress,2007),306;SuraiyaFaroqhi,TheOttomanEmpireandtheWorldAroundIt(LondonandNewYork:I.B.Tauris,2006),73.
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‘hath all its Parts united, abounding withMen, industrious in Commerce, which
gainswiththeirBaubles490andtheirModesthemoneyofallotherNations,which
hath considerable Harbours upon the Ocean and theMediterranean Sea, and in
their neighbourhood no considerable powers to fear but that of the House of
Austria.’491
Thus, Francewas powerful by its lands,men, commerce (note that he views French clothing
fashion as an instrument to extract wealth from abroad492), and harbours all of which
strengtheneditspositioninEuropeanwarfare.WhereastheSpanishpeoplewerenaturallylaw‐
abidingandpeaceful,theFrench,however,werewar‐mindedbynature,almostsavage‐likemen,
ragingwith fire, directed by the natural urge of conquest and unconstrained by anything as,
Lisolaalreadystated,thepreceptsofreligion,orlegality.493
LisolaclaimstohavededucedtheFrenchmaxims ‘fromtheirConductbothpassedand
present,bytheirownWriters,andbythesameTreatiseoftheDukeofRohan.’494Thefirstmaxim
of French rule is to ‘entertain always War abroad and exercise their young Nobility at the
expenceoftheirNeighbours’.Forthereasonthat‘theGeniusoftheNationissuch,thatitcannot
endure to subsist long in the Idleness of Peace; theremust be Aliment for this Fire (,..), or it
wouldformtoisselfmatterathome.’Suitingthecustomesofnoblesuccessionleaving‘almost
nothingtotheyounger[brothers]buttheirIndustryandSword(…)thereisnothinglefttothem
but theWarrsorRobberies, topreservethemselves fromMiserie.’495Thusbesides thenatural
belligerenceofFrenchmen,thefinancialweaknessoftheyoungersonsofthenobilityrequires
they be distracted from causing domestic harm by being diverted to aggression abroad; ‘the
PolititiansofFrance held itnecessary to furnish themwithanothergatebywhich theymight
evaporate this Flame, which would gnaw their Bowels if it did not find another vent.’496
Furthermore,Lisolaexplicitlystates:
‘asthegreatestRevenuesoftheCrownofFranceconsistinthePurseofthePeople,
andthattheexcessiveContributionscannotbeexactedintimesofPeace,without
makingagreatmanyMalecontents;itisnecessarytofeedthemwiththesmokeof
490A‘bauble’isa‘small,showytrinketordecoration’;‘somethingofnoimportanceorworth’.AngusStevenson(ed.),OxfordDictionaryofEnglish(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010;thirdedition),140.491[Lisola],TheBuckler,285‐286.492ThisbecameacommonlygivenfeatureoftheFrenchsystemofruleinanti‐Frenchpolemics,aswewillseeinthechapteronValkenier.493 [Lisola],TheBuckler, 286. ‘Thegeniusof theNation isnaturally inclined toarms, full ofheat,unquiet, loversofNovelty,desirousofConquests,quick, active, and inclinable toallmannerofExpedientswhich they conceive tobeadvantageoustotheirparticularEnds.’494[Lisola],TheBuckler,286.495[Lisola],TheBuckler,287.496 [Lisola],TheBuckler,288.
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someConquestsandalwaystohavepretextstoremaininArms,andmaintainby
force theRoyalAuthority,whichhath so strangelyoverflowed the limitsof their
fundamentallaws.’497
InthefirstmaximofFranceweobservethesocialconstructionofthepredatorymonarchy:the
warlike nature of the people and the financialweakness of parts of the elite demandwar (to
keep them satisfied and occupied, and to keep disorder out), that in turn justifies further
taxationby theCrown,which finances furtherwarfare.A vital part of this construction is the
subversionoftheruleoflawtocreateabsoluteauthority;asincessantwarfareneedsaconstant
stateofarmature,uponwhichcoerciveforcethemasterlyrulereliestoplunderathome,aswell
asabroad.
Thesecondmaximof theFrenchsystemofrulewasto interfere inotherrulers’affairs
underthepretextofdefensivealliances,beingan‘Arbiter’and‘Mediator’,498amaximthatLisola
relocatedfromRohan’sinterestanalysisofSpainandthatinthissensewasnotanewelement
addedtotraditionaldebatesonuniversalmonarchy.499France’sthirdmethodofgovernmentis:
‘TohavefortheironelyRuletheInterestofState,sothattheFaithofTreaties,the
goodofReligion,orthetiesofBloudanAmitiecannotholdthem.‘Tisthisthatthe
Duke of Rohan puts for the fundamental Principle of all his Work; The Princes
commandoverthePeople,InterestcommandsoverPrinces.’500
Whereasmid‐seventeenthcenturyEnglishauthorsrejuvenatedtheaxiomindefenceoftherule
oflawarguingthattherulershouldabidebythe‘true’interestofstate,Lisolaturneditintothe
allegedly guiding principle of the French monarchy, unconstrained by the rule of law and
religion.AsprimeexampleLisolagivestheFrance‐Ottomanalliance.France’sfourthmaximwas
to divide and conquer ‘as much as they can forrein States’.501 Duplicitous diplomacy and
incitementtodomesticrevoltorexternalwarsLisolatooktobeapersistentfeatureofFrench
policy,citingasinstancesofinterferenceinEngland,theHolyRomanEmpire,theItalianpolities,
Denmark and Spain, and in thepresent times in Poland (Frenchmeddling at thePolish court
during the Second NothernWar) and the United Provinces (Franco‐Dutch defensive alliance
1662).As a diplomatLisolawitnessed thepowerof Frenchdiplomacy, in isolatingHabsburg‐
Spainandlater,theDutchRepublic.Heconcluded:
497[Lisola],TheBuckler,288‐289.498[Lisola],TheBuckler,289.499Rohan,ATreatiseoftheInterestofthePrincesandStatesofChristendome,9‐10.500[Lisola],TheBuckler,291.501[Lisola],TheBuckler,293.
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‘All theseMaxims are proper to Conquerours, and asmany infalliblemarks of a
vast and profound Design long ago contrived. The Predecessors of the most
ChristianKingcouldnotbringittoperfection,becausetheCivilWars,thepowerof
Spain, and the just Limits which the Royal Authoritie then acknowledged, were
powerfulBarrstostopthem:butatpresent,havingimposedathomeanabsolute
LawoveralltheirSubjects,andhavingputDissentionamongstallStrangers,there
remains nothing but that they overcome the third Impediment [the power of
Spaine],bycompleatingtheoverthrowoftheMonarchieofSpain.’502
As Lisola had already stated, ‘absolute’ rule was the first principle of conquerors to rule
independently at home, break all the domestic laws and render all property of subjects as
theirs.503‘Absolute’rule,arbitraryruleorthesubversionoftheruleoflawwasthefoundationof
theFrenchpredatorymonarchy.
Lisola’s interest analysis of France puts forth an illegitimate system of rule, absolute,
barbaric, arbitrary, unchristian, tyrannical, belligerent, according to the nature of the peoples
and theelite. It is, effectively, adespoticwarmachinerypursuingwarfare abroad toplunder
foreignpolitiestofinanceFrenchnoblemenandcoercetaxationonitsownsubjects.Againstthis
hostile image Lisola presented an example of good government, the Spanish monarchy that
ruledaccordingtopreceptsoflawandreligion,andthatconductedwarfareforthesolepurpose
ofdefence.Thesedifferences inmaximsemphasised that the realdanger toEuropeanpowers
was not Habsburg‐Spain, but France. French publicists, in particular Rohan, had deceived
EuropeanrulersandtheirnationsbypropagatingtheideaofthehazardousHabsburg‐Spanish
monarchy.Hehadneverusedtheterm‘despotic’todesignateFrance,butasRohan,hereferred
to‘theConquerors’.504However,hefurtheredthisideaofaruleofconquest:exemplifiedbythe
Turks and Moors and outlined in terms such as ‘Tyrants’, ‘absolute’, ‘Masters (of Europe)’,
‘Slavery’, ‘Piracie’, and ‘robberies’.505 The most plausible explanation for the absence of the
terminologyof‘despotic’isamatterofaposiopesis‐thetropeofleavingunstatedaconclusionan
audienceshoulddrawfor itself. It thusimplicatedthereaderintheaccusationandwasatone
withLisola’srelianceonirony,litotes,andthestudiedinterplaywithRohan’stext,withwhichhe
assumed the readerwas familiar. Furthermore, he assessed the French regime as evenmore
502[Lisola],TheBuckler,293.503 [Lisola],TheBuckler, 284‐285: ‘The fourth [maximof the Spanish interest], To rule according to the Laws, andleavetheirPeopleinpeaceablepossessionoftheirPrivileges;whichamongstConquerorswouldpassforanessentialfault,against the firstPrinciplesof theirPoliticks,whichrequirebeforeallotherthings, that theymakethemselvesabsolute and independent athome, and that theybreakall theChainsofDomestickLawwhichmighthinder theiractingsabroad.’504[Lisola],TheBuckler,forinstanceonpages283,285,292,298.505[Lisola],TheBuckler,tyrant:285;absolute:4,15,16,68,285,289,293,294,masters:277,slavery:275,piracy: ,robberies:286(amongstotherpages).
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evolved,and,consequently,beingagreaterthreatthantheseOrientalregimes;
‘All theMaximeswhich Ihaveabove relatedare thoseofConquerours;but their
[France’s] manner of executing them is so much the more to be feared, as it
consists altogether inQuickness and Activity, and that noReason of Justice, nor
anyCondescension to the InterpositionofNeighbours,andof theirownAllies, is
abletostopthecurrentofit.’506
Heusedthelanguageofreasonofstatetopersuaderulers,especiallytheGermanprincestoally
withHabsburgagainstFrance,thatistheir ‘trueReasonofState.507Inthelastpartofthesixth
articlethatcentredon‘thepreciseObligationoftheEstatesoftheEmpirefortheWarrantieof
the Circle of Burgundy’,508 he opposed the French system government ruled by the ‘sole and
supremeprincipleofRuleofInterest’509tothe‘Body’orthe‘Union’oftheHolyRomanEmpire,
whichincludestheCircleofBurgundyasa‘Member’andofwhicheverypartisobligedtodefend
theSpanishNetherlandsaccordingto‘theruleofLaw’.510Withthisargumentheeventurnedthe
secrettreatybetweenLouisandLeopoldofnotmeddlinginaffairsoutsidetheirdominionintoa
positiveargument;sincetheBurgundianCirclebelongedtotheEmpire,theEmperorhadtotake
action.511TheEuropeanlegalordershouldbeprotectedagainsttheFrenchpredatorymonarchy
striving foruniversalmonarchy,and inparticular theprincesandrulersof theEmpireshould
formanalliancewithHabsburgtocountertheFrenchoffensiveintheSpanishNetherlands;their
very interestofstaterequired it.Therefore,Lisolareasonedat theverybeginningof thesixth
articlethat:
‘There are twoMotives of different nature which ought to incite the Princes of
ChristendomtoundertakethedefenceofourCause;theoneistheInterestofState,
the other is a strict Obligation of Justice. The first regards generally all the
PotentatesofEurope;thesecondisparticularonelytothePrincesandStatesofthe
Empire: the one [interest of State] depends upon the foresight and their wise
conduct;theother[astrictObligationofJustice]isjoinedtothedutyofthelast,to
the Fundamental Laws of their State [Princes and States of the Empire], to the
506[Lisola],TheBuckler,298‐299.507[Lisola],TheBuckler,279.508[Lisola],TheBuckler,273.509[Lisola],TheBuckler,300.510[Lisola],TheBuckler,303.511[Lisola],TheBuckler,304‐307.
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Treaties of peace and Warrantie, and the reciprocal bond which unites all the
MembersofthisvastBody’.512
ByturningFrenchreasonofstateagainstLouisXIV,Lisolaconstructedthenatureoflateranti‐
Frenchpolemics: the toposof fearofuniversalmonarchy, thenotionofaEuropeanbalanceof
powerand, ironically,reasonofstatevocabulary. Its foundationwastheHuguenotRohan’sDe
l’interest whose supraconfessional and indirect attack through a putatively objective interest
analysisservedthepurposesofLisolawell.Thetwomajorelementsofhisargumentarethathe
turnedtheSpanishcaseagainstFranceandenricheditwithimplicitaccusationsofdespoticrule;
theresultiseffectively,perhapsself‐consciouslyasatiricparodyofDel’interest.Lisolapresented
a social construction of a predatorymonarchy that needs towagewar in order to delude its
peopletoextractmoretaxes,and,consequently,tomakemorewars.Theinherentenemyimage
wastransformedfromaSpanishwarmachinemisusingreligiontoaFrenchdespoticsystemof
rule,basedonthenatureofthepeoples,whowereruledasslavesandheldnopropertyrights.
LikeRohan,Lisolarequiredasupraconfessionalargumentforpersuadingforeignrulers
ofvariousconfessionstoassistinthebattleagainsttheaspiringuniversalmonarchy.TheFrench
predatory monarchy was opposed to the European legal order, to Christianity as well as a
hazard to its commerce. The term Europe was used as a political and spiritual entity and
interchangeablywithChristendom,althoughLisolaemployedthefirsttermsubstantiallymore
often.ThenotionofbalanceofpowerdidnottakecentrestageinBouclier;itwasonlyreferred
to in countering Rohan’s interest analysis of Spain’s desire to conquest and its design for
universalmonarchy.However,hedidassociatethisimageexplicitlywiththethreatofslaveryfor
allofEurope.
Lisola’swhole case reconfiguringRohan’s seminal study, struck a nerve and it proved
central to anti‐French arguments for the rest of the century. Bouclier produced serious
commotion in the Imperial Diet aswell as in France,where itwas forbidden to read Lisola’s
book.513 During the War of Devolution Lisola’s observations and plea for blocking Louis’s
expansionistplansgainednohearing,but fromtheFranco‐DutchWaronwardshisarguments
resoundedinnumerouspamphlets:Frenchbreachof law,Frenchwarcrimes, ‘Frenchtyranny’
and the imminent French universal monarchy. In the Holy Roman Empire pamphleteers
defendedthe‘Germanliberty’,andfromthestatusofProtectorGermaniaeLouisXIVwasturned
512[Lisola],TheBuckler,273‐274.513WithintheImperialDietdebatesevolved,initiallyaboutthepreciseauthorshipofBouclierandwhenitwasknownwho wrote the work, the debates centred on removing Lisola from his diplomatic office. The Emperor, however,remainedveryreticent.TheImperialCouncilofficiallyproclaimedthatBouclierwaswrittenwithoutauthorisationorconsentandthatitdidnotembodythevisionofLeopold.Rowen,Theking’sState,107;Baumanns,DaspublizistischeWerk,165‐166,197‐198,312‐314.
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intothe‘Erbfeind’and‘Antichrist’.514AswewillseeinthechapteronValkenier,theanti‐French
argument ofBouclier developed intomore vicious anddirect attacks on Louis’s rule after the
FrenchinvasionintheDutchrepublicof1672.Newelementswereintegratedinaccusationsof
universalmonarchy,suchasLouis’sdesigntosubjectEuropethroughthemisuseofthe,claimed,
office of arbiter belli et pacis; and the metaphor of the balance of power became the ideal
opponentoftheFrenchpredatorymonarchy.515Louis’sthreatto‘Christendom’wasemphasised,
in order to place his regime outside of the European Christian order, and it often implied
accusationsofanOttomansystemofrule,cruel,antichristianandbarbaric,athemeunderlined
byreferences to theearlymodernFranco‐Ottomanalliances. 516 Inaddition, the term ‘Europe’
finallyestablisheditself inthestruggleagainstLouisXIV.517Levillainconcludesthatunderthe
effectofDutchpropaganda(followingthe1672FrenchinvasionintheRepublic)Lisola’sideas
aboutFrenchuniversalmonarchytransferredintoaProtestanttaleandpermeatedAnglo‐Dutch
politicalculture.518DutchandEnglishpamphleteersappealedtothedefenceofthe‘Libertiesof
Europe’ often in conjunction with the rationale of the freedom of commerce, the Protestant
religion(especiallyaftertheRevocationoftheEdictofNantesin1685),andthe‘interests’and
‘balanceofEurope’.Helmut SchmidtbelievesLisola lay the foundationsof thesenewpolitical
overtonesof ‘Europe’ byaddressing the threatof Louis’s striving for auniversalmonarchy to
Europe’s liberty,religionandcommerce.519 It is inthiscontextofhighlystructuredhostilityto
FrenchpolicythatwecanpartiallyplaceValkenier.
514Wrede,DasReichundseineFeinde,48‐49,325‐327,330,332‐333,337,378‐380.515Bosbach,‘TheEuropeandebateonuniversalmonarch’,84.516TonyClaydon,‘Protestantism,UniversalMonarchyandChristendom’,125‐142.517AlreadyusedinthewarswiththeOttomansreceivedvariousconnotationsfromthelatefifteenthcenturyonwards.See the collection of essays in Heinz Duchhardt and Andreas Kunz (eds.) Europäische Geschichte alshistoriographischesProblem(Mainz:PhilippvonZabern,1997).518Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,11,6‐7.519HelmutDanSchmidt,‘TheEstablishmentof“Europe”asaPoliticalExpression’,TheHistoricalJournal9:2(1966),172‐178. On Lisola and his Bouclier Schmidt writes on page 173: ‘The publication of the Buckler (…) in French,GermanandEnglishinthatyearhadthepurposeofchangingthatviewoftheinternationalscene.(…)[Lisola]allegedthat[France]wasplanningtheestablishmentofaCatholicUniversalMonarchyandbecomingathreattothelibertyofEurope,toreligion,andcommerce.HethusforgedanassociationwhichlinkedEuropewiththeconceptofreligiousliberty,balanceofpower,andexpandingcommerce,ideasthatcommentedthemselvesatoncetomenlikeArlingtonandSirWilliamTemple.’
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Chapter5.PetrusValkenier’s‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675):reasonofstatetorestoreorder520
As an eyewitness of the so‐called ‘Year of Disaster’ in 1672, Petrus Valkenier had seen the
powerful DutchRepublic succumb under the invading armies of Louis XIV and his allies. The
coastal provinces includingHollandwere not conquered, butwithin their citiesmassive riots
broke out. These disastrous events prompted the breakdown of the stadholderless regime
(1650‐1672). PrinceWilliam III ofOrangewas appointed stadholder and captain general; the
House of Orange‐Nassau as officeholders of the stadholderate was restored. The Grand
PensionaryofHolland,JohandeWitt,whowasgenerallyregardedastheleadingsymbolofthe
stadholderlessregime,andhisbrotherCorneliswerebrutallyslaughteredbyanangrycrowdin
TheHague.521
Inthesuccessfulbook‘tVerwerdEuropaof1675ValkenieraccusedDelaCourtofattacking
withmalicious intent thegoodnameandreputationof theprincesofOrangeandservingasa
publicistofJohandeWitt.522ValkenierbelievedthatDeWitt’sregimewastoblameforthequick
downfallof theRepublic. Inhis large treatiseValkenier tried togivea ‘PoliticalandHistorical
Account Of the true Foundations and Causes of the Wars and Revolutions in Europe,
predominantly in and surrounding the Netherlands since 1664, caused by the pretended
UniversalMonarchyoftheFrench’.523Thiswasattemptedthroughanempiricallybasedinterest
analysisofeveryEuropeanpolitycombinedwithanin‐depthhistoricalanalysisoftheregimesof
LouisXIVandDeWitt,andof theeventsof1672,withtheaimofhelpingtorestoreorder.He
relieduponandengagedwiththeotherwriterswhohavebeencentraltothisthesis:—because
520 I have published on Petrus Vakenier’s use of the vocabulary of reason of state in 2015.Marianne Klerk, “Theunheard Changes in Europe, and the strange Revolutionswhich happened in our United Provinces in our times”:reasonofstateandruleoflawinPetrusValkenier’s‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675)’,inRobertvonFriedeburgandMatthiasSchmoeckel(ed.),Recht,KonfessionundVerfassungim17.Jahrhundert.West‐undmitteleuropäischeEntwicklungen(Berlin: Duncker&Humblot, 2015), 285‐335. In this chapter I add the case of Lisola’sBouclier and several Dutchwritingson reasonof state in the1670s to the context and further thegeneral argumentof this thesisonRohan’slegacyofreasonofstateandpredatorymonarchyasasub‐genreofpoliticalthought.521JonathanIsrael,TheDutchRepublic,796‐806;Fortheimportantroleburghersplayedintheeventsof1672readMichel Reinders, ‘Burghers, Orangists and “Good Government”: Popular Political Opposition during the 'Year ofDisaster'1672inDutchPamphlets’,SeventeenthCenturyJournal23:2(2008),315‐346.522Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,236.Onthispage,Valkenierreferredtothere‐editionofInterestvanHolland,entitledAanwysingderheilsamepolitikeGrondenenMaximenvandeRepublikevanHollandenWest‐Vriesland(Leiden1669),whichembodiedarearrangementof thechapters,someup‐to‐date informationandanewpreface. InDe laCourt’sexcused himself for the controversial contents of Interest of Holland for which the printers were to blame.Nevertheless,AanwysingalsoreceivedsharpcriticismbytheChurchauthoritiesandconsequentlywasprohibitedbytheStatesofHolland.Weststeijn,CommercialRepublicanism,61‐62;ValkeniermentionedDelaCourtandhiswritingsonpages236‐237,246,249and669;JillSternremarksthatthe‘contrast[of‘tVerwerdEuropa,MK]withtheInterestvanHollandwasdeliberate.’JillStern,OrangismintheDutchRepublicinWordandImage,1650–1675(Manchester&NewYork:ManchesterUniversityPress,2010),102.523Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,[titlepage].
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ofhisrelianceonthesepreviousworkshemaybeseenaspartofatraditionofreflection,and
providesasuitableterminusfortheargument.
InthecourseoftheeighteenthcenturyValkenier’sfavourablereputationdeclined,especially
regarding his chronologyof the French invasion in 1672.524 Several historians considered his
historical description of theYear ofDisaster as extremely biased.525Albert de Lange suggests
that togetherwith the dismissal of his historical credentials, Valkenier’s defence of republics
togetherwithhis fiercestand for theHouseofOrangehashelpedconsignhispolitical theory,
prominentintheearlierpartsof ‘tVerwerdEuropa,torelativeobscurity.526Thehistoriography
on Valkenier’s political thought is indeed very thin; recent commentaries revolve around his
alleged‘republicanism’,orhis‘(secular)Orangerepublicanism’.ThomasMaissenarguesforthe
fundamentalinfluenceofValkenier’srepublicanismonSwisspoliticaldiscourse;JonathanIsrael
claims‘secularOrangerepublicanism’founditsmostdevelopedformin‘tVerwerdEuropa;and
JillSternstatesthathisdefenceofthemixedconstitutiongalvanisedtheOrangiststrugglefrom
party‐faction to thebattleagainstFrance, conveyed through thedichotomyof freedomversus
slavery.527
Valkenier’semploymentoftheidiomofreasonofstatehaslikewisehardlybeenresearched.
HansBlombelievesthat ‘tVerwerdEuropadoesnotbelongto‘thetraditionofreasonofstate’,
sinceValkeniersupposedlyunderstoodthenotiononlynegatively;concentratingon‘thedutiful
524Albert de Lange, ‘Pieter Valkenier. Ein Überblick über sein Leben undWerk’, in Albert de Lange and GerhardSchwinge(eds.),PieterValkenierunddasSchicksalderWaldenserum1700(Heidelberg:VerlagRegionalkultur,2004),61‐107,p.75.525 The historian Petrus Johannes Blok (1855‐1929) judged Valkenier’swriting as ‘without any literary value andobviouslycharacterisedbyhisintentiontopresentthestatecraftofWilliamIIIinthemostpositivemanner.’PetrusJ.Blok,GeschiedenisvanhetNederlandschevolk.Deel3(Leiden:A.W.Sijthoff,1925,thirdrevisededition)708;MathijsBokhorst called thework ‘a large pamphlet’ that contained twomain themes: ‘Orange‐love and French‐animosity’.Matthijs Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen voor enna1700 (Amsterdam:H.J. Paris, 1930), 31, 1; DanielRoordadescribedValkenierasnotbeingobjectiveandaccusedhimofdeliberatelywithholdinginformationinfavouroftheOrange‐Faction.DanielJ.Roorda,Partijenfactie.Deoproerenvan1672indestedenvanHollandenZeeland,eenkrachtmetingtussenpartijenenfacties.(Groningen:Wolters‐Noordhoff,1978),12‐14.526DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,75.527 Thomas Maissen, ‘Petrus Valkeniers republikanische Sendung. Die niederländische Prägung des neuzeitlichenschweizerischen Staatsverständnisses’, Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte 48 (1998), p. 149‐176; Israel, TheDutchRepublic,674,786;JillStern,OrangismintheDutchRepublicinwordandimage,1650‐75(Machester:MachesterUniversityPress,2010),21,102,113,151‐152; JonathanIsraelclaims thatEricWalten ‘respected(…) theOrangistrepublicanPetrusValkenier’ as his political ideas (unlikeDe la Court’s) enabledWalten to supportOrange and itscauseof1688,whilesimultaneouslyadvocatingaformofpopularsovereignty.Israel,Jonathan.Monarchy,Orangism,andRepublicanism intheLaterDutchGoldenAge(Amsterdam:AmsterdamsCentrumvoordeStudievandeGoudenEeuw, 2004), 21; InWalten’s popular and often cited pamphlet Spiegel derwaarheyd [Mirror of truth] of 1690 ‘tVerwerdEuropa is one of themost important sources for his claim that the bad policy of the Amsterdam regentscausedthepresentandpreviouswarswithFrance.Spiegelderwaarheyd,oftet'samensprekingetusscheneenarmiaanendevroompatriot,waarinnekrachtigvertoontendebewesenword,datdoordequadedirectieendetoelegvaneenigeheerschenderegententotAmsterdam,onslandin(…)desenoorlogisingewikkeltmetVrankryk(1690).ManypamphletswerepublishedinthatyearoftheconflictbetweenAmsterdamandWilliamIIIonAmsterdam’srefusal tosendthenominationlistformagistratestoEngland,onthegroundsthatintheabsenceofthestadholder,the(High)CourtofHollandcoulddecide.AsatiricpamphletcalledDePoliticqueLotery(1690)statedthatAmsterdamwouldselltwelveraffles in favour of the ‘repressed Truth’, one of whichwas a golden statuewith in the one hand the Spiegel derWaerheyt and in the other ‘the famousBookbyValckenier’.Depoliticque lotery,bestaende invieren twintighnoytgesiene,onwaerdeerlijcke enonschatbare looten,welcke ten voordeele vande verdrucktewaerheyd engerechtigheyt,konnengetrockenwerden.(1690).IwouldliketothankFrankDaudeijforthisreference.
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administrationoftheDutchinterest,notitscunningpromotion.’Valkenier’s‘preferenceforthe
stadhouder‐system(…)isbutatameaffaircomparedwiththereasonofstate‐basedarguments
forabsolutemonarchy.’Moreover,BlomdiscreditsValkenier’sequationof‘interestofstate’with
‘reasonof state’ overlooking the interchangeableuse of these expressionsby contemporaries.
Instead, and implausibly, he wishes to restrict the rise of reason of state to an expression
mirroringself‐consciousstatebuildingandthe ‘programmesofpoliticalmodernisation’lacking
in the decentralised Dutch Republic.528 In a short article, Friedrich Meinecke paid exclusive
attention to Valkenier’s ‘Lehre von den Interessen der Staaten’. He praised Valkenier for
expanding Rohan’s interest analysis of European rulers and their societies, for theorising
interestofstateandforconstrainingitbylegalclaimsandethics.HefoundValkenier’stendency
to discuss economic factors in his interest analysis instructive. Conversely, he held that
Valkenier’s treatmentofFrance lacked thepenetrationandvalueofLisola’s, andcriticisedhis
politicalthoughtforitssubjectivity,whichtheGermanhistoriandiscerned‘inmanymodernwar
writings’, and judged it as containing ‘not very original ideas.’ Above all, Meinecke accused
ValkenierofcopyingentirepassagesofDel’interestwithoutsubstantiatingthis.529
This chapter argues that Valkenier’s political thought should be re‐assessed. First, his
derivativeargumentshowsthehighlypolemicalfunctionofinterestanalysis–theexactmethod
and type of argument was used and re‐used for different, even opposing objectives; Rohan’s
juxtapositionofinterestanalysesofrulerswithsurveysofthesocietiestheyruled,asameansof
denigratingSpanish,was,asIhaveshown,reappliedtotheprincesofOrange(DelaCourt)and
LouisXIV(Lisola).Valkenieremployed thesameRohanesquemodusoperandi againstwhathe
deemedtheruthlesspredatorymonarchyofFranceandtheoligarchicdecadenceoftheDeWitt
regime.Secondly,itunderlinestheinternationalcontextoftheidiomofreasonofstateandhis
argumentshouldbeunderstoodaccordingly.ItrequiresmorethanalocalDutchcontext.Last,‘t
Verwerd Europa exhibits several potentially tensile themes. Behind the politico‐historical
account of 1672 appears the feeling of the crisis of the rule of law and how order should be
restored. Valkenier defended the stronghold of the Dutch Reformed Church in society, and 528H.W.Blom,MoralityandCausalityinPolitics.TheRiseofNaturalisminDutchSeventeenth‐CenturyPoliticalThought(PhDdissertationUtrechtUniversity,1995),162‐166,quotation164.BlomseesinDelaCourt’suseoftheterminologyastheonlyrelevantcontributiontothe‘doctrine’inthesenseoftheformulationofreasonofstatedoctrinewithintheDutch debate, which led to a republican positive interest of state theory (unlike Valkenier’s supposedly negativetheory).529 ‘Man erwarte von dem patriotischen Holländer nicht sehr tiefe und auch nicht sehr originelle Gedanken. ErkämpfteproarisetfocisgegeneinenflagrantenExzessbrutalerInteressenpolitik,undseinBuchzeichnetesich,wiesomanchesErzeugnismodernerKriegsliteratur,mehrdurcheindringlichesPathosundWärmederEmpfindungalsdurch eine rein aus Erkennen gerichtete Gedankenschärfe aus.’ FriedrichMeinecke, ‘Petrus Valckeniers Lehre vondem Interesse der Staaten’, inAusPolitikundGeschichte.Gedächtnisschrift fürGeorg vonBelow (Berlijn: DeutscheVerlagsgesellschaftfürPolitikundGeschichte,1928)146‐155,quote147;InMeinecke’sDieIdeederStaatsräsoninderneueren Geschichte Valkenier’s reason of state employment was addressed in a footnote. Meinecke, The Age ofMachiavellism,230‐231footnote5:EcoHaitsmaMulier(wrongly)rejectedMeinecke’saccusationofcopyingRohan.EcoHaitsmaMulier,‘DiePolitisch‐historischenIdeenvonPetrusValkenier’,inAlbertdeLangeandGerhardSchwinge(eds.),PieterValkenierunddasSchicksalderWaldenserum1700(Heidelberg:VerlagRegionalkultur,2004),108‐122,p.146.
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attackedtheallegedatheismandlibertinismofpolitiques,suchasDeWitt;yethealsocriticised
theologiansofdividingsocietywiththeirquarrelsandincitingprincesandpeoplesintowarfare.
HerejectedDelaCourt’sfull‐frontalattackonwar‐mongeringprinces,yetcondemnedplunder
despots. He favoured Orange princely rule powered by expanded military and financial
resources,yetwithintheconstraintsoftheestablishedrepublicanconstitution.Itwasoperating
within such an order, protecting persons, property and privileges that stopped a prince
becomingapredatorymonarch.Furthermore,Valkeniernotonlystressed that interestshould
bepursuedasamatterofjustice(ashadLisola),butheattemptedtospecifyhowthisshouldbe
donebytheorisingreasonofstate.Inthissense,reasonofstatewasseenatonewiththeruleof
law.
Hisargumentreflectsthegenuinestrugglesofpoliticalthoughtinthe1650s‐1680s;asearch
for alternatives to civil order and the European legal order, for stability. The breakdown of
regimesandtheconsequentcrisisoforderinthemid‐seventeenthcenturygaverisetodrastic
theoriesofpoliticallegitimacy;suchasstrongroyalauthority(e.g.Hobbes)‐as‘olderresistance
theories’ (e.g. Beza and Althusius) had proven to be lethal for upholding civil order. It also
fuelled vicious attacks on princely coercive practices (e.g. De la Court) and on the danger of
religious fanaticism and superstition. Conversely, the political thought of the 1680s was
characterised by a stress on the danger of such extreme theories and on arguments towards
stabilisingsociety(e.g.Pufendorf’slaunderedversionofHobbes’stheory).530
AsValkenieralludestoit,theruleoflawisavariabletopos,sustainingauthority,directly
or indirectly fromAristotle’s insistencethat lawmade forbetterrule thanmen(Politicsbk3).
ForValkenier,thisinvolvedaboveallelse,arejectionofarbitraryrule,theunrestrainedwillof
therulerwiththeconsequentunpredictabilityoftheexerciseofpower.As,however,‘arbitrary’
rule was an entirely prejudicial formulation, some sense of an opposing rule of law was a
commonplace, giving it substance was a more tricky matter. As such it did not necessarily
amounttoanyfixedsetoflaws,orafaithintheindependentauthorityoflawyers;forValkenier,
itsevocationwasameansofcombiningjusticewithreasonofstate,andofurgingthenecessity
of a powerful prince (with prerogatives of action) while castigating the arbitrariness of
predatorymonarchy.
5.1Valkenierand ’tVerwerdEuropa:anti‐Frenchdiplomacy, crisis of orderand Lisola’s
legacy
530VonFriedeburgandMorrill,MonarchyTransformed,introductionandconclusion.
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The tensions and potential fault lines in Valkenier’s arguments suggest a turbulence of
intellectualcontext,anditistothisthatwewillturn,supplementingthepartialcontextalready
providedbythepreviouswritersdiscussedinthisthesis.Butfirst,somethingneedstobesaidof
Valkenier’scareer.Valkenier’stextwas, likeLisola’satonewithhisdiplomaticexperience,but
its francophobia informedhis diplomatic career rather than being shaped by it. Thenwewill
look into the perceived crisis of order and how Valkenier’s professor at the university of
Franeker, Ulricus Huber, attempted to restore it. Furthermore, the events of 1672 and the
responses it generatedwill be outlinedbefore turning to Lisola’s legacy inDutch andEnglish
anti‐Frenchwritings.
5.1.1PetrusValkenierandhisanti‐Frenchandpro‐ProtestantdiplomacyLittle is known about the life of Petrus Valkenier before writing ‘t Verwerd Europa.531 After
publicationhewasgrantedadiplomaticpost inFrankfurt,presumablyongroundsof itsanti‐
Frenchandpro‐Orangistmessage.HisdiplomaticcareerinFrankfurt(1676‐1683),Regensburg
(1683‐1690)andZürich(1690‐1704)isbetterdocumented,althoughnopersonalenvoyarchive
ofValkenierismaintained.HisperiodinZürichisextensivelyresearchedbyMatthijsBokhorst,
whoinparticularhasmadeclearValkenier’ssuccessinbreakinguptheFrenchmonopolyofthe
recruitmentoftroopsintheSwissCantons.532
There has been some doubt as to Valkenier’s year of birth,533 but Bokhorst has
established that he was born in 1641, evidenced by a personal letter of Valkenier to the
secretaryoftheStatesGeneral,FrançoisFagel,of1671,inwhichhewrotethathehadreached
theageof60.Furthermore,theregistrationtotheUniversityofLeiden22October1665states
theageof24andthecityofEmmerikashisbirthplace.534On27April1661Valkenierregistered
531AbrahamJakobvanderAa,BiografischwoordenboekderNederlanden.Deel20(Haarlem:J.J.vanBrederode1877),21;ChristinevonHoningen‐Huene,BeiträgezurGeschichtederBeziehungenzwischenderSchweizundHollandimXVII.Jahrhundert(Berlin:Duncker,1899),125‐195;MatthijsBokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingenvoorenna1700(Amsterdam: H.J. Paris, 1930); Otto Schutte, Repertorium der Nederlandse vertegenwoordigers residerende in hetbuitenland1584‐1810(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1983),152(nr.100);EcoHaitsmaMulierandAntonvanderLem,‘Petrus Valkenier’, in idem, Repertorium van geschiedschrijvers in Nederland (The Hague: Nederlands HistorischGenootschap,1990),414‐415;AlbertdeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,61‐107.532Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen;AlbertdeLangeenGerhardSchwinge(eds.),PieterValkenierunddasSchicksalderWaldenserum1700(Heidelberg/Ubstadt‐Weiher/Basel:Regionalkultur,2004).533 Hajo Brugmans, ‘Valckenier, Pieter’, in P.C. Molhuysen and P.J. Blok (eds.), Nieuw Nederlands BiografischWoordenboekdeel5(Leiden:A.W.Sijthoff’sUitgeversmaatschappij,1921),988‐989.534 Bokhorst, Nederlands‐Zwitserse betrekkingen, p. 1 footnote 3; Willem Nicolaas Du Rieu, Album StudiosorumAcademiaeLugdunoBataveMDLXXV‐MDCCCLXXXV:acceduntnominacuratorumetprofessorumpereademsecula(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1875),526;ThereexistsapresumptionofPetrus’kinshiptothefamousAmsterdamregentfamilyValckenier,towhichthefamousAmsterdammayorGillisValckenierbelonged,yetnoconvincingevidencecanbefound.AlthoughBokhorstunderlinedthis,heassumedtheprobabilityoftherelationship,sincePetrusValkenierusedthecoatofarmsoftheAmsterdamregentfamilyand,moreover,referredtoA.FerwerdaresearchwhoclaimedthatbothGillisandPetrusrepresentedtwobranchesoftheoffspringofGillisValckenierwholivedinKampenaround1500. In Elias’ De Vroedschap van Amsterdam 1578‐1795 Petrus Valkenier does not appear. Bokhorst moreover
136
attheProtestantuniversityofDuisburg,andafterafirstyearofphilosophy,Valkenierbeganto
studylaw.On30OctoberheenrolledasalawstudentattheuniversityofFranekerinFriesland.
On5July1666heobtainedhisdoctoratewiththethesisDeofficiojudicisatUlricusHuber,who
had become professor in law in that same year. The manuscript, however, is lost. One year
beforeattaininghisdoctorate,ValkenierregisteredattheuniversityofLeiden.AlbertdeLange
believesthathereheprobablymetGisbertCuper,whostudiedatLeideninthesameperiodand
ofwhomacorrespondencewithValkenieriskept.535
In the 1670s, Valkenier practised law in Amsterdam, which also appears from the
captionofhisportrait ‘olimcelebrr.Reipubl.AmstelodamensisAdvocatus’.536 Inallprobability
hemoved toAmsterdam in thebeginningof1670,where later thatyearhemarriedCharlotte
BecxvanOersbeek (1652‐1722), adaughterof thebookkeeperof thepowerfulmerchant and
canon‐producerLouisdeGeer.On19December1676Valkenierwasregisteredasa citizenof
Amsterdam, after he was appointed as the representative (resident) of the States General in
Frankfurt a few months before.537 The anti‐French and pro‐Orange contents of his book ‘t
VerwerdEuropawrittenafter1672probablycontributedtohisappointment.
Afteritspublicationin1675‘tVerwerdEuropabecameanimmediatesuccessanditwas
reprinted in that same year. A German translation was published in 1677. In his preface
Valkenierwrotethathesetouttotreattheeventsof1672upto1675,butpeoplehadpressured
him to publish his writings immediately. Perhaps this was an overstatement, nevertheless ‘t
VerwerdEuropawas one of the first systematic interest analyses of the causes of the Year of
DisasterwrittenintheDutchlanguagecomplementedbyatheoreticaldeliberationonreasonof
state. He promised the reader that a second edition about the events of 1673 and 1674was
alreadywith theprinter, but itwas neverpublished. In 1667Valkenier received adiplomatic
officeinFrankfurt.HissecretaryAndreasMüllerfulfilledValkenier’spromiseandpublishedtwo
folioeditionsin1680and1683.538Thebookwasalsogivenasequel intheyearoftheOrange
stressed that contemporaries regarded Petrus Valkenier related to the Amsterdam burgomaster. Albert de Langepursued this direction further in his biographical essay on Petrus Valkenier. A. Ferwerda, Adelijk en aanzienlijkWapenboek vande zevenprovincien;waarbijgevoegd zijn eengrootaantalGenealogien van voornaameAdelijke enAanzienlijkeFamilien (Leeuwarden, 1760‐1781); Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen, 2; Johan E. Elias,DeVroedschapvanAmsterdam1578‐1795,Vol.1and2(Haarlem:Loosjes,1903‐1905).Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen,2,footnote1;DeLange,‘PieterValkenier,’61‐67.535 Sybrandus Johannes Fockema Andreae and Theodorus Josephus Meijer (eds.), Album studiosorum AcademiaeFranekerensis (1585‐1811, 1816‐1844): naamlijst der studenten (Franeker: Wever, 1968), 196; Thedorus JosephusMeijer(ed.),AlbumpromotorumAcademiaeFranekerensis(1591‐1811)(Franeker:Wever,1972)42;NationaalArchief(TheHague)CollectieCuperus,1.10.24;KoninlijkeBibliotheek(TheHague)CollectioCuperus.536DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,67;HaitsmaMulierandVanderLem,PetrusValkenier,414‐415;Brugmans,Valckenier,988‐989.537PetrusandCharlottehadfourchildren,ofwhichonlyIdaCharlotte(1671‐1702)reachedadulthood,butdiedontheageofthirty‐one,childless.DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,67.538PetrusValkenier,DasverwirrteEuropa:oder,politischeundhistorischeBeschreibungderinEuropa,fürnehmlichindem Vereinigten Niederlande, und in dessen Nachbarschaft, seither dem Jahre 1664 entstandenen, und durch diegesuchteallgemeineMonarchiederFrantzosen, verursachtenblutigenKriege,und leidigenEmpörungen,nebenstdenauthenticquen Copeyen der Briefe und gewissen Berichten (Amsterdam: Jacob von Meurs/Johannes von Someren/Hendrich and Diederich Boom, 1677); Matthijs Bokhorst, Nederlands‐Zwitserse betrekkingen voor en na 1700
137
rise to the English throne in 1688, and was reprinted in 1742 at the end of the Second
Stadholderslessperiod(1702‐1747), inwhichtheDutchRepublicsufferedseverelossesinthe
WaroftheAustrianSuccession(1740‐1748)andopinionroseinfavourofthere‐instalmentof
Orange.539
His entire diplomatic career is marked by his defence of the Protestant faith, and in
particular his anti‐French perspectives. In Frankfurt Valkenier enjoyed no successes; his
advocacyofananti‐FrenchcoalitionwasnotsympatheticallyreceivedbyGermanprinces.540In
thisperiod,hissecretaryAndreaMullercontinuedhiswritingsandpublishedtwofoliovolumes
in 1680 and 1683.541 Valkenier was promoted to Regensburg in 1683. Bokhorst describes
Valkenier’scorrespondencefromthistimeas‘aweakefforttopresenttheStateGeneralaclear
image of the chaos of these conflicts.’542 From 1685, however, Valkenier started a secret
correspondencewithJohanHeinrichHeidegger,professoroftheology,representativeofthecity
ofZürich.OnlyStadholderWilliamIIIandthesecretaryoftheStatesGeneralwereinformed.The
cause for this correspondencewas Louis XIV’s expansionist policies (he hadalready annexed
neighbouringFranche‐ComtéandStrasbourg)and, inparticular, theRevocationof theEdictof
NantesinOctober1685.TherevocationhadresultedinaninfluxofHuguenotrefugeesinZurich
andotherSwissProtestantcities.Valkenierwasincensedbyit.Heideggerbelongedtoagroupof
Protestantclergymen,withgreatpoliticalinfluence,whichdefendedaconfessionalalliance.The
central issue of this pro‐Dutch lobby entailed chiefly the Frenchmonopoly in recruitment of
Swisstroops,intheCatholicaswellastheProtestantcantons,andthepresenceofSwisstroops
(Amsterdam1930),3;AndreasMüller, DesVerwirretenEuropæContinuation,oderWahreHistorischeBeschreibunqDerer in der Christenheit/ fürnehmlich aber in dem Vereiniqten Niederlande Teutschland/ und henach in denangräntzendenReichenFürstenthümerhundHerrschafften/zeitherdem jahre1673.biβauffdas jahr1676.durehdieWaffen des Königes in Franckreich erregter blutiger Krieqe/ Empörung und Verwüstung. Abgetheilet in drey Theile(Amsterdam: J. van Sommeren/Henrich andDiedrich Boom, 1680); AndreasMüller, DasVerwirrteEuropa dritterTheil:WahreHistorische BeschreibungDerer in der Christenheit, fürnehmlich aber in dem VereinigtenNiederlande,Teutschland,undhernachindenangräntzendenReichen,FürstenthümernundHerrschaffen,zeitherdemJahre1676.bißauffdasJahr1682.durchdieWaffendesKöniges inFranckreicherreichterbluhtigerKriege, leidigenEmpörungenunderschrecklicherVerwüstung.Abgetheilet in dreyTheile (Amsterdam: J. van Sommeren/Henrich and Diedrich Boom,1680).539Vervolg van ’t verwerdEuropa,ofPolitijke enHistorsicheBeschryving vanallegedenkwaardigeStaats‐ enKrygs‐Voorvallenzoobinnen,alsbuyten’tChristen‐Ryk,VoornamentlijkinenomtremtHoog‐enNeder‐Duytsland,enderzelveraangrenzendeRijkenenStaaten,zedertdenJaare1672tot1675.DoordeFranscheWapenenveroorzaakt.(Amsterdam:HendrickandthewidowofDirkBoom,1688);Vervolgvan ’tverwerdEuropa,ofPolitijkeenHistorsicheBeschryvingvan alle gedenkwaardige Staats‐ en Krygs‐Voorvallenzoo binnen, als buyten ’t Christen‐Ryk, Voornamentlijk in enomtremtHoog‐enNeder‐Duytsland,enderzelveraangrenzendeRijkenenStaaten,zedertdenJaare1672tot1675.Doorde Fransche Wapenen veroorzaakt. (Amsterdam: A. Schoonenberg and J. Rotterdam, 1742); Petrus Valkenier, ‘tVerwerd Europa ofte politieke en historische beschrijvinge derwaare fundamenten en oorzaken van de oorlogen enrevolutien in Europa voornamentlijk in en omtrent de Nederlanden zedert den jaare 1664. Gecauseert door degepretendeerdeUniverselenMonarchiederFranschen(Amsterdam:A.SchoonenbergandJ.Rotterdam,1742).540Moreover,hischildrendiedataveryyoungageinFrankfurt.Bokhorst,Nederlands‐ZwitserseBetrekkingen,2;DeLange,‘PieterValkenier,’78‐79;541Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen,2‐3;AlbertdeLangestressesthelimitedmaterialonValkenier’stimeinFrankfurt,butheascertainsthatValkenieroftenattendedtheDutchreformedservicesinHanauandthatheheldprivateservicesinhishome.DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,82.542TheNationalArchives inTheHagueholdsdiplomatic lettersbyPetrusValkenier toGasparFagel,CoenraadvanHeemskerck,andAnthonieHeinsius;Bokhorst,Nederlands‐Zwitsersebetrekkingen,3.
138
intheProtestantRepublic.ThecorrespondenceendedwhenValkenierwastransferredtoZürich
in1690.543
ThearchiveofGisbertCuperattheNationalArchivesinTheHagueholdsananti‐French
andanti‐CatholicsatirebyValkenier,accompaniedbyacopiedlettertotheStatesGeneralfrom
11April1686.Intheircorrespondencetheysharedtheirobsessionforantiquities,especiallyfor
ancient fossils and coins, and kept each other informed about current political affairs. In the
traditionoftheIuliusexclususecoelisof1514(asatireonPopeJuliusIInotbeingallowedinto
Heaven),ValkeniersatirisesLouisXIVwho‘couldattainnoplaceinheavenwhenhefulfilledhis
destiny’,butFatherPopefeltsorryforhissonandbeatifiedhimonearth;‘AndsoLouisresides
asexilefarfromheaven,butcredulousRomehonourshimasasaint.’544
In ZürichValkenier fought relentlessly against the presence of Swiss troops in Louis’s
armies, which is documented in detail.545 In the first years of his stay, Valkenier often
complainedattheSwissTagsatzunginBaden,whererepresentativesofallthethirteencantons
gathered,aboutthistransgression.SwissparticipationinLouis’swarswasoffensive,whilethe
treatybetweenFranceandtheSwissConfederacyof1663stressesthedefensivenatureofthe
Swisssupport.Inlinewiththisargument,Valkenierpointedtothe‘false’neutralityoftheSwiss
cantons. In1691hedistributedanappeal, addressing this.546 Itappearedsuccessful. InMarch
543AmongstotherDutchrepresentatives,ValkenierpromotedthepublicationofatreatisebyHeidegger,inwhichhepleaded foran alliancebetween theDutchCalvinists and theLutheransagainst theCatholic (French) threat. JohanHeinrichHeidegger,Inviamconcordiaeprotestantiumecclesiasticaemanuductio(Amsterdam1687);DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,84‐85,Bokhorst,Nederlands‐ZwitserseBetrekkingen,2‐3.544ThecorrespondencebetweenCuperandValkeniercoverstheperiodfromValkenier’speriodinRegensburguntilhis death in 1712. NA, collection Cuperus, 1.10.24, inv.nr. 12: 3; ‘Valkenirus eodem tempore sequentes versus adOrdinesmisitLudovicusCanonizatus1IncoelisdecimusLudovicusinordinequartusnonpotuitfatofunctushaberelocum3Viditid,etdoluitRomanaepresbiteraulaePapapaternatitristiafatasui.5Hinceris,incoelissinonpotesesse,beatusInterris,igiturTemeaRomacolet,7Dixit,etaeternisLudovicinominafastisinscripsit,sanctisinseruitquechoris,9SiccoeloproculexulagitLudovicus,atillumSanctorumnumerocredulaRomacolit.’545VonHoningen‐Huene,BeiträgezurGeschichte, 125‐195;MatthiasSenn,PetrusValkenier:ErsterniederländischerGesandter in Zürich und Mahner der Eidgenossenschaft (Zürich: Niederländisches General‐Konsulat, 1990), 1‐15;HeinzpeterStucki, ‘PieterValkenierinZürich,’inLabertdeLangeandGerhardSchwinge(eds.),PieterValkenierunddasSchicksalderWaldenserum1700(Heidelberg/Ubstadt‐Weiher/Basel:Regionalkultur,2004),123‐140;Bokhorst,Nederlands‐ZwitserseBetrekkingen, 28,103;ThomasMaissen,‘PetrusValkeniersrepublikanischeSendung’;ThomasMaissen, ‘”Par un pur motief de religion et en qualité de Republicain.” Der außenpolitischeRepublikanismus derNiederlandeund seineAufnahme inderEidgenossenschaft (ca.1670‐1710)’, in: Luise Schorn‐Schütte (ed.),AspektederpolitischenKommunikationimEuropades16.und17.Jahrhunderts:PolitischeTheologie–ResPublica‐Verständnis–konsensgestützteHerrschaft,HistorischeZeitschrift.Beihefte,39 (München:OldenbourgWissenschaftsverlag,2004),233‐282.546Petrus,Valkenier,DesHoch‐Edlen,GestrengenHerrn,HerrnPetriValkeniers(…)MündlichgeführteKlageUberdievielfältigeFrantzösicheContraventionsdeβmitderEydgnoβschafthabendeBundsundüberdenstätigenMiβbrauchderEydgnöβsischen Völkerwiderdie samtlichHoheAllierten,SamtderdaraufbegehrtergebührenderRemedur (Baden,1691); Translated into DutchKlagte van den heer Petrus Valkenier, extraordinaris envoyé van (…) op den 8Maart
139
1693ValkeniersignedseveraltreatieswithZürich,GraubündenandsecrettreatieswithBern.In
May the first troopswere recruited by the StatesGeneral. By the end of 1695, Valkenier had
recruited four regiments, two from Bern, one from Zürich, and one from Graubünden.
Eventually, 9,000 Swiss soldierswere stationed in theDutchRepublic in 1698, and a varying
number of 20,000 to 25,000 soldiers during the War of Spanish Succession. Notably, their
contributiontothelatterwarwasmoredecisivethantotheNineYears’War(1688‐1697).547
In the Swiss historiography Valkenier is additionally praised for his efforts for the
Waldensian refugees from Piedmont, whom the Duke of Savoy had banned after signing an
individualpeacewithLouisXIVin1696.548In1698‐1701Valkenierlobbiedactivelyforthemin
theHolyRomanEmpire,inparticularattheLandgraveErnstLudwigvonHessen‐Darmstadtand
Duke Eberhard Ludwig von Württemberg. It took Valkenier only a few months to obtain
preferableprivilegesforthereligiousrefugeesfromtheLandgrave,theDukeandothersouthern
Hessianprinces,probablyattractedbytheenforcementofanalliancewiththeDutchRepublic.
De Lange points to Valkenier’s numerous portrayals of theWaldensian communities as ‘our’
coloniesinhiscorrespondencetotheGrandPensionaryofHolland,AntonieHeinsius.549
AbouthislifeinZürichlittleisknown.AccordingtoBokhorst,his‘deepdevoutnessand
his strict ecclesiastical life’ connected him to a group a powerful priests and professors of
theologyinZürich.HiseffortsfortheWaldensianbroughthimhighesteem.Concomitantly,his
reputationwiththeCatholiccantonswasbad.550Althoughhecarriedcredentialsforallcantons,
Valkenier focusedmostly on the Protestant authorities.Moreover, the States General granted
him the secret taskof organising apro‐Dutch lobbyamongst themagistratesof Zürich,Basel,
BernSchaffhausenandotherProtestant cities. In1704 theStatesGeneral calledhimback.He
spentthelastyearsofhislifeinTheHague,wherehediedon15July1712andwasburiedinthe
GreatChurch.551
5.1.2TheCrisisofOrderandthe‘YearofDisaster’,1672.
mondelinggedaan.OverdeveelvuldigeFranschecontraventiendesverbondsdatzymethetloffel:eedgenoodschapzijnhebbende...Beneffensaanwysingederremedienwelkedaeropverzochtworden,(Amsterdam,1691),1‐12.547Bokhorst,Nederlands‐ZwitserseBetrekkingen,77‐101.548 See for instanceVonHoningen‐Huene,BeiträgezurGeschichte;TheoKiefner‚‘DieWaldenserauf ihremWegausdemVal Clusondurchdie Schweiz nachDeutschland1532‐1820/30,‘ inEndgültignachDeutschland1690‐1820/30(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995); De Lange en Schwinge (eds.), Pieter Valkenier und das Schicksal derWaldenser um 1700; De Lange points to the exclusively German literature about this subject. De Lange, ‘PieterValkenier’,93.549DeLange,‘PieterValkenier’,92‐93.550ThiswasnotleastbecauseofhismediationbetweentheHolyRomanEmpireandZürichescapinganimperialbanon wheat in 1689. The Emperor issued this ban after France used Swiss troops in battles against him. Bokhorst,Nederlands‐ZwitserseBetrekkingen,29‐30.551DeLange,‘PieterValkenier,’96.
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From the late sixteenth to the endof the seventeenth century incessantwarfare, confessional
strife,civilwars,andcoerciveprincelypoliticsgaverisetoaperceivedcrisisoftheruleoflaw;it
becameincreasinglydetachedfromrevealedreligion.552Asaresult,theruleoflawsurvivedasa
basic normative issue despite the breakdown of the major religious foundations it had in
confessionalChristianity.
The‘crisisoforder’,asJustinChampionargues,culminatedinbreakdownofregimesinthe
1640s and1650s. InEngland the killingofKingCharles I andArchbishopLaud ruptured and
even subverted basic assumptions about hierarchy, discipline and order, about social and
political legitimacy. Champion writes: ‘After 1660 the cultural and political instrument for
reconstructingorderwerecontinuallycontested.Themostdifficultandcomplexprocedurefor
re‐establishing and “neutralising” power involved bringing conscience back into deference to
authority:thiscanbemostimaginativelyconceptualizedintheformoftherelationshipbetween
church and state, and that between priest and people.’553 Anticlericalism intensified in the
second half of the seventeenth century, attacks on the churchmoved frompurely theological
premises towards arguments posed in more political (still religious) terms, as the mid‐
seventeenth century witnessed the coinage of ‘priestcraft’ for which Hobbes laid the
groundwork. The term became the utmost manifestation of anticlericalism in the 1690s and
1700s.554 In the Dutch Republic during the last decades of the seventeenth century, authors
abhorred the alleged medieval heritage of ‘priestcraft’ (clerical meddling in secular affair’s),
scorned ‘fanaticism’ (theologians, who brought their doctrinal conflicts to the political
authoritiesandpublic,suchasintheArminiantroublesof1618),andcondemned‘superstition’
(quarrels about extremely precise interpretations of faith orworship considered to endanger
the very foundations of faith, e.g. the Voetian rigidity).555 The nature of priesthood and
ecclesiastical power remained central to the political debates of the late seventeenth century.
Attempts to reconstruct order consequently involved arguments on true religion based on
understandings of sacerdotal nature of the church, or notions of true religion as still the
foundationofmoralityandthesocialcementofsocietywithoutthenecessaryinvolvementofthe
552 Michael Stolleis, ‘The Legitimation of Law through God, Tradition, Will, Nature and Constitution’, in LorraineDastonandMichaelStolleis(eds.),NaturalLawandLawsofNatureinEarlyModernEuropeJurisprudence,Theology,MoralandNaturalPhilosophy(Farnham:Ashgate,2008),45‐55.553 Justin Champion, "Religion's Safe, with Priestcraft is theWar": Augustan Anticlericalism and the Legacy of theEnglishRevolution,1660‐1720’,TheEuropeanLegacy5:4(2000),547‐561,‘crisisoforder’onp.548‐549:‘Giventhatearlymodernunderstandingsofconfessionalnatureofthestateinsistedthatreligiousorthodoxywasthepremiseofcivil citizenship,and thatconsequentlypoliticswas infusedwithChristianmeaning, thenstrugglesover thepower,significanceandnatureofreligiousinstitutionswerenotmarginaltopoliticalconflict,butinmostcasesconstitutivetotit.’554Champion,"Religion'sSafe,withPriestcraftistheWar",549.555JokeSpaan,GraphicSatireandReligiousChange:TheDutchRepublic1676‐1707(Leiden:Brill,2011),199.Spaansalsomentions ‘enthusiasm’ as one of the threewhichwere seen as ‘false religions’ by ‘enlightenedobservers: ‘theattempttooverturnpublicorderandestablishtheruleofsaints,aspartofadivinelyordainedmission,wastheonetheyabhorredthemost.’aswitnessedintheEnglishCivilWar.
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confessional churches.556 It is within this broad framework of concern that reactions to the
brutalandsurprisingFrenchinvasionoftheRepubliccanbeplaced.
In March 1672 Louis XIV declared war on the Dutch Republic,557 followed by an English
attackonaDutchconvoy in theChannel.Via theFrenchallied territories,of thebishopricsof
MünsterandCologne,Louis’stroopsattackedtheRepublicfromtheeastattheendofMay1672;
andby theendof JuneLouisXIVandhisalliesoccupied theprovincesofUtrecht,Gelderland,
Overijssel.William III’s small armyhad retreatedbehind the ‘Hollandwater line’, the flooded
zone spanning from the Zuyder Zee to the Rhine. The rapidity of the invasion, subsequent
massivelootingintheconqueredareas,andtherevoltsinHollandandZeelandof1672marked
the beginning of anti‐French foreign policy for the ensuing forty years. The United Provinces
fought threewarsagainstLouisXIV: theFranco‐DutchWar (1672‐1678), theNineYears’War
(1688‐1697)andtheWaroftheSpanishSuccession(1701‐1714).AfterexperiencingtheFrench
forcein1672,Dutchforeignpolicyshiftedfromoneprimarilybasedondefensivealliancesand
active neutrality towards an offensive policy under William III strengthening the army,
diplomatic network, and setting up offensive treaties and propaganda campaigns directed
againstLouisXIV.558
InFebruary1672,WilliamIIIwasappointedcaptaingeneral foroneseasononly.559De
WittorganisedtheDutchdefence.However,theRepublic’squickdownfall,andthesubsequent
risingopinioninfavourofOrangeledtotherestorationbyZeelandandHollandoftheprinceof
Orangeintheofficesofstadholderandcaptaingeneral.CornelisdeWittwasarrestedandwhile
Johan visited his brother in prison, they both were taken by an angry crowd (including
burghers) and lynched.560 William’s power grew rapidly. He was granted the authority to
appoint urban magistrates (although traditional ‘Orangist’ cities as Leiden and Haarlem
556Champion,"Religion'sSafe,withPriestcraftistheWar",547‐561;JokeSpaans,“Hieroglyfen.Deverbeeldingvandegodsdienst,” in Henk van Nierop, ed., Romeyn de Hooghe. De verbeelding van de Gouden Eeuw (Amsterdam:Waanders,2008),48‐57.557LouisXIVwasdeterminedtodiminishthepowerofthesmallmaritimeDutchRepublic,repelledbyitsdiplomaticschemesduringandaftertheWaroftheDevolution.ThehistorianPaulSonnino,however,stressesthatLouisXIV’s‘mostimmediateobjective(…)wastheacquisitionoftheSpanishLowCountries,buttheTripleAlliancestillstoodinhis way, and Louis’ only option was (…) to seek to enlist Charles II of England in a war against the Dutch.’ PaulSonnino,‘Plusroyalistequelepape:LouisXIV’sReligiousPolicyandhisGuerredeHollande’,inDavidOnnekink(ed.),WarandReligionafterWestphalia,1648‐1723(Farnham:Ashgate,2016),17‐24,p.21.558Althoughafter1667thepolicyofactiveneutralitycouldnolongerberetained.SimonGroenveld, ‘WilliamIIIasStadholder:PrinceorMinister?’, inEstherMeijersandDavidOnnekink,RedefiningWilliam: the impactof theKing‐Stadholderininternationalcontext(Aldershot:Ashgate,2007),17‐37,p.25‐26;WoutTroost,'TorestoreandpreservethelibertyofEurope':WilliamIII'sideasonforeignpolicy’,inDavidOnnekinkandGijsRommelse(eds.),IdeologyandforeignpolicyinearlymodernEurope(Farnham:Ashgate,2011),283‐303.559TheprovinceofHolland, ledbyDeWitt factionpromotedthedictatorshipadtempus,orDeWitt’sownterm‘adexpeditionem’opposedtotheotherprovinces.Thefearforthedurationofthepowersofthestadholderappearedtherealissue.Onthisissuere‐appearinginanti‐Wlliamnitepropagandaduringthestandingarmydebatesofthe1690sinEngland, see Charles‐Édouard Levillain, ‘Cromwell Revidivus?William II asMilitaryDictator:Myth andReality’, inEstherMeijersandDavidOnnekink,RedefiningWilliamIII:theimpactoftheKing‐Stadholdetininternationalcontext(Aldershot:Ashgate,2006),159‐176.560 See in particularMichel Reinders,PrintedPandemonium:PopularPrint andPolitics in theNetherlands1650‐72(Leiden:Brill,2013).
142
opposed)andreceivedtheextraordinarypowerofdismissalfromofficeintimeofnecessity.And
heexercisedthesepowers:inHollandhechanged130ofthe460regents,installinghispartisans
or regentswho had advocated the Orangist cause during the tumultuous period. He set up a
networkof clients throughout theprovincespromotinghis supporters inhighoffices.Healso
sidestepped thenomination lists for urbanofficesmadeby themagistrates. In foreign affairs,
likewise,theprincestartedtoassumepower,asWilliamcreatedhisowndiplomaticnetworkof
agents alongside the traditional one. Through both networks, William set up a diplomatic
offensivesponsoringalliancesagainstLouisXIV,inwhichcontextwemayinterpretValkenier’s
diplomaticappointment.In1674theprincewasappointedhereditarystadholderbytheStates
ofHolland,ZeelandandUtrecht,notleastduetotherecentpurgesoftheassemblies,ashefor
instance took over power in Utrecht after the withdrawal of French troops in 1674. Simon
Groenved concludes: ‘Thus William, unlike his predecessors, systematically integrated his
privatecourtandthegovernmentalmachineryofthestate.(…)[H]eextendedthelimitsofhis
powers,onthebasisofwhathehimselfregardedastheurgencyofthemoment.’561
Nonetheless,warfareagainstLouisdemandedvastlandforcesandhighinvestments.The
Union’stroopsexplodedfrom32,5000menintherelativepeacefulyearof1670to93,5000in
theFranco‐DutchWar,upto102,000intheNineYears’War,and119,000menduringtheWar
of theSpanishSuccession.Yet, theFrenchtroopsweresignificantly larger:280,000duringthe
firstwaragainsttheDutchrepublicand420,000intheNineYears’War.TheprovinceofHolland
had to find 10million guilders in 1670, but four years later they had to pay 21million. The
regentsimposednewtaxesandraisedexistingones.However,thesenewresourcescouldnotfill
thegrowingbudgetgapsandthegovernmenthadtoborrowsubstantialamountsofmoney.In
1713thedebtoftheprovinceofHollandwas310millionand70percentofrevenuetaxeswas
usedtocoverinterest.ThewarsagainstLouisXIVhadseverefinancialconsequencesforDutch
societyatlarge:tradeandmanufacturingsuffered,andunemploymentandpovertyincreasedin
thecities.Contemporariesrelatedthearisingcivilupheavalstoincreasingtaxburdens.562
The direct stimulus for the publication of ‘t Verwerd Europa was the planned peace
negotiationsbetweenFranceand theDutchRepublicand itsallies, including theSpanishKing
andtheEmperor,inthespringof1675.InJune1672theEmperorhadalreadycometotheaidof
theDutchRepublicandinOctober1673theSpanishmonarchyjoinedthewarontheDutchside.
Moreover,inthebeginningof1674theEnglishKingCharlesIIwasforcedtopulloutofthewar
by his parliament, in March 1674 the peace of Westminster was signed and in April 1674
MünsterandColognelikewiseconcludedpeacewiththeDutchRepublic.Inthecourseof1674
LouisXIVhadtoretreatfromDutchsoil.Yet,StadholderWilliamIIIcontinuedtopursueallied 561SimonGroenveld,‘WilliamIIIasStadholder:PrinceorMinister?’,quotationfrom23,37.562 Donald Haks, Vaderland en vrede, 1672‐1713: publiciteit over de Nederlandse Republiek in oorlog (Hilversum:Verloren,2013),9‐10.
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warfare.Hearguedthatthefragilesouthernboardersshouldbesecuredfirst.563Themajorityof
the States General, however, favoured peace with France due to the costs of war. Even the
staunchest Orangists of 1672 questioned the prince’s costly bellicose foreign policy, which
revealedthefragilityoffactionalallegianceunderpressureofa(perceived)crisis.Itwasopenly
discussedwhoprofited from thewar. The cities of Amsterdam and Leiden not only favoured
peace,butalsoopposedtheplannedappointmentofWilliamIIIasDukeofGelre,sochallenging
hispower.564ThepointofpublicationofValkenier’sbookwastoshoreupWilliam’spositionby
influencingopinioninfavourofagrandscalecoalitionwaragainstFrancewithallitsbudgetary
implications.
Inthecourseoftheseventeenthcenturyauthorsreflectedontheoreticalsolutionstothe
crisis of order. To examine the nature of the political realm authors increasingly began to
employ historical analysis; history served to determine natural law and the specific laws
belongingtoapolity,ortopredictbehaviourofpoliticalactorsasininterestanalyses.Moreover,
thegrowingpracticeof communal and territorial lawsundermined the invocationofGodand
differentiated notions of legality.565 At different levels of formality writers in the late 17th
century were concerned with a crisis of order, more or less systematically focussing on
conceptions of a rule of law. As we saw in the introduction, Samuel Pufendorf is the most
significantatthemostsustainedlevelofphilosophicalcoherencewithhislaunderedversionof
Hobbes’sargumentsinDecive.Hisargumentwasrootedinhisempiricallybasedanalysisofthe
specific interests of European dynastic agglomerates, which was founded on the origins,
character and changing circumstances of its societies, claiming that it was the natural law
obligation of the ruler (particularly security) to ascertain the ‘true’ interest of state.As Lisola
and Valkenier before him, he assessed the predatory nature of the French kingdom: densely
populated,warlike, passionate people, and robbery by conquest.However, in such aworld of
change and conflict, the Christian moral duty of men towards their fellowmen remained the
basis of security within societies.566 In a number of respects both his works and those of
Valkenier’s professor at FranekerUniversity,UlricusHuber (1636‐1649) overlap thematically
with ‘t Verwerd Europa567 and therefore we will outline Huber’s work before turning to the
563 Charles‐ÉdouardLevillain, ‘William III’smilitary andpolitical career inNeo‐Roman context, 1672‐1702’, inTheHistoricalJournal48:2(2005),321‐350,p.333referencetoaletterfromGabrielSylviustoArlingtonof6April1674.564EventuallyWilliamhadtoacceptthatin1678theDutchRepublic,ledbyAmsterdamandLeiden,signedaseparatepeacewith France; Peter Rietbergen, ‘Persuasie enMeditatie: de Republiek en de Vrede vanNijmegen (1678)’, inSimonGroenveld,MauritsEbbenandRaymondFagel (eds.),TussenMunsterenAken.DeNederlandseRepubliekalsgrotemogendheid (1648‐1748) (Maastricht: Shaker Publishing, 2005), 21‐30, p. 25‐26; SimonGroenveld,Evidentefactiën Evidente factien in den staet: Sociaal‐politieke verhoudingen in de 17e‐eeuwse Republiek der VerenigdeNederlanden(Hilversum:UitgeverijVerloren,1990),213‐245;Price,HollandandtheDutchRepublic,159.565Stolleis,‘TheLegitimationofLaw’,46.566VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,322‐324;Seidler,‘Introduction’,ix‐xl.567Meinecke,Machiavellism:TheDoctrineofRaisond’État,287‐288;Seidler,‘Introduction’,xvii.
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work’s immediate context of the pamphlet wars of the 1670s concerning the future of the
Republic.
AnotherauthortryingtoreconstructorderwasUlricusHuber.568Kossmannclaimsthat
Huber took the ‘middleground’,mixing ‘Aristotelianism’with ‘Cartesianism’ intoaphilosophia
novantiqua, argued in his magnum opus De jure Civitatis Libri Tres (1673) and taught at
Franeker University.569 He believed that Grotius’ law of nature (to which he added divine
inspiration) could be combined with Hobbes’s sovereignty theory, but he rejected Hobbes’
method of hypothesis by stressing historical empiricism to explain the establishment of
government.HemixedtheperspectivesfromAlthusiusoninalienablepopularsovereigntywith
Hobbes’ideasofinalienableandabsolutesovereigntyofthestate;Huberfoundmanyhistorical
examplestoinvalidatebothsuchgeneraltheoriesand,moreover,hecouldfindnonewhereina
multitudeof individualsgaveuptheirsovereignty individually.However,heattributedcertain
inalienable rights to peoplewhen joined in a political society: freedomof conscience and the
protection of life and property. Huber claimed that sovereigntywas absolute, indivisible and
inalienable, but sovereignty could be restricted by a constitution, since some rights could be
partlysharedwithrepresentativeassemblies.Besides,rightsofthesovereigncouldbebreached,
when necessity required it in accordance to the well‐being of the people. Huber pleaded for
constitutionalaristocracyasmostefficientandmoststablebecause it temperedarbitraryrule
by a prince or by a (anarchic) multitude. Instead of stressing human self‐interest, Huber
emphasisedthesubjectionofgovernmenttonormssetbyGod.570
Ofmoreimmediateandfocussedimportancefor‘tVerwerdEuropawasthebodyofmore
occasional pamphlets generated by the crises of 1672. Regardless of whether their explicit
concern was with a rule of law, the breach of norms and rules was presupposed in their
568ErnstH.Kossmann,‘DeDissertationesPoliticaevanUlricHuber’inTheodoorWeevers,P.K.King,andP.F.Vincent(eds.) European context: studies in the history and literature of the Netherlands presented to TheodoorWeevers(Cambridge: The Modern Humanities Research Association, 1971), 164‐177; Kossmann, Politieke theorie in hetzeventiende‐eeuwse Nederland (Amsterdam: Noord‐Hollandsche uitgevers maatschappij, 1960), 59‐102; E.H.Kossmann,‘Somelate17th‐centurywritingsonRaisond’Etat’,inRomanSchnur(ed.),Staaträso:StudienzurGechichteeinespolitischenBegriffs(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,1975),497‐504.569Huberbelievedhimselftobethefirstwhoseparatedthepolitica fromiuspublicumuniversaleastworelatedbutdistinct sciences. The politica was, in his opinion, a system of principles of utility, advising what was useful ornecessaryfortherulertodo,whereasuniversalpubliclawwasasciencesearchingfortherightsoftherulerandthesubjects,teachingtherulerwhathehadtherighttodo.Huberclaimedcontemporariesincorrectlyblendedlawandpolitica, suchasHobbeshaddone.Kossmann,Politiekdenken, 59‐60,85;UlricusHuber,De jureCivitatisLibriTres(1673;re‐edition1684;definitiveform1694).570ErnstH.Kossmann, ‘DeDissertationesPoliticaevanUlricHuber’inT.Weevers,P.K.King,andP.F.Vincent(eds.)Europeancontext:studiesinthehistoryandliteratureoftheNetherlandspresentedtoTheodoorWeevers(Cambridge:TheModernHumanitiesResearchAssociation,1971),164‐177;Kossmann,Politieketheorie,59‐102;E.H.Kossmann,‘Somelate17th‐centurywritingsonRaisond’Etat’,497‐504;TheoJ.Veen,Rechtennut.StudiënnaaraanleidingvanUlrikHuber(1636‐1694)(Zwolle:TjeenkWillink,1976),160‐201;HansErichBödeker,‘Debatingtherespublicamixta:GermanandDutchPoliticalDiscourses1700’, inMartinvanGelderenandQuentinSkinner(eds.),Republicanism:AShared European Heritage. Volume I, Republicanism and Constitutionalism in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2002),219‐246,p.241‐245.
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preoccupationwith the need to save their society from the arbitrary, tyrannical and despotic
powerofFranceaswellaspower‐hungryregentsorOrangeplunderprinces.
During 1672 therewas a flood of pamphlets calling for the re‐instalment of theHouse of
Orange and blaming the brothers De Witt for the disastrous events swept over the Dutch
Republic. Authors legitimised their claims in terms of being ‘true patriots’ defending the
‘freedom’ and ‘fatherland’. Inhabitants werewell informed on the course of the war through
newspapers,newsprintsand journals; and throughdaysofprayer,processionsand festivities,
theregentsattemptedtoinfluenceopinion,whilstcitizensattemptedtoaswell,bydebatingthe
licitscopeoftheregents’officesandthesignificanceofthemurdersofthebrothersDeWitt.571
TheYearofDisasterfuelledpublicationsusingthepopularidiomofinterest.Itappears
thatin1672agreaterattentionwaspaidtothegeneralaffairsofEuropeinordertodissectthe
‘true’Dutchinterestofstate.NumerouspamphletsscrutinisedthepositionoftheDutchRepublic
in the chaos of European warfare and promised to unveil the ‘true’ motives of all regimes
involved.To thisend,authors frequentlyemployed thevocabularyof ‘interest’.These interest
analyses ordered the intertwined foreign and domestic events, pleaded a specific direction in
foreignpolicyand,nottotheleast,ininternalpolitics.Theywereusuallyfashionedintoashort
andseeminglyobjectiveoverviewof interestsofEuropeanregimes in the traditionofRohan’s
interest analysis or conveyed through a ‘praetje’ [pamphlet in the form of a fictive dialogue]
between persona representing, for instance, the rival provinces Zeeland and Holland, or
oligarchicregentsandopposingcitizens.Afurtheruseoftheidiomwastoprove,ortorefuteDe
laCourt’sdeliberationsonHolland’s interestof stateand toblame theDeWitt regime for the
condition of the country.572 Valkenier most probably borrowed his title from the short tract
571SeeinparticularMichelReinders,PrintedPandemonium:PopularPrintandPolitics intheNetherlands1650‐1672(Brill: Leiden 2013); Ingmar Vroomen, Taal van de Republiek. Het gebruik van vaderlandretoriek in Nederlandsepamfletten,1618‐1672 (PhDdissertation,ErasmusUniversityRotterdam,2012);Haks,Vaderlandenvrede;RoelandHarms,Pamflettenenpubliekeopinie.Massamediaindezeventiendeeeuw(Amsterdam:AmsterdamUniversityPress,2011).572See for instanceConsideratienoverdenTegenwoordigenToestantvanhetVereenigdeNederland,GestelddooreenLiefhebber van ’t Vaderland, Tot encouragement van sijne Lands‐genooten, in desen bekommerlijken Tijd. (1672);d’OntledingvanEuroop.Ditisteseggen,DespreukenvanalledeVrijeVorstenenVorstendommenvanEuroop.Overdengeheymentoestandertegenwoordiogesaken(1672);AdolphusvanWolfshagen,DeSchoolederPrincen,EninterestdervoornaemstePotentatendesWerelts.(Cologne:HermanusAlbedeuyt,1673);VerhaelvanStaet‐Saken(…)Seeckeroverd’InterestenvandeStaetvanEngelandt(…)(Amsterdam:JanRieuvertsz.andPieterArentsz.,1673);HollandsInterest,GestelttegensdatvanJandeWit;VoorgevallentusschenHans,Raads‐Heer,EnArent,eenBorger.Waerinvanwoorttotwoort verhaelt wert fijn perpetueel Edict of eeuwighdurende Wet. (Amsterdam, 1672); Discoursen over denTegenwoordigen Interest van het Landt. Tusschen een Zeeu, Hollander en Raedsheer. (Amsterdam, 1672); HetTegenwoordige Interest der Vereenigde Provincien. Nevens Verscheyde Aanmerckingen op de tegenwoordige, enConjecturen op de toekomende Standt van zaaken in europe: voornaamlijck betreffende deze Republijke. Door eenliefhebbervandeGereformeerdeReligie,en’twelvarendezerLanden(Amsterdam,1673),translationfromtheEnglishoriginal[JosephHill],TheinterestoftheseUnitedProvinces.BeingadefenceoftheZeelanderchoice.Byawellwisherofthereformedreligion,and thewellfareof thesecountries(Middelburg:ThomasBerry,1672);DenGrootenenWittenDuyvel (1672) subtitled ‘BetterFrench thanPrince, IncorrectHolland’s Interest’, which stated on page 13: ‘I shiverremembering that I was handed a little book a few years ago (in which the entire interest of our state was soincorrectly drawn up, and for the execution of this interest everything has been so wrongly constructed) which,insteadofpraisingthevirtuesofourpraiseworthyandneverenoughcelebratedPrinceofOrange,waswrittenwithadamned Devilish pen (...) and printed and published by the authority of the State.’ Johan deWitt regime and his
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Euroop vol Verwerring (1673) [Europe full of Confusion]. Instead of presenting the specific
‘interests’ of the different rulers of Europe, this author speaks of their ‘secret passions’, a
vocabularyalignedwiththeterminologyofreasonofstate,butheusesthesametropes,which
were already present in Rohan’s and to a larger extent in Lisola’s treatise: ‘Secret passions’/
‘motives forprincelypoliticalactions’; ‘Betrayal’of treatiesbyprinces; ‘Pretextsofstrivingfor
PeaceandUnity’withinEurope’; ‘Pretext’of the ‘well‐being’of theprinces’ownprincipalities;
French ‘Staetszucht’ [lust for ‘state’/dominion/conquest]; ‘oogmerck’ [objective, which
Valkenier describes as ‘Interest’]; ‘Dissection of Europe’. The author claimed that Henry IV’s
bloodrunstoLouisXIV’sveinsmakinghimaspireuniversaldominion;‘thekingwhoalreadyin
histhoughtshadswalloweduptheSupreme‐commandovertheentireChristianworld’.573
In the years before and after 1672, a substantial part of the Dutch pamphlets was
Orangist,whichhadsuccessfullymonopolisedtheidiomof fatherlandandtheassociationwith
theReformedChurch.IntheOrganistpamphletsthestadholderwaspresentedastheonlyDutch
candidatetofightoffforeignaggressionandtobreakdowntheregentoligarchy,ontowhichthe
imageof the former Spanishoppressorwasoften transposed; hewould restoreorder, liberty
and unity; and under his command the military forces would rise from the ashes.574 These
argumentswere not particularly novel, but nowOrangist pamphleteers had to dealwith two
difficulties: temperthecivildisorderwhilesimultaneously justifythe forcedbreakdownof the
DeWittregime.Tothisendauthorsemployedhistoricalanalogiesbetween1672andeventsof
theDutchRevolt(e.g.thecitizens’capturesofBrillandFlushingin1572),explainedtheevilof
the DeWitt regime through historicalwritings, as Valkenier did, and stressed the distinction
between thepopulus andplebs, andWilliam III and theplebs.575 Little scopewas afforded for
defencesofastadholderlessregime.576William’sextensionofpowerthroughwarfare,however,
provoked opposition in provincial and urban assemblies, and also amongst previously loyal
helpers, notably Pieter de Groot as ‘an atheist, a French Slave’ degenerated the Dutch Republic, consequentlyfacilitatingtheFrenchinvasion:‘Hashenotunderthepretextoflibertybroughtusthegreatestslaveryoftheworld?’Idem,p.14,12.573EuroopvolVerwerring,WaerintesienzijnDeheimelijkstedriftenvanalledePotentateninChristenrijk(1673),4.TheauthorofthispamphletverybrieflystatesthemotivesofthevariousEuropeanrulers(writteninthefirstpersonfromtheKingofSwedenonwards):DutchRepublic,Triplealliance,KingofSweden,KingofEngland,KingofFrance,Emperor, King of Poland, King of Denmark, King of Portugal, Prince of Braganza [Portugal], the Prince‐Elector ofBrandenburg, theDuke of Saxony, theKnight Grémonville, theAlliance in the Palatinate, the Prince‐Electors andPrinces of theEmpire;Valkeniermeant by ‘verwerd’ confused as to sayEuropewasperturbedby the FrenchwarpoliticsandalltherulerswerecaughtinthenetFrenchhasthrownoverEurope.Andasheonpage68writes:‘Thepretext, that France always pretends,why it involves itself in the conflicts of Foreign Potentates, is the Peace andUnity,andbythisbaitandbymanydiversionsandembellishedperformances[France]seekstoentanglethefightingparties in aweb,well‐knowing, thatnothing sounds sweeter andmorepleasant in the ears, because they listen to[thatsound]more,thanPeaceandUnity.’574 Vroomen,Taal vandeRepubliek; Jill Stern, ‘The rhetoric of popularOrangism, 1650‐72’,HistoricalResearch77(2004),202‐224.575Stern,‘TherhetoricofpopularOrangism’,202‐224.576Reinders,‘Burghers,Orangistsand“GoodGovernment”,p.322:‘Fromthe956uniqueDutchpamphletspublishedin1672,only12wereaimedagainstWilliamofOrange,while160pamphletsattackedagroupofregentsidentifiableas“adherentsoftheTrueFreedom’’.’;Price,HollandandtheDutchRepublic,166.
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Orangists.577ResistanceroseagainstOrange’sbellicoseforeignpolicy,mountingwarcosts;and
voices were heard in favour of peace that would enhance commerce and lower taxes. In the
spiritofDelaCourt,attackswerewrittenonthearbitraryruleoftheprinceofOrangeallegedly
usurpingthesovereigntyoftheindividualStatesandcoercingoppositionwithhispersonalarmy
forces.578Discussionsof theextentof freedomof conscienceremainedan inherentpartof the
debates,especiallysinceafter1672OrangistswithintheReformedChurchdisplayedagrowing
fear and intolerance; the Voetian faction reclaimed centre stage, called for stricter reformed
mannersinsocietyandlaunchedattacksonCartesiansandCoeccians.579However,inlightofthe
civildisturbancesof1672mostpamphleteerssharedoneconcern:thedangerofmobrule.580
The image of the new enemy, Louis XIV’s France, was painted in full colours, often
through critical current‐affairs commentaries. In the famous news print Spiegel der Fransche
Tirannie (1673) [Mirror of the French Tyranny], the engraver and pamphleteer Romeyn de
Hooghe transferred the old image of Spanish Black Legend to the reportedly excessive and
violent actions of French soldiers in the plundering of the villages of Swammerdam and
Bodegraven. It was followed up by the internationally successful pamphlet Advis fidelle aux
veritablesHollandoiswritten by the diplomat and news agent, Abraham deWicquefort, who,
through a (seemingly) factual report of the events, sketched the image of an age‐old French
rapacious lust forpowerandconquest. Inaprintof1674,DeHoogheexplainedthehistoryof
‘Dutchtransformations’from1668to1674.Asinhisotherwork,theFrenchthreatisthecrucial
problem,faithintheprinceofOrangeandobediencetogovernmentistheanswer;evencopying
FrenchcultureiscondemnedasthecauseofthedegenerationofDutchsociety.581
577Groenveld,‘WilliamIIIasStadholder:PrinceorMinister?’,25,37.578Price,HollandandtheDutchRepublic,174;Levillain,‘WilliamIII’sMilitaryandPoliticalCareer’,327‐329.Levillaincitesonp.328thepamphletSomethingsconcerningtheprinceofOrangeworthyofgreatreflection[nogivendateofpublication,butprobablywritten in themid‐1670s]; ‘theprince isveryabsoluteanddoeswhathepleases (…) theStatesarenowbutleshuissiersduprince(…)heintendstomodelanarmyafterhisownway,givingemploymenttostrangers, daily rejecting the native subjects.’; for examples of mid‐1670s pamphlets about the planned peacenegotiationsreadDewettelijckeverantwoordingederHollanders,ofteeenVerhaelvan’tgepasseerdevandenJare1624tot desen tijdt toe. Doorgaens aengewesen werdende de trouloose Handeling van Vranckryck, die sy ontrent deopgherechteTractaten hebben gehoudenMet een klaar vertoogh,wat ontrent, voor endeno deVrede‐Handeling totCeulen isgepasseert,etc. (Amsterdam:CyprianusvanderGracht, 1674);ExtractuytdeResolutienvande (…)StatenGeneraal (…)Raeckendehet subjectvandeVredehandelinge (TheHague: J.Scheltus, 1675);RedenenenMiddelen totbevorderingvand’algemeneVrede,engemeneWelstant,daar indooreenonpartijdigpersoon,dietotdegemenerustgenegenis,aangewezenworddoorwelkemiddelenmentoten(…)vrede(…)zoukonnegeraken.UithetFranschvertaalt.(Amsterdam:Pt.Arentsz.,1675);HannibalnochinonseLanden,ofteConsideratienoverd’onmogelijckheytdesVredes,omme in dese tegewoord. Constitutie van tyden een vaste en bestendige Vredemet den Koning van Vranckrijck tebekomen.(Cologne:Pt.deVrede,1675).579Stern, ‘TherhetoricofpopularOrangism’,151;An interestingpamphleteer is JohannesRothé,a self‐proclaimedprophet and leader of a FifthMonarchistmovement in theDutch Republic,who fiercely accused the clergy of theestablishedChurchandattackedtheprinceofOrangeandthepeople’sidolatryofhimascausesforthedelayofthemillennial reign. JanRothé,Refutatie,ofWederlegginge vandeBrief,geschreen, vandePrins vanOrangeopden18Maert1675,aende Staten vanZeelant; [JanRothé],HetBedrogh, en verkeert voorneemen vandePrins vanOrangeontdeckt(Antwerpen,1675).580Levillain,‘WilliamIII’sMilitaryandPoliticalCareer’,292.581[AbrahamWicquefort], Advis fidelle aux veritables Hollandois. Touchant ce qui s’est passé dans les villages deBodegraven & Swammerdam (The Hague, 1673). Haks, Vaderland en Vrede, 21‐57. Haks demonstrates that thereportedviolentactionsexecutedbytheFrenchwerenotfarfromthehistoricalreality.Thetitleisadeliberateturn
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PortrayalsofaFrenchpredatorymonarchywerealsohighlightedbytheidiomofreason
ofstate.Wecanfindsomeinstancesofthisbefore1672.InthechapteronLisolawepointedto
anti‐Frenchpamphletsofthe1640s,whicharguablyintroducedtheidiomofreasonofstatetoa
largescaleaudienceintheDutchRepublicandentailedsomeelementsofthis image,as inthe
famousMunsterVrede‐Praetjeof1646.582AndinthechapteronDelaCourtwedealtwithDen
tegenwoordigeninterestderChristenprincenof1662thatroughlysketchedanimageofaFrench
predatorymonarchy through an European interest analysis.583 In his 1669‐revised version of
InterestvanHolland,DelaCourtevenrecalledhisrejectionofalliance‐policyandpleadedforan
coalitionbetween the rulersofEuropeagainstFrenchexpansionismbyanalysing the ‘general
and true political foundations andmaxims of all countries (..)whichmost Peoples of Europe,
suchas theSpaniards, ItaliansandFrench,call Interest.’584Before1672theFrench threatwas
notexpectedtosuchadisastrousextentoftenarguingthattheEnglishwouldnotparticipatein
Louis’s campaigns;585 but after the disastrous events pamphleteers vigorously attempted to
unravelthemysteriesandmaximsofFrancethroughitspurportedlyevilhistoryoftreacherous
politics,breachesof lawand treaties,anddesire foruniversaldominion–themeswhichLisola
had orated diligently and entertainingly inBouclier.586 Moreover, Lisola’s use of the idiom of
reason of state in indicating the household rule of a conquest‐driven French monarchy ‐its
barbaric,cruelandunchristiannature,evenmoreevil thanthedespoticorientalregimes‐was
reiteratedinseveralDutchpamphlets.
AgoodexampleistheFranscheMachiavelof1675.Theauthordissectedthenatureofthe
monarchybystatingthe ‘HundredFrench‐PoliticalState‐Rules, inwhichtheFrenchState‐and
War‐Maxims and Practices will be unveiled to everyone’.587 After 1672 Machiavelli was
fromthequintessentialBalkLegendpamphletDenspieghelderSpaenschertyrannye inWestIndien[…](Amsterdam1596)thatwasaDutchadaptionofLasCasas’reportoftheSpanishatrocitiesintheAmerica’s.ThepublicationofthisDutch pamphlet led to numerous sequels that focused solely on Spanish violence in the Low Countries, as theSpaensche triannije (1621). Marijke Meijer Dress, ‘De beeldvorming Nederland‐Spanje voor en na de Vrede vanMunster’, in De Zeventiende eeuw 13:1 (1997), 163‐172; Romeyn de Hooghe, Schouburgh der Nederlandseveranderingen,geopent in ses tooneelen,WaeropdeWisselbeurtendesVereendigdeStaetsDoordenFransenOorloggebrouwen, inHistorieleSinnebeelden (Amsterdam,1674):Nottosaythatacolourfulanti‐FrenchenemyimagewassolelyemployedbyOrangistpamphleteers;intensivediplomacyforpeacesettlementcouldalsobeastrategytoholdLouis’sexpansionistpoliciesincheck.Levillain,‘William’sIIImilitaryandpoliticalcareer’,334‐335.582Munsters Vrede‐Praetje. Vol alderhande Opinien/ off d’AlgemeeneWel‐vaert deser Landen in Oorlogh off Vredebestaat.Deliberantdum fingerenesciunt (1646);Blom, ‘Oorlog, handel en staatsbelang in het politiekdenken rond1648’,89‐96.583DentegenwoordigeninterestderChristenprincen(Enkhuizen:DirkKlaer‐Oogh,1662).584AanwysingederheilsamepolitikengrondenenmaximenvanderepublikeHollandenWest‐Vriesland,1.585MurkvanderBijl,‘PieterdelaCourtendepolitiekewerkelijkheid’,inHansW.BlomandIdoW.Wildenberg(eds.),PieterdelaCourtinzijntijd.Aspectenvaneenveelzijdigpublicist(AmsterdamandMaarssen:APA‐HollandUniversityPress,1986),65‐91,p.83‐85.586SeeforinstanceFranciscusRidderus,HistorischenFrans‐Man.InbysondereFranscheGeschiedenissenGepastopdeonderdrucktestaetvanonslieveVaderlandt(Rotterdam,1674).587DeFranscheMachiavel,ofHondertFransch‐PolitiqueStaets‐Regelen,WaerinDeFranscheStaets‐enKrijgs‐MaximenenPraktykenaeneenyderopentlijkvoorgesteltworden.(Utrecht:IuriaenPoolsum,1675).
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perceivedastheevilmindbehindLouisXIV’sexpansionism.588ItbeginswithAubery’sclaimsfor
Louis’s supreme authority over otherEuropean rulers that displayed, in the author’s opinion,
the ‘French lust fordominion’. Europe should fear Spain or theTurksno longer, but only the
Frenchstroveforthe‘fifthMonarchy’.TheFrenchCrownsetuphissystemofrulebymeansof
sixmethods:1)removingexternal,and2)internalobstacles;3)offeringmoney(e.g.bribery);4)
preparing the war campaigns (e.g. diplomacy, propaganda) 5) constructing pretexts (e.g.
religion,protectorofpeace,reclaimingproperty),6)organisingalargearmy.589Heliststheparts
ofsocietiessubjectedbytheCrown,tobeappropriatedtotheFrenchreasonofstatetoestablish
universal dominion: theology, privilegesof subjects (‘like knives toChildren,which the father
maytakeaway,withoutaccountingfortothechild’),590smallsovereignties,andtheParlementof
Paris.Furthermore,theyoungnobilityoughttobeentertainedabroadinpeacetimetorelease
their diabolic nature, the nobility should be suppressed, and the subjects impoverished by
‘taxation and heavy extortions’.591 If the latter produced not enoughmoney, Louis XIVwould
usurpthecommerce,alsoabroad,tobecome ‘Masterovertheworld’andsqueezeouthisown
treasurers.592TheFrenchmonarchyfeltnotboundbyanytreaties,divinelaws,thelawofnature,
and ius gentium. By divide‐and‐conquer methods they ‘confused’ foreign rulers, such as by
bribery,diplomacy,conceit,secrettreaties,tosecurethepromotionoftheFrenchinterests.High
clergymenweresentasrepresentativestoareaswheretheFrenchweredistrusted.TheFrench
Crownextractedmoneythroughitsmanufacturingandclothingfashion,whichwasalsoameans
tocorruptthenatureofforeignsocieties).
More importantly, France had established a ‘new Law of War’ based on ‘inhumane
bloodshed, Killings, Cruelties and Destructions.’593 France ‘stirred neighbours in quiet peace’
(imagealsoseen inLisola’sandRohan’sworks),usedseeminglypeacefulpretexts,dispatched
largetroopsattheborderstoexhausttheforcesofitsneighboursandthenlaunchedasurprise
attack as the Ottomans likewise established their empire. In 1667 the pretext of reclaiming
rightful property embodied in fact ‘Robberies and Murders.’594 The royal commander
implementeda‘newFrenchWar‐Tyranny’toextortmoneyfromconqueredcitiesinthreeways.
Afirstmethodwastothreatenwithpillaging,extortmoneyfromtherichinreturnfortheirlives
and properties and otherwise take them hostage in a manner worthy to Turks and Tartars,
Second,theywouldimprisontheopposingsoldiersforcingthemtositintheirowndirtandeat
588Althoughreferringtohimbecamelesscontroversialthaninthefirsthalfoftheseventeenthcentury.EcoHaitsmaMulier, Het Nederlandse gezicht van Machiavelli. Twee en een halve eeuw interpretatie 1550‐1800 (Hilversum:UitgeverijVerloren,1989),10‐11.589DeFranscheMachiavel,3‐8.590DeFranscheMachiavel,6.591DeFranscheMachiavel,6.592DeFranscheMachiavel,6‐7.593DeFranscheMachiavel,15,594DeFranscheMachiavel,16.
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pestsandliceuntilthesoldierspayadoubleransom.Thelastmethodwastolockupthewomen
anddemandaransombythreateningtohandthemovertothelowestmilitaryrankstoberaped
andeventuallytobesold,‘whicharesuchgruesomeviolations,thateventheTurks,Tartars,and
Pirates have never used in their sales.’595 This new ‘Reason ofWar’ is closely linked to the
‘FrenchReasonofState:andwhichbotharesomiraculousandpeculiar,thattheyarenotvalid
according to the old Pagan theses and the general welfare; but contrary to God, Justice, our
conscience,humanityandprobity.’596Heconcluded: ‘Toconductsimilarhorrible inhumanities,
allthesavagePaganandBarbarianPeoples,Turks,andTartarsshouldattendschoolwiththese
French.’597
The author of this pamphlet reiterated the themesmentionedbyLisola, fashioned the
imageoftheFrenchpredatorymonarchyintermsofmaxims,asRohanhaddidtodescribethe
interest of European rulers, which De la Court in turn defined as interest. This shows the
flexibility of the idiomof reasonof state, and secondly its descriptive andnormative use; the
author rejected ‘reason of state’ as the basis of the new French ‘War–Tyranny’, while
simultaneouslydescribedsuchathreatintermsofreasonofstate.Moreover, itunderlinesthe
polemical functionof reasonof state, oftenaccompaniedwith implicit accusationsmixing fact
withfiction.Besidestheidiomofreasonofstatetheauthor’suseoftyranny,or‘War‐Tyranny’is
worthmentioning. ItentailedthecruelpracticesoftheFrenchmonarchy(morecruelthanthe
Ottomandespots),thenoveltyofLouis’smonarchy(aMachiavelliannewprincipalityasRohan
alsodescribedSpainunderPhilipII),anditsreasonofstate,whichimpliedtheoverthrowofthe
ruleoflawandtotalsubjectionofallsubjectsandconqueredpeoples,robthemoftheirliberties,
livesandlivelihoods.AlthoughtheaccusationsimplythoseofanAristoteliandespoticrule,the
term ‘despot’ isnotused,while itappears that tyrannyserved theauthor’sgoalsnotentirely,
since he felt the need to complement this tyranny with the terms ‘war’ and ‘new’. It may
strongly alludes to the recently coined term ‘war despotism’, but his use speaks for itself; an
arbitrary household rule, a combination of despotic and tyrannical rulewith an emphasis on
necessarywarfare,conquesttocoercemuchneededmoneytofinancethewarmachine.Whatis
more,itsignifiestheslipperylanguageoftyrannyintheseventeenthcenturyasdiscussedinthe
chapter on Rohan, who used ‘new monarchy’ to signify an unrestricted tyrannical control,
modelled on a Machiavellian rapacious lust for conquest. As in a later Dutch pamphlet
Suchtingenvanhet slafeachtigheVrankryk (1689) [Desires of slavishFrance],which furthered
595DeFranscheMachiavel,19.596DeFranscheMachiavel,19.597DeFranscheMachiavel,20.
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Frenchcritiquesof‘wardespotism’ofthe1640s,theFrenchauthorusednotthetermdespotic
toindicateaFrenchwar‐drivenhouseholdrule,buthewrote:‘theutmostTyranny’.598
5.1.3Lisola’slegacy:universalmonarchy,balanceofpowerandreligion
From the Franco‐DutchWar (1672‐1678) onwards Lisola’s anti‐French arguments echoed in
numerous pamphlets throughout Europe. In the initial phase of the war the anti‐French
pamphletproductionreacheditsfirstpeakintheHolyRomanEmpire.MartinWredehasshown
the recurrent themes in theanti‐Frenchpamphletsproduced in theEmpire:Frenchbreachof
law,Frenchwarcrimes,‘GermanLiberty’,‘Frenchtyranny’andtheimpendingFrenchuniversal
monarchy.Francebecamea‘Reichsfeind’[enemyoftheEmpire],evena‘Erbfeind’[archenemy],
andLouisdegeneratedfromthe‘Allerchristliche’[mostChristianking]tothe‘Antichrist’,anda
‘Kreuzzugeswider die Franken’ [crusade against the French]wasdesired as the ‘Substitution
derTürkendurchdieFranzosen’[substitutionoftheTurksbytheFrench]hadallegedlytaken
place.599Adifferencewithlateranti‐Frenchpamphlets,isthatinanti‐Frenchwritingsbeforethe
escalationoftheFranco‐DutchWar,Louisfacedmockeryandcriticismaswellassomegainin
respectandcredit.EvenLisolashowedrespectfortheenergyandvigourofLouis,accordingto
Wrede,althoughweshouldviewthislargelyinlightofhissenseofirony.600
As has been stated earlier, the historian Levillain has stressed Lisola’s fundamental
influence on anti‐French, anti‐Catholic and anti‐Stuart propaganda in England and the Dutch
Republic, and, consequently, his contribution to the political turn of the English parliament
againstFranceandtheAnglo‐Dutchallianceof1677.OneoftheintellectualbrokersofLisola’s
ideas in the Dutch Republic was the diplomat and member of Amsterdam’s city council,
CoenraadvanBeuningen.VanBeuningenwasknownasa fierceopponentofLouis’sclaims to
theSpanishNetherlands.Duringthe1670shewassentonseveralmissionswhereheenjoyed
the company of Thomas Osborne, Earl of Danby (a prominent anti‐French and anti‐Catholic
politician)andDenzilHolles,whopublishedalettertoVanBeuningenof1676arguingashared 598DeFranscheMachiavel,21‐25:‘theGovernmentofFranceisrisentotheextentofTyranny,thattheRulerregardseverythingashisownproperty.HedrawsupTaxes,ashepleases,withoutconsultingthePeople,theGrandees,theEstates,northeParlements.(…)astheMohammedanRulersofTurkey,ofPersia,andtheGreatMongolians(…)havingan absolute power over the Nobility, over the Members of the Judiciary, and over all the People (…) since theministriesofRichelieuandMazarin isFrance loadedwithheavyimposts.But itexhaustedthekingdom,althoughitwasunrightfully,inalessermannerthannow[underColbertwho]madeaReformationofFinances,andhasexecutedwithallstrictness:(...)butnotreducetheimpostsonthePeoplebuttoenhanceit(…).TheNoblemanhasnolongercredittoestablishareductionoftaxationforhisParochy,histenantspayalreadysomuch,andmorethantheother.(...)[Colbert]hasenlargedtherevenuesoftheKingdomtotheutmostextent.(…)Itisinthiswaythattheimpostswillbefurtheredandextracted,andifthisisnottheutmostTyranny,thanIconfessIdonotunderstandanythingaboutit.’;De FranscheMachiavel, 31: ‘Thesemountains ofmoneywere spent to one purpose only: to erect the ‘generalMonarchy.’599Wrede,DasReichundseineFeinde,333.600Wrede,DasReichundseineFeinde,48‐49,325‐327,330,332‐333,337,378‐380.
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Anglo‐Dutch Protestant interest against France. According to French diplomatic sources, Van
Beuningen was obstructing De Witt’s appeasing tactics to the French in foreign affairs.601
Haitsma Mulier suggests that Valkenier got acquainted with Lisola in The Hague in 1672‐
1673.602After theFrench invasion, the anti‐French argumentofBouclier developed intomore
viciousanddirectattacksonLouis’s rule inDutchpamphlets,aswewill see in theanalysisof
Valkenier’swork.TheinfluenceofBouclierinEnglandwasmostprobablyenhancedbyhisown
diplomatic missions to London. Levillain reasons Bouclier ‘set the standard for anti‐French
propaganda in post‐1667 England’, for example an English pamphlet of 1668 titled A Free
ConferencetouchingthePresentStateofEngland inordertotheDesignsofFrance, inwhichthe
author promoted an alliance with Spain instead of with France and the legitimacy of the
renunciationofMariaTheresareferringtoBouclier.Levillainconcludesthatundertheeffectof
Dutch propaganda following the invasion of 1672, Lisola’s ideas about French universal
monarchytransferredintoaProtestanttaleandpermeatedAnglo‐Dutchpoliticalculture.603
During Louis XIV’s reign, Bosbach observed multiple variances in the definitions of
‘universalmonarchy’, traditional oneswere re‐used, such as the desire for achieving the fifth
empire, but also new elements added to, or replaced older ones, such as the claim that the
FrenchKingwouldestablishauniversalmonarchybasedonpoliticalandmilitarypower,rather
than founded on the dignity and spiritual authority of the Empire. New elements were
integrated,suchasLouis’sdesigntosubjectEuropethroughthemisuseoftheclaimedofficeof
arbiterofwarandpeace;and throughuseof themetaphorof thebalanceofpoweras ‘anew
ideal forEuropeanpoliticsandthusassumedFrenchuniversalmonarchybecamethenegative
equivalenttothatidea’.604
Moreover,inthesecondhalfoftheseventeenthcenturyreligionremainedanimportant
rationale in works on foreign policy debating the impending universal monarchy, also those
expressedinreasonofstatevocabularyandincludedorwereadjustedtocommercialfactors.605
Tony Claydon has stressed that late‐seventeenth century English propaganda supporting
William III’s warfare against Louis XIV entailed amultifacetedmix of three discourses (even 601TheFrenchministerof foreignaffairs,HuguesdeLionne,warned thenewambassador to the StatesGeneral in1669ofthedangerouseffectVanBeuningen’santi‐Frenchwordshad.Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,6.602HaitsmaMulier,‘DiePolitisch‐historischenIdeenvonPetrusValkenier’,118.603Levillain,‘Theintellectualorigins’,6‐7,11,quotedfromp.8.604Bosbach,‘TheEuropeandebateonuniversalmonarch’,84,quotedfromp.97.605For instance, Louis XIV’s Frenchmonarchywas accused of desiring universal dominion of trade, as in interestanalyses by Marchamont Nedham and Slingsby Bethel in the late 1670s. From Steve Pincus, ‘From holy cause toeconomic interest: the transformationof reasonof state thinking in seventeenth‐centuryEngland’, inHouston andPincus (eds.),ANationTransformed.Englandafter theRestoration (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001),272‐298, p. 293; Marchamont Nedham,The pacquet‐BoatAdvice (1678) and Slingsby Bethel, The present State ofChirstendomeandtheInterestofEngland,WitharegardtoFrance(1677).Fromthe1650sonwards,Englishdebateson foreignaffairs identifiedtwonewcontenders foruniversalmonarchy,theFrenchortheDutch.After theFrenchinvasion in theDutchRepublic of 1672, the division in English political culturemorphed into a fierce anti‐Frenchstandpoint, except for the court ofCharles II andhis successor James II. The ‘revolution’of 1688hadarguably ‘anintendedconsequence’:waragainstFrance.StevePincus,‘TheMakingofaGreatPower?UniversalMonarchy,PoliticalEconomy,andtheTransformationofEnglishPoliticalCulture’,TheEuropeanLegacy5:4(2000),531‐545,p.535.
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though seemingly technically incompatible): Protestant rhetoric (crusade against Louis, the
popish Antichrist); the theme of Louis’s drive towards a universal monarchy; and, far more
prominently,Louis’sthreatto‘Christendom’,aspirituallyyetnotspecificallydefinedunity.The
latterplacedLouisoutsideofEuropeanChristianorderandoftenimpliedcomparisonswiththe
Ottomansystemofrule,cruel,antichristianandbarbaric,a themeunderlinedbyreferencesto
theearlymodernFranco‐Ottomanalliances.Louiswasevendeemedbymanywritersmorecruel
thantheOttomans,anaccusationthatcouldleadtopositiveevaluationsoftheOttomanruleas
beinghumaneandtolerant.SincetheTurksstoodatthegatesofViennain1683andLouisdid
nothelptheHabsburgsbutinsteadaidedtheHungarian,alliesoftheOttomans,thiscomparison
functionedasavivid imageforWilliamitepropaganda.606 Inaddition, theterm ‘Europe’ finally
established itself in the struggle against Louis XIV.607 From the 1670s, anti‐Stuart and later
Williamitepamphletsjustifiedanti‐Frenchpoliciesinnameofthe‘LibertiesofEurope’oftenin
conjunction with the rationale of the freedom of commerce, the Protestant religion, the
‘interests’and‘balanceofEurope’.Europebecameassociatedwithideasofabalancedsystemof
‘states’, religious tolerance and expanding commerce. Helmut Schmidt believes Lisola lay the
foundations of these new political overtones of ‘Europe’ by addressing the threat of Louis
strivingforauniversalmonarchytoEurope’sliberty,religionandcommerce.608
Withintheselateseventeenth‐centurydebatesthenotionofbalanceofpoweremerged
as a vital justification. Richard Devetak has argued that contrary to what modern ‘liberal
internationalisttheory’perceives,thebalanceofpowerdiscourseinEnglishwritingsconstituted
an‘orderingpracticeinmaintaininglibertyandfightingtyranny’;thisdiscoursecentredonthe
protectionofthe‘libertiesofEurope’,i.e.theEuropeanlegalorderbasedontherightofregimes
toself‐governundertheruleoflaw,againstallegedlyarbitraryandabsolutepower.609Through
interest analysis of thepresent affairs ofEurope, thebalanceof powerdiscourse increasingly
assessedthelevelofthreatto‘libertiesofEurope’(ratherthansolelytoEngland),exemplifiedby
SlingsbyBethel’spioneeringwritingsofthe1670sand1680s.Bethel’searliestworkThePresent
606TonyClaydon,‘Protestantism,UniversalMonarchyandChristendominWilliam’sWarPropaganda1689‐1697,inEsther Mijers en David Onnekink, RedefiningWilliam: the impact of the King‐Stadholder in international context(Aldershot:Ashgate,2007),125‐142.607 ‘Europe’was already usedwith various connotations in thewars against the Ottomans from the late fifteenthcenturyonwards.SeethecollectionofessaysinHeinzDuchhardtandAndreasKunz(eds.)EuropäischeGeschichtealshistoriographischerProblem(Mainz:PhilippvonZabern,1997).608HelmutDanSchmidt,‘TheEstablishmentof“Europe”asaPoliticalExpression’,TheHistoricalJournal9:2(1966),172‐178.OnLisolaandhisBouclierSchmidtwritesonp.173: ‘ThepublicationoftheBuckler(…)inFrench,GermanandEnglish in thatyearhad thepurposeof changing thatviewof the international scene. (…) [Lisola]alleged that[France]wasplanning the establishmentof aCatholicUniversalMonarchy andbecominga threat to the libertyofEurope,toreligion,andcommerce.HethusforgedanassociationwhichlinkedEuropewiththeconceptofreligiousliberty,balanceofpower,andexpandingcommerce,ideasthatcommendedthemselvesatoncetomenlikeArlingtonandSirWilliamTemple.’609Devetak,“Thefearofuniversalmonarchy”,122.
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InterestofEngland stated (1671)demonstrates this.610Moreover,Bethel’s textexemplifies the
dominantthemeintheseanalyses:thefearofFrenchdesignsofuniversalmonarchythreatening
the individual and collective interests of European regimes.611 As David Armitage states: ‘the
TreatyofUtrecht (..)enshrined thebalanceofpoweras thecentral regulatingprincipleof the
international order, in opposition to the threat of universalmonarchy from a power such as
LouisXIV’sFrance.Reasonofstateafter1713thereforemadepreventiveaggressionjustifiable
in defence of the balance against aspiring universalmonarch.’612 In this sense, the analysis of
interestdevelopedintoapossibleinstrumenttoreconstructtheEuropeanorder.
ThefunctionoftheidiomofreasonofstateandtheportrayaloftheFrenchmonarchyin
Valkenier’s‘tVerwerdEuropawillbeanalysedagainstthebackdropofthepamphletsfuelledby
the French invasion of 1672 about the role ofOrange in theDutch constitutional framework,
French(war‐)tyranny,(French)reasonofstate/interestofstate,universalmonarchy,balanceof
powerandreligion.Furthermore,wewilllookintoValkenier’sargumentsfromtheperspective
oftheearlieranalysesofRohan’s,DelaCourt’sandLisola’swritings,especiallytheirportrayals
of predatory monarchy (including arguments on tyranny, absolute rule, rule of conquest,
Ottomanrule,warfinances,householdruleandslavery)andwilltakeintoaccountitsimmediate
contextofpublication:theplannedpeacenegotiations,andtherisingresistanceagainstWilliam
III’sbellicoseforeignpolicyandmountingwarcostsinthemid‐1670s.Thelargercontextisthe
perceived seventeenth‐century crisis of order that seemed threatened by confessional strife,
intensified Europeanwarfare, andwar‐tyranny, all embodied by Louis XIV. Valkenier tried to
restoreorder.
5.2‘tVerwerdEuropa:theruleoflawandreasonofstate
In his preface Valkenier claimed that ‘t Verwerd Europa filled the void in Dutch historical
literatureaboutthecontemporarycomplexandunstableEuropeanpowerconstellation,because
peoplecould‘onlyreadthefewHistoricalStories,whichuptonowhaveseenthelightofdayin
610Devetak,“Thefearofuniversalmonarchy”,128:‘AstheForeignInterestofaNationlookoutward(…)soitisintheInterestof theKingandKingdomofEngland, tomakeuseof theadvantagesof [the] strength [of the ‘PrincesandStates’ofEurope]andsituationgivesthem,inweighingtheimperialpowersofChristendome,keepingthebalance,byaddingto,ordiminishingfromanyofthem,asbestsitswithJustice,andtheirownInterests.’611Devetak, “The fearofuniversalmonarchy”,131,quotes therealsoBethel,ThePresent InterestofEnglandStated(1671); ‘than to design anuniversalMonarchy,which consequentlymakes it the common Interest of all EuropeanPrincesandStates(astheyvaluetheirownsafety)tounite,forthekeepingofhimwithinboundsandlimits’.612DavidArmitage,‘EdmundBurkeandReasonofState’,JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas61:4(2000),617‐634,p.630.
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the German and French language.’613Valkenier turned to his readers and stated thatwithout
properly investigating the histories of the ‘unheard Changes in Europe and the strange
RevolutionsinourUnitedNetherland,whichwehaveexperienced,stillareexperiencing,andonly
Godknowswhentheyeventuallywillend,’latergenerationswouldfindthecurrenteventshardto
believe.HeechoedthesameintroductoryphrasesofrulersfallenasleepbyLisolaandRohanby
asking:
‘whowouldbelieve, thatmostof thePotentatesofEuropewerebarelyawoken in
extreme danger by murder‐trumpets from her slumber‐illness and improvidence,
whereintheyliedsmothered?Yesthatsomehadhastenedtheirowndownfall,thata
FrenchmanhadconfusedallofEuropeandbyhismoney,trickeryandviolencehad
bannedalluprightnessandsincerityatalmosteveryCourt;thataNation[theDutch]
raisedtoheavenbyhervaliantandincomparablebravery,andthatwasmagnificent
fortheentireworld,within50dayscouldhavelostmore,thanithadgainedwiththe
highestpraisein80.yearsbysword’.614
Valkenier accounted forhis interest analysisofEuropesince ‘now thewholeofChristendom is
tornby ruinousFactions,and sincemanyArcanaDominationisorCabinet‐Secreetenhavebeen
discovered,yetonlywithgreatdifficultyanddangercantheybeinvestigatedastheyhavebeenso
cunninglyconcealed.’615Besides,Valkenierfeltobligedtodefend‘asaMilesTogatustheHonour
ofourandothernations(…)byPenagainstthesuperbFrenchandotherEnvious[men]’.616
Inordertoexplainthe‘confusedstateofEurope’andinparticulartheUnitedProvinces
in thebeginningof the1670s,hedividedhis1000pluspagebook into threeparts.Thiswork
maybeseenastheapotheosisofthestreamofpamphletsunleashedbytheFrenchinvasionof
1672;itcombinedmostofthedominantthemesandelementsofthepamphletliterature,suchas
a historical analysis of the failure of De Witt and the triumph of Louis XIV, an taxation of
European interests, a reconstruction of the affairs of 1672 substantiated with numerous
documentsandfirst‐handreports.HisfirstpartconsistedofaninterestanalysisonaEuropean
levelintroducedbyatheorisationoftheinterestofstate.Thesecondpartdealtwith‘theFrench
Designs, Maxims, Schemes at all the Courts of Christendom, its State, Advantages, Wealth,
ProceduresandWarPreparationsagainsttheNetherlands;aswellastheConstitution,Alliances
613Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,AandenLeser.HeprobablyreferredtoWicquefort’streatiseanddefinitelyreferredtoLisola’sBouclierd'Estat.614 Valkenier, ‘t Verwerd Europa, Aan den Leser; Rohan, A Treatise of the Interest of the Princes and States ofChristendome,9‐10;[Lisola],TheBuckler,Preface.615Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,AandenLeser.616Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,AandenLeser.
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andWarPreparationsoftheUnitedProvinces.’617InthispartthetwoantagonistsofValkenier’s
storywerepresented:theFrenchmonarchyandthestadholderlessregimeofJohandeWitt.The
lastpartentailedachronologicalaccountofwaractionsexecutedbyall thebelligerents inthe
Republicduring1672andtheciviluprisingsinthecitiesoftheun‐invadedprovincesofZeeland
and Holland. Nonetheless, he also described the war between the Ottoman Empire and the
Polish‐Lithuania Commonwealth (1672‐1676) and the Second Genoese‐SavoyardWar (1672–
1673),whichservedasfurtherexamplesofFrenchscheminginEurope.618
FirstwewilldiscussValkenier’sreflectionsoninterestofstatethroughhisexplanation
of the five foundationsofpolitical government,which shedsa lightonhowheenvisaged civil
order shouldbeorganisedandhowLouisXIX’smonarchyand theDeWitt‐regime threatened
this order. Then his image of France as a predatory monarchy will be analysed and finally
Valkenier’s interest analysis of Europe, especially of the Dutch Republic, will be taken into
account.
5.2.1FivePillarsofeveryPoliticalState
TheframeworkofValkenier’sfirstpartof‘tVerwerdEuropaismadeupbyhisdeliberationson
‘interestofstate’;‘whichthecontemporarypolitiquescallRatioStatus,theoldIusDominationis
& Arcana Imperii, the Italians Ragione di Stato and the French Raison d’Estat’.619 Valkenier
referredto(andcopiedfrom)Rohan’sDel’interest:
‘OfthisInterestacertainverywiseandexperiencedmilitaryofficerattemptedto
say; that it rulesover thePrinces, alike theyover their Subjects;Andhowmuch
higher a Prince is above it, so much greater becomes the knowledge of State
demanded of him as of all his other issues. A Prince can be deceived, and his
councillors can be misguided, the true Interest can never deceive or be false;
because as much as the Interest is wrongly observed, so much will the State
decreaseorincrease.’620
617Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,[titlepage].618Theselatterpolitico‐societalconsequencesconcerningthePolish‐OttomanWardescribedValkenieronpage869of‘tVerwerdEuropa.619Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,24.620Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa,24:‘VanditInterestpleegseekerseerwijsenervarenVeld‐Overstenteseggen;dathet regeert overdePrincen, gelijkdieoverhareOnderdanen;Enhoeveelhooger eenPrinsbovenhaar is, so veelgrooterkennisvanStaatwordinhemvereyst,alsvanalsijneanderesaaken.KaneenPrinsaltemetbedrogen,ensijneRaads‐luydenverleytwarden,hetwaareInterestkannoytmissenofbedriegen;wantvoorsoveelhetInterestwelofqualijkwordwaargenomen,voorsoveelneemtdenStaatdaardoorafofaan.’
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Contrary to Rohan, Valkenier exclaimed that the French monarchy had never been the true
defenderofthelibertyofEuropeandhadevenbecomeEurope’sgreatestenemyinrecentyears.
Furthermore,hestressedtheimportanceofempiricalhistoricalanalysisinaccountsofinterest,
since ‘all Rulers of Empires and Lands have been subjected to constant change and therefore
they(…)expand,grow,reduce,age,die,anddisappear(…),andiftheywouldseethemselvesin
theMirrorofoldHistories,theywouldnotrecognisethemselvesatall.’621Therefore,therulers
shouldnavigate‘thecommonShip’throughthesestormywatersadjustingitscourseaccording
totheobstaclesitencountersandindirectionofitstrueInterest,andtheyshouldnotfollowthe
stoicswhowouldadvisetonotdeviatefromitscourseforasecond.Inlinewithreasonofstate
authors, Valkenier wrote that interest of state excels all ‘Civil, Public and Fundamental laws’
when‘thewell‐beingoftheStatedemandssuch’,because‘necessityknowsnolaws.’Otherwise,
astrictfollowingofthelawsintimesofsheerdangerwould,asTacitusalsohadargued,leadto
thedestructionoftheselawsand,consequently,thestate.622
ThoughValkenieremphasisedthatallpoliticalactionsweresteeredbyinterestofstate,
he felt the need to explain it further unlike Rohan, De la Court and Lisola. TheDutch lawyer
openedhistreatisewiththereasonofstateadagethattheobjectiveorinterestofevery‘Political
State’wasamatterofmaintenanceandexpansion.623 In this sense, ‘state’ referred toapolity.
Valkenier asserted that the maintenance of every ‘State’ against external as well as internal
injustice and violence was based on the law of nature. Every method (violent or gentle) to
achieve this end (self‐defence)was legitimate. The augmentation or territorial expansion of a
politywasonlyacceptablewhenlegitimatemeanswereused,whichdidnotgoagainsttherights
ofanotherpolity.Accordingtotheauthor, ‘trueinterestofstate’couldbeattainedbyacorrect
examination and use of the five ‘common and true State‐Maxims and Foundations’: religion,
justice,polity,armyandfinances.Thesewerethefive‘pillarsofeverypoliticalstate’anddecay
ofanyofthesepillarswouldleadtoitsruin.624Moreover,‘true’interestofstatewasrestrictedby
four conditions: protection of religion, faithfulness to alliances, honesty, and impeccable
benevolent administration of justice. De la Court had summarised his analysis of Holland’s
interest inmuch thesameterms; ‘Hereby Ipridemyself that I saidenoughofHolland’sPolity,
Religion,Finances,MilitaryandJustice’,625yetwithoutstructuringhisanalysisintermsofthese
variables.
621Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,25‐26.622Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,1‐25;Condren,‘TheUsesofTyranny’,11‐12.623Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,1.624Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,1.625 V.D.H., Interest vanHolland, 88; A century later (1763) Adam Smith scrutinised the same variables, excludingreligion, in hisLectureson Justice,Police,RevenueandArms.Delivered in theUniversityofGlasgowbyAdamSmith,reportedbyastudentin1763.,editedandwithanintroductionbyEdwinCannan(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1869).
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Itwascommonplacetobindgovernmenttoreligion,morality,legality.Itwasexemplified
by writers like Claude de Seysell in positing the bridles of monarchy: religion, justice and
polity.626Others,suchasBoteroandClapmariuslinkedcrucialvirtuestotheofficeofrule;andit
wasconventional toassociatea justifiable reasonof statewithdivineornatural law.627Lisola
likewisehadboundapursuitofinterestofstatetolegality,amixtureofnaturallaw,iusgentium
and divine laws.628 However, as we will see, Valkenier envisaged the position of religion
explicitly without any involvement of confessional theology and stressed the primary
importanceofprotectionofproperty,privilegesandpersons.Withtheuntowardcollapseofthe
Dutch Republic in mind, Valkenier deemed an army and its necessary finances as the most
crucialpillars.
Tobeclear,argumentsof reasonof state inherentlyconsidered theroomof legitimate
manoeuvrefortheruler,albeitthattheselimitsaredeliberatelybeingbendedorstretched.The
interestofstatewasbasedonthespecificcharacteristicsandcircumstancesofthesocietiesof
therespectiveruler;everycountryhadaninterestofstatethat in itselfwasneither legitimate
nor illegitimate.Thenormativenatureof interestofstateentailed the taxationofa trueoran
untrue interest,whichwasused to signify the failedpoliciesof a rulerorhis evil advisors. In
Valkenier’scase,DeWittwasattackedfornotfollowingthetrueinterestoftheRepublic.France,
however,was amaster in itsmanagement of reasonof state, aswewill see below. Valkenier
usedthefivepillarsandfourconditionsofgovernancetore‐establishasenseoforderinaworld
ofchangeandconflict.Consequently,thisgavehimthemunitiontoattackFrenchwarpolicies,
notablyLouis’sexpansionism.
‘Religion’wasthefirstpillarandprovisionofinterestofstate,‘asimmediatelybeholding
theDivine’.629Hedevotedmostspacetoexplainingthefunctionofreligioninapoliticalstateand
therelationbetweenreligionandreasonofstate.Yettheattempttoreconcileadefenceofthe
Dutchreformedfaithwithahighleveloffreedomofconscienceandanattackonecclesiastical
interference in political affairs, proved problematic. His solution was to distinguish an inner
fromanouterreligion.Thefirstresidedinthesoulofmankindandwassharedbyallpeoples
accordingtothelawofnature.Thelatterconsistedofthedifferentconfessions,or‘customs’of
626RebeccaBoone,War,domination,andthe"MonarchyofFrance":ClaudedeSeysselandthelanguageofpoliticsintheRenaissance(Leiden:Brill,2007),19.ReligionentailedtheCatholicChurch,thepoliceembodiedthefundamentallawsoftherealmandjusticereferredtothedivisionbetweenthetreeestatesandtheparlements.627Boteroalsoemployedthemetaphorofgovernmentrestingoncertain‘pillars’,e.g.thetwopillarsof‘prudence’and‘valour’. Because princes are solely ruled by interest, the firstmaxims of prudencewas, Botero claimed, that theyought to be approached by other rulers on the basis of interest alone, instead of trust, friendship or other bonds.QuentinSkinnner,TheFoundationsofModernPoliticalThought:Volume1,TheRenaissance (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1978),34,41;HarroHopfl,‘Orthodyandreasonofstate’,236‐237.628Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa, 20: ‘ThePoliticalGovernmentwill not be sufficient, tomaintainReligion, and theadministrationofJustice,unlessitusestwonecessaryandinevitablemeans,astheArmyandFinances.’629Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,2.
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religion, written down in different holy texts.630 In matters of interest of state, the natural
religionpredominated.
BelievinginandservingGod,werethetwofundamentalanduniversalaspectsofnatural
religion.Tomaintainandexpand‘aState’,itwasnecessarythatpeopledidnotonlybelievethere
was a God, but that they believed God as ‘the Supreme Cause’ ruled all human affairs. Inner
religionpromotedcivilorder: ‘Becauseeverythingstems fromtheServiceandFearofGod(...)
manygoodsuccessesinaStatedependonit’.631Whenconfrontedbyatrulymightyenemy,then
menwouldrelyontheinnerreligion,thatinformedexternalreligiouspractices,suchasprayer
days, irrespective of denominational difference. What unified a people was not doctrinal
difference but the internal religion they all shared.632 After listing the four main confessions
(pagan, Jewish,ChristianandIslamic)andnamingtheonesworshippedintheDutchRepublic,
heclaimedthatnaturalreligion,or‘PietywasnotonlythefoundationofallVirtues,bitlikewise
ofallDominionsandStates.’633Thehighestvirtuewasjustice;justicewasaproductofpietyand
restrictedtheactionsofprinceswhenobtainingtheirinterest.Moreover,itorderedcivilsociety;
menwereforcedbypietyinto‘Subjectiontotheirprinces;Obediencetotheirparents;Lovefor
their neighbours; and the Justice towards all.’634 Valkenier raged against Boccalini, who, he
claimed,saidthat
‘theinterestofstateisonlyarightofaPrince,andit is inconflictwithallDivineand
HumanLaws.HowcouldmancallsuchInterestaReasonofState(RatiosStatus)sinceit
conflictswithallReason,andalwaysthreatenstoruintheState?WhyPopePiusdeV.,
rightly labelled it Reason of the Devil, or Ratio Diaboli, arisen from Tyranny and
Arbitrary.’635
In this hyperbole Valkenier rejected the popular refutation of reason of state, as contrary to
religion,moralityandlegality.Buthewentfurther,linkingittodivinelawasrevealedbyinner
religion.
630Valkenier divided the outer religion into four religions. Firstly, he described pagan religions in Lapland, India,China, Japan, America and Africa. The Indians practiced their beliefs by the spiritual words, written down in theVedan. Secondly, he described the Jewish faith that was scattered over Europe and repressed by so manygovernments according to Valkenier. Thirdly, he treated the Christian faith, which was spread over Europe andsplinteredintomanydifferentformsofreligions.TheChristian’sholytextsconsistedoftheOldandnewTestaments.Finally,ValkenierspokeoftheMohammedanreligionthatwaspractisedinAsia,Europe,andAfricaandhaditsKoranasholybook.631Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,3.632Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,3;AsalsothehistorianDonaldHaksunderlinesthatinyearsofwarfaretheamountofprayerdaysweresubstantiallyhigher than inpeace time,althoughthepeakyears in theby theEsattesGeneralorganisedprayesdaysentailedyearsofmilitarysuccess,1675and1676.DonaldHaks,VaderlandenVrede,74.633Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,5.634Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,5.635Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,5
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Externalreligion,however,wasanothermatter.Confessionalreligionswerenotsomuch
political instruments to bring forth social unity and obedience, but rather hazards to society.
Conflictingreligiousviews,interpretedbyquarrellingtheologiansandclergymen,couldleadto
severesocietalconflicts,civilwarsandevengrandscaleexternalwarfare.Valkenier’suseofthe
distinction between an inner and outer religion entailed not only a conventional appeal to
piety,636 but, more importantly, an increasingly heard plea against religious ‘fanaticism’ and
‘superstition’generatingchaosandbloodshed.Inthe1620sHugoGrotiuslikewisestressedthe
existenceofnaturalreligionasasetofuniversallyvalidnormsindependentofrevealedreligion
torestoreorderinaworldfracturedbyconfessionalstrifeandwarfare.637SimilarlytoValkenier,
Lucius Antistius Constans employed an explicit distinction between internal and external
religion inthecontroversialDe IureEcclesiasticorum (1665)byarguing(in linewithreformed
tradition) for the authority of magistrates in religious and ecclesiastical matters. Constans
enlargedittothepointthatonlyGodcouldjudgeifone’sexternalreligioncorrespondswiththe
truereligion.Sinceouterreligionwasapublicaffair,Godawardedthemagistracywiththesole
powertodecideinthesematters,andmoreover,toconstrainpriestcraft.638
Regarding theouter religion.Valkenierwrote: ‘everyPolitical state is forced touphold
onespecificFormofReligionaboveotherstoavoidthedangerof innovation.’Heclaimedthat
not only Polybius, but also the politques had recognised this, but (wrongly) stressed the
exception to the rule: ‘the famous Machiavelli, who despised ever Religion, but nevertheless
wantsthatallreligionshouldbeaccepted.’639ValkenierbelievedtheDutchReformedreligionto
be‘thesoulofthisState,theFundament,whereuponthisProsperousRepublicisbuilt,andthe
eternalassociationbywhichtheRespectiveProvinceswillremainunifiedwitheachotherina
State‐wiseGovernment.’640Consequently, the reformedreligionought tobemaintainedas the
main religion within the United Provinces. But immediately Valkenier pointed to the
impossibilityofchoosingonemainreligioninapolity,anissuefoughtoverby‘theTheologians
and the Politijken; the first fight for [confessions] of their own; the latter conceive such
indifferently.’Theproductoftheseconflictsistheexistenceof ‘aninfinitenumberofGodsand
Ceremonies.’641
636ErnestinevanderWall, ‘The religious context of theEarlyDutchEnlightenment:Moral religionand society’, inWiepvanBunge(ed.),TheEarlyDutchEnlightenment1650‐1750(Leiden:Brill,2003),39‐57.637 Henk Nellen, ‘Hugo Grotius on religion as a motive for waging war’, in Robert von Friedeburg and MathiasSchmoeckel (eds.),Recht,KonfessionundVerfassung im17. Jahrhundert.West‐undmitteleuropäischeEntwicklungenHistorischeForschungen105(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,2015),261‐268.638 A pseudonym that is attributed to Spinoza, De la Court, Meyer, or Van Velthuysen. Henri Krop, “The GeneralFreedom,whichAllMenEnjoy” inaConfessionalState.TheParadoxicalLanguageofPolitics in theDutchRepublic(1700‐1750)’, in JohnChristianLaursenandMaria JoseVillaverde (eds.),ParadoxesofReligiousToleration inEarlyModernPoliticalThought(Plymouth:LexingtonBooks,2012),67‐90,p.74‐75.639Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,6.640Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,6.641Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,6.
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Consequently,Valkenieraskedhimselfwhether ‘aPoliticalStatemayandought to tolerate
and tomaintain theFreedom ofall these, or ofonealone?’642 Polities could benefit greatly by
securingreligioustoleration,becauseitwouldstimulateimmigrationandconsequentlywealth.
ValkenierobservedHollandandtheOttomanEmpireashavensfor‘FreedomofConscienceand
Religion’.TheOttomanEmpiregreatlyprofitedfromtheJewishrefugeeswiththeirknowledge
ofmanycraftsandtradeofweaponry;andtheOttomanemperorsridiculedtheChristianKings
whopersecutedsuchanumerouspeople.643InHollandtheCatholicfaithwastoleratedandother
religionsenjoyedrelativefreedomofconscience,whichproducedgreatcommercialprosperity.
HecalledtheprovinceofHolland:‘theInnofallsortsofRefugees’.644IfHollandhadmaintained
the Reformed faith as itsmain religion, it would have been subjected to the great powers of
Europe. In line with many reason of state authors, such as Botero and Lipsius, Valkenier
concluded that, though itwas preferable for a government tomaintain onemain religion for
preventingreligiousdivisionsinsociety,violentlyrepressingreligiousfactionsledtocivilwars
andotherunwanteddisorderswithinsociety,e.g.theDutchRevoltagainstHabsburgs‐Spain.645
However, in accordance with De la Court, he argued that diversity of religion and a relative
freedomofreligionledtoprosperityandpoliticalstability.
Valkenier’s religion argument climaxed in his fierce criticism of the political ambitions of
clergymen.Hewarnedrulersnottobeseducedby‘SuperstitionofReligion’foritwouldleadto
‘the ruin of the State’ and ‘those who tried to persuade [the rulers, do] not have the right
knowledge to conform theReligion to the true InterestofState’.646 He exclaimed: ‘It is highly
regrettablethatatmanyCourtssuchWar‐Priestsarestilllistenedtoandpraised,whennothing
hadbeenlearntfromsomanysadexamplesofdisastereveninlivingmemory.Havenotbythe
machineriesofClergymen,bythepretextofReligion,Crown‐baring‐Heads,BornPrinces,andso
manyinfiniteHighLawfulRegentsdiedacrueldeath?Hasitnotrepeatedlycausedveryheavy
andbloodyWarsandruinedLands,Cities,Peoples,andStates?’647
Thefourthprescriptionandsecondpillarofa‘PoliticalState’was‘Justice’bywhichismeant
a universal virtue, its benevolent administration by judges to regulate legal issues between
citizensand itsproperdistributionbetweengovernmentandsubjects.AccordingtoValkenier, 642Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,6‐7.643Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,8.644Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,7.645Höpfl,‘ReasonofState’,1114.646Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,9.647Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,9:“Tistenhoogstentebeklaagen,datsodaanigcWar‐GeestelykeinveeleHovennochsoveelgehoorencreditvinden,nademaaldiebehoordengeleerttezijndoorsoveeledroevigeexemplen,diejaselfsten deele noch ten tyde vanonse geheugenis zijn voorgevallen. Zijn niet door demachinatien derGeestelyken, oppretext van Religie, Kroon‐draagen.’ Examples of such superstition, using religion as a pretext for warfare, werenumerous according to Valkenier: the Dutch Revolt against Habsburg‐Spain, the Thirty Years War, the FrenchreligiousWars,theseveralwarsagainsttheOttomanEmpire,andtheEnglishCivilWar.Hepointedtohorribledeeds,executedinthenameofreligionbymanypeoples,e.g.thewildCanadiansbelievedthattheyofferthesickrelievebykillingthemimmediately,CarthagiansandMexicansscarifyinglivinganddeadpeopletoGod,butalso,ingeneral,byeverytyrant,whohadmadethepretextofreligionastheirhighestdesignsforrule.Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,9‐10.
162
not safeguarding the rule of law resulted in the necessary downfall of polities. He reiterated
Aristotle’spraisefortheruleoflaw;‘Aristotlessaid,thatnoStatecanexistandcontinuetoexist,
whereno JusticeandLawsrule.BecausewhatGod is for theworld(…), that is Justiceandthe
Law in a City, without which neither House, nor City, nor State, norWorld could exist.’ In a
humanist fashion, Valkenier complemented this by referring to Augustin: ‘[who said,without
justice the world] would become a mere shelter and guesthouse of various worrisome sins;
Because whoever rejects Justice, rejects God likewise, because God is Justice himself, which
without he cannot rule.’648 The emphasis of his argumentwas on the abuse of justice, or the
abandonmentoftheruleoflawbymanycontemporaryEuropeanrulers,drawninthevortexof
European warfare. Law ought to be ‘executed with justice and equity, not by hate, envy,
ambitions,greed,andfriendship.’649Valkenierexclaimed:
‘Thisisthereason,whyMarsisalmosttheonlyArbiterandMediatorofallissuesand
differencesbetweenKingsandPeoples(…)andthatMighttodayismorethantheLaw
and Reason, which are of no worth in her [Might’s presence], (…) some French
Politiques dare to write, that a Prince must regulate all his actions in his Interest,
without regard to any laws or obligations,which the French pursue somasterly on
everyoccasion.’650
The French King, ministers and people play the leading parts in Valkenier’s account of the
misuseof thepillars of political government, of ruthless reasonof state politics. For instance,
throughout‘tVerwerdEuropa,CardinalRichelieuandMazarinwereValkenier’sprimeexamples
of ‘War‐Priests’:his term forclericalmeddling insecularaffairs, i.e. clerics incitingwarfare to
enhancetheirpoweratcourt.Thesecondregulation,faithfulnesstoalliances,playednopartin
the foreignpolicy of theFrenchmonarchy; ‘Buthow little this is practised and accomplished,
evenbytheonegloryingwithherTitlesofmost‐Christian,ProtectorofFaithandShepherdsof
theflock,willwepointoutinthethirdpart.’651EchoingLisola,Valkenierreferredsardonicallyto
thetitleofRexChristianissimusandLouis’sdouble‐dealingsunderthispretext,whichbecamea
crucialargumentinlateranti‐Frenchwritings.
648Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa, 13;Aristotle,Politics:Books IIIand IV, translatedwithan introductionbyRichardRobinsonandasupplementaryessaybyDavidKeyt(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1995),BookIII,1287a‐1278b,p.58‐63.649Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,14.650Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa,14;‘Ditisdeoorfaak,waaromdatMarsbynaalleenArbiterenMediateurisvanallequestienendifterententusschenKoningenenVolkeren,gelijkHoratiuisvanAchillesfeyt:juranegatsibinata,nihilnonarrogatarmis,endatdeMachthedensdaagsmeerisalshetRechtenReden,dieinhaarselfsnietswaardigzijn,'tenzysy spreeken door de mond van het Canon, welker stemme mede brengt vrees en respect. So seggen en durvenschryveneenigeFransePolityken,dateenPrinsallesyneactienmoetreguleerennasijnInterest,sondereguardevaneenigewettenofobligatien,waarvanhoemeesterlijkdeFransehaarbyalleoccasienbedienen’.651Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,12.
163
Concerning the third pillar, the polity, Valkenier discussed the traditional Aristotelian
distinctionofformsofgovernmentsandrelatedtheseformstothenatureofthesubjects,which
wasdividedintothreetypes:slavish,freedom‐lovingorsomewhatinbetween.Thepolityisthe
necessarypreconditionforcivilorderandinitsgovernmentstrivestoupholdthecommonwell‐
being,ashereferstotheCiceronianaxiomSalusPopulisupremalexesto.652NowhereinEurope
weremonarchies,inherentlybasedontheslavishnatureoftheirsubjects,tobefound;‘Exceptin
France,where the subjects as donkeys,willingly carry the burdens of anAll‐rulingHead, and
pride themselves in their blindness in obeying their King and honouring him as a God.’653
Furthermore,hedenouncedallmonarchiesas ‘absolutemonarchies’ (unlikeDe laCourt), and
condemnedabsoluterule inthesamemannerasDelaCourt,asahouseholdrulemodelledon
robberybyconquestandbasedontheslavishnatureofthepeople,butnowinlinewithLisola’s
argumentdirectedagainstBourbon‐France;
‘AndifsucharuleentailsaGenerousSovereign,experiencelearnsus,however,thatit
generally tilts towards Tyranny, and that its Subjects experience seldom happiness
butalwaysdisasterscausedbythepassionsoftheSovereign,whoforthesatisfaction
ofhisambition,handsoverhissubjects toPoverty, robs theirgoods,andputs their
childrentothesword,plunderstheircities,andleavesitall[unprotected]againsthis
Enemies.And if in thebest case, that theSovereign ispeace‐loving, evensoare the
subjectssuppressedbytheOfficersandFavourites,androbbedfromproperties,that
itisimpossibleforthemtonegotiatewithaliberalhand,whichistheonlycause(…)
thatcommerceisneverfullythrivingunderanabsoluteSovereign,tothecontraryit
seems, that Commercehas always resided, notwhere the Subjectswere slaves, but
weretheywerefreePeople’.654
Such a government, ‘where a Potentate absolutely rules, and the entire Majesty exclusively
possesses, isso imperfect,and inconflictwiththeRulesofNature’.655 Incontrast, ‘Aristocratic
andDemocraticGovernments’werethose‘whereRulerstogetherasStates[estates/assemblies],
andwherethePeopleself‐rule,andrelatetothenatureoftheNationsthatlovetheirfreedomas
itwasgold’.656
To underline his preoccupation with such a bellicose rule, he employed the neologism
‘stratocracy’ as an ‘Extraordinary’ governmental form ‘that is,MilitaryGovernment,when the
Upper‐Command lies with the Military, as in the times of the Romains after Nero, until the 652Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,19.653Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,16654Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,16‐17.655Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,16.656Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,16.
164
GovernmentofConstantiusMaximus, andwith theEnglishunderCromwell,who insteadof the
ParliamentshadanAssemblyofMilitaryOfficers,andthesamehappenstodaywiththeTurks,
whohavenoPoliticalRegents,butwhichgreatDominionisbeingruledbythemostprominent
Militaries’.657ItshouldbenotedthathedidnotusethisnotionforFrance;itsubstantiatedhis,as
we will see below, relatively positive assessment of the Turkish Empire compared to the
extremerapaciousnatureoftheFrenchmonarchy.Valkeniercopiedthisanalysisonstratocracy
from George Hornius, professor of history at the University of Leiden from 1653 until 1670.
Horniusdiscussed ‘stratocracy’ inapassageonthedifferent formsofgovernment,whereinhe
hadlistedexamplesofthistypeofrule,suchasancientRomeafterNeroandthecontemporary
OttomanEmpire.658
Valkenier’s argument for a mixed constitution or a ‘tempered form’ served to justify the
Orangist rule over the Union of Utrecht.Whereasmonarchies, aristocracies and democracies
degenerateintorespectivelytyranny,oligarchyandanarchy,amixedgovernmentbalancesthe
differentformssothatnonewilldegenerate.Bythismixedconstitution,stabilityforthestateis
secured and the common interest is served in the bestmanner as exemplified by Sparta, the
Roman Republic, the Venetian Republic, the English Monarchy together with the Houses of
CommonsandLords,andtheprovincesofHollandandZeeland.Forover800yearstheselatter
provinceswere ruledbyamixed constitution ‘inprosperity,which theStatesofHolland,by a
certainActdating16thOctober1587onlyascribethegoodConcord,LoveandReason,thathave
beenbetweenthePrincesorCountsandtheStatesofthesameCountry,etc.’659Thisisatractof
the States of Holland written by François Vrancken, which argued that the States General
represented the sovereignty and so the regents and theirs assemblies held supreme power
againstanykingorstadholder.660Valkenierunderlinedthenecessarypositionoftheprincesof
Orangewithintheharmonious‘mixedconstitution’betweentheCountsofHollandorPrincesof
Orange and the provincial assemblies of the United Provinces. Between 1587 and 1651 ‘this
praiseworthy Form of Government, under the Princes of Orange as Stadholders of United
Netherlands, continued, with such prosperity, that the entire world admired [the Dutch
Republic],andtookitasanexemplaryState’,wroteValkenier.Hefollowedthislineofargument
bystatingthatsincetheGreatAssemblyof1651,whererepresentativesoftheStatesofHolland, 657Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,15.658Inturn,HorniuswasprobablyinfluencedbyBoxhorn,whoin1653employedthetermtodebunktheCromwellianregime as a historical anomaly. The termwas coinedbyFrench scholarClaude Salmasius, also living in Leiden, in1649.Salmasiususedthe ‘stratocracy’todepictthenewregimeaftertheexecutionofCharlesI. JaapNieuwstraten,‘Empire, Economy and the Dawn of the Enlightenment: Some Explorations into Seventeenth‐Century DutchIntellectualHistory’, inEvertSchoorl(ed.),TheEnlightenment:Political,EconomicandSocialAspects.SpecialissueofUnitedAcademicsJournalofSocialSciences3:15(2013),30‐47p.40.NieuwstratenreferstoHorniuscommentariesinMarcus ZueriusBoxhorn, Institutionespoliticae, II.1 262‐264, toBoxhorn,MetamorphosisAnglorum (1653) and toClauseSalminus,Defensioregia,(1649),36.659Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,19.660[FrançoisVrancken],Deductieoftecortevertooninghe(1587);MartinvanGelderen,TheDutchRevolt(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1993),199‐207.
165
Zeeland,Utrecht,OverijsselandGelredecidednottoappointanewstadholderafterthedeathof
princeWillem IIofOrange in1650, ‘thegreatShipof theseNetherlands [was] jeopardisedby
suchadangerousconstitution,thatitseemedtostrandonblindcliffsoneveryoccasion.’661
The last two pillars of state, army and finances,were themost crucial pillars in practical
terms,asValkenierarguedand ‘as JuliusCaesaralwayssaid:(...)Thattherearetwothings,by
whichastatecanbeestablished,maintainedandexpanded,namely:SoldiersandMoney,which
areArmyandFinances.’662Fromapessimisticperspectiveonhumannature,Valkenierargued
that because ‘Justice has always been repressed, and thatAmbition andDesire have occupied
andpossessed thehumanmind’externaland internalwarshaveoccurred,and thereforemen
shouldalwaysprotectthemselvesagainstsuchevils.Internalconflictsweretobepreventedby
maintainingtheproperformofgovernment(mixedconstitution);otherwiseapolitywouldfall
intoacivilwarasseenintheurbanriotsinHollandin1672.Propermilitaryforcesandfinances
keptoutexternalfoes.
Thisargumentagainunderlinedthedisastrouswarpoliticsofthestadholderlessregimeand
the necessity of an Orange stadholderate. Valkenier argued along the lines of contemporary
Orangistpamphlets;notonlymaintainingastrongfleet,asthestadholderlessregimehaddone,
butalsostrongfortifications,ammunitionanddisciplinedlandforceswereneededtoprotectthe
UnitedProvinces against suchmighty land forces as thoseof LouisXIV.Moreover, a supreme
commander must lead the troops into battle. Valkenier praised the military successes of the
princesofOrangebydiscipliningthesoldiersduringtheRevoltandsuggestedthattheprincesof
OrangewerethemostadequatecandidatesforcommandingtheDutcharmy.Thestadholderless
regime’sforeignpolicyofdefensivealliancesfailedasshowcasedbythefirstandsecondAnglo‐
Dutch wars (1652‐1654; 1665‐1667), the Dano‐Swedish War (1658‐1660), and the French
‘piracies’ontheDutchAtlantictrade.Awell‐organisedfleetandlandarmyundertheruleofa
princeofOrangeoughttodefendtheUnitedProvincesagainstexternalthreats.663
Followingthisargument,ValkenierreferredtoCicero’sfamoussayingbyexclaimingthat
‘Money,wastheSinewsofWar,thatbytheLatePrinceWilliamIwascalledtheprincipalBuckle
oftheSuitofArmour.’664HepointedtotheSpartanrepublicthatraisednotaxesforwarfare,but
was based on a prosperous agriculture, where harvestswere equally distrusted amongst the
citizens.However,thecircumstancesfortheDutchRepublicdiffered; ‘Inthiswaypeoplecould
live in a wealthy Republic, if they had no fear for powerful neighbours.’665 Not only should
princes have rich subjects or a well‐supplied treasury, Valkenier emphasised that ‘Finances’
661Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,19.662Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,20.663Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,20‐21.664Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa,22; ‘Thesinewsofwarare infinitemoney,’, famouswordsbyCicerospoken inhisOrationesPhilippicae.’665Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,19,23.
166
should be promoted in an honest and honourable way; a prince should not squeeze out the
meansofhissubjectsandshouldnotadministertheresourceseithermeanlyor lavishly.666He
did not explain this honourable and honest way, but throughout the entire book, Bourbon‐
France and the stadholderless regime served as prime examples of wicked, illegitimate
organisationsoffinances.
These five pillars entailed an attempt to restore order. He fiercely attacked priestcraft,
religious fanaticism, superstition, which was followed by a vision of true religion as social
cement of society without necessary involvement of confessional churches. The Christian
elementinthejustificationoflawswaserodedinthesensethatonlytheinnerreligionpromoted
justice as a universal virtue; the confessional churches played no part. The rule of law was
abandonedbyself‐interestedrulersandtheiradvisors,notablytheir‘war‐priests’,‘officers’and
‘favorites’, seeking personal glory and power. Especially by monarchies, which Valkenier
denouncedas‘absolute’,arbitraryhouseholdrulesdrivenbylustforconquest,forwarfareand
booty,robbingthesubjectsoftheirpropertiesandtreatingthemasslaves.Franceservedasan
example of a polity,whichpursued a ruthless reason of state; andwewill see belowhowhe
furthered thismodelof robberyby conquest inhisanalysisof theFrench interest.Due to the
perilousstateofEurope,regimes(monarchiesandrepublicansalike)hadtoorganisetheirarmy
andfinances,buthestressedthatthisshouldbedoneforsecurityreasonsonlyandwithregard
tothepropertyandprivilegesofthesubjects.
5.2.2FrenchInterestofStateandPredatoryMonarchy
After discussing the five pillars, Valkenier examined the interest of France, by a detailed
historicaldepictionoftheriseandcharacteristicsoftheFrenchmonarchy.Valkenierarguedthat
the Secret Council of the French king (referring to Louis’s restructuring of government after
Mazarin’s death in 1661),667 which assembled each morning, effectively controlled the five
pillarsof theFrench interest.Except for religion,whichwas carefullymanagedby theFrench
clergymen, the other four pillars were represented by the four French minsters installed by
Louis XIV: ‘Monsieur Tellier for Justice, Pompone for the Polity, Turenne for the Army and
MonsieurColbertfortheFinances.’668Consequently,theirinterestofstatewasperfectlytended
bythis intimategroupofstakeholders.Hisanti‐FrenchimageresembledtheworksofRomeyn
666Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,23‐24.667Collins,TheStateinEarlyModernFrance,110.668 Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa, 24: ‘Michel Le Tellier, Secretary of State ofWar (1603‐1685); Simon Arnauld dePomponne,SecreatryofStateofForeignAffairs(1618‐1699);HenridelTourd’Auvergne,MarshalofFrance(1611‐1675);Jean‐BaptisteColbert,MinisterofFinances(1619‐1683).’
167
deHoogheandWicquefort,andDeFranscheMachiavelinthesenseoftherapacioustyrannyof
Louis’smonarchy,butitappearsthathismainfoundationswereLisola’sandRohan’sworks.
Valkenier claimed to demonstrate how the interest of state was subject to constant
changeandconsequentlydeterminetheriseandfallofpolitiesbymeansofahistoricalaccount
fromthetimeoftheFrankstoLouisXIV,althoughtheFrench,ashestated,themselvesglorified
theirpastasaconstanthistoryofpower. Thefirstfunctionofthisaccountwastoindicatethe
predatory nature of France. His historical account France functionedmoreover to undermine
Frenchclaims,on,forinstanceHabsburgpossessionoronitsallegedTrojanmythaswewillsee
below.FromtheFranksand theclaimedoriginsof theLexSalica, through the first christened
FrankishKingClodoveus(fromwhompurportedlythetitlemost‐Christiankingcamefrom),to
the successive dynastic houses ofMeroveus, Charlemagne, Capet andValois, he described the
historyoftheKingdomintermsofconquest,partitionofinheritedlandsamongstthesons,and
conflictsamongst theelites.669WhereasLisola claimed thatFrenchabsolute rulewasa recent
phenomenon of Louis XIV, Valkenier argued that in 1460 Louis XI made French kingship
‘absoluteandsovereign’670andconsequentlyestablishedcontemporaryFrance.671Heportrayed
LouisXIasaMachiavellianmonarch:‘theshrewdestandquickestofallFrenchkings,whoseart
ofdissimulationandsimulationwasnotinferiortothatoftheEmperorTiberius.’672Theauthor
warnedthereaderthatthepowerofthekingseemedtobedividedamongst,andexecutedby,
the church, parliaments, and provinces, but in fact the king commanded all. In Valkenier’s
opinion,thewarfarepoliticsoftheFrenchkingscontributedprofoundlytotheaccumulationof
landsfortheFrenchmonarchy,suchasLouisXI’swaragainstBurgundyandCharlesVIII’swar
againstHabsburgs‐Spain.Thecauseofthe‘150years’ofrivalrywasSpain’sdesireforthe‘fifth
monarchy’bytheiroverseasconquestsandprofitablemarriagepolicies;‘EmperorCharlesVand
KingFrancois turned almost entireEurope in a bloodbathwithout onedecisivewinner rising
fromthebattlefields.’673
InhisaccountoftheFrenchreligiouswarhecopiedRohan’sversionoftheWarsofthe
ThreeHenry’s, but changed the sequence and added some specificpart to stress the inherent
Machiavellian hazard of France. Valkenier, for instance, described in gruesome details the St.
Bartholomew’sDaymassacre,whereasRohan summarised the horrid events in one sentence.
Valkenierwrote about the ruthless politics of King Henry III and Duc de Guise; ‘When [King
HenryIII]foundoutthat[DeGuise]aimedforhisCrownandLife,heputonaLionandFoxskin,
underwhichheletDucdeGuisestabbedtodeathattheEstatesGeneralinBlois,andwhilehelay
669Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,28‐35.670Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,41.671ForthecontemporaryimageofLouisXIseeAdriannaBakos,ImagesofKingshipinEarlyModernFrance.LouisXIinPoliticalThought,1560‐1789(LondonandNewYork:Routledge,1997).672Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,40‐41.673Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,44
168
theredeath,hestampedonhisface,asdeGuisehaddonetothemurderedAdmiralColignyinthe
year 1572.’ Yet, he shared Rohan’s praise for Henry IV, who restored order but was sadly
murdered by Jesuits leaving France again in chaos. The turbulent history of civil wars and
regicides in France ended after Louis XIII, on the advice of Cardinal Richelieu, took away the
privileges of the Protestants and eventually destroyed their power‐base at Rochelle in 1628.
ThismarkedthestartoftheFrenchstrivingtowardsauniversalmonarchy(whichLisoladated
from the start of Henry IV’s reign). He referred to French publications of 1666 and 1667
defendingits‘pretentionsto,notonly,theentireHolyRomanEmpirebuttoChristendom’,such
asAubery’streatise,andrejecteditsfundamentaljustificationoftheSalicLawbyclaimingthatit
entailed ‘apure fiction’, ‘aChimera’ (asLisolahaddone), that it conflictedwithallother laws,
andthattheoriginsofthedocumentwereunknown.674
He systematically explained France’s policies for obtaining universal monarchy; it
entailedtwomethods:toremovedomesticobstaclesand,second,toobtainallnecessarymeans
(money and interest management). Here we witness a much more specified and enhanced
account of Lisola’s French predatory monarchy. The first obstacle was the conflict between
CatholicsandProtestants,whichRichelieuhadsortedout successfully in the162os. Secondly,
theCrownhadtostripbaretheGrandeesoftheirpowerandproperty;
‘To prevent disputes amongst the noble houses, King Louis XIII and Louis XIV have
extractedthemeansandwealthofthemostpowerfulHousesofFrancebywhichthey
trytopursuewarfare,accordingtothelessonsoftheCardinalsRichelieuandMazarin;
tohisendtheyusemanymaxims(..)Thatthey[thehighnobility]alwayshavetoreside
neartheKingattheirownexpense,andservehimslavishly(…)Thattheyinorderto
expandthemagnificenceoftheKing,theymustmaintainverygreatandcostlysuitesof
Pages,Valets,Coaches,Outfitsetc.(..),buildexcellentPalacesandPleasurehouses (…),
theyhavetopayalmostalloftheirtributesandpaytheirrevenuesandincomeoftheir
estates to theTailles, and theyhave beenpressuredby every tax one could think of,
morethananyotherChristianNation.’675
He expounded Lisola’s argument of the make‐up of the French household rule that
effectivelysupportedtheruler’swarfareandwasfoundedonthebellicosenatureofFrenchmen;
‘Furthermore, theFrenchhave alwaysbeen agile andagitated, that they, similar to a
PerpetuumMobile,couldneverhavebeenstill,norpeaceful,butalsowere inclinedto
674Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,41‐55;Lisolaon‘ChimericalMonster’,TheBuckler,277.675Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,54‐55.
169
Foreign andDomesticWars, to factions of families, and toDuels (…)And to prevent
thesedifficulties,theKingsfollowthelessonsofRichelieuthattheyhavetochangethe
Governorships frequently, andmaintain their Subjects in constant actions of foreign
Wars.’676
AlthoughbothauthorsreferredtoRohan’sDel’interest,Lisolaperceiveditastheevilblueprint
for France’s predatory monarchy. Valkenier, however, praised Rohan’s take on interest and
aimed his criticism directly and more vigorously towards Richelieu, Mazarin and Louis XIV,
which in the context of the disastrous events of 1672 iswell understood. Indeed, throughout
Europe anti‐French polemics became more colourfully, and the attacks on the French
governmentmoredirectly,aftertheFrenchinvasionintheDutchRepublic.677
Valkenier underlined the exploitation and suppression of the French population, as
Lisolahaddone,butelaboratedfurtheronhowtheFrenchCrowncollecteditsexcessivewealth
by increased and new taxes, confiscations, tithes and relentless exploitation of royal domains
(thesecondinstrumenttoacquireuniversaldominion);
‘The saleof variousandextremelyprofitablehonourableOfficesandDignitiesbrings
the Kingdom yearly almost as much as the entire income of a European Potentate,
consideringthatKingHenryIVinthelastyearsofhisreignmade70Millions,asl’Oiseau
tells in his Tract of theOffices, ;ib3.Cap:1.,which have been extremely augmented
underKingLouisXIV.’678
Furthermore,theFrenchCrownextractedmoneybythe‘extortionandsuppressionofthe
officers’,and,asLisolahadarguedlikewise,bytheproductionandsaleofFrenchfashion.
Valkenier evenviewed the latter asFrance’smost importantmethod,not least to stress
thepervertednatureofFrenchmen679;
‘theFrenchhavebytheirnatureandfrivolitiesblindedChristendom(exceptforSpain
andFriesland)withtheirnewFashionsandconstantchangesofclothing,andbrought
themthewrongopinionthatatruePatriot(...)wouldbeseenasaroughandobstinate
head,when he does not imitate those abominable foreign kind of clothing, butwore
downhisoldclothingthatwasfor2and3Yearsinfashion,andwasaccordingtothe
country’scustoms.’ 676Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,55.677Wrede,DasReichundseineFeinde,323‐33.678Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,58.679Ashelikewiseinhisaccountofthethirdpillar‘polity’comparedtheFrenchwiththedespoticAsianpeoplesandtheAfricanMoors‘whobylackofbravery,areeffeminateandweak’,Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,15.
170
Richelieu hadmoreover, extensively promoted the manufacturing of numerous cloths, which
produced40millionFrenchguildersfortheCrown.Intotal,LouisXIVhadexpandedtheCrown’s
yearlyincomefrom8/9millionto80million.Heconcluded:‘Fromthis,wesee,howtheFrench
mislead other Nations and blind them, how they by the same recklessness, have become
enriched and armed. Because from this treasure France equips its terrifying Armies and Sea‐
fleetsagainstthose,fromwhomitextractsthattreasure’.680
After listing the thirteen ways to obtain resources, Valkenier enumerated the twelve
factors supporting the power of France compared to the rest of Europe. These involved
geographical, logisticalanddemographicalassets,whichproducedprosperityandincludedthe
benefitsofFrancenamedbyLisola.Thelastfactorwasthemostcrucial:
‘ThewillingslaveryoftheSubjects,whodarenottorefusetheKing’staxes,butas
Donkeys load themselves until they collapse, therefore the King is called by
EmperorMaximiliande I a King ofDonkeys, as theEmperor (…) can bring forth
nothingmorethantheGermanPrinces,Spainallowhimbythelaws;Francecando
whateverhepleases,andEnglandnothingmorethanwhichthePeoplepleases.’681
Apart from acquiring money, maintaining its interest in relation with other regimes was the
secondinstrumenttoobtainthenecessarybasisforwarfare.First,ValkenierreiteratedRohan’s
(andLisola’s)wordsinclaimingthat‘ChristendomcontainstwopowerfulKingdoms,Franceand
Spain,whichtogetherasaBalancedeliverWarandPeaceuponalltheotherStates.’AsRohan,he
reasonedthatEnglandfunctionedasthebalancer,butaddedthattheUnitedProvincesare‘the
Tongue, in order to balance the three Kingdoms.’ This was followed by a reverberation of
Lisola’s regulations/maxims of the French system of government to manage their interest;
‘regulations,whichwerelargelyexecutedwithoutanyregardtoDivineorHumanLawsinorder
tofulfilitsobjective,i.e.UniversalMonarchy.’682Promiseswerenotkept,akeycharacteristicof
theFrenchsincetheoriginoftheirexistence.TheFrenchconcealedtheirpoliticalhiddenagenda
with finewords,andreligiousand legalpretextsconstructedbyFrenchpoliticalphilosophers,
whowereonthepayrolloftheFrenchmonarchy.TheFrenchregimebuiltfortificationsalongits
borderstolaunchsurpriseattacks;andthey
‘[w]eaken neighbours by chiefly unlawful means, incite neighbouring countries
intoDiscordandWaragainsteachother,orinstigatedomesticTroubles,ordivide 680Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,firstquotep.56‐57,secondquotep.60,allthethirteenmeansofextraction,55‐63.681Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,62‐63.682Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,65.
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[society] into Factions (…). It is inherent to the Antichrist to create discord and
disputesintheWorld,andiftheKinghastomakedowiththat,[he]shouldnotget
angry,whensomeonecallshimthefirstbornoftheAntichrist,insteadofthefirst‐
bornoftheChurch.’
Valkenieraddedanotherbasicprinciple,whichheseesastheprimaryFrenchprecept:theartof
‘Blackmailing’ and ‘Corruption’. This was executed chiefly by the cardinals Richelieu and
Mazarin,whomValkeniersardonicallycalled‘thetwoholyfathers’.Frenchmonarchspractised
ruthless interest‐politicsbasedon the adviceof these evil clerics.Bymeansof bribery, secret
correspondence,andother tricks, theyplayedoffEuropeancountriesagainsteachother.With
thisstrategytheFrenchmanagedtosabotagetheSpanishcourts,causedEnglishuprisingsand
thedownfallofthekingdomofPoland.HereValkenierreferredto‘thegoodpolicyoftheHigh‐
WiseandPrudentialBaronFranciscusdel’IsolaImperialEnvoy’whosavedthePolishcourtfrom
the French hazard.683 The last regulation of the French interest was the intimidation of his
neighbours(alsostatedbyLisola);‘TheFrenchKingalwayskeepsinhisserviceagreatamount
ofHorsemenandSoldiers,whombygivingnewPatentshegradually changes fromGarrisons,
andstrategicallymanoeuvresentireArmies,notonlytopreventhisownsubjectstorebel,butto
demonstrateitsgreatpowertorestoftheworldaswell,especiallytohisneighbourstoprovoke
constant torments, threats, and fear, so they have to choose to join France for their own
protectionortobeattacked.’684
Inthesecondpartofthebook,ValkenierdealtwiththeFrenchwarpreparationsagainst
the Low Countries. Francois I strove for universal monarchy by conquering successively the
smallpolitiesofMilan,NapelsandtheLowCountries;HenryIVdidthisthroughtheconquestof
Madrid, Louis XIII German princes; but Louis XIV, ‘whose ambition and desire for glory
surpassesnoone(..),hasmaintainedthatnoefficientwayexiststoobtainUniversalMonarchy
and[tobe]MasteroftheWorldthanbytheconquestoftheSeventeenUnitedProvinces.’685He
followed ‘the Lesson of Coligny’ that France needed foreign warfare to extract money and
preventdomestictroubles.686ThecomparisionwithAsiandespotismisalmostaxiomaticforthis
kindofargumentsincethesecondthirdoftheseventeenthcentury.687Thehouseholdrulewas
runonrobberybyconquest;allmembersfacilitateditsinterestundertheplundermonarch:the
(new)officersand favourites, thesoldiers, theWar‐Priests,and theslavishsubjects.Valkenier
comparedthecrazyfuryandsuddenretreatsoftheFrenchwiththatof‘BarbaricNationsasthe
683Valkenier, ‘tVerwerdEuropa, quoted fromp. 71, 64‐74.On pages 71, 142 and175Valkenier likewise refers toLisola’sLeBouclier.684Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,74.685Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,131.686Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,132.687VonFriedeburg,Luther’sLegacy,339‐345.
172
Moors, Tartars, and all Asian and African peoples, which is the cause that France conquers
Countries without difficulty, but loses them as easily’, such as the successors of the great
conquerors ‘Atilla and Tamerlan’ could not maintain their vast captured empires.688 Besides,
LouisXIV,orthe‘FrenchHannibal’and‘Xerxes’689,wastrainedinthe‘LessonsofMachiavelli’to
become a supreme new prince, as Valkenier explained how the French cunninglymanaged a
diplomaticentrapmentof theDutchRepublicbefore the invasionof1672.690Louisbeganwith
thisschemeintheyear1664byincitingwarbetweenEnglandandtheUnitedProvinces(Second
Anglo‐Dutch War 1665‐1667).691 Through trickeries and offering money and weapons Louis
persuaded the other rulers to plot against the Dutch Republic. Valkenier concluded that the
Frenchplansofuniversalmonarchycouldbestoppedifeverypotentatewouldfollowhisadvice;
‘That they,within thecapacityofeachparty,shouldprevent, thatby thesuppressionof lesser
PrincesandStatestheFrenchgetelevatedtosuchaheightfromwhichtheycancrushtheothers
as by lightening.’He called out for a grand alliance of all European rulers against Louis XIV’s
France; ‘theyshould forma frontasoxesagainst theFrenchwolf.’Valkenierremarked that in
France’sbattlewithSpain,otherrulersfollowedFranceasdefencelessanimals.However,‘[o]ne
shouldputoutthefireinhisneighbour’shouse,becauseifthefireskipstohisownhouse,itis
toolate.’692
5.2.3InterestAnalysisofEurope
InadditiontoValkenier’shistoricalaccountoftheFrenchsystemofrule,hisexplanationofthe
general ‘ground rules’ and specific foundationsof the French interest,Valkenier furtheredhis
attackonFrancebyanalysingthespecificinterestsofthedifferentEuropeanrulersandthefew
republics. Other than Rohan and Lisola, Valkenier stated that interest of state consisted of
‘particular Regulations according to the specific Constitution of every State’ and ‘General
Regulations’.693 Every European ruler should manage well its foreign affairs, its secret
diplomacy, maintain societal unity, protect its subjects from external violence, and rule
according to the laws for the benefit of the people. These regulations echo the maxims of
Rohan.694ThedifferentinterestsoftheparticularEuropeanpolitieswereanalysedbymeansof
it recent history, the geographical position the relationswith other rulers, and the economic
688Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,267.689Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,189,343.690Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,148,158,725.691Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,137‐138.692Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,225‐226.693Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,75.694Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,74,75.
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situation. Valkenier pointed out the specific interest of the French king concerning each
particular polity. Consequently, the French hazard for Europe is highlighted. One by one he
describedtheinterestsofstatesasRohandid,althoughinmoredetail,dealinginturnwiththe
interestsofSpain,theHolyRomanEmpire,theItalianareas,England,Sweden,Denmark,Poland,
Hungary,theOldSwissConfederacyandtheinterestoftheDutchRepublic.695
Interestingly,Valkenier added three regimes toRohan’s list: thePortuguesemonarchy
that was restored through its revolt against Spain 1640‐1668, but also Muscovy and the
OttomanEmpire.Hisaccountsofthelatterwasremarkablypositive,especiallysincetheTurks
weregenerallyviewedasthepivotalexampleofdespoticrule.‘tVerwerdEuropawasoneofthe
earliest anti‐French treatises in which the allegedly cruel practices of Ottoman household
governmentswere sharply reduced in order tomagnify the French despotic image. Although
Muscovy did form a substantial threat to the northern European monarchies, the Ottoman
Empire could shiver Europe to its core during the second half of the seventeenth century,
culminating in the siege of Vienna in the 1680s. Valkenier viewed both regimes as absolute
governments,freedfromalllawsandfoundedontheslavishpopulation.‘Muscovyisruledbyits
TsarsoabsolutelyandfreefromallLawsasalmostnootherEmpireintheWorld,andtherefore
itsGrandeesandNobles,aswellasitsSubjectslivealifeofslavishservitudethatisatonewith
their nature.’696 The firstmaxim of the Tsar’s interest is to be honoured as a God to prevent
domesticrebellionandtoenforcestrictobediencetoitsorthodoxconfessionproducingabsolute
unity in society. Whereas Muscovy feared the Turks, Polish, Swedes, and in particular the
Tartars,theOttomanEmpirewasafraidofnoone.TheOttomanEmpirewasextremelywealthy
andwassecuredfrominternaldivisionandrevoltsbyitsstrictandunyieldingpoliticalmaxims
andfoundations;‘TheTurkishSultanisanabsoluteSovereign,andallofhissubjectsareequalas
slaves,whoseLive,GoodsandFortuneweresubjectedtohisPower,whichhecanclaimashe
pleasesandisfreetodisposeof.’697Thesultan’sauthorityrestedonfratricide(oldestsonofthe
sultankillsallhisbrothers),executionofthegrandeesbykeepingtheJanissariesandtheSpahi
(infantryandcavalryhouseholdtroopsofthesultan)engagedinwarfare,andbythepovertyof
the subjects.Yet, theOttomansenjoyed freedomof religion, lived soberly andmodestly,were
piousbelieversfearingGodandstrivingtoascendintoheaven,andbecausetheywereforbidden
to drink wine, they were not driven by disobedience and tumults, which made them stable
soldiers.698
695 Valkenier, ‘t Verwerd Europa, 75‐129. What is more, Valkenier discusses separately the interests of Sweden,Hungary,Poland,Denmark,andofthemostimportantItalianprinces,whileRohandiscussesthefirstfourundertheheadingoftheHolyRomanEmpire,andthelatterunder‘Italy’ingeneral,ofwhichheonlypaysexclusiveattentiontoVenice.Yet,RohantreatstheinterestofthePopeindividually.696Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,99.697Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,101.698Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,100‐105.
174
After the French interest, Valkenier first analysed the Habsburg‐Spanish monarchy,
becauseaccordingtotheauthor,itsharedasimilarpoliticalgoalasFrance:theestablishmentof
a universal monarchy. Therefore, Valkenier claimed that the interest of Spain would always
conflict with the interest of France. As a result, the French monarchy fiercely opposed the
Spanishmonarchy.ValkeniercopiedmostofRohan’swritingontheinterestsofHabsburg‐Spain
andBourbon‐France.HedidnotliterallycopyRohan’sdepictionoftheSpanishinterest,buthe
copied the first ‘points’ and presented them in the same order. Yet, in his description of the
Spanishinterest,ValkeniercopiedalmostletterforletterapassagefromRohan’saccountofthe
Frenchinterest.ThispassagedescribedHenryIVasthefirstFrenchKingwhounderstoodthat
Franceshouldoppose theSpanish interestand thatFrancehad toshowto theCatholic rulers
that the venomhidden behind Spain’s pretext of protector of the Catholic faith, aswell as its
secret support to Protestants in their conflicts with Habsburg‐Spain.699 Valkenier, however,
observedthatSpainhadfailedthisfirstregulationinthelastdecade.Instead,Francehadtakenit
overbydeprivingcities, churches, andprivilegesof theFrenchProtestant subjects, aswell as
foreignProtestants, referring to the Frenchoffensive in theDutchRepublic. CombiningLisola
andRohan,ValkenierarguedthatSpain,aswellasFrancedesireduniversaldominion.
Furthermore, France surpassed Spain in its cunning diplomatic polices of gathering
informationontheaffairsin‘foreign’kingdoms,initsdeceitfulandpower‐hungrypoliticsduring
peacenegotiations, and in the compositionof itsmonarchy. Spain suffered from the scattered
landsofitsmonarchy,whichmadeitextremelydifficulttomaintaininternalconcord,something
Lisola also stressed. Valkenier pointed out that France already hadmade several attempts to
spreaddiscordbetween thedifferentelitesof theSpanish landsand theSpanishmonarch.He
699Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,75:‘SoheeftKoningHendrikdeIV.deeersteonderallenrechtaangeweesen,hoedathetInterestvanVrankrijkdaarinprincipalijkberust,dathetinallepoinctenSpanjensodirectmoettegengaan,dat,waarSpanjenJa,hetselveNeentoemoetseggen:Waaruytdanvolgt,datgelijkdeeersteregulvanSpanjesInterestaltijd voor desen is geweest de Protestanten ten uytersten te vervolgen, sichmet haare goederen te verryken, enonderpretextvanReligiedeCatholykeStaatenmethemdoent’samenspannen,datVrankrijkevensoin’treguardevanSpanjen,altijdvoorsijneersteRegulvanInterestheeftgehouden,dathet,aandeeenezijde,aanalleCatholykePotentatenmosttoonen,watquaatonderdienSpaanschendekmantelverburgenlag,eninsonderheytaandenPaus,hoesekerlijkdathij,nevensalleanderePotentaten,eenknechtvanSpanjensoudemoetenwerden;alsSpanjendoordeschattenderProtestantenverrijkt,deUniverseleMonarchiesoudeoprechten;EndathetaandeanderezijdedenProtestanteninallevoorvallentegenSpanjemoesteassisteeren,gelijkVrankrijkomsijninterestgetoontheeftaandeVereenigdeNederlanden,endeProtestantenin’tDuytseRijk.’;Rohan,Del’intérêt,170‐171:‘Maiscelanesuffisantpaspourtraverserlesprogresd'Espagne,l'interetdelaFranceestdeprendretoutlecontre‐pieddesmaximesquenousvenonsdevousdeduire.HenriIV,commeceluisurlequellasouplessedetouscesartificesaeteexerceejusquesaudernierpoint, lesayantmieuxreconnusqu'aucunautredevant luipour lesavoirplus eprouves,a lepremier etablipour le vrai interet de la Francede contre‐pointer celui d'Espagne en tous ses points.De sorte que si la premieremaximedel'interetd'Espagneestdepersecuter lesprotestantspours'accroıtrede leursdepouilles, lapremieredeceluideFranceestdefuirecomprendreauxcatholiqueslevenincachela‐dessous:surtoutdefairevoiralacourdeRome que les esperances qu'elle lui donne d'augmenter ses tresors par la ruine des protestants n'est que pouravancer son dessein a lamonarchie ou elle ne peut parvenir que le pape ne devienne son valet, l'autorite duqueln'eclatepointdavantagequequand lapuissancedesprincesetEtatschretiensestbalancee'etauxprincesetEtatsprotestants qu'encore qu'elle soit de diverse religion a la leur, elle aimerait plutot leur conversion que leurdestruction, les assurant que cela n'empecherapoint qu'ellene contribuedu sienpour leur conservationet ne lesassiste franchement contre tous ceux qui voudront troubler ou changer quelque chose en leurs Etats et en leurslibertes'.
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advised the Spanish monarchy to observe and secure the specific interests of the different
Spanishlands(herebyunderlingthesplinterednatureofearlymodern‘dynasticagglomerates’
andtheinherenttasktomanageallthosedifferentparts).Forinstance,toprotectNaples,Sicily,
and Sardinia, Spain should allywith theVatican andToscana. Allianceswith theHolyRoman
Emperor and theOld Swiss Confederacywere necessary to protectMilan andBurgundy. The
scattered composition of the Spanish monarchy was the greatest problem, which prevented
Spain from optimally looking after its interests. The lawyer stated that Habsburg‐Spain had
weakeneditselfbyincorporatingseveralItalianpolitiesandtheBurgundy‐Dutchprovincesinto
itsmonarchy.700
Besides the interest of Spain and France, Valkenier plundered Rohan’s account of the
interestofthePope,butsupplementeditbyarguingthatinhistimeFranceformeditsgreatest
threat.HealsocopiedRohan’sinterestanalysisoftheSwissandDutchpolitiesas‘thetwoarms
of the German Empire’.701 Haitsma Mulier sees in this Valkenier’s staunch defence for the
republican government in general,702 an evaluation which we should be careful to accept,
especiallywhentakingintoaccountthatthewordsweretakenfromRohan’swork,whowasby
no means a republican. As Lisola, Valkenier used Rohan’s interest analysis to turn it against
Louis’s monarchy, but, unlike Lisola, he also echoed Rohan’s negative account of Habsburg‐
Spain.703Rohan’selaborationson‘reasonofstate’anditsemploymentbyLisolaandValkenier
show how a rather similar ‘reason of state’ argumentation could result in totally different
outcomes. Valkenier’s practical goal was to block current plans for peace negotiations, to
maintain agrandEuropeanallianceagainstFranceandWilliam’smilitary leadership.Heused
Rohan’sandLisola’sargumentsto indicatethepredatorymonarchyofFrance,buthisanalysis
was farmore detailed and amplified, and the implications of such rulewere extremelymore
distressing.
5.2.4Dutchinterestofstate
ApartfromthelengthyanalysisoftheFrenchinterest,Valkenierdedicatedalotofpagestothe
interest of the Dutch Republic. His main objective was to defend the necessity of the
stadholderateandtorefutetheideaofHolland’sprovincialsovereignty,sofiercelyadvocatedby
Pieterde la Court.He constructed apolitical entity of theDutchUnitedProvinces,whichwas
basedontheUnionofUtrechtfrom1579.WithintheUnion,thesevendifferentprovincesshared 700Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,75‐79.701Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,85andRohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,176;Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,106‐107andRohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,181.702HaitsmaMulier,‘DiePolitisch‐historischenIdeenvonPetrusValkenier’,119.703Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,44‐48andRohan,Del’intérêtdesprincesetlesEtatschrétienté,188‐190.
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theabsolutepowerandmaiestas,whichwascarefullybalancedby theStadholder.704The first
interest of the Republic was to maintain the Union of Utrecht, and to prevent factions and
conflicts between thedifferentprovinces.The stadholder served as the supreme arbitrator in
theinternalpowerstrugglesoftheRepublic.Valkenierwrote:
‘(..)andthereforeathirdneutralpersonisnecessary,aGovernororStadholder,who
displayshim,andtowhomtheygivePower,Authority,andCommandinordertocalm
andtomoderatetheirrespectivefightsanddifferences,andtoavoidalldisorderand
mobs’.705
Thesecondinterestconsistedofthestimulationandprotectionofmaritimecommerce.Inorder
tosafeguardthisinterest,therightofthe‘freeseas’shouldbeprotected,whilewarsshouldbe
prevented.706ValkenierarguedforthecommercialinterestoftheDutchRepublicalongthesame
linesasDelaCourt’sInterestvanHolland,foundingitsprosperityonfishery,manufacturingand
trade.Spain’sembargoofDutchcommercewithSpainproducedDutchcommercialprosperity;
the Dutch had to find their own foreign goods and establish trading companies. Unlike De la
Court,ValkenierviewedthetwobiggesttradecompaniesVOC(UnitedEastIndiaCompany)and
theWIC(DutchWestIndiaCompany)asthetwoessentialpillarsoftrade.Moreover,Valkenier
arguedthatDutchprosperitywasjeopardisedby‘jealousy’betweenprovincesandregents,and
byjealousyand‘desireforstate/dominion’[staatsucht]offoreignprincesandrulers,especially
France that threatened to take down the Dutch Republic as a second Cartago. The prince of
Orange as stadholder and captain general formed the fundamental protection of the Dutch
Republicagainstforeignaswellasinternalfoes.707
ValkenieremphasisedtheimportanceofthestadholderfortheDutchRepublicintimes
of war, aswell as ‘during peace time’. Thewellbeing, in political and economic terms, of the
wholeRepublic dependedon theneutral positionof the stadholder and thebalanceof power
between the provinces. Valkenier examined the history of the ‘factional government’ of the
1650sand1660s.AsDelaCourtdid,hetookthecrisisyearsof1618and1650tostatehiscase,
but instead legitimised the ‘interventions’ of the respective princes of Orange against the
factiousandoligarchicregents.Inthe1610stheDutchRepublicwasatitspeakduetoMaurice
ofOrange,whohad‘stabilisedthestate’,‘temperedgovernment’andbroughtforthtruemilitary
704Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,106.705Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,108.706Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,110.707 Valkenier,‘t Verwerd Europa, 124‐129; As De la Court, Valkeniermay also be interpretetd as an author in thetraditionof‘jealousyoftrade’scrutunisedbyIstvanHont,JealousyofTrade.InternationalCompetitionandtheNation‐State inHistoricalPerspective (Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversity Press, 2005);Hartman, Jan andWeststeijn, ‘AnEmpireofTrade:CommercialReasonofStateinSeventeenth‐CenturyHolland’, inSophusReinertandPernilleRøge(eds.),ThePoliticalEconomyofEmpireintheEarlyModernWorld(Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2013),11‐31.
177
success. Yet, during this period of peace with Spain (1609‐1621), ‘some people pretended
insolently theunlimitedFreedom,bywhich themostevilpersonsamongst thepeople, if their
partiality and imaginary concepts had succeeded, would have discarded the people of their
Freedom.’708By‘unlimitedFreedom’Valkeniermeantfreedomofreligion,freedomofprovincial,
evenmunicipal,sovereigntyinpoliticaland,especially,militarymatters,andfreedomfromthe
authority of the House of Orange. By the imprisonment of certain regents in 1618 and the
execution of Oldenbarnevelt in 1619,Maurice restored order. After the peace treaty of 1648,
someregentsthought,yetagain,thattheDutchgovernmentneededno‘IllustriousPerson’and
thusbegantoobstructtheHouseofOrangebytakingawayits ‘PowerandAuthority’overthe
military.ValkenierslightlytoucheduponWilliamII’ssiegeofAmsterdamin1650,butexcused
the display of force and the imprisonment of eight members of the provincial assembly of
Hollandasasheernecessity.TheseHollandregentshadthreatenedtheinterestoftheRepublic
by the reduction of the army and severely limiting the power of the stadholder. The Year of
Disasterwas theresultofnotacting in the ‘true’ interestof theUnitedProvinces.Thepower‐
hungrystadholderlessregimeofJohandeWitt,supportedbypublicistssuchasDelaCourt,was
toblameforthedisastrousstateoftheDutchRepublicundertheinvadingarmiesofpredatory
KingLouisXIV.709
InthesecondpartofthebookValkenierattackedtheconfessionalpoliticsoftheDeWitt
regime. The regents had suppressed theReformed religion as themain religion of theUnited
Provincesandevensubjectedittotheirpoliticalrule.TheReligiouszealdegeneratedduringthe
1650sand1660s: ‘InsummatheybecamesoLibertineandFree‐Spirited, thattheyfollowedno
particularReligionwhatsoever’.710However,Valkenierstatedthat
‘theReformedTheologiansalsowerenotwithoutfault,sincethey[turned]againsteach
other by unnecessary and vicious Disputes, and by mutual Divisions and Factions,
whichtheyoftensoughtwithheavypassions,[they]deprivedtheChurchoftherespect
of its Enemies, and theAuthority and theRespect,which, previously, it had received
from thewholeworld. (…)Andas longas this remains, theChurchmustberestored
andmaintainedbygoodOrdersofthePoliticalgovernment.’711
ValkenierwantedtoexplainhowthegovernmentofDeWitthaderodedthepillarsofstateand
consequently ruined the state. The regents had a threefold programme to destroy the
stadholderate and establish a aristocracy: ‘to humiliate the House of Orange’, ‘to flatter 708Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,112.709Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,112‐113.710Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,229;ValkenierdiscussedtheDutchpracticeofreligionunderDeWitt‐regimep.225‐230.711Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,228‐229.
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provinces and citieswith absolute sovereignty’, and ‘to caress theCommunitywith the sweet
name of Freedom claiming that they would enjoy more abundantly under a Aristocracy or
StatelyGovernment,thanwhentheyhadaStadholder.’712Hewrote: ‘TheCommunityisalways
ruledsincethetimeofCivilisbyaHeadunderthetitleofaCountorPrince,whowouldalways
besubjectedtottheLaws,MoralandSovereignPoweroftheState.’‘TheCommunity’hedefined
as: ‘thejointNationthatactuallyistheSovereignStateasCicero lib.3.DeRepublicateachesus
Respublicaestrespopuli,cumbene&justegeriturabunorege,siveapaucisoptimatibus,siveab
universopopulo.Thatis:TheRepublicbelongstothePeople,astheywillbeservedwellandwith
justice by a King, or by a few of the most distinguished, or the joint People.’713 However,
‘Freedom of the Community is not compatible when the sovereignty lies with the regents,
because when one falls the other falls as well,’ as was witnessed during the lethal chaos in
ZeelandandHollandin1672.714
The faction surrounding DeWitt had corrupted the legal system, coerced judges, and
installed theirpartisans in judicial,military andpoliticaloffices.Consequently, thearistocracy
slippedintoanoligarchy.Whentheoligarchicregentsfearedthattheirpropositionswouldnot
findthedesiredsupport,theyobstructedtheStatesGeneralwaitingfortheabsenceofpotential
opponentsandforthesubstantialpresenceoftheirownfactionmembers,‘whichappearedfrom
the granted privilege to the Book of De la Court.’715 The De Witt faction promoted and
worshippedsuch‘DefamatoriousLibels’,whichslanderedthereputationoftheHouseofOrange
and attributed to them ‘the most wicked absurdities and crimes.’716 Furthermore, they had
turnedtheRepublicintomultiplerepublics,burdenedthesubjectswithanunparalleledlevelof
taxation.Yet,theregentswereavariciouswithcertainnecessaryspendingasthemilitaryforces
and fortresses.EchoingRomeyndeHooghe’santi‐Frencharguments,Valkenierexclaimedthat
themagistrateshad indulgedthemselves inexcessive luxuries,copiedFrenchfashionsof food,
clothing and palaces as if theywere princes, led society into a general decay ofmorals, and,
consequently,lettheenemyin.717
Against internaldiscordaprinceofOrange intheofficeofstadholderoughttobalance
thefactiouspoliticaldynamicswithintheDutchRepublic.Againstexternalenemies,astrongand
largearmyandahealthyorganisationofwarfinancesshouldbemaintainedunderthesupreme
commandoftheprinceofOrangeintheofficeofcaptain‐general.Valkenierextolledthemilitary
qualitiesoftheprincesofOrange,whichthesuccessoftheRevoltagainstHabsburg‐Spainhad
712Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,234.713Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,234‐235714Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,249‐250.715Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,249.716Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,236.717Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,226‐266.
179
demonstratedsowell.718However,comparedtothe‘AbsoluteMonarchicGovernment’ofFrance,
the princes of Oranges were restricted by the constitutional arrangements of the Union of
Utrecht,which, aswe saw, he traced back in a Grotianmanner to the times of the Batavians.
Moreover,Valkenierpropagatedthe ‘Orangist’notionoftheconstitutionalrestrainingfunction
oftheUnionofUtrecht.HeaccusedthestadholderlessRegimeofattemptingtoacquireabsolute
sovereigntyfortheindividualprovinces.719
Such arguments were in line with Dutch debates on the true interest of the polity;
Valkenierargued foroffensivewarfare, strong land forcesunder thecommandofOrange,and
usedtheconventionalOrangistargumenttobackhisclaim.Yet,throughhisenhancedinterest
analysisanddetailedimageoftheFrenchpredatorymonarchy,hestressedthesheernecessity
for the small DutchRepublic to enforce themilitary and to pursue alliedwarfare in order to
survivethemilitarycompetitionbetweenthepowerfuldynasticagglomerates,especiallyFrench
expansionism. The year of 1672 had proven this once and for all. Valkenier intervened in
debates on William III’s enlarging his authority through the pursuit of warfare and planned
peace negotiations in themid‐1670s.He underlined the popular argument that to defend the
Dutch commerce wars should be prevented. Conversely, William III’s grand alliance against
Francewasamatterofsheersurvival;thecurrentwaragainstLouisXIVshouldbepursuedand
the position of Orange maintained. The success of the prince of Orange was based on his
authority,executedthroughthemilitaryandthepoliticalassemblies;hisauthorityharmonised
theconstitution,moderatedreligiousissues,andfacilitatedanimpeccablelegalsystem,astrong
army and a proper financial organisation, which formed the protection of property and
privilegesofDutchsubjectsagainsttheHollandregentoligarchy,but,moreimportantly,against
Frenchwar‐tyranny. In thisway, Valkenier propagatedprincelywar politics under a rule law
independentfromrevealedreligionandshieldedagainstthethreatofpredatorymonarchy.
Valkenierdealtwith twocontinuing issues:howtodiscredit theDeWittRegimeandpromote
the princely rule of Orange; and simultaneously discredit Louis XIV?He delegitimised the De
Witt regime by explicitly stating how they ruined the five pillars of state, but perceived that
Francewasageniusinthemanagementof its interest; itspillarswereput infullserviceof its
interest,i.e.universalmonarchy;itsreligionwaspoliticisedandFrenchpriestsfullyservedthe
Frenchwareffort,evenadvisedtheCrownhowtobecomeaMachiavelliannewprince;norule
oflawexistedastheKingcoulddoashepleasedwithoutconsentorconsultfromtheelites;he
ruledarbitrarily, absolute inaccordancewith theslavishnatureofhis subjects; financeswere
extortedfromitssubjectsaswellasconqueredpeoples;andthemilitaryforceswereabundant
718Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,23‐24.719Valkenier,‘tVerwerdEuropa,234.
180
in number and bellicose spirit. Though the French monarchy adequately pursued its true
interest (establishinguniversalmonarchy), it executed itwithout regard to the fourbridlesof
interest of state (the protection of religion, faithfulness to alliances, honesty, and impeccable
benevolent administration of justice). Through a historical analysis Valkenier determined its
maxims of universal monarchy and indicated the predatory nature of its society driven by
necessary warfare to supress its barbaric subjects and power‐hungry elites, as well as to
conquer other European polities. Rohan’s rapacious tyranny inversed by Lisola’s into a
household rule served as the basis of Valkenier’s expounded image of the French predatory
monarchy; De la Court’s account of the interest of Hollandwas deliberately reversed into an
common interest of the United Provinces, and its vicious attack on priestcraft and princely
interestwasreiteratedinValkenier’sattackonFrance.
Valkenierstated that interestof statesurpassedall laws (divine,natural andpositive).
However, he stressed that interest of state should be pursued for security reasons only; self‐
defence according to natural law and the expansion of one’s state should be executed with
legitimatemeanswithout explain howprecisely. So howwas he able to condemn the French
pursuitofinterest;istheFrenchinterestofstaterightful?Ateverystepofhisargumenthetried
tosolveanindividualproblembythrowinginargumentsfromallsortsofsources,whichledto
an incoherence, a lack of propositional consistency. His concern was not with a conceptual
reconstruction,butwiththedirethreatoftheFrenchpredatorymonarchy.TheFrenchinterest
ofstatestemmedfromitscircumstances,originsandnatureofitssociety.Inthissenseitwasa
descriptivenotion,buthealsowroteaboutFrance’sunrightfulclaimstoHabsburgpossessions,
France’sarbitraryrulethatwentagainstnaturallaw,andtheFrenchmaximsthatwerepursued
withoutregardtoanydivineorpositivelaws.Valkeniertendedtocollapseinterestintojustice,
not leastsinceheneededamarkof respectability forStadholderWilliamIIIofOrange,whose
princelyruleandthepursuitofwarfarehepresentedaslimitedandjust.Itappearsthatabove
reasonofstateasetofnormsexisted,God’smoralityindependentofconfessionalreligion.
Hisreasonofstateargumentationwashighlyderivative,forsomehistoriansunexciting
or too subjective, yet it underlined the polemical function of reason of state, its international
context, not least Rohan’s legacy, and the contemporary preoccupation with predatory
monarchyandthestruggletorestoreorder.
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Chapter6Conclusion
Thisresearchstemsfromtheneedforareassessmentoftheidiomofreasonofstate.Ithasbeen
perceived asmirroring an earlymodernprogrammeof state building, but since thenotion of
statebuildingasandeliberateorstrategicactivityhasbeenundermined,thequestionariseson
thereasonsfor itsextremelypopularity inpoliticalwritings fromthe1590sonwards,ortobe
more precise: what was the function of the popular vocabulary of reason of state in early
modernpoliticalwritings?Thisthesisfocusesonspecificappealstoareasonofstate;thatis,the
analysisofwhatwasclaimedtobe‘the(true)interestofstate’.Fromthe1630sonwardsauthors
complemented argumentson reasonof state ‐examinationsof theperson of the ruler andhis
political practices‐ with analyses of the nature of the societies that he ruled. Each chapter
considers an interest analysis of an author and scrutinizes the function of the vocabulary of
reasonofstatewithintherespectivesource:HenrideRohan’sDe l’interest(1638),Pieterdela
Court’sInterestvanHolland(1662),François‐PauldeLisola’sBouclierd’Estat(1667)andPetrus
Valkenier’s‘tVerwerdEuropa(1672).Everyindividualauthorintervenedinpoliticaldebateson
immediate issues ofwarfare, foreign policy,mounting taxation, and governmental debt. From
this emerges a shared preoccupation with the fear of predatory monarchy, which may be
consideredatraditionofspeculation,orasub‐genreofpoliticalthought.
Thebackgroundoftheriseoftheidiomofreasonofstateisthegrowingscaleofwarfare
andconfessionalstrifethatnotonlybroughtforthtransformationsinearlymodernrule,i.e.war‐
drivenanddebt‐riddenregimes,butalsoamounted toaperceivedcrisisof theruleof law,as
laws to be found in scripture, Roman law, local precedent, deeply rooted in Aristotelian and
confessional Christian notions. Reason of state was a highly suggestive term, as part of the
‘vocabularyoffashionablepoliticalcynicism’aboutthe‘true’motivesofrulerspromptedbythe
experiences of civil strife and continuous warfare. Its popularity sprung from its opacity; it
could,andwasmadetomeandifferentthingstodifferentpeople.Argumentsofreasonofstate
usuallyentailedpracticalcounselfortheruleronprudenceoftensummarisedin‘maxims’andin
itsmostnarrow,‘Machiavellian’understanding,authorsgaveadviceontheroomforlegitimate
manoeuvreinemergencycircumstancesbeyondtheboundsofnormallegal,moralandreligious
constraints. It was most often used in accusations against certain officeholders in terms of
neglecting or subverting the princely duties towards the divine and natural laws. Such
argumentscontributedtotheperceivedcrisisoftheruleoflaw.Thefashionableterm‘interest’
was used interchangeably offering an insight into themotivations of ruler and a rationale to
executequestionedpolitics.Fromthe1630sonwards,authors,suchasRohan,usedthetermto
182
dissecttheoriginsandmake‐upoftheruler’ssocietiesofferingseeminglyobjectivecounselon
howmaintainandexpandthe‘state’(e.g.princelystatus,regime,polity,)inaworldofconstant
changeandconflict.ThechangingconfigurationsofEuropeandynasticagglomeratesencouraged
such attention. The specifics were derived from empirically‐based analysis, which enabled
writerstoemphasisethecurrentstateofaffairsandthedistinctionbetweenadomesticanda
foreigndomain.Suchcounselassumedthattherulerhadanobligationtopursue‘true’interest
ofstatefreedfromhispersonalinterest,virtues,passionsandrelations.Inpoliticaldebateson
thepursuitofwarfare,authorsemployedinterestanalysestopromoteaspecificofficeholderor
political faction that was purportedly the most able candidate to defend a certain course in
foreignpolicy,andsimultaneouslytoattacktheopposingfactionasdangerouslyunsuitablefor
the‘true’interestofstate;authorscouldaddressandcriticisetheconductofregimespressured
bythemilitarycompetitionandsubsequentmountinggovernmentaldebt,whilesimultaneously
demandingapositionwithinthesetransformedregimes.Interestanalysesweretakenonboard
in English civil war debates and Dutch debates during the stadholderless regime, offering
authors an opportunity for criticism in the name of achieving order, harmony, and the true
interestofthestate,arationaletocriticisetheconductoftheStuartmonarchorOrangeprince,
respectively,andtoreconstructorderbyarguingtheneedtoharmonisetheinterestsbetween
rulersandruledthatformedthe‘true’interestofstate.Fromthe1670sonwards,suchidiomsof
argumentweredirectedagainstLouisXIV’sexpansionisminordertodefendtheEuropeanlegal
order.
Historians have commended Rohan for a seemingly objective and rational interest
analysisonaEuropeanscale inDe l’interest (1638),butbehindhisallegedRealpolitik lies the
propagandistic functionof reasonof state;andasaHuguenot insearchofan importantoffice
underCardinalRichlieu,therewasaparticularneednottofantheflamesofreligiousdivisionin
France. The purpose was to galvanize the confessionally divided French into mobilisation
against Spain. This function is also witnessed in the way Rohan defined a national interest:
always in opposition to interests of other regimes.He defined the ‘true interest’ of France as
necessarilyanti‐Spanish(andsubsequentlypro‐Protestant).Thewholecasewasgivenurgency
by the way in which Spain’s geographic position, wealth and power was portrayed as being
directedtowardsthetotaldominationofChristendom.Itsinterestwasshapedbyfivemaximsor
methodsofgovernmenttoobtaina‘newmonarchy’,ofwhichaproclaimedzealforCatholicism
wasthemostnotableone.Itwasapredatorymonarchy,ruthless,dissemblingandonlyfeigning
religion. The imagewas verymuch a satiric reducio havingmost of the features of the Black
Legendwithoutitsdivisivesectarianism.TheapparentobjectivityofRohan’sunderstandingof
interestandreasonofstatemaybetheresultofoverlookingtwoaspectsofhisargumentthat
havebeenstressedhere:thesatiriccritiqueinvolvedinoutliningSpain’s‘true’interest;andthe
183
strategic displacement of confessional difference, something that should not be taken for
religiousindifference.
InthecontextoftheupsurgeofOrganismin1660‐1661fuelledbytheStuartrestoration,
theDutchmerchantPieterdelaCourtemployedaninterestanalysistodiminishthethreatofthe
reinstatementoftheyoungprinceWilliamofOrangeintheofficesofhisforefathers:stadholder
andcaptaingeneraloftheDutchmilitaryforces.InhisInterestvanHolland(1662)theidiomof
interestfunctionsasathreefoldmeanstoconstructanuncompromisinganti‐Orangistposition.
The mighty opponent of the House of Orange was the province of Holland. The historical,
economic,politicalfeaturesofHollandsuggestedthattheprovincehadnoneedfortheHouseof
Orange.Infact,theOrange‐dynastywasgoingtoruinHolland’ssplendour.Secondly,analliance
with Stuart‐Englandwas of no great value at all; by England’s commercial activities itwould
always seek warfare with Holland. Furthermore, the dynastic connections with the House of
OrangewouldbringHollandtoruin.Finally,itwasarguedthatthePrincesofOrangehadabused
theirofficestopromoteinternalstrifeintheRepublic,tosubjecttheinhabitantsofHolland,and
topursue theirowndynasticgloryandpassions inwarfareanda luxurious lifestyle.Whereas
Rohan’sdemonisedimageofSpainwasofarapacioustyranny,DelaCourtregardedtheHouse
ofOrangeasdespotic‐buttheresultwaseffectivelythesameinthatboththreatenedtocreatea
world of slaves. De la Court’s accusation of predatorymonarchy entailed, however, themore
systematicaspectofa rulewantingwar for reasonsof stabilizationofhis rulewithinhisown
lands.Orangeprincelyrulewasconstructedasahouseholdgovernment,robbingtheinhabitants
oftheirpropertiesandprivileges,enslavingthemall.Anditisincontrasttothedespoticruleof
Orange that De la Court specified the true interest of Holland, a harmonisation of specific
interests that combined and fostered trade with religious toleration. Rather than by‐passing
confessional difference De la Court emphasised that the interests of divisive priests in the
serviceofdespoticrulersthreatenedthetrueinterestsofHolland.
After the French invasion in the SpanishNetherlands in 1667, the trained lawyer and
imperial diplomat François‐Paul de Lisola attacked the Frenchmonarchy by skilfully refuting
LouisXIV’slegalclaimsontheselands,aswellasbypointingtothesourceofitsevil:reasonof
state,especiallythatproclaimedbyRohan.ByanironicinversionofRohan’smaximsofSpains’
and France’s interest, Lisola implicitly argued for the illegitimacy of French conduct, its
predatory nature from Henry IV onwards, feeding on its subjects and conquered peoples,
endangeringthe‘libertyofEurope’.Itwasnotthepeace‐lovingSpaniards,buttheFrenchwho
wererestlesswarlikesavages,andtheFrenchCrownlivedaccordingtoaMachiavellianruleof
conquest.WhereasRohanpointedtothepowerofHabsburg‐Spain,withpossessionsscattered
over the whole world, Lisola urged that Spain’s dispersed territories constituted a military
weakness at onewith its quiet and peaceable nature. Echoing De la Court’s argument, Lisola
184
addedasocialconstructionofpredatorymonarchy,onethatrequireswarfaretosuppressand
delude its subjects in order to extract resources to finance further warfare. Lisola treated
commerce as an instrument to further France’s belligerence and one hat also threatened the
morepeaceful commercialpracticesofEurope.Lisola’smotivewas topersuade theHabsburg
emperorandGermanprincestoaidHabsburg‐Spain,andarguedthisthroughappealstojustice
defendingtheEuropeanlegalorderagainstFrenchexpansionism.LikeRohan,Lisolarequireda
supraconfessional argument for this. Yet, whereas Rohan argued that Spain’s zeal for
Catholicismwasmerelyapretext,LisolacounteredthatjusticewasmerelyapretextforFrance’s
expansionarypolicies;Rohan’sDel’interestbecamepartofhisevidence.ForLisola,theChristian
Europeanorderwas fundamentally apolitical and spiritual entity, opposed to theunchristian
Frenchrule,unchristianas theTurkishhouseholdrule: itundermined theruleof law, robbed
foreign peoples and coerced and abused its subjects, with no consideration for justice
whatsoever.EuropewasusedinterchangeablywithChristendom;althoughLisolaemployedthe
firsttermsubstantiallymoreoften.Thenotionofbalanceofpowerdidnottakecentrestagein
Bouclier; it was only referred to in countering Rohan’s interest analysis of Spain’s desire to
conquest,anduniversalmonarchy.However,Lisoladidassociatethis imageexplicitlywiththe
threat of slavery for all of Europe. The work of a Catholic Habsburg apologist formed the
groundwork for laterEnglish andDutch anti‐Frenchwritings, oftenperceived as arising from
withinpurelyProtestantandcommercialcontextsofargument.Perhapsthefullerironyliesin
thefactthatLisola’sworkwasaninversionoftheHuguenotRohan’sinterestanalysistogether
withitsdemonisedimageofthepredatorymonarch.
In the context of the ‘Disaster Year’, 1672, wherein Louis’s troops and allied forces
rapidlycrushedtheDutchRepublicPetrusValkenieremployedananalysisofinteresttoaddress
Lisola’snewpredator:France.HeaccusedDe laCourtofmaliciouslyattacking thegoodname
and reputation of the princes of Orange, on the orders of De Witt, whose ‘libertine’ and
‘oligarchic’ government was to blame for the quick and disastrous downfall of the Dutch
Republic.However, in ‘tVerwerdEuropaValkenierdeliberatelymirroredDelaCourt’s interest
analysis to turn his arguments around in favour of a unitedRepublic under a strongmilitary
Orange‐princely rule. Furthermore he copiedwhole passages of Rohan’sDe l’interest to state
thatFrancehad takenover fromSpainas supreme threat toEurope.Accordingly,he inverted
Rohan’smaximsonSpain,andreiteratedLisola’simageoftheFrenchbellicosehouseholdrule,
but without Lisola’s ironic touch; perhaps his sense of revulsion was too great to allow any
illusionofdispassionateplay.His imageofFrancewas farmoredetailed thanLisola’sand the
hazardousimplicationsofitsrulewerestretchedtoamuchgreaterextent.Valkenier’sresponse
to the enormity of the threat from France was to put his faith in a prince as supreme
commander.ThisrequiredacompleterejectionofDelaCourt’sattacksontheHouseofOrange,
185
itsambitionsandthecorruptionsforwhichhehadhelditresponsible.Internalcorruptionwas
rathertheresponsibilityofwarpriestsandthelibertinesoftheRepublic.TheReformedChurch
wasneededas themain confession in in theDutchRepublic.Yet, in, as itwere, opposingone
princewith another, theproblemwashow to avoidbothbeingequallypredatory.Valkenier’s
solutionwastourgethatthePrinceofOrangeshould, forallhispower,beconstrainedbythe
constitution, and interest and reason of state ought to be in agreement with justice. His
argument reflects the genuine struggles of political thought in the 1650s‐1680s; a search for
alternativestocivilorderandtheEuropeanlegalorder,forstability.
Thesefourinterestanalysesdisplaythehighlypolemical functionof interestanalysis–
the exact method and type of argument was used and re‐used for different, even opposing
objectives.Aboveall,theyexhibitarelianceonanimageofthepredatorymonarchandalthough
thetargetofhostilitymayvary,eachimageofthemonarchispaintedwithRohanesquemaxims
andconcerted interest indominanceanddestruction, tyrannyanddespotism.The similarities
andthetextualcross‐referencesaresufficienttosuggestthatthesewritersmaybeconsidered
partofatraditionofspeculation,asub‐genreofpoliticalthought.Itrequiresconsiderablymore
study. Rohan, of course has receivedmuch attention, but not in Dutch thought, Lisola’s self‐
consciousappropriationandinversionofhisworkhasbeenlittlenoticed;anditisdifficulttosee
howfurtherexaminationwouldnotalsobreakdowntheunsatisfactoryisolationof,forexample,
Dutch fromEnglishpolitical thoughtor ‘absolutist’ reasonof state froma ‘republican’ counter
ideal.Thepredatorymonarchwasan internationalandEuropeanthreat. If itsometimes looks
like a creation of paranoia, it was widely shared and gave rise to powerful reflection and
resourcefulappropriationofremarkablyflexibleconceptualmaterials.
187
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SummaryThisthesisdealswiththeuseofthevocabularyofreasonofstatewithinthewritingsofHenriDuc de Rohan (1579‐1638), Pieter de la Court (1616‐1685), François‐Paul de Lisola (1613‐1674), andPetrusValkenier (1641‐1712).The riseof thishighlypopularvocabularyhas longbeen perceived as mirroring an early modern programme of state building, but sinceassumptionsunderlyingthetheoryofstatebuildinghavebeenundermined,reasonofstatemustbe reconsidered. The growing scale of early modern European conflict did not generateinstitutional bureaucratic states, but transformed polities into war‐driven and debt‐riddenregimesdependentonnewcollaborationswithvariouspowerbrokerstoorganisea(successful)participationintheEuropeanmilitarycompetition.Moreover,theintensificationofwarfareandconfessionalstrifeamountedtoaperceivedcrisisoftheruleoflaw,aslawsfoundinscripture,RomanLaw, local precedent, deeply rooted inAristotelian and confessionalChristiannotions.Thisthesisreassessestheidiomofreasonofstatewithinthecontextofthistransformation(andconsequentdebatesaboutmountingstatedebt,taxationandthereconfigurationofpower),andagainsttheintellectualbackgroundofauthorsstrugglingtorestorepoliticalandsocialorder.Itaskswhat the functionof reasonof state iswithineach respective source, analysedwithin itsspecific context(s) of crisis and contemporary usages of the idiom of reason of state. Thepurpose of this research is to explore changes in understandings of reason of state; not asabstractandcoherenttheoriesaboutmodernizationandasecularizedconceptionofpolitics,butasstronglypolemicalresponsestoverypracticalandimmediatepoliticalproblems,challengesandcrises,broughtforthbytheintensificationofearlymodernwarfare.
ReasonofstatebecameenvogueinEuropefromthe1590sonwards.InthelatefifteenthandearlysixteenthcenturiesItalianauthorsbegandiscussingthewaystomaintainthe‘state’ofthe ‘new princes’, e.g. the Medici, without relying on more traditional idioms of legitimationprovidedbyappealstocivicvirtue.Reasonofstatebecamepartofa‘vocabularyoffashionablepoliticalcynicism’aboutthe‘true’motivesofrulersspurredbytheexperiencesofthe(religious)wars. This vocabulary included popular aphorisms andmaxims, such as necessitas non habetlegem,andwascloselyassociatedwiththeterminologyof‘politics’, ‘statecraft’, ‘Machiavellism’,and ‘interest (of state)’. ‘Reason’ and ‘state’ could mean many different things (e.g.reasoning/the intellectual capacity to reason/ a rationale, and (princely) status/ condition ofsomething/ an office/a regime, respectively). It had a precarious identity and was a highlysuggestivetermofart;and,therefore,reasonofstateoughtnottobeseenasatheoryorconcept.Yet,exactly itsopacitywasthereasonfor itsearlymodernpopularity.Furthermore,reasonofstate was presented as relevant to the practice of politics (unlike the ‘mirror for princes’literature).Initsmostnarrow,Machiavellianunderstanding,reasonofstatediscussedtheroomfortherulertomanoeuvre,incasesofnecessity,beyondtheboundsofnormallegal,moral,andreligiousconstraints.
Thisthesisfocusesonthespecificterminologyof‘interest(ofstate)’,whichfromthelatesixteenthcenturyonwardsbecameamoreorlesssynonymousorassociativetermfor‘reasonofstate’ emphasising the justifiablenotionofprofit orutility.Rohanpopularised the term inhisfamousDel’interest(1638)thatbecametheblueprintforwritingsonthe‘trueinterestsofstates
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ofEurope’.Hecomplementedcriticalanalysisof themoralpersonof therulerandhispoliticswithcloseattentiontothenatureofthesocietiesheruled(e.g.thepresentgeographicalposition,political structures, religious make‐up, military prowess, and relations with other rulers), soaddingafurtherdimensiontointerestasreasonofstate.Thiscomplementationwasfoundedonthe growing importance of historical analysis, by means of which the international elementcouldbemoreclearlydistinguishedfromadomesticone.Whatismore,Rohandiminishedtheguidingimportanceoftheethicsofofficebyprimarilyfocusingontheruledsocieties.ThroughtheadaptivereferencetoandrelianceuponRohan’work,thisthesisarguesthatRohanprovidedavocabularyorganised intoawayof seeing thepoliticalworld thatwas itself stimulatedandconstrainedbyaperceivedcrisis,bothnationaland‘international’,secularaswellasreligious.Through the subsequent use of Rohan and the employment of his vocabulary of interest thisthesisshowstheingenuityofargumentunderdirectpressures.TheresultwasbothtoestablishRohanasanauthority,providingaseminalandpersuasively inescapable text thatshapedandconstrainedargument; andas resource foradaptation. Inall the casesarguedandcoheredbyreference toRohan, the stimulus to argumentwas a sense of immediate anddire threat, bestsummarised as a predatory monarchy, sometimes deemed despotic, sometimes tyrannical,usually arbitrary in its actions or anticipated conduct, sometimes all three, but alwaysendangering a fragile peace and a sense of acceptable political and social order. Such apostulatedorderwasoftentakenasinvolvingaruleoflaw,sometimesamoralregimeshieldedfromcorruption,sometimesaputativebalanceofpowerbetweencompetinginterests.
Historians have commended Rohan for a seemingly objective and rational interestanalysisonaEuropeanscaleinDel’interest(1638),buttheyhaveoverlookedthesatiriccritiqueinvolved in outlining Spain’s ‘true’ interest; and the strategic displacement of confessionaldifference, something that should not be taken for religious indifference. Hiswork should beassessed as belonging to a ‘genre of critical current‐affairs commentary’ emerging during theThirtyYears’War,inwhichasatiricemploymentofreasonofstate(satiricintermsofimplicitcriticism) was combined with reports on current affairs. Studied against the backdrop ofpressingfactionaldebatesinFranceoverthepursuitofwarfareintertwinedwithdebatesaboutmuchneededfinancialreformandtheissueofFrenchProtestantism,andRohan’sdireneedforaprestigious office as an exiled ex‐Huguenot leader, his use of reason of state shows thepropagandistic function of this vocabulary, first and foremost.Written on the eve of France’sdirect intervention in the Thirty Years’ War in 1635, the purpose was to galvanize theconfessionally divided French into mobilisation against Catholic Spain. He defined the ‘trueinterest of France’ as necessarily anti‐Spanish (and subsequently pro‐Protestant). The wholecasewasgivenurgencybythewayinwhichSpain’sgeographicposition,wealthandpowerwasportrayedasbeingdirectedtowardsthetotaldominationofChristendom.TheSpanishinterestwasshapedbyfivemaximsormethodsofgovernmenttoobtaina ‘newmonarchy’,ofwhichazealforCatholicismwasthemostnotableone.TheimagewasverymuchasatiricreduciohavingmostofthefeaturesoftheBlackLegendwithoutitsdivisivesectarianism.Spainwasapredatorymonarchy based on a rule of conquest, ruthless, dissembling and only feigning religion. TheseeminglyobjectiveandsupraconfessionalinterestanalysisenabledRohan,firstly,toimplicitlyaccuseSpainofpursuingunrestrictedanduniversal tyrannical control,while correspondinglysidesteppingreligiouspolemics;and,secondly,toenvisageapatrioticFrenchunityinwhichtheformerHuguenotrebelcouldre‐claimanoffice. TodiminishthethreatofanOrangerestorationintheearly‐1660s,theDutchmerchant,Pieter de la Court, vigorously attacked the Orange dynasty by identifying the interest of theplunder prince in his Interest van Holland (1662). The idiom of interest constructs an
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uncompromisinganti‐Orangistpositioninathreefoldway.Bycontributingtoitaninterest,DelaCourt made the province of Holland into the mighty opponent of the House of Orange. Thehistorical,economic,andpolitical featuresofHollandsuggestedthattheprovincehadnoneedfor the House of Orange. In fact, he claimed that the Orange dynasty was going to destroyHolland’s splendour. Secondly, an alliance with Stuart‐England was of no great value at all;England’s interest showed, especially through its commercial activities, that it would alwaysseekwarfarewithHolland.Furthermore, thedynasticconnectionsofStuartwith theHouseofOrangewouldbringHollandtoruin.Finally,itwasarguedthatthePrincesofOrangehadabusedtheir offices of stadholder and captain general. They had promoted internal strife in theRepublic, subjected the inhabitants of Holland, and solely pursued their own dynastic glory,passions for warfare and a luxurious lifestyle. His argument on the need to harmonise theinterests between rulers and ruled was at one with English civil war arguments on interest,whichwere grounded on Rohan’s idea that the princemay rule the people, but that interestruledtheprince.InterestvanHollandisbetterunderstoodasadistinctvariationonthethemesenunciated by Rohan, than as a quintessential example of Dutch ‘republicanism’ or ‘anti‐monarchism’.AlthoughDelaCourtpreferredarepublicanconstitutionfortheDutchRepublic,kingship in itself was legitimate and in other polities monarchy was simply acceptable. HemainlysuggestedanidealorderforHollandwheretheprivilegesandpropertiesofcitizenswereprotectedagainstraidsoftheplunderprinceandthepower‐hungrymembersofhishousehold(priests,soldiers,favourites)inordertopromoteeffectivelythefoundationofthetrueinterestof Holland: commerce. Compared to Rohan’s image of the rapacious tyranny of Spain, De laCourt’sallegationofpredatorymonarchyentailedthemoresystematicaspectofarulewantingwarforreasonsofstabilizationoftheruler’sauthoritywithinhislands.
In the context of the War of Devolution (1667‐1668) in which France invaded theSpanishNetherlands,François‐PauldeLisola,deliberatelyreversedRohan’sinterestanalysisofSpain andFrance inhis international bestsellerBouclier (1667). The imperial diplomat Lisolarequired a supraconfessional argument for persuading the Habsburg emperor and Germanprinces to aid Habsburg‐Spain in the battle against Louis XIV. Historians have stated thesignificance ofBouclier in rejuvenating the notion of universalmonarchy power by turning itagainst France and stressing the necessary maintenance of the European balance of powerresultinginasecularandmodernnotionofEurope;buttheyhaveoverlookedLisola’sreversionofDel’interest.LisolaattackedtheFrenchmonarchybyskilfullyrefutingLouisXIV’slegalclaimson theHabsburgspossessions, aswell asbypointing to the sourceof its evil: reasonof state,especiallythatproclaimedbyRohan.LisolaliterarycopiedargumentsofRohanandturnedthesewithagreat flair for ironyagainstFrance,presentingRohan’sworkas theblueprint forLouisXIV’suniversalmonarchy.Theresultiseffectively,perhapsself‐consciously,asatiricparodyofDe l’interest. Whereas Rohan argued that Spain’s zeal for Catholicism was merely a pretext,LisolacounteredthatlegalitywasmerelyapretextforFrance’sexpansionarypolicies;Rohan’sDe l’interestbecamepartofhisevidence.InamoresystematicmannerheassessedtheFrenchsystemofrule,notonlybasedonaruleofconquest,but,echoingDelaCourt’sargument,ontheslavish nature of its people and its inherent household rule, robbing the privileges andpropertiesofitssubjectsathomeandabroad,tofinancewarfareforuniversaldominion.Againstthe French predatory monarchy, the European legal order should be guarded by a mutualpursuitofreasonofstateandjustice.RecentscholarshiphasshownhowBouclier,theworkofaCatholic Habsburg apologist, formed the groundwork for later English and Dutch anti‐Frenchwritings,oftenperceivedasarising fromwithinpurelyProtestantandcommercial contextsofargument. Perhaps the fuller irony lies in the fact that Lisola’sworkwas an inversion of the
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HuguenotRohan’sinterestanalysistogetherwithitsdemonisedimageoftheSpanishpredatorymonarch.
PetrusValkenier’s ‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675)isaresponsetothe ‘YearofDisaster’in1672,inflictedupontheDutchRepublicbytheinvasionofLouisXIVthatresultedinmassivecivilriotsand the re‐installation of Orange. Hiswork has been (dis)credited as amere anti‐French andpro‐Orangist pamphlet, and his thought has been qualified as ‘Orange republicanism’ and anunoriginalemploymentofreasonofstate.Thesequalificationsshould,however,bere‐evaluated.Valkenier’suseandtransformationoftheargumentsofRohan,DelaCourtandLisolashowthehighlypolemicalfunctionofinterestanalysis–theexactmethodandtypeofargumentwasusedandre‐used fordifferent,evenopposingobjectives.ValkenieremployedthesameRohanesquemodusoperandiagainstwhathedeemedtheoligarchicdecadenceoftheDeWittregimeandtheruthlesspredatorymonarchyofFrance.HedeliberatelymirroredDelaCourt’sinterestanalysisto turnDe laCourt’sargumentsaround in favourofaunitedRepublicunderastrongmilitaryOrange‐princelyrule.Furthermore,ValkeniercopiedwholepassagesofRohan’sDe l’interesttostate that France had taken over from Spain as supreme threat to Europe. Accordingly, heinverted Rohan’s maxims on Spain, and reiterated Lisola’s image of the French bellicosehouseholdrule,butwithoutLisola’sironictouch;perhapshissenseofrevulsionwastoogreattoallowanyillusionofdispassionateplay.Whatismore,behindthepolitico‐historicalaccountof1672appears the feelingof thecrisisof theruleof lawandasearch forhowordershouldberestored.Consequently,‘tVerwerdEuropaexhibitsseveralpotentiallytensilethemes.Valkenierdefended the stronghold of the Dutch Reformed Church in society, and attacked the allegedatheismandlibertinismofthe‘politiques’,ashesawDeWitt;yethealsocriticisedtheologians,who purportedly divided society with their quarrels and incited princes and peoples intowarfare. Valkenier rejectedDe la Court’s full‐frontal attack onwar‐mongering princes, yet hecondemned plunder despots in a similar manner. He favoured an Orange princely rule withexpanded military and financial resources, yet within the constraints of the establishedrepublicanconstitution.Itwasoperatingwithinsuchanorder,protectingpersons,propertyandprivileges,whichstoppedaprincefrombecomingapredatorymonarch.
Forallthewritersdiscussedinthisthesis,theveryrealfearsofabreakdownofsocialandpolitical order, of there being no effective legal constraints, focussed on the threat of violentmilitary activity, a fear of catastrophic and exorbitantly expensive warfare. In all cases whatmatteredwasspecifyingandanalysingthedanger,thepredator.Whatitthreatenedcouldoftenberelativelyunspecific,evenopentothereadertoidentifyforhimself.ThisfocusontheevilsofapredatorymonarchywascentraltoRohan’swholeunderstandingofinterest—interestwasthemeansofcastinglightonitsdangers.ButhavingsetthetoneindemonisingHabsburg‐Spainwiththe concomitant imperative to France to stand opposed in its own true interest, Rohan’sperspective was complimented by a wealth of evidence. All the authors (Rohan, De la Court,LisolaandValkenier)exhibitarelianceonanimageofthepredatorymonarchandalthoughthetargetofhostilitymayvary,eachimageofthemonarchispaintedwithRohanesquemaximsandconcerted interest in dominance and destruction, tyranny and despotism. Regardless ofspecifics, the posited interest of the demonised predatory monarch provided a way ofredescribingawholesociety,somagnifyingthedangerstothethreatened.Thesimilaritiesandthetextualcross‐referencesaresufficienttosuggestthatthesewritersmaybeconsideredpartofatraditionofspeculation,orasub‐genreofpoliticalthought. Asthereferencesinthechaptersmakeclear,thesewerenotlonevoicesandsothegenrerequiresconsiderablymorework.
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SamenvattingDezethesisbehandelthetgebruikvandevocabulairevanstaatsraisonindewerkenvanHenriDuc de Rohan (1579‐1638), Pieter de la Court (1616‐1685), François‐Paul de Lisola (1613‐1674),enPetrusValkenier(1641‐1712).Deopkomstvanditzeerpopulairevocabulairewordtgezien als een literaire manifestatie van vroegmoderne processen van staatsvorming, maaraangeziendeonderliggendeaannamesvandetheorievanstaatsvormingondermijndzijn,moetstaatsraison worden herzien. De groeiende schaal van het vroegmoderne Europese conflictbracht namelijk geen geïnstitutionaliseerde en bureaucratische staten voort, maartransformeerdemonarchieënenrepublieken inregimesvoortgedrevendooroorlogenschuld,en afhankelijk van nieuwe samenwerkingsverbandenmet invloedrijke tussenpersonen om dedeelname aan de Europese militaire competitie te organiseren. De intensivering vanoorlogsvoering (en confessionele strijd) leidde tevens tot een crisis van de ‘rule of law’,gebaseerd op wetten gevonden in de Bijbel, Romeins Recht, lokale precedenten endiepgeworteld in Aristotelische en confessioneel Christelijke noties. Deze dissertatie re‐interpreteert het idioom van staatsraison in de context van deze transformatie (en inherentedebatten over stijgende overheidsschulden, belastingen, en de reorganisatie van macht), entegen de intellectuele achtergrond van auteurs, die worstelden met het vraagstuk hoe depolitiekeen socialeorde teherstellen.Bijdeze re‐interpretatie staatdevraag centraalwatdefunctie is van staatsraison in elke afzonderlijke bron. Deze vraag wordt geanalyseerd in despecifiekecontext(en)vancrisisenhettoenmaliggebruikvandevocabulairevanstaatsraison.Het doel van dit onderzoek is het exploreren van veranderingen in denkbeelden overstaatsraison.Dezewordennietbeschouwdalsabstracteencoherentemoderniseringstheorieënof een seculariserende notie van politiek, maar als sterk polemische antwoorden op zeerpraktische en acute politieke problemen, op uitdagingen en crises, voorgebracht door detoenamevanoorlogsvoeringinvroegmodernEuropa.
Staatsraison raakte indemode inEuropavanafde jaren1590. Inde latevijftiendeenvroege zestiendeeeuwbegonnen Italiaanseauteurs tediscussiërenoverdemanierenvanhetbehoudenvande‘staat’van‘nieuwevorsten’,zoalsdeMedici,zonderhierbijterugtevallenopmeer traditionele legitimeringsidiomen die de burgerlijke deugd centraal stellen. Staatsraisonwerdonderdeelvaneen‘vocabulairevanmodieuspolitiekcynisme’overde‘ware’motievenvanvorsten, voortgekomen uit de ervaringen van de vele (religieuze) oorlogen in Europa. Ditvocabulairebehelsdepopulaireaforismenenmaximes,zoalsnecessitasnonhabetlegem,enwasnauwverbondenmetdeterminologievan ‘politiek’, ‘staatskunde’,Machiavellisme’,en ‘interest(van staat)’. ‘Raison’ en ‘staat’ droegen vele betekenissen (e.g. beredeneren/de intellectuelecapaciteit on te redeneren/een grondgedachte en status/ conditie van iets/een ambt/eenregime, respectievelijk). Staatsraison had een kritieke identiteit en was vooral een zeersuggestieveterm.Daarommoethetnietwordenbeschouwdalseentheorieofeenvastomlijndconcept. De ambiguïteit van de term was de voornaamste reden voor de vroegmodernepopulariteit van staatsraison. Staatsraisonwerd daarnaast gepresenteerd al relevant voor depolitieke praktijk (in plaats van ‘vorstenspiegel’‐literatuur). In zijn meest nauwe,Machiavellistische betekenis behandelde staatsraison de ruimte voor de heerser om temanoeuvreren,intijdenvannood,overjuridische,moreleenreligieuzegrenzen.
Indezethesisligtdenadrukopdespecifieketerminologievan‘interest(vanstaat)’,datvanaf de late zestiende eeuw een ongeveer synonieme of associatieve term werd voor
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‘staatsraison’ en daarmee de notie van winst of utiliteit voor de heerser benadrukte. Rohanpopulariseerde de term in zijn beroemde De l’interest (1638), dat de blauwdruk werd voorwerken over de ‘ware interesten van staten van Europa’. Hij vulde kritische analyse van demorelepersoonvandevorstenzijnpolitiekaan,metnauwkeurigeaandachtvoordeaardvandemaatschappijenwaarover hij heerste (e.g. de huidige geografische positie, politiek structuren,religieuze opbouw,militaire kracht, en relatiesmet andere heersers).Opdezemanier voegdeRohaneenverderedimensietoeaaninterestalsstaatsraison.Dezenieuwefocuskwamvoortuiteen groeiend belang van historische analyse,waarmee het internationale domeinmakkelijkergescheiden kon worden van een intern domein. Daarnaast verminderde Rohan het leidendebelangvandeethiekomtrentambtendoorzichvooralterichtenopdebestuurdegebieden.DezethesisbeargumenteertaandehandvanaangepasteverwijzingennaarenhetvoortbouwenopRohanswerk,dathij eenvocabulaireverstrekte,die georganiseerdwasopeenmanieromdepolitieke wereld te kunnen begrijpen. Deze politieke wereld werd gestimuleerd en begrensddoor een beleefde crisis, zowel nationaal als internationaal, seculier als religieus. Door hetopeenvolgendegebruikvanDel’interestenhetgebruikvanRohansvocabulairevaninterest,laatdezethesisdevindingrijkheidzienvaneenargument,dieonderextremespanningenstaat.Hetresultaat was het vestigen van Rohans De l’interest als een autoriteit: een rudimentaire enonvermijdelijke tekst, die argumentatie vormde en beperkte, en als een bron diende voorverdereaanpassingen. Inalleonderzochtegevallenbestonddemotivatievanschrijvenuiteendirecte en onheilspellende dreiging, dat het beste kan worden samengevat met de term,predatorymonarchy.Somswerdhetgezienalsdespotisch,somstiranniek,meestalarbitrair inzijnactiesofverwachtegedrag,somsalledrie;maaraltijdwerdhetbegrepenalshetingevaarbrengenvaneenfragielevredeeneennotievanorde.Dezeordeomvatteeenideevande‘ruleoflaw’, i.e. een moreel regime beschermd tegen corruptie of een zogenaamd machtsevenwichttussenstrijdendeinteresten.
HistoricihebbenRohangeprezenomzijnogenschijnlijkobjectieveenrationeleinterest‐analyse van Europa. Wat zij echter over het hoofd hebben gezien is de satirische kritiek inRohans beschrijving van het Spaanse interest en zijn strategisch ontwijken van confessioneleverschillen. Dit laatste moet zeker niet worden beschouwd als een teken van religieuzeonverschilligheid.De l’interestmoetwordenbeoordeeldalsbehorendebijhet ‘genreofcriticalcurrent‐affairs commentary’, dat onstond gedurende de Dertigjarige Oorlog en waarin eensatirisch gebruik van staatsraison (satirisch in de vroegmoderne betekenis van implicietekritiek) werd gecombineerd met actualiteitsverslagen. Zijn gebruik van staatsraisondemonstreert allereerst de propagandistische functie van dit vocabulaire, vooral gezien decontexten waarin het geschreven is. Naast het feit dat Rohan dringend een prestigieus ambtnodighadnaderecentelijkgefaaldeHugenotenopstandenonderzijnleiding,intervenieerdehijindehevigedebatten in toenmaligFrankrijkoverhetnastrevenvanoorlogvoering,denodigefinanciëlehervormingenendekwestievanhetFransprotestantisme.HijschreefDel’interestopdevooravondvandeFransedirecte interventie indeDertigjarigeOorlog in1634metalsdoelhet confessioneel verdeeldeFrankrijk op te zwepen tot eenmobilisering tegenhet katholiekeSpanje.Hijdefinieerdehet‘wareinterestvanFrankrijk’alsnoodzakelijkanti‐Spaans(endusookpro‐protestants). De gehele kwestie verkreeg urgentie door de wijze waarop Spanjesgeografische positie, rijkdom, en macht werden afgebeeld. Spanje zou streven naar de totaleoverheersing van het Christendom. Het Spaanse interest werd gevormd door vijf ‘maximes’(overheidsmethoden)vanhetverkrijgenvaneen ‘nieuwemonarchie’,waarvaneenkatholiekegeloofsijverdemeestebelangrijkewas.Hetbeeldwaseensatirischereducio,diedemeestevandekenmerkenvandeZwarteLegendebevattezonderhetbijbehorende,verdelendesektarisme.
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De Spaanse monarchie was een predatory monarchy, gebaseerd op een heerschappij doorverovering, meedogenloos en misleidend, en slechts vroomheid veinzend. De zogenaamdeobjectieve en supraconfessionele interest‐analyse maakte het mogelijk voor Rohan om, teneerste, Spanje te beschuldigen van het nastreven van ongelimiteerde, tiranniekewereldheerschappij,entegelijkertijdreligieuzepolemiekentevermijden;en,tentweede,omeenpatriottische Franse eenheid te creëren waarin de voormalige Hugenoot‐rebel een ambt konher‐opeisen.
OmdedreigingvaneenOranje‐restauratieteverkleinenindevroegejaren1660,vieldeHollandse koopman, Pieter de la Court, de Oranje dynastie aan in zijn beruchte Interest vanHolland (1662). Dit deed hij door middel van het identificeren van het interest van deplunderprins.Het idioomvan interestwerddrievoudig ingezetomeensterkanti‐Orangistischargument te creëren. Door het toeschrijven van een interest aan de provincie van Holland,vervormde De la Court ‘Holland’ tot de machtige tegenstander van het Oranjehuis. Dehistorische, economische, en politieke kenmerken van Holland toonden dat de provincie deprinsvanOranjenietnodighad.Sterkernog,OranjezouHollandsweelderuïneren.Tentweede,het interest van Engelandwees uit dat een alliantiemet Stuart‐Engeland niet wenselijk was,want ter bescherming van zijn handel zou Engeland altijd oorlog met Holland nastreven.DaarnaastzoudendedynastiekerelatiesvanStuartmetOranjeHollandingrootgevaarbrengen.HetderdegebruikvaninterestkwamnaarvoreninDelaCourtsverklaringhoeinhetrecenteverledendeOranje‐prinsenhunambtenvanstadhouderenkapitein‐generaalhaddenmisbruiktominterneconflictenindeRepubliektestimuleren,deinwonersvanHollandteonderwerpen,enhunpersoonlijkedynastiekeglorie,enpassiesvooroorlogvoeringeneenluxelevensstijlnatestreven. De la Courts argument over de noodzaak van het harmoniseren van de interestentussenoverheidenonderdanenkwamgeheelovereenmet interest‐argumentenuitdeEngelseBurgeroorlog,dieophunbeurt gefundeerdwarenopRohans ideedatdeprins inderdaadhetvolkbestuurde,maardathetinterestdeprinsbestuurde.InterestvanHollandkanbeterwordengezienalseenvariantopde thema’sopgeschrevendoorRohan,danalseentypischvoorbeeldvan Nederlands ‘republikanisme’ of ‘anti‐monarchisme’. Ondanks dat De la Court hetrepublikeinse staatsbestel prefereerde voor de Nederlandse Republiek, beschouwde hijkoningschap als legitiem, en was monarchie in andere politieke eenheden simpelwegaanvaardbaar. Hij suggereerde een ideale orde voor Holland, waarin de privileges eneigendommenvanburgerswerdenbeschermdtegenstrooptochtenvandeplunderprinsendemachtswellustigeledenvanzijnhuishouden(priesters,soldaten,enfavorieten).OpdezemanierkondefunderingvanHollandswareinterest,namelijkhandel,gestimuleerdworden.Vergelekenmet Rohans beeldvorming over de roofzuchtige tirannie van Spanje, bevatten De la Courtsbeschuldigingenvanpredatorymonarchyeenmeersystematischaspectvaneenheerschappij,diegedrevenwerddoorhetstabiliserenvandevorstzijnautoriteitinzijneigengebieden.
In de context van de Devolutieoorlog (1667‐1668) waarin Frankrijk de SpaanseNederlandenbinnenviel,keerdeFrançois‐PauldeLisolaopzettelijkRohansinterest‐analysevanSpanjetegenFrankrijkinzijninternationalebestsellerBouclier(1667).DekeizerlijkediplomaatLisola had een supraconfessioneel argument nodig om de Habsburgse keizer en de Duitsevorsten te overtuigen Habsburg‐Spanje te helpen in de strijd tegen Lodewijk XIV. HistoricihebbenhetbelangonderstreeptvanditwerkvoordevernieuwingvandenotievanuniverselemonarchieenhetaanscherpenvandeideevaneenEuropeesmachtsevenwicht,datzouhebbengeresulteerdineenseculiereenmodernenotievanEuropa.ZijhebbenechterLisola’sombuigingvan De l’interest niet opgemerkt. Lisola viel de Franse monarchie aan door zowel behendigLodewijks juridische claims op deHabsburgse bezittingen teweerleggen, als door hetwijzen
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naardebronvanhetFransekwaad:staatsraison,voornamelijkdatgeneverkondigddoorRohan.LisolakopieerdeRohansargumentenwoordvoorwoordendraaidedezemetkundigeironieomtegen Frankrijk. Hij presenteerde daarbij Rohans werk als de blauwdruk voor Lodewijksuniverselemonarchie.Hetresultaatiseffectief,wellichtbewust,eensatirischeparodieopdeDel’interest. Rohan beargumenteerde dat Spanjes geloofsijver voor het katholicisme slechts eendekmantel was voor het Spaanse, tirannieke streven naar de wereldheerschappij. Lisola’srepliek was dat het Franse oogmerk van legaliteit slechts een pretext was voor de Franseroofzucht. Rohans De l’interest werd onderdeel van zijn bewijsvoering. Op een meersystematische wijze analyseerde Lisola het Franse overheidssysteem, die hij niet enkelverklaarde als een heerschappij door verovering, zoals Rohan had gedaan, maar als eenheerschappijvaneenmeesteroverzijnhuishouden,dievoortkwamuitdeslaafsenatuurvanhetFransevolk(eenweerspiegelingvanDelaCourtsargument).HetFranseoverheidssysteemwasgebaseerdophetrovenvandeprivilegeseneigendommenvanonderdanen,zowelinFrankrijkals daarbuiten, om zodoende verdere oorlogvoering te financieren en een universeleslavenheerschappij te vestigen. De Europese rechtsorde moest beschermd worden tegen deFransepredatorymonarchy.RecentonderzoeksteltdatBouclier,hetwerkvaneenkatholieke,Habsburgse apologist, de fundering vormde voor latere Engelse en Nederlandse anti‐Fransegeschriften,dievaakwordenbeschouwdalsvoortkomenduitpureprotestantseencommerciëlecontexten.Misschienhetmeest ironischehieraan ishet feitdatLisola’swerkeen inversiewasvandeHugenootRohansinterest‐analyse,metzijngedemoniseerdevoorstellingvandeSpaansepredatorymonarch.
PetrusValkeniers‘tVerwerdEuropa(1675)iseenantwoordophetRampjaarvan1672,waarin de Nederlandse Republiek werd aangevallen door Lodewijk XIV, wat resulteerde ingewelddadige,burgerlijkeoproerenenhetherstelvanhetOranje‐stadhouderschap.Zijnwerkisbeoordeeld als een zwaar gekleurd anti‐Frans pamflet, en zijn politiek denken als ‘Orangerepublicanism’eneenonorigineleuitingvanstaatsraison.Dezevisiesmoetenwordenherzien.ValkeniersgebruikentransformatievanRohans,DelaCourts,enLisola’stekstentonendezeerpolemische functie van interest‐analyse – de exacte methode en het type argument werdgebruikt en hergebruikt voor verschillende, zelfs tegenovergestelde doeleinden. ValkeniergebruiktedezelfdeRohanesquemodusoperanditegen,wathijbeschouwdeals,deoligarchischedecadentievanhetDeWitt‐regimeendemeedogenlozepredatorymonarchyvanFrankrijk.HijweerspiegeldebewustDelaCourtsinterest‐analyseomDelaCourtsargumentomtedraaienterverdediging van een verenigde Republiek onder leiding van de prins van Oranje. Bovendienkopieerde Valkenier gehele passages uit Rohans De l’interest om zodoende te stellen datFrankrijk het vroegere Spaanse streven naar universele monarchie had overgenomen. Hijdraaide Rohans maximes van Spanje om, en herhaalde Lisola’s beeld van de Franseslavenheerschappij, maar zonder Lisola’s ironische stijl. Wellicht was zijn walging voor deFransen te groot om elke illusie van speelse nonchalance te laten bestaan. Bovendienverschijnenachterhetpolitiek‐historischerelaasvan1671eengevoelvancrisisvanderuleoflaweneenzoektochtnaarhoeordehersteldmoetworden.In‘tVerwerdEuropawordendanookverschillendepotentieelcontrasterendethema’sbehandeld.ValkenierverdedigdededominantepositievandeNederlandsHervormdeKerkinRepubliek,enbestreedhetzogenaamdeatheïsmeen libertinisme van de ‘politiques’, zoals hij De Witt afschilderde. Tegelijkertijd echter,bekritiseerdehij theologen,diedemaatschappij zoudenverdelenmethunmeningsverschillenen debatten, en vorsten en volkeren zouden aanzetten tot oorlog. Valkenier verwierp De laCourtsbotteaanvalopoorlogszuchtigevorsten,maarookhijageerdetegenplunderprinsenenhunroofzuchtigehuishoudens,diehijbelichaamdzaginLodewijkXIVenzijnmonarchie.Voor
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deNederlandseRepubliekprefereerdeValkeniereenOranje‐heerschappij,dieberustmoestzijnop uitgebreide militaire en financiële middelen, maar wel beperkt moest worden door hetconstitutioneleraamwerkvandeRepubliek.Zijnidealeordebegafzichineengematigdgebiedtussen atheïsme en orthodoxie, en tussen oorlogvoering en roofzucht, en diende vooral debeschermingvandeonderdanen,hunbezitenprivileges.Dezeordezoudeontaardingvanprinsineenpredatorymonarchtegengaan.
Allebestudeerdeauteursvreesdeneenineenstortingvandesocialeenpolitiekorde,hetwegvallen van effectieve constitutionele beperkingen. Daarbij focusten zij zich op de dreigingvan gewelddadig militaire handelingen en een angst voor rampzalige en exorbitant dureoorlogvoering.Inallegevallendraaidehetomhetspecifiërenenanalyserenvanhetgevaar,depredator(roofdier).Wathetexactebedreigde,wasvaakrelatiefonduidelijkenvaakzelfsaandelezeromtebepalen.Deze focusopdegevarenvaneenpredatorymonarchystondcentraal inRohansgebruikvaninterest–interestwashetmiddelomzijngevarentebelichten.RohanzettedetoonmethetdemoniserenvanHabsburg‐Spanjeenhet inherenteadviesvoorFrankrijkomSpanje tegen te gaan, vanuit Frankrijks eigen interest. Rohans perspectief werdgecomplementeerd door een weelde aan bronnen. Alle schrijvers toonden een rotsvastvertrouwen in een beeld van de predatorymonarch. En alhoewel het vijandelijk doelwit konverschillen, tochwerdelkebeeldafgeschilderdmetRohanesquemaximesenovereenkomstigeinterestenvandominantieendestructie,tirannieendespotisme.Hetgeponeerdeinterestvandepredatory monarch verstrekte een manier om een gehele maatschappij te herschrijven enzodoende de gevaren te vergroten. De overeenkomsten en tekstuele kruisbestuivingen zijnvoldoendeomtesuggereren,datdezeschrijverskunnenwordenbeschouwdalsbehorendebijeentraditievanreflectieofeensub‐genrevanpolitiekdenken.Enzoalsdeveleverwijzingeninde hoofdstukken laten zien, stonden zij niet alleen hierin. Dit sub‐genre vereist daaromsubstantieelmeeronderzoek.
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CurriculumVitae
MarianneKlerkwasbornin1985inMiddelburg.ShestudiedhistoryattheErasmusUniversityRotterdamand in2010 shegraduatedcum laudeona studyof thepolitical thought ofPetrusValkenier, inparticularhisuseofthevocabularyofreasonofstate.AftergraduationMariannebecame a PhD candidate working on the NWO‐funded research project ‘Reason of state’ or‘reasonofprinces’?The‘newmonarchyanditsopponentsinFrance,GermanyandtheNetherlands,during the seventeenthcentury (2011‐2016).Marianne also lecturedon several courses in thehistorycurriculumatundergraduateandgraduatelevel.FromOctober2017shewillworkasapostdoctoralresearcherontheprojectofTheFiscalMilitarySystem,1580‐1850attheUniversityofOxford.
Publications
Klerk,M.B., “TheunheardChanges inEurope,and thestrangeRevolutionswhichhappened inourUnitedProvinces inour times”: reasonofstateandruleof law inPetrusValkenier’s ‘tVerwerd Europa (1675)’, Robert von Friedeburg and Matthias Schmoeckel (ed.), Recht,Konfession und Verfassung im 17. Jahrhundert.West‐ undmitteleuropäische Entwicklungen(Berlin:Duncker&Humblot,2015),285‐335.
ConferencePapersandInvitedTalks(aselection)
Klerk, M.B., ‘Reconstructing the Rule of Law and Reason of State in the Age of Louis XIV’, 14th International Congress for Eighteenth-Century Studies (Rotterdam, 27 July 2015).
Klerk, M.B., ‘Reason of state debates in the Dutch Republic: Pieter de la Court's Interest van Holland (1662) and Petrus Valkenier's 't Verwerd Europa (1675)’ at Confessional Paradigms for European Politics and Jurisprudence in the 17th Century? Althusius Gesellschaft (Rotterdam, 17 May 2013).
Klerk, M.B., ‘From the Anti-Spanish Black Legend to Anti-French Constitutionalism’, XIII Seminario Internacional de Historia "Vísperas de Sucesión. Europa y la Monarquía de Carlos II": (Madrid, 30 November 2012).
Klerk, M.B., ‘Anti-Monarchism in Pieter de la Court’s Interest van Holland (1662): Republican Ideals or Anti-Orangism?’, Research Seminar the Erasmus Center for Early Modern Studies (Rotterdam, 15 November 2012). Klerk, M.B., ‘Petrus Valkenier and Francois-Paul de Lisola: the menace of the French “New Monarchy”’, Oberseminar Frühen Neuzeit Justus-Liebig-Universität (Gießen, 4 July 2012).
Klerk, M.B., ‘Petrus Valkenier and 't Verwerd Europa (1675)’, Expert Meeting Fault line 1700, Early Enlightenment Conversations on Religion and the state (Rotterdam, 21 November 2011).
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AcknowledgementsBeingaPh.D.candidateiswonderfulforoneisgivenprecioustimetoreadandwrite,tospendthe day contemplating thoughts and sharing these with others, and the priceless freedom towork whenever, wherever. And sometimes it is hard, –hard to explain to outsiders what itinvolvesandsimplyjusthardtoundertakeandcomplete.Luckily,Ihavereceivedsupportandguidancefrommanypeopleoverthepastfewyears.
Firstand foremost, Iwould like toexpressmydeepgratitudetomysupervisorRobertvonFriedeburg,whosefirst‐yearcourseinspiredmetostudyearlymodernhistoryandwhohasguidedmeeversince.Thankyouforyoursupportandgivingmetheopportunitytogrowasaresearcher.IamalsogreatlyindebtedtoConalCondren,mysecondsupervisor,whointensivelyguidedmethroughthe lastphaseofwritingand finishingmythesis.Thankyouforyourtime,brilliantcomments,endlesssuggestionsandconstantencouragements.
Agreatnumberofpeoplehavehelpedmealongtheway.IespeciallywouldliketothankJan Waszink for his continuous guidance and companionship. And I am grateful to the kindsupport of Charles‐Édouard Levillain. I thank Paul Rahe andHarroHöpfl for their comments,criticismandsuggestionsattheclosingconferenceoftheresearchproject.AndIamgratefultotheNWOforfundingtheproject.RyanWalterkindlygavemethegreatbenefitofhisextensiveknowledgeoninterest.IwouldalsoliketoexpressmythankstotheHuizingaInstitutefortheirgraduate training program and organising the third‐year seminar, where Wyger Velemarefereedmy research. Moreover, I thank the teaching staff of the London Summer School inIntellectualHistory(2015)fortheirexcellentcoursesandcounsels.ThecommentsIreceivedattheErasmusCentreforEarlyModernStudieswerevaluablethankstotheextensiveknowledgeofitsmembers,inparticularWiepvanBunge,JaapvanNieuwstraten,HenkNellen,AdrievanderLaan,EddaFranckeandReginaBoot.IwanttoexpressmygratitudetoEvelienKoolhaasforherencouragements.AndIthankPeterWilsonforgivingmetheopportunitytofurtherpursuemyacademiccareerat theUniversityofOxford,whichhasmadethetimebetweenhanding inmythesisanddefendingitmuchmoreexciting.
In addition to research, I have taught undergraduate and graduate courseswith greatpleasure. My colleagues at the Erasmus University gave me valuable advice in teaching andhelped me to succeed, in particular Evelien Hazewinkel, Hein Klemann, Ben Wubs, TheresaOostvogels, Maarten van Dijck, Rudi Verburg, Karen Willemse, Dick van Lente, Brechje vanEekelen and Arianne Baggerman. While teaching, my students diverted (thankfully) myattentionfrommyresearchandbrightenedupmyday.
I amgrateful for the glorious companyofmyRotterdamPhD‐posse, including Ingmar,Dirk,Laurie,Tina,HildeS.,Marten,Theo,Annemieke,PieterB.,Pieterv/dH.,Robbert‐Jan,Susanand Geerte. Your expertise, fun and friendship guided me throughout my research. I owe aspecial thanks toNorah andMaryse for their endless support inmy last year, and also tomyfellow‘Schnurbarts’:HildeHarmsenandJesperSchaap.Icouldn’tthinkoftwopersonsbettertostand next tome duringmy defence.Moreover, I would like to thank David van der Linden,FrankDaudeijandLiekevanDeinsen, for thegreat timeswesharedwhilediscussing thepastandpresent.
I am also indebted to my friends outside academia. Tara, Wilma, Pauline, Lana, Lies,Megan,Marije,Kirsten,Revelino,JanPieterandSuzanne,youallhavemademydecade‐longstay
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in Rotterdam feel like home. Jeroen, the road to completingmy Ph.D. would have been a lotbumpierwithout your love and friendship. Tomy boys fromVlissingen in Rotterdam, Jowan,Johan, Sijmen and Erik, thanks for your camaraderie. And Louk, I am grateful for our fifteenyears ofbeing together andapart in love.Tomy life‐long friends,Cathalijn,Ellis, Isabelle andHester,thankyouforalwaysbeingthere,alsowhenIwasnot.Charlotte,youaremy‘sisterfromanothermister’.AndWendy,Icannotimaginemylifewithoutyourwarmandlovingfriendship.Alsobelongingtothisclanisthe ‘Singel157’household;I thankyou,Helge,Ruben,TesselandRover, from the bottom of my heart for making me part of your crazy family. You all havecontributedmoretothisthesisthanyouwilleverknow.
I owe my greatest gratitude to my parents. You have constantly supported andencouragedmethroughgoodandbadtimes.Youtaughtmetoread, towriteandtospeakmymind.Youbothhaveshownmethepowerofintegrityandperseverance.And,nottoforget,youtaughtmethetasteofgoodfood.Aboveall,yougavemeabigsister,Suzanne,whohasalwaysgotmybackagainstbulliesontheplaygroundandnightmaresingeneral–Suus,Iamgratefulforyourandyourfamily’s(WouterandEsmée)love.Dearmomanddad,itisbecauseofyouthatIamatthispointinmylife,thankyou.
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