Public Good game with positive or
negative incentives
Two players game for simplicity and to compare with Rand, Armao, Nakamaru and Ohtsuki (2010)
Public goods with punishment
)mostly and
, assume (we
cost at fine :punishment a
:player -co toincentivedeliver can player Second,
ccost at
player -co tob help providecan player First,
bc
Opportunistic Players
P] ,[O N], ,[O P], ,[O N],,[O strategies 4
Nor P stage, secondIn
Oor O stage,first In
)1:(
P)or (Nplayer -co of typeknowsplayer that prob.
DDCC
DC
Role of reputation in Punishment
Punishment as deterrent
Revenge economically useful
Revenge is sweet (=fitness-enhancing)
Anger is loud
Role of reputation in Punishment
Punishment as deterrent
Revenge economically useful
Revenge is sweet (=fitness-enhancing)
Anger is loud
Barclay (‚Don‘t mess with the enforcer‘)
Role of reputation in Punishment
Punishment as deterrent
Revenge economically useful
Revenge is sweet (=fitness-enhancing)
Anger is loud
Barclay (‚Don‘t mess with the enforcer‘)
Non-altruistic punishment
Role of reputation in Punishment
Punishment as deterrent
Revenge economically useful
Revenge is sweet (=fitness-enhancing)
Anger is loud
Barclay (‚Don‘t mess with the enforcer‘)
Non-altruistic punishment
Kurzban et al, Suter: ‚Audience effects‘
Similarity with Ultimatum
• Ultimatum with orwithout reputation
• (Fehr andFischbacher, Nature 2004)
The feeling of being watched
‚Conscience…the nagging feeling that someone may be watching‘
(Mencken)
Public goods with reward
for efficiency low
,
cost at benefit
:reward adeliver can player Second,
bccost at
player -co tob help providecan player First,
bc
Reward and Punishment
defects) O doubt; of casein cooperates O(
O and O types two:players ticOpportunis
AllD and AllC players nalUnconditio
:stagefirst in types4
N :neither do I,both do P,Punish R, Reward
:stage secondin moves 4
:Extension
DC
DC
Results:
],[],[],[ON][AllD,
:smaller for
],[],[],[ON][AllD,
:larger for pathway
if catalyses ],[
wins],[
D
D
POROR
POPON
bRO
PO
CC
CD
D
C
Antisocial Punishment
)(with
nothingpunish :N
(spite) everythingpunish : S
l)(antisocian Cooperatiopunish :A
Defectionpunish :P :stage Second
O ,O AllD, AllC, :stageFirst DC
Antisocial punishment
• Rand, Armao, Nakamaru, Ohtsuki (JTB 2010)
• Localised interaction:
Social life in groups of N+1 individuals
(introduces spite effects)
Modified replicator equation (or z-dynamics)
Antisocial Punishment
high nor too
low oneither to fine if evolves ],O[
) (if Sor
) (if Nby dominated weakly isA
dominated weakly AllD AllC,
C P
N
N