Download - Reputation, incentives, and opportunism

Reputation, incentives, and opportunism

(with Christian Hilbe)

Public Good game with positive or

negative incentives

Two players game for simplicity and to compare with Rand, Armao, Nakamaru and Ohtsuki (2010)

Public goods with punishment

)mostly and

, assume (we

cost at fine :punishment a

:player -co toincentivedeliver can player Second,

ccost at

player -co tob help providecan player First,

bc

2-Stage Game

P] [D, N], [D, P], [C, N],[C, strategies 4

Nor P stage, secondIn

Dor C stage,first In

2 Stage Game

Conditional Strategies

manifolds invariant

)()()()(

4231

42

31

4231

xKxxx

constxx

xx

MxMxMxMx

Punishment unstable

Opportunistic Players

P] ,[O N], ,[O P], ,[O N],,[O strategies 4

Nor P stage, secondIn

Oor O stage,first In

)1:(

P)or (Nplayer -co of typeknowsplayer that prob.

DDCC

DC

Bistability

•

[OC,P]

Role of reputation in Punishment

Punishment as deterrent



Revenge economically useful




Revenge is sweet (=fitness-enhancing)

Anger is loud





Anger is loud

Barclay (‚Don‘t mess with the enforcer‘)





Anger is loud


Non-altruistic punishment





Anger is loud


Non-altruistic punishment

Kurzban et al, Suter: ‚Audience effects‘

Similarity with Ultimatum

Similarity with Ultimatum

• Ultimatum with orwithout reputation

• (Fehr andFischbacher, Nature 2004)

The feeling of being watched

‚Conscience…the nagging feeling that someone may be watching‘

(Mencken)

The feeling of being watched

Subliminal cues:

Fessler, Haley

Bateson et al

Ancestral environment

Public goods with reward

for efficiency low

,

cost at benefit

:reward adeliver can player Second,

bccost at

player -co tob help providecan player First,

bc

Trust game

Trust game with reputation

Trust game with reputation

For large mu,

prosocial behavior

Reward and Punishment

defects) O doubt; of casein cooperates O(

O and O types two:players ticOpportunis

AllD and AllC players nalUnconditio

:stagefirst in types4

N :neither do I,both do P,Punish R, Reward

:stage secondin moves 4

:Extension

DC

DC

Payoff

Results:

],[],[],[ON][AllD,

:smaller for

],[],[],[ON][AllD,

:larger for pathway

if catalyses ],[

wins],[

D

D

POROR

POPON

bRO

PO

CC

CD

D

C

The case of high information (μ=0.75)

The case of low information (μ=0.25)

Antisocial Punishment

)(with

nothingpunish :N

(spite) everythingpunish : S

l)(antisocian Cooperatiopunish :A

Defectionpunish :P :stage Second

O ,O AllD, AllC, :stageFirst DC

Antisocial punishment

• Rand, Armao, Nakamaru, Ohtsuki (JTB 2010)

• Localised interaction:

Social life in groups of N+1 individuals

(introduces spite effects)

Modified replicator equation (or z-dynamics)

Antisocial Punishment

high nor too

low oneither to fine if evolves ],O[

) (if Sor

) (if Nby dominated weakly isA

dominated weakly AllD AllC,

C P

N

N

Download - Reputation, incentives, and opportunism

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