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SecondPersonsandtheConstitutionoftheFirstPerson*
JayLGarfield
SmithCollegeTheHarvardDivinitySchoolUniversityofMelbourne
CentralInstituteofHigherTibetanStudiesKyotoUniversity
Loveisjustlikebreathingwhenit’strue;
AndI’mfreeinyou.TheIndigoGirls
PhilosophersandCognitiveScientistshavebecomeaccustomedtodistinguishing
thefirstpersonperspectivefromthethirdpersonperspectiveonrealityor
experience.Thisissometimesmeanttomarkthedistinctionbetweenthe“objective”
or“intersubjective”attitudetowardsthingsandthe“subjective”or“personal”
attitude.1Sometimes,itismeanttomarkthedistinctionbetweenknowledgeand
mereopinion.Sometimesitismeanttomarkthedistinctionbetweenanessentially
privateandprivilegedaccesstoaninnerworldandamerelyinferentialor
speculativeaccesstothatworld.Nodoubtthereareotherusesaswell.Butthis
dichotomyisnotthetopicofthisessay.2
Instead,Iwanttocallattentiontothecentralroleofthelessoftenacknowledged
grammaticalandphenomenologicalcategory,thatofthesecondperson.This
*ManyoftheideasdevelopedhereemergedinthecontextofanNEHSummerInstitute,“Self-KnowledgeEastandWest,”attheCollegeofCharlestonin2018.IparticularlythankAnitaAvramides,AkeelBilgrami,ArindamChakrabarti,AmberCarpenter,ChristianCoseru,SheridanHough,BirgitKellner,JenniferNagel,ShaunNichols,VasuReddy,EvanThompson,andDanZahaviforconversationsthatincubatedthesethoughts.ThankstoAnitaAvramides,NaliniBhushan,AmberCarpenter,JohnConnolly,StephenHarris,EmilyMcRae,VasuReddy,andEvanThompsonforveryhelpfulcommentsonanearlierdraft.ThanksalsototwoanonymousreviewersforHumanaMenteforexcellentsuggestionsthathaveimprovedthispaper.1Theliteratureonthisputativedistinctionisvast.SeeGallagher(2012),Kriegel(2009),Thompson(2014),andZahavi(2008)forgoodexamples.2SeeGarfield(2015),chapter6formycritiqueofthisdistinction.
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categoryisessentialnotonlyforunderstandingthedevelopmentofself-
understanding,butalsoforthedevelopmentofthemoralsensethatallowsusto
participateinthesocietiesthatconstituteusaspersons.Thetaskofmoral
educationisthecultivationofcareforsecondpersons.Butwedosobyextending
notself-regard(forthatisinextensible—othersarenotoneself),butbyextending
thespontaneouscaringresponsewehaveforthosewithwhomweimmediately
interact—secondpersons.Ourmorallives,Iwillargue,likeourcognitivelives,
cannotbeunderstoodwithoutunderstandingthespecialnatureofsecondperson
relationships.Inshort,Iwillarguethatthesecondpersonperspectiveisinfact
essentialtotheconstitutionofhumansubjectivity,andthatitpermeatesallformsof
interpersonalconsciousnessandevenself-consciousness.
Iwillfirstreviewsomeimportantdevelopmentalevidenceforthespecialroleof
secondpersonsbeforeturningtosomecross-culturalandphenomenological
perspectivesonthisquestion.Iwillconcludewithattentiontotheethical
dimensionsofthesecondpersonperspective.
1.SomeDevelopmentalEvidencefortheImportanceoftheSecondPersonVasudeviReddyhasdonemorethananyotherrecentdevelopmentalpsychologist
todemonstratethatsecondpersonengagementisfoundationaltotheoriginsof
subjectivity.Herempiricalworkandherreflectiononthatworkprovides
compellingevidenceregardinghowearlyhumaninfantsrecognizesecondpersons,
andhowcentralthatrecognitionisnotonlytotheirlaterrecognitionofthird
persons,but,moreimportantly,totheirownself-conceptionasfirstpersons.
In(2003)Reddyasks,“whatdoesittaketobeawarethatsomeoneisattendingto
you?”(397)Thisapparentlysimplequestionraisestwoothersthatconstitutethe
focusofthestudiesshereportsinthispiece:first,whatdoesittaketorecognize
another’sattention?;second,whatdoesittaketorecognizeoneselfastheobjectof
thatattention.Onemightthinkthatthesetwoareindependent,andindeed,she
notes,manyhavearguedthatself-representationarrivesinthesecondyear,as
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measuredbymirrorself-recognition,whileawarenessthatothershavemental
statesdoesnotemergeuntilthefourthyearwhentheoryofmindtasksarepassed.
Reddyarguesthatthisdeconstructionofasinglequestionintotwoismisguided,
andthatself-and-otherrecognition,orrecognitionofthefirstpersoninthecontext
ofthesecond,co-emergeveryearly.Asheputsit,“…theawarenessofselfasthe
objectofothers’attention…mustleadto,ratherthanresultfrom,representationsof
selfandotheraspsychologicalentities.Thisperspectiveassumeswhatonemight
calla‘second-person’approachtothedevelopingawarenessofselfandother.”
(Ibid.)Thatis,Reddyargues,ourawarenessofourselvesassubjectsiscoevalwith
ourawarenessofthosewhoaddressusandwhoweaddress:first-personand
second-personareco-emergent,andareontogeneticallypriortothethirdperson.
Wewillfindreasontocomplicatethispicturesomewhatabitlater.
Reddyprovidesevidenceforthisco-emergencethroughobservationofinfant-
parentinteractionsinfirsttwoyearsoflife.Byage2-4months,infantsrespondto
another’sgazewithpleasureorfear,andattempttoengageattentionandgaze.By
6-8months,theymonitorthegazeofothersandorienttheirowngazeinresponse.
Importantly,thismonitoring,sheargues,includesaffectiveawareness.Asearlyas
twomonthsofage,sheshows,infantsshowcoyness,embarrassment,pride,and
pleasureandrespondtotheaffectivestatesofthosewithwhomtheyinteract.The
affectiveandthecognitiveco-emerge,andemergeessentiallyinthesedyadic
contexts.Inshort,theemergenceofsubjectivityisinextricablyboundupwiththe
recognitionofanother’sattentionandmood,andsowiththeprimitiveawarenessof
oneselfasobjectforanothersubject.Thesecondpersonisinextricablyboundup
withthefirst.
ThispictureisenrichedinReddy(2016).Inthatessayshearguespersuasivelyfor
twoimportanttheses:first,earlydyadicinfant-parentinteractionsinvolvethe
spontaneousperceptionofactionasintentionalonthepartoftheinfant;second,
theseinteractionsareoftendialogical,andsoinvolvetheexplicitrepresentationof
subjectivedifferencebetweentheparticipants;thatis,evenpre-linguisticinfants
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representthedifferenceinperspectivebetweenthemselvesandthosewithwhom
theyinteract,andthedistinctroleseachtakesindyadicinteractions.
Thefirstpointisstraightforward—evenobvious—butprofoundinitsimplications.
Infantsinteractwiththeircaregiversnotthroughlanguage,butthroughnon-
linguisticactions.Thoseactions,whetherplayfulorprotesting,areinterpreted.A
parentreachesforaninfant,andtheinfantpreparesherbodytobelifted;she
interpretsthegestureasareachingforher.Aparentplayspeekaboo,andtheinfant
interpretsthecoveringandrevealingofthefaceasanenticementtoplay,etc.The
infantmakesfacialexpressionsorgesturestoattracttheattentionofthecaregiver
ortoengagehimininteraction.Theinfantishenceimmediatelyattributing
intentionality,interest,andsubjectivitytotheother,takingthesecondpersontobe
apersoncapableofexperiencingherownactionsandwithintentionsofhisown.3
Andhereinconsiststherecognitionofdifference,aphenomenonequallyimportant
toappreciateifwearetounderstandthesignificanceofthesecondperson.For
theseinteractionsarenotonlydyadic;theyaredialogical,witheachparticipant
takingadifferentrole.Theinfantrecognizesthedifferenceinperspective,in
intention,andincapacityofthesecondperson.Subjectivityishenceunderstood,
fromthebeginningofhumanlife,notashomogenous,butasheterogeneous;the
infant’sownsubjectivestates,intentionsandexperiencesarenotsimplyprojected
ontothedialogicalpartner;theyaredifferentiatedfromthem.Mindsconstitutea
multiplicity,withmanydifferentinstances.Andthislongbefore“theoryofmind”
emergesinthefourthyearoflife,asmeasuredbypassingfalsebelieftasks,andwell
beforetheacquisitionofcompetencewiththesemanticsorsyntaxofsentential
complementclausesthatenablechildrentosucceedatthesetasks,suggestingan
importantdichotomybetweenimplicitandexplicittheoryofmind.(deVilliersand
deVilliers1999;Garfield,PetersonandPerry2001;Fenici2012,2017a,2017b)
3SeealsoCarpendaleandLewis(2004,2006,2010)foradditionalevidenceforthesephenomena.CarpendaleandLewisalsoemphasizetheimportanceofearlydyadicinteractionsforthedevelopmentbothofsocialintelligenceandofself-understanding.
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In(2007)Reddyextendsthispicturetothethirdandfourthyearsoflife,examining
theonsetofdeception.Deceptionis,bydefinition,theattempttoproduceafalse
beliefinthemindofanother.Onemightthink,then,thatachildcouldnotpractice
deceptionuntilshemastersTheoryofMind.Butthisissimplyfalse.AsReddy
shows,childrentellfalsehoodsdeliberately,knowingthemtobefalse,andoften
withtheclearintenttoconvinceaconversationpartneroftheirtruth,wellbefore
theycanpassTheoryofMindtasks.Deception,likeanycommunicativeact,is
initiallydyadic.Andchildrenlearntodeceiveastheylearntotellthetruth,in
conversationwithotherstheytaketobegullible,andsowhosebeliefsand
intentionstheymustrecognizeasdifferentfromtheirown,butassensitivetowhat
theysay.IfTheoryofMindisthecapacitytoattributefalsebelieftothirdpersons,it
isscaffoldedinpartbytheabilitytoattributethemtosecondpersons.
Reddy(2018)drawstheseinsightstogetherintoacomprehensiveaccountofthe
originsofsocialcognitioninthesecond-personperspective.Shewrites:
Thetypicaldevelopmentofsocialcognition…originatesin…second-personengagementsthatirresistiblyinvolvetheinfant,changingnotonlytheinfantcognizer’scapacitytocognize,butalsothatwhichdevelopstobecognized.Theemotionalinvolvementofpersons,inparticularthosemostsalientofemotionalinvolvementsthatoccurinsecond-personengagementswheretheinfantisdirectlyaddressedorrespondedtobyanother,becomesthecrucibleofcognition.(433-434)
Butifcognitionandaffectivematurationbegininearly-childhoodsecond-person
interaction,thesecondpersondoesnotloseimportanceonceonebecomes
explicitlyawareofthirdpersonsandofoneselfaspartofacommunityofsecond
andthirdpersons.Secondpersonsremainimportant,Reddyemphasizes,through
adulthood.Reddycontinues:
Bothtypesofexperiences,second-personinvolvementsandthird-personobservations,mustinfluenceeachotherandbothmaybenecessaryevenforstablepre-inferentialperceptionsofotherminds.…ButbeingaddressedasaYouandaddressingtheotherasaYouarousesemotionalresponsesdifferentlyfromwatchingsomeoneelsebeingaddressed,andengenders—evenifbriefly—amutualityand
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suspensionofseparateness.Theotherbecomesapersontoyou,someonewhoknocksyouoffbalanceorentersyourconsciousnessinamorefundamentalwaythanwhenyouarelargelyuntouchedbytheother,orjustwatchingthem.(438)
Werespondinspecialways—withdistinctneuralsignatures—tobeingaddressed
byournames,orevenas“you,”andouraffectivearousalishigherwhenindyadic
interactionsthanwhenobservingothers.4Wenotonlybecomewhoweareinearly
second-personinteractions,butwemanifestwhoweareintheseinteractionsin
maturity.5
Reddy(439-442)arguesthatsuchengagementrequiresacomplexco-constituted
intentionalsituation:first,wemustbeopentoengagewithothers.Tobeopenin
thissenseistoseeothersaspersons,assubjectsintheirownright.Wedonot
addresstreesortablesasYou,onlypersons.Andaddresspresupposesthe
possibilityofuptake.Butthisisnotenough.Toaddressanotherasasecondperson
presupposesthattheotherrecognizestheaddresseeasaperson.Idonottake
myselftobeaddressedbythesoundofthesurforthunder,orbybirds.Address
requiresthatIfindmyselfinadyadinwhichInotonlyrecognizetheother’s
personhood,butinwhichIamalsorespectedbytheotherasaperson.This
constitutesakindoftwowaystreet.
Butthereisahigher-levelrequirementaswell.IfIamtrulytoaddressyou,whether
asaninfantorasanadult,Ihavetobeabletorecognizethefactthatyourecognize4Therearedozensofstudiesthatconfirmthisresult.Hereareafew.Grossman,PariseandFriederici(2010),usingnearinfraredspectroscopy(NIRS),foundthatspecificadjacentareasoftheprefrontalcortexareactiveininfantsinresponsetocommunicativeintentionfromadults,onethatrespondstoeyecontactandonetotheuseoftheinfant’sname;thisresponseissubservedbyacommonareainolderchildrenandadults.Farroni,Csibra,SimionandJohnson(2002)usedanERPstudytoshowthatspecificneuralactivityrespondstoeyecontactin2-5dayoldinfants.Grossman,Johnson,FarroniandCsibra(2007)showthatspecificgammabandoscillationininfantbrainsrespondstoeyecontactfromhumanfaces.Turningtoadults,Kamp,FrithandFrith(2003)findthathearingone’sownnameactivatestheparacingulatecortextandtemporalpoles,areascloselyassociatedwiththeattributionofmentalstatestoothers;HietanenandHitanen(2017)findthateyecontactwithagenuineinterlocutorincreasesself-awarenessandtheuseoffirst-personpronouns.5Note,forinstance,howeffectiveŚāntidevaandPatrulRinpoche’sproseisinvirtueoftheirforcefuluseofthesecondperson.ThankstoEmilyMcRaeforpointingthisout.
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me.IfIdonot,thenevenifyoumighttakemetobeaddressingyou,Icannottake
myselftobedoingso.Second-personrecognition,evenininfancy,ishenceanactof
higher-ordercognitioninwhichItakeyoutotakemeassomeonewhosemessages
areworthyofuptake.Butatthesametime,todosoistoseemyselfasjustsucha
being.Reddy’swork(aswellasthatofotherswehavecited)henceshowsthatfirst
personawarenessofourselvesassubjectsishencepossibleinthecontextof
second-personrelations.
Thisdevelopmentalstoryisimportantbecauseitdemonstratesjusthowco-
constitutedoursubjectivityis.Wemaytakeourselvesnaivelytobeindependent
subjectswhoaccidentallydiscoverothers;wemaytakeouraccesstoourown
mindstobemorefundamentalthanouraccesstoothers;wemaytakeassociationto
besomehowaccidentaloroptional.Butwearewrongtodoso.Webecomepersons
ininteractionswithsecondpersons;andaspersons,wefullymanifestwhoweare
onlyinsuchinteractions.Inowleavetheterrainofdevelopmentalpsychologyfor
anexaminationofadultsubjectivity.Herewewillseethatthesecond-person
perspectiveisdeeplyenmeshedwiththefirst-andthird-personperspectives.
2.TheSecond-PersonPerspectiveasConstitutiveofAdultSubjectivityAsadults,asmembersofepistemiccommunities,andaslanguageusers,weare
accustomedtoclaimingakindofepistemicauthorityoverourowninnerstates.In
theordinarycase,wearemanifestlymorecompetenttoreportonourowninner
livesthanareothers.Thisprimafaciefirstpersonauthority,however,isoftenused
asthethinendofanepistemologicalandmetaphysicalwedgeintheenterpriseof
splittingthecognitivesubjectfromitsobject,andintheenterpriseofsplittingself-
knowledgefromtheknowledgeofothersinamorecategorialsense.Weseethis
tendencyinIndianandWesternphilosophyalike.
Whenwedrivethiswedgetoohard,weendupconstitutingaspecialdomainof
innerlifetowhichwehaveimmediate,infallibleaccess,asopposedtoanouter
worldincludingotherstowhoseowninnerliveswehaveatbestinferential,mediate
access.Epistemicprivilegestandsagainstskepticism,andreflexiveknowledgeis
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valorizedwhileothermindsareproblematized.Thegulfbetweenthefirst-person
andthethird-personperspectivethenleadstoacomplexmetaphysicscomprising
qualitativepropertiescorrespondingtophysicalproperties,possiblezombies,etc…
Thisisonefaceofthesubject-objectdualitythatbothMadhyamakaandYogācāra
philosophersalikearguethatweprojectontoourexperience,distortingitand
generatingthemassofconfusionthatBuddhistphilosophersargueconstitutes
samsara.(Garfield2015)
Iwillshowthatre-introducingthesecond-personperspectiveoffersawayto
reconcilethesedichotomies.Itallowsusadifferentwayofconceptualizingself-
knowledgeaswellastheknowledgeofothermindsthatexplainstheepistemic
authorityofself-knowledge.Italsoshowswhy,nonetheless,self-knowledgeis
absolutelycontinuouswithourknowledgeofothers,andimplicatesneitherthe
dualityofinnerandouternorthespookymetaphysicsandhyperbolicepistemology
thosedichotomiesentail.Toappreciatethisrequiresustoseethedegreetowhich
ourself-understandingisfundamentallyhermeneutical,andthedegreetowhichthe
actsofinterpretationinwhichweengagearemediatedbyconversationand
address.
Wesawabovehowoursubjectivityisconstituteddevelopmentallyinsecond-
personinteractions,andthatwecanonlyknowourselvesassubjectstotheextent
thatothersaddressus,andthatweaddressothers,inthecontextofamutual
expectationofunderstanding.Ontogenesishereconstitutesontology.Asessentially
socialorganisms,webecomeconstitutedassubjectswhoaddressoneanother,and
whoareworthyofaddress;asweacquirelanguage,wecometoaddressone
anotherinthatmedium,andourself-understandingaswellasourunderstandingof
othersispermeatedbythemetaphoroflinguisticmeaning.Whenweascribeothers
beliefs,desires,intentions,hopesandfears,wedosowithpropositionalcontent;it
islessobvious,butnolesstruethatwedothesamewhenwecometounderstand
ourselves.(Sellars1963)Oncelanguageisinthepicture,thepre-linguistic
innocencethatguidesourinteractionsislostforever.Forthisisthemomentwhen
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webecomefullyresponsibletoanorm-constitutingcommunityinordertomake
andtoabsorbmeaning.(SeeWittgenstein1991;Sellars1949,1951,1963,1969)
Inordertoexploremoredeeplythisentanglementofselfandother,andofself-
knowledgewiththeknowledgeofotherminds,Inowturntotheworkoftheearly
twentiethcenturyphilosopher,KCBhattacharyya,perhapsthefirstphilosopherto
appreciatefullytheimportanceofthesecondpersonintheconstitutionoffirst-
personconsciousness.Wewillseethathisinsightsanticipatethoseofmanybetter-
knownphilosophers,andthattheyprovideacompellingframefortheempirical
workwediscussedabove.InTheSubjectasFreedom(1930)Bhattacharyyaargues
foranintimateconnectionbetweenthefirst-,second-andthird-personperspectives
intheconstitutionofsubjectivity.Thefirst-personpronoun‘I’,heargues,is
“speakable,”butnot“meanable.”ThemeanableroughlycoincideswithKant’s
knowable.Whatevercanbedesignatedintersubjectivelyasanobjectfalls,according
toBhattacharyya,undertheheadofthe“meanable.”6
In¶¶2-3(87-88),Bhattacharyyaexplicitlytiesmeaningtointersubjective
agreementandavailabilityofreferentsforterms.ThisanticipationofWittgenstein
andSellarstakeshimabitbeyondKant,ofcourse,buttheideasarenonetheless
congruent.Thespeakable,ontheotherhand,iswhatevercanbespokenofor
communicatedaboutthroughlanguage.Itisabroadercategorythanthemeanable,
sincetheremaybesomethingswecancommunicate—thatarenotnonsense—even
thoughwecannotassignthemmeanings.So,wecantalkaboutourselves,even
thoughthereisnotermthatcanmeantheself.
6ThisdistinctionisdrawninthefirstparagraphofTheSubjectasFreedom:
1.Objectiswhatismeant,includingtheobjectofsense-perceptionandallcontentsthathavenecessaryreferencetoit.Objectasthemeantisdistinguishedformthesubjectorthesubjectiveofwhichthereissomeawarenessotherthanmeaning-awareness.Thesubjectivecannotbeameaninglessword:tobedistinguishedfromit,itmustbeasignificantspeakableandyetifitbeameantcontent,itwouldbebutobject.Itcanthusbeneitherassertednordeniedtobeameantcontentandwhatcannotbedeniedneednotbeassertable.Apparently,thesignificantspeakableiswiderthanthemeanable:acontenttobecommunicatedandunderstoodneednotbemeant.(87)
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Thesubjectcannotbetakentobemeant,foritisnotintersubjectivelyavailableas
thereferentforI.Nobodybutme,Bhattacharyyaargues,isawareofmyown
subjectivityinthewaythatitispresenttomeassubject,andsothereisnowayto
establishaconventionofreferenceormeaningfortheIthatdesignatesitinthat
modeofpresentation.7Butheargues,thefirstpersonpronounhasauniquerolein
designatingtheself.WereItorefertomyselfusinganameoradescription,inthe
thirdperson,thepossibilityoferrorthroughmisidentificationintrudes.8Butthe
first-personindexicalgetsimmediately,directly,atthespeakingsubject,andisso
understoodbyaddresseesaswellasbythespeaker.So,althoughthewordIhasno
meaninginthisstrictsense,itisnotmeaningless.Itconveyssomething,andis
understood;indeed,itisindispensible.Itisthereforespeakable,butnotmeanable.
Butevenanon-meanablespeakablegetsitspointonlyindiscourse,oraddress.And,
aswehaveseen,wheneverwespeak,weaddressoneanotherassubjectsin
dialoguewithoneanother.InthisdiscussionatthecloseofTheSubjectasFreedom,
Bhattacharyyarecurstoanimportantinsighthedefendsnearthebeginningofthe
book:totakeoneselfasthereferentofIistotakeaddresseesasyou,othersasheor
she.Inshort,hearguesinthefirstchapterofthebook,thepossibilityofspeech—
andhencesubjectivity—isconditionaluponintersubjectivity,simplybecause
speechpresupposesbothaddresseswhocanbeexpectedthemselvestobesubjects
capableofself-reference,andmeaning-constitutedconventionsinstitutedbyothers
whosesubjectivitywealsopresume.Hedeploysthatinsightatthedenouementof
thediscussiontoarguethattounderstandoneselfasasubjectistounderstand
oneselfasamemberofaclassofthosecapableofintrospectiveself-awareness:
120.TherealizationofwhataspeakermeansbythewordIisthehearer’sawarenessofapossibleintrospection.Suchawarenessisasmuchknowledgeasactualintrospection.ThespeakercallshimselfIandmaybeunderstoodbythehearerasyou.Asthusunderstood,the
7ComparetoWittgenstein’sdiscussionofdiscourseaboutinnerstatesinPhilosophicalInvestigations.8AsSidneyShoemakerwasfamouslytopointoutin(1968),aninsightdevelopedfurtherbyJohnPerry(1979).So,ImighterroneouslybelievemyselftobeJohnPerry.IwouldthenmisidentifyJohnPerryasthepersonthinkingthisthought.Icannot,howeverbewrongaboutthefactthatIamthinkingthisthought.
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introspectiveselfisindividual,notanindividualbeing—forintrospectionisnotasubjectivebeinglikefeeling—butthefunctionofaddressinganotherself.ThespeakerdoesnotunderstandhimselfthroughthemeaningofthewordI:hisintrospectionisthroughthewordandnotthroughitsmeaningandislessaself-knowingthanaself-revealing,revealingtoapossibleunderstanderofthewordI.Yetastheaddressingattitudeisonlyimplicit,itistohimaccidentalandposteriortohisself-knowing.Totheunderstandingself,however,althoughheunderstandsthespeaker’sself-knowingbecauseheishimselfself-knowing,hisunderstandingoftheotherIisprimarywhilehisownself-knowingisaccidentalandsecondary.Thespeakerknowshimselfinimplicitlyrevealingtothehearerandthehearerknowsthespeakerinimplicitlyknowinghimself.…Therearethustwocases—self-intuitionwithother-intuitionimplicitinitandother-intuitionwithself-intuitionimplicitinit.Bothareactualknowledge…BecausethewordIisatoncethesymbolandthesymbolized,itcannotbesaidtohavesimplythesymbolizingfunction….(161-162)
121.Actualintrospectionisimplicitlysocial,beingaspeakingoraddressingorself-evidencingtoanotherpossibleintrospectionorself…(162)
InvirtueoftheroleofIasavocable,butnon-denotingterm(herenoteaswellthe
anticipationsofAnscombeonthefirstperson),9thisspeakingoftheself,andhence
fully-fledgedadultself-consciousnessitself,Bhattacharyyaargues,isparasiticonthe
verypossibilityoflanguage,andsotheexistenceofaddresseeswhoarealsocapable
ofusingthefirst,andthesecondpersonpronouns.So,self-knowledgeandtherefore
alsogenuinelyhumansubjectivity,areessentiallyintersubjectivephenomena,not
private.10Bhattacharyyahenceshowsthatthereisnoknowledgeofsubjectivity
whatsoeveroutsideofthecontextofsocialinteractionanddiscourse.
So,Bhattacharyya,likeReddy,emphasizesthespecialroleofsecondpersons,in
virtueofthefactsthatspeechpresupposesaddressandthatwebecomereflective
subjectsinthecontextofaddress.Moreover,Bhattacharyyaargues,wecanonly
9Balslev(2013pp.136-137)alsonotestheanticipationofAnscombe.10Formoreonwhythisisthecaseregardingpropositionalattitudeattributions,seeGarfield,PetersonandPerry,op.cit.;foramoreextendeddiscussionofthesocialdimensionsofpersonhoodandself-knowledgeinthecontextofHume’sphilosophy,seeGarfield2019.
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fullyunderstandourselvesandourinterlocutorseachasaddresseesandas
addressorstotheextentthatwerecognizeandfollowthemeaning-constituting
linguisticrulesandconventionsthataregroundedinthepracticesofacommunity
ofthirdpersons.Otherwise,wecannottakeourownstatementsorthoughtstobe
meaningfulatall.So,justasthefirst-personperspectiveisentirelyboundupwith
thesecond-personperspective—ontogenetically,subjectively,constitutivelyand
phenomenologically—thesecond-personperspectivecomes,asaresultoflanguage
acquisitionandentryintoalinguisticcommunity,tobe,foradults,entirelybound
upwiththethird.
ThepointofjoiningReddy’sandBhattacharyya’saccountsisthatwhenwedoso,we
canseethatwecouldneverfirstencounterourselves,thenourimmediate
interlocutors,andthenothers,buildingourunderstandingofourconspecificsby
analogyinanever-wideningcircle.Instead,wecomeininfancytounderstand
ourselvesandourinterlocutorstogether;thisunderstandingbecomesarticulateand
reflectivethroughthemediationoflanguageandaraftofothersocialconventions,
andagainispossibleonlyinthecontextofaseamlessunderstandingofthe
communityinwhichweparticipateandofourmutualrelationstooneanotherin
thatcommunitythatconstitutethenormativitythatmakesunderstandingpossible.
For,asInotedabove,toperceivesomeone—whethermyself,mypartner,ora
stranger—asmakingsense,orashavinganinnerlife,isalwaysaninterpretativeact,
whetherthatinterpretationisexplicitorimmediateintheperceptionof
intentionality.ThesapienceinadultHomosapiensisalwayshermeneutic,andso
alwaysbeholdentonorms,andsoalwayscollective.Intakingmyselftobeaperson,
Itakeyoutobeaperson;intakingyoutobeaperson,Itakethemtobepersons;
thatis,Itakeallofustobecommittedandresponsibletonormsofhermeneutical
rationality.Ialsotakeusalltobecollectivelycommittedtotheconstitutionofa
rule-governedlinguisticcommunityinthecontextofwhichmeaningcanbe
constituted,andsoinwhichfullyarticulateaddressispossible.
Thishasdeepramificationsforthenatureofintrospection,forprivilegedaccess,
andforourunderstandingofthemindsofothers.Introspection,onthismodel,is
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notinnerperception,butself-interpretation.Firstpersonauthorityisnotinfallible
perceptualaccesstoourinnerstates,butrather,asSellarsarguedsoforcefullyin
(1963),reflectstheskillwehaveinunderstandingandpredictingourownbehavior.
Wearebetteratthisthanweareatinterpretingothers,butwearefallible;andwe
arebetteratinterpretingothersthanwemightthink.Firstperson-thirdperson
asymmetryintheknowledgeofmindsis,then,amatterofdegree,andnotofkind.11
Whenweassignmentalstatestoothers,wemighttakeitthatourattributionsare
trueorfalsedependingonthepresenceofabsenceofindependentlyexistentinner
statesthataretruthmakersfortheseclaims.Tothinkthisway,asWittgenstein
arguesin(1991),istoworkone’swayintothe“problemofotherminds.”The
problemofothermindssoposedisadoubleproblem,withbothanepistemological
andasemanticface.Epistemologically,theproblemisthatwecanhaveatbestonly
inferentialknowledgeofthemindsofothers,andnogoodinductivereasonsfor
thinkingthatothershavemindsatall.Afterall,theonlymindswehaveever
directlyexperienced,onthisview,areourown.Semantically,since,onthisaccount,
wecaninprincipleneverhaveaccesstothetruthmakersofourattributionsofinner
states,weliterallyhavenoideawhatitwouldbefortheseattributionstobetrueor
11Afewqualificationsareinorderhere.First,thehermeneuticalstoryItellaboutintentionalinterpretationiscertainlynottheonlyalternativetoaclassicalmodelaccordingtowhichwehaveimmediateaccesstoourownmindsandonlyinferentialaccesstoothers.Onemighthaveaperceptualmodelofmentalknowledge,forinstance.(SeeGallagher2012andZahavi2008,forinstance.)Butmypointinthepresentessayistopressthecasefortheplausibilityofthismodel,andtodemonstrateitsadvantagesasanaccountofthedevelopmentofourunderstandingofthemental.Carruthers(2011),despitethefactthatwedisagreeregardingmuchofthebroaderlandscape,defendsasimilarpositionregardingprivilegedaccess.Ishouldalsopointoutthatthereisanimportantasymmetryincertainkindsofreportsofmentalstatesbetweenthefirstandthethirdpersoncases.Weoften“report”ourownmentalstatesnotasaconsequenceofintrospectionorreflection,butratherasprofessions,effectivelyactualizingwhatSellarslikedtocall“short-termpropensitiestospeakoutloud”byinfactspeakingoutloud,producingcandidutterancesthatmanifestourbeliefs,desires,orevensensoryexperiences.Itisthepossibilityofthiskindofexpressionthatoftenunderliesthesuspicionofadeepasymmetrybetweenfirst-andthird-personknowledgeofthemental.Butthesearenotcasesinwhichweexpressknowledgeofourownminds,butratherinwhichourstatesofmindaremanifested,bothtoourselvesandtoothers.SeeGarfield(1989).
14
false.Andinthatcase,weliterallyhavenoideawhatwemeanwhenweascribe
psychologicalstatestoothers.
Thisapparentproblemarisesfromthesupposedasymmetrybetweenfirst-person
andthird-personattribution.Ifourownmentalstatesareimmediatelyavailableto
us,butthoseofothersareinvisible,thereisnopossibilityofunderstandingmental
stateascription,orknowingthemindsofothers;butalsonopossibilityofknowing
ourown,astoknowourownstatesistoknowthemasinstancesofkinds.The
second-personperspective,anditshermeneuticmodelofunderstandingshowsthe
wayoutofthisparticularfly-bottle.Foronthismodel,ascriptionsofmentalstates
arenothostagetoindependenttruthmakersinanycase;theyareactsof
interpretation,andlikeallsuchactsareanswerableonlytothehermeneutical
norms,nottocorrespondence.(SeealsoKusch1997andGarfield2015fora
defenseofthehermeneuticalaccountofself-understanding.)
Thisisnot,however,ananti-realist,oraneliminativistviewofthemental.Forthe
absenceoftruthmakersdoesnotentailanabsenceoftruth.Interpretation,onthis
view,doesnotreflect,somuchasconstitute,therealityofourcognitivelives.
Interpretation,thatis,isconstitutive,whentakenasawhole;notreflectiveofpre-
existingpsychologicalreality,althoughanysingleattributionstandsorfallsonthe
groundsofitsharmonywithallothers.Thatis,whiletheentireensembleofsocial
andhermeneuticconventionsinwhichweparticipatemayconstitutethecontextin
whichitistruethatIbelievethatOsloisthecapitalofNorway,oncethatcontextis
inplace,thereisaclearfactofthematterregardingwhetherornotIholdthisbelief.
Thisislikesomanynorm-constitutedinstitutions.Wedonotdiscovermoney,but
createitbyinterpretingvariousbitsofpaper,metalandstatesofcomputing
machineryasmonetary;butthisdoesnotmeanthatthereisnotruthofthematter
regardingwhetheraparticularnoteisadollarnote,orwhatmybankbalanceis.The
wholeiscreated;butitcreatesacontextinwhichparticularstatementscanbetrue
orfalseinvirtueoftheinterpretationsalreadyassignedtoothers.
15
Forthisreasontherecanbeno“problemofotherminds”anymorethantherecan
bea“problemofotherdollars.”Tobeamindisnottohousehiddeninner
particulars;itistointerpretandtobeinterpreted;toaddressandtobeaddressed;
toparticipateinthecomplexhumanconversation.Weeachknowimmediatelythat
wearemindsnotthroughintrospection,butthroughparticipation.Weknowthat
othersaremindsnotthroughinferenceandnotthroughclairvoyance,butthrough
co-participation.Toallowourselvestobeaddressedby,ortoaddress,anotheristo
takehertobeaperson,tohaveamind;itisatthesametimetotakeourselvestobe
persons.Thisphenomenonofaddressrequiresneitherreflexiveself-consciousness,
qualitativeexperience,behavioralevidence,noranyoftheothersupposedly
empiricalmarkersofthementalproposedbythosewhotakethistobeanempirical,
ratherthananormative,matter.
IfweturntoanIndianBuddhistcontext,thissecond-person,hermeneutical
approachtosubjectivityandintersubjectivitygivesusanotherperspectivefrom
whichtoseewhypersonsareconventional,orlokavyāvahāraentities,asopposedto
independentlyexistentselvesorātman,repletewithindependentlyinherent
intentionalandqualitativeproperties.Tosaythatwearesociallyconstructedisnot
justtosaythatsomesuperficialproperties,suchasoursocialstatus,oroccupations,
areconstructedsocially,orthatsomeofourpreferencesandhabitsreflectour
cultures.Allofthatistrue,butitonlyscratchesthesurface.Onceweadoptthe
perspectiveIamsuggestinghere,wealsoseethat,inasmuchastobeapersonisto
beanaddressorandanaddressee,andistobeonewhotakesoneselfandothersto
bethesubjectsofintentionallycharacterizedstates,thatstatusisoneonly
achievable,andonlycomprehensible,inasocialcontext.Ourverybeing,likethe
institutionsinthecontextofwhichwefunction,issociallyconstructed.As
MandevilleandHumealsosawclearly,weareessentiallysocialanimals,
complicatedbees.Onedoesnotcometounderstandabeehivebystudying
16
individualbeesandscalingup;oneunderstandsanindividualbeebyunderstanding
howahiveworks,andwhatthatbee’sroleistherein.12
ThismayalsohelpsustoilluminateanideaadvancedbyŚāntaraksitainOrnament
totheMiddleWay(Madhyamakālaṃkāra)whenheclaimsthatreflexiveawareness
iswhatdistinguishesconsciousnessfrominsentientmatter.
16. Consciousnessarisesasdiametricallyopposed Innaturetoinsentientmatter. Itsnatureasnon-insentient Justisthereflexivityofitsawareness.
Incontext,itappearsthatŚāntarakṣitaissimplymakingthepointthattobe
genuinelyconsciousistobeself-conscious,distinguishingourawarenessofthe
sun’spositionfrom,say,thatofasunflowerorasundial:oursisconsciousbecause
weareawarethatweareaware;theirsisnotbecausetheyarenotsoreflexively
aware.Ihavecriticizedthisargumentelsewhere.(2006)Butwemightadoptan
alternativereadingofthisverse(perhapsmorecharitable,perhapsmore
tendentious,perhapssimplyacreativevamponŚāntarakṣitainaconversational
mood):tobegenuinesubjects,wecanimagineŚāntarakṣitasaying,istorepresent
ourselvesassubjects;and,wemightthenadd,torepresentourselvesassubjectsis
onlypossibleinanintersubjectivecontext.So,onthisreading,Śāntarakṣitais
pointingustowardsthenecessaryintersubjectivityofsubjectivity,evenifthiswas
nothisoriginalintention.Thisisthenausefuladumbrationoftheideaoftheperson
asaconventionallyconstitutedentity,involvingacreativedialoguewithaclassical
text.
Notethatitalsoallowsanti-reductionistBuddhistphilosopherssuchasŚāntarakṣita
awayofunderstandingtheirreducibilityofmindtothebodywithoutasubstance
dualism:wemightnotethatevenifwecantellapurelyphysicalcausalstoryabout
ourbodies,weneedaverydifferentkindofstoryaboutourintentionally
characterizedlives.Thatstorywillbehermeneutical,andwillrelyonsocial
12FormoreonHumeandMandevilleonthesocialdimensionofpersonhood,seeGarfield(2019).
17
conventionsandprocesses.Itwillbeasirreducibletothephysicalstoryas
economicsistometallurgy,oraestheticstogeometry.Itisthesuggestionthatfor
humanbeings,Mitseinisontologicallyaswellasphenomenologicallyand
epistemologicallypriortoDasein.Anditwillbeastoryaccordingtowhichmutual
recognitionliesattheheartofourconsciouslives.13
BuddhistphilosophershadnomonopolyinIndiaontheideathatthesecondperson
isindispensibletoself-understanding.AsChakrabarti(2011,p.31)shows,the
KashimirŚaivaphilosopherAbhinavagupta’srefutationofDharmakīrti’sanalysis
leadsdirectlytoarecognitionoftheprimacyofthesecondpersoninour
subjectivity.DharmakīrtiarguesthatsinceasIobservethatmyownspeechis
alwaysprecededbythoughtsandintentions,Icanconcludethatallspeechis
precededbythoughtsandintentions,andapplythisentailmenttothespeechof
others,concludingthattheirspeech,tooisalwaysprecededbythoughtsand
intentions,andsothattheyhaveminds.TheargumentiscastinthestandardIndian
probativeinferenceform,involvingasubject(speech),aproperty(precededby
thoughtsandintentions),anobservationofuniversalconcomitancethatjustifiesthe
assertionofanentailment,andtheextensiontoanewcase(thethoughtofothers).
Abhinavaguptademonstrates(aswouldWittgenstein900yearslater)thatthis
argumentisstraightforwardlyfallacious.14Theonlyentailmenttowhichmy
observationoftheconcomitanceofintentionandspeechinmyowncaseentitlesme
isthatmyownspeechisprecededbymyownintentions.Thisdoesnotvalidatethe
claimthatothers’speechisprecededbyothers’intentions.Theonlyalternativefor
13ItisalsoworthnotingthatwhilethiswayofreadingŚāntarakṣita,maynotbehistoricallyaccurate—foronething,Śāntarakṣitaiscommittedtoreflexivityasaprimitivecharacterofallconsciousness,humanandnon-human;foranother,heisanindividualist,notacollectivistregardingconsciousexperienceandsubjectivity—itisaplausiblewaytoplacehimindialoguebothwithhiscontemporariesandnear-contemporariesinIndia,andwithus.ItalsosuggeststhatŚāntarakṣitaprovidestheBuddhisttraditionwiththetoolstorefutetheDignāga-Dharmakīrtiviewthatweknowthemindsofothersonlyinferentially,onanalogywithourown,arefutationthat—whileneverdevelopedwithintheBuddhistworld—wasadvancedwithgreatforcebytheKashmiriŚaivaphilosopherAbhinavagupta.14Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśīnī216,astranslatedinChakarabarti2011
18
theBuddhist,Abhinavaguptasuggests,istoassumethatothers’speechisacase
exactlylikemyown,whichiswhatistobeproven.
Instead,Abhinavagupta,asChakrabartiputsit,“findstheYoutobeafoundational
middle-realitybetweenthepureSelfandtheapparentNon-Selfincontrastand
communitywithwhichtheSelfdiscoversitsownplayfulknower-hood.”(32)
Abhinavaguptaputsthepointthisway:
Thesenseinwhichtheaddressorandtheaddressee,thoughdifferent,becomeoneintheaddressingisindicativeoftheparaparaGoddess,whosecharacteristicisidentityindifference.(Ibid.)15
Thatis,itcannotbethecasethatwediscoverthatothershavemindsbyconsidering
thecausesoftheirspeechandbehavior.Fortodoso,wealreadymustpresuppose
thatthatspeechandbehaviorismeaningful—thatitisaptforinterpretation.Andto
supposethatisalreadytosupposethattheyarepersonswithminds,differentfrom
usinperspectiveandperhapsinbeliefsanddesires,butidenticaltousnature,asco-
participantsinthecommunitythatconstitutesmeaninginthefirstplace,playerson
thesameteam,occupyingdifferentpositions.JustasIcannotbeahalfbackwithout
afootballteam,Ican’tbeaspeakerwithoutacommunityofotherstoaddressand
bywhomtobeaddressed.The“problemofotherminds,”Abhinavaguptasuggests,
musthavebeenalreadysolvedinordereventobeposed.
3.TheBroaderSocialDimensionofSubjectivityThisbroadersocialandnormativedimensioninthestoryofthestructureofhuman
subjectivitysetsaccountsofself-knowledgeandself-consciousnesssuchasthoseof
Bhattacharyya,Wittgenstein,HeideggerandSellarsapartfromthoseofmore
individualisticphilosopherssuchasHusserlorZahavi,whotakefirstperson
subjectivitytobepre-reflectivelygiven,andtaketherecognitionofotherstobethe
automatic,preflectiveextensionofsomethingweknowfromourownsidetothem.
HusserlandZahavi,tobesure,recognizetheessentialroleofsecondpersonsin
discourse,inethics,andinourarticulateself-understanding.Zahaviwrites:
15Īśvara-Pratyabhijñā-Vimarśīnī70-71.
19
Thesecond-personpronounisyou.Thissuggeststhattoadoptasecond-personperspectiveonsomebodyistorelatetothatpersonasayou,ratherthanasaheorshe….[R]eciprocalengagementisacrucialanddistinctivecomponent.Formetorelatetoanotherasayouistorelatetosomeone,anI,whoisinturnrelatedtomeasayou.Second-personengagementisasubject-object(you-me)relationwhereIamawareofanddirectedattheotherand,atthesametime,implicitlyawareofmyselfintheaccusative,asattendedtoandaddressedbytheother.Second-personengagementconsequentlyinvolvesnotmerelyanawarenessoftheother,butalso,andatthesametime,aformofinterpersonalself-consciousness.(2016,p.5)
ZahavithenquotesHusserlonthispoint:
Theoriginofpersonalityisfoundinempathyandinthefurthersocialactsthatgrowoutofit.Forpersonality,itisnotenoughthatthesubjectbecomesawareofitselfasthecenterofitsacts;rather,personalityisconstitutedonlyasthesubjectentersintosocialrelationswithothers.(1973,p.175,translatedandquotedatZahavi2016,5)
HusserlandZahaviarguethattoseeoneselfasanaddresseeistoseeoneselfasa
subjectandassomeonerecognizedasasubject;toaddressanotheristotakethat
otherasasubject.16Tothispoint,theyareincompleteagreementwiththe
perspectivewehavebeenexploring.Butthereisahairsbreadthofdifference,and
thathairisworthsplittinginthiscontext.Thequestionconcernsepistemicand
ontologicalpriority.HusserlandZahavitakesubjectivitytobeprimordiallygivento
usinfirst-personexperience,andthenextendedtothesecondperson;
Abhinavagupta,Bhattacharyya,Chakrabarti,Reddy,andI(andonemightaddHume
andHeideggertothismix)taketherecognitionofsecondpersonstobeprimordial
andconstitutiveoffirst-personsubjectivity.
Weendupinthesameplaceinouraccountofmaturesubjectivity,butwediffer
regardingtheroute.Andinparticular,weagreethatinthesecond-person
perspective,wedonotseeourselvesfromthestandpointoftheother,butrathersee
thattheotherhasadistinctperspectiveofherown.Zahavialsomakesanicepoint
16And,asEmilyMcRaenotes(personalcommunication),withholdingthesecondperson,andreferringtoanotherbythethirdpersoninherpresence,isapotentwaytoconveydisrespect.
20
whenhearguesforthepriorityofthesecondpersonoverthethird,contrastingthe
intimate“we”ofdyadicengagementwiththeanonymous“we”ofidentificationwith
alargeclassofthirdpersons.(2016,pp.63ff)Iagreeentirelywiththatcontrast,
andwiththepriorityofthesecondpersonoverthethird.Ontheotherhand,Itakeit
thattheargumentIhaveofferedsofardefendstheprimordialityofthesecond
personoverthefirst.
IndianandWesternphilosophersarenotaloneinthisfield.Thereisalsoaclassical
Chinesesourceofinsightintothismatter,andthatisZhuangzi’sdiscussionofthe
“HappyFish.”Hereistherelevantpassage:
Oneday,ZhuangziwasstrollingbesidetheriverwithHuizi.Huizi,amanoferudition,wasfondofarguing.TheywerejustcrossingabridgewhenZhuangziaid,“Thefishhavecomeuptothesurfaceandareswimmingaboutattheirleisure.Thatishowfishenjoythemselves.”ImmediatelyHuizicounteredthiswith:“Youarenotafish.Howcanyoutellwhatafishenjoys?”“Youarenotme,”saidZhuangzi.“HowdoyouknowthatIcan’ttellwhatafishenjoys?”“Iamnotyou,”saidHuizitriumphantly.“SoofcourseIcannottellaboutyou.Inthesameway,youarenotafish.Soyoucannottellafish’sfeelings.Well—ismylogicnotunanswerable?”“Wait,letusgobacktotherootoftheargument,”saidZhuangzi.“WhenyouaskedmehowIknewwhatafishenjoyed,youadmittedthatyouknewalreadywhetherIknewornot.Iknew,onthebridge,thatthefishwereenjoyingthemselves.”(Yukawa2015,p.27)
Thereisawealthofcommentaryandamountainofdisputationregardingthis
passage.(SeeAmesandNakajima2015foragoodsampler.)Thisisnottheplaceto
enterintothoseextensiveinterpretativecontroversies.Ifocusinreadingthis
passage(asIoftendowhenreadingZhuangzi)onthefinallines.Zhuangzipointsout
toHuizithateventohavethisconversation,HuizimusttreatZhuangziasasecond
person:someonewithaperspectivedifferentfromhisown,anobjectofaddress,
andonewhocanhimselfaddress;butmorethanthat,someonewhois
interpretable,whosecognitivestatescanbeknown,andwhoseutterancescanbe
understood.Otherwise,evendisagreementisimpossible,letaloneagreement.
Conversation,andhenceunderstandingitself,andhencehumanityitself,relyonthis
second-personengagement.Thefisharenothingbutametaphorforthispoint.
21
Zhuangziengageswiththefishas(reduced)secondpersons.Whetherheisrightor
wrongtodosoacrossspecieslines,hispointisthatimmediatesecond-person
engagementisessentialtowhoweare.Huizi’schallengeistoostrong(andagain,
thisisnottosaythatthereisnotaweaker,fallibilistchallengeavailabletohim):it
suggeststhatanysubjectivedifference,anydifferenceinexperienceorperspective
makesunderstandingimpossible.Thathastobewrong;anditisZhuangzi’spoint
thatthatdifferenceinperspectiveiswhatmakessecondpersonengagement
possible,andhenceunderstandingitselfpresupposesnotidentitybutdifference.
4.TheEthicalDimension:ResponsivenessvsReactivityAsInotedattheoutset,thisrecognitionoftheimportanceofthesecondpersonin
IndianandinWesternphilosophyhasanimportantethicaldimension.Inethical
discourseweareoftenaskedtotakeadisinterestedperspective,whetherinorder
tobefair,asinaKantianframework,tobeagent-neutral,asinaUtilitarian
framework,totakeupthedisinterestedpointofviewinHumeanterms,orto
cultivateupekṣaasinaBuddhistframework.Ineachcase,weareaskedtodevelop
equalregardandconcernforallpersons,nomatterhoworwhethertheyarerelated
tous.Thisisademandtotreatthirdpersonsaswewouldtreatourselvesorour
second-personintimates;toelidethedifferencebetweentheintimateandthe
anonymous“we,”inZahavi’sterms.Doesthisunderminethespecialregardthat
seemstobeimpliedbytheprimacyofthesecondperson?
Ithinknot,andindeedthatsecond-personprimacyhelpstounderstandhowthis
perspectivecanbeachieved.Itwouldbeonethingtounderstandthisasademand
eithertomovedirectlyfromthefirstpersoncasetothethirdpersoncase,astheso-
calledGoldenRulemightbeinterpretedtosuggest,ortobeaskedtotreatallsecond
personsasthirdpersons,assomeKantiansmightsuggest.Inthefirstcase,weare
askedtoextendegoisticregardtoallpersons,whichisincoherentonitsface;onthe
second,weareaskedtotreatintimatesasstrangers,whichisequallymorallyand
psychologicallyproblematic.Butthesearenottheonlyoptions.Theother
possibilityistotreatthirdpersonsassecondpersons,andtoextendthenatural
non-egoisticregardandaffectionwehaveforintimateinterlocutorstoothers.This
22
istheworkofmoralcultivation.Humesuggestsasmuchwhenhediscussesthe
waysinwhichwewidenthecircleofthosetowhomwefeelintimatelyrelatedby
theuseofthemoralimagination.17IntheBuddhistcontexts,thisisthepointof
imaginingallsentientbeingsasone’smother.
Notethatthemoralexerciseisneithertothinkofallsentientbeingsasoneself,norto
thinkofone’smotherasjustlikeanyothersentientbeing.Rather,thespecial
second-personrelationonehastoone’smotheriswhatistobegeneralizedinthe
moralattitude.Thesecondpersonhasprideofplacehere,andisthestartingpoint
formoralconsciousness.Incultivatingmoralimpartialityornon-egocentricity
(upekṣa̛),wedoaimtoattainakindofde-centerednessinmoralvision,inwhichwe
nolongerstandatthecenterofourmoraluniverse,butwedonotaimatcomplete
anonymityinthatuniverse,butratherextendedintimacywithit,andthatisenabled
byoursecond-personrelationshipsandourabilitytogeneralizethem.Insteadof
seeingaYouasoneofmany,weaimtoseethemanyasinstancesofYou.18
17StephenDarwallin(2006)arguesforaversionofsecondpersonethics.HisapproachisrelatedtothatIdevelophere.Darwallreliesontheideathatmoralengagementinvolvesmakingclaimsonothers,havingobligationstowardsothers,andrecognizingothersasmakingclaimsonusandhavingobligationstowardsus.ThisideaisgroundedinStrawson’s(1968)discussionofreactiveattitudes.(SeeDarwall2013a,xi).Nonetheless,Darwallalsonotes(2013b,92)thatspecialrelations,andinparticular,intimaterelationships,requirethat“genuinecareforothersisanattitudetowardsthemasparticularindividualsandnotjustas“generalizedothers.”AndendorsingBuber’scritiqueofHeidegger,Darwallnotesthatintimatesecond-personrelationshipsrequireaspecialkindofaccesstooneselfsharedwiththeother.(Ibid.,112)Healsonotestheprimacyofparent-childrelationshipsinestablishingtheabilitytobewithanother.(130)Ontheotherhand,despitehisnodstoHume,HutchesonandSmithinthiscontext,Darwall’spositionisimportantdifferentfromthatIdefendhere,andthisinatleasttwoimportantrespects.First,Darwalltakessecond-personethicalrelationstofalloutofmoregeneralprinciplesofautonomy,justiceandrights,thatareindependentofspecialdyadicrelations;Itakethesespecialdyads,andtheintimacytheyaffordtogroundthemoregeneralmoralperspective.Second,Darwalltakesthemoralpointofviewtobeindependentofaffect;Itakeittobeessentiallyaffective.Third,Darwallseesouridentityasconstitutedindependentlyofthesecondpersonrelationshipsintowhichweenter;Iseethesecondpersonasessentialtoconstitutingouridentities.So,whileweshareacommitmenttothesecondpersonperspectiveasessentialtomorallife,wedosofordifferentreasons,andweconnectthatperspectivetopersonhoodinverydifferentways.18ThispositionalsohasdeepaffinitiestoStoicethicalthought,andinparticular,Hierocles’insistencethatethicalsensibilityinvolvesbothwideningourcircleofconcernfromour
23
Thisismadepossiblebytheultra-socialityofourspecies.Wearebiologicallytuned
forcooperation,includingcooperationwithpassingacquaintances.Weseethisin
oureverydaylifeandinourregularinteractionswithstrangers,whetherin
commerceorcasualmeeting.Thisultrasocialityisessentialtoourbeing—toour
DaseinaswellasourMitsein.Ifwearetothrive,wemustthriveinasocialcontext,
andifwearetothriveinasocialcontext,wemustbebothtrustingandtrustworthy.
Moreover,tothriveinasocialcontext,wemustbebothgoodatinterpretingothers,
andwemustourselvesbeinterpretable.Ifwefailintrust,intrustworthiness,in
interpretation,orintransparency,wefailtobesocial,andifwefailtobesocial,we
failtobefullyhuman.Itisthecontextofsecond-personinteractionsinwhichthese
skillsarecultivated;andwhattheyenableisthecultivationofmore,moremature,
andmorevariedandinterlockedsecond-personrelations.19
Weknowourselvesandourfellowsinmanyguises:asknowersandinquirers;as
moralandpoliticalactors;asfriends;ascompetitors;asloversandasenemies;as
seekersandasteachers.Burfirstandforemost,weknoweachotherasaddressees
andaddressors,andsoassecondpersons.Togetherweimprovisetheeveryday
worldinwhichweinteract—lokavyāvahāra—thatistheonlycontextinwhich
humanlifecanhavemeaning.
immediatefamilytoourclan,toourstate,toallofhumanity,andthennarrowingthatcircletobringasmanyaspossibleintocloserelation,anideathatwesee(Garfield2019)developedinHume’sethicalthoughtaswell.IthankAmberCarpenterfordrawingthisconnectiontomyattention.19SeeRoughleyandBayertz(2019)foracollectionofsuperbessaysfrombiology,anthropology,ethology,psychology,andphilosophythattogethermakeanoverwhelmingcaseforthisevolutionaryperspectiveonourultra-sociality.
24
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