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Security Policies of France in West Africa
Seminar on Security policies in West Africa National Defence Academy, Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management, Vienna, 18-
19 April 2013
Geert Laporte, Deputy Director, European Centre for Development Policy Management
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1. Short history of French security interests in Africa
2. Changes in new rules of the game3. Motives for French intervention in Mali4. Short-term gains5. Possible long-term implications6. Quid the EU? 7. Quid AU and ECOWAS? 8. Lessons learnt
Structure of presentation
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• Strong post-colonial ties with francophone Africa (“Francafrique”- “protection of African dictators in return for minerals”)
• Various interventions to save or remove regimes since 1960s
• Major french bases in CI, Burkina Faso, Chad, Gabon
• Since more than 2 decades: “ time to move away from Francafrique” - “immoral and outdated”.
• Sarkozy: scaling down French troops• Hollande: “France should stop playing gendarme in
Africa”
Short history of French security interests in Africa
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• December 2012: French refusal to intervene in Central African Republic…
• …January 2013: French intervention in Mali as epicentre of post- Libya instability
• Fear of spill-over effects in the region if Malian state implodes
• Need to move fast + unilateral action but with approval of international community (UN resolution- unanimous support Security Council)
New rules of the game can quickly change
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• Security motives: stopping jihadist movements “at EU doorstep”, preventing destabilisation of the region
• Economic motives: secure energy resources (uranium Niger, potential oil in Mali,..) and deter rival powers (China-BRICS)
• Illegal trafficking (drugs)• Hostage crisis
Motives for French intervention in Mali
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• Stop Jihadists and prevent take-over Bamako and collapse Mali
• Re-affirmation of French military power in Africa
• Praise and backing public opinion in France, Mali and elsewhere in Africa/world
• Test for foreign policy approach of Hollande
Short-term gains
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•Neighbouring states could be drawn in conflict (Algeria, Niger, Libya, …)?•Reprisal attacks against French targets in West Africa (30,000 French) and domestic retaliation in France?•Sahel: new battleground of global jihadism•Long term insurgery war with terrorists (tactical withdrawal jihadists and regrouping)?•No clear French exit and long term strategy
Long-term implications (1)?
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•Is France willing to also invest in taking away the underlying causes and breeding ground for extremism (= poverty, injustice, poor governance, violence, state fragility, corruption) and to invest in post conflict peace building?•Military action alone will not end the crisis in Mali•Short-term quick fix should be complemented with structural actions
Long-term implications (2)?
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• Comprehensive Sahel strategy with ambitious security dimension
• Ashton “absent” after intervention of France • Focus on development and long term state
reconstruction + training Malian armed forces• EU should move beyond image of soft power• BUT, EU institutions Post Lisbon not equipped
to make EU a stronger and faster player
Quid the EU?
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• ECOWAS-AU Plan for promoting inclusive democratic process, reforming defence and security sector, restoring territorial integrity, addressing challenges facing wider Sahel with support of UN, EU
• November 2012: agreement on coordinated military intervention but deployment only foreseen in …September 2013
• Exterme dependency for peace operations on donor funding
Quid the African side?
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•Mali crisis is a regional issue requiring regional approach with regional institutions in the lead•Military intervention should be followed by non-military action (structural development)•Great need for more coherent EU post crisis engagement •Foreign intervention can only succeed if objectives fit in with local dynamics= Mali stands or falls with a credible government which does not exist
Lessons learnt
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