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GIGA Research Unit:
GIGA Institute of Asian Studies___________________________
Seeing from Above:
The Geopolitics of Satellite Vision and North Korea
David Shim
No 201 August 2012
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201/2012 GIGAWorkingPapers
GIGAWP201/2012
SeeingfromAbove:TheGeopoliticsofSatelliteVisionandNorthKorea
AbstractSatelliteimageryplaysanimportantroleincontemporarygeopolitics.Arguablythemost
wellknownexampleisColinPowells(in)famouspresentationtotheUNSecurityCouncil
inFebruary2003,duringwhichheusedsatellitepicturestolegitimatetheinvasionofIraq.
Satellitephotographsdrawonatechnoscientificdiscoursethatenablesthemtofunction
asundistorted
records
impartially
documenting
space
and
place.
As
aresult,
they
assume
adefiningauthoritytospeakthetruthwhichisprobablyenhancedwithregardto(al
legedly)unknownandmysterioussiteslikeNorthKorea.Sincesatellitesaredeployedto
revealwhat shouldbe invisible, theirability todetectandexpose,orsee fromabove,
impliesaparticularpower.However,satellitephotographsarenotnecessarilyobjectivere
flectionsofageographicalsurfacebut, likeallvisualrepresentations,underliewhatwill
becalledalogicofinclusionandexclusionthatmakesthemdeeplypolitical.TakingNorth
Koreaasanexample,thearticlearguesfortheneedtodevelopasensitizedunderstanding
concerningthe
use
and
function
of
satellite
images
as
they
often
come
to
have
internation
alpoliticalimplications.Referringtothelinkagesbetweenseeing,knowingandacting,the
article examines the roleof remote sensingasawayofknowingand inquiresas to the
immediacyofimagesandtheensuingimperativetorespondtothem.
Keywords:NorthKorea,visuality,criticalgeopolitics,satelliteimagery
Dr.des.DavidShimisapostdoctoralresearchfellowattheGIGAInstituteofAsianStudies.Hisresearchinter
ests include critical approaches to IR and the relationshipbetweenvisuality andworld
politics.HeisamemberofResearchProgramme4:Power,NormsandGovernanceinIn
ternationalRelations.
Contact:
Website:
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GIGAWorkingPapers WP201/2012
SeeingfromAbove:TheGeopoliticsofSatelliteVisionandNorthKorea
DavidShim
ArticleOutline1 Introduction
2 Visuality,KnowledgeandGeopolitics
3 TheAuthorityofSatelliteVision
4 TheGeopoliticsofSatelliteVision
5 NorthKorea:TerraIncognitaandPracticesofLooking
6 TheSpatialImaginary
7 BelievingisSeeing
8 Conclusion
Bibliography
1 IntroductionIn the contemporary geopolitical order, there are seemingly few states like North Korea.
Continuouslymademeaningfulandproblematizedintermsofthepoliticalandtheinterna
tional,almosteveryaspect,areaoractionofthissocalledpariahorroguestateissaidto
have inherentpoliticaldimensionsand international repercussions:be it the countrysdo
mestichuman rightssituation, itsprecariouseveryday lifeor its foreignpolicyofcoercion
andnuclearbrinkmanship,nomatterwhatNorthKorea saysanddoes, itaffects the stateandstabilityofregionalandglobalpolitics.WhileNorthKoreaisinthissenseunquestiona
blyaninternationalsubject,articulationsofsecrecyplayacrucialroleindescriptionsofthe
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spacesandspatialitiesof thecountry.NorthKorea isoftenreferred toas themost isolated
place in theworld,andparticular imaginationsor, toput itdifferently,certain imaginative
geographiesincludingthatofaterraincognita(Solarz1999),ablackhole(Demick2010)
oralandofnosmiles(VanHoutryve2009)prevailintheportrayalofthecountryininternationalrelations.
CitingNorthKoreasambiguousandreclusivenature,governmentofficials,scholarsand
journalists fromother countries still struggle tounderstandNorthKoreas stateof affairs.
Thecountryappearstobeaperfectexampleofthequintessentialotherofmodernglobaliza
tion, somethingwhichdefies closer scrutinybecause it isunmapped, shrouded in secrecy
andsecludedfromtherestoftheworld.Interestingly,thisassessmentisnotnew.Asearlyas
the1970s,thethendirectoroftheCentralIntelligenceAgency(CIA),RobertGates,wholater
servedasUSsecretaryofdefensefrom2006to2011,describedNorthKoreaasablackhole
and the toughest intelligence target in theworld (cited inFrench2005:xiii).Oneof the
most recent examples of such statements was theblunt acknowledgment madeby Kurt
Campbell,AssistantSecretaryofState,EastAsianandPacificAffairs,before theUSSenate
Armed Services Committee in September 2010. Responding to questions from the Senate
panelconcerningthesecuritysituationontheKoreanpeninsula,Campbellstated,
In fundamentalways,NorthKorea is stillablackbox.Wehave someglimpsesand
someintelligenceandthelike,butthetruthisoftentimesinretrospectsomeofthatin
telligencehasproven tobewrong. Itsavery,veryhard target,probably thehardest
targetwefaceintheglobalarena.(citedinStewart2010)
Ofcentral importance to thesecharacterizations is theclaimofmissing information.What
appearstobecertain,bothforthen(Gates)andnow(Campbell),isthatNorthKorearemains
unknownorisunknowabletotheoutsideworld.However,equallyworthyofmentioninthis
regard is the significanceofcertainpractices for securingknowledgeabout thecountry in
ordertocompensateforthispaucityofinformation:visualrepresentationsthatis,satellite
images.Inparticular,theimplicationsofwhatweseevisionandhowwe(aremadeto)see
visualityaregivenanalyticalpriorityinthepaper.
Inthisvein,thearticlepursuesseveralgoals:First,itshowshowsatelliteimagesfunction
aspowerfulspatialimaginarieswhichmediateaparticularnotionaboutaparticularterritory
(seeDodgeandPerkins2009).Thisproductivefunctionispossiblebecauseseeingisviewed
asanauthoritativewayofknowing.Second,byinvertingthecommonplaceseeingisbeliev
ingtowhatcanbetermedbelievingisseeing,thearticleprovidesexamplesthatquestion
theauthoritativerelationshipbetweenseeing,knowingandacting.Whilethetruthfulnessor
accuracyofsatellite imagesisnotchallenged,thearticleassertsthat it isessentialtorecog
nizethatsuchpicturesarenotselfevident:theyalonedonottelluswhattheymean,what
therightconclusionsareorwhathastobedone.Third,itintendstoadvancecriticalstudies ingeopoliticsbyempiricallydiscussingacasethat isarguablyneglected in thisfieldof
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study:NorthKorea,ormoreprecisely,theuseofvisualspatialrepresentationsofNorthKo
rea.Forinstance,onestrongthreadincriticalgeopoliticsisthefocusontopicsrelatedtothe
USWaronTerror(seeforexampleAmoore2007;Anderson2010;Dodds2007)orthewar
in Iraq (see for exampleGregory 2010;Hyndman 2007; Tuathail 2003). Critical engagementswith the subjectofNorthKoreaarevirtuallynonexistent.Finally, thisarticlepoints
outapeculiarfeatureofremotesensingthatismoreoftenthannotoverlooked:satelliteim
agesareartificialandauthoritativeatthesametime.Because itindicatesthedifferenttruth
terrainsonwhichothermodesofthevisualplay(forexample,documentaryphotography),
thehybridcharacterofsatelliteimageryhighlightstheneedtodevelopacarefulunderstand
ingconcerningitsuseandfunction.
Thepaperbeginsbyexplicatingtherolethatsatelliteimageryisassignedwithincurrent
geopoliticalpractices.Tothisend,ithighlightstheepistemologicalstatusofremotesensing
as such ways of (remote) seeing are embedded within technological and scientific logics.
However,itisalsodemonstratesthatsatelliteimages,likeallvisualrepresentations,aresub
jecttowhatwillbecalledalogicofinclusionandexclusion(cf.Mirzoeff1999):somethings
(aremade to) liewithin thesatellites frameofvision,whileothers remainoutof itsview.
This logicmakes satellite imagespoliticalandopen toappropriation.Thepaperdiscusses
examplesrelatedtoNorthKoreaandconcludeswiththeimplicationsofitsfindingsforthe
broaderstudyofvisualityincriticalgeopolitics.
2 Visuality,KnowledgeandGeopoliticsRemotesensinghasabroadrangeofapplicationsinglobalpolitics.Itisused,forinstance,in
armedconflicts,warsandhumanitarianemergencies,aswellas for internationalsanctions
and drug prevention and environmental preservation efforts (see for example Baker,
OConnell,andWilliamson2001;BakerandWilliamson2006;DodgeandPerkins2009).The
academic analysis concerning the use of satellite imagery varies accordingly. Fields that
studyitinclude(critical)geopolitics,(critical)securitystudies,strategicstudies,conflictstud
ies,environmentalstudiesandhumanitarianstudies.Satellitepicturesaredeeplyembeddedingovernmental, intelligence andmilitary factfindingmissions anddecisionmakingpro
cesses.Oftentheyrepresentthemainsourceofinformationusedin,forinstance,theevalua
tionofweapons(ofmassdestruction)programsandofproliferationactivitiesonthepartof
states likeNorthKoreaand Iran (seeHerman1996).Satellitephotographsarebelieved to
reveal the stageofdevelopmentofnuclear reactorsandmissilebasesand tohelpmonitor
andtracksuspiciouscargovesselsininternationalwaters.TheUSledProliferationSecurity
Initiative,whichseekstocreateaglobalnetworktomonitor,controlandpreventtheship
pingofweaponsofmassdestruction,isoneexampleofthis.Anumberofincidentsdemonstratethatsatelliteimageryhasconsistentlyandrepeatedly
playedanimportantroleininternationalpolitics.Perhapsthemostwellknownincident in
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recentyearswastheinvasionofIraqbyUSledforcesinMarch2003, inwhichsatellite im
ageryinfamouslypresentedbythenUSsecretaryofstateColinPowellattheUNSecurity
CouncilclaimingtoprovetheexistenceofIraqiweaponsofmassdestructionplayedapiv
otalroleinthejustificationforstartingthewar.OtherexamplesincludetheconflictinBosniain1995,duringUSambassadortotheUnitedNationsMadeleineAlbrightusedsatellitepho
tographsinherpresentationtotheUNSecurityCounciltocallattentiontoatrocitiescommit
tedagainstBosnianMuslimsandtoprovideevidenceaboutthelocationofsuspectedmass
gravesnearSrebrenica,1and theairraidundertakenbyIsraelifighterjets in2007againsta
SyrianfacilitythatJerusalemconsideredtobeanuclearreactorunderconstruction.
The involvement of the UN Security Council is indicative of the overall dynamics to
whichimagesrelateandareapartof,assatellitepictureshavebeencentralreferentsinmat
ters related to international peace and security. Against thisbackdrop, images appear to
speaksecurityandfunctionasinstantaneouscommunicativeacts(Hansen2011;Williams
2003).Inotherwords,imagesarenotillustrativeand,therefore,secondarytoknowledge,but
knowledgeintheirownright.Inthisvein,theyareanintegralpartofgeopoliticaldynamics.
Thisnotonlymakesthemlegitimatesubjectsofcriticalanalysisbutalsohighlightstheneed
forcarefulengagementwiththeissuesandimplicationsofvisualrepresentations.
Moreover, theepisodesdescribedabovealsoaptlysummarizewhat isatstake inthese
practicesoflooking.Theyillustratetheimmediacyoftheimages,theensuingimperativeto
respond to them,and the reality thatknowledge reliesonvision.Remote sensingenables
politicalactorstoknowwhat(theybelieve)anotherisuptoandtoactuponwhattheyseeor,and this isalso important toconsider,what theyhavebeenallowed toseebyothers.2The
caseofsatellite imagery isaprimeexampleof the linksbetweenvisuality,knowledgeand
geopoliticsinthatitrevealshowgeopoliticalpracticesaretiedtothiswayof(remote)seeing:
regardedasprovidingcompellingevidence,thesepicturesallowgovernmentstomakelegit
imatestatements,drawconclusionsandtakepoliticalaction.
3 TheAuthorityofSatelliteVisionTraditionally,remotesensinghasbeentheexclusivedomainofthestate.Asaresult,satellite
imageshavetypicallybeenalignedwithofficialformsofknowledge(Parks2005).However,
duetoseveraldevelopmentsinthisdomaintheprivatizationofthesatelliteindustry,legis
lativeamendmentsandtechnologicalinnovationssatelliteimageshaveincreasinglycome
1 Thephotographs led thecouncil toadoptResolution1010,whichdemanded thatBosnianSerbsrespect the
rightsofBosnianMuslimsandwarnedtheBosnianSerbmilitarythattheywouldbeheldaccountableforvio
lationsofinternationalhumanitarianlaw(FloriniandDehqanzada2001:437).2 For instance, the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which uses satellite imagery, among other
things,foritsassessmentofsuspectednuclearprograms,isoftenprovidedwith(particular)imagesbyother
states,includingtheUnitedStates.
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tobeusedbynonstateactorsincludingcivilsocietygroups,nongovernmentalorganizations,
journalists,scholars,aidworkersandartists.Thegrowinginterestinandutilizationofcom
mercialsatelliteimageryhaspromptedsometoarguethatithasreshapedthewaysinwhich
theseactorscomprehendspaceandplace(forexample,DodgeandPerkins2009;AdayandLivingston2009;Parks2009).Further,thesimplicitywithwhichthesekindsofimagescanbe
viewed,usedanddisseminatedhasempowereddifferentsocialgroups tochallengesover
eignpowersthroughthedisclosureofclandestinesitesundermilitaryorstatecontrol.Per
hapsmoreimportanttonotethanthefactthatstatesfacenewchallengesfromcommercialor
privatesatelliteapplicationsisthatthevisual isreconfiguringthegeopoliticalterrain itself:
remotesensingenablesdifferentgroupstoconstitutethemselvesaspoliticalactors(seeHan
sen2011;seealsoAdayandLivingston2009;Litfin2001,2002;Rosenau2002).Examplesare
providedbyadvocacynetworkssuchastheInstituteforScienceandInternationalSecurity
(ISIS)andhumanrightsorganizationslikeAmnestyInternationalthatregularlyusesatellite
imagestocallattentiontoparticularissuesandtopressgovernmentstotakeaction.Forin
stance,humanrightsactivistssuchastheUSCommitteeforHumanRightsinNorthKorea
(Hawk2003;2012)repeatedlyrefertooverheadimageryofNorthKoreanprisoncampsinan
attempttogettheUSgovernmentandinternationalorganizationstoputNorthKoreanhu
manrightsatthetopoftheirpoliticalagendas.TheregularreferencesmadebytheUSState
DepartmentsannualreportonNorthKoreanhumanrightstotheaccountsandimageryof
nongovernmentalorganizations,refugeesand themediashowshowvariousactorspartici
pateinandbecomepartofgovernmentaldiscourse(forexample,USDOS2010).However,regardlessofwhethersatelliteimagery isusedbygovernmentornongovern
mentactors,whatisimportanttonoteisthatitsfunctionremainsthesame:givingauthority
tocertainstatements,conclusionsandactions.Thiskindofuse ispossiblebecausesatellite
imagesdrawonatechnoscientificdiscoursethatendowsthemwithwhatDavidCampbell
(2007:20)callsanauraofunsurpassedobjectivity.Theprecisionofhighresolutionpan
chromaticandmultispectralimagesistheresultofelectroopticalprocessesandinnovations
thatallowsatellitepicturestolooklikemimeticreflectionsofgeographicalsurfaces.Sophis
ticated technologyand its scientificapplication sustain theperception that remotesensingimagesimpartiallydocumentplaces,spacesandsites.Seeminglystrippedofsubjectiveinter
ference,satelliteimagesrevealtraitssimilartothegenreofdocumentaryphotography:like
the latter, theyclaim tooffer transparent insights intomajorprocesses in theworldand to
providetheirviewerswithunmediatedaccesstothetruth.Furthermore,becausegeostation
arysatellitesarecapableofrecordingimagesatanytimeandfromanywhere,theyinaway
analogous to theallseeingeyeofprovidencearebelieved to transcendnaturalobstacles
andelementalboundaries.Similarly toWalterBenjaminsnotionofphotographyasa tech
nologyoftheopticalunconscious,satellitecamerasexpandhumanobservationbeyondits
naturalscopeandextend therangeofvisiblespace (cf.Edwards2006;SchwartzandRyan
2003).Therefore, satellites seem tobe capable of autonomousvision as they continuously
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orbitandscantheearth(Marmor2008).Asaresulttheyprovidetheobserverwithaprivi
legedvisualangle,onewhichnotonlypurportstoofferasynopticviewofagivenlandscape
orterritorybutalsogivestheimpressionofinherenttransparencyandcontrollabilityandof
dominanceoverwhatisbeingobserved.Inthisregard,DodgeandPerkins(2009:498,italicsinoriginal)assertthatsatelliteimagesappeartoseemoreoftheworld,oratleasttheview
ersperceivetheyareseeingmuchmore[]afullerviewofspace;sothatyouthinkyoucan
seethingsyouwouldrecognizewiththenakedeye.
Whatisimportanttonoteisthatsatellitesmakevisiblewhatpeoplecannotnormallysee.
Becausetheyareabletorevealhidden,unknownorsecretsites,whichwouldotherwisere
main invisible and inaccessible to us, their ability to see from above implies a particular
power(PerkinsandDodge2009),apowerthatcanbeassociatedwiththeestablishmentofa
particular imaginativegeography,a specificnotionof spaceandplace.Asopticaldevices,
satellitesnotonlydefine thevisualappearanceandcognitionofspecificsites, through, for
instance,thepracticeofmapping,butalsocreateimaginationsofspatialorder.Forexample,
someauthorshavearguedthatthecameraofthesatellitehascreatedanewwayoflooking,
throughtheadoptionofaperspectiveseenfromouterspace,whichhasnotonlyestablished
theiconoftheblueplanetbutalsohelpedtoconstructtheearthasaunitarybiosphereanda
coherentecologicalsystem(Siemer2007;Sachs1994;seealsoCosgrove1994;2001).
4 TheGeopoliticsofSatelliteVisionThedefiningauthorityofsatelliteimagesisrelatedtotheirpoliticalcharacter.Eventhough
theyareunderstood toprovide theobserver,asstatedabove,withafullerviewofspace
(DodgeandPerkins2009:498,italicsinoriginal),leadingtotheassumptionthatviewersare
seeingmuchmore,onecannotobscurethefactthattheseimagesarepartialrepresentations
ofspace.Nocameraperspectivecancaptureascene in itsentirety,becauseanyattemptto
representrealityinvolvesselectionsandreductions.Imagesare,therefore,necessarilysynec
dochicrepresentations.Theymakeareferenceto thewhole throughapartialaccount.The
partialcharacterofsatelliteimagespointstothemostpowerfulmechanismofthevisual:thelogicofinclusionandexclusion.Again,whiletheaccuracyofsuchimagesisnotchallenged
here, it is important tonote that (satellite) imagingrestsuponanunderstandingofwhat is
entitledtorepresentationandwhatisnot,oruponaninterpretiveresponsetowhatdeserves
tolieinsideandoutsideasatellitesframeofvisibility.Bythismeans,imagescanhelptoerect
hierarchies,createboundariesandsustaindifferenceswhichseparate,forinstance,aknown
fromanunknown,adomesticfromaforeign,orasimpleherefromathere.
Theselectivityofsatelliteimaginggivescausetoaskwhyspecificphotographsorvisual
motifs,andnotothers,arerepeatedlypresentedanddisseminated.Forinstance,eventhoughintelligenceagenciesfromboththeUnitedStatesandSouthKoreapossessoverheadimagery
ofNorthKoreasforcedlaborcamps,noimageofthemhaseverbeenofficiallyreleased.Cit
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ingsecurityreasons,theUSgovernmenthasobjectedtothepublicationofsuchpicturesbe
cause itallegedlydoesnotwant todisclose the reconnaissance capabilitiesof its satellites
(Brooke2003).Theinternationalpubliconlylearnedabouttheexistenceoftheseprisoncom
poundsafter,inDecember2002,aseriesofsatellitephotographsappearedintheFarEasternEconomicReview,whichhadobtainedthepicturesfromacommercialproviderofspaceimag
ing (Larkin2002).While reportsand testimoniesbyNorthKorean refugeeswereavailable
previously, they,as theFarEasternEconomicReviewnoted,suffered fromakey failing:no
foreignershaveeverseen theNorthKoreancamps (Larkin2002:15).TheDecember2002
publicationwasthefirsttimethatphotographsoftheNorthKoreanlaborcampsweremade
public.3Further imagesweremadeavailableinOctober2003and,morerecently, inApril
2012(Hawk2012)whenthenongovernmentalUSCommitteeforHumanRightsinNorth
Koreareleasedareportthatprovidedvisualevidenceoftheexistenceofthesecamps(Hawk
2003). What is striking is the fact that since the 1990s highresolution satellite pictures of
NorthKoreasnuclearandmissilesiteshavefrequentlybeenreleasedandreferredtobyUS
administrations, thereby contradicting the claim that accurate reconnaissance imagery
shouldnotbeshowntothepublicforsecurityreasons.
ConcerningthequestionofwhysatelliteimagesofNorthKoreasnuclearandmissilefa
cilitiesarereadilyreleasedbygovernmentsbutthoseofthecountrysnotoriousprisoncom
plexesarenot,wemustaskwhethersuch imagesareameanstoaparticularendthat is,
whethertheyservecertainpoliticalpurposes.For,asLisaParks(2001)argues,satellitepho
tographsassumeimportanceonlywhentheyhaverelevanceincurrentinternationalaffairs.Thus,the(comparative)invisibilityofthesecampsisnosurprisegiventhedominanceofone
geopolitical issue intheNortheastAsiansecuritydiscoursesince themid1990s:NorthKo
reasnuclearandmissileprogram.4Parks(2001:597)statesthatthesatellitesgazeistrained
onparticularplaces forparticular reasons [that] [] canbemobilizedas representing the
ultimateauthorityofthestate[]orasacompletelyabstractanduncertainpointofview.
Sowhatshouldbeconsideredacharacteristicfeatureofsatelliteimagesisthattheycanei
therbeutilizedascompellingsourcesbyvariousactorsorbeseenassignifyingnothingbuta
viewfromouterspace.However,therearealsootheraspectsofsatelliteimagerythatrevealitsinclusionaryand
exclusionarylogics.Theybringtolightthefactthatremotesensingisnotaninnocentmode
ofrepresentationbutisratheropentopoliticalappropriationandmanipulation.Whilesatel
3 Thephotographsweresodetailedthataformerguardhadnotroublepinpointinghisplaceofwork.Henot
ed,thisisdefinitelyit[]Ifinishedmyshiftat2a.m.ThenIdrovemytruckalongthisroadtotherailway
stationyouseethere,andfollowedtheroadtotheChineseborder(Larkin2002:15).4 However,severaldevelopmentsinrecentyearshavepointedtoincreasingpoliticalcommitmentsandinterna
tionalattentionregardingthe(humanrights)situationinNorthKorea.Theseincludetheenactmentofspecifichuman rightsrelated laws, theappointmentof specialemissariesand thegrowing condemnationofNorth
Koreashumanrightsviolationsbynationalgovernmentsandinternationalbodies.
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liteimagesarecommonlyassumedtobevisualevidence,theyarefarfrombeingselfevident
anddonotspeakforthemselves.RevealinginthisregardweretheremarksmadebyColin
PowellwhenhepresentedsatelliteimagesofIraqtotheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilin
ordertomakethecaseforamilitaryinvasion:LetmesayawordaboutsatelliteimagesbeforeIshowacouple.ThephotosthatIam
abouttoshowyouaresometimeshardfortheaveragepersontointerpret,hardforme.
Thepainstakingworkofphotoanalysistakesexpertswithyearsandyearsofexperi
ence,poringforhoursandhoursover light tables.Butas Ishowyou these images,I
willtrytocaptureandexplainwhattheymean,whattheyindicatetoourimageryspe
cialists.(Powell2003)
WhilethewarinIraqillustrateshowsatelliteimagescanbeusedformanipulativepurposes,
italsoshowsthatsuchstrategiesofdeceptionareenabledpreciselyasaresultoftheimagesopacityandambiguitythatis,becausepictureslackanyinherentmeaning.Tounderstand
howsuch images function, it isuseful tooutlinehow satellitevision ismanufacturedand
mediatedandhowitinteractswithtextandlanguageinthecreationofmeaning.
The impression that satellitephotographsare transparentmediatorsobscures thecom
plextechnicalprocessesthataccompanytheirproduction.Beforetheycanbepresentedand
viewedinameaningfulway,satelliteimagesarecomputerprocessedinordertocorrectdis
tortionsandtogivethemtheirpropervisualappearance(DodgeandPerkins2009;Campbell
2007;Parks2001;2005).Oftentheyarecompiledoutofparcelsofshotsfromdifferenttimes;thiscreatesagenuineviewofagivensurface,freefromcloudcover.Thus,satelliteimages
originatefromaparticulardayandfromaparticulartime.Thesyntheticimagingprocessis
duetothevastamountsofdatainvolved.Thesearetransmittedthroughtheelectrooptical
sensors of satellites to terrestrial stations, where they are converted into a visual form of
analysis (Marmor 2008: 318).However,muchofwhat satellites capture is rarelyanalyzed
andismoreoftenthannotarchived.Satellitedatabecomesrealaphotographonlyafterit
issorted,arrangedandcirculated(cf.Campbell2007).Perhapsbecauseofthis,satellite im
ages,morethananyotherphotographicrepresentation,demand(professional)interpretation
(Parks2005).
Indeed,theanalysisofsatelliteimagesappearstobeamatterofexpertknowledge,asa
distinctbodyofwork and institutions suggests (for example,Conway and TheMaryland
SpaceGrantConsortium1997;Philipson1997;Campbell1996;Baker2001;Lillesand,Kiefer
and Chipman 2008). A common example of this is providedby satellite weather photo
graphs,whichhave tobe interpretedbymeteorologists so thata layaudience canunder
stand them properly. Important stakeholders in the production and dissemination of this
expertknowledge areprofessional associations and international imagery training centers
suchas the InternationalSociety forPhotogrammetryandRemoteSensingor the InternationalInstituteforAerospaceSurveyandEarthSciences.Theexaminationofsatellitephoto
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graphsforthepurposeofdetectingspecificobjectsandevaluatingtheirsignificanceisbased
onanumberof(visual)methodologicalcategories.Thesecomprise,forinstance,thelocation,
size,shape,color,textureandpatternofdepictedobjects(Baker2001:537).AttheNational
PhotographicInterpretationCenter,whichisrunbytheUSgovernment,overonethousandimageryanalystsand specialistsworkonphotographs todecodeandmake senseof them
(Campbell2007:22).
Variousaccompanyingexplanationsandcaptions,aswellasothergraphicandtechnical
tools,notonlyensurethatsatelliteimagesareaccessibletoawideraudiencebutalsomake
thesepicturescomprehensibleinaparticularway,whichinturnnarrowsthepossibilitiesfor
howtheycanbeunderstood.TheprocessingofsatelliteimagesembedstheminwhatParks
(2001:592)callsabroadereconomyoftelevisualsigns.Thisembeddednessreferstothe
signifyingfunctionofthecaptions,narrationsandarrowsthatarealwaysattachedtothese
photographs.Sincesatelliteimagesdonotinherentlyindicatehowtheyshouldberead,the
interweavingofsuchphotographs intoa largercontextofothersignstells theviewerhow
theyhavetobe interpreted.Similarlytoavisualmanualorasetofvisual instructions,the
accompanying marks direct the viewer to see what the presenter wishes to make visible,
therebyreducingthenumberofpossiblemeanings.
5 NorthKorea:TerraIncognitaandPracticesofLookingAsindicatedabove,referencestosecrecypervadevariouspartiesapproachestoNorthKo
rea.Oftendescribedasanenigma(Halliday1981)oramystery(Scalapino1997),North
Koreaiswidelybelievedtobeasecretofitsownkind.Itremainsunseenandishiddenfrom
view.Sincesatellitesaredeployedtorevealwhatshouldbeinvisible,detectingandexposing
thehiddenor,inotherwords,seeing(fromabove)impliesaparticularpower(Perkinsand
Dodge2009).Anumberofexamplesshowthatsatelliteimageryplaysadecisiveroleinex
posingNorthKoreassecret(s)(seeforexampleBrown2009,DailyTelegraph2010;KimT.H.
2010;Ramstad2009,Yang2008;Yoo2010).Whatshouldalsobeconsideredisthatsuchimag
esmayholdagreaterauthoritytospeakabout(allegedly)unknownplacesandmysterioussitesbecausetheyliketheeyeofprovidencehelpustoseeand,therefore,toknowwhatis
reallygoingon.
From the statusof itsnuclearormissiledevelopments, to itsweaponsproliferationor
overseastradeactivities,toitsfoodsecurityorhumanrightssituation,satelliteimagestellus
whatishappeninginandaroundKorea.Forinstance,theUNsWorldFoodProgrammeand
itsFoodandAgricultureOrganizationhaveregularlyassessedNorthKoreascropandfood
supplybystudyingsatellitephotosofitsfields(forexample,FAOandWFP2004).Satellite
imagery isalso important inestimatingNorthKoreasvegetationandcropgrowingconditions.Basedon theestimates theyderive from thesesources, theseUNagenciesappeal to
internationaldonorsforfoodaid.Satellitepictureswerealsousedbyinternationalreliefor
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ganizationstoassesstheextentofthedamagecausedbyatrainexplosioninRyongchonin
April2004,andtoevaluatethescaleofdestructionresultingfromsupertyphoonBilis,which
hitNorthKorea inJuly2006.Remotesensing imageshavealsobeenused toassessNorth
Koreas alleged involvement in the statesponsored production and global distribution ofillegalnarcotics(seeSovacool2009).
6 TheSpatialImaginaryPeoplecometoknowtheworldand itsspacesandplaces throughvisual imagery.Un
known locations are made familiar through visual representation (cf. Schwartz and Ryan
2003).Satellite imagesareoneof theways inwhichpeopleapproachandengagewith the
worldthatis,howtheyimaginetheplacesandsitesoftheworld.Becausetheyareameansofmapping,watching,orderingandrepresentingtheworld,satelliteimagesareapervasive
formofgeographicalknowledge;theymaketheworldknowable.Assuchtheycontributeto
shapingparticularspatialimaginaries.
Intermsofvisualcomposition,almostallsatelliteimagesrevealsimilarrepresentational
patterns,astheyprovideaverticalandplanarviewfromabovetheearthssurface.Exhibit
ingfeaturesoflandscapephotographyandlandscapepainting,satelliteimagestendtocap
turebroadterritorialspaceswithinasingleframeandconveyanenhancedsenseofpictorial
realism,overtnaturalismandcolorfuldiversity(DodgeandPerkins2009:498).Likethegen
reoflandscapephotography,satelliteimagerypermitsviewerstocontrol,orderandscalea
territory intoneatlyarrangedportions (Clarke1997:55,61).Asaresult, thesatellite image
appearsasanaturalmapofanareaonewhichclaimstorepresentthetruthonthediscur
siveauthorityofcartographyandgeography.
With regard toNorthKorea,one satellite image,ormoreprecisely,onevisualmotif is
widelyandfrequentlyused(seeFigure1).ItshowstheKoreanpeninsulaatnight;mostof
thebright spots are located in the south,while thenorthernpart is almostentirely in the
dark.OtherversionsofthepictureincludetheJapaneseislandsandpartsofNortheastChina
andRussia,allofwhichareilluminated(seeforexampleGlobalSecurity.org2006).Themotifgainedprominencewhen theUSDepartmentofDefense included thesatellitephoto in its
standardbriefingsonNorthKoreaunderthetenureofDonaldRumsfeld(GlobalSecurity.org
2006).Thesamepictureorsimilarversionsofithavebeenreferredtoorreproducedinaca
demicpublications(forexample,KimS.2002;KnausandLee2011;Harris2007)andmedia
outletssuchastheNewYorkTimes(Zeller2006),theBritishDailyMail(2006),theWashington
Post(Klein2011)andSouthKoreas largestnewspaperChosunIlbo(2010).Someeconomists
haveevenusedthisimagetoestablishacausallinkbetweentheluminositythatisthevisibil
ity of nighttime light and economic growth (see for example Henderson, Storeygard andWeil2009;seealsoChenandNordhaus2011).However,theacademicuseofthisphotoisnot
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the only example that exposes the nexusbetween certain kinds of visualities and certain
kindsofknowledges.
Figure1: SatellitePhotoShowingtheKoreanPeninsulabyNight,UsedDuringaNewsBriefingbytheUSDepartmentofDefenseon11October2006
Source:GlobalSecurity.org2006.
Inordertoascertainwhatthisvisualmotifisbelievedtosignifyand,therefore,howNorth
Korea is imagined, it ishelpfultoexaminethestatements thathavebeenprovokedbythis
way
of
seeing.
During
a
news
briefing
at
the
US
Department
of
Defense
in
December
2002,
Rumsfeldstated,
IfyoulookatapicturefromtheskyoftheKoreanPeninsulaatnight,SouthKoreaisfilled with lights and energy and vitality and abooming economy; North Korea isdark.Itisatragedywhatsbeingdoneinthatcountry.AndthesuggestionthatitisaresultofrhetoricfromoutsideIthinkismissesthepoint.Wehaveaverystrangesituationinthatcountry.(USDoD2002)
Duringanothernewsbriefing,shortlyafterNorthKoreahadconducteditsfirstnucleartest
inOctober2006,Rumsfeldreferredonceagaintothisimage:
Exceptformywifeandfamily,thatismyfavoritephoto.Itsaysitall.TheresthesouthoftheDemilitarizedZone,thesamepeopleasnorth,sameresourcesnorthandsouth,
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andthebigdifferenceisinthesouthitsafreepoliticalsystemandafreeeconomicsystem [] thatdotof light isPyongyang.And thepeople thereare starvingand theirgrowthisstunted.Anditsashame.Itsatragedy.(USDoD2006)
One
of
the
latest
examples
of
the
use
of
this
image
is
the
book
Nothing
to
Envy:
Ordinary
Lives
inNorthKoreabyLosAngelesTimesjournalistBarbaraDemick(2010),whowasawardedthe
2010BBCSamuelJohnsonPrizeforNonFictionforthiswork.Sheintroducesherbookwith
aversionofthissatellitepicture,stating,
IfyoulookatsatellitephotographsoftheFarEastbynight,youllseealargesplotch
curiouslylackinginlight.ThisareaofdarknessistheDemocraticPeoplesRepublicof
Korea.Next to thismysteriousblackhole,SouthKorea,Japan,andnowChina fairly
gleamwithprosperity. [] In themiddleof itall [there is]anexpanseofblackness
nearlyaslargeasEngland.Itisbafflinghowanationof23millionpeoplecanappear
asvacantastheoceans.NorthKoreaissimplyablank[]acountrythathasfallenout
ofthedevelopedworld.(ibid.:34)
Itisimportanttonotethatthetruthfulnessofthesatelliteimageorthevalidityoftheread
ingsofitisnotquestionedhere;nonetheless,thepictureisusedtoestablishaparticularspa
tial imaginary.ThesiteNorthKorea isparticularlymarked in termsofabsence,deficiency
andscarcity.Itispicturedaccordingtowhatitdoesnothave:light,prosperity,freedom,food
andhope.Itlacksvisibility,vitalityandprosperity.Thepictorialcontrastbetweenbrightand
darkandblackandwhiteunderpinsreadingsthatforegrounddifference,distanceandoth
ernessoverwhatcanbecalledaffinity,familiarityandsameness.NorthKoreaisliterallyim
aginedasablackhole,animagethatformanyisanallegoryforitsuniqueroleinthecurrent
geopolitical order. It is an isolated,backward and mysterious place, which its people can
onlyrunawayfrom;itisasitethatmustbeabandonedbecauseitisoutsideofthemodern
world,evenoutsideoftime,incapableofchangeandentrappedinaneternalpast.Fromthis
representation,itbecomesclearwhatNorthKoreaisnot:homeaspecialplaceofbelonging
thatcomprises theexperiences,emotions,valuesandsocial relationships thatmakeup the
veryessenceofahumanbeing(cf.Gregoryetal.2009:339).
Alsonoteworthyisthefactthatcertainconstructed(in)visibilitiesestablishtheconditionsaccording towhichmeaningful statements and conclusions aboutplaces, spaces and sites
canbemade:thatwhatcan(not)beseendetermineswhatcan(not)beknownandsaidabout
alocality.Anothercrucialpointisthatthesubjectofthephotoisunderstoodtospeakinse
curityanddifference(forexample,asRumsfeldstates,Itsaysitall).Itdoesnotcommuni
cateanycartographicknowledge,whichisoneofthemostessentialassetsofremotesensing,
but isratherimplicated inaparticular imaginativegeography:NorthKoreaastheplaceof
thegreatunknowninworldpolitics,aplacebeyondtherealmofcomprehensionthatisnei
therpartofourworldnorpartofourtime.TherepeateduseandcirculationofthisvisualmotifNorthKoreaindarknessinaca
demia,politics andmediademonstrate itsoverarchingpopularity asan iconicgeography.
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Thatistosay,thephotossubjectfunctionsasanimaginativesignifierratherthanasacarto
graphic referent. This form of visuality is also hegemonic as it marginalizes alternative
modesofrepresentationanddetermineswhoseandwhatkindsofperspectivesaremeaning
ful. For instance, the constructed visibility of this photograph would take on a differentmeaningwhen interpretedaccordingtoanenvironmentaldiscoursethatproblematizesnot
the lackof lightbut,on thecontrary, itsexcessiveapplicationand thedamage itcauses to
naturalecosystemsandphysicalhealth(lightpollution).Also,satelliteimagestakenofthe
Koreanpeninsuladuringthedaywouldnotservethespecificpurposeofspeakinginsecurity
andemphasizingdifference,asthenighttimepicturesdo,becausetheycouldnotdisplaythe
necessaryvisibleormetaphoricaldisparitiesbetweenNorthKoreaanditsneighbors.Inthis
vein,itisnotsurprisingthatdaytimeimagesoftheKoreanpeninsulaarealmostnonexistent
while nighttime pictures are prevalent and widely used, as the abovecited cases demon
strate. The selective practices regarding what and what not to picture/show highlight the
political implications of satellite images logic of inclusion and exclusion. These practices
disguise thefact thatknowledgeofcomplexpoliticalsituationsbecomessimplified,partial
andreductiveasaresultofwhatisincludedandexcludedintheimagesframes.
7 BelievingisSeeingSatellitesurveillanceofNorthKoreabeganintheearly1980s,whentheUSspysatelliteKH11
tookpicturesofa facility inYongbyonbelieved tobeanuclear reactor.Thehistoryof the
observation of North Korea through satellite vision provides many examples of how the
sameimagescanbeusedtoeitherbuttressorrefuteparticularclaimsregardingthecountrys
militarybuildup.Thisisnottoarguethatremotesensingiscompletelyinaccurateorfalse,
butratherthatitsdata,duetotheopaqueandambiguousnatureoftheimages,isproneto
divergent interpretations. In thisvein, the following section challenges thenexusbetween
seeing andknowing, andhence its repercussions for taking action,byproblematizing the
possibilityofknowingwhatisreallygoingonsimplybylookingatimages.Whiletheun
certaintyof(satellite)imagescontradictsthecommonplacenotionthatthecameraneverlies,itisimportanttopointouttheroleoftheseimagesinshapingtheunderstandingofcertain
eventsanddevelopmentsrelatedtoNorthKorea.Becausesuchpicturescometohavegeopo
liticalimplicationstheyareinvokedtolegitimizeparticulardecisionsandactions,suchas
inspections,warningsandsanctionsthebriefexampleswillmakethecasefortheneedto
developasensitizedunderstandingregardingthepurposeanduseofsuchimages.
Inthelate1990s,USintelligenceagenciesspottedwhattheybelievedtobealarge,secret
underground complex near Kumchangri, in North Pyongan Province that supposedly
formedthebackboneoftheregimeseffortstodevelopnuclearweapons.Theevidenceconsisted of several photographs that hadbeen taken from a reconnaissance satellite, one of
whichalongwiththeinformationthatNorthKoreahadreviveditsnuclearprogramwas
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leaked to theNewYorkTimes inAugust1998byaseniorgovernmentanalyst from theDe
fenseIntelligenceAgency(Sanger1998;KimY.H.2005).
The US government stated that the images depicted construction activities at the site,
with thousands of workers excavating a huge area underground. The type of excavationprompted theClintonadministration to infer thatNorthKorea intended tocircumvent the
socalledAgreedFrameworkonthefreezingofNorthKoreasnuclearprogrambyrecreating
the facilitiesof theYongbyonnuclearcomplex,which,meanwhile,hadbeenunder intense
scrutinyfromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency.AlthoughNorthKoreahadnotvio
latedtheagreementbecausetherewasnoevidencethatithadbegunrebuildingthesein
stallations thepicturescausedagreatstirwithinboth theUSgovernmentandCongress,
whoseapprovalofthefinancingfortheagreementwascrucial.TheClintonadministration
warnedNorthKoreaabouttheconsequencesofbreachingthebilateralagreement,demand
edthecessationofallconstructionactivitiesandaskedtobegrantedaccesstothesuspicious
undergroundfacility.DuringapressconferencewithhisSouthKoreancounterpartinSeoul
inJanuary1999,thensecretaryofdefenseWilliamCohenstated,
Webelievethatthereissufficientevidenceforustobesuspiciousofthatsite,andthose
suspicionsmustbeaddressedinordertosatisfyourselvesthattheagreement[Agreed
Framework]isbeingcompliedwith.(USDoD1999)
WhiletheSouthKoreangovernmentdownplayed the findingssoas tonotjeopardize its
socalled Sunshine Policy, which emphasized dialogue and cooperation with the NorthKoreanleadershiptheincident,andthedemandforonsiteinspections,emergedasmajor
pointsof contentionbetween theUnitedStatesandNorthKoreaduring thisperiod.After
monthsofdiplomatic negotiations,NorthKorea eventually agreed to allow aUS team to
inspect theundergroundsite inKumchangri inreturn foraidconcessions (Sanger1999).It
wasthefirsttimethatPyongyanghadallowedinspectionsbeyondthoseatitsnuclearcom
plexinYongbyon.
During twovisits to thesuspicioussite in1999and2000,however, investigators found
nothingbutemptytunnels,aresultthatwasembarrassingtoboththeUSgovernmentand
intelligenceauthorities(Shenon1999;Risen2000).GivingcredittoNorthKoreaforitscoop
eration,Washingtonofficiallyconfirmedthatnopreparationsfortheconstructionofanun
derground nuclear reactor something that the images were stronglybelieved to have
shown couldbedetected. Itwas later revealed that theNorthKorean leadership,when
theylearnedthataUSsatellitewasscanningthesite,hadmusteredthousandsofsoldiersto
simulateahugeconstructionprojectinprogress(KimY.H.2005).
Acoupleofyearslater,anotherseriesofsatellitepicturesbecamethesubjectofanemerg
ingdebateintheUnitedStatesoverwhetherornottoconstructanewnationalmissilede
fensesystemagainstsocalledroguestatessuchasNorthKoreaandIraq.Theimageswereprovidedbyacommercialspace imagingcompanyandwerepublishedinJanuary2000on
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thewebsiteoftheUSpolicythinktankFederationofAmericanScientists(FAS)aswellasin
theNewYorkTimes(Broad2000).TheyshowedalaunchfacilityfromwhichNorthKoreahad,
inAugust1998,sentoffwhatwasclaimedbyPyongyangtobeasmallsatellitebutwasin
ternationallycondemnedasadisguisedattemptto testan intermediaterangeballisticmissile.5
While forsome imageryanalyststhepicturessimplyshowedaprimitivecomplexwith
dirt roads and no visible housing or fuelstorage facilities, government officials from the
UnitedStatesandSouthKoreawarnedofunderestimatingPyongyangsmissilecapabilities
(Anselmo2000;AFP2000;Zakaria2000).TheFAS,whichhadpurchased the images,con
cludedinastatement,itisquiteevidentthatthisfacilitywasnotintendedtosupport,and
inmanyrespectsisincapableofsupporting,theextensivetestprogramthatwouldbeneed
edtofullydevelopareliablemissilesystem(FAS2000).Itthereforequestionedtheneedfor
aUSmissiledefensesystemandnoted,itisfittinglyparadoxicalthattensofbillionsofdol
larsshouldhavebeenspent,andarangeofnationalpoliciesreoriented,onaccountofthis
distressinglymodestandunderwhelmingmissiletestfacility(FAS2000).
Inanindicationofhowprivatewaysof(remote)seeingchallengetheobservantvisionof
sovereignstates,theUSDepartmentofDefensewascompelledtorespondasfollows:
Itisourjudgmentfromapanoplyofintelligencesourcesandmethodsthatgofarbe
yond thisrather limitedcapability that theFederationofAmericanScientistshasput
onitswebsitethatthereisagenuinethreatandariskfromthepotentialmissilepro
gramofNorthKorea.Webelievethisisarealdangerthatwearedealingwith.[]we
recognizethatthis[facility]isntatthatkindofleveloftechnology[thatofUSequip
ment].But,nevertheless,webelievetherearerisksandtherearethreats.Wedontbe
lievewevebeenexaggeratingthethreat,andperhapstheFASmightbeunderplaying
itabit.(USDoD2000)
WhilethethensecretaryofdefenseWilliamCohenwascertainthatNorthKoreawouldbe
abletodeveloplongrangemissilesby2005,thusjustifyingtheerectionofamissileshield,it
shouldbenotedthateventhoughtheimages,andothersources,seemedtogivecompel
lingevidenceNorthKoreahasstillnotsucceededindoingso.Inarecentreassessmentof
NorthKoreasmissilecapabilitiespreparedbyUSsecretaryofdefenseRobertGates,theUS
governmentstatedthatthecountrywouldbecapableoflaunchingintercontinentalmissiles
by2015.InviewoftheUSmissiledefensepolicy(anditsgeopoliticalrepercussionson,for
instance,USChineserelationsandthebalanceofpowerinEastAsia),whichwaspredomi
nantlydrivenbythepredictionthatNorthKoreawouldpossesslongrangemissiletechnol
5 Sincethislaunch,NorthKoreasmissile/rocketprogram,alongwithitsnuclearambitions,hasbecomeamajor
concernintermsofinternationalpeaceandsecurity.Whilethe1998launchwasformanyanattempt(albeitafailedone)totestanintercontinentalmissile,theUSgovernmentlaterpubliclyacknowledgedthatNorthKo
reahadindeedattemptedtolaunchasatellite(USDoD1998).
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ogyby2005,itisnecessarytopayattentiontothepoliticallogicsthroughwhichimagesare
madetowork.
FiveyearsaftertheFASpublishedtheimagesdiscussedabove,inMay2005,satelliteim
agerywascentraltoUSadministrationclaims thatNorthKoreamightbepreparing foranundergroundnucleartest.AsNorthKoreahaddeclareditselfanuclearpowerthreemonths
earlier, thepictures,which were said to show workers excavating tunnels andbuilding a
reviewstand,presumablyforhighrankingofficialstoattendatest(SangerandBroad2005),
fuelledconcerns that tensions in theregionwouldescalate further.Althoughthe imagesdid
notprovideanyconclusiveevidence, theyweresufficient toalarm theBushadministration,
whichsubsequentlybriefedtheJapanese,SouthKoreanandChinesegovernments.Thisdevel
opmentledUSandJapaneseofficialstoissuestrongwarningstoNorthKoreaandtothreaten
theimpositionofUNsanctionsifthecountryconductedanucleartest(Sanger2005).
WhileNorthKoreadidnottestanatomicdeviceuntilOctober2006ayearandahalfaf
terWashingtonhadstridentlywarnedofanimminenttestthis2005episode,alongwiththe
abovementioned examples, points to a rangeof epistemological problems with regard to
satellite imagery:Whatdoesasatellite image tellusabout the intentionsofagivenactor?
Howcantheambitionsofanactorbeknownbylookingatimages?Whatcanmeaningfully
beconcludedbywhatwe(wantto)seeandhowwe(aremadeto)see?Howcanweensure
thecorrectinterpretationofsatelliteimageswhentheylackanyinherentmeaning?Whatis
a proper interpretation? Who decides when and whether these media are compelling
sourcesornothingbutanartificialviewfromouterspace?Andhowcanweharmonizeandalignwhatsatellitesmakevisibleonthegroundwithestimationsaboutwhattheobserved
partywantstheobservertoseeandbelieve?Foreventhoughsatellitesarecreditedwithhav
ing superiorcapabilities (theallseeingeye), it shouldbekept inmind that theydonot
necessarily reveal what is seemingly meant tobe concealed. Clandestine activities on the
groundmaybepartofadeceptivestrategyonthepartoftheobservedtofooltheobservers
andmakethembelievethatsomethingsuspiciousisgoingon.Satelliteimagesdonottell
uswhetherparticulardevelopmentsonthegroundareindicativeofgenuinelycovertactivi
tiesorwhethertheyaremerelyashowstagedforthewatchfuleyesinthesky.
8 ConclusionImagesserveparticularpurposes.Because theyareselective inwhat they include (andex
clude)within their frameofvisibility, imagesand thepracticeof imagingarebothdeeply
political. Satellite images are no exception. As seemingly realistic representations of the
world, satellitephotographs are effective toolsofpersuasion.However, references to, and
relianceupon,themneedtoberegardedcautiouslybecausetheyareopentospecificuses:either aspowerful spatial imaginaries conveying aparticular truth about a territoryor as
subjectsforparticularappropriationsthathavegeopoliticalimplications.
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Because they are simultaneously artificial and authoritative, remotesensing images re
vealaninterestingparadox.Thefactthatsatelliteimages,asaresultoftechnicalprocedures,
areheavilyprocesseddoesnotdiminishtheirstatusasobjectivereferentsofthetruth.They
continue tobedeemed transparentandauthentic.The implicationsof thisparadoxcanbeillustratedbycomparingremotesensingwithanothermodeofthevisualwhich,likeremote
sensing,isalsoelevatedtoanalmostsacredlevelofobjectivity:photography.Thegenresof
newsphotographyanddocumentaryphotography inparticulardrawon similarclaims to
accuracy, neutrality and science and technology to underpin their supposed truthfulness.
Giventhatsatelliteimagesoftenfunctionasnewstheyarenotillustrativetonewsitcould
beaskedwhatwouldhappentotheauthorityandcredibilityofacommonnewsphotograph
ifitsubsequentlyturnedoutthatithadbeenmassivelyphotoshopped?Howwoulditsclaim
totruthbeaffectedifitcametolightthat,likethesatelliteimage,itwasprocessedandhad
beencomposedofdifferentparcelsofinformationstemmingfromdifferenttimesinor
dertobepresentableandviewableinameaningfulway?
KarenLitfin(2002:67)remindsusthateventhoughconsensusonwhatasatellitephoto
graphdepictscanbereached,thepicturedoesnottelluswhat itssupposedmeaning isor
whathastobedoneaboutit.Further,theabovementionedepistemologicalproblemsofre
motesensingremainunaddressed.Theambiguityofsatelliteimageryhighlightstheneedto
takeintoconsiderationthepoliticalcontextwithinwhichitoperatesandismademeaning
ful.Inthisregard,itshouldberememberedthat(satellite)visioncanbeaffectedbyprecon
ceptions(believingisseeing):whatpeopleseedependsonwhattheybelieveor,putbluntly,whattheywanttobelieve.Itisthusimportanttonotethatwhatwe(wantto)knowde
pendsonwhatwe (want to)seeandviceversa.Thisalsodemonstrates the inevitabilityof
interpretationinthearticulationofdanger(Campbell1998).
Thequestionsoutlinedabovepointtothenecessityofdevelopingacarefulandsensitive
understanding regarding the uses and functions of remotesensing data. However, these
questionsalsoapplytoothermodesofoverheadimaging:aerialphotographyand,perhaps
more importantlydue to the increasingdeploymentofsocalledunmannedaerialvehicles
aroundtheglobe,droneimagery.Utilizedtorebutasmanyargumentsastheycansubstantiate,visualimagesarenotnecessarilyabletoservetheenlighteningfunctionthatmanyreadi
lyattributetothem.ThecaseofNorthKoreaprovidesdiverseexamplesofthis,rangingfrom
theambiguityregarding thenumberofatomicbombsandstorage installations fornuclear
warheadstotheuncertainpresenceofnuclearwastesites,proliferationactivities,andmissile
andnucleartests.
Whatisalsonoteworthyisthatamomentofrevelation,forexample,theemptytunnels
andtheundergroundsysteminNorthKorea,doesnotendthequest(oftheUnitedStates)to
uncover (NorthKoreaspresumed) clandestineactivities.Rather, itactually intensifies this
impulse, true to themotto that these things that is,whatever theactor inquestion isas
sumed tobehidingmustbesomewhereelse instead.This, in turn,makes thesearch for
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thempracticallyendless.Inotherwords,thereisnoactualneedtofindtheseobjects,asitis
sufficient todemonstrate thataparty iscapableofsecrecy (cf.Bratich2006).Asimilar logic
prevailedwithregardtothe(failed)searchforIraqsweaponsofmassdestruction.
Further implicationsforthebroaderstudyofvisuality incriticalgeopoliticsarisewhenimagesarenotconsideredasdirectreflectionsoftheworldbutasinterpretationsandsenti
mentsthereof.Whenapictureisbasedfirstandforemostonanunderstandingofwhichis
suesorplacesareentitledtorepresentation,thenitisnotobjectivedocumentationbutrather
theresultofasubjectivedecision,aninterpretiveresponsetohowcertaincircumstancesare
imaginedand framedby the imagemaker.Similarly to thewritingofacommentaryoran
opinionpieceinordertopursueaparticularpurposebypromotingordefendingaparticular
position, a picture can likewisebe viewed as a statement ofbelief, a statement of intent
and/orasastatementofdefense.Acceptingthatpicturescanservecertainpurposeshascon
sequencesnotonlyfortheevaluationofethicalandpoliticalresponsesbutalsoforthevery
possibilityofhavingtheminthefirstplace.Whenheorsheisawarethatanimagecouldbe
astatementofopinion that followsaspecificgoal, theviewer isable tochallengepopular
imaginationsof,forinstance,whatconstitutesaspecialplaceofbelongingthataffecthisor
herensuingresponse.Itfollowsthatitbecomespossibletothinkandactdifferently,which,
intheend,couldstimulatetheformulationofdifferent(policy)options:inthecaseofNorth
Koreathisismeantinthesensethatitspeoplecouldbeseentobelikeotherpeopleinother
countriesandthattheirhomelandwouldnotbethegreatunknownotherinworldpolitics,
whichwould legitimizecooperationandengagement regarding the countrys containmentandisolation.
Accordingly,viewersofsatelliteimagesneedtobefullyawarethatthesepicturesarenot
only prone tomanipulationbuthave also alreadybeendoctored.AsCampbell (2007: 23)
aptlyconcludes,weneedtoreadthem[satelliteimages]criticallylikeanyphotograph,ex
ploring theirproduction, interpretationandcirculation in termsof thepoliticalwork these
supposedlyobjectiveregimesorvisionsupport.
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