Situating the Mortar in the Future of the British Army: Vision for 2020+
Colonel John Musgrave
Assistant Director Offensive Support Combat Support Capability Directorate
HQ Army
Context behind Artillery Involvement in this Conference
If Mortars are operated in the British ORBAT by the Infantry so why should a Royal Artillery Officer be talking to you?
My response is:
We need to look at Joint Fires support to the manoeuvre battle in its totality
Hence given that it is the total effect that is required we need to recognise that their may be balance of investment decisions between components
The artillery have lead the way in technology fields which may be applicable to mortars
The British artillery has a formal responsibility to certify mortars before operational deployment
I will contend that greater synergy is required
Scope
Historical context
Strengths and weaknesses of the Mortar as part of the Joint Fires support of the Manoeuvre Battle
Possible Capability Enhancement:
Defining the Spectrum of Precision
Addressing the Accuracy of Unguided Shells/Bombs
Balance Between ‘True Precision’, Course Corrected and Unguided Bombs, Shells and Rockets
Opportunities for Longer Range
Universal Observers?
Summary
Historical Context
Direct support ‘battalion’ guns (usually a pair of 3 or 4 Pounders) have been attached to infantry units since the 17th Century
In addition Field artillery has been largely been used in direct support of infantry until longer range small arm fire forced the indirect fire revolution and the resultant deep battle
Hence, for most armies, the close support role switched in WW1 to mortars; weapons that had hither to been restricted to siege warfare
Why the Mortar is an Ideal Infantry Support Weapon?
Low velocity, and for fin-stabilised, no requirement to withstand the rotational forces allows the bomb to have greater explosive yield than a similarly sized artillery shell
Together with a high rate of fire this equals high lethality in return for a small crew:
WW2 Operational Analysis determined that the 3” Mortar caused twice the casualties as similarly crewed Vickers Medium Machine Gun
Easy to operate
Ability to engage targets in cover with plunging fire
Ease of concealing and protecting
Transportability over almost any terrain
It is not as burdened by the logistical support needed for artillery
Resultant Disadvantages
Low velocity = short range = cannot adequately support armoured manoeuvre
Fin stabilised = reduced accuracy
Plunging fire = high trajectory = instant WLR detection and thus counter fire
Easy to operate = reluctance to increase technology
All terrain mobility = man-portable = slow into and out of action
Light logistics = inability to sustain high rate of fire
Challenges for the Mortar
Capability Areas to Address:
Greater accuracy and consistency
Range
Increased agility to avoid counter fire
Deductions:
Recognition that the current compromises in a single general purpose mortar (81mm) whilst providing excellent support in dismounted operations is inadequate for armoured CAM
Requirement to embrace technological enhancements whilst keeping the system simple
Greater Accuracy and Consistency
Defining the Spectrum of Artillery Precision
‘True’ Precision Cat 1 Target
Location Error
Unregistered Fire
Either guided weapons or precision weapons
using mensurate target coordination
Near Precision Modern Artillery
Some Post 1917 Artillery
Artillery Problem not adequately understood or
addressed
Spectrum of Precision: Artillery Balance of Investment
‘True’ Precision Cat 1 Target
Location Error
Unregistered Fire
Either guided weapons or precision weapons
using mensurate target coordination
Near Precision Modern Artillery
Some Post 1917 Artillery
Artillery Problem not adequately understood or
addressed
Balance of Investment Area for
Modern Artillery
Indirect Fire
Inefficient
Spectrum of Mortar Precision
‘True’ Precision Cat 1 Target
Location Error (TLE)
Unregistered Fire
Either guided weapons or precision weapons
using mensurate target coordination
Near Precision Modern Artillery
Some Post 1917 Artillery
Artillery Problem not adequately understood or
addressed
Mortars with Course
Corrected Fuses & Cat 1
TLE
Mortars systematically
addressing accuracy
Most Mortars reliant on
‘shooting out the error’
Addressing the Accuracy of Unguided Shells
Met: 300 – 350m
Survey:
Fixation: 100m
Survey Orientation: 5mils
Gun Laying: 2mils
MV Calibration (including ballistics)
Wear / AMV error 3 m/s
Occasion to Occasion 3 m/s
(during Fire Missions)
Charge Temperature 4 degrees
Addressing the Accuracy of Unguided Shells
Met: 300–350m 100–150m
Survey:
Fixation: 100m 10m
Survey Orientation: 5mils 0.5mils
Gun Laying: 2mils 1mils
MV Calibration (including ballistics)
Wear / AMV error 3 m/s 2 m/s
Occasion to Occasion 3 m/s 3 m/s
(during Fire Missions)
Charge Temperature 4 degrees 1 degree
Error Budget Breakdown
Met 60%
Calibration, MV 25%
Survey 15%
Where does the RA stand in addressing its error budget?
Met : RA have addressed most of the savings
Calibration, MV : greater accuracy can be delivered (adopting MVs round to round)
Survey: greater accuracy can be delivered in target location during mobile operations
Utility of Course-Corrected Fuzes
Status. Several contenders including the European Course Corrected Fuse (ECF) and Precision Guidance Kits (PGK) which is currently deployed with US 120mm Mortars
Limitations. Needs an accurate grid and most of the mortars error accounted for
Analysis:
Delivers significantly improved accuracy at least c30M CEP over all ranges
Separating accuracy and consistency from range therefore makes Base Bleed and RAP effective
Pointless for Smoke and Illumination
Deductions on the Utility of Course-Correction
Will allow increase in range through countering the inaccuracy of Base Bleed or RAP
Will allow effective first round fire
Impact of a ‘circular’ as opposed to a ‘cigar’ distribution of fire on close support tactics
However. Requires all the other elements of the error budget to be addressed increasing the overall complexity of the mortar system
True Precision
Static Target. accurately and consistently hitting a point (usually described as a grid reference)
Base Assembly
Warhead Assembly
CAS GNU
GNC
Fins Canards
HOB Sensor
Radome
Increment IB
•Mobile Target: •either a Man-in-Loop to guided the projectile to the target (usually indirectly through designating with a laser or directly ‘flying’ the projectile); or • the projectile having its own target seeking capability
Excalibur
What is Criteria to Judge the Correct Balance between Precision and Guided Projectiles
The RA believes that posing a choice between ‘precision’ and ‘suppression’ is false and divisive, principally because:
Modern artillery area fires are precise
Suppression is an effect on the target
The true choice is between:
the level of accuracy and consistency required to effectively engage a target;
recognising that the nature of the target and its environment (own troop safety and avoidance of collateral damage) will dictate the level of precision
‘Just as the machine gun is a valid choice to engage an area target in the direct fire battle so are, in many circumstances,
unguided shells’
Integrating Joint Fires: Fire Support Team (FST)
FST Commander Arty Controller
Signaller Driver
Forward Air Controller
Mortar Fire Controller
Attack Helicopter Controller
Arty Controller
Fire Support Team (FST)
MORTAR FST COMD ARTY
ATTACK HEL
FAC
• Precision Fire (Cat 1 TLE) through: • FIRESTORM differential GPS and laser range finder • Mensuration applications
• Long range location and identification • Communications
• Ground to Ground • Ground to Air • Data transfer
• Down load of full motion video
Merging of Artillery and Mortar Observers?
Option 1: Separate capabilities with limited effective integration
Option 2: Building on the FST concept look at further integration of the two separate capabilities
Option 3: Universal observer trained to cover all aspects of the Joint Fires system
Wireless Ridge – Falklands 1982
‘In contrast to their battle at Goose Green, this time 2 Para could call on massive fire support. The support units included two Batteries of artillery, or five in total if the situation became desperate, HMS Ambuscade, 3 Para's mortars as well as their own and they had
two Scorpion and two Scimitar tanks’
Summary
In the British inventory the 60mm mortar is hugely effective in its role, as is the 81mm mortar on current operations, however this capability has not embraced enhancements possible due to the revolution in the Joint Fires capability
The role of the mortar in support of dismounted infantry remains at least as important as previously, but the current 81mm:
Unmodified its role in armoured operations is problematic;
it can be greatly enhanced through addressing the Met/Survey/calibration error budget;
Course Corrected Bombs offer a further significant accuracy enhancement; and
with base bleed/RAP a real increase in range
Further integration into the Joint Fires capability are possible