School of Journalism and Mass Communications
Faculty of Economic and Political Sciences
The dark correlation between weapons’ possession by residents of
Thessaloniki’s western territories and the installation of relocation
camps for refugees – immigrants under the prism of mass media
influence
BY
Georgios Akilidis
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF DIGITAL MEDIA, COMMUNICATION AND JOURNALISM
Specialization: Risk Communication and Crisis Journalism
Supervisor: Prof. Christos Frangonikolopoulos
May 2019
ii
Abstract
2015. The influx of more than a million people in Europe in a period of less than a year,
created a crisis in the nexus of European Union (EU). People that crossed the European
borders were in majority refugees, who were also followed by a large number of immigrants,
trying to benefit from the situation. The EU and each member state individually without
having a strategic plan to respond to the massive arrival of refugees - immigrants tried to
handle the crisis by adopting insufficient measures. Greece, through its state and not only
actors made significant efforts by installing relocation camps for refugees and immigrants in
western Thessaloniki, a decision that met many opponents especially from the local
communities. Mass media which have become an integral part of our everyday life and a
highly influential factor as to the way we see the world around us and the way we act focused
mainly on narratives of distorted images of immigrants and harmful stereotypes, especially
on the internet. All the above factors led the inhabitants of the western territories of
Thessaloniki to show a significant sympathy on weapons‘ possession, taking advantage of the
legal hole that exists on the relevant legislation. The present study therefore attempts to shed
light on this phenomenon, whether it is true or not, by examining first of all the facts through
the written literature in three specific fields of interest, targeting to an analysis and general
review; the operation of the relocation camps in the western districts of Thessaloniki;
weapons‘ possession in Greece; mass media‘s coverage concerning the presentation of
refugees and immigrants and the processes of integration. In sequence, utilizing a quantitative
approach via a questionnaire, which consisted of 55 questions of different types and
distributed through four local shooting and hunting clubs to 100 residents of western
territories of Thessaloniki, obtaining their weapons‘ possession license during the period
2014-2018, will attempt to give answers to crucial questions such as whether the installation
of these accommodation sites was the cause or the motive to this stance. Finally, after the
outcomes and correlations that will emerge, it will suggest proposals for action in order to
eliminate the researched phenomenon and promote a healthy intercultural dialogue,
especially through the media.
Key words
Weapons‘ possession, relocation camps, refugees, immigrants, mass media, peace journalism.
iii
CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ii
CONTENTS iii
INTRODUCTION 1
Focus of the study 1
Research objectives 2
Structure of the Dissertation 2
CHAPTER ONE: RELOCATION CAMPS IN WESTERN TERRITORIES OF THESSALONIKI 4
1.1 The story from the beginning 4
1.1.1 An unprecedented crisis 4
1.1.2 A deliberate confusion? 5
1.1.3 Functioning the first hot-spots 5
1.1.4 The Central government‟s role 6
1.1.5 NGOs‟ role 7
1.1.6 The Hellenic Armed Forces‟ role 8
1.1.7 The local community‟s attitude 10
1.2 Current situation 11
1.2.1 The functional relocation camps nowadays 11
1.2.2 The EU‟s continuous support to Greece 12
CHAPTER TWO: THE POSSESSION OF WEAPONS IN GREECE 14
2.1 The current legislation concerning the possession of weapons 14
2.2 License issuance for hunting guns 16
2.3 Legal gaps 17
2.4 Penalties for illegal possession, carrying and usage 18
2.5 Numbers talk 19
2.6 A sense of insecurity 20
2.7 The tendency abroad 21
2.8 The EU requires a stronger framework 23
CHAPTER THREE: THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA 24
3.1 Mass Media credibility 24
3.1.1 Weaponizing words: Metaphor and war 25
iv
3.1.2 Making enemies: Propaganda 26
3.1.3 The fabricated enemy 27
3.2 Television‟s stance 28
3.3 Radio‟s stance 30
3.4 Newspapers‟ stance 30
3.5 The Internet‟s stance 32
CHAPTER FOUR: QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY AND ITS OUTCOMES 34
4.1 Participants 35
4.2 Questionnaire description 35
4.2.1 General data – Personal values 35
4.2.2 Daily routine – Personal beliefs and perceptions 36
4.2.3 Media influence 36
4.2.4 Possession of weapons 37
4.3 Sample characteristics 37
4.4 Data outcomes 38
4.4.1 „Daily routine – Personal beliefs and perceptions‟ results 38
4.4.2 „Media influence‟ results 46
4.4.3 „Possession of weapons‟ results 48
CHAPTER FIVE: PROPOSALS FOR ACTION 53
5.1 The legislators‟ responsibility 53
5.1.1 Weapons‟ possession measures 53
5.1.2 Recognition of refugees‟ and immigrants‟ dignity 56
5.1.3 Assistance provision to other actors 57
5.1.4 Fake news‟ control 58
5.1.5 Security's sense consolidation 60
5.2 Mass Media‟s proper response 61
5.3 The Educators‟ responsibility 64
5.4 The local communities‟ succor 67
5.5 NGOs‟ assistance 69
5.6 The EU‟s key leading role 71
CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 72
The Limitations of the study 72
Suggestions for further research 73
v
Concluding remarks 74
REFERENCES/ BIBLIOGRAPHY 77
APPENDICES 94
vi
LIST OF APPENDICES
1. European Migrant Crisis 2015: Number of refugees, migratory routes and top countries
of origin
95
2. European Migrant Crisis 2017: Number of refugees, migratory routes and top countries
of origin
95
3. Trends of global displacement and proportion displaced (2007-2017) 96
4. Map of functional relocation camps in Greece‟s mainland for refugees – immigrants in
2018
96
5. Arrivals of refugees – immigrants in Greece (2014-2018) 97
6. Relocation of asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other EU countries,
commitments vs reality (December 2017)
97
7. Homicides by firearm per 1 million people (2012) 98
8. Respondents‟ opinion on the statement “Immigrants are a burden on their country‟s
welfare system”
98
9. Respondents‟ opinion on the statement “Overall, immigrants worsen the crime
problems in our country”
99
10. Europeans believe that immigrants want to be distinct from broader society 99
11. Europeans‟ beliefs about allowing more immigrants in their countries 100
12. EPRS‟ compass of 8 directions to spot fake news 100
13. Distributed questionnaire 101
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1 – The participants‟ level of education 38
Figure 2 – The participants‟ political ideology 38
Figure 3 – The participants‟ statements on the differences of the terms “refugee” and
“immigrant”
39
Figure 4 – The participants‟ responds on the question “Does the fact that the majority of
refugees and immigrants are Muslims worry you?”
40
Figure 5 – The participants‟ responds on the question “How many refugees do you believe
that your region could host permanently?”
43
Figure 6 – The participants‟ responds on the question “How many immigrants do you
believe that your region could host permanently?”
43
Figure 7 – The participants‟ responds on how their relations with refugees will develop
during the following years
45
Figure 8 – The participants‟ responds on how their relations with immigrants will develop
during the following years
45
Figure 9 – The participants‟ responds on how they mainly get informed for news related
with refugees and immigrants
47
Figure 10 –The participants‟ responds on what was the main reason that impelled them to
get a weapon
49
Figure 11 –The participants‟ responds on what weapon they bought in the period 2014 -
2018
50
Figure 12 –The participants‟ responds on what year they bought their weapon 50
Figure 13 –The participants‟ responds on the statement “the fact that you possess a
weapon makes you feel stressed”
51
Figure 14 – The participants‟ responds on what makes them feel stressed because they
possess a weapon
52
1
Introduction
Focus of the study
Countries have a moral and legal duty to provide sanctuary to those who flee grave
danger. Nowadays, the issues of immigration and integration have been politically sensitive
across Europe, particularly in the aftermath of increase in the flows of refugees and
immigrants over the last few years. According to a Standard Eurobarometer survey conducted
in November 2017, immigration is seen as the most important issue facing the European
Union (EU)1. The chaos of recent years though depicts what happens when politicians fail to
take a pan-European approach to what is clearly a pan-European problem, while in parallel
European citizens‘ mood seems to be more defensive – worried about their future in a fast
changing world; anxious to protect their wealth; worried about their children‘s future in a
rapidly globalizing world; and feeling threatened in their everyday life by the unfamiliar
cultures and traditions of new neighbors.
The situation is evidently worst in already deprived areas where the lack of policing
and insecurity are prevalent. Natives in these areas, trying to excuse their impulsive decisions
in such malicious environments, are in a search for an easy target-victim. And when
intolerance and discrimination prejudices are in a rise, if not dominant, refugees and
immigrants seem to be the perfect victims of any accusation. The problem however is getting
even worst when this inhabitants‘ stance turns to an oversimplified sympathy for weapons‘
possession, taking advantage of country‘s legal framework gaps, in order to make themselves
feel secure by ―ghost‖ enemies, with many hidden dangers coming into view as a
consequence.
Apparently, this quite strange link between weapons‘ possession by residents of
underprivileged areas such as Thessaloniki‘s western territories and the sudden arrivals of
refugees and immigrants in the aforementioned areas, including the installation of relocation
camps for them, is affected by the daily mass media‘ coverage. The image that the media
delineate for every incident has a very big impact on how the information is received by the
audience. The Media reflect public opinion, give ‗voice‘ to the people and present the
prevailing opinion of the ―crowd‖, initially through the domination of major newspapers, the
emergence of television, radio and now with the development of the Internet through the use
1 European Commission, (April 2018), Special Eurobarometer 469; Integration of immigrants in the European
Union Report, page 3
2
of social media, exercising a catalytic effect on all levels of life of a society, especially today
with the rapid evolution of technology 2
.
Research Objectives
With that in mind, the main aspiration of this study is to explore the connection
between the sympathy of western Thessaloniki‘s inhabitants to weapons‘ occupation and the
establishment of relocation camps for refugees and immigrants nearby, under the influence of
migration crisis coverage by Mass Media. Subsequently, to propose realistic solutions
through the prism of peace journalism in order to eliminate any negative tendencies of the
researched phenomenon.
The specific research objectives are:
1. To determine the role of all the involved state and non state actors to the
installation of relocation camps for refugees-immigrants.
2. To summarily present the overall framework of weapons‘ possession in Greece.
3. To discover the connectedness between the negative media coverage of the still
existing migration crisis and the pre-mentioned researched question.
4. To examine the attitudes of locals to the western territories of Thessaloniki,
occupying weapons, towards refugees and immigrants separately, whilst also their
opinion about media coverage on the refugee – migration crisis.
5. To reveal legislative shortcomings about the possession of weapons and
propose measures to be taken in order to limit the researched phenomenon.
6. To provide effective solutions driven by particular sectors of society and
institutions, having the capacity to change the way people in Greece think about
refugees and immigrants, aiming to a peaceful coexistence.
Structure of the Dissertation
Weapons‘ possession and its connection with the function of relocation camps for
refugees and immigrants could be investigated by several methodological approaches, such as
paradigms, interviews, extensive literature review and questionnaire surveys.
First of all, this study is based on a comprehensive literature retrospect in three
specific fields of interest, aiming to offer a basic analysis and general review of them in order
to infiltrate in sequence more decisive to the examination of the researched question. The first
chapter refers to the operation of the relocation camps in the western districts of Thessaloniki,
how they started to function, the role of state and non-state actors that got involved and
2 Choutos K., (2016), Media and Public Diplomacy; Case study: Greek financial crisis, page 17
3
concludes to the presentation of the current situation. The second chapter resolutely attempts
to deal with the sensitive issue of weapons‘ possession in Greece. A thorough investigation is
conducted concerning the present legislation, revealing innumerable legal deficiencies
especially to the granting of hunting guns‘ licenses by the Police authorities. Simultaneously,
a comparison to the legal frameworks of other countries is attempted so as to display which
are the tendencies abroad on this matter.
Finally, the third chapter of the dissertation provides a general view of mass media‘s
coverage mainly in Greece, concerning the presentation of refugees and immigrants and the
processes of integration. The dangers of hate-speech, stereotyping and social exclusion of
refugees and immigrants that occurred in all media sectors –especially to the Internet– but at
the same time the inspiring examples of careful, sensitive and ethical journalism that have
shown sympathy and compassion for the victims. This chapter was considered very important
to be studied, because it is the necessary link between the aforementioned researched
question and the matter of how the inhabitants of western territories of Thessaloniki got
affected by the media regarding refugees and immigrants during all this perilous period.
In sequence, the research paper in its fourth chapter, utilizing a quantitative approach
–which was considered the most appropriate– via a questionnaire survey, aims to an
assiduous analysis of what motivated locals of western territories of Thessaloniki to buy a
weapon during that period, how they were affected by the installation of relocation camps to
their region, how the mass media influenced them on the migration issue and finally their
impression and beliefs about refugees and immigrants who live to their neighborhoods
through a satisfactory number of participants.
During the first phase, a paper-and-pen questionnaire was designed –consisted of 55
questions of different types, separated in four sections and organized in distinct units and
tables– and distributed through local shooting and hunting clubs to 100 residents of western
territories of Thessaloniki who have in their possession weapons, bought during the period
2014-2018. Many authors have argued that online surveys using the Internet and electronic
mails have sometimes methodological issues, related to low response rates, bias and access3.
Thus, and due to the fact that most of the candidate participants did not have Internet access,
a hard copy questionnaire was more appropriate.
3 Schaefer, D. R., & Dillman, D. A. (1998). Development of a standard e-mail methodology: Results of an
experiment, page 10
4
The questionnaire was chosen because it could comprise a number of various
questions, measuring different aspects. A general opinion was probed, therefore a bigger
number of participants needed to participate, something not so easily accomplished with such
a focus group.
The pursuit of this survey is to bring on the surface legislative shortcomings about the
possession of weapons in Greece and to recommend measures to be taken in order to limit the
researched phenomenon. Moreover, proposals for urgent solutions to be adopted by state and
non-state actors and especially by the mainstream media through the scope of peace
journalism on the sensitive issue of integration of refugees and immigrants persists the core
aspiration of this paper.
Chapter 1
Relocation Camps in western territories of Thessaloniki
1.1 The story from the beginning
1.1.1 An unprecedented crisis
One million eight hundred thousand refugees and immigrants have arrived in
Europe since 2014, more than 1 million of them in 2015 alone. Three years since the peak of
the crisis, numbers are sharply down, due to the 2016 EU deal with Turkey4, new order
fences in Central Europe‘s countries and Balkans and the bilateral agreement between Italy
and Libya in 2017. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of people from several underdeveloped
areas and war zones are still trying to reach Europe, rising again migration tensions.
According to UNCHR‘s5 2017 report
6, by the end of 2017, 68.5 million
individuals were forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, conflict or
generalized violence. Among them, there were 173,800 unaccompanied and separated
children, being particularly at risk of exploitation and abuse without the protection of family
or kin. Thousands of people have died by attempting to reach the EU. Almost 90% of
refugees and immigrants have paid organized criminals and smugglers to get them across
borders.
4 On 18 March 2016, the European Council and Turkey reached an agreement aimed at stopping the flow of
irregular migration via Turkey to Europe. According to the EU-Turkey Statement, all new irregular migrants
and asylum seekers arriving from Turkey to the Greek islands and whose applications for asylum have been
declared inadmissible should be returned to Turkey. Source: https://ec.europa.eu/home-
affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/20180314_eu-turkey-two-years-
on_en.pdf 5 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
6 https://www.unhcr.org/5b27be547.pdf
5
In addition, in 2017 more than two-thirds (68%) of all refugees and
immigrants worldwide came from just five countries: Syrian Arab Republic (6.3 million),
Afghanistan (2.6 million), South Sudan (2.4 million), Myanmar (1.2 million) and Somalia
(986,400). For fourth consecutive year, Turkey hosted the largest number of them worldwide,
with 3.5 million people. The IDP7 population in the Republic of Congo doubled in 2017 to
4.4 million. War-torn Syria remained the country with the highest forcibly displaced
population in 2017 with 12.6 million at the end of the year. Finally, the number of refugees
and immigrants who turned to their countries of origin increased in 2017 to 667,400 up from
552,200 in 2016.
1.1.2 A deliberate confusion?
With more than 65 million people forcibly displaced globally and boat
crossings of the Mediterranean, the terms ―refugee‖ and ―immigrant‖ are frequently used
interchangeably in media and public discourse8. The two terms have distinct and different
meanings and confusing them, leads to problems for both populations.
According to UNHCR, a refugee is someone who has been forced to flee
his/her country because of persecution, war, or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a
particular social group. Most likely, they cannot return home or are afraid to do so. War and
ethnic, tribal and religious violence are leading causes of refugees fleeing their countries.
Refugees are specifically defined and protected in international laws9.
On the other hand, there is no universally accepted definition for immigrants.
Under UNHCR immigrants choose to move not because of a direct threat of persecution or
death, but mainly to improve their lives by finding work, or in some cases for education,
family reunion, or other reasons. Unlike refugees who cannot safely return home, immigrants
face no such impediment to return. If they choose to return home, they will continue to
receive the protection of their government10
.
1.1.3 Functioning the first hot-spots
A hot-spot approach on managing exceptional migratory flows was adopted by
EU in May 2015 and a draft timetable for establishing and functioning of them was sent by
Mr Dimitris Avramopoulos, Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Commissioner of
7 Internally Displaced Person
8 Lind Dara, (2015). ―Migrant vs refugee: what the terms mean, and why they matter‖ [Online] Available:
https://www.vox.com/2015/9/14/9319695/refugee-migrant-difference [2015, September] 9 UNHCR, (2016), ―UNHCR viewpoint: ‗Refugee‘ or ‗migrant‘ – Which is right?‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrant-right.html [2016, July] 10
UNHCR, (2016), ―UNHCR viewpoint: ‗Refugee‘ or ‗migrant‘ – Which is right?‖, op.cit.
6
EU11
. Specifically, for Greece, 5 hot-spots on the most burdened islands (Lesvos, Chios,
Samos, Leros and Kos) were planned to operate and an unspecified number of relocation
camps in the mainland depending on the migratory flows12
.
Focusing on Western Thessaloniki‘s region, the first relocation camp that was
ordered to function was the former ―Anagnostopoulou Camp‖, an abandoned military camp
in the town of Diavata in February 2016. In sequence, 6 more temporary accommodation
sites were installed in the western outskirts of Thessaloniki and the commercial port of the
city13
:
Former ―Exelka‖ factory in Oraiokastro
Former industrial building in Kalohori
Former logistics center in Kalohori
Former ―Softex‖ logistic center in Nea Magnisia
Former ―Karamanli‖ tannery in Sindos
Former industrial building next to the biological cleaning facilities in
Sindos.
1.1.4 The Central government’s role
In parallel with the ongoing financial crisis, undoubted shortfalls and delays
took place by the Greek state at the beginning of the hot-spot implementation, but also from
the EU14
. Once a central authority to oversee the incoming EU funds was created by the
Greek government in 2015, attached to the Ministry of Interior and Administrative
Reconstruction, the European Commission disbursed its first emergency fund of 30 million €.
Greece created a central coordination committee involving the most implicated services and
chaired by the Secretary General for Coordination. Separately from this help package, 474
million € would be dispersed over the ongoing six years from funds set up to help Greece
bearing the brunt of the crisis15
.
11
European Commission, (2015), ―Managing the refugee crisis: State of Play of the Implementation of the
Priority Actions‖, [Online] Available: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/communication_on_eam_
state_of_ play_20151014_en.pdf [2015, October] 12
BBC, (2015). ―Migrant ‗chaos‘ on Greek islands – UN Refugee Agency‖ [Online] Available:
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33818193 [2015, August] 13
Voria, (2016). ―7+1 locations for refugees in Western Thessaloniki‖ [Online] Available:
https://www.voria.gr/article/i-71-chori-gia-tous-prosfiges-sti-ditiki-thessaloniki [2016, April] 14
European Commission, (2015), op.cit. 15
Stupp Catherine, (2015), ―Emergency funds sprout up to temper storm for refugee crises‖ [Online] Available:
https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/emergency-funds-sprout-up-to-temper-storm-of-refugee-
crises/ [2015, August]
7
In November 4, 2016 after the 123 presidential decree16
declaration this
central authority reconstituted to the Ministry of Immigration Policy, whose role was the
coordination of all state and non-state actors related to the migration crisis in Greece.
Establishing functional hot-spots, implementing the relocation program, ensuring effective
returns of immigrants not entitled to international protection, improving border management
and creating sufficient and adequate reception capacity were its five core responsibilities17
.
Albeit with some progress in the establishment of all these shelters, many delays and a lack
of coordination were still among the main problems that the Ministry faced, with official state
actors being absent or lower than the crucial circumstances, as many declared18
.
1.1.5 NGOs’ role
In the early stages of a massive influx many organizations applied to the
government for permission to enter the country (if they are not already there) and assist
refugees and immigrants. The government had to decide how to respond to these requests and
how much to cooperate with or restrict the organizations19
. From the very beginning of the
crisis in Greece, innumerous NGOs found fertile ground to expand and display active role in
helping refugees and immigrants, such as the Children's Fund UNICEF, focusing on children
and mothers, who have fled war and crisis zones or Hellenic Red Cross, Médecins Sans
Frontières (MSF), etc. Greek civil society has also developed organizations and initiatives
strongly committed to help refugees and immigrants, with Arsis, Greek Council for Refugees,
Solidarity Now and Smile of the Child to be the most famous among many others20
. NGOs,
―big‖ and ―small‖ groups of volunteers from all over the world, came to Greece to help as
much as they could, but few people knew how many NGOs are in Greece, where they have
come from, what they did and why. Some people talked about real help and solidarity, others
16
Presidential Decree 123/2016, (2016), ―Establishment of Immigration Policy Ministry‖ [Online] Available:
https://www.e-nomothesia.gr/kubernese/proedriko-diatagma-123-2016.html [2016, November] 17
European Commission, (2015), ―Progress Report on the Implementation of the hotspots in Greece‖
[Online] Available: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52015DC0678 [2015,
December] 18
Smith-Spark, L., Elaine, L., & CNN, (2015), ―Migrant crisis: Greece struggles to handle influx in Kos‖
[Online] Available: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/08/13/europe/greece-kos-migrant-crisis/index.html [2015,
August] 19
Jacobsen, K., (1996), Factors Influencing the Policy Responses of Host Governments to Mass Refugee
Influxes, page 659 20
https://griechenland.diplo.de/blob/1338134/f4434bb9418ce2039c5a7698246ca13b/merkblatt-
hilfsorganisationen-hilfe-fuer-fluechtlinge-in-griechenland-en-data.pdf
8
linked NGOs with fraud and profit. The attempts by the state authorities to record them came
too late and in a rather peculiar way, throwing a veil of suspicion in their actions21
.
The role of NGOs suddenly became ambiguous. They are experiencing a crisis
of legitimacy, over their neutrality, independence, politicization and subordination to their
donors and the international media. Seemingly they are unable or unwilling to address
structural problems related to their present shape and functioning22
. Discomfiting questions
flooded the mainstream Greek media regarding the legitimacy of NGOs‘ undertaken actions
and their funding sources, leading to extensive police investigations, which resulted to
NGOs‘ members‘ arrests and the exclusion of a countable number of them as non-certified
accused for funding mismanagement, drugs possession or ever worst, for illegal
transportation of refugees and immigrants in the mainland23
.
Obviously, their role in dealing with pressing humanitarian problems is
increasingly doubted and challenged. Given their growing dependence on governmental
funding and the absence of mechanisms holding them to account, NGOs are characterized as
―governments
‘ puppets‖
‘ and
―big businesses‖
‘24. Nowadays, after thorough police
investigations and data verification by the Ministry of Immigration Policy, 64 NGOs are
actively involved with the migration issue in Greece, specializing in assistance to refugees
and immigrants (e.g. medical care, distribution of clothing and other essentials) or trying to
help in additional ways (e.g. providing interpreters, psychological support and entertainment).
Some NGOs call on the Greek authorities for the difficulties of accessing and being able to
intervene in ―closed structures‖, complaining that they have been excluded from there, with
negative consequences for refugees‘ living conditions. However, the majority claims that
they are satisfied with the level of their cooperation, both with central government authorities
and with local communities25
.
1.1.6 The Hellenic Armed Forces’ role
After a multi-month delay in the state apparatus and under the justifiable
pressure of EU, the Greek government on 30th
of January in 2016, during a meeting which
21
HuffPost Greece, (2016), ―Everything we learned by asking NGOs working in Greece for their role in the
refugee issue‖ [Online] Available: https://www.huffingtonpost.gr/2016/07/01/mko-ellada-
prosfugiko_n_10713690.html?1469024875 [2016, July] 22
Frangonikolopoulos, C., (2005), ―Non-governmental Organisations and Humanitarian Action: The Need for a
Viable Change of Praxis and Ethos‖, page 61 23
Proto Thema, (2018), ―Attorney for the management of funds in the migrant issue‖ [Online] Available:
https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/827636/eisaggeleas-gia-ti-diaheirisi-ton-kondulion-sto-
metanasteutiko/ [2018, October] 24
Frangonikolopoulos, C., (2005), op.cit., page 49 25
HuffPost Greece, (2016), ―NGOs in Greece‖ [Online] Available: https://projects.huffingtonpost.gr/oi-ngo-
stin-ellada/ [2016, July]
9
the Ministers of National Defense, Interior, Finance, Citizen Protection and Maritime-Naval
Issues attended, decided to assign extensive jurisdictions to the Hellenic Armed Forces in
order to manage the refugee crisis in the interior of Greece and specifically to grant and
reform the Sindos and Schistos former camps as relocation camps for refugees and
immigrants, with a direct capacity of 4,000 people, to appoint temporary coordinators at the
five reception centers on the islands of Kos, Leros, Lesvos, Chios and Samos and to supervise
and assist with every available means in the completion of the construction works26
.
Moreover, the Hellenic Armed Forces undertook more responsibilities, involving many more
assets of different levels and at various locations by the establishment of coordination cells at
central and local levels to which they would have to provide staff, as well as provision of
personnel, machinery, material and contracting for the construction of camps and provision of
services, vehicles and personnel for transportation, medical personnel and equipment for the
medical support, and finally installations, personnel and later contracting procedures for the
food provision27
.
On March 9, 2016, the Central Coordination Cell for the Refugee – Immigrant
Issue under the command of Hellenic National Defense General Staff was established28
. Its
role would be to administrate and coordinate, in cooperation with the Asylum Service and
First Reception Service, the actions in order to effectively deal with the issues which arose
due to the refugee and migrant flows in the country, strictly concerning the transportation,
accommodation, food and medical provisions of the refugees and immigrants29
. Until the
summer of 2017 Hellenic Army Forces constructed fifty accommodation sites with a total
capacity of 45,000 people, seven of them in the wider area of Western Thessaloniki.
Finally, the overall contribution of the Hellenic Army Forces which is in
progress until now, in handling the refugee - immigrant issue, in terms of numbers is
prodigious. From the first months of 2016 and until the gradual hand over of the food
provision to catering services, the Armed forces had prepared and delivered by their own
means approximately 1 million daily portions of food. In addition, they managed to set up
5,000 tents and 3,000 Refugee Housing Units in the relocation camps and approximately
26
Skai, (2016), ―Greek Government decided Greater Involvement for Hellenic Armed Forces ‖ [Online]
Available: http://www.skai.gr/news/greece/article/305727/megaluteri-summetohi-tou-stratou-sto-prosfugiko-
apofasise-i-kuvernisi/ [2016, January] 27
Morfidis, G., (2018), Could CIMIC foster the Civil-Military Interaction in National Response to Refugee
Influxes? Case Study: The Participation of the Hellenic Armed Forces in Resolving the Refugee Influx in
Greece 2016. Diavata Open Temporary-Accommodation Center‖, page 37 28
630 Newspaper of the government, (2016), ―Regulation of issues concerning the Central Coordination
Committee for the Refugee Crisis Response‖ 29
Morfidis, G., (2018), op.cit., page 36
10
1,500 transportations had been conducted carrying a total of 17,000 tons of supplies. On the
medical support sector, 25 doctors and 18 nurses were daily dispatched from military
hospitals to contribute to the medical services of the sites. Gradually, however, many things
have changed on the competence level. The Ministry of Migration Policy took over many
responsibilities from the Ministry of Defense, engaging successfully state organizations and
NGOs (in the context of a broader European program) in taking over the provision of certain
services in the camps such as payment of water, sewage and electricity, rent of locations,
cleaning services, maintenance services, as well as food provision via cash assistance30
.
1.1.7 The local community’s attitude
Each time the Central Government authorities were announcing the
installation of relocation camps in the suburbs of Western Thessaloniki, both local
community and the local authorities in an enviable coordination reacted strongly negatively
to these plans, with many respondents speaking for a further degradation of an already
deprived area. More specifically, in February 2016, 80 residents from the municipalities of
Delta and Oreokastro gathered and camped outside the ―Anagnostopoulou‖ former military
camp in Diavata, which was decided to be transformed to the first relocation camp for
refugees and immigrants in Greece‘s mainland, guarding the entrance of it, in order to
prevent the reformation of the camp by the Hellenic Army Forces31
. To the continuous
mobilizations, such as temporary closures of public schools, roads or public service offices,
many local state representatives were not only present but applauded them, such as mayors of
the related municipalities and former vice prefects, while the presence of Golden Dawn32
was
also intense33
. In general, local government representatives complained of incomplete
information, stressing that the western side of Thessaloniki was being deflated.
Apart from the reactions of the local community, the regional authorities were
also not in agreement with the establishment of a relocation camp in Diavata or Sindos. In
particular, the Regional Governor of Central Macedonia wondered ―why the central
government insists on setting a relocation center in Diavata, while the Region and the
Municipalities have proposed another camp in Thermi to the eastern suburbs of Thessaloniki,
30
Morfidis, G., (2018), op.cit., page 40 31
Enikos, (2016), ―Occupy in a camp that will become a hotspot‖ [Online]
Available:http://www.enikos.gr/society/369436/katalipsi-se-stratopedo-pou-tha-ginei-hotspot-video [2016,
February] 32
The Popular Association – Golden Dawn is an ultranationalist, far-right political party in Greece. It is led
by Nikolaos Michaloliakos, accused many times for its xenophobic perceptions and actions. 33
Anti1news, (2016), ―Hot Spots: Reactions grow‖ [Online] Available:
http://www.ant1news.gr/news/Society/article/435539/hot-spots-klimakonontai-oi-antidraseis-se-diabata-kai-ko
[2016, February]
11
a solution that the relevant municipality agrees‖ and stated against any upcoming function of
a relocation center nearby the urban fabric of Thessaloniki34
. Ιn all this intensity environment,
the lack of police patrols to these areas led to an aggravation of the whole situation. In an area
that includes the Technological Educational Institute, the Industrial Area of Thessaloniki and
a total of nine settlements in Delta municipality, only one police station with one police
vehicle exists to undertake all the emergency incidents, resulting inevitably to very frequent
crime incidents. Notably, the mayor of Delta municipality, Mr. Mimis Fotopoulos noted that
the inhabitants feel strongly insecure and constantly complain, mentioning that if at some
point they reach the limits of their endurance and go out into the streets replacing
substantially the police, the municipal authority would support them in any way35
.
Only the mayor of Thessaloniki, Mr. Giannis Mpoutaris stood up against the other
mayors, stressing the responsibility that they have to provide care and solidarity to the
refugees and immigrants who have settled in Thessaloniki. Pointing out that the refugee issue
was very complex and difficult, he proposed to the Central Coordination Cell for the Refugee
– Immigrant Issue specific warehouses inside the commercial port to be used as
accommodation sites36
.
1.2 The current situation
1.2.1 The functional relocation camps nowadays
Twenty-six relocation camps are operational in the mainland, almost half of
those existing at the pick of the migratory flows in 2016. Seven of them are located in Central
Macedonia with an official maximum capacity of 4,650 people and only one is now
functioning in western Thessaloniki, the ―Anagnostopoulou‖ camp in Diavata. Moreover,
22,000 people are hosted in rented apartments through the ESTIA program, administered by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees funded by the European Commission37
.
Unfortunately, the phenomenon of improvised camps by refugees and immigrants in central
34
Enikos, (2016), ―Tzitzikostas: The Diavata project cannot go ahead‖ [Online]
Available:http://www.enikos.gr/politics/371227/tzitzikostas-den-borei-na-proxorisei-to-sxedio-gia-ta-diavata
[2016, February] 35
Ethnos, (2019), ―Research on Thessaloniki: Rising criminality, patrols by citizens‖ [Online]
Available:https://www.ethnos.gr/ellada/21454_ereyna-gia-thessaloniki-sta-ypsi-i-egklimatikotita-peripolies-
apo-polites [2019, February] 36
Newpost, (2016), ―Xenophobic reactions to the hotspot in Diabata, they do not eat people‖ [Online]
Available:http://newpost.gr/ellada/517449/mpoytarhs-ksenofobikes-oi-antidraseis-gia-to-hotspot-sta-diabata-
den-trwne-anthrwpoys [2016, February] 37
Ministry of Immigration Policy, (2018), ―Relocation camps in the mainland‖ [Online] Available:
http://immigration.gov.gr/documents/20182/31265/Fotografiko_leukoma_prosfyges_gr.pdf/ccf067ab-99ff-
4de4-8e95-2696745f7d05 [2018, November]
12
squares, parks or abandoned buildings is very common in Thessaloniki38
. A transitory
solution by the state authorities is their transport and temporary stay in the only camp of
Thessaloniki in Diavata, exceeding the maximum capacity, with what this entails to the
facilities‘ downgrading and the provided hygiene to the hosted people39
.
1.2.2 The EU’s continuous support to Greece
According to the EU, addressing the refugee crisis and managing its external
borders are top priorities. The Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) supported,
and still does, Greek national efforts to improve reception capacities, ensure that asylum
procedures are in line with the EUs standards, integrate immigrants at local and regional
levels and increase the effectiveness of return programmes. The Internal Security Fund (ISF)
supports national efforts to achieve a uniform and high level of control of the external borders
and to fight cross-border organized crime. To support the Greek authorities as well as
international organizations and NGOs operating in Greece in managing the refugee and
humanitarian crisis, the Commission has already awarded over 816.4 million € in emergency
assistance since the beginning of 2015. The emergency funding came on top of the 613.5
million € already allocated to Greece under the national programmes for 2014-2020 (328.3
million € from AMIF and 285.2 million € from ISF)40
.
The numbers of refugees and immigrants are sharply down from their 2015-16
peak because of a 2016 EU deal with Turkey, new border fences in the Balkans, and a 2017
bilateral arrangement between Italy and Libya, but tens of thousands of people are still trying
to reach Europe. Frontex contribution was also catalytic to the deterioration of irregular
crossings at Greek borders. The number of detections of illegal border-crossings on the
Eastern Mediterranean route in 2018 rose again by nearly a third to 56,000. This was mainly
caused by a higher number of immigrants crossing the land border between Turkey and
Greece, while the total number of detections in the Eastern Aegean Sea was roughly in line
with 201741
.
38
Makthess, (2019), ―Refugee camp next to the center of Thessaloniki‖ [Online]
Available:https://www.makthes.gr/kataylismos-prosfygon-dipla-sto-kentro-tis-thessalonikis-fotografies-194935
[2019, February] 39
Newpost, (201), ―The camps are filled in Thessaloniki after the new waves of refugees from Evros‖ [Online]
Available: http://newpost.gr/ellada/670239/gemizoyn-oi-kataylismoi-sth-thessalonikh-apo-prosfyges-poy-
pernoyn-apo-ton-ebro [2018, May]
40 European Commission, (2018), ―Managing Migration: EU Financial Support to Greece‖, [Online] Available:
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/20181219_managing-migration-eu-financial-support-to-greece_en.pdf [2018,December] 41
Frontex, (2019), ―Number of irregular crossings at Europe‘s borders at lowest level in 5 years‖, [Online]
Available: https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/number-of-irregular-crossings-at-europe-s-
borders-at-lowest-level-in-5-years-ZfkoRu [2019,January]
13
On the other hand, a ―Janus‖ behavior concerning Europe‘s states and
institutions, with only few assertive exceptions, is undoubtedly obvious. Clearly, the issue of
integrating the migratory flows is a political one concerning most EU countries, which has
yet not found a sustainable remedy. Most countries retreat from their assigned commitments
under the pressure of xenophobic trends prevailing in their interiors. What remains
unchanged is the predominant problem of shaping an effective policy of integration that will
revitalize national economies and relieve both migrant populations and local host societies42
.
Obviously, the EU is definitely still in shock, but not only. It seems that is also divided in at
least two opposed camps, a clash between Western and Central Europe. While none of the
latter states favored obligatory relocation, some were quite open to the concept of burden
sharing. And some Western European countries seemed equally reluctant to accept an
automatic distribution of refugees, even during at the peak of the crisis43
.
Unfortunately, concerning the relocation program for refugees, in the years
2016-2017, less than a fifth of the original target have been relocated or resettled. Initially the
plan foresaw 160,000 refugees to be shared among EU countries. Then it was reduced to
98,000 before falling to 33,000 places in April 2017, with the EU citing a lack of people
eligible to be transferred. According to the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the EU
received 43% fewer asylum applications in 2017 than it did in 201644
. In addition, the EU
with its member states appear to have often focused on their urgent interests in border
control, security, and measures to restrict migratory flows rather than issues within origin and
transit countries. Moreover, their security-driven approach to migration risks exacerbating the
problems that drive migration in countries of origin, generating greater instability in the long
term. Through the policies it has adopted so far, the EU, which has a presence in civilian and
military missions in Africa, effectively moved its borders south towards the Sahel.
This externalization of borders control and European security has helped to forge the image
of a ―fortress Europe‖ that has little interest in acknowledging or addressing the real causes
of migration45
.
42
Kasimati E. and Panagiotopoulou R., (2018), ―Migration and refugees in Greece in the period 2015-2017:
Integration and social acceptance issues‖, Working Paper Nr.10/2018 43
Lehne S., (2018), ―The EU remains unprepared for the next migration crisis‖, [Online] Available:
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2018/04/03/eu-remains-unprepared-for-next-migration-crisis-pub-75965 [2018,April] 44
EASO, (2018), ―Press Release: EASO releases overview of 2017 EU+ asylum trends‖, [Online]
Available:https://www.easo.europa.eu/news-events/press-release-easo-releases-overview-2017-eu-asylum-
trends [2018,February] 45
European Council of Foreign Relations, (2018), ―Migration through the Mediterranean: Mapping the EU
Response‖, [Online] Available:https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/mapping_migration# [2018]
14
With all these happening in a fluid political environment, anti – immigration
sentiment is on its rise across the continent. The presence in Italy‘s government of the far-
right League party of Matteo Salvini, which campaigned on a pledge to send 500,000
irregular immigrants home, is making itself felt. The similarly rightwing, populist Freedom
party is sharing power in Austria. Even in Germany, which welcomed more than 1 million
refugees and immigrants in 2015, the rightwing Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) party has
kept immigration firmly at the top of the political agenda46
. The right-wing Euro-skepticism
poisons societies with xenophobic and Europhobic feelings, fosters nationalistic
introspection, undermines significantly liberal democracy‘s rules, the ideological and
democratic functions that have been established hundreds of years before in Europe.
Undeniably, EU faces a multidimensional crisis, the consequences of which are increasingly
affecting the quality of the democracy of its member states47
.
Chapter 2
The possession of weapons in Greece
2.1 The current legislation concerning the possession of weapons
Staying faithfully committed to the purpose of the study, it is absolutely necessary
firstly to scrutinize some very special terminologies directly related to the arms law
framework and weapons‘ possession court laws of Greece, in order to acquire a more
comprehensive view. According to the 2168/93 Constitutional law, a weapon is any machine,
which, by means of thrust generated in any way, launches bullets or chemical substances or
rays or flames or gasses, causing injury or health damage to persons or damage to objects or a
fire and especially any gun, grenade or mine of every type, as well as any device that can
cause in any way the above results48
. Practically this means that apart from the usual,
firearms of various types, revolvers, hunting guns and airguns, all objects that are suitable for
attack or defense and in particular: sprays (pepper), knives, metal punches, bats, swords,
spears, arcs and police globs, are also considered as weapons.
Moreover, in article No7 of the 2168/93 Constitutional law, weapon possession is
allowed only with the permission of the competent police authority of the place of residence
46
The Guardian, (2018), ―What is the current state of the migration crisis in Europe?‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/what-current-scale-migration-crisis-europe-future-outlook
[2018, November] 47
Frangonikolopoulos, C., (2017), ―EU: The inevitable challenge of democratic accountability‖, page 83 48
2168 Constitutional Law, (1993), ―Setting topics related to weapons, ammunition, explosives, explosive
mechanisms and other provisions‖, FEK 147/A/3-9/93, page 1
15
of the concerned person. More precisely, there is no license required for possession of fishing
rifles and airguns, clarifying that it is forbidden only for persons who have not reached the
age of 18. Likewise, knives whose possession is justified for domestic or professional or
educational use, hunting or fishing rifles are not considered as weapons, with the
precondition though that the owners are obliged to receive all precautionary measures for safe
storage and not to hand them over to third parties49
. Completely different are the definitions
of ―weapons‘ carrying‖ and ―weapons‘ usage‖, whose licenses for the public are given under
a stricter framework.
For those serving in the Greek army, Police, Fire Department, Coast Guard and
Customs service the applicable case-by-case provisions for ―weapons‘ carrying‖ apply and
always in accordance with the commands of each ministry. In article No10 of the 2168/93
Constitutional law, it is specifically stipulated that except the above mentioned, only for those
over 18, a ―weapons‘ carrying‖ license is permitted and only in two occasions. Firstly, if
there are serious concerns or proven threats about someone‘s security or life and always in
conjunction with competent Prosecutor‘s written permission. In the second case, if it is
required for the safety of other companied persons, shops, banks, money transfers, museums,
etc50
. Unfortunately, until the end of 2015, almost anyone could get a ―weapons‘ carrying‖
license, if only he/she could prove to the court that his/her physical integrity was threatened.
Detailed reference to the required papers is not needful, because most of them are just
procedural to acquire them. Perhaps the most crucial document is the one that certifies the
former clean criminal record. Not even the medical certificate is difficult to obtain, by a
physician or a psychiatrist, showing that the person concerned is mentally capable to have a
weapon. Only after the alarming rates of requests for granting a ―weapon‘s carrying‖
permission, which exceeded the 50% growth51
, the central state authorities in December 2015
tightened the rules by adopting an amendment, according to which, a yearly compulsory
examination test on 30 questions out of a bank of 120 must be given, in parallel with a
practical examination, under the responsibility of the local police departments, in order
someone to be granted with the license52
.
49
Hellasnow, (2017), ―Weapons and all that you should know about them", [Online] Available: https://hellas-
now.com/ ηα-πεπι-οπλυν-και-ολα-οζα-θα-εππεπε-να/ [2017, July] 50
2168 Constitutional Law, (1993), op.cit, pages 10,11 51
Newsbomb, (2014), ―Weapon‘s carrying requests have been increased‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.newsbomb.gr/ellada/astynomiko-reportaz/story/532639/ayxithikan-oi-aitiseis-gia-adeies-oploforias
[2014, December] 52
2881 Newspaper of the government, (2015), ―Procedures for granting a permission for weapon‘s carrying for
safety reasons‖
16
At first sight, one could say that these tests were very well adopted as a prerequisite
for the cherished license. But after a more detailed research, many grotesque things emerge.
Questions differ for each type of weapon that someone wants to carry, yet effortless to be
answered. For instance, the candidate to the question ―What is the ballistic science?‖ has to
choose between the two options ―a kind of training to improve shooter‘s ability‖ or ―the
science that studies the movement, behavior and effect of the bullet from the moment it leaves
the gun barrel till its impact to the target‖. Remarkable also is the question ―Who has the
right to be granted with the weapon‘s carrying license for personal safety?‖, where the
participant must decide among the two possible answers ―Anyone who has a lot of money and
is famous‖ or ― Anyone for whom there are serious concerns or proven threats about his/her
security or life‖53
. Luckily, ―weapons‘ usage‖ regulations are tougher according to article
No14 of the 2168/93 Constitutional law54
, reside with the principle of proportionality and
necessity of articles No 22 and 23 of Greece‘s Penal Code, drawing severe penalties55
.
2.2 License issuance for hunting guns
At this point, a reference to the regulations about the license issuance of hunting guns
in Greece is necessary, in order to reveal the ease and rapidity with which anyone with clean
criminal record can get a weapons‘ possession certify. The compulsory documents even
though seem to be plenty, at the same time can trouble-free be collected. An official request
to the local police department, the receipt by the specialized shop of the purchased hunting
gun, an affirmation that the interested person has never been condemned in the past, a
medical certificate from a physician or a psychiatrist stating his/hers mental stability and two
recent photos are ample to grant someone with a gun. Afterwards, the local police department
and with the precondition that the Ministry of Justice responds positively to the submitted
request for a clean criminal record, concerning the interested person, supplies him/her with
the ―desired‖ license, valid for 10 years, without any other obligation56
. Clearly, all this
easiness has resulted to an incalculable arsenal in Greece. It is indicative that while hunters‘
licenses do not exceed the number of 300,000, the actual number of hunting guns in the
country is estimated at between 1.5 and 2 million. A major question and rather unanswered -
53
News247, (2018), ―Weapon‘s carrying law in Greece: What happens, how easy is licensed, all the answers‖,
[Online] Available: https://www.news247.gr/koinonia/oploforia-stin-ellada-ti-ischyei-poso-eykola-chorigeitai-i-
adeia-oles-oi-apantiseis.6599254.html [2018, April] 54
2168 Constitutional Law, (1993), op.cit, page 14 55
Lawspot, (2019), ―Penal Code – Defense and its Excess‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.lawspot.gr/nomikes-plirofories/nomothesia/pk/arthro-22-poinikos-kodikas-amyna [2019, February] 56
Greek Police, (2019), ― License issuance for hunting guns‖, [Online] Available:
http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=1186&Itemid=131&lang= [2019,
February]
17
arises in what hands are the remaining weapons and why the official state grants licenses to
people not related to hunting or shooting competitions57
.
2.3 Legal gaps
Most importantly though, is that from the above context very serious and critical
issues emerge. First and foremost is the complete absence of a substantial clinical periodic
examination of those who have in their possession -legally- weapons, regarding their mental
health and stability. Practically, when someone receives his/hers hunting gun‘s possession
license, its validity lasts for 10 years. In the interval, the state deems the owner as a mentally
stable individuality for these 10 years, without demanding any other clinical examination or
even skill and shooting tests. Additionally, grievously absence is the age limit deterioration,
till when the owner is capable to have in his possession the hunting gun. Virtually, anyone
who manages to obtain an ascertainment by a physiologist or a psychiatrist after the passing
of the first ten years license granting, concerning his/hers mental stability, can replenish it for
more ten years and this modus operandi maintains basically till the normal death of the
possessor58
.
One more crucial legal gap of the 2168/93 Constitutional law, regulating these issues,
concerns the omission of the numbers of weapons that someone may have, avoiding any
reference to a limit. Realistically, if someone has the financial comfort to purchase weapons,
is unrestrained by the law and can possess as many weapons he/she desires, as long as the
compulsory charge is rendered. Happily, though, a Joint Ministerial Decision (J.M.D) by
Ministers of Citizen Protection and Culture in 1999 tightened up the legislation of the
shooting clubs in Greece and all the related issues for possession, carrying and usage of
shooting weapons. For instance, according to the article No12 of 4325/99 J.M.D, anyone who
possesses shooting weapons (pistols, revolvers, carbines, arcs, airguns, etc.) is obliged to
secure them in a safe, accompanied by an alarm system59
. On the opposite, no mention is
discerned to the 2168/93 Constitutional law regarding the securing regulations of the hunting
guns, except the following piteous general instruction:
―Holders of hunting guns are required to take the necessary measures to safely keep
their weapons and comply with the relevant instructions of the competent police authorities‖
[Article 8, §2a, 2168 Constitutional Law, (1993)]
57
Kathimerini, (2008), ―Greece: An incalculable arsenal‖, [Online] Available:
http://www.kathimerini.gr/311547/article/epikairothta/ellada/aperanto-oplostasio-h-ellas [2008,January] 58
2168 Constitutional Law, (1993), op.cit, page 9 59
4325/99 Joint Ministerial Decision, (1999), ― Regulations for shooting clubs, possession, carrying and usage
of shooting weapons‖
18
Disappointing is in addition the negligence of an obligation by the occupants of
hunting guns to acquire in sequence, an official hunting licence by the innumerable hunting
clubs all around Greece. It is not required by the pre-mentioned law for someone to obtain a
hunting licence, immediately after his hunting gun possession bestowal. According to official
data of Macedonia‘s and Thrace‘s Hunting Federation60
, given by the chief executive,
although hunting guns‘ sales increased in the last five years, the validated hunting licenses by
hunting clubs decreased due to the draining financial situation in the country61
. Irrefragably
fatal questions come to light analyzing the legal incapacity of the 2168/93 Constitutional law.
What logic can legitimize the possession of a gun for personal safety without firstly the
possessor being trained to a shooting range through an official shooting club? Which
rationale permits the granting of this license when the holder does not have a certified
knowledge of the subject and even more, which rationale permits the re-issuance of it till
someone‘s late years62
?
2.4 Penalties for illegal possession, carrying and usage
In Greece, illegal possession, carrying and usage of weapons constitute independent
and self-contained offenses and are punished in parallel with the crime that has been
committed with them (e.g. robbery or homicide)63
. All of the above crimes belong to
misdemeanors, punishable by imprisonment, up to a maximum of 5 years (starting with 3
months) in parallel with fines, up to a maximum of 30,000 €64
. However, there is also the
prominent case of illegal weapons‘ possession, which constitutes a felony and is punished by
imprisonment from 5 to 20 years, when the perpetrator sells, imports, possesses and delivers
weapons to third parties, intending to commit a crime or supplies groups and organizations -
not necessarily criminal- with them. The same penalty is declared as well to those who accept
or conceal these weapons65
. In Article 59 of the 4249/14 Constitutional law there are
conditions‘ designations for those who possess undeclared hunting guns or their license -
provided by the police department- has expired and are obliged to proceed to immediate
renewal of them, paying the compulsive fee of 30 €. Otherwise, after a passage of 2 years and
60
http://www.hunters.gr/πποθίλ-ομοζπονδίαρ/ 61
Macedonia‘s and Thrace‘s Hunting Federation, (2018), ―Macedonia‘s hunting licenses‖, pdf archive 62
Flynews, (2017), ―Legitimate weapons‘ possession and weapons‘ carrying‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.flynews.gr/ νόμιμη-οπλοκαηοσή-και-οπλοθοπία-πολι/ [2017,January] 63
Legal Advice, (2012), ―What the Law provides for illegal weapons‘ possession, carrying and usage‖, [Online]
Available: http://nomikisimvouli.blogspot.com/2012/04/blog-post_09.html [2012,April] 64
KnF, (2013), ―Illegal weapons‘ possession, carrying and usage: Read the Law‖, [Online] Available:
http://www.knf.gr/nomoi-gia-to-kynigi/παπανομη-οπλοθοπια-οπλοκαηοση-διαβα/[2013,August] 65
Amyna sto spiti, (2014), ―Illegal weapons‘ carrying and usage‖, [Online] Available:
http://www.amynastospiti.gr/paranomi-oploxrisia-kai-paranomi-oploforia/ [2014, August]
19
in case of a police check, the transgressor will be arrested at the spot and next day will attend
to a trial and sentenced with 6 months imprisonment in parallel with an exceptional fine66
.
2.5 Numbers talk
As a result of the above mentioned, the officially declared hunters in Greece in 2012
approached 200,000, signifying the big question why does the state grant everyone
permission to own a lethal gun and why people buy and keep them inside their houses.
According to the data base of Ministry of Citizen Protection there had been a rapid increase
in the hunting weapons‘ market, while the number of declared hunters remained constantly
the same67
. In recent years, the phenomenon has been magnified due to the shipments of
illegal weapons and ammunition that ended up in the country especially from Albania. Border
Police authorities tried to eliminate weapons‘ smuggling through continuous patrols on the
borderline. However, smugglers‘ networks adapted and through new inaccessible points have
improved their ―operational‖ capabilities. Conditions similar to those on the Greek-Albanian
borders were recorded also to the southern maritime borders of the country. After Libya‘s
insurrection of February 17, 2011 against Kaddafi, immense amounts of illegal weapons
transported with trawlers from the Libyan Sea, were channeled to Crete and the rest of the
country constantly68
.
Crime‘s explosion and civilians‘ fear that they may face a burglar with a
―kalashnikov‖69
shove them to the easy solution of a hunting gun70
. Experts on the subject
argue that a respectable number of the population has proceeded to the procurement of
hunting guns as a measure for their personal safety. Throughout the country, 50,723 licenses
were issued in 2012, instead of 43,798 in 2011. In Western and Central Macedonia in
particular, licenses for possession of hunting guns increased in 2012 to over 60%.
Indicatively, in West Macedonia, licenses for hunting guns from 1,501 in 2011 rose to 2,414
in 2012, while in Central Macedonia, from 3,403 in 2011, they climbed to 5,450 in 201271
.
Unfortunately, no recent official data are revealed by Police authorities, nevertheless there is 66
4249 Constitutional Law, (2014), ―Reformation of Police and Fire Brigade services‖, FEK 73/A/24-3/14,
page 1142 67
Proto Thema, (2012), ―Over 1 million weapons in our country with declared hunters to be 200,000 ...‖,
[Online] Available: https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/202959/oi-ellhnes-phran-ta-armata/ [2012, June] 68
Kathimerini, (2008), ―Greece: An incalculable arsenal‖, op.cit 69
A Kalashnikov rifle is any one of a series of automatic rifles based on the original design of Mikhail
Kalashnikov. They are widely known as Kalashnikovs, AKs, or in Russian slang, as a "Kalash". They were
originally manufactured in the Soviet Union, but these rifles and their variants are now manufactured in many
other countries. The Kalashnikov weapon design has become increasingly more popular in the American
firearms industry. 70
Proto Thema, (2012), ―Over 1 million weapons in our country with declared hunters to be 200,000 ...‖, op.cit 71
Alfavita, (2013), ―Last year, 53,000 new weapon possession licenses were issued‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.alfavita.gr/koinonia/88559_dothikan-persi-53000-nees-adeies-oploforias [2013, January]
20
a diffuse sensation of an escalation of the problem. Assuredly, undesirable consequences of
this tendency are occasions where the Police unveiled and resolved cases of entire arsenals in
houses, with most notably those in Rethymno72
, Volos73
, Ampelokipi and Vyronas Attiki74
.
In all these cases, more than 100 weapons, including explosives, were found by Police
authorities, most of them without the appropriate documents and licenses, whilst their
possessors were all fans of Greece‘s far-right party ―Golden Dawn‖, very well known for its
xenophobic ideas and beliefs.
2.6 A sense of insecurity
Seventy percent of Greeks are worried about falling victims of criminal activity
according to a very recent research by the National Technical University of Athens75
conducted in December 2018, with most of them concerned about home burglary at 41.8%,
followed by robbery or street attacks (31.3%), and children safety in public places, such as in
the park or on the school route (30.7%). In early March 2019, Police authorities dismantled a
gang of 213 foreign offenders, involved in more than 320 robberies, burglaries and drug
trafficking, operating lately in the wider area of the center of Athens, with most perpetrators
being from Morocco, Algeria, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Bangladesh76
. More than 350
laptops, 300 mobile phones, knives, daggers, machetes, a sum of 16,000 € and 60 cannabis
packs ready for disposal on the illegal market were found in the gang‘s possession.
Moreover, local authorities‘ anxiety is more than ever obvious on the subject of crime
in the areas of their responsibility. In unison with civilians‘ worries, mayors of Thessaloniki‘s
municipalities state that Police‘s overview does not correspond to reality, showing a
downward trend, due to the fact that not all incidents are reported by the victims because of
the general disappointment, existing in cases‘ investigations, while often being deterred from
making official complaints or prosecutions. At the same time, they motivate their citizens
72
Alfavita, (2018), ―A follower of Golden Dawn, 32, with the arsenal in Rethymno‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.alfavita.gr/koinonia/248488_opados-tis-hrysis-aygis-o-32hronos-me-oplostasio-sto-rethymno
[2018, March] 73
Alfavita, (2017), ―An entire arsenal was found in a house in Volos‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.alfavita.gr/koinonia/211109_olokliro-oplostasio-brethike-se-spiti-ston-bolo [2017, February] 74
Alfavita, (2013), ―Weapons in Golden Dawn‘s members houses in Ampelokipi and Vyronas‖, [Online]
Available: https://www.alfavita.gr/koinonia/109399_opla-se-spitia-hrysaygiton-se-ampelokipoys-kai-byrona
[2013, October] 75
ProNews, (2018), ―Greece, a country of insecurity: 70% of citizens are afraid of stealing, robbing or abusing
them!‖, [Online] Available: https://www.pronews.gr/amyna-asfaleia/esoteriki-asfaleia/737724_ellada-hora-
anasfaleias-70-fovatai-oti-tha-toys-klepsoyn [2018, December] 76
Protothema, (2019), ―Stealing Athens, trafficking drugs: 213 aliens in a gang with 320 robberies and thefts!‖,
[Online] Available: https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/869983/pano-apo-320-listeies-eihe-diapraxei-i-
summoria-allodapon-ton-exarheion/ [2019, March]
21
who fall victims of thefts and burglaries to censure the incident to their local police
departments and to the municipal‘s services concurrently77
.
Inversely proportional to the above mentioned, according to official statistics and
tables on crime in 2018 compared to 2017 and 2017 compared to 2016, released by the
Hellenic Police Headquarters, a gradual reduction in offenses which are directed directly to
citizens and affect the security feeling, every year is evident78
in Greece. This image is
attributed by the Hellenic Police Headquarters to their targeted actions on serious criminal
groups‘ dismantling and their members‘ arrests. However, in Thessaloniki‘s province a
respectable increase after 2014 (10,116) has been denoted. In 2015 there were 10,454
robberies and burglaries, in 2016 the number arose in 11,822 and in 2017 Police announced
13,506 of them, while in the first semester of 2018 they exceeded 6,37979
.
2.7 The tendency abroad
Examining other countries‘ stances on weapons‘ possession subject, zestful results
emerge on the surface. In England and France, unrestricted remains the capability of buying
weapons similarly to Greece. However, substantial mental health and capabilities control are
serious prerequisites for both countries‘ pertinent authorities, in order for a license to be
granted. In Germany, every person over the age of 21 has the right to buy and own up to 12
weapons, 10 hunting guns and 2 pistols or revolvers. On an annual basis though, any
individual who possesses even one weapon undergoes strict psychological tests and is
required to attend special training sessions80
. Unfortunately, German citizens in recent years
obvert to pistol replicas, pepper spays or electric teasers impressively rapidly. Approximately
two years after 2016, the number of those granted small-scale weapon possession license has
almost doubled. A poll by the German Infratest Dimap Institute shows that 23% of Germans
feel ―unsafe‖ and 51% ―almost safe‖. Compared to statistics about two years ago, about 32%
of Germans now feel ―less secure‖81
.
77
TyposThes, (2018), ―Neapoli - Sykies: In the "rails" for crime - The 7 decisions‖, [Online]
Available:https://www.typosthes.gr/thessaloniki/151234_neapoli-sykies-sta-kagkela-gia-tin-egklimatikotita-oi-
7-apofaseis [2018, February] 78
Naftemporiki, (2018), ―Decrease in crime according to Greek Police data‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/1334000/meiosi-tis-egklimatikotitas-sumfona-me-ta-stoixeia-tis-elas= [2018,
March] 79
Greek Police, (2019), ―Criminal Statistics‖, [Online] Available:
http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&perform=view&id=81738&Itemid=73&lang= [2019,
March] 80
Kathimerini, (2008), ―Greece: An incalculable arsenal‖, op.cit 81
Deutsche Welle, (2018), ―Increase of weapons possession in Germany‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.dw.com/el/αύξηζη-ηηρ-οπλοκαηοσήρ-ζηη-γεπμανία/a-42421747 [2018, February]
22
The only country that allows its citizens to be equipped with –except weapons–
silencers in Europe, is Finland, with the excuse of noise pollution elimination, caused by
those who want to exercise their abilities in shooting. Even the automatic shotgun
―Kalashnikov‖ rifle is sold freely in Finland, with the sole condition of turning it into a
―single shot‖ weapon, so as to throw only one shot at each burst. The world‘s first country in
proportion of weapons per capita is India. At the same time, it is one of the first countries in
crime rates associated with the use of weapons. Corresponding figure is pointed in the United
States, the second country in proportion of weapons per capita, with suchlike high rates of
armed violence and crime82
.
Certainly, the United States should be studied and handled as a unique case on
weapons‘ possession issue. According to the Small Arms Survey‘s Report of the Geneva-
based Institute for International and Development Studies, in 2017 120 weapons
corresponded to every 100 US residents83
, with Americans consisting just 4% of the world's
population, but owning 46% of small-caliber weapons worldwide. Nowadays in United States
there is an outbreak against a crowd, correlated with guns, once a month. Since 1968, more
Americans have died in their own country than in wars. Nonetheless, there is a lobby that still
prohibits registration and identification of guns. At the same time, figures reveal that the
number of stores selling weapons is more than 55,000, much higher than that of
supermarkets84
. Recently, in Oklahoma State after the latest Amendment of the law,
regulating weapons‘ issues and which came to force in November 2018, any person aged 21
years or over -or 18 years of age if he/she belongs to or belonged to the ranks of the armed
forces- will have the right to buy a weapon and to carry it publically, without the need for
authorization from state‘s authorities85
. Notably though, the US had nearly six times the gun
homicide rate of Canada, more than seven times that of Sweden, and nearly 16 times that of
Germany, according to United Nations data for 201286
. Consequently, it‘s obvious that there
is a clear association that areas with more guns are more prone to murder for other reasons.
82
Kathimerini, (2008), ―Greece: An incalculable arsenal‖, op.cit 83
Alfavita, (2018), ―US: For every 100 inhabitants there are 120 weapons‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.alfavita.gr/kosmos/259356_ipa-se-kathe-100-katoikoys-antistoihoyn-120-opla [2018, June] 84
News247, (2017), ―In United States you buy a gun more easily than a mobile phone‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.news247.gr/afieromata/stin-ameriki-agorazeis-oplo-pio-eykola-apo-kinito-tilefono.6524759.html
[2017, November] 85
HuffPost Greece, (2019), ―Oklahoma liberates weapons‘ possession- Right to everyone to carry a weapon
without permission‖, [Online] Available: https://www.huffingtonpost.gr/entry/e-oklachoma-apeleetheronei-ten-
oplokatoche-dikaioma-se-oloes-na-oploforoen-choris-adeia_gr_5c78cbc2e4b033abd14a6949?utm_hp_ref=gr-
homepage&ncid=other_homepage_tiwdkz83gze&utm_campaign=mw_entry_recirc [2019, March] 86
Vox, (2018), ―America is one of 6 countries that make up more than half of gun deaths worldwide‖, [Online]
Available: https://www.vox.com/2018/8/29/17792776/us-gun-deaths-global [2018, August]
23
2.8 The EU requires a stronger framework
Europe‘s attention after several terrorist attacks, such as in Paris in November 2015
and in Berlin in December 2016, focused on the capacity of organized criminal networks to
access and trade firearms87
across the borders in Europe, including large numbers of military
grade firearms, whilst controls and cross-border police cooperation have been hampered by
differences in national legislation on ownership and use of firearms88. In the autumn 2015 the
European Commission put forward a comprehensive set of proposals to protect its citizens
against assaults by firearms. The EU Firearms Directive 2008/51/EC classified firearms into
four categories with corresponding rules for acquisition and possession89
:
Category A - fully automatic weapons and military weapons: cannot be owned by
private persons unless they have been deactivated;
Category B - repeating or semi-automatic arms: can be owned by private persons
subject to authorization;
Category C - less dangerous repeating and semi-automatic firearms and single shot
firearms: can be owned by private persons subject to declaration;
Category D - other firearms: can be owned by private persons and are not subject to
authorization or declaration
Presently, the EU Firearms Directive 2017/853, which amended Directive
2008/51/EC and was published in the Official Journal on May 24, 2017, reduces the number
of weapons‘ categories from four to three, removing category D, which currently requires
neither an authorization for the weapons nor their declaration to the authorities. The majority
of what the European Commission originally proposed, such as the ban of automatic firearms
transformed into semi-automatic firearms, the inclusion of museums and collectors in the
scope, the regulation of alarm and acoustic weapons, the regulation of Internet sales, more
exchange of information between Member States and medical tests for the renewal of
87
Firearm: An assembly of a barrel and action from which a projectile(s) is discharged by means of a rapidly
burning propellant. Also called a weapon, gun, handgun, long gun, pistol, revolver, etc.
http://www.tncourts.gov/sites/default/files/docs/firearmshandout_1.pdf 88
European Parliament, (2019), ―Revision of the Directive on acquisition and possession of weapons‖, [Online]
Available: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-area-of-justice-and-fundamental-rights/file-
acquisition-and-possession-of-weapons [2019, February] 89
European Commission, (2016), ―Firearms Directive; Frequently Asked Questions‖, [Online] Available:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-4465_en.htm [2016, December]
24
licenses adopted by the Parliament in plenary on March 14, 2017 and by the Council on April
25, 2017, with few exceptions.
The Commission would have liked to go further in restricting magazine sizes and in
banning the most-dangerous semi-automatics, but this was not supported by the co-
legislators. Two countries have rejected the directive: the Czech Republic, which opposes any
tightening of the firearms regulations and Luxembourg, which -for its own purposes- wanted
stricter laws90
. Practically, automatic firearms converted into semi-automatic firearms and
short semi-automatic firearms fitted with a loading device exceeding 20 rounds, long semi-
automatic firearms fitted with a loading device exceeding 10 rounds and long firearms that
can easily be concealed by means of a folding or telescopic stock are prohibited for
civilians91
. Nevertheless, there are still Member States vigorously insisting on exceptions‘
determination and allowing the acquisition of these guns for a sports-shooting discipline or
hunting. Concluding, it is more than ever obvious that despite the EU‘s coveted efforts for
setting up a strong and free of bureaucratic procedures framework on weapons‘ acquisition
and possession, many obstacles must be overcome including the gun lobby in Europe which
never hesitates to transfer the field of conflict even to social networks.
Chapter 3
The role of Mass Media
3.1 Mass media credibility
Undoubtedly, the mass media in the 20th
century transformed in the sole information
provider worldwide, taking advantage of the rapid technological development, while
influencing the public more than ever, especially nowadays, positively and negatively. The
big question that has been raised many times is if the media guide public opinion or public
opinion is the one that directs the media. Of course, almost evidently, the media influence the
target audience and contribute to shaping public opinion but on the other hand, the media are
also influenced regarding their choices, goals and their functions by the attitudes of the public
90
Euractiv.gr, (2016), ―Stricter framework for weapons in the EU‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.euractiv.gr/section/thesmika-themata/news/pio-afstiro-plesio-gia-tin-oplokatochi-stin-ee/ [2016,
December] 91
European Parliament, (2019), ―Revision of the Directive on acquisition and possession of weapons‖, op.cit
25
or the intended audience, revealing an interaction between media and public opinion through
a continuous feedback process92
.
For the above reasons, it is therefore necessary to examine how the mass media
affected -and continue to do- their audience in Europe and more specifically in Greece on a
so sensitive issue. Plainly, mass media played a crucial role on the way people framed the
refugee crisis, with a mixed reaction both in volume and coverage. The coverage was
different from one country to another, especially when the media were trying to catch and
follow the pulse of its public. Across the European media, media landscape and journalists
have struggled to strike the right note in the tone and the language of discussion of the crisis.
The EU‘s media relation machinery made sure that they had set measurable campaign goals
and objectives and during press conferences, they ensured that the reporter‘s packet press was
filled with proper information. The main focus of the media machinery was to capture the
crisis, how it could be helped and the adequate information that was important to understand
the project93
.
3.1.1 Weaponizing words: Metaphor and war
According to Steuter and Wills, the metaphors we draw upon, often
profoundly racist, increasingly threaten our chances of building a safe society. The language
used by mainstream news media, politicians, military commanders, think tank scholars,
religious leaders, pundits, columnists and bloggers in response to terrorism ironically makes
people less safe by creating a discourse characterized by fundamental and insoluble divisions,
distinct in both informal and official public speech94
. Italy‘s Interior Minister, Matteo Salvini,
is a typical example of racial rhetoric‘s spokesman, who said on March 15, 2019 that ―the
only extremism that merits attention is the Islamic kind‖, in response to a question about
whether the domestic terrorist attack in New Zealand that took place on the same day is
something to concern Italy as well95
. One of the most important reasons to pay careful
attention to the relationship between metaphors and thought is that this relationship is often
92
Choutos K., (2016), ―Media and Public Diplomacy; Case study: Greek financial crisis‖, [Online] Available:
https://ikee.lib.auth.gr/record/287653/files/GRI-2017-18488.pdf [2016, December] 93
European Commission, (2017), ―The EU AND the Migration Crisis‖, [Online] Available:
http://publications.europa.Eu/webpub/com/factsheets/migration-crisis/en/ [2017,July] 94
Steuter E. and Wills D., (2008), ―At war with Metaphor; Media, Propaganda, and Racism in the War on
Terror‖, page xi 95
Ansa, (2019), ―Salvini says Islamic extremism only kind worth attention‖, [Online] Available:
http://www.ansa.it/english/news/2019/03/15/Salvini-says-islamic-extremism-only-kind-worth-
attention_d52c57a4-877b-42a5-b983-4acd8905e481.html [2019,March]
26
largely invisible. While some metaphors have an overt or obvious influence, the influence of
others can be much more subtle and oblique96
.
The Italian Interior Minister, advocates for tightened immigration, insisting
that a ―culture war‖ is evolving in Europe. The problem, he claims, is not with individuals
but with Islam itself, an incompatible religion with European societies97. Obviously, there is a
certain clarifying quality to an extreme metaphor such as the metaphor of war that makes it
potentially very attractive. War has the ability to focus issues, framing them definitively and
inarguably. Steuter and Wills argue that the war metaphor offers the promise of victorious
domination and protection: it implies we can so thoroughly defeat our enemies that we can
keep them from ever hurting us again. This is a promise, however; we have never
successfully managed to fight the war to end all wars, and so clearly the closure and finality
implicitly offered by the war metaphor is at least in part wishful thinking98
.
3.1.2 Making enemies: Propaganda
Mass media seems to be the primary vehicle for many persuasive appeals and
persuasion shows up almost every day in our life. Pratkanis and Aronson claim that ―every
day we are bombarded with one persuasive communication after another. These appeals
persuade not through the give-and-take of argument and debate but through the manipulation
of symbols and of our most basic human emotions. For better or worse, ours is an age of
propaganda‖99
. Markedly, propaganda is not concerned with disseminating information but
with rallying emotion. Pointing to the massive amounts of propaganda spewed by
governments and institutions around the world, Noam Chomsky mentions that
‗propaganda is to democracy what violence is to totalitarianism‘100
. Exemplary, Hungary‘s
Prime Minister, Victor Orban, declared -and still does- that migration is the ―Trojan horse‖
of terrorism for Europe and the immigrants, many of whom are Muslims, are a threat to
Europe's Christian identity and culture101
. As a consequence of his rhetoric, 76% of
Hungarians now link refugees with terrorism, whilst 82% of the respondents surveyed by a
Hungarian research center in 2016, Závecz Research, are convinced that refugees will be a
96
Steuter E. and Wills D., (2008), op.cit., page 7 97
Politico, (2017), ―Matteo Salvini: Islam incompatible with European values‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.politico.eu/article/matteo-salvini-islam-incompatible-with-european-values/ [2017, March] 98
Steuter E. and Wills D., (2008), op.cit., page 11 99
Pratkanis A. and Aronson E., (2010), ―Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion‖,
page 6 100
Chomsky N., (2007), ―Propaganda, American-Style‖, [Online] Available:
http://www.zpub.com/un/chomsky.html [2007, June] 101
Business Insider, (2017), " Hungary‘s leader calls migration ‗Trojan horse‘ of terrorism‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.businessinsider.com/ap-hungarys-leader-calls-migration-trojan-horse-of-terrorism-2017-3?r=UK
[2017, March]
27
burden on the social system, few days before Hungary‘s referendum with the question: ―Do
you want the European Union, without the consent of Parliament, to order the compulsory
settlement of non-Hungarian citizens in Hungary‖102
.
Propaganda is the mechanism by which governments persuade the public of
the evil of the enemy and the justness of their own cause. When propaganda spreads through
public discourse, flowing from government spokespeople through the news media to the
internet and television, re-articulated by news anchors and columnists, bloggers and talk
show hosts, it inevitably influences public opinion. Influence, after all, is propaganda‘s
purpose103
. Unquestionably, what differentiates our time from the past is not the growth of
mentally and emotionally depressed people but the means to which they have access and how
dramatically they can affect societies of people around the globe.
3.1.3 The fabricated enemy
According to Huntington, who argued that future wars would be fought not
between countries, but between cultures, the clash of civilizations occurs at two levels. At the
micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often
violently, over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from
different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the
control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their
particular political and religious values104
, adding that in the post-Cold War world, the critical
distinctions between people are not primarily ideological or economic, but cultural105
.
Europe‘s far-right representatives building their ―hate speech‖ narratives on this basis,
exploit on the maximum level all the media. The news media constantly re-circulate images
and language that reinforce this characterization of the Muslim as fundamentally alien, as do
scenes from countless movies and TV programs featuring Arabs almost solely in the role of
fanatics or terrorists. News broadcasts repeatedly show scenes emphasizing this zealotry;
moderate voices from Islam are ignored in favor of repeated images of extremity. Newspaper
headlines echo the framing of the struggle in epic, eternal form106
.
And because of their religion and culture, refugees and immigrants that enter
Europe‘s countries, have been conveniently transformed to a suitable fabricated enemy by
far-right leaders. Demagogues such as Hungary‘s Prime Minister have positioned themselves
102
Hungarianspectrum, (2016), ―Orbán‘s anti-refugee propaganda is a roaring success‖, [Online] Available:
http://hungarianspectrum.org/2016/08/09/orbans-anti-refugee-propaganda-is-a-roaring-success/ [2016, August] 103
Steuter E. and Wills D., (2008), op.cit., page 18 104
Huntington S., (1996), ―The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order‖, page 35 105
Huntington S., (1996), op.cit., page 1 106
Steuter E. and Wills D., (2008), op.cit., page 31
28
as defenders of a Christian European civilization, enacting anti-migrant policies to protect
Europe from being overrun by Muslim hordes, a totally misguided vision which tries to erase
the fact that Europe is a diverse continent, in which Christian, Muslim, Jewish and secular
traditions have been present for centuries107
. Greek far – right propagandists using the
‗us/them‘ dichotomy narrative to depict immigrants as inharmonious with Greek culture,
cashing in on the lack of contact between host societies and immigrants to spread their lies,
exploit an ignorant public through mass media and mainly the social ones108
. The fact is that
instead of listening to multiple stories, instead of using the investigative tools of credible
journalistic media and people‘s critical minds to search out these stories, this ignorant public
rush to fill the silence with a story of its own: not the whole, complex truth but the story that
war, to work, needs us to hear. Our most violent passions and most dehumanizing metaphors
seem to be directed towards those enemies that we ourselves most actively help to
construct109
.
3.2 Television’s stance
Manifestly, without media attention, humanitarian crises, with their horrifying
impacts, will continue to be learned by the outside world way too late. Unfortunately,
public‘s appeals for wider media attention, with some notable exceptions, fell on deaf ears
with an apparent lack of interest on the part of the vast majority of television companies,
concerning the biggest refugee crisis in our generation110
. TV media struggle to provide
balanced coverage when political leaders respond with a mix of bigotry and panic – some
announcing they will only take in Christian migrants while others plans to establish walls and
razor wire fences. Much of the focus has been on countries in South Eastern Europe which
has provided a key route for immigrants and refugees on the march. In Greece and Bulgaria
in particular, TV media have failed to play a responsible role and sensationalism has
dominated news coverage111
. Unique exception on disdainful speech about the refugee and
immigration crisis in Greece are the public TV channels, where emphasis is given on news
sympathetic on refugees and immigrants, following ethical guidelines of the Athens Union of
Daily Press Journalists112
.
107
The Guardian (2018), ―Five myths about the refugee crisis‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/jun/05/five-myths-about-the-refugee-crisis [2018, June] 108
The conversation, (2018), ―Syrian refugees — the need for an image reboot‖, [Online] Available:
http://theconversation.com/syrian-refugees-the-need-for-an-image-reboot-100874 [2018, June] 109
Steuter E. and Wills D., (2008), op.cit., page 26 110
White A., (2015), ―Moving Stories: International Review of How Media Cover Migration‖, page 1 111
White A., (2015), op.cit., page 6 112
Mediva, (2012), ―TV Channel Evaluation Sheet: Greece‖, page 2
29
Mostly though, from the very beginning of the refugee – immigrant crisis Greek TV
media were conquered by increased bias, using many misleading words on this very sensitive
issue. Greek TV journalism is driven many times by hyperbole, intolerance and distortion
with TV media in confusion over what are the correct terms to use to describe migrants,
refugees and asylum-seekers113
. And how not be, when Greek and other European officials
on migration policy do extensive use of ambiguous words to describe this phenomenon. A
representative declaration was the Migration Commissioner‘s Dimitris Avramopoulos answer
to the European Parliament in February 15, 2016, stating ―The relocation mechanism is
linked to the hotspot approach‖, seamlessly using two fuzzy words in one sentence114
.
According to Steuter and Wills, the images being so repeatedly transmitted though
popular culture on TV aren‘t accidental; they do reflect the reality that we see so often on the
nightly news, in which screaming, angry Arabs appear looking just like the ones we see over
and over on TV and movie screens, overlooking some important points. Firstly, is the
selectivity of the images emerging from news broadcasting; by definition, the news
documents and hence newsworthy events, events with enough inherent drama to catch and
hold audiences. Moreover, there is a tendency to generalize from relatively small groups of
people to all others who share the same race or ethnicity. For example, racism and
Islamophobia drive westerns to represent the actions of the nineteen 9/11 terrorist as a
reflecting the desires and actions of the 1.3 billion people who make up the Arab world,
effortlessly conflating individuals with their entire race or religion, but on the opposite, we
don‘t do this with those who look more like us: for example, we don‘t claim that the actions
of Ku Klux Klan members who are Christian represent all of Christianity115
, revealing how
subjective and frivolous is people‘s critical way of thinking when receiving instantaneous
visual images.
Definitely, words matter and that increasingly visible public figures demonizing and
dehumanizing large groups of people because of their colour or religion will encourage
violent extremists to take matters into their own hands116
. Clear evidence of all these was the
113
The Guardian, (2015), ―Where media fails on the reporting of migrants and refugees‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2015/dec/17/where-media-fails-on-the-reporting-of-migrants-
and-refugees [2015, December] 114
Politico, (2016), ―7 dirty words in the EU migration debate‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.politico.eu/article/7-dirty-words-migration-refugees-asylum-push-back-relocation-hotspots-
detention-europe-refugees-crisis-asylum-seekers-syria/ [2016, March]
115
Steuter E. and Wills D., (2008), op.cit., page 102 116
News Thump, (2019), ―Far-right commentators keen to distance themselves from Christchurch shooter who
shares every single one of their beliefs‖, [Online] Available: https://newsthump.com/2019/03/15/far-right-
30
unbelievable mass shooting in two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand, where 50 people
were killed and many more were injured by a shooter on March 15, 2019, who released an
anti-immigrant manifesto. However, commentators and personalities with far-right views on
immigration and nationalism have been quick to distance themselves on TV from the
Christchurch shooter who appears to have believed absolutely everything they have ever said.
3.3 Radio’s stance
Nearly all media are controlled by corporations or licensed by the governments117
. Of
course, radio channels could not be excluded. Radio utilizing its advantages, such as the
direct dialogue with the public, its 24 hours 7 days broadcasting, short speech and immediate
updates, influence public opinion in ways never before possible through carefully crafted
messages118
. According to Steuter and Wills in recent years, without a great deal of resistance
or commentary, hate speech has been institutionalized as part of contemporary mainstream
media, including radio stations, addressing audiences numbering in the millions. Popular
right-wing talk show hosts broadcast inflammatory rhetoric daily, abusing and demonizing
minorities, environmentalists, liberal politicians and government social programs119
.
Unfortunately, in Greece, there is no official mechanism to detect and record this
provocative hate speech on the radio broadcasting, concerning refugees and immigrants that
are settled in the country. The only evaluation that ever been made on the Greek Radio
broadcasting, was held by the Robert Schuman Centre, a European university institute,
which through a co-funded by the European Fund for Integration of Third Country Nationals
project, called ―Mediva‖, confirmed that only one radio, ―Radio Filia‖ station of Greece‘s
public radio broadcasting, broadcasts in the languages of the main immigrant communities
living in Greece, whilst also there are several specialized radio journalists that know very
well the migration environment in Greece. However, they are qualified as such mainly
because of their long-term interest and involvement in migration news, having not received
any training on the issues120
.
3.4 Newspapers’ stance
According to Glencross, in the majority of EU countries, especially where newspaper
readership is lower, the mainstream print press is more sympathetic to refugees‘ and
commentators-keen-to-distance-themselves-from-christchurch-shooter-who-shares-every-single-one-of-their-
beliefs/[2019,March] 117
Stewart C., Smith C. and Denton R., (2012), ―Persuasion and Social Movements‖, page 374 118
Stewart C., Smith C. and Denton R., (2012), ―Persuasion and Social Movements‖, page 81 119
Steuter E. and Wills D., (2008), op.cit., page 131 120
Mediva, (2012), op.cit., pages 2-3
31
immigrants‘ integration, even if the citizens‘ interpretation of what the EU does for them and
for their country is becoming more skeptical121
. Thankfully, a report, which was published in
2015 as part of a programme of assistance to the work of the Ethical Journalism Network122
by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, revealed that the ongoing refugee story has
been dominated by two themes in press– numbers and emotions. Most of the time coverage is
politically led with press often following an agenda dominated by loose language and talk of
invasion and swarms. At other moments the story has been laced with humanity, empathy and
a focus on the suffering of those involved. The report has also disclosed that for almost a year
media, including the press, have missed opportunities to sound the alarm to an imminent
migration refugee crisis123
. In December 2015, UNHCR commissioned another report by the
Cardiff School of Journalism to explore what was driving press coverage in five different
European countries: Spain, Italy, Germany, the UK and Sweden. Overall, the Swedish press
was the most positive towards refugees and immigrants, while coverage in the United
Kingdom was the most negative and polarized. Amongst those countries surveyed, Britain‘s
right-wing press was uniquely aggressively in its campaigns against refugees and immigrants.
Moreover, threat themes, such as to the welfare system or cultural threats, were the most
prevalent in Italy, Spain and Britain124
.
As it has already been mentioned, in Greece there is not any official organization that
could detect and publish reports on how media confront the refugee crisis, including the
press. Newspapers‘ stance on this very crucial issue in Greece, which in parallel try to
surpass their disadvantages of not timely update and absence of video, can only be divulged
by private researches, such as the one that SETA125
conducts every year investigating
Islamophobia across European countries. According to its report, the press of the extreme
right plays primary role in the reproduction of Islamophobic discourses, e.g. the newspaper of
121
Glencross A., (2014), ―The Politics of European Integration; Political Union or a House Divided?‖, page 271 122
The Ethical Journalism Network (EJN) is an organisation created to 'strengthen the craft of journalism and to
promote for the public benefit high ethical standards in journalism' was created in 2011 to strengthen journalism
in the face of crisis. As a coalition of more than sixty groups of journalists, editors, press owners and media
support groups, EJN promotes training and practical actions to strengthen ethics and governance. Its work
includes developing a test for journalists to expose hate speech, guidelines on reporting conflict or producing
reports on covering migration. 123
Ethical Journalism Network, (2015), ―Moving Stories: International Review of How Media Cover
Migration‖, page 6 124
Berry M., Garcia-Blanco I. and Moore K., (2015), ―Press Coverage of the Refugee and Migrant Crisis in the
EU: A Content Analysis of Five European Countries‖, page 1 125
Seta, a foundation for political, economic and social research is a policy think tank based in Ankara, Turkey.
It was established in 2006 with the objective of informing policy makers and the public on changing political,
economic, social and cultural conditions.
32
Golden Dawn, or Makeleio, Stohos and Eleftheri Ora126
. Other examples come not only from
right-wing but also from some lifestyle and gossip press. Dimocratia, is also a newspaper
which reproduces Islamophobic discourses, especially after terrorist attacks have occurred
abroad, talking about ―the monsters of Islam‖ and ―the crazy [people] of Islam‖ on its front
pages. What needs to be underlined is that in most of these cases and despite the validity or
the novelty of the information, a kind of moral panic is constructed through attractive
headlines and photos on front pages trying to disseminate a fear about Islam and Muslims127
.
On the other hand, trying not to be nihilists about the Greek press, there are many newspapers
which promote positive images for refugees and immigrants in Greece, while they criticize
and reprove the ―hate speech‖ rhetoric of right – wing press. But even in Germany, where
over one million asylum seekers arrived and welcomed, press journalists lost their objectivity
and drove a wedge through society, according to the German Otto Brenner Institute. The
researchers of the institute, who studied thousands of articles published between February
2015 and March 2016 by leading daily newspapers, including Bild, Die Welt, the Süddeutsche
Zeitung and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung came to the conclusion that the moralistic
reporting by the major newspapers ‗massively contributed‘ to a loss of trust in the
mainstream media and a split in German society128
.
3.5 The Internet’s stance
It is common concession that we live in the Internet Era which obviously offers
another dimension to the mean of communication, information, update, interaction,
availability of sources, nevertheless to danger as well, uncontrolled information and lack of
privacy. Choutos highlights that although journalists have numerous assets in order to
broadcast news from around the world the outburst of the internet poses a great time pressure
on them while trying to do so, occasionally leading them to mistakes. In addition, Choutos
mentions that although the technological revolution enabled to a high degree both journalists
and the public while presenting and receiving news respectively, both ends ought to be very
careful as to how they were going to utilize the means of technology129
. Evidently,
cyberspace worldwide, including Greece, is a place where one can find a variety of anti-
Islamic views but at the same time it is very difficult to study and monitor every website or
126
Sakellariou A. and Huseyinoglu A., (2018), ―Islamophobia in Greece: National Report 2017‖, page 294 127
Sakellariou A. and Huseyinoglu A., (2018), op.cit., pages 295-296 128
The Local, (2017), ―German media failed to report refugee crisis honestly, study finds‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.thelocal.de/20170721/german-media-failed-to-report-refugee-crisis-honestly-study-claims, [2017,
July] 129
Choutos K., (2016), op.cit., page 13
33
social media accounts. As it might be expected websites and blogs of the far right are
dominated by Islamophobic views, particularly connected with the flows of immigrants and
refugees and with the terrorist attacks that took place till now130
.
Two tendencies of the digital age are widely obvious: speed eclipses accuracy and
social media abhors an informational gap. The instantaneous nature of social media platforms
incentivizes attention-grabbing misinformation. The inaccuracies virally spread by expanding
their reach and influence at a dizzying rate. One can easily witness this attention-driven
virality by watching a social media post‘s ―like‖ and ―retweet‖ counts exponentially increase
in real-time131
. Notably in Greece, one can find blogs with Islamophobic content and images
supporting that Islam and Muslims should leave Greece because Islam is a ―violent and
savage religion‖ and that all illegal immigrants - mainly Muslim – are threatening Greece,
whilst also is very common to find Islamophobic pages and comments on Facebook or
Twitter, such as the Facebook groups ―Stop Islam in Greece‖ and ―No to a mosque in
Athens‖132
. Apart from the above, many extreme right-wing websites that disseminate
―news‖ about Muslim countries in relation to violence (e.g. killings, rapes, murders, etc.),
cultivate and spread the fear of Islam and to create a repulsive image of Islam and Muslims,
affecting in sequence prejudices concerning refugees and immigrants entering the country133
.
Of course, residents of western territories of Thessaloniki could not be excluded by this
misinformation.
Minorities appear, or more often do not appear, in cyberspace; and when they do
appear it is often through stereotypical and alienating images134
. The situation is aggravated
when policy makers and European representatives, taking advantage of the Internet‘s
interactivity, unleash their hate discourse for refugees and immigrants, such as Matteo Salvini
does. His Facebook page boosts the turnout for his appearances, and posts videos of his
speeches and interviews to build up his online following. In parallel to his Internet personal
advertisement, dozens of attacks on black people and Roma have been recorded in 2018, all
over Italy, from Treviso in the north to Gioia Tauro in the south, including Florence and
Rome. The attacks range from drive-by shootings with air guns, in which the attackers were
130
Sakellariou A., (2016), ―Islamophobia in Greece: National Report 2015‖, pages 211-212 131
The Conversation, (2018), ―Social media can be information poison when we need facts most‖, [Online]
Available: https://theconversation.com/social-media-can-be-information-poison-when-we-need-facts-most-
100495?utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Twitter#Echobox=1532659016 [2018,
July] 132
Sakellariou A. and Huseyinoglu A., (2018), op.cit., page 299 133
Sakellariou A. and Huseyinoglu A., (2018), op.cit., page 298 134
Silverstone R. and Georgiou M., (2005), ―Editorial Introduction: Media and Minorities in Multicultural
Europe‖, page 434
34
reported to shout ―Salvini!‖ to the assassination of a Malian trade unionist campaigning for
fair pay for migrant workers135
. Someone could say that almost identically in Greece, the
former minister of the conservative party Nea Dimocratia, Andreas Andrianopoulos, who
teaches at the American College of Greece (Deree) and is the director of the Institute of
Diplomacy and International Developments at the same college, through speeches, articles,
books, his website and mainly his Twitter account, continuously (re-)produces Islamophobic
messages talking about ―Islamic beasts‖ after terrorist attacks, about the threat of the
thousands of immigrants coming to Greece, and, on the whole, implying that there is a
cultural chasm between Islam and the West and that those who are friendly and open to
Muslims will pay the price in the future136
.
It may be easy to dismiss this social media ‗noise‘ as the province of fools and naives
and as a small gullible minority taken in by the usual rogue gallery of conspiracy peddlers
and Islamophobic hate merchants. But the noise they make, exploiting the advantages of
Internet technology, is significant as they spread bad information, making it difficult to
determine fact from falsehood causing public confusion137
. People become more prejudiced
when they feel threatened, while even worst, consequence of the above referred, not only
right-wing extremist groups rely on the means of Islamophobic propaganda and discourse,
but unfortunately social democrats, liberals, leftists or conservatives are no longer immune to
this form of racism138
.
Chapter 4
Questionnaire survey and its outcomes
As previously mentioned, a quantitative approach for the examination and analysis of
the researched phenomenon was assumed more suitable for the dissertation, aiming to reveal
the causes and effect of a possibly existent dark correlation but also to scrutinize as many
variables of it as possible. Hoping to obtain a realistic picture of beliefs of the participants,
the questionnaire was mostly structured with closed-ended questions purposing to
quantifiable answers. Finally, data that gathered, inserted to the Microsoft Excel format tool
and through it, outcomes and correlations came to surface by exploiting its possibilities.
135
The Guardian, (2018), ―How Matteo Salvini pulled Italy to the far right‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/aug/09/how-matteo-salvini-pulled-italy-to-the-far-right [2018, August] 136
Sakellariou A. and Huseyinoglu A., (2018), op.cit., pages 299-300 137
The Conversation, (2018), ―Social media can be information poison when we need facts most‖, op.cit. 138
Bayrakli E. and Hafez F., (2018), ―European Islamophobia report 2017‖, page 9
35
4.1 Participants
Due to the peculiarity of the respondents, a hard copy questionnaire was decided to be
distributed through four local shooting and hunting clubs of western Thessaloniki, a fact that
has made it difficult to collect a large number of replies. Most of the members have not
granted their e-mail addresses to their clubs, resulting to the difficulty of gathering a large
number of replies through Internet technology. However, the questionnaire was dispensed to
all participants in November 2018, having 4 months at their disposal to answer them.
A general opinion that was probed is believed that has been achieved by succeeding to
gather 100 hard copy responses. Of course, three preconditions on this survey were defined
before the filling of the question sheet. First of all, all the participants ought to be members of
Thessaloniki‘s western territories‘ hunting and shooting clubs. Secondly, the candidate
respondents ought to have a valid weapons‘ possession license, which finally should have
been acquired between 2014 and 2018, a period in which the issue of immigration and
establishment of relocation camps in the for-mentioned area is included.
4.2 Questionnaire description
On the very beginning of the question sheet, which was designed in a Microsoft Word
format, all participants were being notified about dissertation‘s purpose and that the
questionnaire was strictly anonymous, aiming by this way to elicit their actual beliefs (as
appendix 13, page 101). The questionnaire was consisted of 55 questions and was divided in
four central categories:
General Data – Personal Values
Daily Routine – Personal Beliefs and Perceptions
Media Influence
Possession of weapons
Each section was intended to supply us with specific facts and figures, all of which
would fulfill a considerable overview of what the participants believe for refugees,
immigrants and weapons‘ possession, how they were affected by the media on this sensitive
linkage and all these on the basis of their personal values.
4.2.1 General Data – Personal Values
Its first section, planned through 7 questions, to provide a spherical picture of
respondents‘ special characteristics, such as their gender, age, religion, etc. If questions about
general and demographic details are placed in the forepart of a questionnaire, respondents
might be influenced on the manner they perceive themselves and consequently on the way
36
they answer the following questions139
. The level of education and their political ideology
were on purpose required at the very beginning, in order to relate and preferably envisage
people‘s thoughts about so delicate issues, with different jobs and backgrounds.
4.2.2 Daily Routine – Personal Beliefs and Perceptions
The unexpected influx of people, with different ethnic or religious
backgrounds to the existing population, is often met with hostility by the locals and viewed as
a headache by city authorities. Displaced groups are seen as an added burden on already
insufficient infrastructure and basic services, particularly in such deprived areas like western
Thessaloniki140
. Therefore, in this section, 27 questions, specialized on the immigration and
integration issue, were placed for responses, aiming to three different goals.
Firstly, to determine the reactions of local residents on the relocation camps‘
function issue and in sequence their perceptions concerning refugees and immigrants
separately. Most of the questions attempted to distinguish refugees and immigrants, in order
to have a more distinctive view of local communities‘ beliefs about them. Moreover,
questions about integration processes were settled, expecting to define locals‘ perceptions
such as whether refugees and immigrants should keep their own culture and adopt it to the
culture of Greece or abandon their original culture in favor of the culture of the receiving
country. But also, to specify inhabitants‘ intentions on how willing they are to co-exist with
integrated refugees and immigrants into their local community. After all, the future of Europe
depends not only on the acceptance of diversity but also on the quality of integration of
heterogeneous groups, and that in turn is a question of recognizing their equality141
.
4.2.3 Media Influence
Intolerance threatens the social cohesion of plural and democratic societies142
.
Indicators of intolerance such as prejudice, anti-democratic attitudes and the prevalence of
discrimination are present on the media, predominantly on the Internet sector more than ever,
especially in Greece. Crucial objective of this survey is the delineation of different types of
media influence on the perceptions of residents of western territories of Thessaloniki, relative
to refugees‘ and immigrants‘ images.
139
Babbie E. R., (2012), ―The practice of social research‖, page 269 140
The Conversation, (2018), ―Refugees can actually create jobs for locals in growing cities – if given
the chance, [Online] Available: https://theconversation.com/refugees-can-actually-create-jobs-for-locals-in-
growing-cities-if-given-the-chance-96289 [2018, May] 141
Zick A., Küpper B. and Hövermann A., (2011), ―Intolerance, Prejudice and Discrimination: A European
Report‖, page 15 142
Zick A., Küpper B. and Hövermann A., (2011), op.cit., page 11
37
Eleven questions thereby tried to catch the impact of the Greek mass media on
the residents living near the relocation camps, how they are affected by them. Finally, one
more goal that was set initially by this category was the verification of any deliberate
confusion between the terms ―refugee‖ and ―immigrant‖ on each media sector separately.
4.2.4 Possession of weapons
The last section of the questionnaire‘s dealt with the core subject of the
dissertation, the possession of weapons, aiming to reveal very essential angles of this focus
group, through their replies on 12 targeted questions. As previously mentioned, the candidate
respondents had to be strictly residents of western territories of Thessaloniki and to had
bought a weapon between 2014 and 2018, amid the refugee and immigration crisis.
These 12 questions were consciously set on a fixed sequence, so as not to
provoke awkward feelings on the participants, but in parallel to make public any possible
deficiencies about the possession of weapons, such as the accessibility of them by other
family members or their storage conditions, targeting even further to legislative
shortcomings‘ stigmatization.
4.3 Sample characteristics
Respondents of this questionnaire were as already mentioned residents of western
territories of Thessaloniki who possessed their weapons from 2014 till 2018, an absolutely
targeted group. The majority of the 100 participants that answered all 55 questions were
males, whilst also there were 14 females who fulfilled the question sheet. Considering
participants‘ age, 10 of them were between 18 and 30 years old, 51 were between 31 and 40,
32 respondents between 41 and 50, 4 of them 51-60 years and only 3 participants were over
61.
As far as their occupation, the greater part works in the private sector, 30 in accuracy.
Eighteen stated freelancers, while 17 work in Police and Greek Army Forces. Among the
respondents there were 14 civil servants and 13 farmers. The smallest proportions belonged
to 3 pensioners, 3 unemployed and 2 women that declared housekeepers.
Regarding the level of education, most of the respondents claimed to have a first stage
tertiary education, while on the opposite only 4 among the weapon possessors stated to have a
primary education level. As far as the political ideology of the participants, 26 are attached to
the right, followed by 21 respondents who stated that they are admirers of liberalism. Finally,
concerning participants‘ religion beliefs, 11 out of the 100 respondents stated that they do not
believe in God, whilst 1 respondent answered ―do not know-do not answer‖. Among the 88
38
participants who claimed to believe in God, not surprisingly, 84 declared to be Orthodox
Christians, 2 Catholic Christians and 2 Buddhists.
Figure 1: The Participants’ level of education
Figure 2: The Participants’ political ideology
4.4 Data outcomes
4.4.1 ‘Daily routine – Personal beliefs and perceptions’ results
The participants had to express which their initial reaction was when they
were informed that relocation camps for refugees and immigrants were going to be installed
in their region. Fifty of them stated that their first reaction was negative, 38 neutral and only
12 positive. In correlation with their political ideology, only one of those who had a positive
initial reaction claimed to have conservative right principles and another one right ones. The
remaining ten claimed to be connected with a left ideology. 31 out of the 100 have been at
least one time at any of the seven relocation camps that functioned in their district, while 74
4 4
21
67
3 1
Primary Lower Secondary
Upper Secondary
First Stage Tertiary
Second Stage Tertiary
Do not know - Do not answer
3
14
26
2119
8
2
7
39
respondents articulated that have heard a negative incident for refugees and immigrants that
took place at a relocation camp.
Respondents are more likely to run across with refugees and immigrants in
their neighborhoods in western Thessaloniki on a daily basis (52%). To the decisive question
if they know that the terms ―refugee‖ and ―immigrant‖ are different and denote a difference
between them, 9 out of 100 said that they do not know the discrepancy. Among the 87 who
stated that are familiar with their difference, the mass (64) wrote that refugees move out of
fear, while immigrants move by choice.
Figure 3: The Participants’ statements on the differences of the terms “refugee” and “immigrant”
According to a survey which was conducted in spring 2016 by the PEW
research center143
, broad majorities in Greece (72%) stated that refugees are a burden on the
country because they take people‘s jobs and social benefits, with lower-educated people to be
much more concerned about the economic impact of them144
. In complete alignment with
PEW‘s survey, 74 residents of western Thessaloniki who answered the questionnaire, believe
that the presence of refugees and immigrants in the country will worsen the economic
situation of permanent inhabitants, while on the opposite only 7 out of 100 disagree. On
October 2017, a survey requested by the European Commission, Directorate-General for
Migration and Home Affairs, and co-ordinated by the Directorate-General for
Communication, revealed that a majority of respondents in most European countries agree
143
The Pew Research Center is a nonpartisan American fact tank based in Washington, D.C., USA. It provides
information on social issues, public opinion, and demographic trends shaping the United States and the world. It
also conducts public opinion polling, demographic research, media content analysis, and other empirical social
science research. 144
Pew Research Center, (2016), ―Europeans fear wave of refugees will mean more terrorism, fewer jobs‖,
[Online] Available: https://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/negative-views-of-minorities-refugees-common-in-
eu/ [2016, July]
64
19
3 1
Refugees move out of fear-Immigrants move by choice
Refugees move because their homes were destroyed in a natural disaster or due to war- Immigrants move for
better economic conditions
Refugees move due to war and violence - Immigrants move due to their political opinion, their religion or
beliefs
Immigrants move out of fear-Refugees move by choice
40
that immigrants are a burden on their country‘s welfare system with Malta and Greece
acquiring the highest proportion (75%)145
.
Participants additionally also had to respond to the tantalizing question
whether the fact that the majority of the incomers are Muslims worries them or not. Again,
more than 78 participants admitted that it worries them and only 5 answered ―not at all‖.
Cultural difference (28%), religious aggression (34%), terrorists‘ sympathy by Muslims
(14%) and aggression towards women by Muslims (16%) were the most indicative answers.
Unfortunately, Islam is perceived as a major threat to Europe by many Europeans because
they feel that Islam is incompatible with ―modern European life‖146
. Immigrants who belong
to a non-Christian religion are quickly labeled as outsiders in the overwhelmingly Christian
continent of Europe147
. Truthfully though, not only in Greece, but in many European
countries with large Muslim immigrant populations there appears to be a trend to equate
―immigrant‖ with ―Muslim‖ and perceive all Muslims as immigrants regardless of their
citizenship or place of birth. Muslims are frequently regarded as ―foreign‖ rather than as an
integral component of the majority society148
. Almost identical were the results of an
extensive survey conducted by PEW research center in 2016. Majorities in Hungary (72%),
Italy (69%), Poland (66%) and Greece (65%) stated that they view Muslims unfavorably149
.
Figure 4: The Participants’ responds on the question “Does the fact that the majority of refugees
and immigrants are Muslims worry you?”
145
European Commission, (2018), ―Special Eurobarometer 469; Integration of immigrants in the European
Union Report‖, page 77 146
European Council, (2010), ―Living together; Combining diversity and freedom in 21-st century Europe‖,
page 15 147
Zick A., Küpper B. and Hövermann A., (2011), op.cit., page 21 148
Zick A., Küpper B. and Hövermann A., (2011), op.cit., page 41 149
Pew Research Center, (2017), ―Muslims and Islam: Key findings in the U.S. and around the world‖, [Online]
Available: https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/09/muslims-and-islam-key-findings-in-the-u-s-and-
around-the-world/ [2017, August]
5
17
47
15 16
0
Not at all Slightly Enough Much Very much Do not know -Do not answer
41
One of the objectives of this dissertation that was set at the very beginning was
the examination of the attitudes and beliefs of locals in the western territories of Thessaloniki,
occupying weapons, towards refugees and immigrants separately. Interestingly but not
surprisingly, most of the respondents seem to be more tolerant and sympathetic with
refugees. 60 participants said that they do not feel threatened by refugees or slightly
threatened, whilst also the same percentage (60%) believe that refugees will not contribute or
will slightly contribute to crime increasing in their region. Contrastingly, 69 participants
claimed that they feel threatened by immigrants enough (39%), much (14%) or very much
(16%), while at the same time 74 out of the 100 respondents believe that immigrants will
contribute enough (35%), much (16%) or very much (23%) to crime increasing in their
region, revealing practically inhabitants‘ disinclination to this group.
The PEW research center through its surveys in Europe in the spring of 2016
reached the same results, stating that the threat of crime ranks much lower in Europe‘s
concerns about refugees. Majorities or pluralities in most countries [Greece (57%), UK
(66%), and France (74%)] believe that refugees are no more to blame than other groups for
crime in their nation150
. On the other hand, according to PEW‘s latter survey in spring 2018,
59% of the respondents in Greece said that immigrants are more to blame for crime than
other groups in their country, scoring the highest percentage among 10 surveyed European
countries151
. European Commission‘s Special Eurobarometer 469 in October 2017 verifies
similar trends, showing that 70% of respondents in Greece believe that immigrants worsen
the crime problems in their country whilst the average percentage of all the 28 European
countries does not exceed the number of 55% at the same question152
.
In an effort to sense the overall picture of the participants‘ beliefs and how
familiar they are with the conditions in the relocation camps, the respondents were also
requested to state if they were aware that the majority of refugees and immigrants have been
hosted in homes through hosting programs of EU and UN. Most of the respondents disclosed
that they knew about this (71%). However, almost half of the respondents were not aware
that the majority of the relocation camps in Central Macedonia are closed. Only 45% of the
participants knew about accommodation sites‘ closure in their territory.
150
Pew Research Center, (2016), ―Europeans fear wave of refugees will mean more terrorism, fewer jobs‖,
op.cit. 151
Pew Research Center, (2019), ―Europeans Credit EU With Promoting Peace and Prosperity, but Say Brussels
Is Out of Touch With Its Citizens‖, [Online] Available: https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/03/19/europeans-
credit-eu-with-promoting-peace-and-prosperity-but-say-brussels-is-out-of-touch-with-its-citizens/ [2019,
March] 152
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 78
42
One more aspiration of this conducted survey was to distinguish the
participants‘ perceptions on sensitive issues directly related with integration processes.
Optimistically, 51 respondents believe that refugees and immigrants should maintain their
cultural identity and adapt it to the Greek culture. On the other hand, 41 respondents divulged
that the incomers should abandon their cultural identity and adopt exclusively the Greek
culture. Unsurprisingly, most of the ―assimilation‖ fans when correlated with their political
ideology belong to the conservative right of the ideological spectrum. It is obvious though
that more Europeans believe immigrants want to be distinct rather than adopt their new
countries‘ customs according to the latter survey of PEW research center in 10 European
countries. Although a median of 38% said immigrants are willing to adopt their customs and
way of life while 51% believe immigrants want to remain distinct from the broader society, in
Greece these percentages are totally different. Sixty three percent of Greek respondents stated
that immigrants want to be distinct from the host society, coming second behind Hungary
with 66%153
.
Greek society appears to be divided in an absolute equilibrium concerning the
success of integration processes according to European Commission‘s Special Eurobarometer
469. Half of the Greek respondents (49%) believe that integration is successful in the local
area and the country, while the other half (49%) stated the opposite154
. On a same relevance,
the participants from the western territories of Thessaloniki were requested to state their
opinions about helping refugees and immigrants to integrate into their local communities.
Sixty five out of the 100 participants [enough (33%), much (24%) or very much (8%)]
claimed that they are in favor of action to be taken by state and non state actors in order to
achieve integration of refugees into the local community, while at the same time the situation
is totally different as far as immigrants are concerned. Thirty seven respondents stated that
they are absolutely negative in any sort of action taken by state and non state actors aiming to
achieve immigrants‘ integration into their local communities, while another 29% are just
slightly in favor of these efforts. Indicative is the outcome of Special Eurobarometer 469, on
which 60% of Greeks completely disagree with the statement ―immigrants enrich the cultural
life of inhabitants‘ country‖155
, while at the same time only 37% of Greek respondents
admitted that would feel comfortable about having an immigrant as a friend with EU28‘s
153
Pew Research Center, (2019), ―Europeans Credit EU With Promoting Peace and Prosperity, but Say Brussels
Is Out of Touch With Its Citizens‖, op.cit. 154
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 62 155
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 74
43
median being 57%156
. Ironically though, only 38 out of the 100 participants on the
dissertation‘s survey conceded that they have heard at least once that social integration
actions for refugees and immigrants take place into their localities.
Interesting observations are moreover noted in respondents‘ answers about
their expressed support for taking more refugees and immigrants in their communities. A
quiet respectful percentage (36%) supported that mainly refugee families should be hosted
permanently with the corresponding rate for immigrants being only 10%.
Figure 5: The Participants’ responds on the question “How many refugees do you believe that your
region could host permanently?”
Figure 6: The Participants’ responds on the question “How many immigrants do you believe that your
region could host permanently?”
Not symptomatically, under the European Commission‘s Standard
Eurobarometer 89 which was conducted in 21 EU Member States in the spring 2018, a
majority of EU respondents consider that their country should help refugees with Greeks
agreeing by 78%157
. Additionally, from PEW research center‘s latter survey in the same
156
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 38 157
European Commission, (March 2018), ―Standard Eurobarometer 89; European citizenship Report‖, page 79
15,00%
40,00%
6,00%
36,00%
3,00%
No one Few Enough Only families Without limiting
47,00%
36,00%
5,00%
10,00%
2,00%
No one Few Enough Only families Without limiting
44
period, it is evident that most Greeks (69%) support taking refugees from countries where
people are fleeing violence and war. However, under the same survey, European publics tend
to want less immigration. Though the number of migrant arrivals to Europe via Greece has
fallen from its peak in 2015 and 2016, roughly eight-out of -ten Greeks believe there should
be less immigration into their country, with this view being also widespread in Hungary and
Italy, two nations where governing parties have embraced an anti-immigration stance.
Visibly, there is little support across European publics to allow more immigrants to move to
their countries with Greece (2%), Hungary (2%) and Italy (5%) to be particularly resistant158
.
Furthermore, drawing on a unique, new Chatham House159
survey of more
than 10,000 people from 10 European states, striking and sobering results came to the
surface. Public opposition to any further migration from predominantly Muslim states is
fairly widespread, ranging from 71% in Poland, 65% in Austria, 58% in Greece, 53% in
Germany and 51% in Italy160
. Significantly, Greeks according to the Special Eurobarometer
469 of October 2017, over half (58%) of those polled, estimated the proportion of immigrants
in the total population in Greece at 20%, while the real figure in 2017 according to Eurostat
was 8.4%161
. It is likely that they were influenced by the sharp increase since 2014 in the
number of arrivals of people seeking protection in the EU, with Greece and Italy as the
primary countries of entry. It is also worth noting that a high level of respondents from other
countries also believe that there are more immigrants staying illegally, have borders along the
Mediterranean coast (Italy (58%), Greece (47%), Cyprus (38%), Spain (38%), Malta (36%))
or are at the Eastern border of the EU (Poland (36%), Bulgaria (38%))162
.
Remarkable results emerge also in the correlation between the European
Commission‘s Special Eurobarometer 469 and the dissertation‘s survey on the inhabitants‘
views on how their relations with the refugees and immigrants will evolve in the near future.
According to the Special Eurobarometer 469, most Europeans view integration as a two-way
process in which both the host society and the immigrants are responsible. However, the
―fostering integration of immigrants is a necessary investment in the long run for my
158
Pew Research Center, (2019), ―Europeans Credit EU With Promoting Peace and Prosperity, but Say Brussels
Is Out of Touch With Its Citizens‖, op.cit. 159
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, commonly known as Chatham House, is a not-for-
profit and non-governmental organisation based in London whose mission is to analyse and promote the
understanding of major international issues and current affairs. 160
Chatham House, (2017), ―What Do Europeans Think About Muslim Immigration?‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/what-do-europeans-think-about-muslim-immigration# [2017,
February] 161
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 23 162
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., pages 5,16
45
country‖ statement divides Greeks once again, with 47% agreeing with this view and 44%
disagreeing163
. What‘s more, 58% of Greeks believe that their government is already doing
enough to foster the integration of immigrants into their society164
. In concurrency,
interesting key finding of essay‘s local survey in the western territories of Thessaloniki is the
fact that over the half participants (53%) believe that the relations between local residents and
immigrants will worsen in the following years, while on the opposite the percentage on the
same question about refugees does not exceed 24%, revealing an already burdened
connection between inhabitants and immigrants and a more favorable stance about refugees.
Figure 7: The Participants’ responds on how their relations with refugees will develop in the
following years
Figure 8: The Participants’ responds on how their relations with immigrants will develop in the
following years
163
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 109 164
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 156
24,00%
46,00%
24,00%
6,00%
Will improve Will remain the same Will get worse Do not know - Do not answer
16,00%
22,00%
53,00%
9,00%
Will improve Will remain the same Will get worse Do not know - Do not answer
46
While Europeans are willing to consider accepting immigrants under certain
circumstances, there is also a general sense that immigrants who are already in their countries
illegally should be deported according to PEW Research Center. Majorities in seven of 10
countries support this policy, while Greeks express the highest level of support for
deportations, with 86% agreeing with this policy165
. Emerging questions swirl around all
these numbers. To what extent is diversity desired or tolerated in Thessaloniki, Greece,
Europe? How great the willingness is to treat these groups as equals? Do Europeans believe
in the values of human rights, such as tolerance, intercultural diversity and solidarity? How
widespread are prejudices towards ―others‖ that are supposedly ―different‖ especially in
Greece? And lastly, to which extent are we willing to accept ethnic, cultural and religious
minorities as equals and grant them equal participation166
?
4.4.2 Media influence results
As millions of refugees and immigrants experience blurred and interconnected
situations, and everyone is just seeking a place to call home, indisputably the media bear
considerable responsibility for helping to form these indistinct images. The above groups
have little access to the mainstream media, being under-represented in them and generally
considered less credible by them167
. The problem is by no means limited to the ―traditional‖
media – newspapers and broadcasting. Today, these are being displaced as the main source of
information, communication and entertainment by the Internet. In the era of social media,
which is driven in large part by spectacle, everyone has a decisive role to play in ensuring
that these two defenseless groups must be treated with respect and dignity.
For the above reasons, as well the fact that views on the impact of immigrants
worsened in six European Union countries, surveyed by PEW Research Center in the spring
of 2018 including Greece168
, the present research considered that the participants should be
asked about their opinion on the media from which they are informed for such sensitive
issues and how they are influenced.
Not surprisingly, the majority of the respondents (48%) claimed that they are
mainly informed for news related with refugees and immigrants through television, with
Internet sites coming second (21%), while newspapers and social media each at 12%. Only 7
165
Pew Research Center, (2019), ―Europeans Credit EU With Promoting Peace and Prosperity, but Say Brussels
Is Out of Touch With Its Citizens‖, op.cit. 166
Zick A., Küpper B. and Hövermann A., (2011), op.cit., page 9 167
European Council, (2010), op.cit., page 31 168
Pew Research Center, (2019), ―Around the World, More Say Immigrants Are a Strength Than a Burden‖,
[Online] Available: https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/03/14/around-the-world-more-say-immigrants-are-a-
strength-than-a-burden/ [2019, March]
47
out of the 100 said that they mostly hear news about these two groups through radio
broadcasts.
Figure 9: The Participants’ responds on how they mainly informed for news related with refugees
and immigrants
To the question how they are affected by each media sector about refugees and
immigrants, social media gathered the most ―negative‖ answers (55%), with internet sites
(51%), television (41%), radio stations (38%) and newspapers (36%). Interestingly,
newspapers gathered both the most ―positive influenced‖ (5%) and ―neutral influenced‖
(53%) responds by the participants.
It is thus a fairly uncontested fact that racism and intolerance characterize a
significant portion of the content shared on major social media platforms. From the United
States to Europe, the spread of hate speech has been witnessed by ordinary users as well as
journalists, politicians, celebrities and activists. Episodes of intolerance diffused by social
media toward minorities and civil-rights supporters have been reported throughout the world,
and especially where right-wing populist parties have risen to power. The roots of social
intolerance have always been lying in the ways salient events – e.g., economic crises, peace
treaties, migration flows and everyday tragedies – have been framed for contingent political
purposes. Social media are the stage where the cynical politicization of news stories is
systematically enacted and, then, amplified by click-baiting media outlets169
.
Similarly to European countries‘ trends on social media‘ hate speech about
refugees and especially against immigrants, Greek Internet pages, likened to far – right
parties and in many social media networks‘ groups, reproduce negative views comparing the
incomers with ―Islamic beasts‖. According to the yearly published European Islamophobia
169
The Conversation, (2018), ―Intolerance on social media: #refugeeswelcome and the Paris terrorist attacks‘,
[Online], Available: https://theconversation.com/intolerance-on-social-media-refugeeswelcome-and-the-paris-
terrorist-attacks-106795 [2018, November]
48,00%
7,00%12,00%
21,00%
12,00%
Television (News) Radio Newspapers Internet sites Social Media Networks
48
report of 2017 by SETA, many extreme right-wing websites continue to disseminate ―news‖
about Muslim countries in relation to violence (e.g. killings, rapes, murders, etc.), using these
stories to cultivate and spread the fear of Islam and to create a repulsive image of Islam and
Muslims. Furthermore, they aim to correlate all these distorted images with the refugees and
immigrants that entered Greece, especially after 2015, implying that there is a cultural chasm
between Islam and the West and that those who are friendly and open to Muslims will pay the
price in the future170
.
As mentioned, many times already, a crucial intention of the survey was to
reveal participants‘ views for refugees and immigrants separately. Therefore, they were
questioned to give their opinion about the possible existence of any deliberate confusion
between the terms ―refugee‖ and ―immigrant‖ on each media sector individually. Negligible
differences were revealed among the five investigated media, with 67% of respondents
claiming that there is an intentional confusion on the two terms on the Internet sector,
followed by television (66%) and social media (66%). Once again, newspapers, followed by
radio, are considered as the more credible media sector on the balanced and decent
representation of refugees and immigrants.
4.4.3 Possession of weapons’ results
In order to evaluate the participants‘ answers as a whole, aiming to solution
proposals for any emerged deficiencies, there should also be an individual endorsement in the
given responds of the latter category, that of ―possession of weapons‖. It could be claimed
that this is the most crucial part of the questionnaire as this part aims to reveal what forced
citizens of the western territories of Thessaloniki to buy and posses a weapon during a
difficult period and moreover whether any dark correlation between the possession of a
weapon and the establishment and operation of relocation camps in their region exists.
The responses of the participants were shared in different answers when asked
―what was the main reason that impelled them to get a weapon?‖. Most of the participants
stressed crime increasing (28%) and lack of policing (28%) in their region as the main causes
that led them to that decision, followed by insecurity with 16%. ―Installation of relocation
camps for refugees and immigrants in their region‖ gathered the same percentage with
―hunting‖ (10%), while the rest 5% stated ―personal threats‖ for reason and 3% the
―sharpshooting‖.
170
Sakellariou A. and Huseyinoglu A., (2018), op.cit., pages 298-300
49
Figure 10: The Participants’ responds on what was the main reason that impelled them to get a
weapon
It is utterly obvious that almost 3 out of 4 participants, who acquired a weapon
in the period 2014-2018, noted reasons correlated with conducted crime to their localities.
Somewhat reasonably, if taking into account police official data about thefts, burglaries and
robberies in Thessaloniki which are in a steady increase from 2014 (10,116) till 2018 (6,379
in first semester)171
. Furthermore, the overall ominous picture is enhanced by the serious
scarcity of police vehicles that could conduct patrols to the western municipalities, reminding
again the terrible condition in the municipality of Delta, in which there is only one police
vehicle capable to provide security in its nine settlements.
Interestingly, the fact that only 10 out of 100 participants declared that the
installation of relocation camps pushed them to the possession of weapons, scoring the same
percentage with those who bought a weapon in the same period for hunting, should allow us
to assume that the function of all these seven accommodation sites for refugees and
immigrants were practically the motive to buy a weapon and not the real and core cause,
taking into consideration the other responds for insecurity and lack of policing. Unexpectedly
though, there is not any correlation between those who answered the above statement and
their political ideology, as among the 10 respondents, only 2 claimed to belong to the sphere
of conservative right.
Interesting findings emerge by participants‘ responds on what weapon they
bought and how much money they spent to obtain them. 59 participants stated that they
bought a hunting gun, obviously because the current legislations are less strict and there are
171
Greek Police, (2019), ―Criminal Statistics‖, op.cit.
28,00%
10,00%
16,00%
28,00%
10,00%
8,00%
Crime Increasion
Installation of relocation camps for refugees-immigrants in the region I live
Insecurity
Lack of policing in my region
Hobby (Hunting)
Other reason (personal threats, sharpshooting, etc.)
50
no consequent obligations in order to retain their possession. 30 respondents bought a pistol
or a revolver, while other 5 stated that bought knives, police globs or pepper sprays for their
protection. It is worth to mention that most of the weapons were acquired in 2015 (34%) and
in 2016 (34%), another indication that leads us to posit that the installation of relocation
camps in western Thessaloniki was just the motive for those who obtained their weapons in
those two years, while the deeper causes which gained the majority of participants‘ responds
were other. Moreover, most of the participants (42%) said that they spent between 500 and
750 €, followed by those who spent between 250 and 500 € (29%).
Figure 11: The Participants’ responds on what weapon they bought in the period 2014 -2018
Figure 12: The Participants’ responds on what year they bought their weapon
Unfortunately, similar to the lack of consciousness in many important matters
in Greek society, the same superficiality is observed to the weapons‘ possession issue
management. In particular, over half of the participants (57%) hide their weapon inside the
house in order to be quick accessible by them, however not in a specially designed furniture-
30,00%
29,00%
23,00%
7,00%
5,00%
1,00%
5,00%
Semi automatic hunting gun
Automatic hunting gun
Pistol
Revolver
Airsoft gun
Shooting gun
Other (crossbow, knife,police glob, etc.)
21
34 34
8
3
In 2014 In 2015 In 2016 In 2017 In 2018
51
locker. 40 participants said that they store it in a safe, while only 3 mentioned that they keep
their weapon outside the house, in a parking or a cellar. Ironically, 81 out of 100 respondents
stated that their weapons are not accessible by other family members, although that most of
which are just lay in a house‘s corner completely unlocked and by extension fully accessible
by the other members of the family.
Another disappointing outcome of this survey is that 6 participants admitted –
anonymously of course– that they have never made any shots with the weapon that they own,
all of whom obtained a hunting gun, obviously taking advantage of the legal gap that exists to
the present legislation about hunting guns‘ possession licenses that are granted by the Police.
Negatively correlated these 6 respondents with the required answer on what was the reason
that led them to possess a weapon, none of them marked for hunting. Of those who claimed
that have shoot with their weapon, 39% did it while hunting and another 39% to a shooting
range.
In sequence, all participants were required to state what was the doctor‘s
specialty that signed for their mental stability, with 31 answering ―pathologist‖, 58
responding ―psychiatrist‖, while the rest 11 marked the answer ―do not know – do not
answer‖. As previously mentioned again, this conducted survey aimed to grasp participants‘
various and concealed thoughts on this so sensitive issue of weapons‘ possession. Therefore,
a targeted question that posed to them in order to unmask specific feelings and considerations
was if the fact that they possess a weapon makes them feel stressed. Surprisingly again, only
15% of the participants acknowledged that they feel stressed, giving several replies on what
is the cause that provoke this sense. 3 participants admitted that a weapon ―is a dangerous
object and can harm‖, while other 5 are afraid of the probability that their weapon might be
stolen by a burglar. Ironically again, none of these 5 respondents secure their weapon to a
specific safe.
Table 13: The Participants’ responds on the statement “the fact that you possess a weapon makes
you feel stressed”
15%
84%
1%
Yes No Do not know - Do not answer
52
Table 14: The Participants’ responds on what makes them feel stressed because they possess a
weapon
The final question of this category, remaining committed to questionnaire‘s
aspirations, looked for truthful responds by this focused group of participants. 63 out of 100
respondents admitted that they have considered other alternatives instead of granting a
weapon possession, such as placing an alarm in their home, which practically cost less in
most cases. Apparently, this attitude reveals participants‘ concerns on the overall matter of
insecurity. However, almost one out of 3 (31%) replied that they have never examined
another option with only 10 of whom disclosed that bought a weapon for hobby (hunting),
when correlated with what impelled them to get a weapon. Essentially, 21 participants on this
survey, a respectable number, who proceed to be granted a weapon possession license and in
parallel claimed that the overall pale atmosphere of insecurity and lack of policing to their
localities were the reasons that impelled them to this act, had never been troubled on
searching for other alternatives. This fact by itself, should be a matter of a great concern both
for the same possessors, but much more for the state actors who should urgently draw up an
action plan in order to be in position to control an underlying tension of weapons‘ sympathy
that is steadily generated in Greek societies, especially to deprived areas, such as western
Thessaloniki. Otherwise, the risk of derailment of this tension may become fatal and
constantly face incidents such the one of Police investigation in a case of 4,000 ―orphan‖
automatic and semiautomatic guns which found in a secret warehouse of an entrepreneur who
was a supporter of the far-right party of Greece, Golden Dawn172
.
172
Alfavita, (2013), ―They are searching for 4,000 weapons of Golden Dawn‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.alfavita.gr/koinonia/109334_psahnoyn-4000-opla-tis-hrysis-aygis [2013, October]
5
4
3
1
2
Theft of my weapon Do not do something bad
It's a dangerous object and can harm
Only in the beginning, now I 've
got used of it
Ιn case I need to use it
53
Chapter 5
Proposals for action
This dissertation‘s intention from the very beginning has been to record as much as
possible a realistic overview of the researched phenomenon and through a variety of aspirant
proposals utilizing state and non-state actors in order to eliminate the existent vices, to endow
the reader with positive feelings and a sense of an upcoming dynamic. Greece is democracy‘s
and equity‘s birthplace and should remain their guardian, instead of transforming to a
potential ultranationalistic country. Migration and weapons‘ possession and usage are the two
obsessions of Matteo Salvini, Minister of Interior in the neighbor country, worldwide known
for his racial rhetoric against refugees and immigrants173
. And through this social media
mainly presented hate speech, weapons‘ possession and usage laws are loosen thanks to
Lega‘s far – right party and the danger for Italy to be transformed to a new Far West in
Europe is evident more than ever, if someone takes into consideration that the discrimination
and intolerance incidents have increased in the last months174
.
5.1 The Legislators’ responsibility
It is obvious that this is not the path that Greece should follow and central
government‘s authorities have the main responsibility to ensure that this will never happen.
Reminding again that the actual number of hunting guns in the country are more than 2
millions, although hunters‘ licenses do not exceed the number of 300,000 and in accordance
with the negative outcome of the conducted survey, that an increasing trend of weapons‘
sympathy, steadily generated in Greek society and especially in deprived areas, such as
western Thessaloniki, the central government in absolute cooperation with country‘s judicial
system ought to take immediately specific action in five distinct directions, so as to control
this tension before it is too late.
5.1.1 Weapons’ possession measures
Apparently guns are not the only factor contributing to violence; however their
prevalence can cause petty arguments and conflicts escalating into deadly encounters. A
recent study from 2013, led by a Boston University School of Public Health researcher in US,
173
Efsyn.gr, (2019), ―Migration and weapons‘ possession and usage are the two obsessions of Matteo Salvini‖,
[Online] Available: https://www.efsyn.gr/kosmos/eyropi/189062_metanasteytiko-kai-oplohrisia-oi-dyo-
emmones-toy-salbini [2019, March] 174
Efsyn.gr, (2018), ―The xenophobic obsession of Salvini ... is fruitful‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.efsyn.gr/kosmos/eyropi/160682_i-xenofobiki-emmoni-toy-salbini-apodidei-karpoys [2018,
Aaugust]
54
found that more guns lead to more homicides175
. No single policy could stop all gun crime,
because there will always be a black market selling them. On the other hand, lawmakers in
Greece should reform -and not just regulate- the present legal status of hunting guns aiming
to limit the legislative shortcomings at all levels, analyzed already on the relevant chapter.
First of all, a restriction on the amount of hunting guns must be set, especially
for the ―self-proclaimed‖ hunters. There is no need for more than a hunting gun in order to
exercise their hobby. Additionally, age limit restrictions must be legislated, rather than
allowing possessors to grant their license till their death. Which rationale permits the re-
issuance of it until someone‘s late years? It is not proper to have stricter laws on driving issue
rather than weapons‘ possession. What is more, every 2 or 3 years a compulsory health
examination by a three-member committee consisting of a psychiatrist, a pathologist and a
police officer should be set. There is no logic when police and army personnel -who have
trained on weapons‘ carrying and usage- pass mental exams every year, while on the other
hand, people unfamiliar with special training to be considered mentally stable for the rest of
their lives by the state.
According to recent studies conducted in Sweden and Unites States in 2015,
drugs and alcohol abuse are the most crucial factors for gun violence, rather than mental
illness176
. Although Switzerland is the world‘s third country in proportion of weapons per
capita (46 weapons/100 individuals), at the same time it is the last of European countries as
far as crimes caused by weapons are concerned177
. The reason is very simple; addicts to drugs
and alcohol are forbidden to own a weapon. So, another proposal for Greece‘s legislative
reformation on weapons‘ possession issue is the prohibition to drugs' and alcohol addicts to
be granted with weapons‘ possession permission. Practically, this could be ensured by
unwarned blood tests requested by Police authorities to those who have already obtained a
weapons‘ possession license.
In sequence, these unexpected Police controls should be extended to house
checks concerning guns‘ security inside these houses. Article 8 of 2168/93 Constitutional
Law, regarding the securing regulations of hunting guns must change in accordance to the
175
Vox, (2015), ―More guns mean more gun murders. Here's how we know‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2015/12/8/9870240/gun-ownership-deaths-homicides [2015,
December] 176
Vox, (2018), ―A tiny fraction of gun violence is committed by the mentally ill‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.vox.com/2015/10/1/18000532/gun-violence-mental-illness [2018, November] 177
Ptisi & Diastima, (2018), ―Why is Switzerland with a high percentage of weapons not experiencing mass
murders like the US?‖, [Online] Available: https://www.ptisidiastima.com/switzerland-gun-laws-and-gun-
related-deaths/ [2018, March]
55
article No12 of 4325/99 J.M.D178
, in order to oblige all gun possessors to secure them in a
specially designed strong metal box. A disappointing outcome of dissertation‘s survey was
that over half of the participants (57%) hide their weapon inside the house in order to be
quick accessible by them, but not in a specially designed furniture-locker. Practically this
means that these guns lay in a house‘s corner completely unlocked and by extension fully
accessible by the other members of the family, especially children. According to data from
the 16-state National Violent Death Reporting System in the US, States with guns in their
houses see more accidental deaths from firearms, and children ages 5 to 14 are 11 times more
likely to be killed. Additionally, due to the fact that the absence of guns from children‘s
homes and communities is the most reliable and effective measure to prevent firearm-related
injuries in children and adolescents, the 2168/93 Constitutional Law should immediately be
reformed and Police should be authorized to conduct unwarned checks in order to ensure that
all guns are secured in proper safes.
Lastly, 6 participants of dissertation‘s survey admitted that they have never
made any shots with the weapon that they own, all of whom obtained a hunting gun, taking
advantage of the legal gap to the present legislation about hunting guns‘ possession.
Meanwhile when correlated with the reason that led them to possess a weapon, none of them
claimed for hunting. Apparently, this legislative deficit should be altered. Firstly, compulsory
theoretical and practical examination tests should be set for the ―potential‖ hunters, in
complete compliance with those who exercise sharpshooting or are granted with weapons‘
carrying license179
. In sequence, holders‘ certified knowledge should be retested every five
years by Police authorities, whilst furthermore an obligation by the occupants of hunting guns
to acquire an official hunting licence by the innumerable hunting clubs all around Greece
should be determined. Otherwise, after a logic period of one or two years, the license for
weapon possession should be recalled by the Police authorities. Of course, central
government is the actor who must provide incentives for seminars and trainings on safe use
and self-protection concerning all weapons, which is currently not allowed.
According to Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence180
, States such as
California, New Jersey or Massachusetts with tighter gun control laws have fewer gun-related
178
4325/99 Joint Ministerial Decision, (1999), ― Regulations for shooting clubs, possession, carrying and usage
of shooting weapons‖ 179
2881 Newspaper of the government, (2015), ―Procedures for granting a permission for weapon‘s carrying for
safety reasons‖ 180
The Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence is a national public interest law center which provides
legal assistance to elected officials, government attorneys, and activists in the United States to promote gun
control and to oppose firearm ownership.
56
deaths181
. Oppositely, only after the worst mass shooting in New Zealand‘s history and the
death of 49 people and 48 seriously injured at two mosques during Friday prayers in
Christchurch on March 15, 2019182
, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern announced
that gun laws face scrutiny and will change, following EU‘s latter strong and free of
bureaucratic procedures framework on weapons‘ acquisition and possession183
. With so many
catastrophic examples worldwide, it is politicians‘ and lawmakers‘ urgent duty to ensure that
the country which developed democracy will not face similar incidents and adopt the above
proposed solutions.
5.1.2 Recognition of refugees’ and immigrants’ dignity
The Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), after its visit to Greece from 10 to 19
April 2018, through its report recalls that foreign nationals deprived of their liberty by the
Greek authorities must be treated humanely and with dignity, highlights the systemic
overcrowding in the relocation camps184
. And it is this point where the central government‘s
responsibility lies. It is not acceptable the only accommodation site in Thessaloniki, the
former ―Anagnostopoulou Camp‖ to the town of Diavata, to be in such a miserable situation
in terms of living conditions; completely inadequate, hygiene and safety totally inappropriate,
with 1,800 people housed instead of 800, as provided by the center's structures185
. Inevitably,
protests of refugees and immigrants will occur and surely it is not their fault186
. And the
situation worsens day by day mainly on the level of mental health.
Doctors working in Greek refugee camps report asylum seekers experiencing
mental anguish and anxiety symptoms related to border closures and not knowing whether
181
Vox, (2018), ―America‘s unique gun violence problem, explained in 17 maps and charts‖, [Online]
Available: https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/10/2/16399418/us-gun-violence-statistics-maps-
charts [2018, November] 182
The Guardian, (2019), ―New Zealand gun laws face scrutiny after Christchurch attack‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/15/new-zealand-gun-laws-face-scrutiny-after-christchurch-attack
[2019, March] 183
European Parliament, (2019), ―Revision of the Directive on acquisition and possession of weapons‖, op.cit 184
COE, (2019), ―Greece: Council of Europe anti-torture committee calls for the situation of psychiatric patients
to be improved, while criticising once again the poor treatment of immigration detainees‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.coe.int/en/web/cpt/-/greece-council-of-europe-anti-torture-committee-calls-for-the-situation-of-
psychiatric-patients-to-be-improved-while-criticising-once-again-the-poor-t [2019, February] 185
The press project, (2018), ―Protests of refugees and migrants in Diavata on living conditions‖, [Online]
Available: https://www.thepressproject.gr/article/129594/Diamarturia-prosfugon-kai-metanaston-sta-Diabata-
gia-tis-sunthikes-diabiosis [2018, May] 186
Proto Thema, (2018), ―Wild fights among immigrants at the hospitality center in Diavata‖, [Online]
Available: https://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/792890/agrio-xulo-metaxu-metanaston-sto-kedro-
filoxenias-sta-diavata/ [2018, June]
57
they will be relocated or granted asylum187
. And as the EU member states continue to be
divided and reluctant to reach a commonly agreed solution based on fairness and solidarity
and enhance the Asylum processes, widespread anxiety symptoms and distress among all
groups, especially to kids, will arise. It is the central government‘s obligation therefore to
coordinate properly and effectively the healthcare services in the relocation camps, providing
medical equipment, medicines, health care staff and translators, such a vital support for
incomers to restore their traumatic experiences.
Another measure that central government should forthwith enact is the proper
operation of the permanent observatory mechanism monitoring and recording manifestations
of discrimination, xenophobia, racism and physical attacks at a national level in order to
insure refugees‘ and immigrants‘ dignity, which is implemented under the provisions of
178/2014 Presidential Decree188
. The Greek government should take into consideration the
European Commission‘s Special Eurobarometer 469 results, according to which Greek
citizens acknowledge that national governments are very important players in the process of
integration with a proportion of 72%, the third highest among 28 European countries189
,
whilst also 58% of Greeks believe that national government is doing enough to foster the
integration of refugees and immigrants into their societies190
. The only thing that should be
done is to focus effectively on the recommended proposals that the citizens themselves
suggest; improve language courses to incomers upon their arrival; introduce orientation
courses, providing basic information on the way of life, values and norms of the society;
make integration programmes and language courses mandatory for all incomers and not just
for children; promote intermingling of citizens and immigrants in schools and neighborhoods;
introduce stronger measures to tackle discrimination against refugees and immigrants191
.
However, the central government should take in seriously the role of the coordinator between
all the different actors responsible for integration, such as local authorities, NGOs, civil
actors and media, in order to hope to a controlled, lawful, monitored and two-way successful
process.
5.1.3 Assistance provision to other actors
187
Chatham House, (2016), ―Refugee Crisis: Europe Must Find a Humane and Dignified Response‖, [Online]
Available: https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/refugee-crisis-europe-must-find-humane-and-
dignified-response [2016, November] 188
Greek Police, (2019), ―Services for dealing with racist violence‖, [Online] Available:
http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27..%27&perform=view&id=23730&Itemid=
1027&lang= 189
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 148 190
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 156 191
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., pages 113-114
58
It is a fact that at the national level the legal framework for integration is
already set. It is thus vital that the national authorities should have integration strategies with
specific measures as analyzed before. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously, this is a two-
way process. The Central government should first of all communicate with the inhabitants
and persuade them that although refugees‘ and immigrants‘ long-term support is expensive, it
finally pays off in the long run especially by benefiting the children. Only by this way an
acceptance and acknowledge that integration can take a long time, might be achieved192
. In
parallel, while most Europeans including Greeks, view integration as a two-way process in
which both host society and incomers are responsible, legislators and judicial authorities
ought to ensure that people who enters the country must obey the laws, learn the language
used by the majority of their new neighbors and strive to make themselves useful and not a
burden to the society in which they live in193
. By adopting a mandatory integration policy and
at the same time through a respectable funding to all related and coordinated state and non-
state actors for effective integration actions into the localities, Greece could communicate a
positive intent; a strong commitment to invest in the future to a peaceful coexistence between
local residents and refugees-immigrants194
.
5.1.4 Fake news’ control
The media occupy an important public space in our culture and both reflect
and shape public culture as well as people‘s private relationships195
. Fake news and
disinformation –information deliberately manipulated with the aim of fooling people– have
become an increasingly visible global phenomenon. Social media and their personalization
tools have made it easier to spread bogus stories196
. Significantly, six out of ten news items
shared on the social media were not even read first by the user who shared them. Some 85%
of Europeans face ―fake news‖ as a problem in their own country, and 83% consider ―fake
news‖ to be a problem for democracy in general. Of course, the media are not the only
influence on people –other key sites of power and influence include the family, schools,
peers, church, work place, and so on. However, the media play an increasingly important role
192
World Economic Forum, (2016), ―10 ways countries can help refugees integrate‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/10-ways-countries-can-help-refugees-integrate/ [2016, May] 193
European Council, (2010), op.cit., page 55 194
The Conversation, (2018), ―Support for refugees increases when refugees participate in integration
programs‖, [Online] Available: https://theconversation.com/support-for-refugees-increases-when-refugees-
participate-in-integration-programs-99270 [2018, July] 195
Carter C. and Weaver C.K., (2003), ―Violence and the media‖, page 162 196
EPRS, (2019), ―How to spot when news is fake‖, [Online] Available:
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/599386/EPRS_ATA(2017)599386_EN.pdf [2019,
February]
59
in everyday socialization processes in many countries around the world197
. The spread of fake
news through the media is in the epicenter of a longstanding debate this period in Greece
especially after the last incidents, regarding the noxious fake message that dispersed through
refugees‘ and immigrants‘ mobile devices calling on them to gather in Diavata, Thessaloniki
so as to head all together for the north borders where at the exit points there would be
volunteers and employees from NGOs aiming to sneak them into the next country198
. It was
only after this incident and after two thousand refugees and immigrants were gathered to the
region that the Greek authorities took action so as to calm down the crowd, informing both
the officials of the Ministry of Migration Policy and NGOs dealing with refugees and
immigrants, of the possibility this ―fake‖ message being a trap set by a circuit of traffickers
who staged the turmoil in order to exploit once again the refugees and immigrants.
Simultaneously the growth of negative images about incomers in many
Internet sites and social media‘ accounts, congenial to far-right beliefs, promoting
Islamophobic and anti-immigrant feelings is evident. It is the Central government‘s
responsibility to safeguard both inhabitants and refugees-immigrants from this malicious
atmosphere, and the knowledge to achieve it exists already and is provided by the European
Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), which published a document, addressed to the
Members and staff of the European Parliament as background material to assist them in their
efforts to confront fake news‘ spread. According to this document 8 proposals are given in
order for someone to navigate safely in the ―ocean‖ of information and find the right path
through the disinformation199
; simultaneously checking the content, the outlet, the author, the
sources and the pictures; thinking before sharing; comparing with reliable sources; and finally
reporting fake stories.
Furthermore, the European InVID platform200
- funded by and collaborating
with the EPRS- designed and enabled novel newsroom applications for broadcasters, news
agencies, websites, newspapers and publishers to integrate social media content into their
news output without struggling to know if they can trust the material or how they can reach
the user to ask permission for re-use. InVID platform ensures that verified and rights-cleared
video content is readily available for integration into breaking and developing news reports.
197
Carter C. and Weaver C.K., (2003), op.cit., page 166 198
Cnn Greece, (2019), ―The fake note for opening the border that sent the immigrants to Diavata‖, [Online]
Available: https://www.cnn.gr/news/ellada/story/171931/to-fake-simeioma-gia-anoigma-ton-synoron-poy-
esteile-toys-metanastes-sta-diavata [2019, April] 199
EPRS, (2019), ―How to spot when news is fake‖, op.cit. 200
The InVID project-innovation action develops a knowledge verification platform to detect emerging stories
and assess the reliability of newsworthy video files and content spread via social media.
60
Validated by real customer pilots, InVID helps protecting the news industry from distributing
fakes, falsehoods, lost reputation and consequent lawsuits201
.
At national level, there is a clear lack of a comprehensive legal framework that
deals exclusively with cyber issues and ―fake news‖ crimes. So far, the Greek courts attempt
to resolve disputes which rise in the Internet environment, however inconsistent verdicts are
inevitable in various cases, which consequently result to the so-called legal uncertainties.
Nevertheless, the fact that the law concerning the dispersion of ―fake news‖ is on public
debate, aiming to its reformation and tightening the penalties when the law is broken, is
without a doubt a positive step for the Greek society202
. The Central government therefore
should immediately disseminate -as a first step- this useful tool of 8 directions-
recommendations203
, distributed by the EPRS and proposed to be followed, to all coordinated
actors and mainly to all media sectors, demanding to be spread and become familiar by all
residents of this country. Finally, the establishment of a Police‘ permanent mechanism,
monitoring the connection between crimes and the origin of those who committed them
across Greek regions should in parallel be developed. By this way official authorities would
have a reliable tool, whose facts could not be denied by anybody, neither the xenophobic and
racist parties nor the –vulnerable in disinformation– Greek population.
5.1.5 Security's sense consolidation
Without a doubt, none of the above proposals could practically succeed if they
will not be combined with a security‘s sense stabilization strategic plan. Neither any
welcoming successful integration, nor any weapons‘ possession decrease can be achieved if
Police authorities will not manage to limit crime rates in deprived areas such as western
territories of Thessaloniki. 3 out of 4 participants who acquired a weapon in the period 2014-
2018, according to essay‘s survey, claimed that reasons correlated with conducted crime to
their localities, boost them to buy a weapon for their protection. Taking into account also
Police‘ official data about thefts, burglaries and robberies in Thessaloniki which are in a
steady increase from 2014 till now204
, the central government must recognise and concede
201
Invid Project, (2019), ―InVid‖, [Online] Available: https://www.invid-project.eu/ [2019, April] 202
Athens Bar Association, (2019), ―Article 187; Fake News Spread‖, [Online] Available: http://www.dsa.gr/e-
διαβούλεςζη/άπθπο-187-διαζποπά-τεςδών-ειδήζευν [2019, April] 203
EPRS, (2019), ―How to spot when news is fake‖, op.cit. 204
Greek Police, (2019), ―Criminal Statistics‖, op.cit.
61
Thessaloniki‘s mayors who urgently request for additional 24-hour police patrols in their
municipalities in an attempt to redintegrate the feeling of security to the locals205
.
However, worth mentioning is the ―City‘s Police Hearing Day‖ espousal by
Thessaloniki‘s Police Headquarters started on September 27, 2018, on which every last
Thursday of each month, a four-member committee is set up to hear citizens‘ problems live,
highlighting therefore Police‘s social face and strengthening the relationship of mutual trust
and understanding between the Police and citizens, aiming subsequently to their insecurity
feelings‘ reduction206
.
5.2 Mass Media’s proper response
Media narrative rests heavily on the inter-connection between cultural difference and
integration. However, the generalized suspicion against Islam that fosters prejudice cannot be
explained by the numbers of Muslims. Anti-Muslim attitudes exist without Muslims. In fact,
in the eastern European countries, where the number of Muslims is negligible, prejudice
against Muslims is prevalent. That is the power of prejudice: it exists even in the absence of
contact with the group against which it is directed. Especially where information about the
group is rejected and contact avoided, there is no real experience that could refute the
prejudice207
. The speed and ease with which hate speech travels across national boundaries
and the willingness of extreme populist media to disperse it, raises certain challenges to
regulation of hate speech. Namely, it asks how free speech might be balanced with equality
and human rights within a democratic society208
.
For example, worldwide, news reports often headline claims from police or other
officials that appear to be unsympathetic or dismissive of black victims. When contrasted
with media portrayal of white suspects and accused murderers, the differences are more
striking. News outlets often choose to run headlines that exhibit an air of disbelief at an
alleged white killer‘s supposed actions. Sometimes, they appear to go out of their way to
boost the suspect‘s character, carrying quotes from relatives or acquaintances that often paint
205
TyposThes, (2018), ―Thessaloniki: More staff for EL.AS. and 24-hour patrols are demanded by S.
Daniilidis‖, [Online] Available: https://www.typosthes.gr/thessaloniki/152025_thessaloniki-stelehosi-tis-elas-
kai-24ores-peripolies-zita-o-s-daniilidis [2018,March] 206
Life-Events.gr, (2018), ―Thessaloniki: Police welcomes citizens on the hearing day‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.life-events.gr/gegonota/thessaloniki-i-el-as-ypodechetai-tous-polites-stin-imera-akroasis/ [2018,
September] 207
Zick A., Küpper B. and Hövermann A., (2011), op.cit., page 161 208
Daniels J., (2009), ―Cyber Racism; White Supremacy Online and the New Attack on Civil Rights‖, page 24
62
even alleged murderers in a positive light209
. And while we defend freedom of speech and
media credibility, we must rally our creative energies to find practical and effective solutions
other than the blunt one of censorship, mainly through the prism of peace journalism210.
Peace journalism is based on the proposition that the choices journalists make while covering
conflicts tend inescapably either to expand or contract the space available for society at large
to imagine and work towards peaceful outcomes to conflicts211
. Thankfully, promising
examples of peace journalism are detected in all media sectors in Greece every day.
For example, ―Migrant Birds‖, a newspaper written by refugees and immigrants from
the Shisto Camp near the capital of Greece which is distributed by the ―Journal of the
Editors‖ newspaper in its weekend edition, aiming to make indigenous population familiar
with their anxieties, feelings and hopes212
. Excellent idea is in addition the promotion by
successful integration examples of refugees and immigrants into the Greek society, such as
the case of Mokhtar Rezai, an Afghan unaccompanied minor in 2001 who became active
supporter of the refugees and vice-president of the Greece‘s Afghan community in 2019,
transmitting optimistic messages to the potential viewers213
. However, the Hellenic
Broadcasting Corporation, country‘s state-owned public radio and television broadcaster, is
the most sympathetic and dedicated to a proactive intercultural dialogue.
Exemplary is ERT3214
effort which devoted its entire program on November 27, 2015
in order to show all aspects of the refugee problem, with direct links and journalistic
missions, responses and testimonies, from the relocation camps, hot-spots and refugees‘
communities all around Greece215
. But the highlighting of actions taking from state and non-
state actors by the local newspapers is also remarkable in Thessaloniki‘s press. Taking
advantage of the celebration of the World‘s day against racism on March 21st, 2019, a human
chain starting from the port of Thessaloniki and ending up in the White Tower had been
created by the residents of Thessaloniki and demonstrated by the local press. Participants 209
HuffPost, (2017), ―When The Media Treats White Suspects And Killers Better Than Black Victims‖,
[Online] Available: https://www.huffpost.com/entry/media-black-victims_n_5673291?guccounter=1 [2017,
December] 210
Steuter E. and Wills D., (2008), op.cit, page 146 211
McGoldrick A. & Lynch J., (2000), ―Peace Journalism; what is it? How to do it?‖, page 21 212
Efsyn.gr, (2019), ―A step of freedom from refugees for refugees‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/177937_bima-eleytherias-apo-prosfyges-gia-prosfyges [2019, January] 213
HuffPost Greece, (2019), ―Mokhtar Rezai: The Afghan Cretan‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.huffingtonpost.gr/entry/mochtar-rezai-o-afyanoanoyeiano-kretikos_gr_5c8d77f9e4b0db7
da9f41c8b?utm_hp_ref=gr-homepage [2019, March] 214
ERT3 is a Greek free-to-air television channel, owned by the Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation, the public
broadcaster of Greece. Although it broadcasts nationwide, most of the content on ERT3 is centered towards
Northern Greece, with regional studios in various cities in the north. 215
Ert, (2015), ―ERT3 devoted the entire program to the refugees‖, [Online] Available:
https://webtv.ert.gr/ert3/i-ert3-afierose-to-sinolo-tou-programmatos-tis-stous-prosfiges/ [2015, November]
63
holding a placard with the motto ―when racism is trying to break us, we stand against him‖
and wearing t-shirts with the slogan ―blood has only one color‖, wanted to make clear that the
city condemns every phenomenon of discrimination and racism, wherever it is expressed216
.
A very interesting example that should also be adopted by the Greek media comes
from Great Britain. BBC Radio and Television both initiated and now have regular shows
where feedback is sort from the audience and criticism put to BBC editors and management.
A recent episode of ―Feedback on Radio 4‖ spent a large part of the programme shadowing
the station‘s flagship lunchtime news programme to understand how they decide what they
cover, how they report on it and other insights on how the programme is produced217
. Only
through these clever ideas mass media could regain their credibility and a mutual two-way
healthy relationship might be developed between media and audience. Journalists, their
sources and their audiences are counterparts in a ―feedback loop‖ of cause and effect218
.
Unfortunately, the sector where most of the deficiencies lies is the Internet, a fertile
ground for the reproduction of xenophobia not only in Greece but worldwide. Although
Facebook, Twitter and Google have all committed to voluntarily implementing measures to
address the spread of misinformation and targeting accounts that troll other users with often
bigoted, racist content, racist attitudes are still popular219
. In 2018, Facebook has been
actively shutting down accounts responsible for spreading hoaxes in some countries. Social
media platforms should play a key role in stopping the spread of misinformation. Until
recently, social media justified their lack of action by arguing that they are not media
companies. However, platforms should be responsible for preventing the spreading of
misinformation and hoaxes for at least four reasons220
.
First, actors who spread misinformation are often part of an organized group. One
person, no matter how resourced he or she is, cannot protect him/herself from these networks.
Thus, platforms should minimize the spread of hoaxes because relying on individuals is not
enough. Second, social media platforms establish the algorithms and artificial intelligence for
timelines where hoax and misinformation are being circulated. Therefore, they are the ones
216
Karfitsa, (2019), ―NOW: Human chain against racism in the center of Thessaloniki‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.karfitsa.gr/ηυπα-ανθπώπινη-αλςζίδα-καηά-ηος-παηζι/ [2019, March] 217
Ethical Journalism Network, (2018), ―Ethical Storytelling: Journalism and Media Literacy‖, [Online]
Available: https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/ethical-storytelling-journalism-media-literacy [2018,
November] 218
McGoldrick A. & Lynch J., (2000), op.cit., page 22 219
The Conversation, (2017), ―Regulate social media platforms before it‘s too late‖, [Online] Available:
https://theconversation.com/regulate-social-media-platforms-before-its-too-late-86984 [2017, November] 220
The Conversation, (2019), ―Facebook has shut down accounts spreading fake news, but is it accountable?‖,
[Online] Available: https://theconversation.com/facebook-has-shut-down-accounts-spreading-fake-news-but-is-
it-accountable-113037 [2019, March]
64
with the knowledge and understanding to prevent ―information bubbles‖ among their users.
Third, social media companies have unlimited access to all the data to help them identify
misinformation on their networks. Last, as a part of society, social media companies have
an ethical responsibility to manage the circulation and quality of information221
.
Necessarily, a special measure that social platforms and Internet sites ought to adopt
is an adjustment of the sensitivity of hate detection tools‘ algorithms so that people are
allowed to share content, however platforms catch a lot more of the hateful stuff. Moreover,
during attacks, platforms could introduce special procedures and temporary quarantines so
that content is flagged for immediate removal but then re-examined at a later date. Creating a
shared database of hateful content is another measure which would ensure that content
removed from one site is automatically banned from another. This would not only avoid
needless duplication but enable the platforms to quickly devote resources to the really
challenging content that is hard to detect222
. Finally, while sharing is a fundamental part of
social media, and platforms actively encourage sharing both on their sites and among them,
easy sharing also carries significant risks. Extreme and hateful content is imported from far-
right sites and dumped into the mainstream where it can quickly spread to large audiences,
especially during attacks. As a solution, platforms should limit the number of times that
content can be shared within their site and potentially ban sharing between sites223
.
There are hundreds of codes of conduct, charters and statements made by the media
and professional groups outlining the principles, values and obligations promoting peace
journalism. Truth and accuracy, independence, fairness and impartiality, accountability,
humanity and solidarity are the most common themes among innumerous proposed
principles224
. The question that emerges is if the usage of the respectful investigative tools of
credible journalistic media that exists is all that is required. Or should we simultaneously
target to strengthen people‘s critical minds?
5.3 The Educators’ responsibility
Many Europeans feel ill-informed about immigration and integration related matters;
less than four out of ten claim that they are well-informed, while they are significantly
221
The Conversation, (2017), ―Regulate social media platforms before it‘s too late‖, op.cit. 222
The Conversation, (2019), ―Four ways social media platforms could stop the spread of hateful content in
aftermath of terror attacks‖, [Online] Available: https://theconversation.com/four-ways-social-media-platforms-
could-stop-the-spread-of-hateful-content-in-aftermath-of-terror-attacks-113785 [2019, March] 223
The Conversation, (2019), ―Four ways social media platforms could stop the spread of hateful content in
aftermath of terror attacks‖, op.cit. 224
Ethical Journalism Network, (n.d), ―The 5 Principles of Ethical Journalism‖, [Online] Available:
https://ethicaljournalismnetwork.org/who-we-are/5-principles-of-journalism
65
divided on the issue of whether immigration presents an opportunity or a problem. Europeans
are around twice as likely to see immigration as a problem as they are to see it as an
opportunity, with over half of the respondents in Hungary, Malta, Greece, Slovakia, Bulgaria
and Italy adopting this opinion225
. Only educators, the most reliable actors in Greece‘s public
opinion, are able to provide a genuine solution to reverse this data. Otherwise, there is no
chance for the Greek society to win the bet of healthy intercultural dialogue and prejudices‘
elimination, even if other well-intentioned efforts would be undertaken by other actors.
Greek educators and education authorities should aim to develop ‗intercultural
competencies‘ as a core element of school curricula. An optimistic proposal is the pilot
creation of a national prize to be awarded to education institutions for their work on field226
.
For instance, the Hellenic Open University through its remarkable effort launched an
integrated Action Plan, named ―Project Press‖, aimed at detecting and addressing the
educational needs of children alike with adults, who are immigrants, refugees and asylum
seekers, in Greece, a detailed plan of actions which extends to three strands of action:
research, linguistic integration, empowerment and awareness227
. Additionally, the
―Supporting University Community pathways for Refugees-Immigrants (SUCRE)‖ program,
focused on the processes of linguistic preparation and control of knowledge required for the
proper integration of refugees and immigrants in higher education, is coordinated by the
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, another remarkable initiative that should be properly
promoted and imitated228
.
Innumerable initiatives, such as ―Polydromo‖, an inter-university educational and
research programme focusing on the issue of language contact, bilingualism and multicultural
education in cooperation with educators, parents, communities and local authorities,
implemented again by Aristotle University of Thessaloniki229
, or ―Linking School and
Community‖, an undertaken project by the University of the Aegean, functioning teacher
225
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 162 226
European Council, (2010), op.cit., page 61 227
Hellenic Open University, (2016), ―The HOU is launching an Action Plan for the EDUCATION OF
REFUGEES (Project Press)‖, [Online] Available: https://www.eap.gr/en/anakoinvseis-ekdilwseis-2/general-
announcements/general-announcements/4571-the-hou-is-launching-an-action-plan-for-the-education-of-
refugees-project-press [2016, July] 228
TyposThess, (2017), ―Thessaloniki: Program for the education and support of refugees‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.typosthes.gr/thessaloniki/133056_thessaloniki-programma-ekpaideysis-kai-ypostirixis-ton-
prosfygon [2017, June] 229
European Commission, (2013), ―Polydromo: group and periodical for bilingualism and multiculturalism in
education and society‖, [Online] Available: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/intpract/polydromo-group-
and-periodical-for-bilingualism-and-multiculturalism-in-education-and-society?pdf=1 [2013, March]
66
training seminars, mobile counseling units, which visit the immigrant families, etc230
, are
showing to the overall population of Greece which is the healthy path to be followed.
Finally, knowledge about the fundamentals of Islam is highly limited, which provides
another space for Islamophobia to flourish inside Greek society. Islamophobia in Greece is
mainly found on the discursive level, while physical attacks against immigrants and refugees
based on religious motivation are fewer compared to other European countries - although
they are difficult to record231
. In January 2017, a new European project, including a partner
from Greece (ALBA Graduate Business School232
), was launched, called the Counter
Islamophobia Kit (CIK). The overall aim of this project was to produce a transferable toolkit
of counter-narratives to Islamophobia for policy makers, professionals and especially
educators from across the EU, building on an assessment of the range and content of counter-
narratives to Muslim hatred and hostility in eight European Union member states (France,
Germany, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Portugal, Greece and the UK)233
.In this
respect, the new textbooks for religious education introduced this year, which include more
information about Islam, are likely to assist the overall understanding of Islam in Greece234
.
For the same purpose, training seminars should also be held particularly for teachers,
including information on Islam and additionally on how someone should deal with
Islamophobia.
Attached to this tempo, media literacy programmes should be included as a core
element in school curricula, focused on alerting children and young people to expressions
motivated by racist, xenophobic or other related bias which they may encounter on mass
media, especially on the Internet sector235
. Furthermore, initiatives that would bring together
Christians and Muslims, especially in Greek schools could be of major importance. For
example, discussions, visits to churches/mosques, and cultural events could enable a climate
of mutual understanding to be cultivated. Though this is not necessarily the solution to the
problem, such an effort could result in the demolition of prejudices and stereotypes that exist
230
European Commission, (2014), ―Linking School and Community‖, [Online] Available:
https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/intpract/linking-school-and-community [2014, March] 231
Sakellariou A. and Huseyinoglu A., (2018), op.cit., page 38 232
ALBA Graduate Business School is a privately run academic institution in Greece. Founded in 1992
in Athens, Greece, ALBA operates under the auspices of the Federation of Greek Industries - an employers'
union in Greece, the Hellenic Management Association - an executives‘ association in Greece and the Athens
Chamber of Commerce and Industry. ALBA was the first non-state business school to be established in Greece. 233
University of Leeds, (2019), ―Counter-Islamophobia Kit‖, [Online] Available: https://cik.leeds.ac.uk/ [2019,
March] 234
Sakellariou A. and Huseyinoglu A., (2018), op.cit., pages 52-53 235
European Council, (2010), op.cit., page 62
67
among a large part of the population and could particularly help children and young people
better understand the concept of ―religious difference‖236
.
One thing is certain, that if all the above proposals deployed with devotion and
magnanimity by the last shelter, the educators, there would be a chance in sequence to
resolve the sneaky rapport with the weapons‘ possession in the country. Obviously, the
family environment and the responsibility of parents in passing on attitudes to their children
are very great. But so is that of more formal education, with its essential role, that of
prejudice‘s crusher.
5.4 The Local communities’ succor
The dangers stemming from the lacking in integration policies vary and are at the cost
of everyone. To be more exact, they seem to pose threats to societies, as their
marginalization, especially of the single males and those that are rejected the asylum and
remain at the country and the city –since there are not concrete deportation mechanisms that
are applied– can cause violent behavior, since already fights are taking place on the streets,
dividing people and the society itself. This perilous path eventually leads to situations such as
the one that occurred in Konitsa, a small city near Ioannina, Greece on March 17, 2019 when
a group of native offenders attacked and injured minors, unaccompanied refugees from a
relocation camp during sporting activities237
.
According to the European Commission‘s Special Eurobarometer 469, half of the
Greek respondents (49%) declared that integration is successful in the local area and the
country, while the other half (49%) stated the opposite238
, revealing that Greek society
appears to be divided concerning the success of integration processes. In addition, only 38 out
of the 100 participants on dissertation‘s survey conceded that they have heard at least once
that social integration actions for refugees and immigrants take place into their localities,
showing practically the direction on which local authorities and communities should follow
almost urgently. Throughout history, towns and cities have been the main sites of human
diversity, where people of different geographical background and culture came together and
lived side by side239
.
236
Sakellariou A., (2016), Islamophobia in Greece: National Report 2015, pages 253-254 237
News247, (2019), ―Racist attack: They battered minor refugees in Konitsa‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.news247.gr/koinonia/ratsistiki-epithesi-epitethikan-me-ropala-se-anilikoys-prosfyges-stin-
konitsa.6704288.html [2019, March] 238
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 62 239
European Council, (2010), op.cit., page 47
68
While debates about ―multiculturalism‖ are carried on the national or the European
level, it is in towns and cities that the reality of culturally diverse societies is lived day by
day, withal its creativity and problems. A sense of place is vital element in identity formation.
National leaders may set the legal framework, but it is the mayors and city or district
councils, working with various voluntary groups, who have to deal with the issues as they
arise. In the last resort it is often their wisdom, or lack of it, that determines whether or not
people in a given area can live together successfully, without conflict or unmanageable
stress240
. Thankfully, Thessaloniki is pioneering in initiatives targeting to bridge the gap of
differences.
Exhibitions such the one named ―The art of the other‖ that took place in
Thessaloniki‘s port facilities with paintings, engravings, and poems of refugees from Syria,
Afghanistan and Iraq, targeting to promote the diversity through culture occur very often241
.
In November 25, 2017, 200 students from city‘s schools presented their point of view and
perceptions throw documentaries about the refugee crisis, aiming to bring closer Greek
students with students from non–EU countries242
. In June 2, 2017, journalists from
Thessaloniki‘s media and refugees participated in a football tournament, which aimed to
bring city‘s inhabitants and migrants more closely243
, while there are more examples where
refugees and immigrants find sanctuary especially in football. A grassroots group of
volunteers has created its own football movement for refugees and immigrants
in Thessaloniki, with the code name ―Football for All‖; organizing a monthly event, open to
the community of Thessaloniki where everyone is welcome. Its main goal is to bring people
from different ethnicities, religions, genders and ages together and make them feel like they
belong somewhere244
.
Evidently, there is some light coming from the civil society. Local and regional
authorities have a key role to play in the process of building harmonious relations between
different community groups and reducing tensions which often arise along ethnic, religious or
240
European Council, (2010), op.cit., page 47 241
TyposThess, (2017), ―Thessaloniki: Inauguration for the exhibition "The Art of the Other"‖, [Online]
Available: https://www.typosthes.gr/politismos/133959_thessaloniki-egkainia-gia-tin-ekthesi-i-tehni-toy-alloy
[2017, June] 242
TyposThess, (2017), ―200 students made 24 documentaries on the refugee issue‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.typosthes.gr/politismos/145591_200-mathites-ekanan-24-ntokimanter-gia-prosfygiko-zitima [2017,
November] 243
TyposThess, (2017), ―Thessaloniki: Journalists vs refugees in Kafantzoglio‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.typosthes.gr/thessaloniki/131512_thessaloniki-dimosiografoi-vs-prosfyges-sto-kaytanzogleio
[2017, May] 244
Deutsche Welle, (2018), ―Refugees in Greece find sanctuary in football‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.dw.com/en/refugees-in-greece-find-sanctuary-in-football/a-44656007 [2018, July]
69
cultural fault lines245
. Finally, public statements tending to build or reinforce public prejudice
against the newcomers should not be left unanswered. Considering the aforementioned, all
citizens of Thessaloniki, and especially those in positions of authority or enjoying privileged
access to the public ear in the localities, have an obligation to condemn racial or religious
abuse, and to refute misleading generalizations or stereotypes, wherever they may encounter
them246
.
5.5 NGOs’ assistance
NGOs have already gained a position in the modern global system and have proven
that that they can influence global governance247
. However, this is a period of intense
insecurity for NGOs, with their credibility and legitimacy increasingly in question. The role
of NGOs suddenly became ambiguous. Instead of being marginalized, they can be a vital link
to and from the public, to engage policy-makers and personalities in this unprecedented
crisis. To do so, however, they need to undergo a period of self-reflection and put their house
in order. They should give emphasis on how they will distance themselves from governments
and limit their role as instruments of policy248
.
In a world where uncertainty prevails, NGOs must be an example of the world society
they want to create. In order thus, to continue to invoke the moral dimension of their action,
they need to improve their performance in terms of autonomy, transparency, accountability
and representativeness249
. Simultaneously, they should focus on how they will enhance their
remarkable efforts on activities such the ones of ANTIGONE250
and ARSIS251
NGOs.
ANTIGONE implements educational workshops based on non formal education methodology
in Greek schools on a volunteer basis, through the project ―Schools for Change‖, aiming to
the prevention and the elimination of discriminatory practices and racist incidents in schools,
the promotion of imagination, creativity and critical thinking and the development of
245
European Council, (2010), op.cit., page 48 246
European Council, (2010), op.cit., page 36 247
Frangonikolopoulos, C., (2007), ―NGOs‘ global role‖, page 249 248
Frangonikolopoulos, C., (2005), ―Non-governmental Organisations and Humanitarian Action: The Need for
a Viable Change of Praxis and Ethos‖, page 71 249
Frangonikolopoulos, C., (2007), op.cit., page 284 250
ANTIGONE - Information and Documentation Center on Racism, Ecology, Peace and Non Violence is a
nonprofit organisation that was established in 1993, in Thessaloniki. ANTIGONE develops activities on anti-
racism and non-discrimination, human rights, social ecology, peace and non violent conflict resolution, aiming
to the promotion of equal opportunities for all without any discrimination. 251
ARSIS – Association for the Social Support of Youth, established in 1992 and operating in Athens,
Thessaloniki, Volos, Alexandroupoli, Kozani and Tirana, is a NGO, specializing in the social support of youth
that are in difficulty or danger and in the advocacy of their rights. The main target is the prevention of youth
marginalisation, the elaboration of policies which defend youth rights and the active social support towards
disadvantaged young people.
70
solidarity and common responsibility feeling252
. ARSIS in an effort to make natives more
sympathetic to the newcomers, published a small magazine as a result of a 16 interviews
round with refugees and immigrants, hosted in relocation camps in Thessaloniki and Epirus
from August to October 2018, narrating their grueling stories anonymously, the paths, the
adventures, the anxiety and their nightmares253
. The wastewater of the agonizing narration of
their stories is that they feel deeply relieved after the difficult escape from their homelands
and their settlement in Greece –they are truly grateful for the hospitality– as a prelude to an
imminent happy ending in another European country where their relatives expect them.
Similarly enough, ARSIS implemented a youth club comics project in the same
aforementioned relocation camps, aiming to enhance children‘s creativity and ability to freely
express themselves, in accordance with the Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the right to freedom of opinion and expression254
. More specifically, within the
Comics Youth Club Project, which still runs, refugees‘ and immigrants‘ children are able to
express their feelings and anxieties in paper with colours. ARSIS in the late of 2016 published
the first anecdote comic book, named ―Passing Moments‖, which contained a total of 35
drawings from equal participants, both girls and boys from 8 to 17 years old, expressing their
own experiences and interests255
.
Moreover, a remarkable idea that should strongly be adopted by the NGOs in Greece
is coming from Zaatari, one of the world‘s largest camps in the Jordanian desert with about
100,000 refugees and immigrants, where all the accommodation shelters were transformed
with the aid of NGOs and its temporary residents, through the power of colors, to stupendous
artworks256
. By this way mental anguish and anxiety symptoms related to a long-lasting stay
in a place with not so appropriate living conditions might change, especially for children.
Non-governmental organizations evidently managed to enhance their performance
and effectiveness in the last decades. However, in order to continue to be actively involved in
252
European Commission, (2014), ―Schools for Change - non formal educational activities on human rights in
primary schools and secondary schools‖, [Online] Available: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-
integration/intpract/schools-for-change---non-formal-educational-activities-on-human-rights-in-primary-
schools-and-secondary-schools [2014, March] 253
Efsyn.gr, (2019), ―Refugees and immigrants tell their stories‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.efsyn.gr/ellada/dikaiomata/180670_oi-xenitemenoi-diigoyntai-tis-istories-toys [2019, January] 254
SocialPolicy.gr, (2017), ―Passing Moments; Comic book by children hosted in relocation camps‖, [Online]
Available: http://socialpolicy.gr/2017/01/passing-moments-βιβλίο-κόμικρ-από-παιδιά-θιλοξε.html [2017,
January] 255
ARSIS, (2016), ―Passing moments‖, [Online] Available: http://arsis.gr/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/
Passing%20Moments.pdf [2016] 256
Europe Now, (2017), ―From the Power of Colors to Empowered Communities: Refugee Camp
Transformations‖, [Online] Available: https://www.europenowjournal.org/2017/06/05/from-the-power-of-
colors-to-empowered-communities-refugee-camp-transformations-curated-by-nicole-shea/ [2017, June]
71
tackling global problems at all levels, they should continue to invent new ways, new ideas
and new solutions257
.
5.6 The EU’s key leading role
Concerning weapons‘ acquisition and possession issue, it is obvious that EU from
2016 made courteous efforts for setting up a strong and free of bureaucratic procedures
framework on it258
. The current revision of the EU Firearms Directive which adopted by the
Member States set stricter rules which ban certain semi-automatic firearms for civilian use,
tighter rules on the online acquisition of firearms, the EU common rules on marking of
firearms to improve the traceability of weapons, stricter conditions for the circulation of
deactivated firearms and stricter conditions for collectors, to limit the risk of sale to
criminals259
.
On the integration issue, there is widespread agreement among Europeans about the
importance of potential measures to be taken by the EU to support the integration of
immigrants. A majority of respondents according to the European Commission‘s Special
Eurobarometer 469, including Greeks, think that each of the measures by the EU explored to
support integration is important. Namely, over eight in ten respondents consider it important
to promote better cooperation between all the different actors responsible for integration
(85%), to share best practices amongst member states (83%) and to establish common EU
policies and measures on integration (82%). Just fewer than eight in ten have this view about
providing financial support to governments and civil society organizations (78%)260
.
Moreover, the majority of Greeks (92%) agree that the role of the EU institutions is important
for the successful integration of refugees and immigrants261
.
Failure to release the potential of third-country nationals in the EU would represent a
massive waste of resources. There is a clear risk that the cost of non-integration will turn out
to be higher than the cost of investment in integration policies. And more aggressive images
with new ghettos, huge discrimination and radicalization attitudes might be faced once again.
In sequence, with the EU in a deadlock over the new negotiations, regarding the reformation
of the Common European Asylum System, Dublin IV Regulation262
, it is unclear whether
member states can actually agree on a plan to effectively share responsibility in the
257
Frangonikolopoulos, C., (2007), op.cit., page 285 258
European Commission, (2016), ―Firearms Directive; Frequently Asked Questions‖, op.cit. 259
European Parliament, (2019), ―Revision of the Directive on acquisition and possession of weapons‖, op.cit. 260
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 132 261
European Commission, (2018), op.cit., page 153 262
European Commission, (2019), ―Country responsible for asylum application (Dublin)‖, [Online] Available:
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-of-applicants_en [2019, April]
72
continuing migrant crisis, with frontline member states acutely concerned that the outcome of
current talks may worsen the situation by further overburdening them263
. These problems
reflect the underlying issues that go to the heart of the European response, namely a lack of
solidarity and responsibility sharing in crucial matters264
.
The solution exists however it is harsh. The EU should find eventually the
indispensable political willingness and besides its role in proposing legislation, to obtain and
utilize its watchdog functions; monitor the implementation of EU policies by member states
and the conformity of their laws with treaties and EU laws. Failures of compliance must
result not only in the Commission bringing infringement actions against particular countries
to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), but also notable financial penalties for
failing to comply with an earlier infringement ruling are to be imposed265
. Moreover,
especially for the urgent issue of migration crisis, by confronting recalcitrant member states –
perhaps by cutting off access to EU funding – the Commission can halt the current ―a la
carte‖ mentality that leads states to pick and choose when they share responsibility266
.
Both demanding issues require solidarity and burden-sharing by all member states of
the EU and of the Council of Europe. However, particularly for the refugee and migrant
issue, they should pressingly join their forces and endeavors to work together towards a
comprehensive, coherent and transparent immigration and integration policy, before it is too
late.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Limitations
This dissertation apart from the literature review consisted additionally by a
conducted survey and its examination in order to lead to certain findings. Through this
questionnaire a general opinion was probed, therefore a bigger number of participants needed
to participate, something not so easily accomplished with such a focus group. The targeted
group ought to be both inhabitants and members of Thessaloniki‘s western territories‘
263
The Conversation, (2017), ―Has the EU really solved its refugee crisis?‖, [Online] Available:
https://theconversation.com/has-the-eu-really-solved-its-refugee-crisis-80435 [2017, July] 264
The Conversation, (2017), ―Named and shamed: EU countries are failing to share responsibility
for refugees‖, [Online] Available: https://theconversation.com/named-and-shamed-eu-countries-are-failing-to-
share-responsibility-for-refugees-80918 [2017, July] 265
Glencross A., (2014), op.cit., page 106 266
The Conversation, (2017), ―Has the EU really solved its refugee crisis?‖, op.cit.
73
hunting and shooting clubs. In addition, the participants ought to have a valid weapon
possession license, which should have been acquired between 2014 and 2018, considering
that this was the period in which the issue of immigration and establishment of relocation
camps in the specific area are included. The gathering of more responses of course would
result in more credible outcomes, however the fact that 100 answered questionnaires were
collected, taking moreover into consideration that they were distributed to the participants
through four hunting and shooting clubs hand by hand should be seen as a small victory.
Although there was not any strict time limitations for the participants, regarding the
time that they had in their disposal to complete the questionnaire –the question sheet was
dispensed to all candidates on November 2018 and was to be returned till February 28, 2019–
the questionnaire is assumed to be demanding for the respondents, with its 55 questions. It
comprised a number of various questions, aiming to measure different aspects of a special
problem, intending to present a considerable overview of what the participants believe for
refugees, immigrants and weapons‘ possession, how they were affected by the media on this
sensitive connection and all these on the basis of their personal values. On the other hand, its
questions were conceived corresponding to other surveys‘ resembling questions with similar
targets, adapted of course to the particular environment of Thessaloniki‘s western districts
having in mind study‘s focused group. Moreover, the data that were gathered inserted to a
Microsoft Excel format tool and through it outcomes and correlations came to surface and not
through a more specialized software package used in statistical analysis of data.
It should be mentioned that many candidate participants were observed to be
unwilling at their very first intention to fill in the question sheet after reading specific
required questions –especially the ones related with the possession of weapons–although they
were repeatedly informed that it was anonymously. Finally, the absence of updated official
statistics‘ release by the Police authorities, concerning the number of hunting guns‘
possession licenses that are granted nowadays –the last release was in 2012– limits inevitably
the real detection of a sullen phenomenon.
Implications for further research
As it has already been mentioned, two were the main pursuits of this survey. At first,
to bring on the surface legislative shortcomings about weapons‘ possession in Greece,
especially on the field of hunting guns, and recommend measures to be taken in order to limit
the researched phenomenon. The second core aspiration of this study was to recommend
proposals for urgent and practical solutions, so as to be adopted by state and non-state actors
74
and especially by the mainstream media, always through the scope of peace journalism, on
the sensitive issue of refugees‘ and immigrants‘ integration.
Obviously, the release of updated official statistics‘ by the Police authorities,
concerning the number of weapons‘ possession licenses that are granted nowadays, in
combination with the changes that are expected to take place to Greece‘ Penal Code and the
imminent reformation of the laws regarding the dispersal of fake news that is promoted will
offer new dynamics to a potential future investigation on the research. Moreover, in parallel
with a bigger number of participants that would provide better statistical outcomes, a further
investigation through interviews from all related sides –natives, refugees and immigrants,
journalists– aiming to detect specific thoughts and unmask the true motivations for every
single behavior, would be desirable in order to drive this research on a higher level in every
angle.
Concluding Remarks
It is a fact that the dissertation tried to combine particularly demanding issues with the
potential danger to face a dead end. Both weapons‘ possession issue and the function of
relocation camps for refugees and immigrants in conjunction with the integration processes
and beliefs are very sensitive matters that should be dealt with caution and respect to all
sides. And when they are correlated through the prism of mass media, then more attention is
demanded. Fortunately, the only serious dark correlation that was revealed by conducting the
research is that the function of the seven accommodation sites for refugees and immigrants
that were installed to Thessaloniki‘s western districts, were practically the convenient motive
for some inhabitants of the same localities to buy a weapon and not the real and core cause,
such as insecurity and lack of policing.
Realistic proposals aiming to deter or even eliminate the legal gaps that exist on the
hunting guns‘ possession processes with its obnoxious consequences were offered, following
other countries‘ standards, pioneers in this field. However, the reduction of penalties in a
series of offenses, related to criminality, such as robberies and burglaries, to the much-
debated reformations in the new Penal Code that is going to be adopted, is not supposed to
minimize the problem, rather is expected to enhance it267
.
267
Ethnos, (2019), ―New Penal Code: The 5 Friction Points - Storm-causing reformations‖, [Online] Available:
https://www.ethnos.gr/ellada/26735_neos-poinikos-kodikas-ta-5-simeia-tribis-oi-diataxeis-poy-prokaloyn-
thyella [2019, March]
75
Regarding the immigration and integration issues, it is imperative that effective
policies are developed in the EU, including Greece, in order to secure refugees and
immigrants by transforming them again to fitting assailants. Taking also into consideration
that as climate change continues, more frequent and extreme weather events are expected to
put more people in harm‘s way, which inevitably will lead to a huge increase in the number
of immigrants seeking asylum in Europe268
. Restrictive measures, like fences and troops,
eventually will prove inefficient in the face of the vast numbers of immigrants. Integration
can only succeed if all those involved play their part, so fundamental attitudes to integration
on both sides – minority and majority – are crucial. Refugees and immigrants must be willing
and able to participate, while the receiving population must be willing to accept
―newcomers‖ as equal members of their society269
. In order to reverse the tendencies of the
residents, not only in the western provinces of Thessaloniki, but also to all Greece‘s regions,
all actors must intensify their efforts simultaneously.
When it comes to mass media there is an important truth that must never be forgotten;
metaphors matter. They are figures of thought as much as figures of speech, and in their
framing of events and identities they offer a way to understand our world and to act within it.
With this power to generate and shape action, metaphor is a potent force270
. Simultaneously,
decision makers pay attention to the media. As a result, journalists reporting with care,
humanity and professionalism have enormous power to tell stories that create a new path. The
challenge that journalists face, especially in trying to practice peace journalism, is that the
issues relating to refugees and immigrants are politically motivated, sensitive and continuing
for years271
. Stereotypes and prejudices are the lifeblood of right-wing populism and
extremism, both of which threaten social cohesion and peaceful coexistence in the European
Union more than ever before. Right-wing extremists –mainly through the Internet– promote
their prejudices further and oftentimes propagate ideologies of violence against those seen as
―foreign‖ or ―different‖. Populism barks, but extremism bites272
. Thus, reporters should
make a great effort to focus on aspects that make a refugee or an immigrant stand out as
unique, rather than one of a million who suffer. These stories are more valuable for an
268
The Conversation, (2016), ―How do we deal with the prospect of increased climate migration?‖, [Online]
Available: https://theconversation.com/how-do-we-deal-with-the-prospect-of-increased-climate-migration-
69614 [2016, November] 269
Zick A., Küpper B. and Hövermann A., (2011), op. cit., page 105 270
Steuter E. and Wills D., (2008), op.cit., pages 207-208 271
Hannaford, A., Hurd, J., Parkinson, J., Robjant, K., Salloum, R., & Gering, J. (2016), ―Reporting on
Refugees: Tips on Covering the Crisis‖, [Online] Available: https://dartcenter.org/resources/reporting-refugees-
tips-covering-crisis [2016, February] 272
Zick A., Küpper B. and Hövermann A., (2011), op. cit., page 159
76
audience with critical mind, do not fuel stereotypes and –without a doubt– are more
respectful to the person or people journalists report on273
.
The media carry a heavy responsibility. They prepare, consciously or unconsciously,
the premises for ―dramatic‖ choices274
. The focal point of peace journalism is the expansion
of the conflict discourse to include peaceful outcomes and processes, making peace
perspectives visible275
. It exposes untruths on all levels, focuses on invisible effects of
violence, gives voice to all parties and highlights the peace initiatives, searching for
resolutions and reconciliations. Peace journalist is not an advocate or a judge. His/her job is
to report the news always with objectivity and balance, be critical if it‘s necessary.
Objectivity in favor of truth, where the facts should not be selected, distorted or repressed.
And balance so as to give attention to all aspects of a conflict, before, during and after, and
especially to all sides. In a globalizing world, we should learn to be as attentive to the
suffering on the other side of the horizon as in our ―camp‖276
. While stereotypes form
consciousness and their influences are reflected in society, it is journalists‘ job to help
expunge stereotypes and prejudices that they create. It is important for the EU and the media
to focus on giving information through the prism of healthy peace journalism, because this is
the only key for a co-operative or collaborative approach to this ―conflict‖277
. Only through
the difficult path of promoting peace journalism there could a chance to make equality a
central ―topos‖ in Europe.
In conclusion, the research in such a peculiar terrain of interest, in which no previous
investigation existed, constituted an exceptional challenge, aiming to offer wide-range
information, targeted results and practical proposals in sensitive issues that will continue to
be the epicenter of everyone‘s attention. This dissertation therefore attempted to provide a
valuable base for future research on a topic that will be always on the frontline of all
stakeholders.
273
Hannaford, A., Hurd, J., Parkinson, J., Robjant, K., Salloum, R., & Gering, J. (2016), ―Reporting on
Refugees: Tips on Covering the Crisis‖, op.cit. 274
Galtung J., (2006), ―Peace Journalism as an Ethical Challenge‖, [pdf] Available:
<https://eirineftikidimosiografia.files.wordpress.com/2013/11/galtung-j-peace- journalism-as-an-ethical-
challenge.pdf. (2006, Fall) 275
Galtung J., (2006), op.cit., page 2 276
Galtung J., (2006), op.cit., pages 4-5 277
McGoldrick A. & Lynch J., (2000), op.cit, page 9
77
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APPENDICES
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1. European Migrant Crisis 2015: Number of refugees, migratory routes and top
countries of origin
Source: FRONTEX, 2016
2. European Migrant Crisis 2017: Number of refugees, migratory routes and top
countries of origin
Source: UNHCR, 2018
96
3. Trends of global displacement and proportion displaced
(2007-2017)
Source: UNHCR, 2018
4. Map of functional relocation camps in Greece’s mainland for refugees – immigrants
in 2018
Source: Ministry of Immigration Policy, Greece, 2018
97
5. Arrivals of refugees – immigrants in Greece (2014-2018)
Source: UNHCR, 2019
6. Relocation of asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other EU countries,
commitments vs reality (December 2017)
Source: Eurostat, 2018
98
7. Homicides by firearm per 1 million people (2012)
Source: UNDOC, Small Arms Survey, 2012
8. Respondents’ opinion on the statement “Immigrants are a burden on their country’s
welfare system”
Source: Special Eurobarometer 469, October 2017
99
9. Respondents’ opinion on the statement “Overall, immigrants worsen the crime
problems in our country”
Source: Special Eurobarometer 469, October 2017
10. Europeans believe that immigrants want to be distinct from broader society
Source: PEW Research Center, March 2019
100
11. Europeans’ beliefs about allowing more immigrants in their countries
Source: PEW Research Center, March 2019
12. EPRS’ compass of 8 directions to spot fake news
Source: EPRS, February 2019
101
13. Distributed questionnaire
QUESTIONAIRRE
The questionairre is strictrly anonymous and it aims to elicit useful inferences which are
going to be refered on the Dissertation with the title:
«The increase of weapons‘ possession by residents of western territories of Thessaloniki due
to the installation of relocation camps for refugees and immigrants and the role of mass
media».
A. General Data – Personal Values
Gender:
Age:
Occupation:
1. What is your level of education?
a) Primary
b) Lower Secondary
c) Upper Secondary
d) First Stage Tertiary
e) Second Stage Tertiary
f) Do not know – Do not answer
2. What is your political ideology?
a) Fascism
b) Conservative Right
c) Right
d) Liberalism
e) Social Democracy
f) Left
g) Communist Left
h) Do not know – Do not answer
3. Do you believe in God?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
If so, what is your religion?
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
B. Daily Routine – Personal Beliefs & Perceptions
4. Which was your initial reaction when you were informed that relocation camps
for refugees and immigrants were going to be installed in your region?
a) Positive
b) Neutral
c) Negative
102
d) Do not know – Do not answer
5. Have you ever been at any of the relocation camps for refugees and immigrants
that functions in your region?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
6. Have you ever heard any story – incident that took place at the relocation camps
for refugees and immigrants that functions in your region?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
If so, the incident that you have heard was:
a) Positive
b) Neutral
c) Negative
d) Do not know – Do not answer
7. How often do you run across refugees or immigrants in your region?
a) Daily
b) Every other day
c) Every week
d) Do not know – Do not answer
8. Do you know that the terms “refugee” and “immigrant” are different?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
If so, could you mention a difference between them?
…………………………………………………………………………………………
9. Do you believe that the presence of refugees and immigrants in the country, will
worsen the unemployment rates of permanent inhabitants?
a) Not at all
b) Slightly
c) Enough
d) Much
e) Very much
f) Do not know – Do not answer
10. Do you believe that the presence of refugees and immigrants in the country, will
worsen the economic situation of permanent inhabitants?
a) Not at all
b) Slightly
c) Enough
d) Much
e) Very much
f) Do not know – Do not answer
103
11. The fact that the majority of refugees and immigrants are Muslims, worries you?
a) Not at all
b) Slightly
c) Enough
d) Much
e) Very much
f) Do not know – Do not answer
If so, why?
a) Cultural Difference
b) Prone to thefts
c) Religious aggression
d) Terrorists sympathy
e) Aggression towards women - Rapes
f) Other reason
12. Do you feel threatened by refugees?
a) Not at all
b) Slightly
c) Enough
d) Much
e) Very much
f) Do not know – Do not answer
13. Do you feel threatened by immigrants?
a) Not at all
b) Slightly
c) Enough
d) Much
e) Very much
f) Do not know – Do not answer
14. Do you believe that refugees will contribute to increasing crime in your region?
a) Not at all
b) Slightly
c) Enough
d) Much
e) Very much
f) Do not know – Do not answer
15. Do you believe that immigrants will contribute to increasing crime in your
region?
a) Not at all
b) Slightly
c) Enough
d) Much
e) Very much
f) Do not know – Do not answer
104
16. Have you ever witnessed any case of theft or other criminal offense, committed
by a refugee or immigrant?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
17. Are you aware that the majority of refugees and immigrants have been hosted in
homes through hosting programs of EU and UN?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
18. Are you aware that the majority of relocation camps for refugees and
immigrants in Central Macedonia are closed?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
19. Are you in favor of integrating refugee families into the local community in
which you live?
a) Not at all
b) Slightly
c) Enough
d) Much
e) Very much
f) Do not know – Do not answer
20. Are you in favor of integrating immigrants into the local community in which
you live?
a) Not at all
b) Slightly
c) Enough
d) Much
e) Very much
f) Do not know – Do not answer
21. Do you know if social integration actions for refugees and immigrants take place
into the local community in which you live?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
22. Are you in favor of taking actions from state and non state actors in order to
achieve integration of refugees into the local community in which you live?
a) Not at all
b) Slightly
c) Enough
d) Much
e) Very much
f) Do not know – Do not answer
105
23. Are you in favor of taking actions from state and non state actors in order to
achieve integration of immigrants into the local community in which you live?
a) Not at all
b) Slightly
c) Enough
d) Much
e) Very much
f) Do not know – Do not answer
24. Do you believe that refugees – immigrants should maintain their cultural identity
and adapt it to the Greek culture?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
25. Do you believe that refugees – immigrants should abandon their cultural identity
and adopt exclusively the Greek culture?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
26. How many refugees do you believe that your region could host for ever?
a) No one
b) Few
c) Enough
d) Only families
e) Without limiting
27. How many imigrants do you believe that your region could host for ever?
a) No one
b) Few
c) Enough
d) Only families
e) Without limiting
28. How do you believe the relations between local residents and refugees will
develop in your country in the following years?
a) Will improve
b) Will remain the same
c) Will get worse
d) Do not know – Do not answer
29. How do you believe the relations between local residents and immigrants will
develop in your country in the following years?
a) Will improve
b) Will remain the same
c) Will get worse
d) Do not know – Do not answer
106
C. Media Influence
30. From what media are you mainly informed for refugees and immigrants?
(More than one answer is allowed, positioning in ascending order)
Ascending Order (1 till 5)
a) Television (News)
b) Radio
c) Newspapers
d) Internet sites
e) Social Media Networks
31. How are you affected by watching television (news) about refugees –
immigrants?
a) Positive
b) Neutral
c) Negative
d) Do not know – Do not answer
32. How are you affected by listening radio about refugees – immigrants?
a) Positive
b) Neutral
c) Negative
d) Do not know – Do not answer
33. How are you affected by reading newspapers about refugees – immigrants?
a) Positive
b) Neutral
c) Negative
d) Do not know – Do not answer
34. How are you affected by Internet sites about refugees – immigrants?
a) Positive
b) Neutral
c) Negative
d) Do not know – Do not answer
35. How are you affected by Social Media Networks about refugees – immigrants?
a) Positive
b) Neutral
c) Negative
d) Do not know – Do not answer
36. Do you believe that there is a delibarate confusion between the terms “refugee”
and “immigrant” on Television?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
107
37. Do you believe that there is a delibarate confusion between the terms “refugee”
and “immigrant” on Radio?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
38. Do you believe that there is a delibarate confusion between the terms “refugee”
and “immigrant” by the newspapers?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
39. Do you believe that there is a delibarate confusion between the terms “refugee”
and “immigrant” on Internet sites?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
40. Do you believe that there is a delibarate confusion between the terms “refugee”
and “immigrant” on Social Media Networks?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
D. Possession of Weapons
41. What impelled you to get a weapon?
(More than one answer is allowed, positioning in ascending order)
Ascending Order
a) Crime increasion
b) Installation of relocation camps for refugees – immigrants in
the region I live
c) Insecurity
d) Lack of policing in my region
e) Hobby (Hunting)
f) Other reason (personal threats, sharpshooting, etc)
42. What weapon did you buy? a) Semiautomatic hunting gun
b) Automatic hunting gun
c) Pistol
d) Revolver
e) Airsoft gun
f) Shooting gun
g) Other (Crossbow, knife, police glob, etc)
43. What year did you buy the weapon you own?
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
108
44. How much money did you spend for the weapon you own?
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
45. Where do you store the weapon you own?
a) In a specially designed furniture - locker
b) Inside the house
c) Outside the house
46. Is it accessible to other family members?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
47. Have you ever shot in the past with another rifle or gun?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
If so, where?
…………………………………………………………………………………
48. Have you made any shots (even a test one) with the weapon that you own?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
If so, where?
…………………………………………………………………………………
49. Have the other family members made any shots (even a test one) with the
weapon that you own?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
If so, where?
…………………………………………………………………………………
50. What was doctor’s specialty that signed for your mental stability?
a) Pathologist
b) Psychiatrist
c) Do not know – Do not answer
51. The fact that you possess a weapon, makes you feel stressed?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
If so, why?
…………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
109
52. Have you ever thought other alternatives, since you felt threatened, such as
placing an alarm in your home at less cost?
a) Yes
b) No
c) Do not know – Do not answer
Thank you very much for your precious time…