1n 2tz n th enemy sttion w rerovrtd as foliow:7 The
%ritiah 53$ Infantry iviothe Guards arow cdv fori, ndthre
armored dtvi-fons, were cn trated in the atack area Itlor, the % '.1
Ziver. Canadian forces are not rcp tor~ine in the attack. -ear .-:emo
the eraeo of two arncread divt.sio-'s, two .infanty divfis , anid severa
armored brinaes was assumed. fligh water rrcventd the tosibility of
attack d~ the front bold by Army Group E. Ffay tanks succeeded in
reaching Ginve and the road through the Retebawld. Thirteen ersy tank
were disabled. Corps Luettwits was to be assigned to this sector where
parme xwte troo sa w-re now prtly plcred.
Preparations for t aw enemy attack crntinued along the front held b
t-rmy Group T~. The Thar overflowed its bTan ad forced the enem positions
back as far as Jtalich. Again the 'aes main effort was directed against
Pruem, whc habd already bc--en ent ,,l The 9th Panner Tivision was cone*
zittad. lbthis area the enemy nemployed tour divisions.
to oed fighting continued in the Army Croup C area. The Tiaraonau
Forit ws blocked by the construction of. otstals, Ao crer wes issued.
for th rehabilitation of three divisio which bad forely been employed
inAlsace.
an e he iider in Cief of the Navy informed the C
snder in Chief West that twentw boats loaded with 9,00 tons of oal
adten empty boats andi tboats, eli belongig to th Ilv, were bafted
in the attok area at Cl*e. The A. w asked to help with their snow-
tion . it van stated by tel hone that the lol headquarters had already
-.136-
ma ruins for the reoxu3 at the boat s p~er th protecti on of art.ilowry
J~ r or of the Chief of the Webreaht Qrrtion Sta'he chief
of staff of the Condner b2Chief to tsutzitted a report Ly LVI Carp;
with rerird to the enemy's rerxets tion of the Wotwall northeast of
wuhet, where a C'roup of bunkers at .nndsheid bad boon captured on
4 January Tb. report called attention to the emhusted condition and
the lack of coo bt experience of the bunker garriso ns (the 326th Yolks
greneier Vi'ytion), the lack of re seres an the iraadeqizto antitank
defense. In sOdition, the Coarier in Chief west pointed out that the
average daily losses in thi area asounted to about 3,000 men, motly
infantry, ile the daily replacements including returning convalescents
nbened only 200) me.
On 12o ?orr the sw captured the north part of Clove. The
situation in the Neiohsw ld wan not clear. Some houses were lost at
Gennep. A counterattack waas launched by the XXXXII Panzer Corps eimploy-
iug two batteries of the 116th !flhw IDivision a.t, after 1200 hoar, the 15th
Paanerga ler Dhlalocn. The flooding caused the Ru flyer to widn by
three hundred atrs 9 anl created stamps In the Seeiel the 24 83
?Pamn fitsla recaptured '?rusm and sweeded in restoring the situation
along that etiro sector of the front. Te nay ho wvr, w"ale to
enlarge the brd ehed at Dllinja and chternach.
tootise fihting continued in the An Group 0 area. he the
front blge at the Pian, fighting took place aeaur ttenofn.
-137.-C 204~
a~n 12 F'ebruary the Cou~nder in Chief = ast subitted a report or the
situation of Firm~ :osips B and ii with regard to the nten~ sng ensm
offensive against the ihive - eitphalian industrial area. fIn part, this
offensi~ve was already In progress.
Of 29 divisions as~signed to ^r.y Group B, 7 were fully ready for.
co nto .t, including 2 motorise diviions, 17 were capable of limitsd
defensiv, action, and 5 were battle-weary and not fully able to fight.
?Total losses since 16 December amounted to 832, 234 men; replacements for
the same period numibered 29,7O$ men. Infantry strength amounted to 45
full battalions or 6b full divisions.
On the other hand, the enemy was so strong that-in the sector held
by the Fifteenth Prm one battalion faced oeenemy division, and in the
sectors held by the %ventb Army and the Fifth Panzer Army one battalion
face. two-thurd8 of an enem division. In the Fifteenth. Army sector,
115 tanks and assault guns facd 1, 000 enemy tanks. In the Fifth Panser
Army sector, 185 tanks and assault guns faced 400 enemy tanks. In the
Smieth Army sector, 114 tanks end assault guns :faced 800 enemy tanks.
Reere being shifted to relieve the particularly unfavorable situation
of the Fifteenth Army did not move as fast as enemy forces being concentrated.
in the general vicinity of Mshen.
The position of Bey Qroup H was slightlymr favorble. Nine 'divi..
alons were availabl t, of which only four parachute divisions and the 15th
Pansergrendier Division were not fully capablee of combat. IWith the exwep-.~
tior of the 7th ?'amohutte Division and some of the cadres, the parachute
Mt -.020 el , .a
dtviiorzo ht' it9.: cot exPerinoM' The ezn aoroe oposn t
rzaicx~t dv~icn wroez~Q~eat 1C infantry r94arZ-rOd dVi, r"s
and prrobably an a tios Carmored Prig ls The oroprton ot forcs
on tho 7 tffteenth Anmy front wereA now to be two utnc a half times leiss
favorable than ~ryn tho nuoesaul doe no on the A rhe are. Moree
over, the strong artiliory- support wic h had in'de t hat suceeso possible
would novwb lackin due to the shortage of aunition. On 10 Yea ry
the Comwaner in. Chief at had drawn attention to thin fact after an
order was issued by the Chief Zpsly' on 7 ditnstratior Officer limiting
the allotment of lisght field howitzer ammunition on, the entire estrn
Front for Vebruary to 1.1 baste ,sues and for he-avy field howitzers to
045 basic iasses)
The ehsnnes for a sucessful defense of Aechen anid the area heldb
the paehtte. divisions ha therefore decreased. flooded sections of the
front would protect Army, Croup !~ only. until 16 Fer r. Periss ion had
been granted bythe F"4hner on 8 7ebruary to onen the iuw and rft " T e ey
dams, The time rapt int.o& before the start of the aenw offenive Vag to
butilized for tranferrtg further foge to the Fifteenth ?&rm area.
"ta not ao pesm , oocted the, C ridr in Chief 11at, 'blat in
viev of# the decisiv nsture of the coin Wtfle, I consider it- dt
to gives aclearr ot of the eituations I Zaeit. Both officers-am
meare fully aware of their respoeibltties.'#
Once aaib the Comander in Chief Vest repeated his request for the
rapid shipnnt of reerves arnd for an E ncreaseod amount, of . f"uel, swmantion,
and other supplies.
?43 e139s2
A direettvD wanH issued in ose of an enemy brek- through from. the
fleve area. taiio Gran co r-mesres.
On jerm the Vu ehrer issue a pramorad : ir wtie to theO Coz
mender in 014a2 West dionatoed o the rwrtng of IC rbrw r7 to cover the
case of' an Allied broet-tbrowjh from the i~ichewal' or across the 1Roer
Rtver in the d rection of the Rhine. In s aa an event, the Co -rder in
Chief pasat was to defend th flhie beteo Atnem and Dorm, including the
prepare bridgeheads on the. western bak. A proposed defense plan wee t
be submtted in advance but no directive wore to be issued to the sub-
ordinate e smaniers or troops. Firm contact was to be ma Ltaine bt en
those forces detendins th~ c W- at l and thoe holding th~ Thtno, at least
between Nuee adthe ?srgheia. - Roer pocition near Olutran. To strengthe.
the !ttne defenses, the construction of a fortification system along the
eastern bank from ifmmerioh to Itarlaruhe was ordered. 'Unless the 3elgolau
tight were endangered at thm; sn time a~i an enemy treet-rouxgh occurred,
the Oc ° ander in Chief est was to be sent all ams:Lablo forces from the
ante at tim Oprtions Staff orth Eost.
On '2 eb rr the Luftwaffe Uigh :osmnd received directives for the
eoitaont of the air fore in the area 'Nijmegen - Venlo - Sehieldan, Where
defeus lye fightin had already begun on the enev'e loft wing. Th. weaken-*
la of the air force in the Wet in fayo of the Est, together with the
low sn ply offuel, ade necessary a clear Ulttion of the objectives.
The in effort was to be directed a~ eInst the section of the f ro between
rijmogen and Ichiciden. Plombing was to becarried out both during the day
and at night.
k' t~Q20 -140..
Cm 3 'bsr r ships at Antwotn amiountd to 150,000 Irds TS4StA!
tons loss tA wetI last 1~ere. 111a zir rail3s waye no , ftopc bc!a s
of the lack of fuel. Zne.' atta cs in the Vlove ares, were rust bystrong
ar tilery ire, The Qerwm UTIrn3f&Lb ODG$'Om ThBC3Vn
a short :dtance into the ;;sichawald, but the oea ruhed, thead east of
Clove as fa as Eaaselt. Ground wan also lost on the left wing. Frther
to the south, high floo aters continued to effect the si tation. At
?rnthe en~had again :ented th tow n fighting contine, while
at X ronu feld the C era line bold.. ighttn also canined at Zohtcrraoh
but the eneWy made no gains. Enthe Aachen area the headqszatere o the
LVIII Panzer Coras was emloyd s an oners tiona staff.
In the Arm roup area it appeared 'that the %S lX Ccrps was t
be coatta against the lint 1fl7. 'rh location of the three armored
dit ion aruo to bo west of Colirr was not clear.
As priotwly anunced, the Gsawier in Chief West n'dbittr a
report on 13 ? ebrtwry concerning that shortage of rumnition and its vroatble
effect on the fighting along the entire Wstorn Wrot. The preet supply
of Ight and heavy field howitzer asunition wa carclted to last for
only on. week of heavy defonsiwe fightinj. While the clculation a only
theoretical, it could be applied to the most serious circmtaossw which
mgt occm=. The C sumde r in Chef W .tasked for a raptA deciio onth
asmat of additional eanitn that could be ezpected in Febrry.
At 2000 hours onflekM= a study was sutaitted bythe o r.
in Chief West regarding teproibibe intentions of the enemy. T he attack
N .
tr u t> Yt'o; ' te h b th Virt phase ot f gnrddede
wau to be attackd tr~ tiwl rear. IT this Wire su aeatful, the #flew4
would thcm, ! .a froztal attack tetvei Wv3lo ar4O Re end.« t'1C eni
the ttac er 1 not fimuesst4 t * 4. l2th A $ roup vould attempt
a rtmhrouh inthe directio tW Cologn and fttr oo batg theER tn e e rrn in s , w ou ld se ad to tti not h a d so uth . . T n to th b b r a ~ h v a . 1 a a u # t e U .. e t
Anyq vued attnst a bmrathroues into th raatte .by wey of Eatser-w
u ia t n rm art tend va k order to ra ck theTe O s t r o v o .h ld i * t rieu tr p la in .
amn tdthdrsv volutamr in a ao malte 'dvun atit to tbea
Rhne Pwner, if onatact b.W..t th Tvertyttfth Ar n d the pasoae
at. divisin vere broken, t1e front was to be wlt r0n to the WSSER
Postin (I s~ Ztea a. tet of trna) Ths ot g4ving uptortveten
flP n aMd th 72 ba, as rai as the ab aninent or it nava
E'wtioa (the ampiqwzt of aze motor bits, midget n
sines) at the mouth o1 the bfo t Rieran the vrtlen ar rtatth
*mui. A is of sbc owisaq m id ab ae W' the ebre.
Anr wp P Ad so tar not be se otake nob a 4.velcmst uder
:h tu t plie ot possible en air lanins o4cmlr been
aseed. A nswsf lsrg..ai airborne operation on the coat ofitla
land Bieht, it was falt, weud brintg about the ooflp of the Wetr Front.
!4S 0-0d.20 42
A ±rthor e'itim&to of the sitestiara in th -_, nth Army sector pre .ad
th o a of Army (Orur a Subiit ted by t o ~o tdo it C pie
West pointed out the. possibility of an enimy thrust az int the Wstvll
Tortifioactiona at the Ours rc ur positomni. In oso sutficient resre
could not be sent (two to three diviionzs, roplsoee.nts for the troops on
teline, fuel, an a w tion ), it wa s uggstedl thait the front be with.
drawn stepa by step tothe shorter true ipioition. In addition, it ws pro-
posed to moveu oe VO hsstu division each; as reserves for the Eyll posi-
tion and for the fortifid town of Trier. This ruqs~t was refused by the
Co mnder in Chief Wst b enure it constituted a delaying action and, among
other. reasons, because of the vit hdrawl to the north of the U.S. 6th Armored
Ditvision, With regard to the eployment of two Volkestur d ivisions, the
toamaderof PArmy Group B was referred to 'a .eter Sint,, simn the Ca03w
mander in Chief West had no authority to m~ake assignments from the zone of
the pntrior.
On U b~rCanadian treop wee reportedly taking part in the attack
OnCleve. ~orinferemes we being receive by the on~, whose in
effort ws stil saoentra ted at Vano. The !. . 99th lnfattriiionnowe ito the Vrvlers area, while the whebuts of the fr1 infnr
an five armored divisions which in the eantime wre prsmdto have been
rehbiltaed)wenet flir.
Tb. Geram dfse. on bot si4es of lin vas still .s s"" am a.
eounts bthrxst Into the 1W*bsvald we begn tnn ~ssur at Gonep
contire. The level of the Rur ?fiver had risen and the Rr iake, as a
-,142-
M2 443a
result ot mlting snow, bid risen anothe two ters despite the onelig
at the d&:. -'trony nrssueonu at* rut ariC Z Thnrah, evdetl
a im!e at bring through the b'1izo in the. flank, Severl grPof i hos
were lost at ?ren, the enemy received rin oroatints. The in line of
resistance was no the Pnoum switch position. - At 77ohternoh the situation
had becm more acute.
In the Army, Grop B sector the flohcusollnr l Bridge near Cologne was
again abl, to support 25-tc vehicl loads and: the doable tnt* railroad
bridge wes argan ins.
Ithe AryGroup 0 sectr the whereabouts of the .S. 10th Armored.
Divis ion we not detent. .~ s artiller y wes re inforce in the r orbach
ad Igua arose. ?ightin contipue at 'ther bulge of the front ontin
Pide. Inthis area the en .reported theaptur of 150 sea which
corresu ponmds' to t he number of our teeing2 .i rtilery fire ch hn. Vletm ob rai botied omnw n
the ppe fline Th Vokasurswasto e oganuafy asor.'!into the
three Als.atia n division which were being norgaaised at the front along
the Bhin.,
on It Fe bnarr the Cousdri Chief Waet as orered to denine
Lhih f ea vel nfale. to reinforce tien southern flatk of Sevent
Army in the ma n area In ease it vas, nt posible to bring fown'd
the 1th S83 e d e Diviio. First consideration weto begige
to the 24 asn Division.
on15 'mc t was learn that on Arioan division 1.4 been
shifted fromColar tothe Mochen area. At %chtermcbh the enemy had
){1 C-0230
comwmitted the 15th, 80th, and. eleen s of ths 76th !nt nr Pivisicns.
The 6th, 17th, aM +2A irtxrno ri inioL sere col zitt at- the front or
ware held inthe r.n' The 101st Airborne Uivis ion, which was last
repote near iguenau, nreanbly was badly wekene anid had been with-i
draw from the lin.
Nothing further- was reportaed about an apparently aiuior enemy landin
on houwt bland,
On the Western Front there were no hanges of any iportance. Attacks
near Cit were +ontinued, with the sin enemy effort inthe left sector.
Most of the attacks were relsed. rnemy attacks along the roaxd were,
considered likel to coantinue. 1een mil vMage were lost, The
fighting near rrs adin the ohterbaet area was contiued.
Ithe Any Group C area it appeared that vrnchb armored forces would
beccntte aginst the ist Army
An order of the fTebrer on 15 rebntary assigned the Uth snser Pin..
Ston to Army Grou E in the area northwest of Colon.
.1 i u"talk we ported concerning posible ladings on the.
North Sea coast and in the northern areae. ?iaoe diploatia mirlee played
a pert In dissecutiug tis intonmation, it ma7 have been only. deceptive
nae. Ro eccnrtion of shipping wsrepoted. ?wcftoa r divi-
sions wre said to bestill in Zaglaud, three of which were ksrlcn; all
ofthee were expece to beat to rnc. While, the Luft'affe did not
expet any eneWlanding, there was son possibility that as taetical land-.
ing might m sde. Peconniamrnewa ordered.
.. L 4h..
0-'45-
The !Wsrse of' the rtibh 15th an 3to .nfnrry rvts ions arodun
love ts con firmead. :so rport& in tht area wwere four additionali
infantry divioions, one naoed division, and two armored brigde. The
4th Psnzer tvision was moved forward into the Rchternaoh area. At the
sons tis, the 4th Paach t ividion wis withdrawn under the momentary
proection of t wa wath'r and was transferred to the Clove area. The
division is replantd by fres of the p1amut 7froning Army. Follow-
ig a report in person by Cnl )odel, the ?ixehrer ordered tin transfer
of the flth 'Panser fivision into the Cologne area in oppositio to the
evr,-ressed opinion of the Cie nder in Chief Jest.
T)1 organization of Korpsoppen9 on the Western Front as considered.
The Fuebror was opposed to the plan, since the rtention of divisions would
tend to deceiv e the and , at the sear tin:, allow our o w = to
kvno exactly what strength was available.
The attack againat showon was repsned* rnmmy attase at Clove
were usccesfual and heavy losses were inflicted. There were 560 enemy
dead. The Coa trop fought well. here scented to be no dangr of a
reakathough between araie, sine, the Ri River formed a strong natwral
obstae agiont a thrust t the east.
ittle ativity we reported near Plue, whl at tornob the
eumy s reulsed. In th, opinion of Fi6 rhatl Mdel the high water
wald resin ntfl 20 lebwwy aoording to ether repors, the high water
would last for an additional ter to fourteen days. The Rhino 'River was
9. A e e sally oomm'ied two or three nderstrength divisions
assembled Ito a taotial unit under a corps onandor, with an inrOrisedcorPaps staff (Editor).
~ ~1 CU~b
-146-
exracted to rea ci on oien for two weelw
tr the - rmy rotw G1 atre renewed V lht had Ir- nrt}en ouat P-t th
Oreholt switeb position. In. a surnrise attack, the en.eiy saceeded in
teretnrti ng the canter of' First rAny.On 17 _ ebunry the Lftnrte report? that air trvasort fCa c ilities
hdbeen inoroase inth greater 1ttrie area,. evidently only to augment
the supy serie. Vie heavy glider wore reportedly in use andn air-.
born umtts bad been brought for .r. In Thig~nd there were etil air
twmpotfacilities aind equtyamt but force were 1ackin,. Sine only
em'rittsh amd on. Maricani airborne division had been renorted in
Zngleand a najor airbore oprta on va not thought to b.likely.
Te amloynent of siget subsruno continued. One steamer of 6,000
gross register tons is sunk off the Degima cast *d a second stoer
of similar wise was lne.Inthe Ca".nel, 1,230 tone were suk and,
7,000 ton wrn daaged; this was considered an erordinary suces. A.
total of 24,00 tans wi suk or dew-e.
lb.octuent of the '7.S 11th Armored Division at Cloe ws not yet
sonfire. Tb 1 *h TT89h Dliviston istransferred from Colmar to the. are
vest of liege
At Cloy th en ontinud to attace with stron formes in the
direetion of Calar, supr b strong ertir tfre and 150 tanks. The
Germn psitions were pulle task a short distance but, on th. whol, th
day assed favoraly. ' orn attacks south of the tteioheld wore rewulse d.
C -020 J4
One battalion~ of Ofan thnr" tovns . was moved utto the I. use front and3 the
Paeier L &:r Division w es shifted to the ry Group Garea. Strong ernei
attacks forced a snort withdrawal of the re nn line at Thhternach.
n the Army (Group G area localized fightin~ occurred on the First
Army irnt. righting continued in the sector hold by the 17th 3 S .vyjsion,
The 2d 1ountain Di ris ion was moved out of the Alsace bridgehead and it
forward elements were commtted in an attack.
jo r Priedel of the yeracht Operations 4'taff submitted a report on
his visit to Army Groiap B (First P~arachute Army) and Army Group B (rife..
teenth Arm) from 10 to 16 February, the contents of which were as5 f olow s
"Second in importance onthe Westen~ Front," he said,, "was the holding of
the area west of C~olon.'" It seeod certaira, according to the report,
that the enemy, particularly the !1ritish, would hold to the same method-
io al combat methods that had been observed since the start of the invasion.
After the determination of an objective, usually strictly limited in
nature, the area to be attacked was sutbjected t o heavy,; artillery fire.
Dhrin the attack, tanks were employed lees for the break-through than
for destroy loal nests of resistance. The objecti.ve of the attack,
usually a single village, wes first screened, off by a cirty~ of artilley
fir, an then wes oepied by 8lW wrvig tankS and infantry, rc the
captured villa r, tanks weud then strike out to break up other setion
of the wdn ine of resis'tane.
it was the opinion of the units that in most ox the enem could
not beprevented from oeaptw'tng these limited daily objectives. Under
.. 147..
v,s 0- 023~!
favorable ctrowmatanoos, the fighting would remlt only in the loss of
Smor or 1es wide strin of ground, while at t'. me tIns t Streiigth
of the attack w ou l d gradly ucbside. Pased on the eny's method of
attak, a defense hd een zranised which provided for only forty bat-
talions (sic) of eah divion on the wdn defense line, one regi t
with etlve (sic) battalions in the artllery cover position,, and the
Tuesflir 1 0 battalion, the engineer battalion, and the field replacement
battalion in the second position. The artillery wns likewise echelons!
in depth, with only the foremost batteries in the artillery cover position.
Tb sae principle was applied to the antitank artiflery.
Generally, the era thought it possible to hold out during the
first three das of a lar- a le e n attack with nly the divisio
on lipne After that, the cgr t taet of large reserve formtions was con-
sideed necess .r
The C r or inChief West and Army Group B were for attempting to
defend every individual village and bunker in accordance with the exiting
orders of the tueer, and for attempting to nall dov" the min 4. i. of
rten e.dwo B s e ng every village t. be a base or strog point. At
the sam time, the tit M re rartiuarly th divisin cs t
urged the adoption of a more aasth defesa , allowing the ew enatia Of.
i vt sl vidlage before artillery bombardment bad betm sad letting be'.
hind on a weak rear guard. This rcdre would rresere the streth
10 Infantry or remoaisseance battalion,
KX-- -020 i4u
of' the inf'.nttry over a longer tine. llowever, this meth of combat
r'qui.re i well-trained infantry, kept: rfimly pner control. in the
case of' exhausted or poorly trained troops, there was great danger' that
the tactically correct e&lasticity of this method of' corbat would lead
only to a series of' delaying aotions, a nd that no. position would ever
be held.
With regard to the use of tanks in defense againzst a major attack,
the cow er proposed not to attempt counterattack s, vhich a~fter
initial successes .could- only come to a complete stop, but to employ.
parser unite only to intercept or force bak enemy penetrations.
Assault guns and tanm destroyers had proved to bethe only effective
defense against tanks.* Tb. heavy traotoudawrn antitank gun warn not
considered efficient.
Major $'rie del'st report also covered the ammunition and fuel situa-
tion. The o tinder in Chief West belie ved it would be possible to hold
out 4th existing-stocks of' ammunition only for seven days after the
beginning of a major enemy offensive. e leek of fuel would not only
hider the forwwrd movement of the Yolks artillery 4orps, Volk projector
brigades, and other large formations, but would also affect the ability
of the defense to shift tactically. Tanks and assault guns,, already
Insufi it its nusber, could not be empoyd to their full. advantage
because of th. lack of fuel.
The matter of replace~nt s was also considered. At that tie, the
7f'ifteenth ArmIy was receiving no replacements since those available were
.. 149..
d'5{'d.
3oyr sztpo to th" >vnt kcay a r tthn >nr 3 Ariwro.nts
1,rin~ to th. 7'f:nhA5i er~ie r~i~~
e rrot Thatly dealt wIts the oonntr ci' ot nf 7jv, o fi i
by male civilia lare post ot thtn nurow £o frtifficttione rtie thte
front rznd the Fthtne "fiver waro cmeider& useless.
On 2Z &~ ir the CornLa~nde in Chief Wvest ws orderd to aseemble
the ran, antiaircraft briraee still a-signed tohim insuch a aixer as
to beable t o intervene quickl agait possible enry airborne opra tiom9
in the sectors oi' Army Gros a nd Hi.
On A I" rrn another freighter was rer ored ernt by a midge sub..
rinsue. Thbe mnth off the Emtor <ite wo me . In the Cleve &aa the
tttish 22d Pivtido and the "eanadian lt !rigde were reorted to have
taken part in the attack. Airborne units were sdthdnwn from the sector
of the rtea rrt rmy. Roenr, these units were only tmufled kc
a shots distnc from: the lie, aned since they were to be- abIlitated,
nconclusions could be C rwny conerning a tr jar enemy action. sea Clove
thsh t daarply twrds Qnch adapproached the norter win of
the Westwfl, which we badly oonetruoteed in that area. The enm addao
ws held iap but reservs were tobe available onthe foflowln Oay. The.
water. bad arte d to subsde in the sector of A rmy Group 3. An attack wes
totiued against the left wing of the Fifth Panzer Any At oetuah
furthe enm rgs was dciep a oomterttae was lamhl
It the sector of kryGopCfighting continued southeast of
Sa arbrueoken. The enemy a ttac eod with six to seven bttalion, probably
from two divisions, bu1-t in bster off aifter th arrival of resere e,
the chief of staff of iXr' Group P. i.sue) d~roctiws~s for the conduct of'
bttle between the M osefle and hine Rivers. The groeatest danrer wss
from t he iiagtena ares. 2y lvtng Uath rchl wtch peition, the
outpost area at the '=oDene gap as far a0 Trier :ad also be lost. Owving
to the situation in the tt it waveof great imnortane tot to lose th
industrial area aron Sarruetken. The strength of the wilts asigredto Any Group C was mc greater then these signed to Gn Grop 73.
ft 1 r~ebrZ Ioalise attaccs weecarried out againt the COrehols
switch poitio and the area south of Snisrtrueoken. Apj rently the W-ronch
let crored Pflivis ion was being transferred" to Oeveler, After noon
fight-ing became stronger inthe Cletean ob areas. While the line at
Gle+ was hold, the stuatio around Gech becats more serious. The DOnn
forces were regrouped. B~y the foll.owin night the bulk of the Panser Lehr
rivisio wasn eoted to arriv'. "he attack against 3eveth fAn continued
from the north aced south, but as no arc ored divtiin were emd, it
could not be aoed ae oobined-.rm dier attack .
?wvilages were lost in the northern sector. The ads lin, of
resiosnc wes moved buak two to three ki Los ters. Resrvfrcsor
left in pootio, except for the 2d Panzer _Divison vbic. as shifted to,
the soth. A number of fortifications were captured by the on. in the
ohtenzoh are.
0-020 a152e
The Groolt witoh no attion in the f ry -run 0 ares had beer unider
attae z-n ne rlry iiorning and a nwm"rno no, ;eratttor were ,ade. ot h
of Saarbrueoken tt zituation bad beer ata dlizeti and! an u nterrtedi
main ine of reslst%nce was estabitshed.
The 708th 71olkagreadier Th'iv.i io, erpoye an t aper Rhino, was
bein reorganized into the 106th £nfnty --1virdon. From the 32d wavs
(age-+lass 19"), four divisions were being newly activated onthe w~er
Rhine. from the same agoeclss, one division eaoh was. being activated in
Wldfleoken, holln, Derrk, and Slovaki. One division in Holstein and
two di~vision in r"enmrk wore tobe rehab iltated. In holstein, one naval
division wnn to benewly activated, Two Paehrer briLa-a wore to be
p~lsreorganised
into divisios,
On fl ar f a sibarin reort the enm a ovessels over
3,0 rone register tons betwe the Scheldt and Tae .ive.
At Clove the radians played a larger rart in the fighting, nrobr~bl
due tothe haiy losses already sustained. It had not yet been d ee +
whether the enery woul stare an airborns attack.
E iehoww had reportedly transferred hid headquarters tothe iteia
fethel .area. This wes tken to mean that the otfoasivo would begin soon,
Heavy fighting cotinudna Cln along a line betsee C ear and
Cosh, The Ceman forces wee forced back to the road betwe thee two
towns btit the Panzer Loe' Diviion suceeed in retaking part ofthe. lost
gnuwi Hard fihtg o' both ade of Coch resuted in heavy loses btt
the overafl situntion wasoe onidordt be stabilized. Additional reserves
..152_
-153-
were locat&d at ' bi14z. The tranz :3,or of t"tt :rt cha:ts : tvis ion
would ber ont th ' f~oflow .. iz day. Th 11th cp~sr MZ 'c wus 7phtft+ ed
to the A ri YGrow P area a s a r sorve;. The bulk ofl the 9th =an er 2 lvi-
atom had alra dy arrive '. Th.it or to the K oathp the %4th infantry 7%jyj
dion had n ed into petition. -'rmy Group also received the 104th
Panze ride
The water level was still high. Inthe ennth Army sector fighting
continued in the north an south and ainbl -.=nket continued to be lost
every day. These bunkers were mostly designed as urergun quarters a
were in the main unoccupied besa of the shortage of roersornol. sear
Igohterneth the eny- praased to the northeast.
At the probls switch position the enemy adancd through gape i the
lin, and captured four villages. Contact betwee Grm forces n the.
line was re .stablinhed by counterattack. A. new, thin main line of resist.
amos wac being rebuilt. The Orhoisi switch position was pierce between
?ettirrn and terleuten. A uerba o, Eouth of 5iarlautern, was lost and
te enq now approached the Spceren feights. The situation at still
not considernd tene.
The 11 tn Division bad now arrived in the rear of the First
Army. The 16th Infantry tivisio, whih was to be umited with the 905th
inntr Divisi on, was moved forwrm Bn aden .emn.
OnB92 ka the C ne r in Chie West and each of the three
arwz grup were inf'ored of the Vuehrer's i pression that Seventh' Army's
nlanned withdrawal to the ?rueut position (see 13 February),, which the
A-' C-012 04
?ushrer had forbidden, d~ boed to hirvs n hautf'ul e ffect or. ths !moeth
A rm's conduct of b ttle . Lr~ee =re, thU : tit e ir the trcn; c
the Fuehror ordered the sevoth 'r- to hOld the 4 ostwaI boundtary. 'The
idea that defense wol eeasier from the so-cali, - ruOPi ntion," he,.
said, 'tnw t be effaBedeCoz themnso the uit c zeramtheir
sbtordts. 4
At 2130 hours on 20 rbruy the Oainder in (Chief V est trsnsAltte
to the Chi ef of the vtrnciet 0fltion Staft: his general istwsston of
the situation on t he Wet e rn ?tont. ti ilatedangeo a break-through
was seen in the sector of the Tirst Parachute Army. An unusaly la.rge
conentrtion of enem armoro units in the A'che area was reported. The
situation in that secto wa flawe with co'noera. A attetpt was mrtde to
shift -the 3d Pansr ergnaior tvision ito the area west of Cologes. The
enemy threatened to break through along the southern part of the Z itel
bend, which would react onthe situation at the 44oselle Cap. rightin in
the area west of' 3rrebourg, arid for the rr- fining sqcttors of the Crelicils
switch .position would avn to be co-ordinated with openations to the north.
lb onaybetwsn h First 4, reet M epi was to beprotected under
alcirctmstanoes. T':.his point inthe front was strengthened after theCW
bad, permitted. vith.nwal of the First Arm right wing. A farher cause
for eonos we the defense of th liaguenau Forest. te tipper Rhine atd
twent-fifth An (Bllet) fronts 414 not seem to be in date dner.'
Whr they were fresh ad strong, the troops continued to fight bard
and brvely, particularly in the sector of ArM roup B. flovover, the
efficIency of -i ny unit-i hrs2 be gretl rec cs by the ritr ain of th
eaerc £itlng * Th r ruon at pi*r oZ~ rcwp cx ~ r w~rl a
searious problea .
The Corra.ndr in Chief es t informed the 7aehrer that Cfoa the
beinring h had f ught again:t the danger of "s!now &alflrg t; y ret asitg
to arov reats towithdraw the front Itne. ~owuld make su.ch
requests to the Lhrer only if itt were cear ly a matter of saving a
valuable unit.
O21 1'eruarr the thef of the CW informd the Co or in Chief
Wlest that the TPuherr bad agreed as to the proms ale areas (Rtoora
Dweron) where the ain enemy effort would be concentrated. Aga-in the
Wiorer repeated the iirtanoo of clingng teenacusly to eah foot of
G"rman son, to each bunk-.r, etc., ina order to zzevent an ever fastor
retreat to the Phine. The $?uerer reserved the right to sanction the
evmoution af individual units in the Wetwlt, a move whic would b
made only when it wa necesar to bolster the infantry strength or a new
msin line of real tance. A directive for organizino the front line within
the Wtwfl ad already b assued on 10 Fbr:,ary.
In his rerzly it 1600 hours on 22 February-v the Widor in Chief j est
assure the flmhrer tint nobh of the a ny groups had been ordered in the
strmest terms to defend evr foot, of ground. The C er the x-
plflned 4wy metin snotions of the front, prticulrlyr those with strong
bunker lines, had been lost in en astonishingly short time. Chiefly, the
difficulties had been the slow arrival of replace fite, their lck of
S~ f.02-0~l6
training an stamina, eamI the lack. of siufficient nirhers of troops to
hcpa all of the bk~rr. Ths., ile the bunker's w r ' ueul In poteotimn
end quartering reserves in the do-nth of the reair area, they were easily
damd by direct artillery an~' tank fire, et icularly whn aimed at the
frontal embroues. T~he lack of mutual flank protec ion in zany bnlkersws also pointed out, '+he decisi.ve factor, however, was the lack of
sufficient niumerical strength to occupy afl of the exdsting fortification
nd to control the in-between mrss. This bad mmritte d the enemy to by-m
pass the bunkers and to rnut them out of actio from the rear.
OnZ hanr twenty-.one motor torpedo boats were in action, part
of which succeeded in breaking tbroug'h.
S\rher enemy rifroeens were maoved into the Clern area, Th
lotion of the three major British uit was not clla. Fighting in this
area had now lasted two. wmks, during vhich tie the enemy had gained
twenty kloo ters. nemy tarks wore moved forward behind the TT.S. First
and finth ;ryfronts. They could bhv come only from the strategic
resevs,
Until this tUm the fighting near Car an Oceb had been the heatest.
(leurlly, the enemyv ws conta ined,. while the Pan s e hr Divisim t had ee
gaied omeground. Only at Caiar was thw line withdrawn. Despite the
defensive atu~re of this battle, 28 enemy tanswr disabled and 142
prisoners wer taken. TeI 'xaht Corps had be netdi re
to effect a unified, vell.a-ordihate defense* On the aeura front the
L!X'1 Corps ws in action, while to the south the 8th ;!arachue Division
was being withdrawn.
9 42 slV
Zthe 3vnth Afrmys str enn attck cc tinu& aainnt the flanks.
?o the north the oma had reehe d th line -rou'eld -St .lhioh - &tnschoid ,-
Fie ebfeld. The %astmfl bad been pilerced fler. bat ua being diotendod
further to the west. To the south the enemy toaed oft' to the vest, cutting
off one negimnt. Ak s only haf were ocpied, a ta> of bunkers were
eapture. Gersm fores, including tank and. assut gm, were eingmoe
The situation at the Or ohls s awitch sition was crital. After the
bulge nnar Tottinrein had been reduce, the anew suoaedd in breaking
through to a new defense line vhtch bad not yet been ecne . The Caa "
oader in hio! West ordered replaceent training batalis to be moved
forv.rd inthis area. The loss of sarebour would seriously
secuity of the tswf. Ha fighting continnsd south of ssbruecka.
Althouh Snihern wes lost, the heights which permitte hostile obsrvnation
into $arbnueekan were still Win held.
the fuetbrer again s tresso the importance of holin
the Spiohen heghts, the lose of whicn was to be pevente tdew al circue.
stwnes. Any op Cwas to report in the eveiga to whtmesaea
mnteeein of 23. ?emy7 the Scd in Chief Wot ws instructed
that sic the fortiication. at the ?4on12 gap were among th. strongest in
fth entire Weeall, the shoud beoccpied by the etrongeet peuilble force,
if neesay by weakening the outpost ares.
147-
1- I Bc.' -as4-
Cn ;2 ! *ri tr It van repnrte t't the w-oto r tiree t -ats a
so far r otl, neonntrrr~ ar ~rer rt. T rty Mdget iubsarines also
put to tea. There' wa inceraseed evdene that enes air orme foration
were beizy ha tllr readin sjn.
At -chit:cmah thae errt r ite the 6th Anware £tvisicn Mprobctb ly the 4th Arues 7 ti :m. cmenr, t strati attak was
being planned in that area, sines thore wera no North r lare units
r ete to be onentrating thn. The heavy pressure at the Orchals
switch position wes aprlahwlf by the eowmrdtmeft of an additioa
Arertnar& division.
thttn had died dw at Galar anid Goch. The avm resed &t
blc had ennicyad only tro orn, To the northeast owa foes
fofl.nin up the Osnen witbirava ware alse repulsed. The Psaser 1.1w
flivisi r was;v wtsMwa srin to fow a reve. The 238th lnfantr7 Djvje
alec and several prachute uits wemre ontheir way to the front. Further
to the south the seex artifllry bosa ajustzent fire. In the Seventh
A seetor eontinued pressure free the north and south resulted in ftmer
vithdrs-als. the Grms wer foned to isproin.
In the south contact with th '79th Isfntry i t ore tb
and then l.t again. Weak itt wer vithdnawn frt the trout to neuf
the netr wi tch positis. ?> iung at th (hos stb pstition *ootimned. The n5th Infantry Division and the right fitS of the 416th
Infantry livisiae were famed back behind the Suer River. After heady
figbtire Gs brdwore lot nd the *fevQ ov into
£a rrbourg. .er Snertg eneey f ris reabd the 'Star ivtr. Those *l-
zents of the 11th ?anstr Disn which bad not yet been vitraw were
ms 9 r20O
thrown into a counterattack. Enem y forces entered Irora ch and occupied
the heights between hrbch cn cnd the zSieherr hoights, oar-turi several
bunkers To the east, the enemy was retsa e ack at ".r:choenbach, but at
two points his ac anoed ole ents were able to look over the valey at
.arbe oken ant Volkingen. The Co ner in Chief zest ordered the
o-nat tnnt of the 5C9th Infantry Ditsior together with the assault gnms
of the 17th 3 Panzer ivision.
On 22 ?ebiarr9' the Coinnder in Cief Wst rported that the forces
brought forward south of Trier for roinforenent of the Watwall (on,
Uight field howitzer battalion of the 212th Xolkgrenadter Divison, the
519th Antitank Battalion, the 47th Volks -Ing er Briade, one mxed anti-
aircraft artillery battalion, and other urits), the 212th 'olkredier
Division, and nints from the south trier sector, woul4 be tobined to form
Group Serfuss. O23 February Army tr B reported that the garrison
strength of the fortifiottions on both a idea of the 4ose11 'g ap uwabered
$79 men. These figures would increase after the oomttmnt of the 7*1ocm
engineer brigade.
on 22 V1ri c the Wi nder in Chief West tranemitted an order to
AryGrou B to establish a suffioiently large force (Csee ofa the
79th aM 276th fantry fvtsion) at the P asrm psition in vinew of en
suns at the of the south f lf front (see 13 an 20
Ves x ry). Oat the ase day, the Feb er rplod that it was permissible
to secure the I rues position, prvi ed that it would sue. no wenig
in the spirit of those troops stifl fighting in the forward area. ecurity
~555r-
s C-O20
force for the ocow atone f the re nzition wnre rot. to- b tC'ke frr
the .1knks -. i'T Sevett h A± Qn 23 oruarr theCntre in Chief ~i
eorted that ranewa eney neetntions inL the flnsat, the io end
rad. forced .Pctto&! idth rrwnl1 to e. iri rt 3itsoi.: Neuorburg
o1liendor '.
on X1 Fo =anr' the rjor eneimy offensive weiz be p'xm. it iaevs reportod
that two days earlier twentyetwo m~otor torpado bots encontere an enm
convoy and e robably sank sein s tsnrs * li ;other stemr were damaged,
while the dnage on the Giern . rOde was light. All of thek e oomitte
in the Sohedt sliver haw returnet The nidget sub arines Th ite to retort
any success1, although in the Irish =e one loir er-rnge sumrineo sank two
s hins a daniged two others.
At och the enem's main point of effort was reinforced by the co it
mot of the British 15th Inftantry rLivision.
As wn ox octod, the xr Corps took over cor and .
Thepretene o th TV Z'h Ifanry rivision near .onsohauwa
confirmed. At Eagunau the 4,2d Infantry riviston was shifted to the west
where the 45th infantry t3ivinio had ben withdrwn to form a roesv. Th.
?rnoh 19th Infantry rivision arrived in Aleac. from E:rittany,, alt lug i it
was not Yet fully or aised.
Fighting at Cocl had abta te nmy pene dton were mt b~Gea
counterattacks.
At. X45 hours on 23 Vemegry the mruete enemy offensive was bog~un
in the eeotor of A r y Group f. 4 rtillery boi raot ha nreceded the
attnck.. T1e right wing ins.q less effeote4 becau's a' t~ :Ainundate g rodnd.
-I461-C4220
Tn the beszfnr the mai eneny effort wran ocn. rentrnate near tinnich,
where water COnyhtics we're more favor t1q to ear avac, ThnkS apmr°ed
there. An enemy bridgehead measuring- 2 kiomtere wide by 2 kilomasters
deep was formed. Tridzeheitde of local_ importne were also establishe at
Jzalieh and- tltenbrg. In the 2ator bold by the xxav r'i anzer Corps
brI4,heads were estatlishd on both sidos of Dueron. A further attack
was direoted against the 353d Infantry Division which still occupied a
position on the lett bank. ecause of th. heavy smoke and the saatwaton
bombing, it was still not poss ible to 'determine the enot point of min
effort.
The tnser Lehr Division oner the a th ?araehut ivrision wore held in
restv bG the Comaner in Chief Wt. Those -units were both supplied
with trucks and fuel for rapid mvmt. The 9th Panzer Pivision was in
position in full strength, while the lO6th ?anser Brigade a! elements of
the dVclks A rtillery Corps had not yet arrived.
Heavy fighting ameewed on the northern and southern flanks of the
Seventh Army, resulting in the loss of ground. Th. infanty lost further
strength to several uaits were out off. floments of the 5th raraehute
tion vows appt'isching.
Southvest of Trier in the Army Ortp Csector, the enmy ma headway
at Okfen, At Srrieb and Ham the snow' joined several bridgeheds and
advamedto the Sear heights. One 'lebrkret battalion was bein socdvu
from the rear.
) e# -02 uwlo
Nar Saarbrueeken ened forces apture several bunkers on te
Spichoren heitghts only the reconnaisuance battMalion of the 2d t Launtir
Division suoceeded in recapturing .the heights themselves. There was
s e hope that the situation could be stabilised at least until the
afterno. The 2d Aontein Division vas withran at Pirmasen and
moved around to the northwest.
On *AE)M ight ofthe fourte idget sbam rturned
ho without hamin encountered the enui, altog the sinking of cue
destrzyer and two or thre mechant ships or transports bad been obs erved
Asuccessful attack bythree flotillas totaling twentyon motor torpedo
boats asreported to have been carried cut despite poor visibility,
rovin the feasibility of such operttosi.
The British were regruin and attacked vdth only two divisins
lot all of tte Amria uis were identified. The U. S. Ninth A rq
widene! its eatr to the south in preartion for a driv, t owards
tha~seldort axd Cologne.. Mcooringly, the U.S. First Arvq' provided
flankU~x rc tiIt appared m ely that the three a irborne mits
At Gosh the British stueee ingin frthe gou:. to hek
this advance th Gten epplared the Pse labs flvise the 1t
Ins t Dis, ar two battalions of th :I rahe
)Is o olgthe enem was LaU~e the seco of thi U
8$ Corp. At the corps botindary, hover, enem forces advanced as tar
-462_
10 C-0020 w163el
as Bal. Inthe sector held iqthe y L! orp, the Raer River was
crossed at uever places, iolitn at tihnich , Juelich, end Dtwr a,
ighg was growing Weker in the. -seor off the 353d Infartry Division,
although the s he ad gained a brtdehead at t rauthauso. The Poer
vual dam was blown up for a aseon tira, oaiwirg the release &oftour
zillio cubic satan a water within sit days.
'' o the flth Paer Division and the entire 9th
Pader Diwtsicc, at the corps boundax, w~r novel toward, while the
34 Pasergresadter Division wa wtnrwn. Other rainforc eots were
unable to ucrf torwad fros the rear because of daVto the railroads.
The opeo4fl of the offenive was aopanied by stron air attacks.
In ,th Seventh Army sectr heavy fighu bad again broke ot is
the Prs poition. New .n ain had led to the dedsioa to withdraw,
lad wile the nao was carre ncot uoeesfufly, two eairled
12ba had to be abwanoned !nUm attack sotipta against the
soutlwent corer tthe positic.
In the Arm Group 0 area the Amrens atu t tne and gained two
brldhas atthe Boer Rive. Snt alm be alrnlernd i
river WIt it wAM tl hoped that th gains c.ud be locald. After
the entwis t o the 24Muti iialce it was hoped tha i situto
woul lspnn.o
Ilk twls 3 si4DS tOn attar o* It of ini sta12 a1 remt esettum duagwntsea!ooueig aa
X ; w 0-020
Pi. tip contine o the Spichern hight with alternating ouccess.
era Larces occupied the hegtwhile certain bunker weyre hel by
the *e7
2 a~ 3 anport the0C srmntom'Westvwasnrem.e
bthe Chief of the X aenet Optrationa Staff. N ti i eiate break-*
truhbetween the IHnae and Itineo Rivers was eiqmd *acording to the
report.I the Fifteenth Al ser hnver, the enha rse
the gMac finer and metseven k tens.. Th rain thrust towards
Cols and the north v mmnn.
The chief conert o the C er In Chief West was the devolr eat
of th situation an either aide of the Mo a River. Ifthe evWcouldnot bethrown back across th Prmec a vit Mvl to the £41U position
weud becoma eesar. This udght neeitate the abac aof prer.
The First w was not stronm nc. to fore the eateq back acros the
Sas River. n.ns brmak-hroub al.ng the Thsek highroad was
likely.
The repr of the Oair in CMie West poite a the upoua
ofaauinit contact betwee nW w rup 3 o an .It ws not posaib
to ttbnw aove frt either a , in the area soubh at the
Rsefl Itv . Mimnent attack agait the Wisenbcurg
relte &w abitq of toe ihnth sctor of rW Group 0. the
Cmmne in Chief ft" fe o aw d ireetivs
13 "prt the situation for 25 February is issingfo theLitratio o* (Auho).
ale
-1,4 4i 0-20e15
On 1 :jkMat 1635 hours the Csomdr in Chief ieet received a
teletyp letter signed by the Fuebr.r The Anerican attacks onboth
aides of the )oelle gap were described a being only in the nature of
hdig attacks Accordin to the ferr, the U.S. Third Arq did not
bats sufficient forces to eXploit a beAlc~troug into the )4osel alley.
he enoq's main effort was concentrated onthe lRoer front in an at tcmpt
to break through to th fin. Thre was no doubt that a lsgoeo
m attack lwas in thear.
With regard to th Me. - tor frot, the Fsr issued the
f ollwing direetiv to the Oower .in Cief West a A break-
through war to bprve te at al css. Ift ecsar, reserw were
to be taken ire the . ntet of the Fif t ase r e ven if grat risk
vone iuvlv A withdraa of, thesh t fna of nq Grop 3 wa
*unl out of the question, despite the eag penetration into the
rk.a are (toe below). The tes on the . ifteenth Aqfot
scold not be eqmatod for bythe tact that the Keuse Riv.r, on than
sq oter rear po atmn oaO be ocpie by tne forces. In ceeo
OS ISV tkchth cotS tit.a wire to be suemtte
in svscw iah a.e dire.tve of is Nt uary.
Vbhj it asstill too early to wthdraw the seeth AnyW fronta
both ses o th teefe g to the Ny oition, ti Puer would
alo ent s nte front Is with his direcie
of 10 Febru "y Banter, fis eattat with the tamer tot in the
Seifel lnteins, in the Pram area, aMd e th. Eaus ier wevve to
.t CEO et~pe
be secured.
A further eztintet of the it atin on, 27 r'ebrusry ttdicated that
Trier, eve if encircled, could ause Sthe utmost difficulty for the
*sip d hould therefore. not be abadoned. In order to pren an
nulargement f e the en bridge-ead, the nta Division wuld have
to attack in the diffiult train south of the ton.f It was. essential
that this sncsO of the frost should keep close contact with the
fofifiawto south of Trier the one band, n with those at liersig
atd Milbh on t other bt. After the arrival of the reinfoCed
6th 8tai Division5 the eq bridgewhd was to be elI a ediati
Based on these oas ideratin s, a further directive was set to the
Co as er in Chief West othbe see ight. the Mias front was to be
hele it hdrawal would be ade yet to the 171 sueor In the
Sarrborg ara the euow was to be contained by forces .the M
Moutain Division, The 6th S.S Mountain Divsion was to be brought fore
ward. O the folleuig day, the hrmoaaht Operation Staff loand that
t last co bat elemt. of this divisio wold4 asable in the hilfdl4
7.Uwi~ a* tlx oocveiatt@4 with the DepaV Chief f the
W net Oprtic taff, the ohio f staff of the GUd S in Chi
Vestrepoted theewbeiehhA U&led tthelmss of alb
of bunkers uedia the Spi em . t jmitom (see 21 ?en ctw),
the details o which b.4 not so far be hwn to the (W4h
Us Webnacht 1ib Cnai,
*0 # 0e020 467-
Also on27 Febrar, the C omnnder in Chief >est was it omd that
the 1Puenr agreed to the w tdrawi of thde 346th Infan try DIvision from
th arv tone, provided that the section ofthe front from which this
division wa taken woulsl stl be defended.
Cti2 the Febrer had declined a request bi the C or
is Cef West to wthdaw the riohtwing ofthe II S Cirs adthe left
win of~'rOrop to the Xiedr-Kues area. After a briefigr
the DevuV Chief of the Webm l pratis rStaff Lt. Colonel D
usthe critica sitmatio in the rrkelws area, the C ei he
est on 27 Februry reed his request to witdnvw the left wing of
AMw Grop H' to a lin running from Keseleonetb+e e to the, area
south of iadr~ek . At th.se tm, the C evdr in Chief' Ilst
would tvr to sh ift th 1'lth Divisio into the resultiug gap, thnt
lestablishing msat with the Poser Lebr isite in the Rheindablea
area. The neqnest was spo ted7 the Dpw Chief of the Weho ht
Operations Staff, and was subsequent2y osnctiaad bar the Fuebrear .1-o
thoq 'with a beary Virt* as rered by the D putr hief, Lt. Colo el
.r~ The chit of .tttf of th C eitaa La Chift w as iufom
aeeerdlagl Ir V bs a the w - SLIW
At =1 ban the Caster an Ch eet reported
btelr p let ter tthe Puobers that al diffiet t wed e
a n so tas itws in his powr to do e@. Anocrdlug to th
Ommar inChief West, the main task was to keep the entir Wester
Frost intact, in order to protect for as long as possible the imprtant
l67
E # 0e020 -168-
indatrial. areas of the Rtuhr and ""er. In view of the vaiu mont-
bilities which might lead to a strategic en bra--thro, sis of
which were already a ri (ai pentrtion at J"irelea; and eneq
admones towards Colope, the yU pvtio, and th. area .. st of
Sanebourg ),# the r~r er in Cyief West asked for greater freedom of
action than that prmitte by the secret dfrective Cive to his peronaly
an 15 February. A decision would have to be tad as to whether the los
of taottcll isprtat tow9 suet as Trier, or theaVM s tvfforti
tioatios asjustified in order to save uite fighting ther e r more
imaportant later an eats. A new diretive on thi question was re«-
quested.
Again th opiio wa repet that it was moeimportant to maizeo
taes the c ontti'tyo the front then to elagr a unified lineof
reistane by clintg to cerain area.* The C o*Mr in Chief West
begged for permissio to order the necessary tacticalyea hImelf,
since valuabe time was oite lost mewating for decisions. ?tuf
rep ort ach measur taken wud begive to the 1W.
In e ittn his repor, the Cosaer in Chie Veit age's Wee
the Ntitt9 f "bytmu imq pbe il e dou top prv the withtraval@ the front Use t. the Rhb iver.'
1i te evenin of U8 Febraury, the Pser asrd the la C rniri
Ce Weto his efiesa aM, referin o h directiv of the
prMein dq, urged th. rapid withdrwal ofte left w of Arq
-.168m
C.02 -69
(In the sane day, the Cimader in Chief Ves~t sent to the ?uehrer a
rew estiwate of the eituato with referreroe to the flehrer'e direetive
issued on the altenoon of 27 Febrary, It yas painted out that the
.ne bad broken through the front in the area of the lilt &4 Corps and
that two snmort divisions had slreadyr advanced as far as the W^aJdspiesB
are The Panser Lelir Divisin was egd nhenvy defensive fighting
at Rhidahln. Tere was imcrasig danger that the front held by the
Frst ?arstte 'w ould coapse" as a result of ane press r t
the south. Strong attacks against the Drft position had ade the loss
of vrowd there unavoidble. It vas no longer posible to transfe
gleenta of the Fifth PaserAr to the north because of stron
attack agast the a right ving. At the Koefle gap, the nwmy
pla n ived more tha aamer plin d of the Gene forces. Th
heavel bettered Sevent Ar~bdbe onrated on the left wing,
the retv ekelyepsn other sections of the front. That the
addition" al upr of the 246th Volkereair Division would be sufficient
to stabilee the sit"ti " apered doubtful. nEt o Ssr rou the
attac b the Ud homctal Piiic b not bessonstu. The 6th
OSKutaa Division uld ntarie from the teina od arabfore,
AolrLN ad =0 the Osa for Is ChefWet had bees ordered to osmne po-.sibIlitte
for imrvn the poition of Rineteauth Any b avcin the vai line
of resistance to the line Eehlettstatt - Narkireb a Col du Z na«
-269.0
1$R C cm0047.
. Vltin aid by emp og'ing te 6th S$ ountain -Piion, than assigned
to the ?irst Ani f£ighting t2 the onort.
The report of the C sr inChief rest, submitted at 21.05 hours
@8 &M dscried as impossible the withdranwal at this division
from First Any in view of the i plg enetrey drive against the Moelle
gap and the Sars and booms, of the time whioh wold b needed to effect
the transfer. The possibility of an attack a inst the Wissabourg
dopren ion y also susidered. At the same ti , the adva the mai
line at resistance was not feasible: without the support of an additiona
division. Probably th. 2 t Untain Division vas no longer capable of
offensive antiso. It was Jtdged sore important to stabilzts the existing
front by stre~igtheng the bridgehead hold by Nineteenth A rq.
the C or in Chief West transmitted the fofliang
order to rnw Group 0t 'th. Aas. bridgehead mast bheld trier all
ci ramtns in order to tie up the a forces there and to prevent
their reach ig German soil. As support is not available fta other
eat o, the neessay fore.f atsut be taken fram the Mntain tract as
rapdly as pmusible.*
on t it 2330 hou"r the Costr in Chief Vest submitted a
reprt describing the tense situaio at the Atles. bridgehead. The
e5W VS reported ta b only eight 'ilnegdterit the site of the
Dreish bridge, hile the greatest idth of the bridgehead va '01 35
kflm ten. Under these conditios, the question asasked whether it
vawise. in the lon ras to contiu holding the bridgehead, and wther
the Nineteenth Ares was not still in danger of being cut off.
-1370
fg 4 ClYl-
tf n~ n the trsner in Chif t e ast ponted out that on the
First Ar~ front thore were no orpe~ svailablc to eomperate fsr the
vtthdrvalof the 10% SF anser fivision. Contray to the piion of
the W4, the Corander in hief We.t mnentarly epected an attack
against the Vosoetle front 1P way of the oros switch position, against
which only a weak.r Oeran fore was available. An n tihrus towars
the indutrial area along the -Saar River wasnot considered i mnet.
No solution could be fond by attmapting to shift the sector boundaries
withn the First Army ara.* The forces necessary to stn.g the
First Arm front culd only be taken fr Alsare.* Thi aised the
question as to whether or not Alsace should beabandoned. Wile this
wol oertainly release enw forces at th ae tine, it was ot coca-
siderad that they would be available for i ate emitent.
Upon receiving the report from the Chief of the fl concerning the
situation ab the upper tine, the ubrer resed to allow the vacu-
atin of the Vosge. bridehead, and at the same time requested a d es
oriptim of the overall defense of the tne 1 5
b ~ lat 2310 hus, the Comner in Chit? Weist was in-
fored aooordizg]y that the upper Rie bridgehead ato be held.
Vthim the brdgehead the bulk of the de fendg forest were t beo
eamitted >ant attacks in the Cozar atSanheia fulose arems,
while the frost bordering the Vosges listass was to be secured oly
15 rn a note ade by the Chief of the tehraoht O tiperaton Saff.
-1711M
)Z#C0O -1720
Ia thin defense Lime To obtain a more aoiwate picture of the situ-.
atton, the Yuerer- dmed a s tatemet off the actual ~tren off the
Nineteenth Arq ad a map sheto the disposition of secrity fos
alog the astern ban o the !hn south of IMsatt.
On Zg==at 1325 hours the C ar in Chief West anwer
that in the long run th defeat of the Zineteet Arny would be inevit~-
able, Without the Ncineteenth Axq teres wcudb no forces with which
tbuid upa stron an lasting 4sfeone othe upper Itmne. Aleady
the frot bordering on the Voegs KMowtais bad been weakened so tarda
to resemble oly a fBarni pition. ?2tbing ould now prevent the
.new trai crusting this line.
(ii 2 Tebrzqi th ie If of staff ofdAt Grop 0 submitted an satiate
of the situatio at Nwnteent A to the Cht.!ef the Webfct
Oeratio ataf (throg the Deputy ctiat). At th point of attae
near Coie rl, a thin .ermax line faced three enem inantz r divisions,
two French snored divisions, erA possibly eleents of the Algerian 3
Ztvnsion. Ano eqbrak.4rough at this point was ccasidered ikely.
A fauhr v"ekin o th aetai fratt ad the rigtbank o the
RhZOInei favor of the Coluare nt. no loner possible
bler the ObiW of the ehaeht Ortion Staff wped with tie
estimate ofthe a ituain hep 'te out that the cit" task of Nine0
tnth Aw was in w sa to istrengthen the probbl point of brett-'
At 1300 hr on2 etran' a telephone anuse vs received fm
11-10 # e.02047.
(oener lsutnn~t W estphal (Chief of Staff to the Coma~er in Chief West)
stating that end. troops had entered Coi.uar, that the line of r'etirement
as189, and that the 16th frantry )iviaion was endangered. General
~etplal ashe that this further report be given to the ?tohrer.
In view of the report bythe. earin Chief. =est and the proposal
of the Chief of the liehrnacht Operations Staffa the uefirer decided that
the Motain fiot should be further veakened in favor of the Co~man
corner in ardor that n units would beout *ff. This involved a with-
drawal to a bridgeha at the rear of the Riuae44arns Canal from where
a line could be held until aUl of the re ng Germ forces had crossed
th Vine
A Cmlete evacuation of the bridgeh.~4 vas to be coningent on the.
state of the Rhine defenses at that tie.. Forces released as a relt
of evacuatin the bridgehead were in pert to be used for other missions.3 '
At 2250 hours an 2 February General WIestphal again telephoned to re-
quest an iunediate decision on the evacuation of the bridgehead. The
Chief of the V~hmoht Opratloas Staff pointed out that as all forces
includili the art llewy v r e already being itdam fro the mutai
frt, am isuav tion bad actual7 'bedu, axv that an i idiate decisio
was not n ees auv. Nwv e, he added that a definite decision wouldbybera hd a h ovn.d y
At 2105 hours n F Feb ruary Genea . estera repotedi on the general;
2 oe ud y the Chief of the V ebraht gyrations Staff. (Author).
-173-
I 53 20 G+,42
outlxtsof tLe reduced brl4geh sad =4x on the intended enploament of
troop which would 'he re: med. F~our divisions (those with thc 1ower-t
cwnbt a trcDgth) would ae ssigned to the upper R~hine front anzd three
divisionu would be sent to First AruWy
Later on the sea dat the C er in Chief reeeived p riaion to
evacuate the Alsace bdehead.
Follow a onv ration with the Chief of the t .zacht OratioM
Staff1 General Westpha told~ the Depu~ty Chief that he udrstood the
moros, of fit1.r'a intention to pin dow as many of the en s' forces
as possible forvard of the VIia.. hexplainaed by the D~eputy Chief of
the Wehrmacht Operation Staff, the flanks should be reinforced at the
-zpee of the sal4ent. The outposts should be vithdravn cu2y in cae
of an attack that would mean their d~strucetio
At a mttution conference an 5 Fabr r, the ?ehrex' enphasised the
inpor'tsaef not losin ai artilleryT ian the " rid ebea4 was evacv ted.
The mrilles would first have to be w thdravn behind the fIinemfhone canal
and tbiea late across the IRhine Rivers. An order to this effect was to
bism eto the C dr in hit Wont. At the same tium, he should
bs vised atthe lpite seo l tb. t t lueir Klotz end the
Iaisrtu agains the possibility ofa surprise attek
dlaat Isish the0a erief Vst e td that
the bridges and fee at the Aime brdgehea were exposed to strog
artillery fre". Te inantry forces were no longr able to contain the
eaw Loig delays in the withdraval threatened to break up the infantry
-174-
?;/ C-.020 e74
forams.* In riv of the apparent witfrlraval. of eelr £o~et fryt northern
Aliae, it as ±mpowtnnt to a'ivanos r es of thc Un.+defntL r~~ as
quickly ae possible into the Wist~bou depr asion. Theretore, tlit
Coweander in Chi e iit desired to evaeu te the fls'ee bridgehead by the
m orningU of 1/0 rew.ar unless a to wte rrer va aiven feitl.
The ?uebror granted the nqu ew t onthe rollcmin ds,p Tfoavin the.
proposa of the Chief of the rsrueht Cperatiems Stea if and inf2.uned
tr the feet that the bridgehead was no Icege large enosht tie up as
statable enetv fore. Arder to this offet was issued at 0 hblz
at 05 hor the Gwawerin Chief Wext reported a
Mis intention ith regrd to reorgsisig the chadn of ead, the
distriltto of ton cm a th. upper MIni frot nd on the l.ft tt teItnd oit t t +.Aa fr uwing of
PintAny aMtheintndrioomtset o foces.Apat fwz nit ofthn Ill S ofpf, the 159th, 189th, 198th, 70th, aw 716th Inantry
Division vould rmain assigned to flretmnth Army. The pers , of
the 189h, 708th , end 71 th Infatry Division were to bewre with
the 16th, 1 9h, ea 18h Thtntry Divisions. mhe atcuzttu Diviia
and ti 33t Infantry ierio wane to be tnfaed as soot as possible
to terear ofthe lof wing of Fi rat A in afle to replace the 559t
nantr D.tvii and the 905th lDvision is the Toge.
At 202 biurs tb C ow r is Mhef West mesed an oder to r.o
habl tm the 708 M. 76th Vo gr eD tutsiec n the 189thInfany Divsin near the front in Webulcret V 1le ist). '.
enemy opposite this ertr ofthe front shoyl be gins the Iaprssia
spy
-476 4? £'. C020
that these thre divsions were being held Ir. retnev by netsenh Art.
The upper _ ie de3 egger wers e to be furer. stregthbedb the
comuitsaent of Volk stw battahon, for the quatericg and training of
which the eourltios onthe upper Rhino wor favoreble. Additional
Volkasturu battalions were to be activated in the Nineteenh Aw sector
in accordance with the request of the C ander in Chief West.
ZOn ho the or in Chef West was directed to instrat
the Nieeeth Arqr of the ?nhifrs opinion regarding the lkeihood
@f an ean7 attempt to cross the Rhine in the sector Bisohveiler
Stnsbourg The rehabilitated divisicms were to be eaployed agant ash
a possibility..
2n 28 Ferar an order ras gives to transfer the 190th Infar
Divisio fre the upr Itan fiot to the ieb area. The
division would breplaced bythe 553d Volkigeir Division, which
was bein rehabilitated in that area. tazpt in the case of an tasty
attack, the infantry adengineer elements were to be held in the nearj
the entire division vas to be onrd ly if the er attepe to
cssthupetie
The defenses of the uppe Rhite front vir to be tr
steghndby al available inn., Reisas. was to be eari
out arme the river.
. the,
Oesar in Chef West orderu Aw Group B to spoy its loca tOrces
to stop the enety drive west of Clove aM to retain this city47 as a
F4it C"020 7'
pivot point. All aesu prepswmtlos vwe to be ade for a partial
withdrawa). Of the lef't wirng of ?wevtyfifth Ary. The mafr effort
should re*main oonentrate d onboth tides of V.nU lo &~r ad.
~th s ndy, thbC arin hiefX .st "fued arequestb
A~ Grioup H to -dtWrev the front to th Lim Bab* switoh position-
Clor. deprossiona Qannop. The pwsnt lin avs to be hel with the
aid of elemts of the 7th ?aaot Division (abmlt tvo-hizii of th
die sion). Vhile the ?ubwr bad alloved the vithdwtval of the salient
at 1i esr, hbad refusad l~~iion to plideo the left flank of
'n the maer in Chief a et asked fo w e uthoit to
shift 'n atta lion fr iBehren Iusad 4. the iula front of the
?fven - if"h Anw, whisk WA t een akened by th et *. atteoks I
the Clove area. This request was wetued in v of the ism eds imp4
sne. for the pr'teotiom o the D~utch naval base and for tb.- ei t et
of midget sh ie against ship trafi, n the Soh.3t River.
At 3230 hoom a 10 1'.bruzs* the eaadar LaChief Wet dispateod
a uss to Awi QOp " draving Ateatios t the Nerious eftuw~a
of an min bik-thr t to thes Pbnaw stressing t he ismrts~e
Mo34i" Clov at al a. Contest Witt tbho T weaytthAu e to h
ainte aer a13 eirsutanes.
ka WWeW!d 1a a with zWak mad the Vuthre darlt the situatiofn
'oserm Fn 0 V auwmwy the attuiioso the Com~ in Chie West
vas aai . drawn to te possibility of an enmy aiern landing in the
Ki # Cw.020
Arbsm area in conjunction 'nth the attac against Cloe . The Cnander
in Chitf? West vas instructed to examine the defensive easures that had
so far bee ntskene the possibity of transferring additioal replacement
taining units and rehabilitated parachute units, and such other naures
which might b. still feasible. The transfer of the 245th Infantry
Division to Tioand was to proeed as rapidly as possible.
at 2045 bors the hief of staff of the Co ndr in
Chief W.t tranmitted an order assigng the 33ath Infanter Division to
Anya Group H in the Gden area.
U rabr an .nher was issued transferrin to Holismd the entire
replacement training orgnination the parachute a m t. the
Wst ia ordor to tae admatage of the favonble billeting ,oowiticss
ant beanie it was desired to aocup tefo n! in grater fom. This
order reslted trona ssion by the Chief of the Wemracht Operations
Staff dxin ue of the situation oaferenees. "Weak paracute units in
Italy (let and 4th Parchut t Divisons and the 9th Prachute Division
is Geawur wre not stnct to this ordr. In acordanoc ith a
requst the Counter in hef West, an order an3 February direoted
that th1 361t Volkegrenadter Divso wovo be roe tivated souh of
UtVeett ratt he r tha n northeastern tfln, . The diisionm to be
rtainm as pat of te r es an was to be ewltted onfl In
the eect of 'as neq airborne l ag,
As ore cc directed thit the division would be
reabilita"t near the frot but that infautzy ant engineer elements
-17- 1
Z45# C00 02 -179
were to he used only for recocnaisanoe sad cmbat patrols.
t 25 Pebrunzy the resons for shifting th 361st Voflrsgresdier
Division nearer to the frnt, were explained to the Ctender of the
ltQ1AadI;I~flt Training A , who ad asked that the order be ohansed.
eserves would have to be shifted ftc. quiet sector in order to
provide anpwer for defensive. fihticg elsewhere onthe fronat; there-
tore it was necessary to emloay mashift measures of evr sot to
oac 1 sectors ot the fract.
O0 19 an order was Issued direting the 265th Infantry
Division to be rehabilitated east of the rhine in the Boolt area
rather than in northern Ballet as had bean previously ordered (sue
10 febuary). Utfl the arriv tnw replasaents, the Coaas
in Chit I st was permittd to agoy th division stfs, sigfa
battalions, artillery, ad aitank wit of this division for security
issions along the Rhine. A rus y the C or in Chif West to
use the infantry and engineer uits of the division was declined sie,
they llwou~d beee asa crr ad~e.
they w m M be nepp as 2 7e b the oa tb t sta re of the .5th Parachute Dfv tsi n
V'as reported to number W? a fle, th.e.abt strength of the 7h
Parachte Duieteion trS $67 a.
For details concerning the withdrawal of the left wing os ir
b"up K to the lb#ao XerIteh, sepeg. 167.0
For details osenrsimg the withdral oi the 346t Inantry D.vision,
see pape 167.
r57C79
#C0a0
(b P the P'ushrr ismue a directive oonendn the
eploymet of deeeptive moasures to cove the ithrawa of .force fryn
the ?atytft A. Uit. frcm all branc. were to he constituted
into "deceptiv tviioute 6i3d, 21 , 249ths 34th en 7Q3d Thart
ivision s. T he n w u n it d e sig n tio n w ere to e d in a ll c am' P w : a n o a m p s i g t e a a or b Car c ef es,
takin into ashon the admiistrative difficulties that woed eour.
Two Nfrther directive fr the ierwre transmitted to the
o m er is Chief West an 28 Februry. Owing to the rutm iti in
launehing tado sfe, the area east ofThe Hage would gin in Is-m
portau to the emes. Therefore, the fones relieving the 346th
Ina ntry Division were instructed to increase their vigilance.
The stron points ofresistance in the area of tb. 64 earn ez
tratios east of Sarrebmr were to b hld at all cost saw with the
ss f aain obstinacy which the Ameans had displ ad .t taste
in order to create favorable onditions for th counterattack of the 6th
88 Matls Division.
4. i n
to sift certai antiaircraft witsro th West to the e Frot,
the Vhruaoht rO tntms Stafft, which eeet4 a enw attac k twtvesa
Vole and L. iQh atter P ea y c a sinew sen attack betws
a S-arantft ate ~wafter 10 February, requsted an 30 Jau
that the comimet of antiaircraft arftillry in the aboweumetieum
eras adat the Mane Arosinga emi unchale in order to reduce the
)W# Qe0l
infleee of euesi tir supiPority on the pve of tattle. Thereupon,
the Chief of the 'Jizuaeht Opations Staff proposed on I TFerary to
re a 191 antiaircraft batteries from the ost Frot am! th. son
of intrioar for tranfer to the Fat. This proposal was agreed to by the
Febrr
31 "Ml= the Fuebrer further ordered that the 21st PuiAer
#tvlio. ve to be ove d to the Faste front. An order to that effect
as s at to the C or in Chref Wet. At the sane time the CaEnoder
inCef" t4 wo asked to eenine Sheher the 10th SS Punier Division
could 1 released for assig nent to the An Gnral Staff. Te division
was then casitted on the First Any front.
the Contender in Chief Ve p as Informed that the
evaonatin of the 21st Vrner Division made it uaeoessary to trans!fe
the Venter Letir Division to the fltst. The 10h 5 Peaser Division was
de tfiaitey to be shifted to the. Fast. Bath of those division, the 21st
Panser Division first, were to b given priority of movement, A further
rdeer direted the Cmnier in Cief West to .transfer the U WierPaer
Corps aong with the 2ftt aser Dion. The U!?!? lesser Corp. we
to be pld it th. dipoal of tt* Ay General Staff wr oaitwat in
the East.lr
ow104m a telephone oevesttos iht obietf stf. the
Cowaster i lC"! Wst, te Cef of te lhnht Operatio 3t t
r r on r Se Yebrr moonig the delay at Anrar mp B in e i
nis intended for transfer to the Fast. It was pointed out that snow at
Wlaaw
#L C-O2O
ta, enemy fighterbomber activity, and intnrruptioms in the supply of
fuel (air attacks had oyrail zovenet to a bait in some instane)
bad contributed to the delay. Intrptions in telephon e serie had
made it diffioit to locate stalled trainf, pticular in the ease of
trin carrying 5$ uite, which were sattered over a wide area. The
sudden transfer of the Co or of the Sixth Eaaser Any, who should
have praly eup rflsed the loeisg operatisj also vas a factor in
the delay. In aelloctig fl to the isite designated for transfer, the
C er in Chief tad so depleted his on supply that defensiv
operations along the trout bad suffered. Th. late niela of antitank
units in the Ujpaenau ara was due to the shorage of fuel at that tine.
P the 404th VoUka t lery Cops, ate!d of the
rigtnally desigate d 401St Vlks rtillery Corp and the 6th battalion
of the 40th Vtgks Artillery Corps were laced at the asposal of the
Aray Geel S taff for ausigawt on the Ptasten Fot. The Ocanmder
is Chi!West was to receive the 6th batta lion of the 40tkhofls
Artleryo .aiw.
S acerase with asorder of 24 Februar, the Csaater ix Chief
West as to transfer the 24th Fortrss m Stff to the Chief
and Fortiftatos O fficer for neew e is the defese* sowe
between the Elba a e rv ive..
5. fn~ In 'itation a h Vecrs ernt, In vi of the
imp e euew ofemive in th West, teC or is Chief Jest a
30 Jamary reqnested imnediate atio to remedy the asteful distri
butten of petrsonttl between the three branches. the ame forces.
IC s20 01830
Large numbeors of y soldier assigned to the Min ort th uft rfe
were being ploe4 in the rsar areas at a time bahu additional m~nower
wsneeded at the froet. The Graner in Chief vWest asked .the fnrer
to wae a deeeicon ts fundmzetal problem.
Cmanting on the condition of his forces, the Cranier in Chief
ass on I rebroary stated that certain nits engqe& in defnive
fighting wonI4 =euavoidably lost :mu the supply of Wenoren ti
vere mediatel increased. The orgaizton of cadre regiments for
newly activated waits bad proven vauable; herer, thesereint
aol4b retuied to their wi division. The traimngo reiforoaets
coflinued to be inanttiient. It was not posibl, for each division to
train itsow em toed oficrs. 'Recent figures indicated that
8$ percent of .1 lodes were ft's the tnfaatl.
the Comrin Chief"Wst reptd to the blefOtthe s that th. aveag strength ofthe irtfantzy battalion in fl
Group G nmb'ered 200 mon9 whbile in 4wM Group Bthe aerage inifanty
batlon nweaered osly 34 o. Based on thest statistis, the
Catder in Chef West sa that 'it isso diffitat to nszlu ta
the r ecabao t engtb of teinfantr will be dtrcqe4 it no
plasamats f a il to a rri . Th. C hifo th Welunokt igh
declare that the C or iChef" Wst aft r ene or t
bataion of repiseements ta eah diviuio orattl of mtV to.*ifl battalion of r Iplaeem ts, me Ss ing eomvats,
.b the Cauder in Chief West fckowledge receipt at a
MS 4 COO4
t.etjp. e ege frw the Chief of the Ct sh declared that no
aditios repine Uwou24 be ailadle. The C iander In Cidef V est
pointed out that he hd rinot evn reetvod curreut rep.acoaints and aeked
urgenty for .the late aisnet of at least ten bttaltza of
replaowsnt tros
.On m the fayW Oenl Staff , and the Zys~ r ot the
ePsoem .Treit ing Mvw received word tbat the Fuerer had ordered the
a"ILSMa iothsC e Cif Whest of fifty bttalion of ifantry
rep ea#aand ten battalions of repleents for the armrd tr p.
Fifteen battalio of i.fantr and thre battalions of anczoed troop
wor, to be ade avaiable between 10 awd IS February an the halane a
to beaniltl by 23 February,
Ct5 February the Chief .t the ' normed the C ar in Chief
Vest that the nassar plaoeate woul be prc dby drail
heaviy ro personnel stil ast to the tiy as d :mtdte. Fo
tee battalion of rala t were to be ready by 0 teruary
As t e brerisw dem tow fift batlons of. rplsomts coul
sot be fulile W' the OsC er of the Reli eat Trinn v, an
order was lasht n ml Febrar for the $nadmate assWA toth
"et of fi thasemarine " wo wr te bing taine in Dtmat
th ae Tr ain fit Amadin. fin thouasa d main
ware tob tranfer Et to the Vest o 2 Febrar z
Inme with a order oftA Februry the following- units em
the Western Front were to bewithdrawn for rehabilitation at re-
organiat on The 24th laantry Division (Is two bttalions), the
4 84..
CeZ l 5
edre of the 85th, 7th and to other divisions of' the ? nteenth
Araw (to be used in train newly. aetivatd- units), the dtvis ion staff
adsignal battaflon of the 4Mt Infantry Division, ad the reginter
ae of the 3dVlkagrenasdier Ulvision (for aneigieut to units
designte for rehabilitation).
Ct one full-strength battalion from the rhabilitation
reglst t the 36th Volageado Division was ade available for
ocebat epat by the di visio. The buk ofthe regiment was also
tbe avalable after the rehabilitation of pers ae a comlete.
Within the next ten dams, te btta lion of replcm ents for the 58th
ligda tattalion, about 450 =mn was to be assigned to the Co ear in
Chief West.
Aoorim to a rport of 3 Februar received on8 February lossesm
ofthe )atoeth AM .frog 20 January to 3 February were 527 dead,
1,769 vom4 a 2,310 missing.
On 'eb the faoleig GM units were designated for ansigawn
to the Cmenter in Chief West durig Februarys The 31334 Fortress
bglaat (61e)' the 115tb ll th, Y3lth, oa 3fl6th Fortress Batters
(ss* ), ala light antiaircrat artiller biae (505th *U, 17h
508t, Sflb, an 5lt) adfiv fortresis antitank "ompaias (for
feigaet as saorS troop). teset redueM4 productiom eawitr,1
bra of tho se wo.tits wee epeted t be delaed.
oil ther C omdr WMin Chieof Werst wa inorm ed flat only
1,250 officer an rose's offieer apnplits sould be assigned to the
-185-
#CamO
;'eetr n P m t during Februay, inst ed of the 1,80 onrinally pr ad.
In aco dane wi th exoder of 10 Februiary the Co~andr in Chief
weswa to aseig to the .p e eent Train~~ Army the adrea of the
159th and 19dInfantry .i in n the 16th Voikogrenaier Di.sion
for use i aotivatin reabilitation re jixvent
Z*h 11 !Mbru diri~ttvy were sent to the Cosaedr in Chiaf West
ordering te fiset possible reorguaization o the 189th. anti 726th
Tfantrz' Diiios and the 70 th Voksereadir Divisionk. 1Rerpnusatiam
Was to b. arried out in an area zmr the frot. Two strong Coares
wer to be detadhed for this purpose.
The Co new in Chief east was asked to prohibit the drafting of
personnel bythe troe uits theilves, a tios vbih bad heen
earned out in* s ese, as it won3 disturb the established spsts
of jwiidig rplaoesets
C~ 1 ?bwurithe ea tier of the replaaeat traimn uits oththparaohute divisions was inforsed that 10, 750 men wouild be requmr
for the six di iios# in ordar, to avo1& a total doplstioa of t weir
the Geawander iAeL' WeJst was ordered to traiser.
the 27hAssault Gu ~gds,a a p e ln unt vithx trzucks, to
the flplao t ais ng for aperiod of wrgenisti.a
Ia. ?obruewy 3,m0 wep1.. us wer allocated to the Cmane JI'
Chief blast This ube diA not inelud 16,0 atm laborers n
RsiRan prinorfers of v'ar who were also asesped to the 4.ste ?nt.
J.! # Ce2 4
The panohut. diviions hd askced for 12,750 rplacement troops. I
16 Yebruary thrynumbcr of replacesents fuonised durnj' theaL ht
O r in Chief beest totalet 55,250. This nw itr i i ,e a route
fpso but not foreig *uxlise# or cotwale oenta. ' -the total,
wh i ch was higher than t h at d by the ?uebre, 30,407 men had
alrea4 ben assigned orwere under orders. The CaGer in Mehit West
na solel resporiible for the distribution ofal replaceents, i-
eluini~g those designated tow the penehut dirisiozis.
Sine, the faces of the 7O0h M n1th Volka edier Division a
the 19t TfnyDivision, tihih the C e r in CiI* rest h ad
designated as ceadr for swl organised uits, were no4 sufficient for
the usber of nit. d 4e by th ?hrer, additional ces were
ordered to bewihdvn fra uits aong theo upqt ine frit. Th. los
ofthis additional strength was to be aspstad for bythe inease d
ositent of Volkaszturn uits in the sane area. Coa 21 F ebrur h
Camnde isChief Wort reporeo the str njtb of the a res vbdoh had
bee relesed.
0b 22 Tebrna the Gmaier is Chie 'est was t ai4- that
deniuet. s the Ep roae the assigm of further iaaut
diwisi o th Wester Trou.
CO.MMA"de in Chief West akite a rport a hisixe
distributios .t the Febrary rsp a at. Ieudo foreign auiires 5
31,34 se would be assige to Arq Grraup B.
In order t tak ful advantage of ever; defensive poscibility, te
-l8"7-
MS #£ 0-020 - e
Cnsclr in Chiof West rerqueeted on23 !ebmery the tumedite asiignnont
of a11 forces of Wehrkretse ' VI, an! XII.* In justifyin this requst,
the C or ina Cief W.t pointed ott that tmaf lon range plan Of the
(SW withi regard tothe orgardzation of new units, traainhng, and re-
hbilitatio can only be carried out if an eney bre akhroug is pr"-
vented to,'"
The % -ehmsht Opention $taff pointwd ou so 24 2Febrtor that8
in addition to the repleoutints assigned cte17 month, the Cetno in
Chief Wnstb habe able to seenre replsoert personnel f'ro the
f'rontior Vehrk ib. Hoe ver, still3 eaiting or reactivated replacn t
training toruztion wotald be shifted tothe area of the Coffr i
Chef W..t. The requested asne t of personzael trm th. above-
maimd a~hrrin would Eager the entire replacement system ofthe
field onr . Who three Werkreiae fiarnisbe 27 percent of the replan-m
awent personnl or th. entire eich. The re fore the Cwmaler in Ckd$f
let was referred to the order already issuiedb theb accordin to
w hi ch b e we give b r oad authorit to us. personnel within bin a
area. This ardor bad boon issued on7 e ptember 1.944 to give the
Coauer is Chief We suthority to soplq -for de fensiv use f fre
of e doanht, Aslti s 8$ u i, and a3. organtatloa not Pert ofte Wbhrhaet with i is ka area. The rues asig en t the
toe from th three f'rontier Mebztrois. w as red. When the reques
was reeted cc26 Febrr, the Fbror ansered that no change itthe
deetatot 0414'bo mao.
MS # C-020
To offer ied4.ate relief, the C ner in Chief fleet was assigned
fiveO infntry bat zi ion~ 'r c~ oikis~ e 17 d XII Zr em p1m nt as
r p~acients ~ the 1iea an additiona3. five thbuand somie= wit
fz'm four to eight ieeks of twain. hese try p er In addition to
repIC ont8 aLroady aeoigtId 'or ?ebruarZ7. .1-pa2t f the 12,.000
February repl1 eeens which ha already arrived, an edditionsl 28OOW
Rninoiw nz prachute troops were in transit. Special eazres vwr
to be t ken to expedite the departure of the rmining 16,800 men.
1+r the "?ebriiachiL c ration t off protested against o
ordr Issued bHiltler's =1ehrm acht cihief p rsonne of.icer for the rapid
activation of one division in eknkr, is X, to be osigne4 to Asr Qoi
Vistula. It argud that this would sever y strain the tailn api
of the Rewnnt Trining A~ and further weaken the position on the
sslgoland bitbt. 1oreo er, two d ivisio 'rs this aea had been
prom~ised to the Cizwaner in Chief 1pest.
on 27 Zec ru the~ Co zdez' it Chief Wet issu 4 en order releasing
spa tr ined in the use of specil weapons in pa zr aid, puisergrenadlordivisions for employment as ini'antry troops in their respecstive divisions
sine theme was no Icnger sufficient an~ition axe equipment to jute4their se. The divisions, Including thoe of the Waffn $ , ver. to bhereogvaud so as to coneentrate the greatest ocmbat strength in the
paunepeaiei divisions.
'B suse the smooth am~ply of reacement peraoan al,such as replac.
seat battalions, was eozetial to the def ense of the Western Front, the
# 0-020P'-190..
foflovig directives were issued to the eannd hem& uartars in charge
of movig prsonel r erenttt:
1. The C ar in Chief West was iwediately to desitpate the
destintid and the receiving division of each imt of replceents.
2. R~lceme were to be tmaved out i ladtely even though the
intende route of transport was not open at the bqinning of the move-
sen t.
3. The onder of the Replaemet Training Ary was to take
Samdiate zeo for the reroutg or detrueking of repl~eaorxts is
the event of interruptions intransportation. i nece~essry, movemen
was to prod cco foot.
lOn Se tbe C er in Chief West reported that the @adrn
had been withdrawn from the re hilitation regisents of the #9t inantry
Division =a from th 9th, 3th, and 560h Volkgrenedi r ivision.
Remaining elsents of the Sixth Paner ArM now masered 149 ead
23 eiles.r
6. Th aeil$tto mteVtr twt 2 Febu the
lowtS Assault Nr Ii er Rattowas assigned to teC is
Chief' Wtf
A oe~iq to a repefl of SFebu ry, a total of 633 tasks, assut
gums, sat tn 4sstw o von avalale in th Wet (Awry Onup Ha
126, *1 OnaW 3s 281*J Am * GrupQ 397)o -Of flaeg~ 269 flQUIZ'5
amo repairs en 420 required n jar Veir". in aoor .eae with an
t$ C C4J ll
order of 6 revbruay, thc 51 .. rr ,t!tdt" ' a14"dth 31 "Jnti; rw
tadcs a ct aointc Tr 'ymrst z r thrsI t 'rr .tront. The
1st Capa of the hattalton wes t Wb rest! for eor vtmcnt by
A repozt oa Lll. tW~a~ L.rr-m?I cn the 4We ttrn rot
was suittte to the m: e4 .1a, t&v 3Id vnc, (1pnrnttlnS "Staff on
7 F.eay. $in . no furthcr taus nrfld b~e aeetrtt to 'the C or
ins Chiaf West inth near t tno e va diretc to jne1n h
eighty t a nks iateAzyrp &rcvs thot vr'e r mmtly nat being
*sp~re beaur ofthe ka-k sr fuel
An oriAcr of 9 Fibrinry di re td the rtts.bilitetien of the let
Iattal iou, 13%th iner i~giuft (rafeweh) for ineorporatia into
the Panzer Lohr Di iion. The mnpotor Genral of Penser Forres th pWo rn t , ewa tf e
recqvstc or 10 Fcbrus ry to ucis snttte* eopeniea as sanis poseJ
to tree dvisions on the T4kter Front vhlch sr L'ar had no antitank
i st. Thre. of six obthe divisions whch h so antitet unit wer
assige the CdOcepanios of the 79th, 212th, er V63 Vokg ier
Division , The othero tw i c ati .otnes if tbne divisions worn
tnansferned to teTpaeosot fang Arsy for reo rgani tis.
Mooriq to a report of 10 Thbruar, the sssig nat of weapons
the Westons ant inette 3,000 pistl, 1,000 n pu, at
2,000 noins Sa.. Issiprenat wa based on prodwuc eapaity.
To sugant the projeetar amwzm tion in th Wet, additional suppis
1~S # e020 192-
were to be assigned to the aa grops arid es.
Because of the low rate of produetion and the situation onth
!nter Wiot, only a smaell number of tanks were asp gne to the
CoGaeer I Chief West, whereas eight hunded tanks together with their
respeotive unit pononel had teen transferred from the West to the East.
The Cosande in Chief West had been promised the assigxet of 20 -tank
dest ry , type 38 the 512th Antitank ttalion, and the lot Battalion
ofthe 130t inter Regiet. The 653d Antitauk Battalion (41 'Jagtigt
tma o whimh 32 ere ready for cusitment) was alred avaiable. It
yas expected that the 1st Cowp of the 512th Antitas battdlion woud
be ready for oanituet at Dolersheiu ty 22 Feb rar.
t23 Teraythe Ccmsader in Chief '4est recivwrd that ha
woud heassesgned .*J Jgp tet tank (twa ne prodotican) for the
654th Atitan Dattalica (QM), twenty "agdpuise tanks, type 383,begining cc 15 February, anrd another twenty tanks toward teedo
the moth. Further ueesnza armoe reserves would have to be taken
ftw the large steak tf taks that 'were not yet ready foro cccii
iealgthe eigtystvo tank ai assut gusleft 'behind t~ th
S dt Pser wthe twae *Ja psnses' wrer readyr for ummat cci ebruaryp
an aditoal! twenty tanks were exetdto be naty b 3 March..
I O afr x toteD e Chm stinte ebruar that wo ore tank ft new produflias wodb
mde avalabl durin the r t~i of the month. hi attention we
1Z G-re2O
agin drawn to the tanks left binfd tr the S ixth Paser Axwy. Rf emer
w as also made o n 25 Thbruery to the blockizg of aunitiz stoks wichb
* hd oouodon the Westn Front the days Erler.
n28 Nebrtiz it wa neporte4 that A' Group B * bals 100 .3 oktPo o i hedfniefgtn o e guns
and 5 rcke prjecors n te dfeniveftgbingup o. 6 Fbns.
7. "a+ naEM11laJa Cb 5 e ebrur p rido wa
puaitad Ll sjetw *sfolhmtUe f t4M giulfli4 RJ" a ine
04.4 to ftedriebshfef) since the fl,O0 laboers eepld there were
on th uerlin f'rot.
1 e thC .eriChif Westwvsord vr .dto ree e
mesures take so tar to crate aobtacle zone in the deptht of the
defense sstem. To the extent that it has acot yet beat dose, a bstacle
ae was to be eamtrueted a the Ta e14* of the Wa twall (so far a
was possible oiieriug th had aready reached the VJetwfl at
saq point) with the strongest section in thea W in.sw depressics.
Th. chief of staff to the CnaMer in Chief West rplia that ordere
based apeie gane the fi xtig trout haiaread
b eert Copie*o the openw vn submtted.
On JL4flWX the apW riat heaquatens sere ler tht the
NWi er bad urdewi the ostket ot a ep4n tine.' A deey
syse t fortiflat. wato bmstrmt. agm the
eSas ba t the tine from u oh to Karnh, with the river
surin as the ain line of resistace. Zehid this live va to bean
?E5 P -00 9
obstacle so. up to thirty kflaeten i depth extoning as far as the
line w d awl etward fr the pro-
teotion ofthe industrial area. The strongeat part ofthe line was to
be Iithe sector btveen !norich and Koenigainter. All coastructiom
work was to becarried out by the Gauleiter, wit nilitary tontrol
exercised bythe Cander in Chief West. COcztrwction of fortifi.cations
eat ofthe Rhine vas to be stopped.
S. U mnslam~am~a. OQa 31 JanuazY an oder was
S v t at l l e d V2 o e a ith r W b s e of 83 Obern Rain er. The targets were still to be
deter ied by the CP i accordance with directive frm the Puebrer.
an order direce d that all nattens relating to the
V.I and VaR rocket projeciles in the Webnaoht Oprations Staff would
new be hadled byr the peratios Branch of the Army instead of the
Operations Branho the Lufwafe.
After 17 Februar the 317t Atiaircr ft Artillery $attalion, a
statie unit splqwl to proet 7. firin postion, ws no lnge
sbodisated to the Comner In CMef West.
9. M" ~ cl.m n Q 30 January at the request of blobs
)mster Speer tvo rea t of Org iatio Todt wre, "aged from the
aw .t the Commndr in Ce West to guard the Rhin bri de
Zview t th seios ee of ligh fil howitser ss th Wste
frost, the Orgaiaion Pbrac ot the Army Cement St.! Va rqete
031 31 Jenn to a saig thirt-six ligh fieldhwtzers to the new
4-19400
W «0020
atiler remit of the 84th Infan Division.
on 31 Jte .the CGeaner in Chief 2e!st reiported onthe atrength
an! am.asxet of the 361st Volarnder Division,
the opetom staff of the Voia stur was infonmed
that the C or In Chief Wes ha requested tewithdrawal of all
Vo kstu wits on the Wston rotsi tWesiyumex battalons, nine of
whch hdfive independen compoa
. the artillery ngent of theL 8th Irfaty flhii
wlhhdn lest all of its hore, ws assigned to the e scortee
Brige, This latter Wilt was to be. roorgantud #tt the 1nhnr Escort
Division and transferred to the ' ast r r . To replace the artier
regient a the Westeon front the C teRa rm
Ar van to assig anether artfllez rgaat (honseadnvn) to th. area
of the flat_ 2"asat. Any'.
'e' ar the staff fthe C or E" ast Hvollwan was disso lved,nthereby restoring full resibiltyr for military interests in the
Jietherland to the Militay0 Qvno
Sithe supply of casvt would ot perit the destrastion at,
all gnot time frtiftle te thes CChe tt wa Wred
-o Zkunt d astr a); thee fertificatioaVU wh r et h±&*ly'
t.0ose iertat t th e'
Caiba an order Artille ery Rttalta
(ow) fu it s as ldpsat n*ter d orpaw i uorise
unt, rthe than as £ pert of the artillery reglent .f the10t
1$ G .20 -9.
Infantry Diin, as had been previously cared
It was reported on 2fr. wa that the withdnwal of the 184th
Artillery egiet bythe C er in Chief vest va not postdble owirg
to the comt sitation but db carried out aftr the defensive
flghtim btween the Va and Pinc ivers had partialy subsided..
eb J& ''it was reported that addtion a ss on the Western
ront had been merised.
,, iar three (WQ light antiaircraft atillery briade wowse
comittd on the Westorn rot to pMoet supply routes against attak
1o o flying plaes . A flurthrote grate perninsiom to taporrily
e poy eight repaleesmnt training battalions from Webkris V to relieve
the Ml Pae hute Diviion. Those battalions had previously been
emidttedo the ?nt line.
ca *6eb~ an mor was given for the constrtrtio of fortit-
caatio. 1 7i
On 11 b the Contnder in Chief Jest var iulontd that
requests for meging diviin into'>n " a ena r
tv the enter of Arq Group S, naut be eomided ilkuafyV
the ?nebrr who desire that the divisoms -shouIt wet l... their in..
divwa oberacter in th.es t th
U Fe bra the %th 8 Pwse rpac Dttalic assigned to the
6th 88 Waat Division 'Nndo' was ordered tob wihrawst the
17flwther datia .a not .given. (wtor).
""196-
.#C..320 9a
front for assigmt to the Rei bfnehrer M'$*
Th er in Chief West na it known an 1... that the
ensq press ara dio reported. that the Uern= eoldie braveby stood
his groiwd, esiona criticisum of th defense wee voad* o b'
f or the ustial p QP#aSda pbz;O58.
On 2 'bM the easrte baurada27 of the oo ares of the
C v ine Chief Wst vas ezed to iaoude that Ppt of W~heis
V in Get Eadn w d the distreti o Ca, ?fioen tat, Bab, t(stWii.
adTuttliugei In (2n Mettberg.
Reaing the di pera nd vaa tion of the civiliant poff:sti
in the Vst, the a pprra te ecasnd headqueaers were ±if#*md on
22. ?erMsr that a fiwtber qsbeatio evacutio of the population fro
the red and gree zone va not intendd, since thoe involved vould
onb be sujected to danerv and bardship and no oti.er ae vm
available for quatering evacees. lcl evacuation were p+essble
with the conment ofthe Gauleitor or the XNational 1)eee Constmoer
if fighting at the frn raeit n@sai. Wiens refsting to b
#woae vere not to We raded trit w. Al a 3*.bo&d and
kiled v~za .mode not albd bean drafte into the Vabrssh
-,th Vey1ist~ were to be aated is all oaen.
~ 23~.biuzthe Ins etr +eei of Tron~wope eore
that the Adolf Bitter Bridge at Colgn. bad bean 4.etw~ed "~ a drc
w hb it!
1g a reimes al ta of the 7Qt V ogrwdier
497-
ikZ #c Q0O
Division (later the 106th I nflatn Division) vax orlered to bead
withi the feork ofthe 406th Tlnfantr7 Division.
Ct than divisio staf of the 716th Infa ntry Division was
to beassigned to the C~a or in Chief Vast for ooctit nt t'ithil
Pinetnth :Anq mtil 31 ahe.
On fl. am pnnision was given to merge the 62.d Vo3kas odir
Divisio n and the 09th 'nantry' Diviio into Zorpegrappe !ati. As
soo as sp aoaons vw. trained the two units wer asjain to be
28, r. a remr a g4ven on, o~ent in the cantwe and
neutral press coneerning the recent fighting.
Ut.1 fltCCWTX (V IN w1MCt the toner C namer in Chitf Sothwat, 11*34 Tbral
Kessering, tplae. 71e4 Mantel vo btstedt as C es i he
West. Genrl t iee tpba remuinsd as chief of staff.Goeraberst arpe eseste of thed First Paahte Any.
(b w9 Orcup teat 'vwearns of th. 71nt asa Siat
,Armaes The upper Rhino front vu aide imeiately subtwdiate to the
Ccmnster i t. Vat.If to the wihraa of mU peait mit fra the low Paso9
Sin, the t . s s of D mtaomtalab into nation athiprtal, the folloin ot i rtten nl f etIin th'Sitwaat ioa.'
iWml9w} C0020
that sector of the frn was held bypoice, instrtor wits, etc.,
whch were orgad into "Eopp Ratern, un.mer the ccmuazv of
Wetherlard oic he tatr
For the puse of dcoeivinz the enew, "AnecabteflunZ !efL'el'
vas oranised ard acaignsd to the Twentynfit A ~A. 1 9
O eer alo' b ers t flaskwvi tsz wa tr eoarman of the tve nty.Citt Ar.
After 9 April the area via refrrd to as 'otrn n.
~b 1 ,.It was reorted that 25)#0O groes ?e fiste ton
bad besa stuk off the coast of !n lart.
Until R7~e Foarr a continuous defence line hssd been matntaim4
alngthe etire coure ofthe Vneten iot, althouah the euew had
attacked infaes at thre different poiatsl Wing to hea vy losses vai
p1 teal ezhssttcn# the fightin sbfltt of the troops ha! dininlehed.
The forces of the Omisder in Chief West co'41 not be fully nantained
ving to the lack of repisesent personne. The fact that the enq
hd boon force to employ ali of their Eat .zgio teo res, with the
rtcetio of hre airbon dithto a tvd tw !Yzsttlsh tormtioe,# whose
ReSDOe h otbe rent l erifiod yas to be regaia as a runes",
The cnsa ha cusedd in brntzg through at !flelen a Wi
pereads reache the Ahin Rier at eaus.i pntrated Iato friar
An- ' a is*ei.noMe aorps with a corps-type staffegad~l a corp. r Cmer
J~#C-020 20
ne eeitatin a further wthdrawal ofthe parachute azv. It was hoped
tht the gap at Trier would not be inaesed1 to asinin stntegio
signiene. Until 28 Februr it was posibe to rpma of a "large
scale dsesive aoration.' Since then, the fighting had taken an
unnatisfactory torn, in spits of the prformaeo the troop and the
@-tope operations wrere eapcted along the Dutch coast. The
346th Infantr' Division was to beshifted to, the 0mb ares whre the
eaw contiued to attack against I~rib and ! !!e l.M The oer's
main effort vman contrated againat the left flank. In spite of heavy
nm q artillery fr., a coneted fromt was reestabished by do eotr-
attack FUocdg this# the Fuebrer pertitted the main line of
resistance t. be wthdr"awn,
The .sm'y via repote to breruing ra.pidlyr, end anthe British
Arq7 was appa nl being eapioyed in the arers, new surprives voe
empeted. Strong prlure vw exerted at the corp boundary where the
U.&, XI Corp prssed to the north and the U3.5. XflU Corps attacked
.saar. nFigtinm wt in th Vnlo are,2 feetsf the U3..
III orp"ealso atume to the west though Me hen~ah awl
Jqdt flepit .; efo .f th Pastie va Mviato seal off the
sdvvenes am ye s a I reaching th. railroad statinat
mess, th 1th Psier Ditiia wee able to edgaony to the. ra.
nwahiwg ..oni.o al.er t. tft lve, whon eneu brideheds wersealed oft. Th LVII Fiagr Corp a in a critica poitio. Weak
VZ#Ci.02 w 23le
ene=' f os attaeked the right wing of the Tftb Per Arny. Strong
artilnyex fr continued. The left oin of the fifteenth Panzer Akw,
dssending pert of the Wtwli, suffered only loa l lses. The Seventh
Arq released forces for comm tn t in the Trier area, naldug possible
the estaabhRiset of a n ' line between Perosy ai ruhlbflrz. The nn
frcs were moved by trcak.
Che of the brlldgs at Cologee amapsed.
The British press hted th. brae defens of tbe rb area.
in the Ar Group 0 area two ene r arnored divisionS admeed
toward the norh, reashed the eastern outskirts of Trier an pexnetrated
into the southern part of the ton. Th. southern bridge had already
bee destroydS4. The enaW division leading the spearhead radioed that
heavy losses wore sataineadg the o triigf general
order the advazce to contine, sts ie a vibdrnaval vcld also insve
se * The Qenmn line wase no longer cotinuots . It was considered
doubtfrl that the 6th SS Mountain Division could rtore the sitiastica
an h fat a surit s coud be established in tim on the Ece River.
Nothing f imprtae occre on the southern setit of the ft.*
Ixthe Arr G roup C assume+ commend of the frtad a eventh
Aries, The pp Rhin e treat was ante me diate y subordint, to the.
Ca er Is Chief Vest.
The reort on the eneq atuations r sle& . that the
Srittsh 11th Anutad ivision bad bees l tfitelld t Vb ,8 wher it bed
wVdently made its apaerace for ther purpose o attackng southvard to
424073
N4 C-320 apLw
destroy thos Gemn ioe t est of the Rhins. After this had
bee achieved, sAntac ars the Rh-ine at Woeel and Tierieb was
expece to follo. This uld e tinly take place after the snaw
bad o cpied the road betwee 'ee1 a elden, Aeordtng to reportS
from reliable atees, the emmiq then planne to uxlvanoa north of the
industrial area to the niort Gren p ,l, orossing the Rhine with the
sumf of the IBrittab 6th Airores Division, two Ca aian pacrachute
bttelion, slth. Nlish paracute bricade.
Eight ai~ tof the ES. tint Any were emitted north of the
Urf Vallq ar in the Colges ,. Don area. A decisiv attack W the
four dtvtsioas resetin south ot the dam va not eonuidared likel.
It was tgt tp be more probable that the ID 5. Eighth ArqW would
oouoentrate its sein effort oath right. Alog the Rhie, fen Trash
divisios" distributed ona widesfot.
~th iwer hine tb. ew attacked in the Gch area after the
nsilnt station at Lbbeck had bee subjected to stron artillery firej
oever, t)h advnc was htedb a (lenin cu ttaot South cot
USwr ms w tnks advanced to ithin three kil e. the area
southwest of 8on e where the psetration vw seaed .ff kr a
thrst. To the south the e~ a ocupies ia ~ ados Sa &tna
ati near Yale les vuto S ds but a Pot e established a
fthold at Irefeld
Ithe Anq' Group) se to te fightingo s tised ona lre meals
The an bad roportedly enter e KurhaGlad bh Couterattack t
30 if C.O2 .2m
the mazr Lair Division uresed the nmq Wok at Soblieflefln. The
torward snuriV flue at Neon was :breen. fla farees wrre throa
batk agais at Qrenbrieh, il, at Weienfe ld the f ti tg ttontinued
without either side ainin g the advantage. ?ieedrath twas reisptutredbu
Qymerieh, t leob, !trp, am ixi refletn were lost.
In the sector of the ?t ?anzer Army, Zuelpleh uag lort and
ffihtotng took place fir the bunkers at Orsost, bear )ettsrnieh te
e advace b io Kyf. North of Trier e r ew res penetrated
thrUgh the Gema eiroleaut. The esg apture frkr nor
dueesfly a ttacin fro the east.
Tthe Anmy Growp 0 area the fighting vest of Pm wa of a
detain nature.
=b 2 * It was observed that th Brittsk employe their
tortes ofly for a few days at a tin., Whether they Veore aseblIng for
an assa lt In anither diretio na tot clear.
The paitio of the inst falcute Arm had deteriorated, The
point of mai effort vas is th Anrhern froet. Evm though attacks
eotU be o eok a withinvsl became ceessary after n fytoes a
brake throan the souhr sect of the trot. A transfer of
tor,. w he orternto te soAhern scion ot the fiot wan
losser possibl. The brtehe was Nill of Ga"troop.- h
bryge over th Ma e wunear artiflery fire sdhd beet oere
leted. flsttn cotai at Ema.0- TFifteent A'v vira v
to the tr River A brigehead had bu'n tone. at Cologne. The
C~mO2O
positio of the Fifteenth Arm had4 sot deteri rt.4. At Yettemioh the
snw' advaed across the 1Xyf River. At Trer the stationx was tn-
oh ;ed the en ,y famees were not strong.
It was ?tport.d that onthe evening of thirythee forte
were rtiU. held along the ~twaI.
Ith iawj 4op G astor the 11th lanser Divis cm was csplcye4 at
the )Xyll River. Figting continued at ?ozrbah in the face of strong
pressre
_5 irehL4. An agent raporta that 3O0 land1ing crot '.e :cam
concntr~ated In the Grimsby area although a large4"ecale o fratic t; C d
not s to, be p1 ~.a. It was possible that th1.s was or4 for feeder
traffia. Submarinns repoteI beat' night trftio at the uut~ of th
S.i and at Chertarg. A steewer of 7#0OO eos register' t=n vas snk
off the coast of unglau4. Another ship of C#000, tor was sun b~y one of
the new suwrines. These new veaasels operated fro~ cave y, were very
facs, but carried onl~y two t r"*d oss.
General eta.e was torepsr to the )eair onthe ocosaton of
the Situation eonferee
Tbe 345th infatry Division vas to have been vlran fron a
isleatls t7 24 kB+ 'y7 tre$$'io was orossing the byld( at Ni a e..
It was to bedo rwmand whether the Wavy or the Lutaffe could take
actio amant the bz'idpo
The -Kaier ' i1heI a Bdge at Cologne vo. stt.ll intat andi capabl@of a ppo ig ;xeen~ vehicles. All of the hridge at Dese orf
2
)45 CnM00 25
wer, destroed oc3c ib At Krefeld the foarln bidge vaz, blown up
first; the rain bridle was not destrye utl . tic two tridgee
at Pauci ctr the tv h r ovr edt of Exam Wrt J 0 Lztroyed.
cL1 artillery, fire ba do trad the atrcet-ca~ t:t at '
while the ,rahlrm brttze wts AS 411 utle Wk t p'o lI2
brille acin the' attc zce w'nrr ~ue-erthfy dsztr t
The First Ptaacute Ar still heol d a bridlohea vent of the fainc,
althouh the eney e ttaokod str ngly fro the 'dlit .d tie south.
Special ttn staf f of leare v ere sen~t out 4w 2&ti I b
corps were Interrtted. The German bridgheds further to tom so~uth
Vere still hodfrg out anA their yoeitio reaincd t-} w an e. T-he "'II 3S
Corgs was ptwbn~ toward the south. try'Group twas cadinheav
fighting. vest t Coon an endm penetnation was stalc4 off. At
Woarringen, hoever, aneny r petrhaeed tuioe cdI splitting up the
Viftotert; flm. Cot: rattseks w "r- irade fry:. the aorth., en tl etne0
terrain ws lost near (olhtt the enemy et-'ace : tQed.
Ithe sector held L7 the Fifth Pern Ary thcs enemy vas stopped,
although ?askirotan was lest. More bunkers mare amatnc4 I the
S+eventh Arw sec tor. It frost of Cton the dvnee was .Ae&iis: at aot
pints . A gabtf ad to be closed att the armry .g t bow ,n7.
The lh$. 1Oth imore Division advnei eastv-ark aaron the 411
lin to Trier, prbably cro"ssg over the souther bridge whileh could
not beblows pp,
I n te Ar GCroup G sectr the xacy at t!he Tkmwe flgvet atterte to
4 *2 C5..
W#R 2 206eo
eonolidsto their astabl shd brd ehnads an to forei others. The
attack by the 6th &S ~uutai Division, sported ty a Voiks rtIll ery
corp, wa to begin in the evening _in the direction of Oberv *l two
bunkes wer lost in the Stating k+ernIl are while ea t outposts
tthe mast weve wit raan. At other points on the line the"e was only
localized fihtn.
11di." " NTo snr ifatxy divisions and n. acre diviic
Von reportsdt have arrived fi Eglan. ;Theewsstill no nSidene
o1 an .nae landing at the atern Ports. Odang to an increase in
sppli in the Canadian seoar during Jamaaq sad ?.bruazyl, the arrival
of an ad ditiona three infasntry divisions adtwo armored division ws
aemmed. This wade a total of sight British an Chamdn division..
)(onovw9 four British infautr .M three a cored division weerlad
tv narrowing the attack area. T or with the 7th AmedDivision,which liW not yet beena emloyed, this ae total of eight aidditional
diviio. Elements of the V S. Ninth Arq wone also released. The
Oceaderis Chief West expected a British attac ehelond in depth
ar fore at frier ha still ntbeen reisfmed.
After the tw tyithdyf figing the bridgehead poitica of
the First Aaaht Js bad Wa ertica, p aiwly to the. soit
when a Csse unt was st bulatet
It, h t. a r v s o * t e 1AVM h Div Uiio the O th and n% th Tf aa Divisi o, the 16th C a ea
igae 9 a! two assault gu battalio would beat least prtiall
destroyed The =mntion suppli was critical. The sev erit of the
-Q ob-
-- 0Cs2 '27
fighting va i2 ieat&d by the fact that 302 tanks ver destroye within
four days * The eney 's fint attept to ero the Rhine was un usfnl..
All Germ brdgads on the western bank of the Whte had been destroy-
In the Arm Gru 13 sector -the corad staffso the fthM Pine
MnW and the Fifteenth Army wer a b~. The chief of etaf to the
C or in Chief Vest, Geneal Vetpu, was preset at the situatio
nflt@ held4 at the Thetaw's hndqwarbrt . A twnet to md~erteke
an air l abi operation Wastitted bythe cowier ofArm Oroti Bi.
A decision van to be mwde coceaig the milleatio of foni
Wehreis V.
The brdbMheld northwest of C was piemd togethe i
the spi into two pr. North at norh t ofCelagae enem tor
pieweed the Coan l nes. ai a th cate at the city where
there wee no ifteatr. &ithe anuthemn flak ndat the 'bouaro th
V Nrahute Corps the situation beeoritiesi. The tract now ra
ftw north of San to the southwest. ute p s a ot as tin
rgt wing of the Ffteent Arq. the a gainm c or -te kio
meesatth fighting owthe fllevin d. At a~there wats f for lsbakens. ~'vtroop pentate into 411,
This saunesea to catrtt4s a prviw tam t inwhiekthe athsu ie the 'bridgehea itil hel q the Pint
Mmy. kbcetrfres npetedl refer *4e s hweston bn of the tine. (1sttr).
HS C..00eZa
while eat of th M v tor tanics pnsh;ng to the north werr sealed ofrfb
alert tmits. Thert< was s till hoe that the eap could te closet A
request by (lnera loberst Iausser to ithdrew to a chord position was
refused bythe C er An Chief Whest in order to s~itain a connection
with the Westwall.
The attack of the 6th S" Motan Division btgan according to plan
at 2300 hours e, advaning by way of Z sen, eontiw~ed to ak. good.
ar es spite stubomar iuatanoe.
Il the AnGroup 0area Porbaoh was lost and a emaiulineeo
resistanc, was established * The situation at Spiohoren was unchanged.
The Osnttion and fuel supply re even more serioes. To help
alleviate the situation, the r1*t of the MW released 500 cubic mters
oaf fuel, leaving a balance of only 500 cubic meter in the CAW rsese.
Z-bmU til now the reaining ,els of the First Para-.
chte Anmy had been stationed in northern Eolland. During t he nighta
order vets given to occupy. the area around the ljssel and to m forvam'
units Trm Web 'reies VI, slate a tactinil airborne leaing was eeted
as the easter sid of the tiner. It was expeco that airborne trop
wouU be drpped either in the rich _-- oel are or in the fbr
terrtori order to eable th seq to 'begin a strate attaok
bar ral traffic had iomsed durfag th last fear days.
P reparations t ar Si crossing were unerwqar and an attapt was
expeted at arqime. The U.S 101S Mt Mrborne Division was located at
Se, the 82d Airborne Division was at Stesoane, while the- wherebouts
oft Of;-of km
W ( C0 020
et the 17th Airbornw D-ivisio was Ot!11 rvft knin.
Int t of hr 3rcsup F thA rjr br r .. ?tihc sA t <si WS
further relued, desrpit e aounttesra ttao. The front vaS now held only
by & series of idividual strng points. In the anten sector the e
was reportsd to be laying ati oke screens for an rn~1cown purpose. The
bridgehead was stifl connected with the eastern bank of the Rhine by the
main bridge and the railroad bridge, both of which bend beeS .repaired to
earW thirty toe vehicles. The 15th asergtna er Division was beMin
ooogetrated in t erioh area as a reserve. Instead of being
transferd to the Cologne area as or iialy intended, the aser r1r
Division was held in reserve further to the north. IBoth of these
division hed lost ,aost all of their taom. A largeasale tbattle
continued to be fouht in the area around Cologne. Th. anew bad
penetrated into the city frn the vest arid had reached the river. Ony
* fa' etrongpoiats still held out, The 9th taner Division had bees
crushed nra t of the city enl the e oer vas killed is action. The
MlobAsMole bridge was dsetro $ a nd the ini Ine of reitasoe sOth"
of Cole was piessed back to the highay, flare v fiht i mbi.
The Atones sbift.4 thir usia effrt and re w attackig tovaa
te uth and sotheast. Deep tsrust were M ae tvwarde, Prahr nda
areh"6t. Same of the German stry to, f&ic amprise the do s
V, balready bea surr ouded. At the yllin ver the aance vet
stepped by the lett wing of Fifteenth Arq.
In the Anqy Group 0 area the situation at the any group bouary was
)H$ # C-020 10
dangerous. W eak but active eneg forces were stoppezI et uatterihach ,
Thirty tanks were -rerrtedfly, a vanelwrr trc )a torxa d the o utheaot.
Another penetration vas =mde at Pst'fors t. No reports were received from
the 3524 Infantry Division. The 179th Infantry Division at Lauterbach
Was attacking Ntoobn on the I osel iver, The attack of the 6th Z!S
M~ountain Division vas stopped in order to cosit it north ofthe teonl
South of the Mosal the enew counterattacked, Along the Rowe Rivet
th. 256th Tatantq Division was presed bak,' The 6th 28 Mloimtuiu
Division was fone to gtveuaphal"f- of thegon that bad boen gained.
Localized fighting continued at Forbach and between the Fuar and
Blie Rive.
According to enm press reprts, the nin enemy effort vat conoernat
with destroying the Fieenth Army and the First Parachute Army, while
the next objective was to reach the Rhne. The latter objective hd beat
ac hievd. Other press reports described the renealo V-1 ativity,
ofair action, tant of the scarcity of ocean shipping a ce. On 4
I M uie Mitert Churchill was isthe West, visitin Aachen ant
*T aftvt. rpted that it also easidaete
si rbo"e a ttack to fir ikely. oceetration ,of trasprt planes- for
that puroe had cot yet bees obsrd, althouh prp ti oss could be
m~co shot ntie.o
The Fuerer deanded that the, traaining units of all three branches
of :t Wehmcht, so far as teohnioally possible, be withdrawn wel
-2z
)$ 4 e11.e
bahin the front, vith the exction or th taoary antiairoraf't
artillery. However, the reserve 'units wore to rtamain where they were.
A order to that effeot was to be issued. The parachute its yene
arriving.
The ?uebrer expected an enemy unetaking in ith Arben area. What
the British would do was not yet clear. 1Btween e ich and W.ese1
the uituation rmed quiet Perhips the .seq sk e screens in that
area wre meant to conca the arrival of supplies. Serit7 iitms of
500 seneach and seven Volkusturs nits were distributei , er a flstae
of twenty kiloleters. mnition continued to be in short s p2. The,
'fine Position' was still in the process of construction at was Rot yet
echelosed in depth. Barbul wire .ntanglaeuts were at yet strung.
The situation at the 'WesI bridgehead ba bess stailised -after
the a En withdrew part of their foresa, perhaps to the ersric h 4"el
sector. Heavy weaos had been sooessfully withdrawn across the linse.
It was necessary to eoonomise on uitton.
Th. herd fighting arund Cologne was is its thirteenth day., Boy
arti ery fire ooxti uu. thre* ware no enaions btweenc e
0lgne andDnka. North of *e the remaider of the 9th hae
Disof bad e uessfully vithtran. BflSistJflb is Cologne bat
oswedl a few r ai its still helrd at south of th our..
ha a had befawnd arun the outskirts of on* The 10th Assult
Qa Brigade was available for ctent. In the sector at the Fifteenth
Arq the snee bad reached the Rhine on both fanks salband errun the
I~ilJ1~
fl? -02
LIII Corps hesdiquartrirs * There wa probably no longrr any unitfied
coifn. Lremy fores ret,,he re'° mzerg alt th2& bridge at i~azen, which
apparently was crowe with irefu ce. The bridge was crosser ad a
bridgehead onthe easter bank was secured. A counteattack was launche
in the mornig.. The n1th Panzer triae was move up ra ton but the
fuel aupp]7 wa not suffiolent. Onthe western section ofthe Fifteeth
-T front there wen nl llsee p trationo the line. Frtbar
pestration 5lit upthe Geran fones o n the lett win. The sea
ccuie Koal an advaned to within fie kilo eters west ofColns.
Thus, the attack wa directed ent1 aginst the cors boundary, which
bed bee shifted. Other attacks woe ma near Heerfrt spite the
be of Muit, the left wing still held aut at the Msel fiver.
In the Arqy Grouzp 0 secter thre was deyloaied fihing.
J, W,. Radio intelligence made it clear that the British
weeon oocentratin six to seven divisions,. They were faced br the t
Pader Corp (84th .M 245th Inantry Divisions) with the 15th Paze.
erDvisio held is .resetv. The Com er inChief West wes tSbe ukoed for.a stateimt of his intenss te Lutaff &M the Nv
'were to report whether such devicesupe aS tt u st ointin sine ea be emiq
nwq effort voulA he mue, al.thou stryge tores were being +mle
ainst toan, At Rmg the. 78 Mnt dui M elemens atthe
9t nfaty anl 9th Artored ° .visionsi wre* tnv into the bridgehead.
Oppola thene was &Pgrppe von. Kortsflelseh.
Xi C4-2 -2C30
Tebreasa-throxtgh ifl the sector of the !ftfteenth ty was aocomplishei
byv the. U.s . 1th Artor&h.s tn; o .y .ftu nfllr throug:- a narrow grap.
Mdditionol enety re:inforcements were moved np to the corps boury.
The 45th fantry Division remained in the ose. Eountins. A concen-
tratio of foames in the W4iszembourg depression was considered a
possflhlitq', meaning that the ene~ would attapt a pincer attack to
annihilate .those Germe forces -still holing. out vest .of the Rhine. Tie
offensive would then be carried to the eastern ba of the river.
The n.th Infanty Division van being vithdnwn from the Dtch-
iesla *. Sat eemonts had already been moved. The W ea l bridgehead,
which was still held by the 3dParachute Division and the 116th Pmnser
Dili on~ ws further redced in area :by strog eary pressare. Afer
the ;etera heights had been reached, the ezwq coid look down ups the
Oens positios. Unit *onand staffs were being wthdrwn in order to
take over the defense enboth sides ofthe ie. Division Hbur? was
to 'be espled on the so ther via. South of Colorne tiof the
German tonces crosed to the easten .betk. Stron pressure was being
crted at Bones. It was still possble to blowupth bridge. C "-
atin ha been Isernpated sice 0200 'how., after tanks ha oe
over to the estr bank At R ae h attacking 11th ser Divisica.
was able to ew a vlas, bat the nza q .u a the bridgehedt
the artheastt REQ troops ,were brought fcwsal.
The Fifeent Anyr was in a serious situation, although. on the
heights south of the Abr river the enety was still contained. Cwung t
IOZ C C-.020
deep enes penetrations, there was no longer a six le c ar. Enem
forces continued to advance in the ! osci acrd Coloeriz areas * The IX
Corps was m~oved up Prot Wiseernbonx'g. The 6th S~ 1-ontain Division was
being concentrated.
The northern front ofthe Sev .th Army was quiet but strong attacks
on the western section of the front had forced a withdrawal of the lain
lUse efresistance to the* Sal sector. At Lsmapa.en the Gernms forces
retreated to the southwest.
10 iakiib1945. The Scheldt River was mined again. During the night
of 8 March elevgy boats made a surprise attack from the chanel isla, .
against the port of randvif.e. ?ive ships totaling 4#80O gross register
ton were stik 9 ,one large steamer was captured and brought back, .fit t~y
five prisoners were taken and- sibt persons were killed. A lighthouse
was damaged.
Intercepted radio messages between London and 'France made it sewm
more likely that an airborne operation was imminent.
It appeared that the. 7h : ~v Division v as being moved foward
inU~ the tmgen brSfehead, here ntil now nl the 7$tli IsTri
34ioz sue eia s of. the 9t rfjt7 and 9th Wirared Diviuionsh4
bee plq ed.
Nothing bad -so ,far indiated what the eneq intended doing with fios
o i ar.. fldli the 1.S. V Corp) which were, tot then Tmoyed. ?h
=II Corps had now been c mitted opposite the Yirst Anw and the.. fritish
3d Infantry Division was assigned to the W issembourg sector.
-22$-
No pentration were wade in the bridgeeis at U-ese tt thq er
both later contadnrA-. foswrse reported that 100 prisoner5 were malen
ad forty-two tanks wer disabled. I-urins the night the Cierp fos
were wituirawn, exp for rear guards whic were to folo by on7~.tThe rairoad andt toot bridg wore to hedeted; the other two
bridges had already bee bow up. The ferries wre ready to operate.
By abadonin the bidgeehead, the ensiy 6t srI 9th Infantry Divisions
were released. At the e tis hoverr, good troop were made avtaI
for aplopient as seoiit fores behind the Germ nes*.. there vam o
fighting along the !.in front. The fightng at Bia had stopped. The
o ant, Gene rvo Botimer, was a e oed bya cotrbaattal to
losse .r is rak &at five years imprisoe Wnt, whruo h. shot himse.
At Reme the en r tried to e"lrg the bria * oue
attacks were mde bythe U1th Pter Diison. Reseofte hatd.
Ith. sector heM by th. LXII Corp the ees pessed further
to then sot, fortin a bridgehead aiencircolig Aernch. h buk
of the Fiftent A bad now been eeie vest of ak. Leash.
attept vold bemd to break out to the sth.N detailed evdes
veto give,. The C orIIU, of the 131Co , Geeal Iaht wa rcr
to resAte )tel to the souh
There vant ese e the nor ther section of tefret. Ne
pntrtion of the western sectio of the front fore a withofwa
2# C-20
the win line of resitzze. the left wih thoa tttic' wara r1 teod,
maki nrecesaary the ocunatlon ot a ohor3- pa~wt itr Th.cre tano .,i.hting
othe southern front.
, " 2* Apparently the enemy had forted a te rw, the
7±i4 )4nal von ftuna t was reo replace as C r i Chif
West Fiel 7±4Mral Xesfflrin, who had been C or in Chief £0tbs
west. Field Mrhu esselring now worked awan with his fogner cif
of Otaff3, Gene e estpbl.. Gene aoberot !1rpe wa appointed c
of the irst Parace Arq
E reinforcements were moved into the Clovea~aler area, ira-
dicatan intention to attack towards rich.* Mie a mget, te
engs was attnacting Elust th. eutire Aaeriean any. 'At the
tohel the drive was no d iced toward the south, rather then
eastward.
The bridgehea that had been held by the First Parachte An was
- omlet*C esatad ad bot btgee were destrye. Sines the
beginin .t the ar battle Ar ipBb4 destroyed 700ene take
sa ake %O prsan kilw flin was heat' aog the Rhia. bt
nto imporan atic ee takin plan. The Gern side wev lackn is
tafaratt fowns 4 tasowpntwg T natws =its sad eowlrW
bttai flm, t f±tr str h babe incrsed but *78* diuted.
the e st and t . M v d i t n i i e h ote s , Three m flitat bridges had alred be n thrw
Cc.920 2le
across tiw rIver, ?or l4onner thc encry was forwd to wi t*.raw two
kt cc trrs. r* r .tnf terty twre Y .r mc 'I*" mrd * 7It~ 106th
&zsatlt (kn Drh d r rovtd agfrtonr while th' t and 11
?anwr iviies nd the troops r4 the orricer candidate setool wer
notsttd.
The G-ztan bridgehsa was caroe; its evacua.tiQE had already been
psntted by .the Piwhrr. Andormaeb was lost. "Thene vere noother
reports from thew Sevnt Any.
The Coblecz a vas rstvcly ea la. The brid~ vew Uwn up in
the nnnxmn alone wth all other bridges across the Iose1. EnAMY £orefl
advaned s1onq a wid fnt and .tanks had arvady mnvah4 Kookiei. The
front on the vest was moved beek to the Mloel Pdver, On the l0Ier
?4osol front the LIZX Corp hnquartorc avurmed cortaM
fl rsh 12l. The best of the p ahute divertons were to b
tepidly rehab litated dee~sion or, the enuitent of th 10th
ansr Dision hdnot yet been made..
(hs son airboree M iio was trasterrd Tro* Ewaee to Franc..
Th encetnttien w ap eda to beeamt. The let Airborne Brigad
ofte )ritish eairborne dvisies was in JilamI, There n wevidence
that the -Polish brigae aM two Cnia battalions two ~SlaMme wer.
*3. in Holla, =atn a totlo about sne and ace-half dtuC
The U.. 32 irae iii vs ia tbe Meehrrs are,; oebrigad
Olt te U65. 101st Arborn Dtflsion ws in the Ziseonampea the
location o f t he 1 7 th Airbornme ig tqe vas not known.
&e ' as-
At Reiwsgn the enemq continual to move torwzH. It wat not yet
clear in which irectiorn the 1. . Thir! i Dtison4 :ouid tuim. The
point at =ain effort tight be directe either agant the Vioel River
or against Coblena z n enar coraeeatration .was reported north of Trier.
Apparontl the 65th Intatrr7 Divinion had arrived from the United States.,
It wv clar that the 'Britisb would lan their airborne divisions
inthe Perich ara bitt it wa not ceran whether the Amricans would
drop limediatol to the south or inthe area of the Twelfth Army.
e e of thq crowded baildigs the )eael of area wase not considered
a 4liel target for as airborne attack, although the area of Bon an
frakftirt mght beconsidered.
The- Patch islands were oaupie d by naval units jprouped together
uder the deceptive designtion o the "11th Naval Division.'
The Jtzeber had permitted -the Division Haburg to bebroken up ito
separate units ; the reorgnastion was elpeted to be completedb
15 Naeb.
South of Duseldorf the cae arried out an anssat ra arns
the Shine The situation at Magng+ zr eiu after the .n
gandfurthrgod to the. noth an eSat. ?iv, me taurlswethe Oly totm N
4stra en thuhth.-M Corne tmntz7 w wa, onl tote t
nC4 tb situaton be mpoved.
Claz4poitions wee mopid it. the Mosel -set,'or ao ttt oft the
riv'er. Ot ewse, there w Ulttl, activity. South of Voelkiimgean
~ Theauthor " mea 3dftom Division. The 3d Inf'antr Division,vas in the TVoges. (Edtor).
CO -219
bunkrers ic could ?vt 1:e ocunial tyhe rear nr h xJs bo1a up.
1JrAj95.Th Tt;af re Iatni t xtor emteirper1iig
ened arberc attack. The ?ueh rr still exprtd the attacks to be nade-
in Roll nd. On the main points the 'J ehrmacht Qpsrations V taff and the
Cwaner in Zhiet West were in agreet.
A t t he ttengen bridgehead the ensueq hay: c ittd the 7th and 9h
Armored Division and the 9th, 1 th, ad99th Infantr Divisiozis. The
24tafantry Division was still etthe weste bfnk, while further to t he
rear the V Corps waie ed in mopping-up peretioza.
Tighting continued in the lake Leach area where the 5th Parachute
Division was still fighting. Regrouping continued in the )soul sector.
Aordig to the oning's reports the eneq had wa roscsed
te )4osol, although the ui ae of the fo was not yet clear. At ae
event, a rwi crisis appeare4 to be i. enst.. The entire 6th 8, Xoutaa
Division an the 559th Livision Were being move forward, vhfle the 198th
Inantry Diio as being traneferre from the upps Rhne to Singen
to bued man aw group reserv. Anotne asault gunbattalio as
to arriv. All of thea * however9 woe exet totkesn
ti ,
2Z00eptat a tbenverreeabat atorof au twe
Aodg t lat reporb, tks bad already reached the autobaba The
S61Q wie nos auteporss towards the no. T G rnn attak
Were nc~ effectin.
At tac, along the entir front between the )4oeel and the Sear ivns
II c-o e22$m
serionaly threatene the Gerxtan poition., The s'ithcrn part of the
frt wa qiet. Thci 56'i 4Tn mhr -tr; Div1Stn; wac b:ing iutovr up to
Simnern.
1aA5Z1 2La2 A Router 'a report concerning a' chage In the ocrnsa
relationsd~p betwreen Bradi anl hontgomery V&E retracted. It wa con
sideso possible that the Ertish would bqbi a thnt towsxdc the nort
sdeast. The emsw pres stated that Rewagen was not veil located ad.
that difticultia ha arisen. The puwpose of the report nyhave opeethp rmb rie o uc drs no-Grybest
sinae the iesw strateuy seemed to aim at annihilating the German force
befor crossing the Rine. Eflita circles are wondering wheth.er then
re rq ami forces 3SZ in lfa. 1poaver, a te landing vcul
*tm. hars ben diffiotit for the enmo' since the flooded areas offered
protection and there were stfl German wits stationed ao the coast,
Ithe sector hld trAm Group Sactivity va limited to th
norsnt of troop. Two regents ofthe 346th Infantry Divisio were
no eaite. The Division Bmibirg had bena split up and divided .be-
tweet the 17' Vo~ksvntiar Diilon an the =1E'lm Infants7 .e~ss
The 9t Vclksgrfaaie Dvisio wa withdrawn. 'Attacks at !n~
o t u m d b e - e t o ws v4 t e no r sa d o r th a st, w th t e m on-ot m r t s s a d i g t e v * f l o
adac{ w cekatr as nh th e toni ofte teb
WE thea ,ut' also made acs progr s # bfe th ad z a n theo
lout was checked RPort on =nit strength arrived; three division
ismilIllEt
iu
M5 9 C--O2O 21
wer to be dissolve and their o r staffs ewl.ayed as oponatioxs
staffs.
1the Anzy Group 0 sector there were attacks along the entire length
of the front. There was fighting around. toppard on the NoselS*2 An
enear bridge was thrown across the river at Waen. The 19th anI 559th
Divisions were etif en route to the front. EnaWq forces wee repulsed
again at Nnaste. lighting continued inthe soh. The eneq had
crossed the Sohwarawaeler Rochwald (souh o the oadl, nea Trier).
Near Srbrueoe the situation .nquiet. Cotainig attack were
bein nde on both sideo the '4estwafl. Z oast itt Sarbrue en the eneV'
penetrated to a dewt oftelve kfoete~ wh the line s taorarf47
weaened by the witdraal of defending uits that were schdue for
r4.ef. Hower the. eye' ha itill not reached the Wotafl.
16 n'oh The situation was nov ade clear with regard to the
British, The S$ccn Arq was ccsutted onthe right wing and the
Chnaian First Ja o the left wing. British air neoca~naae is
sat eole oncerned with th ftto i twin. if the Third Arqy
erb not extended t bsot but nrq pree together ino r
eeter9 it it t mhsis. their ittoa to attak
The U.8. Nith Arq (the 3d AxswrDii an the 9th Inftry
-by the U.S. Seventh Away onthe soern frot in Rine. and which 'ratnever thereafter stopped. (Eitor).
-221w
15 # 0.00-2.
Division) van r eady to a t tok. The U.S. Tint Aflwy as maintainingS
nadte etlsee, which also insdented attak ncntions . ?repratioz
for a nwv effort againf the Pinpt Anr vast of 1~t he w a tns .e.o
At Hag'uenan the iits remn~ ha efon. tne no r ech dit io
vae ecmittted then it wa possIble that they ir ealed to push aroa
the Wiper ine. So far it vas sa o that the attark aia t~h
First krqV wore Wae only for the rstpo e ctaimsit and were not
itteed to be strateo
In order t. deeiv.e the enne , Me eabetnn fleffel vas foned i
Rolnd water th e a of the evn t .tb AW. The noeessa7y re-
rosptngo the Qoerso force on the Itiu wa no ocplota. flghtig
*otiso4 at basges where th bridgeba8 va vtdeon4 to the nortA c
ast. T he Dr els+ hadt beu apr d b fihtn continued at
Ko~nlgawister, where the e uq a only a towad raert fros the
autoa. To the eat the nlwer thrncd ee kiln:tern an! captured
Eiesoetdt. Vettelsohoe .vow held. In the south thene wa orly aime
activity. T Pwtsergnier Pivioac e a ovn p .
Ta he l'v rou 0antea sitmwtiec o t rigtwigM na
nnserious Rotils throe ba seaed the Macel ad had ma deep
tat ps ti . hsee fightig .t St. ear Man Snn' a ef
as sthas ofKoks All T rca to the vest of the thretesed arm
wo Mndr t. the flU i 125 Crps. rc to the nust Wvet b the IUhf Crs. The ect $.eaim t Uofh 6th. 0. $oati
T)YSO Vat wat knon., fr eq forces non faced the iSoonvwa ad tb.
ate..
vs ~'
Btn erw aerA hd broken through to the vest wher there bros fightIng
In the Sehwarzwaelder Hehwld.
At itehe the we ti i ficant Chage tr the rdtuntior. A
char poition vas ocu;I Sin the I oer Vogs ;>rti~
T h C or in Cbier ~et rep-etcd th~ t 'h rtra er ofthe
I!plaeaent Training Army reinase forces trw V7ehrrwt TX 'a XII.
Saat the face of the TXCorps were srare4 units am! those ot the
XI Corps vows met2 stationed in the wrut tn,A
fli1arhL1241. Th. locatiot of the left botndry at the Prokttsh
Beoon Army was asertaimed. ' eb n th. area to the sout
were the tareao the attaek. It wae etili not devries hethr the
Canatan flnt Anr voit prtitnt the fltn of the tritish e4Aw
or would launh its oaattak tova the nort. The Fuobror tiwM
that the latter possib~lty wan the ,"st likely. At aq :vt, the
reaetton of the front betweean Wesel anid the point where the Rhine divlden
into three branebe was ecnsidcrd to b e tteed. The Tritieb were
eanduottu neonnaisssne in the Gera rear.
Is the r kNae assault vat neitars the smit. The
1.8, 4th Arme4 Ditetoa a tb. 15th aMd 90th tfat i)vi en
being em,10r1d en the soer wentter of the front. The otion at the
12hnut 14th Trfat? Diviios *abo knw
24 rwa sors t the sm mroideguto as its bnVebereie. (Mditr).
C-2 .224
Actten in the Ariuy Group S. sector vat limt to patrol activity.
At £hictrg a rin shat 'ner the i Thire was tloted.
Further crazy retn ret s wtere mtoved intQ tha Rage bridjehead
'whe aditional ground vat lost tc the northeart. Xonigsinter was
lo~t bzt &on famces succeeded in recptuting QeGlberg. Fighting
continued at Aegidienburg where the enn7 proesed ahead to the autobahn,
A ocunerattak wa la nhed by th 3d Pnergrenadie gnaer Ditision.
The aituatiot n the southern setor of .thermt was not clea.
Ithe WBel sector the eneivy pshed across the hahe !tver west of
reanech. The town was ft iLl in Gern hands. (n th. extra right,.
the UnIX. Cor was bein wthdran across the Ihn. The bulk of the
&III UEV Corp was wi "r for an attack towards the ... t, whilea tbe
359th lntntry Division was ea rtt to the Soom"d. At all other pelts
alcmg the $os,1 f rout the ene forces h ad been repulsed. Fightig
cotinued in the Sechvrsvaldn Eaehwal er pnetrations wer made at
&ttong flet attacks were mae agatet the southern sector of the
trit, ree f ore were wt M Ct the bitch. are m the lester
Vugas jl atbs Tesw a r tat ann
arn The na reoiteden adjuttw their fit.
Intsatv tint *8*2* reported' in editem t. the artiflw7 fin0
isdicatin that the lne bad been strenth ned At Rmwfa -the 3
?a aerrnair Division advancd towards the southwesxt but was the
brought to a halt.. One village vas recapture.
.224_
YS~ 002 -O5
Furtbsr ground aslost onthe southern sector of the front. The
blanc.s of the 1&th ad 16?t Volkcgrena&Ie Dilenso were being rncve
up from the south.
In the Mace. sector the righ wing of 1ru Group G stil held fast.
The craned the Wake River wih onl a weak forn. The l;flt1h
Infantqy Diviion wa sig moved upto the front.
7mw force* had entered Boppi. A Grma bridgehea s being
e stablshed arond Binges. The fit Ct~orp was now assigned to the,
'First Arq German attacks bad eco. to a staadtifl. The 559th That7
ivision was fightinrI the Soocal. Ther. was heavy fighting art the
most votor part of the fros. fliar forces advanced as far as BlI*Was
1.1. The eropin peltts were held, but since infnr strength was
Ilckng te line vas held es 2y a series of stroupoinb.
Sthe souther fecor of the front the hnq ad wade a gap of 700
latem in the mter Wntvaf.
9 ah %. In the Dueaelhcrt Cologn sector the tuericmfl
bad ecimtteed mlV three flvist+on a vide frot. At Reaga the E.S.
V Corps waited to tres te riv. In the s a vr sectr mUl ew
tone We n idntfi.
There was 11v2l tmeto s 0 th sct of Away 0ro: R.
44At a th ew gained AMditioni to te nort ad north-
Bot h Genes 4s.n lee oaidaable. Onl a few pemtnt
were ade wht, tho front bad been puse furhet to the .xt. Wak
"225-
4C02 fn
attark w ere reprten the sother seotsr of the Wiot. Acoding
to a British report the bridges at Rrsgr bad collapsed as a rilt of
Gera Oir atta. . n Coblenss, vhic was being dended by2#OOO *w
al rsstance bad reportedly ca ed, The Pins bidgh* vasn being
evacuated. A ne lne va being established by the Il X Corps an!rt~ th1b k a s X * A G a b d e~ t f ~ u e
held fir two battaon, o .hh vat a wee a ac un it. The
b Pmsa tn " v e t e at V~ " l m uopt
at issebourg, w her * a section of 2 fo w rd are w still 1
held, the 1sVia,~l van being occupie at all points The 47h VTe
.c m dwRi v e r , . h r i g h t w o f t h ,i ' t h e e f o t e
to eater the Palatinte.
tamq activity inreasd the upper Via.
II Tar. s4ip wee o i ritih water. Anther
ti esl tet S A tag l7 U ton eat pmb.f atow4 f
ftin VA 8t fw (ae t ae h t TidE"
thshn Tt 9. tr ntifhu ws ttc h
IWnel seat thu a a srong takt, apoit h
Geran right *~n The Ynmh sue readto cre thes upper Zine.
#1 c-W0 f e
The luf afe Oporation Staff reported as tefon on the lxper~ig
enues airborne 1ainsa The British It Airborne Corps was noted near
to the British I Airboye Cos ed.it. forer position was occupied by
th U.S . 9t Airborne Division (area of Nijitegen - Veno a Eindhovem).
reparationsove presumab2its copete m operations wer emoeted to
bgin at eqtts. Thes 17th, M. at 10st Aiborne Division were
tO w isted1MA,4 at Rhein. That the 1.01st rbre Division asreviwed
Vi enral Fisewr was regarded as evider: that that din ion wras
also ready for bacto. Air iea~m ta..te the presence o
transport pinsn trop carryig gldr .t Reins.
Itentio of th e w shown by et a satvt
tas Wstpbli, Erum huaire, at Euarg, attacks agans
brides ad viaduots, ni4ght Mail ome attek ocetral Germ,
end tbe sealing of .f the rea area. The Iaclones wer expnte to
attc in the Rhie - Kain ae.m etire picture of the euw"
intentio was clear.
Re o ts fo aget t aa that peve tions wer being made i s n-i o *1 M n t t e m ut o h
Ther wer no siiime.ttoseotdl the AM Grou I
Ithe nsto! Aw Grasp S thee attace northad frn th
.1 $t the a..m was bet by theUnser'.
greaisr Dvisio and little grow S as t.
-'-
C ..CS2O
Cn the sowhen sector of the front trog attackr uable enem
tan to rea.ch the area hrwdatel north ofAndern ach.
The Karl gn 5 fired !on.e~ rounds.Army Grp C) as enaged in heavy defensive fighting, with the
cneq attacking towa'ds the southeast against the right wing. A nil
fore in Coblens ws still holdin out. ftiye was attacke and the
" mo dat tins vas Nurther roued. Enw fores appeared at
ais. The L=X Cop ocuie a swith poitio th the right flat
pe. The Semeth Aw held a line ramming vest fuWorn and t
beaingbak. On the right wing of the fleventb Army the situation was
net clear. The XII and LXXI Corps were withdawin. z ' elmets
advaned towards ZasIAb1 ,
Cthe sothern part of the front the Vntwafl wa no etirey
0-ed,
b~bj* According to an agets rer, the peone of
enem airburn units bad been under restriction since, 9 arh. tight
tat bad areef be loade. Th. repm ad ofe roano to six
diviioae hihfuradith t*ooiiis
aied know^ to be is Frae Mbgaz., it wS stil ot kns
whether al ftee u=its il be q togete Insate
ttc rhehthee Morto' vaRl "attc nsat int[rn
fatarea.Te.41eq t.atatcaaitbls.A
renege ntrepted 1v n ?vnt lt AsW indiated that %t*y
intended to launc a attac.
A5 6l3evs heavy howiter, also known as WThorI (?dtor).
C~ -020 29
There vat no imorat attion in the metor of Aty Group B.
In the Py Group n3 sctor attaeks continued. all alone the ine
from Dinsen to the north and northeat and enem Corees succeeded ±nI
reaching the moutain olts. There was fighting at Bee and 4lon
the rotul to Slegburg. To the norhest the c tutios waus stabillze
afteron h been gained byr iits of the 364Infant r iiionad
the 34 ogr Diviaio..( that sectio of the front furthst
to the east there vas Only lcisdfitting. To the soth th
situation at Az4eruaeh took einfavrafle.a tint At Thmerstein a ocimterew
attack led b the LI Corps s r, Gsenrl lit sed, vas brough to a
stanstill, fl ghting va reporte a d.latolsdorf,
Ith Ar Group G s er the situii had doveloped noily
threatening the position of tFit Aq sistmaa at Coblnsha
stopped. E troopi entered Binge ant wore approsoig Pains. The
1U43, 4th Arord Division turne off towards the soh, approaching
Worm. and the area to the south. A bridgehead whih ha o b at -
visaged i n adma.., was ste azboit Worms sndr t he a M r of
th 47th Inantr Dhli. flhta ga rpoted inthe area.
re U bad arrivdfo thEC or flU 1885 Corm . th rimt vt
ofTnt *r tenq .dntasa ther" aruadXtwe~tftf
th butt, .th headquarters ofthe LEII Corpwa onsidered last.
The =XI Corp at tie itls4tbir estwa rdas Kaiser-
slater. teir ntwn btbe lnk of fuel.
Attark o the southerna section of. the fron were rimuled.
-zz"3-
IC 9 0.020 ai2jOsw
22 ~arh ~)I5STbe Consis 5th flivi4in Rw move up Trm Stily.
It t os~d lc;y tbnt other Cnm3ia divi.sionns there u also.
be sent tothe e atton front sine ol . thee units ha so far baei
employe togeher.
Ithe Axn' Group 0 seotmr the enw 247 , end I9G t Diiions
wone eup.oyeA along the ZAdn frot. The 4th Arod Division t the
Sth Zaatry iion wee splayed aant Won, The U,, . flth and
12th Dtviians sdthe 89t Infantry Diiio vo fihing in tin
Pfaeserwsld. The 10th Armo re Division was oomdttad as t Artw$.ler,
while in the rear the 46th and 'nth Infatry Divisions wen bald in
Lth A Group B ma a o sheq thrus agfaist, Daldr
van repDusd. At R"mfight eostinud a th. north aM north-
a.stern edgesro the bigea, taeq tone" pshe ahead to U Steg
River but bir uh to a hat in front of Sisr. In the ee200A omtswih t eea h ztt *w
1u$hel4 te 36X I3a1r Divisionft, hi eb thw C is Cbie Wes
41 ao cnider eaai. of ofei.ntion bon. the division
ifantrya we omot lmost etinry t strained stOiM or mademb
at the Volhsstums.
Petatosrt a t. khseter it doph were ad a th Atbensectio of th fro ba the eqa stepped beo recingthe
autoza To the south further attacks were not otizuwd. Kta guppe
.0230M
)CS0 C3 zlv
teayerlein wee dissolved; Generl fhrlei asvn couwr of the LIII
Cors, the former c der of whih had been taken priaornr.
In the Amy7 Group G sector the ennry was active at Worts where all
of the Gertan bridgeheads bad now been fimlete'' withdrawn.
Fighting was reported at ?eutadt. The situation in the wooded
area was not cle ar. Th. flU, LXIII aid LIMX S$ Corps had to be
oonsded ovar. The LXXX Carp was attempting toforme its
through to the et. The 17 th S3 Pser Division wsalso fightin its
wy bakto th Germn lines. Nde was to be supped.
flier force. breached the We twal near Anelr a a coxrtenttae k
was de fro the softh. An e sn ored re sere probabl the 24th
Armored D ivison was being held in reediuiess.
*The T4S Firs"t Ar had arie d in the Pa are.
At the bend in the Rhin enw tonesft Wer ed to the south, The 1t
Wimred Dvision arn two infeatry regiments were pushing .crthwsrd in two
searate sperheds. It could not be determined how the.e planned
to dispose of those troops that bad bee eleacad fwa oouitsaf sot
ofth eetal
Then VMs 40 ispotan action i h secter of 42w Grup N.
les Imge the aw turned eastward south ofthe Slog Ryve.
Fighing as rpor e wM teet The sitation there scold be.
irrei. Ch& the rigt vwin of t Un.S. -tvsyit L.azw (tie) the
eaw avanedthree kilseter. the 15th lamaer Divison a other
forces were being ovdforward, Advueos wer made aross the Wid Rive.
or-
Cumt2O 022
Gexran forces on the to er 'lec were Dressd hac and the oney entered
Tellie.
The AMix Group G sector was qidiet. Resistance had ceased between
Coblens and t4aint, A critical situation was created then two hundred
men with tank sueeedd in crossing the river at Opemibeim,. vhere they
advanced .as far as COroaa.Ooraii uder the protection of smoke and r'tillery
fire. The attaek force was then reinforced by other units, proba3y
frog the 4th Awi, red Division* Renaisano a was umade possible b
permanent fighter protection. A Eoton bridge was already half coampleted.
German fores were being moved forward. .These Inc~luded a partly motorised
regiment from the idneteentb Army and local antiaircraft forces from
Fvankftrt.
The situation bad fuwther deteriorated in the sector of the First
Army, although the switch psition to the northeast was still holding
out. The 17th IS Nnsr Division vas firghing south of landau. Attacks
from the south were wisucessfu.. The fate of Boreen division, of
which at least elements presuably still eisted, was otclear.
Th C er in Chief West eas suficiest .qui et. for fire
divisions.
Tnom inte lies learmed tOat 71.3 Marshal lesseiriug 4tke
oveommea Of the Gum a29,00uin the Vest,
24, rob , The V .3. Pit Lmy was ready to attam. The 1IJA.2d Infantry Division vat also moved u ~te the Reage bridgehead. (
the wester side of the river the V Corp with three divisions was still
-232-
VSCaO2O42
waiting. Opotf:ttc Aram Srouzp GI, ertem ing as far as LsAin;, there was,
li ttle a &at ac t ivity. The 5th Infantry Division en2 the 4th anI 5th
Armored, Divisions were still waitin to cross the river, indicating that
General Pattontis next tactical rovemeati had to be taken into account.
The 12th a rd 94th tntantry Divisions were near Ludwipehaf en and the
11th Armored Division was to th north. What other forc e tre available
to the enory could not .be learued.
The larpecale enwd attempt to cross the Rhine was begun at Weel,:
as expected, in conjunction with amt arborn attack. Sa f toereac hed
the eastern bank of the River at flees and the area to the .vest at 2200
hour. German counterattacks were not snoeesetul. At 001 hour ensaq'
tornes attacked south of' W...i, eaptur.n several villaes ant entering
the town from the norhest. At 1.90 bot trop-crrig gides 'tore
reported flying over Thaktk. A landin was affected .t 1020 hours
south of' ooholt. At 1125 hours word was received that thirty tryo-
carryig gliders had been shot down arid that Regiment Kanst, in ifoxe.
territory the landing wasiad, had ulrnflag* thse in pcombat.
Apa 7nl the attackin force was th British lit Afror Diviuica
Thre were no prtant etints reported alg this Rhin fl'on tbm-
+e bndgeheat the *nasw psh$W forwm south ofthi Stey itav u
Wade little prges against the Gearya ounterattacks. . Theose Leh
DivisIon san! the 11th Panze Diiuion wer tti held in-a'rsse .Th
enem made noattem$ to* take Siebur but advanced fro euied to
Katenwengere. Fa Tr elements crone the lower_ e1. River and advanced
-23
wor? boirn rovd £oiorsad.
In Lic IArT &roup C secotor ~Vxth thitc e btec;Cur n
azA Vtnz. The arm~ ba rity he.d at Zpnhc it 'ens en] arged.. A counter-
attitet laurched at 230 houns was sutcesful 'but Trehur va aln4orf
were l~oot again.
The X1lI SS Corps (fire divioa*) rnppeand, so that the wene
about of only nice diisim wa u n nan
Vnew forces entered Lwigahfea where I ttomue fI bti a
repoted. fltre were iltl 70,0O0 civilians isth tn.
The bridge at Gt.nrrshek was rtfll in rm QWsihns. The ef
reported the opntio of er
I 1 Inth ntw (C the Csxia firstAyth
Patish it Arzorod Dvisiton erA the BritIeh 49U DisioTvere idaaifiad.
(nw Cae eTsn dtlio aw the rttiah 7th Arzos 12visio vanr identia
flid et toes* S mt4h f tooholt trny the Trit.ich 6th Aitrborn. Dliiica
had definitely beer identifie. The :Il30th Infantry ivislon an
t C Caada 8h Amed Divisti wont idautflt4 an the lef n ic at
th# U.S. Nitnth kw.y The US. 9h Aral Division Was u1fowa to be
a ft ns. north of kwiod. hi the Oppenbla b t Vctwe the
U. . 4th an d*d bh Infantry Difltns wxto th XMt It atry
ivo tW (rpasd South of Mias te 26th Inantr Division) end
probably the 6th Amenrd Diia and tone3s lad fr+ the Sat
Palatinate. The bo edry' bttwn the UJ.S. Thrd axt Seventh Artes
weeso at Worse. Th. latter *.ry inwltiue the ,6th and 42d Infantry
is # C-~o -3
T~711~$arithe 10th s414th irterod Di.vis iore.3
fry~rog ! rrtc £Itror artillery fire on, t if wiry.,
uto te Ylrt ?aaehuts Air cane ord that about 1,.20O nn had
landsd at rdrra-dn - z lirrrtnlt.. A >rm cornt'rattack presaczd the
e z7 tackr south of t n rb rg. The JA ftwatfe reported that 59 out of
11troc arztz zi &rs we're shot down. A second Arerican l.auftog
was wade in the rear ofthe S4th Thtantry Pirisiom. Part *fth
attaek n airtonte troop were arrtih t"4
Tmhnrz the ntzht atta ck wr re nde tron the Rec., area towards north
anid xortl)East. ri~rsr d r ere; aptured by the ew'wy, whbile
Speldrop was belrhidefendred arid Rees tws at~f in On.eran hands * South
ofthe Ltst'o Canal the eneea dvenee touar kilomten to the east b'
fway of 7'riorchsfsl&.,
Tr fore', pushed rm tbrcagh ftins1~ItYn to lea el. South of
UHlmsa ,en fort 4Trplane loads f fratr rs joie the erey pen..
ttrtxg £'roi the y 1e t.
On 24 ?4Aroh sixty troop-carying gitlers end thi.rty'-eight plane
wnr* shiot dow . ?*enty-thres enem trang ere destrced.
In the La Group P area thn rmow attacked stronly tters t.
northeast east of Traef. A naber of vfllas were lost in the
Fifteenth Arty sector.
In the Lny Group 0 ares the Rhine van croned betwen Braaseh
tt. Goirohu rn. The Djpcnheis b ridgehead was widere to the nrtb h
and southest. Themyu forces captured Ateiez, Cret-r, end GrosQerau and
C -. 20
entered Mederanstacit and Rehnlein. nThe, bridgehead at tdwgehafen was evacuiated. The1D wan. lost.Th
Zarisruhe bridgehead was attacked vtrconlly fran the north and south.
ineq forcs ba reached the outskirts atWoerth.
There was no ignlfioant activity £n the sector of the Nineteenth
*rq.
Z6 .srsL941. Two enem sttaen totaling 10000 tote were sunk.
tar mines at the mouth of the Soeldt River. fThippig aacity sufficient
to transport one to two diioas. being assaxbld at the with of
the El bcr River. The U1S. 17th a nd the British 6th Airborne Div iio
were reported in the tievel-e:ee ares. The 79t Arored Division was also
.rupred in the c area. The U# S. , 9h Inantry Dhvisica, which had
rettly arrived fro the Unite States,wa reported south of Coblens.
Uder flat protection of the 5th and 9t iAmre iviesios, the U.S .
4th Aitored Divisio wa lead ing the thrust to the Vai River. A .'rench
divisio was ove from ainet the Western Alp ax4 van repiacad b
n4w2r' arrived units.
?h ire attacked ftmRses t. the north, f' al -to the noteat
aMwt h .. ~pf eh atte p. aa to the east. Tht*
nn almeho o cbat woes a esibl onl W the 'a is ts.. 1.
ta capture.- CQean farce edterpsto nte(1 ie
rjjjrm
The bulk oC the 4th rfantry .lv iot t o mm t northeas t of' teoe behaddc ?t
Inmthe Arxz Group r area the C.v, ?irst Arny begat to atta.ck on a
wid, front. In thet center of the ttack area, the German forces Were
pressed bak kour to six ki.lometers. A new a line of' resitnee was
being built upwith its stronest point in the sector of the anzer teh
Division aMd the hnrl r combat units. The situation was especIally
critical northeast of Coblenz where the advrnce had reached Grenshausen.
To the souzth of this point the enesV had been able to establish bridge-*
heads. A switch position war occupied youth of the Labn River, Units
fn Webtrei VII ware reporte to be approaching.
Ithe AylGroup 0 sector the .aews ashaut area had been
ooueidenably widened, Ger forces were pressed back to the forest andDamzstadt, whIch was being held by only 2CC) men, was captured. A bridge
at ianau was only partialt destiwed. eavy righting var' reported at
Achafenbure'where the railroad bridge (over the Vain) had. not yet been
blov up7 Th 3 t il elkgr dier Division was organising a switchposition ruing southest fr , Asbaffeabar. Tmforces attackedan a v14 fmt betwee Tdwidghf b Spey.r. Dridgeheeds weae tobe
eon2s two maa S s eq forces gained te road along the river beak.
27 the Gon4i not suectedi destrqyin this brld.y. The U.17 orp ltr plaed -it over, andused it for motor vehicles. (aitor).
VSz WtaC2
At Speyer, however, etnen attaeks were repulsed. The R~hine arnt had
now been plecroed alonz a ditance Off f ro thirty to forty k11omter.
There vas no isi nfia nt actionm on 'the southern ection of the
front.
The enemy can entratedi front of the ZEouth Oironle fortress.
According to ne pross reorte, fi ttn vas still goinj on
within the, Wettal.
Churohill witnessed the ifigbting at ~et
The eomrar4 area of the Conune In Chief W}est wras aain extned.
Two hundred tanks were shifted to the est from the Vistula Itver. Five
thousad i'e of the ~$ Rlaplacezent raisdn~ Erigade assigned to the
Filnt Parachute A rwv wore transf erred to te is7 Z Diviaifm. Two
other re.placetent training brigao were rovd iforward brtrunk at
0530. hamr.
All f orcs rtitnng in the zone of interior, according to n order
tthe Fuewer, were now thrown into the front (movces rTTZ1 a
The Reioheb rer 3$, after having: rdiquishd aofM
Ontp Vistial, aw eonondhiul again iu.ith civil atain.
Aorder was given toftae strong steps against pens ahowin
fit, flag or re Mantiank otta .
A 34 NamIl Divisio was beir au.t 6nted$ eossaqat the 2d huti
Division was expected to remain in the luecksdt area.
Propgna wa tak-1. advatage of the fact that the Mciriea
shot down Ttsian fighter planes ovr aocian twirt.z .
PS -23as9-
_____________ A ' '4
n- p #^ +" ro.Ao= ,.teb adr
btwecn the 1 sttk an1 triewl canr. At th .s? nint the zltrrienS
erpleyed tht ih am 79th T .ra nt'y7-- .i n .s hlo proably
bclona cd to the 31± Artored fition, The U.t. 3d nord Divisio 175
now i~Aer tti in the lezy t:dshed It xtstot yeksnow, wher
the three Wtvigonh of the US. V %rps were empoyed. Ithe ?renkuf
area thre. eneq divisions attacked rk 'tbLr-s . "he 1 th Armord t.visio
tuheo towards the east with the 26th ivicsion toflowtng in the rar
The location of four diiiers in the sotthen reeotor was not yet knowriS
Three ?rnh 4!1viions wer kowt to t it the S$trasboarg area.
Ink the JAi Group I!sector the enery only witr local gains at WoEsel.
Pr=m Bohlt, near here enem foren ha jugp4 hostile elaent*
penetrated to the north, opposed iycounterattacks launhd by a t
Kast. The enemy was Etopped at the iippe branch canal.
The 3±tuation war cadet at the 9 3 roup tura. The 'P arachufte
Divisio and the 1920th Volkeeir Division vwere still avaflable as
reseres.
smrcan force sesedl in 1wnij out of the. Rmsgenbigeha.
The JZI Corps was overua adn~ sares reached the Ltxhurg a
Countenattacks ver hnched t r the Piner Lehr tviaio an the 2
Vo s d erD vs o . T e . e i i i ns t e6hDivision were brought forwa d from the s outh. ts istan was sttett
28 These comprised the_ U. S. Seventh Arey which Va them preparing tocross the Rhie. (Editor).
C -02
a .+c th li Uf1l1 - .loht =.
Thre vi littler eriay activilty in the wrthcrrs cart of the ArVty
Group 3area. A r staf Yw~~t ere thrownt ccT> t c i ai r 'er
To the east the ent.w pe roe an far ai, :schaifenburg ar!at %605
hour a Toroo spe-arh eced hy th rty to fifty tarW. rra h&4 Loh in the
itiz. fnu, wltob was defeivled by a arrion ot 2,700 irs, still
remian quiet.
The on+ wais attempting to alarm the population by broadcsting
false stateaents on the tactio.
T' r cmnWr the ery, srncedi easttrd to the P c's traws,, tie road
eonnectin Darmstadt an Eeiddlberg, arr! pushe bai the Gecnan detenden
at Xanaeis. The bridges at Eeiddlberg vere blown up. The 36th Volkee
gr ow dcier Division was being uiovod up from the south but it w doubtfrl t-ud a r v nt
20. 1arch 1LThe GYI=wvtent iaz ndrter. Task ?orce
TU5hfl dakr "us.11 ' eparted! for they t est, ?aner Task Three flAK ase heduled
tleave Ztittgart withi two days an P'anzer Task ?ore UFTFIMAfl was
reufl for movemet Col oe ?rier of the Arj Otneral Staff ari htA.
Ca4 7fe of t lspcoet Training Antdeparted for the hed'
quarersof the Caoer in Chie West .t contrl the movement..
Three ivisions were beiha activate froui th cadre of the. Eie
labor seie -ant thn further duvsos were to b* toned out of
Pere a ttahe to the service schools Tortyethre tryin wer
dispatched, twelve of which had already arrived at the Wester Front. 1*
additiou, 72,30 trainees (without tanks) were moving by foot to the
est and 94000 trainees were being rove to the Eat. T of tber with
the othr forces, this made a total of 20, 00 won. No particulars
were available yet on the activation of the Rfobert 14y Volunteer Corps.
General ?isenhowor announced that norther llollod would not be
attacked sine it was not conside-red a strategi# objctive. The lerm an
Vel operations would imediat y stop if the lines of ecmmnaication were
ut.
Itore ground was gaine in the Wjesel area where en=q attacks to the
north and northwet wore oontinued* Diktea was lost. Eneiq troops
advacd to the wooded area to the east and reached the western edge
of Oadeok. The autobaba was crossed and, no reserve toes were agail
able to stop the ,dvance. With the withdrawal of the 12th Voltke.rendier
Division, the 95th Infantry ,livision, arid other units, the 5th aser
Division could now do nothing more tha serve as a security tfone.
HEvy attacks omntied in the t ator of the riftecath Ary,
spittigthe German forces into two parts with the lager force to the
nomt,. An attempt was made t. hold a ne line Siege - hrtur OigGi.ss
rakfonb. Tj sets betwe the lab andt, the Mim Riven was assiged
So Aaq Gmap 0.
The sw t of the 12th Puesr Ztvisioa was hapered tV lak of
fuel Vetsar wa beig held but Ltinburg was already asptured. tn
units a dvanced along the autob as far as Aseb where alert units were
stationed. In the P. area the flUXT Corps was attacked f'rm the roar.
9 mt242
Ithe anmy Oroup Garea heavy uttckz Cutnrxd In tbt Vtanktu rt
Aschi.f a~acna:r , .ae tr- rt' t -n t g r c'F.rsd. tc:D .rd4d9c; lri, -%:rt ur1 ,e-onttrsf t asfar as We ~rn z 9 T Hi na t Lil t ' eot iitd but the eneVa
ge7a2ycz0Mnd Zwetz o tb ThZlY r GeC'rry :n*c~eed! in forcingthae on to wlthIraw trra JAtc ttrvr;. th tank colta which had
broken ti nuo to the east twaz nx cut oft . flsnolburg vnt- uder attuok.
it was posible toevamate nost of the 6,000 prisoners ot var 2.eae
te. Thin ota :oro 9 fitty ene~ tar r oe destroye, the
raaanior beix forced "bc to the et. For the preeent, the nev2ye
ostabl~if z wito ,oettoni wa holdin g out.
Srt t Dnrtadt th G ierman iutoh post ion vs. peerated. A
ew front Vuse b in bit uap alo;r the 1trnk Miltenberg Ebrbh -
Ktekar - ?mnheisw.
flJ rot 1',. This eta wth regtard to the British was no
cha r. The .U.. t int Army pushed twards the north and norstht with
the 3dand 7th DUitnstrnn zirh ad ad the 99th Oirtuton fofloves
tag to the rear. 4parexl two other flvit vern bcng tnugt up.
The U.?& hird AnyT1 uder Qenenl Pattn, likwie Gisoottnud its
drive townl the east en turned nrth. The atens sattyko
the Germ deteio at the tn be. flwubl the southern eorfl
boetr vaU snt ot Asehatfezburg.
*eport teate d that th ta ir in lviuten was -beighodI
Thtl1axA for am airborne lauig at ?des. A shmultaeu attf waso
came by sea.
-uIIIEmEhIIII
r° r
I~5 A' 0-020 n243e
Another beaka through was made ithe .eco the flrc t Thraohute
A rmy. i oeoltY was lost and, enray Ccfrcew now t eei. d ott' towaras Twax riohA.
Conetn between our units wase iterrupted. Lk rater was tor~t in a
push to the east. Tho troops crossed the railroad and pi shed towards
Oesfe o. Sout h of the tippe branoh canal the enemy took Gladbeok and
fathorn. It as not clear where th. 2d Pnrachut Division ouldbe
employed. There was little aetivt on the left wing of the P tt
asser Arm. A switch position was established onthe lieg titer. The
3d Puergremndisr Division and thbe Panzer Lebr Division were shifte4
to close the gap at Sieges. Hostile forces. pushed north fran Marbesg,
reaching Eattanb~rg at 1025 hours. The r ocupatioc of rkenberg was
Rot yet *~md T''he artere of the UXVI Corps was transferred
to tt34ko. There was n report onthe lction of teLllOw
headquarters.
In the Ay rop0area (six days after the eneq crossing at
ppenein) the i.S. 4th AWired Div is dvanced northwards as far as
Rtdda-44aesenbrg. its of th tint and Third dnes had alreay
like up4 in this aes- after advancing by wa o 'fitlr. Sownd of
fl~tin cold .be head sear Laitnbaeho
At hasa the Gerom deftees were forced to withrw from the
altier bu cotc w t heold brigehead a retained, hr.a
no furter entic at Asehuffenbrzg., At:I l r eromantroops
destroyed three eWtanks, the crew of whih were drunk. In the
Odetald the euae pushed on to the southwest, penetrating -a obstacle
-243-W
tt$ 0 -020 s24
line that had been established there.
~%~aIU'.Two mldget sub rin',s Feznetrate3 the Mrbor defene
at Dunkizk. A third one was f ollhwit .
It was now known where the British employed the bulk of their
infantry strength but the disposition of their armored divisions Was still
not clear. The Amricas concentrated three iniantry divisions in the
Qladbeok.'Duisburg - abrn area. 1'robubW two of these were the 5th an
8t Armored Divisions. Leadine the advancing forces were the 3d and 7th
Armored Divisions under the ca nd of, III Corps.
Wile the bulk of the .enem forces was advancing efatward, the
75th nt antry Division pashe towards the north. From varicas rerorts
it was learned that strong enem forces wore stifl. pinne down in the
rear areas to opup continuing German resistance.
The U. S. 3d Infantry Division turned agoa to the east towards Pulda
and XEasel.
Ithe Wel area the enemy advanced towards the north and northeast.
Cesfeld ad IUb wrn lot en hostyl elem ts reacted the Jaerich
witc position. Four bttalvza s were being assembled to arry out a
flmldng attack towards te southwst. Zaew avanced elmets rache4-
th are northeast oW aster. A switch position wa occio "south
otasel
Th eb of Arq- Group t Goaloberst Slaskeits ordered
that the First Parachute Arm and the Twntyefifth Army should attempt
to make contact farthor to the north instead of onthe Ithine. It was
.240
#P CsC2O 25
AXSdecided to defend western old as an indetr~enet fortre ss. The
49t Infantry D~ivision an the entiairart t sore :rom Whe tuhr ara
were to take uppositions alIon the oetud &t 4 canal. At the
:boundary betwee the ?ifth P aer Lxw. and the rifteenth ttrm the latter
was forced. to with:raw to the north. The. Any headquartens was tempore
wrily out of but yato attempt to push its way thre h. The Lil! Corps
van being assembled. Auorder was given to nfl off the Edr den.
The eneqfs path of a dvac1. through Srillo to the ar ea south
east of Paderbon~, turned offC towards the northeast to Hobur and
then proceeded eastward again, Germn tans and antiaircraft artillery.
fome oouterattaokd. inthe Any. Group 0area fighting was reported
othe Yoelsberg vest of ida. Germ resistc in Frankfut had.
stope. Ji was also reported to b. lost. From Rban the en
advanced towards the northeast but could becontained. Southeast of
Marte only a minor withdrawal was neessary. At Asohffenbug the 30th
Volksgruadier Division advanced eastward against the eneq Widrhead
bt van lreujt to a staudstfll. oca fighting wats reported at l .ltan-
berg. Th new main Itn of resistanos. was partially pnlled bk. Con"a
forrns no cling to the line on 't Necar .River. Sot of )as~
thei enoW ves held bask by th 17h ivis. Th .nq the+re we
prais Iridg equpmet. T orsd aotivi4r we obsre and it
apeae that ensqw forcs were to be moved ut'wd to thenrhat
Movements were also observed around Strasbourg.
fl Yarh 1945. The situation in thelritisb ports remained unchanged.
-2/4540
S4 ' 0-020 '4
Only fifty-four lending arct wnre assembleci. Two ships were reported
sunk off the outhern coset,
It. was confirued thst forees on the rigbt ving of the Canadian
Second Army were aged in the fighting. It was to ae assumed that the
gards Division and the 11th Armored Division were ccwzitted. The
British 7th Armored Division was identified. The 8th and probably the
5th Armored Divisions were on the left wing of the UIt. th R±Mbr'. One
division each was being brought p behind the :3d and 7th Armored
Divisions', which pushed on to the east.
On the sector of Arq Group H the ensq left vial had advanced to
the western outskirteof hF eioh. The 6th Parachute Diisal was now
separated from the First Parachute Arw. Sinc, the easy advabce into
the area nrhwet of ftenter and southwest of Rheie, # theran
front was now too far extended. Arty Oroup H could b. reached either
with difficulty or not at ali. Little ground was gained by the
Aerians south of the ippe. branch canal. According to the srvq' group's
satiate ot the situation, the fritis had. nearly comleted their
strategic brea-tdhr h afloin force whic b ae advanced from wsel
to the east ant from m* t the northeast to join hands and encircle
Arq rou B.& One, poit at ains efor was at Sedge~r vhere tfhe aeq
bad aready apturgd several villag s east of the. town. It une not yet
known tethr the hequarters of the Fif tth Ar# hd attemted t
cut their way through to the Geman lines, The 176th lfantry Division
was being moved forward bqy tuk. south of Paderborn the $5 Brigade
2bE-
t talen disabled eightnen tanks. The. bri ade a d been placoed at the
d1ianom. flc the arm group. A new lirve Wlt bei .: bilt ur feer :(arael.
Ituem fol'ces. advanoed along the corps boundary' to Ursteld , while a
smler force adv ad southward to Kar hein. A gap had been created
south of tessel. Only local fighting was reported at linau. Little
round had ben lost &t Asohaftenbtsr g, although to the Snuth the eneqa
had advanced as tar as Wrtheis.
East of the Olenwald the eneW -advace tough Nohen towards the
nothast and to the southeast. The 17Ith S5 Phuser Divisiona which had
been concentrated since 28 Earorh, was not yet engaged. After the in-
coHoratio of 4,000 sn from Amb rg, the divisio had a, strength of
1200to 3,00 non. South of Hleidelberg th enemy gained further
ground.
if. U ThC ORSS 0? EVh DIfl# Th .10h 1-18 ARI
.:mi tw9L. o ships totalin 14,00 gos register tons were
ask went of Englad
U~t tn*loeds of tr*4s, six tral ad of i tta, Sad tw
tran lofs with fue two disptce to)lsdb test trnsor.
Teofa letrs blS nqdn 40 toH of fuel sad 60
to erne eastwar, eaIrlnesting Lotus fihtgwa
retd in, tnste from whe An Group .hd, withdaw. Enar r?
M4$ t c-ozo . .2 4-
acdvanoed towards ltzstr A brakthonh wa&s ntaze in tUe southent
Clank ot army Orouxp H. !a~ericsn an$ rttiahi Careen advanced zas ar as
the Bi teld area.. The enemy advateed along the tutobahn from Soent to
Ltppstadt, thereby completing the encirclement of Army Group B. From
Hian an artored column of about 150 tn nk turned towards the south. Gum
pivo :at- Htern still held out.
Fightin in the south cotinud with gret losses. The 'LXXIT Corpis
wast assigned to the FIft Penner Army. Ct teleft wing of the LbS.
'First Anuy the th Armred Division advanced northzwards wy Wyof
lirilon. After having reconnoitered to the east on the previous day,
the 3d rore Division advaced through Warbug to the area southeast
of ? aderboru (Thu, the enemy haA taken the rouedbot way.) kdditionfl
enw tanks arrived in Knel. The 6th Wrmred Division vas reported.
heading for ?ifhr-oh, maing it necessary to withdraw German fons from
the ohne.
Tanks from the boundary of ArM Group D ad0 advanced to the area
i sdiates~ went of iisenaeh a6. s tdll inmen hande. A
mdteh position was being organsb on the fla wiug# although Seblits
and GelnhaauesI were alread lent The situaition on. the left wing wa a-I
chtned. tmyTons crse d the Rhi at. Fnunbur. rtheitwans
lost4 but this adjacet a siU held out. Petatiods wre' ier. bee.
twe the nfata e Weckar* River. pr" ty th neu' ai& efft
badl been shited to the north. The Wiench were moving their forces
northwards and had torw two bridgeheads, althoueh neither one had been
XIS ~ C420 e2t9As
eanded, The 17th C Pan ergrencir Division wa now cn.r.rtted but
ta contained by enemy armor. :n ele :tnts wtre: rssmorted heyAing
from Scahwetzingen to ?rtuchsai. The !?Iaok Yorest was being, hold b7
alert wilts. It was reported that the population was taking anincreased
part in the detaense. W4oinn bad joined in the C±.htiug at Schweinhiin.
Ten heavy batteries wn being snt to tkieraburg.
If eessnz7 orders wer, to be sent direetly to the C ri
Chief Waest and to the ay grois.
2SariLI945. The lot Atirborne Division t n Tgland was ready for
cormttment as of I pril. The let, 24, And 3d Inantry Divisions and
the 4th and. 5th Armored Divisions wer, assumed to belong to the Canadian
Ut Corp. It appeared that the British 7th Armored Division was at
the e, the British Armored Qua rd Division and the 14. 7th Airborne
Division were north of iwnter, cad the British 6th A ra rd Brigade,
the 11th Armored Division and the 6th Airbore Division were west of
)uenster. TMe buary between the British and the Americans run from
Don tem to a point six kflnmsters south of fluonster. Strong uit of'
the. US. Ninath A~ vere being sent uap behind te rigt wig ofth
fItJS sed Ay apparently for an attnokt southeast otf Thwute.*
the S. It A i I U1 m * y f Lp e tt'a ato~bh o t of 3 ie.t.1d, while te 3d ArumS Division vS. m m-"
ieta in ti tiotn ofe a wbon tippstdt. Th 10t In tq
Division was brought up to Rrilon. Southwest of 7 Kassel the 9th Armored
nd the 9th and EOt IX 'nantry Divisions were probably heading towrds
VS rt X0On2c
ettinren. At $iegen reports identif ied the let an th In tryt
Yivisions, the latter oC whic wstrviousl nt orn.
Cn-t the left vine of the ~S. Third /ry reint'oreements hind rrive
for anassault towards the northwest aantMlug
Iaddition to the 1Oth Arooreod Division, which had advanoed to
Ifruobeal, the 24 oroca Inantry Division and the 3d Algerian Infantry
Division were reported betwee truehnil and Gormershis. There nos
strong ertiflery fine .t IFalderon. The bridehnd at Locen was unse.
Ithe sector of the 11 Parachute Corps the enemy captured mae d
Gronav. During the night the florund - Vt canal ws crossed at Grow.
Attacks sothwest of Dielef eld vere repulsed. essu e was exerted
a t Iii. Law troops passed though itokl~ngbausen.
Tthe 'Ar mrup Rarea the situation long the luine was unchanged.
Figtig we reported wet of Siogen and within the town .itself. H
and Knseel were attacked.
Ithe area of AM Group C the encey pushed further to the e ast9
with fighting at OGeser. dThe dfdesheld out at !shluechtern btt
Nd Orb. wa lest. besy forces *o Ochenfrt. Oroffi va lost
north of bo be. The *nemy headed dRhekarisehfhes while
fgting w report noth of
I AP~d The bundary bewe the Srt tand thes t
Ws nWot of mter. 4'o t. south vone the U.. 2dand, 5th Arond.
Divisiue, while the 6th Armored %ivsion was now rportedly north of
-ad M elsagen. Te 11th Armed Division *nd the 6th and 71st Inant
eZ25l0245 # 0-020
Divisions were at the Werrs di'yr. The:1.. 1st, 24, and 3d nart
Divisions were n Tpoyed to the n rheAt l sr a dirivc i nto centrai
Oeney 1 so that0 for the ttimc bing 5cnthorn Uenx.any was less
threatened. Thq French were brigig up the 9th Colonial Division to
Join their other three divisions.
Futer ese ttacks were mats towars the 'vest nnd north at the
Dutch - Gee°a- bonder. Nod ar appers tobe been entered,. th.ereby
Opniu the way to Uinen and mren. Other 'eneq fores reached the
Teutobur r Forest and approached O nreck. After a break-throg
at Blielefeld the ene ' read ferford.
Ithe Arq Oroup B sector the northern sector of the waled ot
tightbv no"e was assigne to rq Group Hf for reasos of supply. This
led toan error in whmnd4en Asi Group B ordered the 116 tanner
ttain 'to dvaet the east. After four kfloters the division
was forced to a standtill.
The Ryie front nequiet ic!the rdtustim on the 2±.;s front re-
mied the. es as Ifon ta tones entered Kasel an d attacked th
s"itch position running to thbe southeast. !isennh was only two kilo
eters away. Two k'dgahnds weave thg'cwa annme. the upper Thd n.-
Shal .was sttf in Genes Wais. Gene fitte von U Gaine Wa Uk0
wlig. the - ties of ar ets 4Pse tW'm fernes bed
enter Fald. Tie sitta in he Suart )oatai was stA n3 oM
ehanged. Frm Bed Or the anow pushed on ttor, where swipme wone
to blow upthe bridge. env forces avenoed on Waersbrg. Southes
n2 524.# 0-020
of. Ashatfenburg, whih had already been captured, one battalion was
conl.tte mgttnt a nning forceo at' itty Vttke.
l ernthein vas still being held. The Xl 3$I corps was in ct~rgo
of the area. 'Southwest of the Odenwald a' mney thrust to the south,
split upthe Grmrin forces. ?ighteg was reported near Nek rulm anid
Itoter's. re otd that roads ini the rear vw attacked by Prtis s.
Only in one instance, at Limburg on tb. taba, ' was there talk -of the
oneq being vold b the populetion. Qetn. reports or such aes
indicated that foreigpens, who felt liberated, wore apt to welome the
advancing enem.
The encirle 6th 3 Mountai Divie we ordered to reain in
the enemy rear, rather then to attempt to ant th rcig the limes had
been originflly ordred.
The ane now threatened the area of' S&felt -tuolstadt,
wbiqh was the ehief center for mszutacttzrta torpedoes for the Navy.
The Comando in Chief West don his headquarters frot Obrdruf to
A44 4.kcordih ,.. aptured -n s themi objecat ve
ofthe Srttis va * 6 Thw 11th Snore Division noted in ta
.4irctiam. fli thA wet a dea sprtmbewn itshat
Axericas Tores~ easel t ht. tieby th assignment of the U.S%. 'nth
Airbore Division to the Nfinth An~y. The armored division were being,
followed br The :infantry divisions.
1$ 2
In thc4 Yi~pjenaeh re !the~hifir tivcnwsTlw h
the flctthoflt. The Prench nWante4r tensnrd : n{en i ' ZhrnhetS.
fltere wa no 'inication of vhae te other released 'forces voutd be
Th Gitnation in tho sector of 417 group 11 hqd not 'chunged. hemyq
forcess advanoe I1 beyo n e~nn. fhmabrseek vas lost.. Qnervtohbet
Student wn ordered not to attack. Three battalions that he %m to
receive were thvw -into the jgp. There was figtn for the ?uobte
7orest. A new line was bon built at rfeynasn on the 'ever.
In the AM~ Croup sector the !' in front woe ts .tfl quiet. The
southern (steg) front vet stllben hold slthcuit the enemy had mjae
two minor p nertir an t U egn. 7o the east there were deeper
eUtfltionS bat e brnk-trogh wes prevented by Task Thre esyerlein.
The tXVI and L VII Cop stablished a neline byemployig kmprovike
unite,1 but heavy weapons wore looking. Y!ighting took lse at Ressiaeha
Uohtenau.
the Tnerine ?Ft th boundar of Arq rotp 0 vwased
Cotha haad been lost after. te: ant Ou along the atehn. Thrn
ea ~twed, Yah M Sohuakl were let mdMlW
eurwt.. Ftbtgv eorted at Sl.AtQhrthtt the sta tek
through the Thneringen ForestAd avnce tmrd s the eouthws. fTh
6t tt oti iviaton failed to receive the order to rain fighting
?4S 7C-020 e~5/e
ina the enee rear and wan now returning to the Srer li1nes.t
T here w s~rgting in the Werzhurg and Ochsaen flxrh areaps. itwa
inr tant 'to retain the laset lecylt vhieh trtctnra ball boar-ins.
F'itting continued at ReckMsih end Heflbronn.
The tineeteenth Arq was assign ed directly to the Ortender in ChieI'
West after having until now been aigned to An Grop G. The front
now ntesde generally along the Wase 8* h uoahtef a Karletadt a.
uesbug v est of Maktrit X osigshfen -. lleilbrn - Karleruhe.
Activatio of new units -we being h eredt.
5 Arl 14. The ene. c nned to attack towards the northeas t
in the dieto d of Ijsul. It would soon be n csry to bod back
the front ln to the uierZe and to begin the defense of 'fortress
HlisM.. The British were organice o a narrow front Lfa peparatio
for anattack towards the northeast. It wsnot yet known which uits
were available t the sney Unth Aty4 Onate effort was being
exeroieod aganst ?ask Force Dayerlein on the Ax Group B front. The
4h6tand fib - btt t ane. , folloCtel
Wthe 25th, 26 sM 90t Inan r iit w advrncig agant
rJnep. Te12th and. U t Anwe + visions spesrese the Seve
Arq's atttaeis thbe l~rlr eeta ea 'oto the sth th
Ynre nre taking an oeof t setors from thir avaLing alles.,
Itoe teetr of Ar rn fighting ooaiae in Holland. no.ncr advanced Irwyof ineto te nteast. At Rhein an airfield
was already being laid out. The, Weormaal 'had beau crossed at
several point. Furth edwy ws wade btino: Osnseeaandfite.
g C-20
The Weser "ront still heldi ^ut. Th9 enety probed thodt lc.~sh
Th" th-n °Y Ar %ctp Ptotor } tit-,o,-. wre, nfi tEtt2 Z'u t he
auto bahn. 1$ ep ~0etrat nni r e ra e northes 2t :0rt- and.
rnomy forer o the Rhino front wre crmin.:ed.
Two Nrhor airfields 'were -lard o t ini the k ri Group ? sector. The
rlwenth A afssumed commnd of th nevlyaeostublihed front south of
th, Wser River. Theihusn wee captured. there was no activity to
the south. tDgnalza wa stifl In Gorman hn . flseaeh vaB vter
fire. ?i htin continued outh ot oths vTe enemy asdv ned c wsw
of Crruf to Arn :at. (frman fore still held the oeeart Mounta.
At Versbr the enem suceeded Sn crossing the M1tin River. 7It~tixtg
at Ohnnturt contifned with o.teting swon.
A totel of fortyeeit tans vas dines.l.. Ti hting ectatie at
Heflbron. TerarUrte ia lest but there was stil ftghtim arou d the
city. Freneb forces advaedt the east.
The Corgrnder in rhef 'iest sent In 'oter esat ato the situat4.o
in wih in phaslsed the ar of holding Sebfrt an th
bordh..im a re. Th. t. ar ilin df emd by Oruppmfentuh
$isd . The * R ite Aq ws pied wider the co dotth #.
twelft Aw Orup tere gvn the Drit isa
ind "edently. Aerican foces were aea with the eelaent o
wGroup a with thrusts twards the eust. The 9t Agrned Diis
)W.l t~ G-i J2O -25*- S
amd tx r v to fror -Urtc t dIvioun the 3x~h r 1t i oh w ouM soor.b
bing sent to the 77. S.* enth :-. ='.
it the Army Gro'p F eotor Matak against t Mortrees *Iclleazr bed not,
icreased In intV nntty. The eney aned norrthwards at then bot4ar
betw t he LXtVIUI Corps Dnd the ..T ?aratrts Cors but tngen was
retakes. flps in the Win at tMim en and !4enbur. placed th prirachate
anzy in a critical posttion. Yoar bridgeheads had been thrown across
the e r titor ant hoati s Torooe had push past inden in the
diction of Brueckeburg.
The nrttern sector was eananded by Task foree Lwtt ts; the
soxtthoro sector vut oosnded by the 5th ?asr tlivinion; and that pert
of the front further to the east was wide the ocire.d offfenth
Arom. ae of these sector; hard been ansinecl one mbfle nit. Tb.
Panzer Lehr Ziiato was held as a centnal 'reserve.
Tere va no signifiat ain -in the flevntb , sector.
t ppa nty the ennr had mad to muthr proess at Mue~hausen aMd
Lagenalza . ?br were futer a tts b in the 'Trtae Fent,
*ee ieflr against ias a. The inea speatead was batd fe
pss*in soirth of Cotta .1am the .'autobsh i the directioofrrt-
ZDn7 tns aedvace by of. Vi*. twt ware not able tol os p with
the rou headint towards fut. Arnrtdt was stfl in German hands.
Thwere was little activity reported en the southern 'segto of the front.
MAS oa a'57
Amky Grouip C suggenited that the everth Arr p, prating around Jena,
shoud move the First MrW o-it of the ~rb-rg area,$ and that trhe tetr
sot or Sohwabieh Hail should b. ritn over bythe !aneteent tray.e
It vas pointed .out that cinect consind over the southern sector tr the
a a',;in Chief E#t was net feasible. The forwr part of' the
salient held bySeneth s~u inte Snart tftmtaias vas cut off b
tesnq
The situation had wore itt the ?4aanhlm and lra a.
*urktbneit ws lWst, although the enmy had not been able to for a
pockt as was prtnbl intended. French forces were moving south !of
Karluto. Ettlingo and ettn were lout andti th 16th Volkegrnadir
Division wes onerrw.
9 a were being taken t* improe the suppl of
saauition en fuel.
-2 xnr . On Total Isla measues were taken against rebelling
Itus1s0ians who wer .being supporeted by the civilian poultion. The nwq
weo at Noth
t lint .Paraibt Arq now toke the sector pnvausl held
Yr a Stdet (withuat thZVUCro while the atr
ni.4rt h nte of VhteisIand U b awop i the
orea of AqbwpIadne t 2. Na In try Division. Attacks
fr. Lingo and Sies voe repul. ?4htlgtk ple at Smacs
29 l ea iwroised am under an Any Cm adr wth nlarviSn ta f .
KS K X-20 28
and in the bridgehead atc tlsenn on the eoor.
A.rsteerrurpe Ctudent atacked Bueokotmg~ and the aren 0outhz of
No reports had arrived from arv Group tB.
Attacka wre mae agakagt the Weser -W erra bridgehead In the
flenenth Azw mector. Imen was lost ad ond fores .reaed
Ithe flyGroup s scor the enem captured Zisenach. Attark
nin fnthedinectio of Iagpslalsa. nmy forces pushed ahead
towards frt . There was fighting for V riedriolaros with alternating
aeoen. taincen, Gerafeld, and Wildtfeoken were lost and issinpa
was threatened.
-to thePit ~warea itsia was lot and fighting was reported
at leilbrona and south of Ir ttem.
LJ2AI#...,. Three tacic divisions wore blievd to besouth
of $Icmove, r, GroupD wes reinforced, probably y the 20th Armored
flivisn wich bad Just rd fr t Unte States sad by a divtsin
wich atlnor hdaparntly been at Qrleans.
T eusqyge Swtvat"a bflted, .fldnt4 r o
th iatry to cat upwth th nired divi c. The 67t lanty
fivlio.ne *pn then.
woting fther bed eelopd th 5weth .r seater. It a
conidered ossib that the nmyintended to tae Sowintrt bfor
advancing on Nuenbrg.
-258 4M
CeS2O um~259n
Arevolt had broken out on Texel Island. Th retclltnig ' risonene
weze tcsd b ut the cadre pcnvonl were killed.
In spite of strcrug artillery- swn ort tro was i1ttle hapdway
mae in the sou th.
Terrorist activity wa reported to beincreasing.
The enemy advan;ced to the northeast by ay o Lireyn and passed
Eheine. Fighting was reported south of Jrau ad at Verden. Enem
forces crused the W'eser River between £tolp. adPtershaer an
advanced twenty kilcemetens to reach Vhmtor and ?eutat in the
direction of fannover. A switch position w as being constructed west of
the towm. Gesaralobenst Ztudent was asswatng eouwaui of the sector.
During th normin, a force of1(X tanks advanced beyond Eame in Luth.
direction .f enigsn. The lertran were forced back to the stern out-w
ski of flfldeshein.
The enemy reached the !4oelme valley in the sector of Arna' Group B.
To the southwet the advance was cheked * There was sufficient
anttitio for only two weeks * An attempt vas to be made to ros
production in thoe areas whih bad not yet ben occ upied..
Lnageeln ws ac' occupied. Thre was lns activity reporte In
the Thuerisgen Fewest. The exqadvanced west fi n t rt. flhl4bnrgeP
M aussn was lost. Re iestadt was attaced. Sehvinturt stil held atut.
Reqw fonce peetrated into Mergethea. Figtig wasreprte in the
Dikelseh and Cntilbsa awns .where the enm advace veyred in the
direction ochwasehe Hal. Close comubat antitank units wor bein
.M , # am -26a
employed heo., The enemy enter d t oei. othing ofi htQrtanee
occurred on the upjper fhino.
tfls fl . Th .fe rebelling rusians on Toi ere sealed off o
the northern part of the islan. Zltx in ad tbolten were lost. The
penetration at tDoventer was extided. Attack were repulsed at
Fnerstenau inthe sector of the paret rMy.
Bassia Syk., and seeral neighboring localities wrn lost.
Armored spearheads advanced as far as Lhrte a Veryo. Th* enm
attacked on both sides ofthe Steinhudor iake i the sector of -s
grp. Student.' Stad .n, Dueoksbrc, an Rintela wore cupioei.
From Rfldsheiathe eqavnednorthwrds an southeast towards
Saisgiter. The Weerier intws crossed at I txt..
further grond ws lost in the Arm Orop B sector. A bridgea
wen established .t Dermg in the sector of the ? lovnth Ary. F'rm
Veckerhagen enem forces advacdb way ofQettingon to Landolfahausen
and from Vitsaaimsaen to fihengdr.,. Airborne troops crossed the
river at floods the eney ta wy of Ueiltestradt..
is the sector of Arm Group C0 a GOrusa hedeho positionwa
.itsbflhed at ?r "iaerd. Attack were mae from &*1 towad the
eat.as lat from Arabs tt..k werae in* theU
diretion of n ,At Volkactz thea se crse th.azRvrCraia b wa IsGnshas ea f1 orcslttt tw4sae
off. The Jaget front was still holding out. At Pfonzheim the eem
was forcd bak.
HI4 0-20-21
flAnit2A The eny uituatic opposite Army Grouzp URwa still
obscure. lten ofls regarding division which had formerly been ep1hyd
in Italy had not yet been conirmed. The Britis still advanced orth
Ward, whil the Americans did not proe eonsistently inthe dseto.am*
eneraloberat BUiakwts assue comaar of *?ortres $ofln.*
T l lssd as being .tt.*.d. Qenn tene were withdrawingfr
Zwlle. The * continued to advance northwards at lMep"*n Strong
pre~sure was e tdo the left wing of the- II Phachute Corps. The
15th Paurgrensttier lflvieion ada~das Ias Syke, where it was
forwd to stdp. There was little aibt activity report from th
urea. At Terdens the .n cuidthe vsterbako the river.
?gbtat wa Vepre at Seharmtedt. iU elemets advanced towirs
Cefle. The cetral are of I cvr was puer artfllery fir. The
enemy advanced as far as the i ars)omtds.9 Fro U1de hai. ttack
ere ad e nstward. QeaOVNltbSZ'Zt Student assue oft his new
bth tw Grasp area strgg attaks co.ined is the sttm
C isothnt secton. Soost v" eqtund* An attempt to cress te rime
atLemekn a peetd 'hxe weo so siiicant actions @n th
stera settsst tome frot.
fihigw eorted at atse end
?110"Rt AryIro flul1dedeei the .nty aaced to the Saisgitter area.
Both Gndesi ndtiaeck were lost. Mpid progress was mae east of
261.'
i'S ;. 462
Goettirigen where rery forooea avanc ed fry: Eeiigenstat to Duers talt.
The road between Antat and ILrenau wtw reached. FEnemy forea were
being assemble vest of Eisenach.-
An advane wa tbnatee trou Koenigahofen towards :aberg. eNor
ground wa lost north of $ohweintw't. The tow was to be held as 1o1
as poss ible. The ball bearing plants wee not to be destroyed. All
resistanc at Wuers~bug bdstopped. Eat of thenfurt the ener
continued to advatce. Thoe cits thatwere, pocketed at luerehofen
suceeded in fightin their wa bek to German Lines. ftghting was in
progess vest of )'ferzheim. The greater peat the city was ntfll
holdin out. Gonan fores made scm progress at Nekanvula.
The right win of the 25tnth Any was again in. an saute position.
D efending tortes at D amffberad to fight off the UT.8. 14th Arired
Diviion ad two infantry divisions. The situation there was serios.
There were o Surher reports fro the 6th S.S )4outain Division, which
adperhaps spit up into sal groups sxa bedu operations behind the
new" lines in accdance with ores. The Potadm division wa owr oflta ae tet't t ase being
Tweltth Arw hes~ arte vas t* bo trasferred to Mneug
British pamplet, the 'flips.,'0 togther with the arps cv nas
was eaptrd. The pamphlt dulIt with the adainistrationmo at Gerga
after the .apitAulatio43 Berlin was to bean enclave ithin the boalsn
30 This probably refn to pian LCL1fl. (Eitor).
j? 0-20 sj3a
Zone ad was to be partitioned between the hre occupygjtrs Th
rn p we s T e Wlz Ameri an were to be give an enclave on the 4:o Rivr which was t
Xntalt Wilhaaven.
J~ra2A1.Three atonaers totaling 22,000 w'ra rogistcr ton
were sunk off the coast of ?Azland. Atta frop Dunkrk sad Lrient
wore aose
1t~th AmyGroup U sector the ene pepare aifields aM lction
frair, drw*'. Thrten cargo airpl a were identfif ed during the night,frThe U.S. 34 Division reached Dntor,9 1 t hie the 4th Armred
Division continud to row eatward. The Dritish 531Ifantry 1ivioai
was at the lin-er virr. T he 6th Airre tv iio joibe the metns
at ftanor. Apparenty the 24 Armed Dltvisioz and the 30 Infantry
Division were comitted agaist Brwsiok. AryGroup 3 was tring
down twenty infatrt divisions or one-third of the ene's ftoa infanr
strength. (fl-tenth of the *s armored divisions werec c ittdi
this sectr. Moreovr# it h4d b eesnry towithdraw divisions from
ote sectors offth front for comtteut against Awe Goup 3.Tire
aencdiv±fsicn. ba pparenty asssled smith of the Thsis let
Zviesw the foiet wes to be trpaepe4 in a 64w twards Ilpsig and
t te suthasttowcts owtra reus
Prsuewe st st) ieto of 0*1*a f itgn
retd at Terdes.
obabl 3d Armoed ivision. -(ditor).
fi 0-% -264-
Fighting continued in Holland. The iaraohute army s uffered fizn
the lack of artillery.
Since the last canal through north west Hollani was threatened and
it was not possible to reroute water transport to the Zuider Zon, the
supplying of 'Fortress Holland" was not expected to continue. The ene y
made no progress an 1'exel Island. At Deventer the tner circle of
defenses had been 'breached by terrorists. A nestch position was
being built up on the western outskirts of the ton. The Ijssl Caal
vas still being held. Amred points had advaned to the Orange Canal
and armored reoonnaiesance forces were reperted at Graningn. Terrorists
were actiVe west of the Ems eRver.
The eney made some proress An. the sector held by tb. First
Parachute Arm but was pressed back again. There was fighting northeast
of uerstenaa nd south of ?3rsmen. The bridge in Bremen was under
artillery fire. A conterattack b the 15th ?anzergrenadier Division
Wade no hndwsy. Eney torces at uoaihols were repulsed, from Pine
ta. enmy advanced to the north a d eat as far as Uchte4afllb
Wut did not enter the toi. Several villages were -lost in the. Wolten
beuttel ares. Salgttc was attacked. tnty-tor eemy tanks vanM_
reprtdly .. +destroyd.
Local lowst are reportod onthe nrtheasters frnt. of th As'
aMp sector. Seris penetration were made I the Au area btvase
t rtmun and !ssen. There was houetohoun fighting in Eehvu The
situation on the southern -ection of the front bad not chaged exezpt
-264-
-265-
at the southeastern corner slone the army boundry where a deep pene-
tration was roade near Olpe. This ws regarded as serious because the
front there was wakly held.
The enemy advanced into the nr Mountains and occupied Goslar and
Bad Rnburg. fennth Arm did not sed a complete report because it
was changing position. n ta Hueh ualhun the enemy advaneed, into the
Nordhaia n area. ?ighting began in the Thueringeen. Forest. The Germ
were. fored back to Eiokfeld. The enmy concentrated their effort at
Co bug whoe they mreba d the area north of the to and then advanced
south and northwest. A German line still formed an arc around Sol weins-
atit, Locaizeed fighting wa reported east and south of Wers b rg.
Crasheim we recaptured by the Germ as. The 2d Mountain Division, the
len# Tiplaesent Division and the 19th Vokgrenadier Division were
to be commtted in a counterattack againstt the eney armored forces in
th. penetration ara.
At lisilbronn in the Wineteenth ArM sector there was only localized
fighting. The upper Rhine front as qidet. The 96th Inantry mDiiio
had ben withdrawn to thene to fm t reserve.
ri s The .S. d and 5th Arnd Divisions were fightng
at Wadebtrg. Nrth of the T uflg orst, T A the 11.5. Tid Ar; adnuod
to the e , tf routh .f the T riaga ret other elements of the
ensw -rt1a adved to the sout~hest. T tf) sa:- 14th Armoed aivialcas
Vere rer t d at Oorg and the 13t Arred Division was conitted
against the southwestern corner of the Arq Group B front.
MS "0 C-020-2 -
Genmn forces on texel Island made no re progrers. Sotb of Deventer
the eney threv a small tridhetl acro; p the Ijssel liver. Tast of'
Zwolle the ene;y was repulsed but (itrna n forces loot further ground in
north-eastern Itiland.
fleavy fighting continued on the right wing in the area of the Sixth
Parachute ry, where enem forces were contained. 3 2 There was atifl
resistance forward of the Geran lines. Fighting vas reported at ua oene
ruek. South of ram there was little combat activity. there was
fighting at Sohwrmtadt with alterating sUcess. A bridgehead .was
formed acro the fler 'River. Cello. was lost during the morning.
Bnmi ok was being attacked bone armored and one infantry divisin.
The auleiter 's report that Drunawick had been captured was evidently
incorrect. Enemy frcs adanced. northwards by way of Cifhorn. At
Gardelae n .two hundred vehicles trned north in the direction of Sals-
vedel and duvand as far as Calve. The eney ar eare -at Ztohosnebeok
on the Elbe. The Magdoburg sector was assigned to the parachute rm.
In the rmy Graop) s ctor there ~was boitinued~ ressuI~re) from the~
x* the serlargest jart of the i dustrial distriet, including tXuebheiu,
h rn bee lost.- Oernx forcs fuord soon be ftnce to vithdrsv ,fro
th Rhine. l ee and Witten were the last areas in t industrial r *nb c uey r
whic a ! ~set be:eni sa~Ptrad. Th enem aradvg~~Panee~r fsrm Qlb twards~
Iaennebtdt was mosidered erio e. Couterttacks wvre launched W
32 The< tthor probably refers to the fst Paraohute .Army. There isno record of a Sixth Parachute Arsy. (!4tor).
-264, i
the Panzer bohr ivision. Army Growp B still om:, .tle seventeen
divisions, but since each ecmtpriaed only about 3,0CC> mzen there were in
reality, only the equivalent of :fWO to six divisions. N ortLy of' the liars
Mountai.ns the enemy ture -towards Blankenbrg and alvanced in the direction.
of D4Rssau.
There was pressure inthe leventh Army sector but no significent
chimge took plece. enmn force withdrew from the northwest cornr.
The situation around Nordhaunen was not clear. outh' of the liars.
Mountains the Germ .positions were threatened. Zrfurt and "W-eiaar were
lost during the wrning. After the Sal flivnir wi crossed at Ksnaenberg,
the entry advanced towrds Iaubuing. Zuemy forces stood before Jen.
Th. stu ationi the Thurige Fo rest ass. u hanged.. At Ooburg then
was Little action. floeer, & new danger was produced by a penetration
from the north which reached a point eight kiloseters from Bamberg,
stain threatening the Z ighteonth Ary from the rear. "Further grouud waMs
lost in the Cra lshela area. The assumption of the Cownner in Chief
Vest that a ajor attack was imnent ha not yet beers coninae, although
-it was eviet that the sneur intended to advance towards the south
Strong . ssaulta were mae9 spne frbr 'and uraborg Sout .of there
tVi sw was stope.
After the 24 Thftxsi DivIsion. was vithdnvft,1 the enem .uar the
Widgeeabd &tat)fislbrom Tanks: pushed abs*ad oait of Paden 0AS
The 17th 35 Division was shifted to Nuremberng and the 19th )iviaios
to Regensburg. Both of these divisions were part of )Uet entz Arn.
Mws 0-020r
The 98th Infantry ivison wato replace the 17th Von toer Division at
the roit.
An order was 4von to ticid the ater: $on tais. A ccnttrary rt4er
isvspd to the E eVnth Army by the Reichseterr 33 and dolivered by an
officer was not clear.
The weltth nuy was being led W General :enek, forter ohist af
the Operations Brach of' the Aw General Staff. The Reiohsfuehrer 55,
In his capacity as Ltdcbh Minster of the Interior, stated that sio 'opn
citiet* would be declared.
l1 Aril 194. In eastern Thgend there ware no preptratiou.n in
proess for an immediate major landing.
The aupply senioe of Amy Grop B was apparently i order now.
Strn pressr. was exerted on the right wing of Anieegruppe Student. It
was expected that this fore* would he pushed back to the coast within
a short time. The line between Cloppenurg and Proisnn aa still being
hold. The situation in the yreen - Cello aea was unchanged. There was
pressure free C.11. weno one regiment ha4 taken up psitiee north of
the tow. Ealberstadt was still holding out. & acmb t cc dadvanced
a ar as tftnbsrge where the bidge had been destroyed. Th. enemy
entered Sterse8l and appeared near Tanranende. a iome west of
V~gdebparg wecaptured. Wring the night a small torc crossed the UWb
betwee fagdebtwg and Se eriossbeo, whereuon efforts to bridge the rive'
wret begd. The a or of th t.elfth Army placed the ea of
Mageburg under his authority. erm force were eommitted againft the
KS -020-29
sass's attempt to bridge thQ iv*r. ZSu'pport uwa aa 1able Cron Dtvislo
Soharnhoret. and Division Huttoen, both ot which vere nez.rly ready' ror
coiit'npt..inthe barz sector tile eoe y advance4d to W 1ttatadt mnd
south of the mountains to S ctdatstadt near Parseburg. The "Uaven th
fra in tbe Lans 1ounteine was ner enveloped on three 44de0. It was
not yet known whether W Issofsl wee - ocoup .ed. 'Woak enem forces
very reported in the Leipzig area.
The rnqW continue d to advance towards tabr;. iiostile tones
attaokd Solieinfurt and broke th-rough to the high read, cretiting wtat
wass lmoot a hedgehog position around fchwetnf"urt. Threc waso no combat
activity btween Schweinfurt and flothenburg. The situation at Crails--
shot had developed well
it .aril 19LS, b. Cnadian let Division, f'orerly employed i
Italy, wras now reported at )venter. The 7th Amored Division and the
524 and 53d l Thf..try Ilivisions were concentrated at Vcrdon whra the
nqr was eerting strong proscarn. therore, an attack against famburg
m exected. About sixty tank were in tin $tendal area. The U.S.
Firt A n ow nned its opratios to south of the iRen )Iuntalns.
'No inf antry divnision wero attack i n thee ountains. The 69th Wntst
DtvieSa advanod to Lipsig, so that te arq boundary nOW rDa south o
ratsig. The 4th Armored Division wem comitted against Ssxony, perhap
is Jpoint eft with the 4th (nfantry Pvision. In the Kuisbach ae
th. ines 0 s objective was iof. For that reason, forcs which had been
separated to rove arod both sides of the Thuringm Forest were again
-21
91
*;920
w R -020 20
,joined together.
There was no eimane in the situation on Texel 1stbrnd. Cor unication
with Holland becam more difficult. Gi'oonmgn wag already under artillery
fire. 'The enemy still continued to attack in the sector o'the parach ute
army. Cloppenburg was l4n t, while to the north reeinrnta of the Divisiou
O~-.'.sutSchkIW wer still holdiing out. Th .ginf sector was quiet.
A bridgehead we forme across the Afl er iver at Ottsnse. Fightingcontinued at Seharaatedt. A ermm attack had been planned further to
the east but the lotion of the 230th Antitank Battalion, which was to
participate, was not know. Attacks against the Gemi~a bridgehead wore
repulsed. Thirty enm tanks wee reported at Seehansen.
The situation had deteriorated in the Ary Group D. sector. The
n)zetratioe areas around Luedeneebeidt and southeast of Hlagen had been
widened. Begwen the Ea'~st and the Woet there was only a lane 'twelve
kilometers in width. Axmuition and fuel stocks vire expected to last
uantil 14 or 16 Ari,r~, with food supp~lies acetd to lust longer. it
wedoubtful whether contact with the prod ction a ea c could be matain d.
Several thrusts were made into the He*r untains. South of gburg
th* forces on the mast aide of the river were attacked but the dee o
e'woe was not yet kuow*. En~ forces also crossed the river at Deby
ithe 41x"eto of Zrbet but were pressed bait again. T he Twlfth
Ai'uy we be te it onl wee forces along th $afle River. Enos
elements cotinued to advance to the southest towcar~ fe. It was
ossible that the Division Sohsrnhorat had arrived during the day. The
--
WI, t 4
situation around !.sipntg was tvnehrngod exei~t 'or tko ritht swing of iiri
Group 03 where the env'had apture dhitz end advanced into the Chwzits
ars. Gera and Wida wre ocouded. At the 14 ' e bend fur'ther nttaocs
were Tade towards the northwest, ighting was reported at Lbo htenberg,
to the souith of uich a stron force was being oonctntzte.
On th southern sector of the front the sritustirx had further
deteriorated. !ezq forces were twelve kiomters from Bayruth. Thire
wes still no newt concrning the eocitmt t the 189th Infantry
Division and the 17th $3 Division. There was no report on the situation
in the !hwin rt area where the First Army had advanced as far a
fillbronn. Ta the Nineteenth lrt sector there was only localized
fighting. esistanae continued in the norther Black Forest. There
wnno important changn o the Rhin front.
It ws learne that the Polis 3..t Armored Division and the
Canadian 5th Armored Division were to take part in the attack against
?"ortnese lland.' The U.S. 11th Armored DivIsion wa ?i ,kting at
Uelsmn. In this :ars the ermane were able to advance ten klm eters
without opposition. Sine, the erm had not used all of their strengt
at the bgnig, addtional yoes wer still aailable to throw into
the attack. It wsnot fleer tore the eayhad oml yd tb 6th
Amored Division The 4th moe d Division vst in BAzozy and the th
Armrd iflision was at ? * Th '142. Third A had sua
turned to the northeast. Since a.l1 three American airborne divisions
were employed at the front opposite Any Group B, only the airbon units
PC ;1 -7ze
still in !nland wore aailable for an air landing.
IS Ai A194 . Ater repudiating the armistie agremnt, the French,
snpported by 120 American boTwboras attacked the north and sOuth Gironde
fortresses. The French declared that any destruction b the Germans
resulting from th. fighting would be regarded as nbotage, since the cute
come of the war was a foregone cncluaion.
The iua ton on ton Iserand nob not yet iremedaied. The tener
captured Arahem and advanced to the north and; norteat. There was no
Mahge in the situation at the Deventer briwslgehead but the enesy was
receiving reinfrcepente. Fores were being concentrated at Zvolle. The
wterst ede of teal Isad wes still in Gran hands;. WVi the aid of
territs 9 the eyar ent d ronizesa. Twenty enem tanks wen dis-
abled. A part. of the advancing fore turned eastward towards the Ema
titer, Fighting was reported at Friseuthe and Cloppenr g. At reas
tere was no change. A now bridgehead was thrown aross the Alter River
and the bridgehead at $chwar te was enlarged. A arme orce of
twaety tanks aru ed at Veluen. The Corman attack began at 0500
hrbos ad net with resistnce at Vettenkap, after vhioh the frnrcs were
'tzouped. Saa de Aredye were lest.
The sitation is the Am Qrotq S sector had eonuiddenb dbter rated.
8am ties cosmptin was higher then had bees calculated. The eupp2ly
tr.ais lacked wayne. rther ground wes lost. The tlevnth ry as
hard' prssed in the Ea l&ars tain by attacks frmi the soth and west.
Vighting was rorted at Stolberg. An attack v lauc ahed from Rlnkenburg
Ms 47 0-020
tewards the youth. vefl r, the sttuntion t'-ere 1i- vd. Thc're we no
longer any c~onnrect# ith the Tsct. The Tlfthb Arv-y 1s position on
the rit had been 2tsblibd. South o? Y debnrrg ttw enay brid ehea
was narrowed down end the bridg~e was destrryed. Whethe brid ehead a-t
Darby was enlarred, no brid~e wan as yet avrdl.e ?nd, therefore, n
t ak had reached the easter n bnnk. There wams no nignttioat actIvity
reported at frnburg. ruevy forces advanced through DitterFeld tDessau
whore four battalions fro ivision Schsrnborsot we're comittod. "flvisioa
Button was to be npioyed at the ?f!ulde River. fletuenWal and Leipzig
there war n o ohstge. C ersan faoes retired wreat o? the Sanale River
after the bridge was destroyd. ,A section of Menseburg was still3 in
Goran hais. 1nstn was lost. cmrmiation with Leipzig bad not
yet been out of.
in the Army Groop C sector th esituatio had detsriorted south o
Leipzig where the enemy ,advanced from Cheaiitz towards 0Cfldita to the
northeast. Tanks were reported in the waitern part of' Ch& its. Clsuohsu
was being attacked, There were no enter gains onthe northern Stale
Liver from Hfb a thrst vas directed tows Hirscbeg. Rqnutb weg
lot South of fliberg the enemy advanced to Riltroun where the attack
stopped. On the Rhine plain the Gemans were foroed tAo withdraw fifee
to twenty kfl.oetera to the soat.
ltuf13. The Girodo fortresses were again attackd by 1#200
American boutbrs. At the same time, the main Usne of resistance wes
assaulted by goud troops. rrom the sea, the .fortresses were shelle
efl74e
navanl forces. At 2~3 hours th -aizdr~Roanr iral $ieahofle,
sent rd by r± 1io tirt eemy r ror had broken through *nv. that the
fighting had reached hit' eorcn ott. The. ?Ftai btttle had begun.
French troops vers erployd.
Thern was ttill ti ting f or tj.esge Mollsnd' and northwst
Germany. A major conentratin of forces at Seahansen ws observed. flu
eneer bridohed south of Mgdbwg was emoved. Sout of Dery the
adva reached the ieiflty tel ne. 7 t of Zerbst. Strog prensufl
was exerted ajainat the still large~e' bridghed in the Derubergw
Pessau-littorf old area. Co nterattaeka rert!ted in local 'ains. I
hlls the enemy advanced as tar as the cathedral, whil to the south o
there the br~head vae further enlarged. The northeri par of
kMerneburg ans till in n hbnds. There was no action in the taPSIS
area but e ne Forces advanced through± Grtm to ?4tsschen.
The enemy Continud to attack the !!i Mntains fro the est and
the south.
The situationi the AyGroup E area was rapidly bai g onrn.
Gorau forcs were split vp. To th et a emil poket cotaining the
Fifteeth AnqP was- being attooked fron the svifth sn east. Tb. Fit
Panser AM vas fighting i a lgr poket to thevest where the aq
also attce from the sout an est The ftiia front was still quit
Un the Am Group 0 a thVe enm advnce en W aeg. Fonbach
was lest, The brideed at Refltram was enlage. (~thwpeRie
armor penetrated deeper towards the south. Rear tahr th flak Forest
MS I CeO2O or?,-
border position was occuied. The ueem reported the cawue ofr Field
Marhl von 14alnen and Prinoo August Wi.hel. Ct the previous day
tat. capture of Axbaesador von Pa pen had been reported.
fl42xrUJ4. 'ighting cotinued at theG Gironde-ortt fortresewhere a sewon lin of dees had been organised. There was also
fighting at Giroatp-3oth. Ground attacks received air and naval support.
Fors ware releaed from f1plend for emnloyment against the German
posonsO along th a River. South of Bremnen, t rdane hid Salted.
The ritish viII corps ld the assault at Usea. The 83d Inantry
Dtvision and one armored division were c omitted at Patty. It was not
clear what imits were being eme in the northern onrs fontainsan
whethr the en was bringing up forces which had been released from
other sectors .1' the front. Two armored divisions were reported to b
in the Hlle w Leipzig area. A American divisio req uested saps of the
ar K rlab ad se cto r. T e U .S . S ev en th A ruM co n tinu ed to advance tow ard s ? ste s u h a d s t e . A c r i gc e s r p r s n A e l
dat hi established radio contest ith the . ed Arsyr
is th notwest the en' enlarged the bridgehead at Arehem and
advaned to the road leading to 4pltoorn. ast of the Zuider 'Zon the
ersaus attaske towars th sothwst in order to hold th Gebbs libe.
A arma bridg ed wats stil held en tat. eastern .ita of th*e mandike.
?4ting cn~ at Oroninges. At teLsriver furher progress ws
ade towads the noth. Enmy fees ware r eaused again at rizuide.
South of' Bm the eney tpassed. oltan and advanced to Schnverdingoa.
M.310..020-76
-Pressure was everted at las and Imediately to the west. It s
not known bow far the advance ba reace in the ares south of ldee rg.
Further; progress was reportby Division Clausevita. There were no
reports from Sahwvedel or the area isadiately to the south. The reports
of an e econcentration at Seehausen would ;set have been ilstaken.
In the Ay Group t4 sector the final decisive battle ba bedu..
There wrln 110 ge fS f frot the Fifteenth rMy. 'The ase'~ group _101 ,-
reported two deep pontretione. Several =nits ba already been overrun.
Guns and amanmition were lacking. The corner of the front near fessele
dof was being held. The staff of the arygroup comander sered as a
reserve forem. A deiad to surrender had been reusd. Radio contact
was still maintained.
The situatio in the Hars Muntains was liewsewre aut.
Penetrations w're made south of the rocke. Fighting was in progrss
nea~r feaunla and k~rnigero.e. There was racnaasa to the east.
Despite heavy artillery fir wnd air attacksa the defendera at
hgdelsarg refused a demnd tosure ar. B~oth sides suffered losses .at
Bab. Aditiona nm reinforcesants arrive. Division Soarnorst
was to narrow down thenes7s position. There we no action at erarge
I closed main lie resistanee was to beestab'lishted at Desist
Division tten warn fghtg nrh ofittorf'eld. At flli sad flrseburg
esail forcs were holding out bravel. It ws still posuible to
o o with Itipsig fro the noarth and the northest. The enemy
continued to advance eastr.
MSI -2O 47
Ithe Arqw Qrvnp 0 area & oonoentration asreported it the Mude
iner near emnts. The population .ae d.ffktfties. The soo' was
souith of flt.e. 130 was oapturedt Other advancing fones moed no--
wards against a g. At 0300 hours tgrpp Orafenoh bega
a ooufortrust towards the vest. Gra forces made sor prgrss ait
hitdorf atie enm~ continued to m west of rg POP
trationsd five to ten kilometers deep wre vae twa the ?irst A' y secto.
Figting co nt id t thlack corest and at Oflbwg. A bridgehead
WAS still being held at Kabi
18 Ait 141. The U.S. 5th A&rrerd Division was at Arton1
foflowed upbg the U74S. tfnth Arq. The 8th In entr Division, thougt
to be at wasno reported ,t eeausen Fret the Ruhr area
the 35th Wa tr Divisioe asn vv through annon to Koehe.
The en 1rs main effort was oonetnttd between Sohoenebe en
Dttterfeld, aimed obviously at Derlin. Sonth of taipsig the 9th. Arored
Division advanced towards the loude Rdver. Fo cs were still being con-o
merte for a ates agist taipst 1 while in the Ottt rathe
Mssng amm ime doet wait for the iunfntry divisions. the
7th Inftr Division "$' at Pine IThe 145.S 14th Divs ongn
tart north thi 2d Marie Dvia vas at euW
the3 4 lriai Diilas me at ?tiuzshalu.
'tm gdu°r'trtees eOnf the oi n j a r outo
wee ot attacked by 60 pis as eme fi
frot the ent ed ln. Sehfortresses vere Atll hling out.
UsTh 14th Division. attacin Gens at doarf. (Kdttor).
r
MS G.2O"mn
(bi To:i s n~ five German fort uw' still being held. The
pibility of flooding the land to protoot the forts 'was coueidcrod.
tide te omAof the First Paraoe A-rm eadqarter, th orner
of th. front at mroingen was stil being defended. Little activity
was reported on th. lower Era. An nerj bridge was trown arOus
the ut. canal.
Southwst o f eebawg the w thet rood to Sltan.
Uolsen could still bereached from the nrthest. Under the cadof
the fUX Panser Corps, an attack was launhdb Division Cleusetes
buit was stopped by ma aroed force of fifty American tans. A new
attack plinei the directio of Faflereleben had apparenty wit yet
bee arrisd out. An order was given to dstenns whether the 160th
and 194th Infantr Pivisions could bedote at Lne~burg.
It was learnd tht enem reinforoenents had definitely arrived In
the Seusen area. Wittenberg and the bridzehads .irediately to the
south, were wder artillery fine. The Eleventh ArW was new being
supiced byair bat no rort re h a~y mae reive.
Any Group S bad oip l *&1 chermnt resiste - ,17 arm. 1mal
units cotinue to fight
The euW- mde futhe ror is the direction of Nagisbug. the
par of the totu on th west beak of, the Elbe bad to be considerdlost.
sattac fo the direotio of:aBes was empeted. Slase it was sot
Vosaible to desro the bridgehead, an order was given to narro it
dow byml-cl attaeks.
MS I c.ao "Mm9
Presue contiue wet of tDsssau. The tia of the population
was bad. South of )esau contact was to hrmstablished with Division
Thttn which had formd a bragiad at IttterfsIA. Oenan fores still
held out south of 111. The u aexjeotedly attacked Leipzig ft's.
the trest but not yet from the east. ?rcseure was exerte at Zilenber
on 0 the )enld, Rvr. Near Chemits, there was quiet. ?lauz asid
vieka were lost. Deep penetnatione were asd. &t Mambagv east
of £tdort whene fightn cntiziwd on the outskirts ofthe to n. The
convention hell scaght fire.. ihre were no cntion ith Anstach
w here fighting was rep=rtd. Ksmptgruppe Grai'enw r was able to ake
furher headwa ine the sea ter northeast, of {urberg was oovrd
onyby th US. l4th Anoned Dlivisica. Thes 17t S~ Psrgnnaadier
Piviuics and Division Nib1elgen werseoed up to this area from the
swath. The .garrison at 4roab~rg was to make sorties. Pighing
continued at the eas outlets of the $laok oreat, at )orb, a d in
other localities.
M 0102 .20
TMl SwTr?
I . DZELORW M IN JAEART AND BlRIAT? 2
1. Chanjem in , oo At the be ginningr ofa Ja ry 7i1.34 arhl
Ksseirig again sensed cosa of An Qer roup C (C -er in Chiat
othest ). H. bI altol no r f ram the effets of an
accident in which hi mtorcar had collided with a gun. Since Geeral-
oberet von fletinghoft (tailed vn School ), who bad served as hsdeputy,
bad taprrl beenW gi v en a e omd onthe masoe Frot, t he command
of the two unait h a j s ral Ues. Wheo esseiigtokoe
oand of th West on 1March, van 1VietInhoft suceeeded hism as
o ner in Chief' Southwest and remained in that poition until the
en of the vat. During a11 of these cangs, General ficttiger reseired
-s objet .f staff of .theacs p'p
Beinu in 194x ta as mbaseor assite by $
and Poall#e e Csute IWde.
I I this area th ttrsts of bends cai sonerial for an 4 eithuho)
2 Regoiti t toare seprt .: eap ttos of Awy mp Southwst,whieb tore b u .in Jama, .4y know - n to th Wehnoh QpntoStaff aftertn l bad takes plan, anwo thrfe 'a t un"tise isthe dosiret an are not ntferra t he bre. (Ahor).
qm2sow
2. >eea SiMsina ~eiRiRh of Ta. With the excptionoft
awm lecalised fighting, the calm period which stagto at th*eand of
1944, in the Apennines and th Alps continued in 195o. hIovevr, the
enemy vas .eoted to reame the offensive at anyt n. Asthe enemy
was far superior in nmiters ari t riel and had already outflanked
the Germ forces onthe eastern foothills of the Apenin. ~oa
as far as the Senio Itivers, the worst was to bempeted of a new major
attack # Therefore, the tendeny had been to ithdrav the armored
division s and to wove the paraechte divisions to the east where the
danger way lratest.
The, snowfall in Jaury a revented anattack inthe Alps and wade
inpobble an operation in the Ape nica Whil, this was an a dvazta #
the Geman suffered fram the fact that the northern Italian railroad
net as well en te P bridges were constantly expfsed to air attacks,
so that all of ths suppl routes were not aways open. There were
900 major interruptioar in weber, 51) of which were styl not cleared
up byI Januar. T. Grmsn air forces in this area were cmpletely
inadeute, cad siime the repeated and urgent requests for reluoreo-
Manto would have brought about no *ajar change is the situatio, thu
were always dm1nad. (~yrein replamet shifmets were reoeived
a : tsiian i issions wers assigned.
Duringf Deambre tbir.eig.t ny airsrf vera de strc de4
metl by antialsraft artillery, ad thirteen German planes (mostly
reconnaisrsance) were lest.
Mhs 1~ 0-02 -Zn
n spite of th." 4ff leulties, the supply siuation had not bee.
critcal nt the begtinig of the year, larglg due to goo org-
lntic of the moor truffle ash to riorOus conservation saire.
Tese ss weasem, which had stood the teat in Italy, ere as r a
possible introduced to the W"stern frt.
lip to the begining of the year 30.000 ton of supplies per ROath
were sent to Italy. This 1.4 to attempts at sking the theater self-
sufficient. The reslt was to further decrease the alreay strained
supply o ,o sine the Amt and War Miistries and other
gevermzat agencies apeared as buyers. The prie level as not to b
eangeWred, as had been the ease in Onto., where inflation had teen
th. result. Since in ancases there was no opportunity to forward
the purchased gobIs, an effort was ade to coordinate the demads of
the off ices cerd a.eording to their uec, giing priority to
the C , ier in Chief $rnthwest. The chief ofthe s eractt Operations
Staff pLae4 the Fieid Faconcies Office in carg. of these transactios.
ecause railroad traffic could be na 1stsind only in isolated
&an, the crantly appointd chief of 2mltary admnitratioc, St
.Grppestuebnr reehter requested that Germa rprusetativa be
assigned to Itia rimil administration. Ti propoal0, else
Saed for other enldention, was supporfted by the Rfiehstuhrer
SI and tq the W ermaht Qpertisus Staff.
Regisniug a Januay incrstred amiet vas, aused y the lack of
off. GA 21 _ J t2 C . r in Chief Southwest va. iformed that
i~k~
$3102n23
in the ftur Es vault have to aet an alnost oocplate stoppage tf
suppes trm era..
3. * ~ritto (9lam the n~appoared to have
aailabl.e ' 26 113divisions, or about the same rut as hd bee
fortdon 23 Deember. 14* chang was expected in the9 strength .t
ene forces in the western lieiterr aes while from six to eight
faor units yern aused to bein the eastern Mediterranea.
According to en estimate by the Caner in Chief Southwest, only
two Amriean divisions were empl1 0 4 em the front. south of B~ologna an9 Janmr. It was sot knn wht had becom ot the other -divisions
previously reported thene. Sine there was nondication that they had
bass sent to Pgance, it w" autatd that these division were beid
assembled for a ewlargeesoale attack, perhaps directed against the
weak Gems right wing. The US. 85th Division hdbeen identified
at l ae. ?Areovor, the interrogation of prisoners adthe. reet
navia baratnt serxed to support this theory. It was also posible,
however that the en pannd a axeial oprtion against aSpesia.
l ,, ,an estimate set an rerves at five rather than
save divisions. Thes eePrise4 British awiste division a14
four Italia diviims. hrw fighting strength of the Itals dirisis
was con sede segljiible. Ca the follown dqr it was determined that
the VA8. 30th)an 4thU DivIis ha nearo the fruit.
3 Tis is an .rwin. (EdSite).
MOMM
Ms oni a e it was o t o that the ~ritish had available
three infantry and two armored division with which to forte a noewpon
of is effort. Sinc only1 Itu.tasa units and security fores h o bee
identified on the eastern wi g, so attack was expected from that area .
jq ;only 4' division were believed to. be spicyod,
thereb indicating that' nine divisions were being held in reserve. The
unit sti in ?Xrth Africa vwr not considered available for emlomet.
The VA.. 10th (ioutia) )ivbisa hod recently mrived from Aerica.
The new Italion Division "Crea=om was identid as part of tht !rit h
)Uinth Airy
Noe morxtent chane occurred until the en fFebruary.,
b , 2 2/3 divie tons were assue to b at or behndth frost.
aOvfn diviions wer being held in remev, two of hih wae Italia.
By the middle of February it was confirmed that all ttts division
with t he neptio of the 6th. Armored Divisios, (i.e. the hth, 56th,
an 78th 1sf ntry Ptfleion) tad been withdraw from the front.
The traffi at EOiratar was norma arid reedcaias* along the
Italian oast t at Nice, in pert usie idget sumrines, offere no
sugest ions as to the enemy 'ani mowsVi.
atar the iritish hal .ttas Pelt anal Traste, destroying two
'torpedo boats ed4aag n trdo boat had the wharves, the
C saml is Chin! f the Navy pointe out on 21 Nbn ary that the*
nmWr. ti ti i,. a , to wo ke, under observato won
closely, flowerer risky an operation miht be, it would beof great
MS #C-O~O .fl5e
value to theea to gain .a foothold behind the Genmn fores in the
Sothat arid S ouzthwst.It was onsidere signiiant that the $ritish 24 Airborne Brigul.,
until then asswn to be inAre tat bad now appeared near Rtome. This
ant that thn 5th Airborne Division now comprised three brigaes.
an adition, the Italia had rehabilitated two further divisions, The
C or in Chief was to report on whether he weu24 be able to cordutao
an operation against those Italian =Iits on itted onthe front with
the supplies of .tion eurrentl at had. Cx r be VaS
intoneod that the ?ehrer requested stronger sesures against the
opposing Italian divisions in order tower their sorule and to ,force
the anlto ssplq AMoriton or British diuisiocs in their stead, Th
C or inChief Solozvst replied that the operation could not be
canted out beoause of insufficient amition. Te decioio was
;accepted by the *u rr.
4.. Th Inta S5tedeStuation. At the begiging of the yar
it bees.. say to reinfrc the 1.ft vw of the Tenth Aw in
prepmrtioc for the, exete .qtrut twara lc. Conehio. The
4M Infantr Diiiota v replaced bth n Inaty ivision and
the bul o the au sad available wasrns yore o itte4 sath of
the lae The 4 Infantr Diviion too over the sector between the
16th 138 g din Division and the southern tip of the lak,
tile th. 1t Intntrz Diviion amed resonibility for the sea
shzore ea the land between the lake and the sea.
CS eZ0
thechieotstafftto the0C crinClefothw..
declardb telephone -that wie he- conidere en attac k tobe the best
*707 if impoving the sitution, it -was not feas ible be ause sucoss
V$ prmsed conly in b*4 weather, edunder such eonittons, the tanks
v d41 be unable to cross the cans . Mooer, it was neesar to
maintain a reserve force* in oae the uneq conuted en opeation
ajakat La Spes ia.
5.~~~~~~ Tharans nJnar n em At times the sncq one*
poyad roe than 1,000 fighttr plane in daylight attacks. etwee 100
and 200 bwming ission wore Lime per day, in additi to the usual
night attacks. The avernge numbr of mission flown per day atbered
sever hudred.
In the beins of January when the encq bad w e4 up to Lk
Conoobto, it could not be igroed whether th lake was inpas able,
meannj a stregtwang of the frnt, or whether the lake could b
crossed bymsera cqutimet. The naval unit attach to thecrs
bano fame availbl tow proteottag the shore. A Lofthe 36h Pader Diviio vs rnferred to th nrthern se, es
that for the preet th trait eald still he enitsed4 fiul belm.
A si a S u were toata e the G i n d f eders. t e L M C r o h
4 A regimet etratedduin oprtin en *misting of se aequtpmnat twos variou an. (itor).
WIa f Cm ml
dates, of the northern shore. oni its righ, the Ut? Pazer Corps
.d the trot ar aas 1 with a lUnbaed on the Soul* Diver.
Th. front foflowed a line almost due souh, the trnd towards the
.west at a oint just south of t~lg.a
?k the Wehrmoht Oprations Stat!f hearl a ro-Port tw'an officer Pust rered from th northern Adriatic Sea areas The
operational son along the riatic Coast was not oonsidered thrned
at the prsent time, althoug there was danger that te eamq sight
oeeupy the Daltatla Itlmns and fro there jump to Yluw., There w
also a possibility that the en night attaek the southeastern flank
othe continent, where untfl now nofortif ications had been constructed.
A thrut through the (lu of T reats5 h weer9 was not expcted.
secause offavorable lending posibfli.tiel, the report said, the
western coastal sector etween tZalvore er Cittsnov was endangered.
Lately the oendn'se corned had discussed the_ defense of the
northern Daltian Islans * The Navyes reuet to fortify these islans
had been refused by the C or. Sa Chief Soft aust onthe grounds
that the ecessary force were not arailable. It was his intention not
to sp l it tp the fere a n on3 t o deed t h eomet. The av y Ci 111il
noth bed been asked to tasfar additioal nav a oes to the islets.
Zontm withot ensq prssur was not to be com se. The area
v. alrd veil prtecte ies., The defense of. Pots caed general
eanoern since its land sad sn defee were still ink.
Defense ratlon alob the oast had not been upto ezpnetatiwon.
MI et .280-
to ooustnet peutiio tn aree emadr ba explqd .120,000
waiters, inoltding sen from Crgntntic tot. Th Chibeeoden line
ws. to be eostpleted about 15 rbuay n would hold roughly two
divisions. The fl.ig Position to the southeast was still. bin
reconnoitered. a~ difficrulties Vote cased 'by the nerly 35,+(X
foreign troops +eployed in the oprational sone. These inelwd
Cosaks, Chetnik, Serbs, and the 10h 1.A.5. (an Italian naval
formation).s The report conoluded with the observation that the bulk of
the artillery' batteries were only infield positions.
On the C er in Chief Sotlrestv'as informed that
he Van not to withdraw major sections of the front line. Ps! replid
on jfr!IMgZ int, while he did not it'en doig so, be did desire
tomoavebaokosertwnsetorvhih wudbebadly epsed in case Of'a
strong neqattack. H. referred skeitioafly to eectos eoath o
Lugo and south and east of take Ccmaohio. Ci 2s.w thise pundssio
was grated, so log as it was evident before the fPront .Line was
alterd that a larpceeleenm attaok bad alrady begu.
How he C derin Chief Sowthvt viened his position at the
alefl of the month can be see frmn a memrandm he prepared for a
possibl, reot to th Nttr a e~~ h 17Vsapc9
to tr#om t. break theog to the to plain. Thrs wan assemble a
strateg a . at six or tern division, which could bereinforced
byusing U'aff clos divisio (ni.., tl ian, and ooh tnoop)as fores on the line v4d by eovirg zp duter divisions. (Mls to thbe
MS # ~O2O 489e
of e m n e s, it w as n ot y et detemieho the
reserve xa to bemre. It was possible that a strategi attack
wotil be ad amant the enthena tract, aimd at the weaker hel
coatal flanks. The piet'w. was rot yet clear, bt new nigniievce
was ade b th cangmi th .Wran situatios th ipreonto
the weather; the reins, oX' battleatstd wauits; the increa izg gravity
ofthe nppy vn4 trssaport s ituation; ant the derease inmbil.ity.
Grines a m; the civilian population reutn tb r toad showtgs and
tn'epleywiet wen ezmted to onue further dirficulties. Mtrtz
units could only be roved 250 kiloitetro, thereby ncenaitatIMg the
use of horse-draw unite as strategic reserves. * Te tine factorta
to be closel conz i4 rd in all, opertiod oleulatir* and it was
necssary that decisions be wae early,
kartfl ro rosifl attacks on the Ltiartn coast, enemy operation
we, also efet ti aain t the caton wing of the ary roup, with
armphibious 1nfriings twa the ave a nd Iren Riven * This would
strategicall effet the Visas portito. At least two hbrearawn
diwisien whih cold eybe tae from Taoth A y, wld tat to b
00314 . a o d t h t 4 O q t ve k n n f o t T eaoly be e c p nsate tow by alteri g the cotut ot bettle a t tha
eastr wing oft the soutern fret. the attack whieb valt tov a
landing was to be worn doma by stubsor atefs and ht-to a bait
at the latest at the Gghs WM* lie.. it this sttuation. fi'edt
develop, the enec vould have to take into aut thosw diviion h.$d
w 289w
14 1 0-020
in resre s1ing th rit coastal m.o db diadvantageo losing
time tbroitgh returing the Iu to the Southern Front was not as gret
as tha resulting if this wone not don. The Couder lzChif So.
west asked the chief of the Wehneoht dpotin Staf for his opinion
an for a reply as to wheother he deired a persoal rernt bythe
Ci sr in Chief Sthwest or byhisobiefotamsf.
Th e rAeh Op4Mration taff conurd nerally wit the esimate
of' the situation but did not conider the danger of a lendin htutePeeea ienmteouh Jse t
o f t h at coast a t the oense of the soer front. A brewaetrou
to the V iem ars, for which ftones and transpor facilities wart
both lacking, ys mowoer i cels for pliwa reasows It any
ease, sch an obique thet could no bring about the collapse of the
southern front. Therf eTh, it was colsdered suficent t*take
defensive resures that woed not weaken the s outhern front. it wa
suggested thtthe f1lOhWnantariivao be clydbetween the
Pane i4hosead toshift a diilmc te the area northest of Lake
Comceic A redaction of * fa Ma the Adratic wa s JvUaibl
risk,.n a diioalg teshore of the lake wol be aalae as
aresewve for the atha front eaelsoemwid be movedi t to t he-
AErite ent
Th. objectv of an enW laudin would w to bring about the
collapse .f the. stern frn, attrfr th. atak would m~
robably mae between the eas line of resistance at the. P efstua.
)Z I 0n33 .491er
This dmner woud be irased it the loft wing of the Tenth r
won withdran Mreover, the lake col not be ecoafiered an effective
oLsteCle so that fonces from that area could not be released to rein-*
t o the &drtatio cast.
$aes the ew~ prob lewso deci ive i yrt ae all de&i
of' the Wdohot Iigh C were tobe made If in advance, HWever~
it would be, neaS~a~ to give authorization now for a delaying atiom
on the asenwing ofthe Tnt f. M
ata was danded cononting the occupation ofthe Aeriatic coat
between °riestea and the iain line of rests tamce in oflr to obtain a
decisin from the Fotrer.
CAn2 a directive was reevet according t@ which the
eotbat xalsk assiiued on15 Decstber was still vaid s "A forces
had tee vea ine and reserve strerth was low, the defenre should he
ortn ad in gnestor depth in crier to s trengthen the post ion of' the
towar defe lti . The Febre would bject to a planed with
dral to stra poitio in the fac. of a luagesne attc, Wut
hevoul neve coen to a delay action, bhc he f.It wotd
toatr the troops' j nm3~
an & t a the chief 4C tbe W eaht Opattion Staf nut
the fooig rApy to the Ci orin C?4i.f Southwest with refers
to t latter's stinat. of th eit'atio datd 15 hbrazye7 A nnwd
large-scale attack direct against the cen ter &ad left wing of the
tenth tiny was ezpete at t egging ofspring. $trog chiefly
91*.
ML #+ CaO 2Q 9
Brttff nres woulvmd be epee, ilesos thy were previo sl with..
drawn. While landings were Poseible bt~s the Pine* and Isonie
Rirs, it was ooasildsre4 more likely that anamphibio opetirton
would de dirted at a' point betwee the tatin flne of raistae
and the Po eary. tn~ause at tefr united iaoblity, resn'%t would
have to be autsembled at those points Were the would mo probbl
bewee. Th. chie! of the Webrmneht Qprattoc s$taff onsfdred the
foflowin distrIbution adquto s The 710h Wianry Divisio awl one
preohato division (wrhich na to benewly aotivate4) between Vealee
ad the Ise=so River; o r mbile division (29th P ssr tirisoz) sout'.
Est of Fers;. and ott infmntry division or the 93t1 Panzergreadier
Division .south ast ofBoil . tispoitic with regr t@ the vitm.
, l i u t o ol . * l te.'eOn 27 F bu ry a order was given to occupy nfisi 4lia in
atmt,&sso ot a p edble lanling on the Le Clank.
6. 3hnec4Cza ctt~h Jaury lasses w ere reported a
follosa
Sikn
Piting Jansry only 3,00 ao were receive as pom s
47 22 Jasuary th 35t IUfanr Di~ bad apsrtet- fow
flugry in aeeofann with an orer of 14 Jnuar (miut. trvisio0
Ennt Pass; four trafr~oads per tvety or bans).*
I'll
14;5 OX"42 03
Th 715th Thetry lliso v trntferred tothe som or interior
at the ed of Ysbnzery, e ~ras repaced b' th 27Mt Infatr Diviion
N evem ent b egan fr n V erona on 25 7,h f n "; n r J mi : s i' :br a nnry . n r ,4
to Ihagary. W4vent hegan on '7 re brary but in dlyri bydr't to
tue railroad sstem.
S3vera1 wxontain opnies were transterrrd tho'et
Ey 3 Januaryz th fl71OW Intantr Dlvlzdon kwA ardived fre !ra* .
evral o pa hte batt c were tra r .w from tne earct to nplae
the departed 16th Panr fr ivisio.
Mtcr the te 4.ins oC ~ruwry stt ts Krc tite to ztrctpthe
the let n 4th Parachute )ivlsione ci to aeYtamtc tir 10th rae}m
Dtvision. This S~asre wMs Qrdhrd by tn.e esehrr 26 7cbrty. 4t
th cr5 z ik=Pq~roL t ' are u grn wasz r<e to troSnit;'"r :, - r~t
7. gRon rLM . i fl Janiuary te 157th ~aaer V Ivizion sa& the
Italia lt Infantry Division were withdrawn fro in " 'attack prao9
Alpine front for rhabflitation.
IiThzring the nooMr hal of Januar the l1t Res er liv iot ro
plac the 4th Parachute Division. Thsc latter unit had been trsnrnd,
tthe mast in orer trolese a jnzer diio for the reserve. The
98th Inantry Tvieton was insertdin the line, to f14aclitat the
remova o-f otar 'w tt Tor rcia tttioa. The 710t Ilimraft7 Uvii
64", U
as reltrod by, the 12ltt natr Division t. tranferel to t ,he
diatto coast, All trsxse were ccxspae by thin cry of Jauery,~
Th Z7St "n tnr D.1viuL n n~ tz ravnr t "n ebt ; . Th' 169th
to r4.icv a div ion for coni .tnt at btr. front,* Iu antiettov r of
Melt.xi wnWn the .piae£ fnt, thoi &vtor.bh thefn vs
brought forv'ard.
? 4hsuar the Duce urg1 the ccwtmet of Itsfr dvivsos
Lou r off iiie tad been activa te * 2iscver, no change irero ratt r Ines
IAhe Italiana 4th toutain Divisio an teeints of the Italia n 2d nfantz7
tilviaion 1web6 alead cein cwlvc along quiet sectr: of the £rozt
and wcr e nct cuited for eombat s0140. The. Foreign Group6 was rdcrn
on 25 January to info i'h Ai accordingIy.
% V~~nt4he~ Itai~ lct ZDiv in whiot ha! hec tved forvard
in . ~tomta, isa at~aade aid dfeati It th a L acil Velley.
'a S Thn' an orIor was jgiven to alternat-e 1ralian dtision
with O6n diviica on the ine.* Fixperiowo durin g the past fe
woks tad prove4 their low cosbat value.
b-* the tlo'n dtvii ware tob smp:ed ti
Italian front (li order zfro riht to ieit).
m h 169th tfvitr dos not sets to have been ative ina this aeIn Jawuy. Perhaps the 1624 Thfatry Division, whoe penSowel waIm4r aby tr o 7ozctu, I; heart. ThIs is I on vts in the area. (dltor).64 Am-up of the C,4,, ire1wini t. %1rarto, for } :litar ttaches.
Italia lEt DiiioItalian 4th LDiisios148th Infantry Division (t the nx)
ofthe two abov, twits22 Infantry Division (boundary)9&th Infantry Division.157th Ronntaiu iv in (after 27 February
redes igte the .th t~ tain Die i on )65th Infantry Division305th Infantry Divisika1st Parahte flivtsion334th Infantry ivisio715th Infantry flivis ion (repl1aced by the
278th Infantry Diris ion)90th ?anse rgrenedir Division4th Panochute Diiio26th ?ennr Division98th Infantry Division3624 Infantry Divisio
42 Ig~ht Infantry Dirtsn169th (Turkestan) Igantry i.vision
LI.~~ ~ rr}GrsThKM % A~ AP&IL
1. St *i At the be tnniw of Wroh Jritish reserves
were estimate to total five divisitons:a thelt 4th, 46th, and 76th
Infantry Dirion e au e aroredI v!it . ftherry oe rstnfr
Itffy ap anst th +. bpae were no longer ooxwtredol probabU . Riepots
L'nat the Iritish wee wltlra~ig izits bati sqtiil niot bee ~ofre.
iCflvmly the enemy's sir forces had been rndueed anprprt .on to the
deerne.ed ara of the Italian theoater of ?a.
The tiny had been ninfornd by apkla t)'a three Italian
divisions. (i it was dete rm that the Eritish tad nov
u responsibility for the fruit as far as the coat. Theb zofthe Pois orps ha been shifted to thb northeast. The loatio
of the New Zaan 24 .2vistac, which hMi been relieved bythe trttish
5th Infantry D1iiio, cii of the Canadia 5th If Apry Division was
'7 L
not knwn Thu U.S~ 8th Irtfan z~yflvisio was asume to hiave been
w ttnv to the are of the 11.. corp*=s stationed near Anmomna
'Utxf increasing evidence izvfleae that thet erg~
con 4ed ty Italinot of £eoa imnortant.. Tt Er iab
divisioy hadi been vitbinwri and replaced at the. frozt 1c txo Tdien
divisions, one ratili.tatd Polish division, ed three It0alian
d1iviin of lo *=bat vim . By tts Ma da. of Febr tht nritish
lt Div iiohd already been tranferred tothe it a it and th
L6th Infsntxy 'Edvision had been moved to Gr ee "h U.S 1 t 1#ut
.f 1i O !, 'w h ic h had a rriv e d re c e n t y fr =z th e U n ited : S t tu , w s±,n2 i ar a 1 e w d n t i w n 1 o t a k
Lallandings verx still weeted along the Adrtatto cwat.
There waad tus mande partly for poltial purpose and vomid not involve
' tt e ";a , 'Ee = " o c en etn ee 2 ) F uw r t ut m ore v e ssels had been tsber vn i d sep rttn g
than ariving. Thirty -more lading craft had ajived.
The Italia Divisio 'riui on the wester part of the front
wv laced uc A r the am& of the P os corps . pparntl the
aasption that the U.S 5th infantry viiin a on the est era
coat was in rrect.
The Britis Uth fvlvuin had been wita since ?Febrtuuy and
tr"afrred to Orecee. This further confirmed the opinion that the
italia theater wat considered of seonary i otane; a view, hcAeflr9
35C4047
which yar cot ske tV the CoUmmande 1A Chie SethvOt
A fobrt Itla division wa aw SntifiSd at tefrt.i
4 ~ deo'the *Wt t it bee.. ewient that the Drtih
tbIntantqy Division bad also been f itrava. The british let
fIat' Division teA bee idntltiSd at Cairo an the Br i t 4t
Infantry Diviin ve rn to be in &Nre. h Arioa bavith
idrn both the 8t r I nfanty Dtvisicms.
byte i o e GeeO Claro Iar Fil blnk
£Sut Mate et en inprix offensive in Itely. a erica and Btitish
activities nported thin thery
At the begirmfrg of April the attotn ot - C ad in Chief
Sct- was 4ireete towards the attitude etthe Italians which gave
rise to Su~nio.a
tib the en y l*4 wing, ad5ent to Th V.3-S. lst iv*izn th,
43.* 9lst 0ivisiort tookth pin of t}3 34th Infantry )ivioion. Me
4oien or thxe liewere the 1thIznd In ttC tsn tvc tai=
diif, an the Polsh unitsf
'The lo efpotd lbgeeale attack began 1c 2ox2. Dy the
idle! April it wa definitey nf'ine th th U.S. 7th Diisio
adbeen traneredt the litern Frt . The ltian of the
Caad~as 5th Inat D~iin wa not clear. Ck L~ a speech t1r
Gealm Alexader ecuwfined that this wats to be* the f1a.l t'easive.
Aleast six snord brigades ha nowbe idemtifted btven the Via
Lia s sd the sea.
4497M
Sm ICeU
* 2. * A ttacks began at Xcctn n is lth
senter of ti..8 dlu (60u) Ditvision. 'lb. 29 t mnrpenadier Divisioc
w a d up to set oft h pntats, whe edbeen mad up to
three kfl o s in tepth. Py hL m t e u* a -a been stopped byn t t .te ma n l n f r i
to te oatflo 15*., eat cc the tolwag da the 'niw gains
ware eenltanbl rue d. Whfl e the rtero the nwth wa
r*latlv~ citft a flow assaults were mae in the area of the Great
(r. L4 l styr oa attacks woe mad, agait the LeC amlra lf otffOgvrui stms Cc
ised their egdcuflr stafms. Zyevnfrg the encired unite baA
fught their way beok t the Gtnrns lieos. Oi J, te ey broke
thro 4 thc rv cviteb psition. On ', Atit 10$flhour strong artill.ery
Lire ceoicnn d ontheo ltgu an ca t but was tollodcmyb a local
attak.. ~ lttfr , n thtr r3at wits v alsdo local, altho~s =a na Wlost on± j.Cwct ativit cowd Lake Ceaoblo did not inase
ntfl2sa
Cm jgflstrong artiler tir preodd th lng npetsd major
attack At. ti. same time there wa an ingress nparts activity
Wa! sabotage.
Vii the .neq pressd beak the tones orhof tb.
iaf r a t . T O o R v r v r eaTelandi g vs wa de at aw * tak. C aoch o A t that tii the att dc
NB fC.O~O
stow bad a wjAth of sity tl nt v.
By 2~.E~headquarters stiff EM did )zo o k w ether, the . via
tttpt1g a b « rbwouh r 4.y V tot tie dov Gfwuss to..
The Visitbility of an Xtaliaw 4otet vs t *os~a d wd. Thee vas no
ehswio of fuxwdshing *1 with fuel, forus, or a3 tft.
~ the follwig OM to" e re Identified as taking
part in the astks The 2d Nov Mfa~ Dvisi~os; the 60h Indian
)v ion; the Italian Di 1aia 0 wo aa'; .1at of the Drtish 56th
Irza tv Dlvi tn; and the )'olish wavts. Tc situation looke4 s3Igbti$
be tter, time attacks spainst the U~gurisn ost ME ,bted. Part sn
ctWity made it dificult to defen Carr ra. C the left wing the
Oriey approac ~d St. Ton* but jgaizid 110 major s cos.
C~ 3Arf the a 4w~e alon th Sala River a3 south
of Inola ir the d reeLion of Eae'ass ,sue.&. L= o2a tas lost on the
toll~ing dad.
In aFditi n to the atror; attack on the rzt wing, 1by -5 krri1
the offensive a 2e spy~dt the Salaopa area. b$4tin c= iiUmed
been the Via Eil$ and the le. Genrally, a oeted front
was still beltg W&Stae15i0
2..k1 eewy fosoa admoed to at point north of Carrara.
Groun Was lost southvaat ate, south of i4.gna. (a the Via !.ia the
wn~apoebe t"~iu ad aterd Argeta.
It vas u~ a idsr a matter of 4qsa if not hamr, before the
510.49 000
RI te alLl .t Spl the Fresh Is the mes Spsla e-6soli~tetree aiateO SAO as ,
Lordiag to astint. Oa Lh4, th esqal& 2,00
twiweu aM tour ea bebiad lae
S'. Jti eay isal ns e haLs bees game aglst th 41tvieg. West etEoloa lbwmr oe e~e kg uras Ve.
ableow to filter through tb. lies Penetnatoas men made ha t the fot
south of BDooa bnst the 65th Inatr Division d~tnguise Iif
by ol~ngthe are intact. Enem tones -were contained setuth of theVia bsills. At Argesta the lma. vttMr~v eagy two kilnters Is
spite of the fact that 60,00 shellbs Vote tire by the eeq.
3. Field Marha £essanlring
arrivod at the Ntehrer's hadqurers, Ctthe fofloia day,. afterraking a personal reort, he pa put in o ewt of the Weten Frot,
Getrslobet von ti t asied a e.of Ay Group 1outhwnt.
4.. 1 pi A th begnlz of P th 14th Ugt
Iantry flvlo tover the right eM cetnal secto ot theposition. d by the 2324 Inatity 4iiin
4 abt U tth 234laryDvson svldaa afterhain stood the tett battl. VUSi .JiktefkbIfnrXDivlslm as- bal wet Lfa n o oe.
aw=h Yt nat D iin vas plaVth
Italian let Divii
Stt th midl a 0 th onfth ppea Ma ie to theO On er
ICf* 93~
Chief' s wqst teo dlsb t the 362 (7zta Mylisme but the-lsde va then oouat. wmn e.
Daisg the second balt of Naeh th. 334th Xutaatrg 1iytica
rplae. the 29M Paws wgztnal Divisis In Od.r that the Uatz~eou16 he blittat sorth of )obuha
The towiwt its wee n .mlq (twsm tight toleft).s
l4th Irt4 Divisii
334th fi try Divisiop
94th i fAntwy Iiai8I h i~tai* Di io65th Itnfa Oivtion305th TI'faJt17 D~ivisioin
1sth Patra ! Divisia,4t Faate. Di ii26th Paree Divioloui
364Ztn Divisia
4