Transcript
Page 1: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

Turkey and the Islamic Identity

Birol A. YeşiladaMark O. Hatfield School of Government

Portland State UniversityMarch 2004

Page 2: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

THE REPUBLIC Turkish republic established in 1923 by M. Kemal Ataturk after

the War of Independence that followed WW I. The Treaty of Lausanne (July 1923) signed between the Ankara government and the Allies.

Since 1946, it has a multi-party representative democracy that has experienced two military coups and two military interventions. It has a parliamentary system of government.

Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe and all other European intergovernmental organizations, associate member of the European Union (and a candidate for accession), NATO, and the UN.

Turkey has 65 million citizens of mixed ethnic background reflecting the heterogeneous makeup of the Ottoman Empire. Identity issues continue to be a major topic among Turkish citizens.

Page 3: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

Background (cont.)

Reforms of Ataturk include: Abolished Sultanate (1922) Abolished Caliphate (1924) Secular education (1924) Language (1927-35) Dress (1925) Civil code (1924-26) Alphabet (1925) Significance of laicism Significance of etatism and

republicanism

Page 4: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

Islamic Identity in Turkey

One must distinguish between religiosity and fundamentalism.

Most Turks belong to the Hanefi school of Sunni Islam. There is a large presence of Alevi Turks who are close to Shi’a Islam.

Other minorities include Arabs and Kurds (mostly Sunni Muslims), Christians (Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks), and Jews.

Page 5: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

Islam in Turkish Life

Most Turks follow some form of “institutionalized” Islam ranging from daily mosque attendance to attending the Friday prayers to observing prayers during religious holidays.

There are those who do not follow formal religious practices and consider themselves strict laicists.

Page 6: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

Islam in Turkey Turks have always interpreted Islam in their own

way:– Mixing their Asian cultural norms with those peoples’

they ruled during the Ottoman Empire.– Religious tolerance was at the heart of Ottoman rule.

This resulted in the Millet (Nation) system of administration.

– Strict & conservative interpretation of Islam emerged during the 19th century as pan-Islamism became a political force aimed at redefining the Empire in the face of Balkan uprisings.

– Quickly, this movement split into pan-Islamist and pan-Turkic political ideologies.

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Islam in Turkish life

Religious orders, known as tarikat, provide organizational networks for followers of different congregations.

While most of these are sufi orders, some are quite active in political life and aspire to change the constitutional order of Turkey.

The goal s to replace the laicist system with an Islamic state.

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People’s attitudes Most Turks (~80 percent) state that they would

like to have more adherence to Islamic norms in their daily lives.

20 percent state that they would like to see Islam be a source of law in State affairs.

Only 3 – 5 percent,however, state that they want Sharia (Islamic Cannon Law) be the law of the land.

Even among the supporters of the religious parties, AKP and SP, 61 and 45 percent respectively reject Sharia law.

Page 9: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

Recent opinion poll on headscarf

More than 80 percent of the people believe that the headscarf issue is over played by the State. Asked where it should be permitted to be worn:

– 95 percent approved it during shopping, etc– 90 percent while receiving medical assistance in the hospitals– 90 percent in public offices– 81 percent while in court– 80 percent during visits to the Parliament– 71 percent as university students– 70 percent when providing medical assistance in hospitals– 68 percent for civil servants– 67 percent for university faculty and staff– 65 percent for judges– 64 percent for the members of the Parliament

Page 10: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

National Election Results in Turkey, 1987-2002

Political Party Orientation% votes Seats % votes seats % votes Seats % votes seats %votes seats

Motherland (ANAP)moderate right 36.3 292 23.3 115 19.6 131 13.2 86 5.12 0

True Path (DYP)moderate right 19.1 59 26.2 178 19.2 135 12 85 9.55 0

Republican Peoples (RPP) moderate left 24.8 99 20.1 88 10.7 50 8.8 0 19.4 178Democratic Left (DSP) moderate left 8.5 0 10.4 7 14.6 76 22 136 1.23 0

Welfare/Virtue (R/FP) Islamic right 8.4 0 16.4 62 21.3 158 15.4 107Justice and Development (AKP)

Moderate Islamist 34.26 363

Felicity (Saadet) Party Islamist right 2.49 0Nationalist Movement (MHP) nationalist 2.9 0 NA 8.1 0 18 129 8.34 0

Kurdish nationalist (HADEP/DEHAP) Kurdish NA 0 NA 0 4.1 0 4.7 0 6.23 0Others 0 0 3.6 0 2.4 0 5.9 6 12.38 0Independents 1 9Vacant 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0Total 100 450 100 450 100 550 100 550 100 550

*Welfare and MHP joined together for these elections

20021987 1991* 1995 1999

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Voter Realignment: The Left-Right Spectrum

far

left 1 2 3 4

cent

er 6 7

8

9

far

right

1990 19

95 1999

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

percentvotes

1990

1995

1999

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After the 2002 National Elections

Seats in the National Assembly (March 9, 2003)

365

177

2 6

AKP CHP DYP Indep

Page 13: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

365

66.36

177

32.18

2 0.36 6 1.09

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

# seats & % total seats

AKP CHP DYP Indep

Distribution of Seats in the National Assembly (March 9, 2003)

#seats %total seats

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Rise of Islamist Groups

Since the establishment of the Republic, the laicist order of the new state has been challenged by a variety of religious orders and political forces.

Turkish-Islamic Synthesis v. Islamic-Turkish Synthesis.

1970s, 1980s, 1990s, and now.

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The rise of Political Islam

The Islamic Democracy Party (İslam Demokrasi Partisi--IDP) was the first Islamist political party to enter into politics during the multi-party period in 1951.

It is true that the center-right Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti—DP) under Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes attracted the support of the Islamist voters with policy decisions that reversed some of the Kemalists’ bans on Islamic practices like the call for prayer in Turkish and the ban on Koran schools.

Page 16: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

In the ensuing years, those who played important roles in the establishment of other religious political parties made use of similar phrases of religious importance:During the 1960s, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi-AP)

came to represent the "home" of the democratic Islamists in Turkey.

Sheikh Mehmet Zahit Kotku who was a leading figure of the Nakşibendi order (tarikat) and head of the related İskender Paşa congregation (dergah).

At Kotku’s encouragement, Necmettin Erbakan entered political life.

He became the founding chairman of Milli Nizam partisi, Milli Selamet partisi, Refah Partisi, Fazilet partisi, and was the main figure behind the Selamet Partisi.

He also established the Milli Gorus (National Vision) organization.

Page 17: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

The informal party organization was extensive; it relied on a tightly controlled network of activists and volunteers:The party maintained a divan (council) in every district,

comprised of 50 regular and 50 alternate members. In addition, there were neighborhood representatives

who maintained an information database on everyone living in that area, including each family unit.

There was also a network of headmasters and teachers (hatipler ve öğretmenler), who engaged people in discussion at the local coffee houses and other gathering places.

Another informal network came from the Koran courses and the Preacher and Prayer Leader Schools (İmam Hatip Okulları).

Finally, these parties drew strong support from some of the religious orders.

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Relations Between Tarikats and Islamist

Political Parties

Traditionally, tarikats, which Atatürk shut down and were later reopened when the Democratic Party was in government, supported the center- right parties, seeing them as security against the secular state.

Among these tarikats, the Nakşibendi order is one of the most influential and well organized; its ties to the RP/FP dates back to late1960s.

In present day Turkey, the Nakşibendi members involve themselves in the activities of Dergah (congregations).

Among these the Iskenderpaşa dergah has been one of the most politically motivated.

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The current AKP Cabinet and its Significance

The cabinet includes followers of the Iskenderpaşa dergah (congregation) of the Nakshibendi tarikat (a mixture of students from the Kotku and Erbakan teachings), Nurcu, and Fethullah Gülen.

The key to this coalition is Korkut Özal’s Birlik Wakf. It enabled the tarikats to get together again. The original coalition of the Nurcu and Iskenderpaşa dergah that gave rise to Erbakan’s first political party, the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party), collapsed soon after the creation of the party.

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Refah-Fazilet-AKP

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Religion And Politics

Seem to be two distinct Preferences

• Religious and Moral Politicians

• Absence of direct interference in Political life by religious leaders Politicians who don¥t believe in God are unfit for public office Agree strongly

Politicians who don¥t believe in God are unfit for public office Agree

Politicians who don¥t believe in God are unfit for public office Neither agree or disagree

Politicians who don¥t believe in God are unfit for public office Disagree

Politicians who don¥t believe in God are unfit for public office Strongly disagree

Politicians who don¥t believe in God are unfit for public office

Country - wave Turkey (4)

250

500

750

1000

1250

Valu

es

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Religion and Politics

Religious leaders should not influence government Agree strongly

Religious leaders should not influence government AgreeReligious leaders should not influence government Neither agree or disagree

Religious leaders should not influence government Disagree

Religious leaders should not influence government Strongly disagree

Religious leaders should not influence government

Country - wave Turkey (4)

Country - wa

100

200

300

400

500

Valu

es

Crosstab

Statistics : Count

Page 23: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

Religion and Politics

Religious leaders should not influence how people vote Agree strongly

Religious leaders should not influence how people vote Agree

Religious leaders should not influence how people vote Neither agree or disagree

Religious leaders should not influence how people vote DisagreeReligious leaders should not influence how people vote Strongly disagree

Religious leaders should not influence how people vote

Country - wave Turkey (4)

Country - wave

0

500

1000

1500

Val

ues

Statistics : Count

Better if more people with strong religious beliefs in public office Agree strongly

Better if more people with strong religious beliefs in public office Agree

Better if more people with strong religious beliefs in public office Neither agree or disagree

Better if more people with strong religious beliefs in public office Disagree

Better if more people with strong religious beliefs in public office Strongly disagree

Better if more people with strong religious beliefs in public office

Country - wave Turkey (4)

250

500

750

1000

1250

Valu

es

Statistics : Count

Page 24: Turkey and the Islamic Identity

Conclusions Turkish populations has changed dramatically since the

early days of the Republic. There is more tolerance of Islam in personal life and its

inclusion in State affairs. Secular forces, the Kemalist elite and the military, oppose

any change to the laicist system and represents an uncompromising position.

The military identifies irtica (religious reactionary movement) as the number one domestic threat to national security.

The military is cautious about the AKP. In addition to nonmilitant Islam, radical fundamentalist

groups have emerged to challenge the system.


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