National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) Review of IED Activityin Mexico
(U) Review of IED Activityin Mexico
THIS INFORMATION IS FURNISHED WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT IS TO BE USED FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES ONLY; THAT IT IS TO BE AFFORDED ESSENTIALLY THE SAME
DEGREE OF SECURITY PROTECTION AS SUCH INFORMATION IS AFFORDED BY THE UNITED STATES; THAT IT IS NOT TO BE REVEALED TO ANOTHER COUNTRY OR
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY FURNISHING THE INFORMATION.
The Overall classification of this Briefing isThe Overall classification of this Briefing is
CONFIDENTIAL//LES
The information marked (//LES) in this document may be distributed within the Federal Government (and its contractors), U.S. intelligence, law enforcement,
public safety or protection officials and individuals with a need to know. Distribution beyond these entities without authorization is prohibited. Precautions should be taken to ensure this information is stored and/or destroyed in a manner that precludes unauthorized access. Information bearing the LES caveat may not
be used in legal proceedings without first receiving authorization from the originating agency.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) Overall incidents in Mexico (U) Overall incidents in Mexico
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) Approximately100 IEDs ReportedSince 2004
0
5
10
15
20
25
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
# of IEDsrecovered inCaches# of IEDs fromIncidents
UNCLASSIFIED
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) Groups Known to Seek or Use IEDsin Mexico
(U) Groups Known to Seek or Use IEDsin Mexico
• (U) TCOs– Los Zetas– The Sinaloa Cartel– The Gulf Cartel– The Beltran Leyva
Organization (BLO) – The Tijuana Cartel– The Juarez Cartel– La Linea– La Familia Michoacana
• (U) Leftist Extremists / Other Criminal Organizations– Ejercito Popular
Revolucionario (EPR)– Zapatista Army of National
Liberation (EZLN) – Tendencia Democratica
Revolutionaria-Ejercito Del Pueblo (TDR-EP, The People’s Democratic Revolutionary Army)
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
TCO: Transnational Criminal Organization
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) Known Explosive Material and IED Usage by TCOs and Other Criminal Organizations
(U) Known Explosive Material and IED Usage by TCOs and Other Criminal Organizations
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Group Explosive Types Initiation/Switch TypesGulf Cartel Pipe Bombs (steel and PVC containers), VBIEDs (Orica) Cell phone, Time Delay
Los Zetas Cartel Claymore Mines, Grenades (possibly conventional and homemade), VBIEDs, C4
PMR, Time Delay (clock)
Tijuana Cartel VBIEDs with unknown explosives (reported interest) Unknown
Sinaloa Cartel TNT, possible improvised grenades Unknown
Juarez Cartel Possible improvised grenades Unknown
La Linea VBIEDs (Tovex) Cell Phone with Improvised Circuit Boards
La Resistencia PE4, C4 Cell Phone, Furtaba Toy Car Remote
BLO Improvised Grenades Unknown
La Familia Michoacana
Unknown Unknown
EPR Platter Charges, Possible Improvised Shaped Charges, ANFO, Tovex, SEMTEX
Time Delay (possible digital watch), Possible Cell Phone/Remote Control
TDR-EP Unknown Time Delay
ELZN HMTD, black powder (enhanced with sulfate, aluminum, paraffin, cyanide); containers used : bags, bamboo, gas drums, books
Unknown
(U) HMTD: Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamene
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) Targets for IEDs in Mexico(U) Targets for IEDs in Mexico
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Commercial Infrastructure
Government Infrastructure
Civilian Populace / Businesses
Police Forces
Government Agencies
2004-2007
2008-2011
UNCLASSIFIED
(U) IED attacks in 2004-2007 were conducted by leftist extremists and other criminal organizations. These attacks were focused on infrastructure such as banks and pipelines.
(U) IED attacks in 2008-2011 were conducted primarily by TCOs. These attacks focused more on the Municipal and Federal Police and instilling fear in the local populace.
(U) The introduction of VBIEDs in 2010 showed a significant change in TCO tactics towards higher profile, bold attacks.
Leftist Insurgents/Criminal OrganizationsTransnational Criminal Organizations
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) IED Specifics
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Unknown RCIED Time VOIED
7
(U) IED Components in Mexico(U) IED Components in Mexico
ANFOUNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
• (U//LES) Types of improvised container indentified in Mexican IEDs:• (U//LES) Butane tanks• (U//LES) Backpacks, Duffel Bags• (U//LES) Metal and PVC containers• (U//LES) Military munitions (mines, grenades)
• (U//LES) Switches– (U//LES) Few types of improvised switches have been identified– (U//LES) Primary switches in order are:
• (U//LES) Remote controlled using primarily cell phones orwalkie-talkies.• (U//LES) Time Delay using either clocks or digital watches
• (U//LES) Explosive Charges– (U//FOUO) A wide variety of explosives are used in Mexico. The most common are used in
the mining industry or commercial explosives.
• (U//FOUO) C4, PE-4, Tovex, Orica manufactured explosives, ANFO, Black Powder, Smokeless Powder and R1.
• (U//LES) Initiators:– (U//LES) Electric blasting caps
• (U//LES) Types of improvised container indentified in Mexican IEDs:• (U//LES) Butane tanks• (U//LES) Backpacks, Duffel Bags• (U//LES) Metal and PVC containers• (U//LES) Military munitions (mines, grenades)
• (U//LES) Switches– (U//LES) Few types of improvised switches have been identified– (U//LES) Primary switches in order are:
• (U//LES) Remote controlled using primarily cell phones orwalkie-talkies.• (U//LES) Time Delay using either clocks or digital watches
• (U//LES) Explosive Charges– (U//FOUO) A wide variety of explosives are used in Mexico. The most common are used in
the mining industry or commercial explosives.
• (U//FOUO) C4, PE-4, Tovex, Orica manufactured explosives, ANFO, Black Powder, Smokeless Powder and R1.
• (U//LES) Initiators:– (U//LES) Electric blasting caps
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) Device Employment(U) Device Employment
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
• (U//FOUO) Devices are typically thrown or surface laid.
– (U//FOUO) 2006 TDR-RP attacks on multiple banks used IEDs concealed in backpacks placed near targeted banks
• (U//FOUO) VBIEDS are static – not suicide. Come-on tactics have been used in Juarez and Hidalgo.
– (U//FOUO) Suicide attacks are not a TTP used in Mexico. There have been two accidental suicide bombings in Mexico:
• (U//FOUO) 13 March 2010 – Bomber armed an IED while exiting a vehicle to emplace the device. The IED is assessed to have prematurely detonated.
• (U) 1 Aug 2010 – Bomber reportedly intended to place an IED inside Police Headquarters in Mexico City, but the IED prematurely detonated approximately 200 yards away.
• (U//FOUO) The necessity for buried or roadside attacks does not exist in Mexico.
– (U//FOUO) Majority of incidents are targeting specific organizations, facilities, infrastructure or are designed to instill fear and show capability.
– (U//FOUO) Targets are not randomly chosen
• (U//FOUO) Devices are typically thrown or surface laid.
– (U//FOUO) 2006 TDR-RP attacks on multiple banks used IEDs concealed in backpacks placed near targeted banks
• (U//FOUO) VBIEDS are static – not suicide. Come-on tactics have been used in Juarez and Hidalgo.
– (U//FOUO) Suicide attacks are not a TTP used in Mexico. There have been two accidental suicide bombings in Mexico:
• (U//FOUO) 13 March 2010 – Bomber armed an IED while exiting a vehicle to emplace the device. The IED is assessed to have prematurely detonated.
• (U) 1 Aug 2010 – Bomber reportedly intended to place an IED inside Police Headquarters in Mexico City, but the IED prematurely detonated approximately 200 yards away.
• (U//FOUO) The necessity for buried or roadside attacks does not exist in Mexico.
– (U//FOUO) Majority of incidents are targeting specific organizations, facilities, infrastructure or are designed to instill fear and show capability.
– (U//FOUO) Targets are not randomly chosen
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
9UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
(U//FOUO) Improvised Shape Charge from Mexico
(U) 2007 EPR Pipeline Attacks
(U//FOUO) On 10 July 2007, in Mexico City and Guanajuato, assailants detonated multiple explosive devices near natural gas pipelines, damaging the pipelines but causing no injuries. The Revolutionary People’s Army (EPR) claimed responsibility.
Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator
Time Delay(Casio Watch)
Improvised Shaped Charge
Unknown Unknown
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) 9 Sept 2009 Los Zetas Safe House Cache Recovery
(U) 9 Sept 2009 Los Zetas Safe House Cache Recovery
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSISTIVE
Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator
Time Delay(Alarm Clock)
MI8A1 Claymore Mine
C4 M4 Electric Blasting Cap
UNCLASSIFIED//LES
(U//FOUO) Few details are known about the Zetas IED types and usage. This modified alarm clock with military claymore mine was the 1st identified improvised device associated with the Zetas. It was recovered in a weapons caches in Tlaxcala, Mexico.
UNCLASSIFIED//LES
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) 8 Mar 2010 RCIED in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon
(U) 8 Mar 2010 RCIED in Cadereyta, Nuevo Leon
• (U) SUMMARY: On 8 March 2010, a RCIED detonated in a public bathroom at a Pemex gas station in Cadereyta.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator
RCIED (Motorola Cell
Phone)
2 x PVC Pipes with Screws
Black Powder Cattle Prod
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) 13 Mar 2010 RCIEDs in TuxtlaGutierrez, Chiapas
(U) 13 Mar 2010 RCIEDs in TuxtlaGutierrez, Chiapas
• (U//FOUO) SUMMARY: On 13 March 2010, one of two RCIEDs detonated in a car killing the passenger and injuring the driver. It is assessed that the IED prematurely detonated as the bomber was exiting the vehicle to emplace the device. The target was the Mexican Department of Justice.
Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator
RCIEDs(Motorola PMRs
with SCR and safe to arm
switch)
N/A 2 x Blocks of C4 (one per device)
Unknown
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUOUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) Apr 2010 RCIED in Reynosa, Tamaulipas
(U) Apr 2010 RCIED in Reynosa, Tamaulipas
• (U//FOUO) SUMMARY: In April 2010, a RCIED was recovered in Reynosa, Tamaulipas. Details are not available on the emplacement or recovery of the device.
Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator
RCIED (Nextel Cell
Phone)
PVC Pipe with Nails
Smokeless Powder
Taser
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) 29 June 2010 RCIED in Tapachula, Chiapas
(U) 29 June 2010 RCIED in Tapachula, Chiapas
• (U//FOUO) SUMMARY: On 29 June 2010, four RCIEDs were seized and an amount of C4 assessed to be enough for four additional RCIEDs.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator
RCIEDs(Motorola PMRs
with SCR and safe to arm switch)
N/A M12 Blocks of C4 Unknown
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) 9 Sept 2010 IED Recovery in Tonala, Jalisco
(U) 9 Sept 2010 IED Recovery in Tonala, Jalisco
• (U//FOUO) SUMMARY: On 9 Sept 2010, IED materials including two RCIED switches and various amounts and types of plastic explosives were recovered.
Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator
RCIEDs(Furtaba Toy Car
Controller, Nokia Cell Phone with unknown
circuit board)
N/A C4, PE4 Det Cord
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) January 2011 Chilean Embassy IEDs Recovered in Mexico City
(U) January 2011 Chilean Embassy IEDs Recovered in Mexico City
• (U//FOUO) SUMMARY: On 17 and 21 January 2011, IEDs were delivered to the Chilean Embassy.
Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator
Magnetic Sensor Pipe Bomb Black Powder Unknown
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUOUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) VBIEDs
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
(U) VBIEDs in Juarez(U) VBIEDs in Juarez(U) SUMMARY: Two VBIEDs have been identified in Juarez on two separate occasions – 15 July & 11 September 2010
- (U) Come-on tactics used in both VBIEDs(U//FOUO) The first VBIED on 15 July was reportedly in retaliation for the arrest of the La Linea member “El 35.” The
explosives filled briefcase was placed on the floor behind the passenger seat. A dead rival cartel member was dressed as a municipal police officer to lure in additional police.
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator
Unknown (Likely RCIED - PMR)
VBIED - VaultzBriefcase
22lbs Tovex Electric Detonator/Det Cord
UNCLASSIFIED//LES
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//LES
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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UNCLASSIFIED//LES
Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator
RCIED (Kenwood TH-K2AT
PMR with DTMF capable circuit board made by SYSCOM)
VBIED –Fragmentation added (bolts)
Tovex – 220lbs, ANFO
Electric Blasting Cap/Det Cord
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
(U) VBIEDs in Juarez cont’d(U) VBIEDs in Juarez cont’d(U//FOUO) The second Juarez VBIED on 10 September reportedly targeted the Federal Police. A similar come-on tactic
was used in this incident as well. A gunshot victim was placed inside a vehicle to lure in police, while the explosives were in a nearby vehicle.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) 10 Sept 10 VBIED in Juarez(U) 10 Sept 10 VBIED in Juarez
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//LAW ENFORCEMENT SENSITIVE
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//LES
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) VBIEDs in Ciudad Victoria(U) VBIEDs in Ciudad Victoria• (U) SUMMARY: Three VBIEDs have detonated in Ciudad Victoria on two separate occasions – 5 August & 27 August 2010
• (U) The VBIED on 5 Aug 10 detonated at approximately 5:20pm outside of the Tamaulipas State Public Safety Complex.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Switch Main Charge Explosive Initiator
RCIED (Nokia Cell
Phone), SCR, Mechanical Timer
VBIED - Metal Box
Orica – HydrogelSlurry: Approx 20-
25 sticks
Electric Blasting Cap
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) VBIEDs in Ciudad Victoria cont’d(U) VBIEDs in Ciudad Victoria cont’d
Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorRCIED
(Nokia Cell Phone), SCR, Mechanical Timer
VBIED - Metal Box Orica - Hydrogel Slurry Electric Blasting Cap
• (U) Two VBIEDs detonated on 27 Aug outside a television station and a transit police headquarters.• (U//FOUO) Information obtained to date indicates the VBIEDs were nearly identical to the 5 Aug 2010 incident.• (U) The television station was reportedly targeted by the Gulf Cartel because of “bad press.”
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon(U) Summary: Nuevo Leon had a total of 4 VBIEDs between December 2010 and January 2011.
(U) The first VBIED detonated in Zuazua, Nuevo Leon on 17 Dec 2010 and targeted the municipal police.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorRCIED
(Nokia Cell Phone), SCR, Mechanical Timer
VBIED – 5 gallon Gas Can utilized to enhance
the blast
Unknown Unknown
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUOUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) The second VBIED detonated in San Nicolas de los Garza, Nuevo Leon on 18 Jan 2011, targeting the municipal police.
(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d
Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorUnknown VBIED - Unknown Unknown Unknown
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorUnknown VBIED - Unknown Unknown Unknown
(U) The third VBIED detonated in Monterrey, Nuevo Leon on 20 Jan 2011 targeting the municipal police. The explosive device was placed between the two front seats.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorUnknown VBIED - Unknown Unknown Unknown
26
(U) The fourth VBIED detonated in San Nicolas de los Garza, Nuevo Leon on 21 Jan 2011.
(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d(U) VBIEDs in Nuevo Leon cont’d
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUOUNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
(U) VBIEDs in El Carmen-Tula, Hidalgo(U) VBIEDs in El Carmen-Tula, Hidalgo(U) Summary: The first VBIED in Hidalgo detonated on 22 Jan 2011 targeting a municipal police chief. Come-on tactics similar to the Juarez VBIEDs were used: a body was reported in the trunk of a vehicle prompting a police response. The VBIED detonated as the police chief approached the side of the car.
Switch Main Charge Explosive InitiatorRCIED
(Unknown with unknown circuit board
VBIED – 3 x 20ltr gas containers, 1 x 15kg butane container –
various fragmentation added (nuts and bolts)
Possible Tovex or ANFO – 25-50kg
estimated
Unknown
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) Guatemala IEDs/VBIEDs(U) Guatemala IEDs/VBIEDs• (U//FOUO) IED activity in Guatemala has largely been unreported in intelligence
channels.
• (U) Recent IED and VBIED events however have gained increased interest from law enforcement, counter-drug agencies and analysts, and the intelligence community.
• (C) According to US Embassy reporting, “Guatemalan authorities are genuinely concerned about the amplified use of VBIEDs and proliferation of technical expertise among organized crime entities within the country.”
• (U//FOUO//LES) IED usage in Guatemala has primarily been used inextortion cases associated with one particular bomb maker affiliated with the criminal gang “Little Psycho Criminal”.
• (U) According to reporting, each of the IEDs recovered in Guatemala have been very similar – making authorities confident that there were looking for one bomb maker.
• (U) The gang leader who is assessed to be responsible for the IED/VBIEDs has been detained.
CONFIDENTIAL//LES
CONFIDENTIAL//LES
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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Cigarette lighters
Alcatel Cell PhonesDC Motor
(U) VBIED in Guatemala City, 15 Sept 2010
(U) VBIED in Guatemala City, 15 Sept 2010
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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(U) Conclusion(U) Conclusion
• (U//FOUO) A significant increase in IED usage in Mexico will likely be a reaction to C-IED and Counter-drug efforts of the Mexican military or increased violence between TCOs and other criminal organizations.
• (U//FOUO) 2010 has already superseded the past 6 years of IED activity in Mexico, and it is likely to continue to increase. As knowledge of how to improve the employment of available weaponry is proliferated from other conflicts, members of the TCOs and criminal organizations are likely to experiment to find more effective devices to serve their overall purpose.
– (U//FOUO) Currently no evidence exists to indicate that there has been a direct sharing of technology, devices, or training between TCOs or criminal organizations, insurgents and militants in the Middle East, Colombia, or Africa.
• (U//FOUO) Sharing of IED successes between TCOs operating in Central and South America is going to be an important trend to watch. TCOs have been successful in Mexico, but not so much in Guatemala – this could change if the TCOs perceive they are achieving expected results utilizing IEDs and VBIEDs.
• (U//FOUO) A significant increase in IED usage in Mexico will likely be a reaction to C-IED and Counter-drug efforts of the Mexican military or increased violence between TCOs and other criminal organizations.
• (U//FOUO) 2010 has already superseded the past 6 years of IED activity in Mexico, and it is likely to continue to increase. As knowledge of how to improve the employment of available weaponry is proliferated from other conflicts, members of the TCOs and criminal organizations are likely to experiment to find more effective devices to serve their overall purpose.
– (U//FOUO) Currently no evidence exists to indicate that there has been a direct sharing of technology, devices, or training between TCOs or criminal organizations, insurgents and militants in the Middle East, Colombia, or Africa.
• (U//FOUO) Sharing of IED successes between TCOs operating in Central and South America is going to be an important trend to watch. TCOs have been successful in Mexico, but not so much in Guatemala – this could change if the TCOs perceive they are achieving expected results utilizing IEDs and VBIEDs.
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO
National Ground Intelligence CenterIntelligence and Security Command
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POCs: NGIC IED and Mines Branch
Sherry Hatch - SOUTHCOM/NORTHCOM IED Team Lead: [email protected]: 434-951-1976 DSN: 521-1976
Ted Kanokogi – SOUTHCOM IED [email protected]: 434-951-1466 DSN: 521-1466
Questions???