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Vico and SpinozaAuthor(s): James C. MorrisonSource: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1980), pp. 49-68Published by: University of Pennsylvania PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2709102.
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VICO
AND
SPINOZA
BY
JAMES
C.
MORRISON
The
following
is
a
comparative study
of Vico's
New
Science and
Spinoza's
Theological-Political
Treatise.1
A
common
link
which
unifies
these
apparentlyquite
disparate
works is
found in
the
concept
of
history,
for as
Vico
laid the
basis for
the
modern
historization
of
philosophy,
so
Spinoza
laid the
basis for
the modern
historization
of
religion.
Although
our main
purpose
is to
bring
to
light
the
major
philosophical relationships
holding
between these
two
revolutionary
and foundational works of
mod-
ern
philosophy,
we
believe
that the
numerous
striking
agreements among
them
in
thought, expression,
and intention make
it
highly
probable
that
Vico had read
Spinoza
and
was
influenced
by
him.2
We
also
hope
to
demonstrate that
a
comparative
study
of the New Science
and
the Theo-
logical-Political
Treatise
contributes
significantly
to
a
clarification of the
works
themselves.
The
recognition
of
the
Spinozistic
elements
in
Vico's
thought
is
especially
useful
for
disclosing
his
real
(but
veiled)
intentions
and
the ultimate
implications
of the New Science for
religion
and
Scripture.
1
All direct
quotations
and references to
Vico are from the
English
translation
by
T.
G.
Bergin
and
M.
H.
Fisch,
The New Science
of
Giambattista Vico
(Ithaca,
N.
Y.,
1968),
hereafter
designated
as
NS;
numbers refer
to
paragraphs,
which
are
the
same
as
those
in
the
edition
of
Vico's
Opere,
Vol.
IV,
ed.
Fausto
Nicolini
(Bari,
1942). When quoting directly from Spinoza we have used our own translations
based
on
Carl
Gebhardt's
edition,
Spinoza Opera,
Vol. III
(Heidelberg,
1924).
Numbers refer to
pages
of this
edition,
hereafter
designated
as
Op.,
and to
the
English
translation
by
Elwes
in
Works
of Spinoza,
Vol.
I
(New
York,
1951),
hereafter
designated
as
TPT.
2
In
regard
to the
question
of
Spinoza's
direct influence on
Vico,
cf.
Frederick
Vaughan,
La Scienza Nuova:
Orthodoxy
and
the
Art
of
Writing,
Forum
Italicum,
II,
No.
4
(1968),
350;
Vaughan
asserts
that Vico's
New
Science
was
written
under the
spell
of the
Theological-Political
Treatise and
Spinoza's
idea
of a new kind of critical history.
He
even goes
so far as to
say
that
Spinoza
was
the
most
important
influence
on the formation of Vico's
philosophy.
Cf.
also
Vaughan's
The Political
Philosophy
of
Giambattista Vico
(The
Hague,
1972),
44-51.
We have
not been able
to find an
unequivocal
affirmation of
Spinoza's
direct
influence on
Vico
in
the
writings
of Fausto Nicolini or in the
Bibliografia
Vichi-
ana,
2
vols.,
ed.
B. Croce
& F.
Nicolini
(Naples,
1947-58).
Croce
says
in
one
place,
non
par
dubbio,
il Vico aveva
letto
il
Tractatus
theologico-politicus
del
reprobo
Spinoza.
And
when
discussing
Spinoza's
views
on
Moses
and the
Pentateuch,
he
adds that si
direbbe
quasi
che dalla critica biblica dello
Spinoza
il
Vico
avesse
avuto incentive alla
sua
della formazione
e dello
spirito
dei
poemi
omerici,
e
che,
passato
per
tal modo dalla storia sacra alla
profana,
da Mose a
Omero,
si
fosse
poi
ostinato
a
non
ripassare
a niun
patto
da Omero a
Mose,
dalla
storia
profana
alla
sacra.
La
Filosofia
di
G.
B.
Vico
(Bari,
1965),
182.
On this
latter
point,
cf.
Section III
below.
49
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50
JAMES
C.
MORRISON
Our discussion
is divided
into
five sections.
In Section
I
we
make
some
introductory
remarks
about the
general
thematic
and
aims
of
both
works;
in
Section
II we discuss
the
critique
of
divine
providence;
in
Sec-
tion
III
we
turn to
the
general
critique
of revealed
religion
and
Scrip-
ture;
in Section
IV
we
deal with
politics
and
natural
law;
and in
Section
V
we
draw
some
of
the
ultimate
implications
of
Vico's and
Spinoza's
methods,
arguments,
and
doctrines.
1. The
Theological-Political
Treatise
has
a
philosophical,
theological,
and
political
purpose.
These are
intimately
connected.
Spinoza says
in
his
Preface
that
philosophical
readers
will find mere
commonplaces
(TPT 11; Op. 12). This means that the work is written not for actual
philosophers
but for
potential
ones.
The latter
are
those
who could
or
would become
philosophers
were
they
not
inhibited
by
the Christian
and
Jewish
claims to
possess
a
suprarational
truth which has
been revealed
by
God. The
belief in
such a revelation
inevitably
leads
to
a
tension be-
tween
reason
and
faith.3 This
tension
expresses
itself
either as
skepticism,
the subordination
of
reason
to
faith
and
revelation,
or
dogmatism,
the
subordination
of faith and
revelation
to reason. The
Theological-Political
Treatise,
then,
is a
philosophical
critique
of revelationaddressed o Chris-
tian
or
Jewish
skeptics
or
dogmatists
in order
to convert
a few
of
them
to
philosophy
and the use
of reason.
But the
free use
of
reason
is inhib-
ited
not
only by
faith in
revelation
but
also
by
political
and
ecclesiastical
authority.
Spinoza
tries
to remove this
other obstacle
to
philosophy
by
arguing
that
everyone
ought
to
have the
freedom
to think
what he
likes
and
say
what
he thinks
(TPT
6,
11,265;
Op.
7,12,246-7).4
He
thus
addresses
himself
to
present
and future
rulers
in order to
persuade
them
to
permit
freedom
of
conscience
and
expression.
His
argument
is that
such
freedom
is
necessary
both
for
piety
and
public peace
(TPT
6;
Op. 7).
In
other
words,
the
Theological-Political
Treatise
seeks
to
free
actual
and
potential
philosophers
from
persecution
by promoting
the
establishment
of
a liberal
democratic
state. But the
political
and
legal
free-
dom
to
think,
speak,
and
write
is
ultimately
worthless unless
reason
itself
is freed
from
the
limitations
imposed by
belief
in
revelation. The
freedom
to think without fear of political and
ecclesiastical
persecution
therefore
requires
for its
full realization
complete
confidence
in the natural
ight,
i.e.,
one's
capacity
to
know
the
truth
by
one's own reason.5
For
when
the
philosopher's
own
capacity
to know
is doubted
his
will to
know
is
paralyzed.
The
resolute
commitment
to
a task
presupposes
complete
con-
3
In
his
discussion
of miracles
or that
which cannot
be
explained
through
natural
causes,
Spinoza
says
that he
recognizes
no
distinction
between
a truth
supra
naturam
and
contra
naturam
(TPT
85,87;
Op.
85,86).
Since
the
spheres
of nature and reason are coextensive, a truth above reason would also be a truth
against
reason.
.
..
For whatever
is
against
nature
is
against
reason,
and
what
is
against
reason
is
absurd
and so
must be
rejected
(TPT
92;
Op. 91).
4
Cf.
the
subtitle
to the
Treatise.
5
Cf.
Spinoza's
critique
of the
belief that
the human
understanding
is
naturally
corrupt
(TPT
7-8;
Op.
10).
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VICO AND
SPINOZA
51
fidence
in one's
ability
to
complete
the task. The
philosophical quest
for
wisdom
would be
annulled
in
advance
it
one
did
not have
complete
con-
fidence
in
one's
ability
to
become
wise.
The
possibility
of revelation or a
suprarational
truth leaves
open
the
possibility
of a contrarationaltruth
and
hence casts
into doubt the
certainty
of reason's
clear
and distinct
ideas.
The
deceiving
demon
of
revelation must
therefore be exorcized
by
reason and
philosophy
themselves,
which must demonstrate
their
autonomy
and
power by
demonstrating
the
limitations and deficiencies
of revealed
religion.
In
short,
the
ultimate
aim
of
the
Theological-Political
Treatise
is to refute
the revealed
religion
of
Christianity
and
Judaism
and
replace
it
by philosophical
wisdom.
Whereas
Spinoza's
Theological-Political
Treatise is a
propaedeutic
to
philosophy
dealing primarily
with
theological
and
political
questions,
Vico's
New
Science
is
a
philosophical
work
dealing primarily
with
philo-
sophical
and
historical
questions
and
only
secondarily
with
theological
and
political
ones.
Although
Spinoza's
work
is
primarily
theoretical,
it
has an
important practical
purpose.
Vico's
New
Science
is also
primarily
theoretical
but
seems to
have little
direct
practical bearing.6
Its main
aim
is not to free potential philosophers from a pre-philosophicalservitude
to
faith
and
revelation
but to
lay
the
basis
of
a new
philosophy.
Vico's
whole
problematic
rests
on
a
fundamental
distinction
between the
world
of
nations
(history)
and
the
world of
nature.
This distinction
is
linked
with
the
epistemological
principle
that the
knower can know
only
what
he
has
made and
the
metaphysical-theological
principle
that
nature can-
not
be
the
subject
of
human
science
(NS
331).7
Vico nowhere tries
to
bridge
the
dichotomy
between
nature and
history
or
to reconcile them
in a higher unity. For him there is no all-embracingsingle whole but
two
mutually
exclusive
parts.8
The
specific subject-matter
of Vico's
new
science
is the common nature
of nations
or
the
origins
of
institutions,
6
Only
in
##1405-11
(not
included
in
the
published
versions
of
the
Scienza
nuova)
does
Vico
explicitly
raise
the
question
of the
practice
(prattica)
of his
work.
There
he
briefly
alludes
to
possible political
implications
and
applications
of the
theory
of
the
New
Science for the
wise men
and
princes
of
the
com-
monwealths
who desire
to
recall
the
peoples
to their
acme
or
perfect
state
(#1406). These sections have recently been translated and published in Giam-
battista
Vico's Science
of Humanity,
ed. G.
Tagliacozzo
&
N.
Verene
(Baltimore,
1976),
451-54.
7
It also follows
that
man can
have
no
knowledge
of God.
Nor can man
know
that
nature has
been
created
by
God.
From the
point
of view of Vico's
science,
the belief
in God
and
His creation
is a
mere
postulate.
Men
can
know the divine
only
insofar
as
it
is
a
human creation.
Vico's
point
is that
human
knowledge
is limited
to the
human.
It
ends
where
the realm of
history
ends and that
of
nature
begins.
8
By contrast, Spinoza's thought is essentially a doctrine about an all-embracing
whole.
Everything
that
is,
is either nature
or
an
aspect
or
part
of nature
(the
substance,
its
attributes and
modes).
Human
things
are
merely
finite
parts
of
an
infinite
whole.
Humans
and
their creations
are thus
wholly
natural.
They
do
not
constitute
an
independent
realm
in
opposition
to nature
but are themselves
ultimately
manifestations
of
the
power
of
nature.
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52
JAMES C.
MORRISON
religious
and
secular,
among
the
gentile
nations (NS
31).
Its
aim is
to
study
these in
the
light
of
divine
providence
(NS
31,342).
On
one
level
this means
showing
how
God
or
the
divine
will
operates
(NS
182).
On
another
level it
means
showing
the
way
providence naturally
guides
the
process
by
which
man becomes
human
or the
families and
civil
society
develop
from the natural
state
of
bestial
wandering
(NS
146,310,338).
On
yet
another level
it
means
showing
that
the
world
of
civil
society
has
certainly
been made
by
men
(NS
331).
Vico's
argument
moves
vertically
from
the
divine
to
the natural to
the human.
The
chief
accomplishment
of
the
New Science
is therefore
the
secular-
ization of human history. The old Judaeo-Christiantheocentric under-
standing
of
human
things
as
guided
providentially
by
a
divine
mind
is
replaced by
a new
anthropocentric
doctrine
according
to which
men
themselves
have made
the world
of nations.
Tacitly recalling
the
Car-
tesian
assumption
that all traditional
opinions
might
be
false,
Vico
speaks
of
the
night
of
thick
darkness
enveloping
the
earliest
antiquity.
All
historical
knowledge
is obscure and
hence doubtful.
But
in
the
midst
of
this
darkness Vico
discovers
the eternal
and never
failing
light
of
a
truth beyond all question: that the world of civil society has certainly
been
made
by
men
. . .
(NS 331).
The truth
that the
human
world
has been made
by
men recalls
the Cartesian
certainty
of
the
cogito.
But
Vico
replaces
the
Cartesian
Archimedian
point
of
self-conscious-
ness
by
human
self-making:
the
identity
of
thinker and
thought
becomes
the
identity
of
maker
and
made.
He
thereby
completes
the
Copernican
revolution
in
astronomy
and
the
Cartesian
revolution
in
metaphysics
with
a new revolution
in
history.
Human
things
will be understood
by
Vico solely in human terms: men have not been made by God or nature
but
by
themselves.
Human
self-making
will
in
turn
provide
the
basis for
the
accomplishment
of
the ultimate
aim of the
New
Science,
namely,
to
unite
history
( philology )
and
philosophy.
II.
If the
history
of
human
things
is
to
be
understood
anthropologic-
ally,
the
theological
conception
of divine
providence
must be
demytholo-
gized :
it must
be shown
to be
a
metaphor
enclosing
and
concealing
human truths. In Vico's own
terminology,
it must be translatedfrom an
imaginative
genus
into an
intelligible genus.
This
is in
fact
what
Vico
does. He
presents
a
non-theological
and
non-traditional
account of the
corso of the nations
under the
veil
of
a
theological
and traditional
account
of
divine
providence.
But
at
the
same
time he
provides
the
hermeneutical
rules
for
stripping
away
this
poetic-theological
surface and
disclosing
its
historical-human
nucleus.
For
the
New
Science,
which
overtly presents
the
method
of
interpreting
the divine
poems
of the
theological
poets,
also
covertly
presents
the
method
for
interpreting
its
own divine
poem
of
history
as
the
unfolding
of
providence.
Just
as
all
myths
are
essentially
civil
histories,
so
the
mythical guise
of
Vico's
providence
masks the
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VICO AND SPINOZA 53
historical-philosophical
truths
which make
up
the real
content of the
New
Science.9
According
to
the
surface
argument
of
the
New
Science,
the
idea
of
providence
is
linked
to
the
division between
gentiles and
Jews,
for
God
aids
the
former
naturallyby
divine
providence
and
the latter
super-
naturally
by
divine
grace
(NS 136;
cf.
310,
313).
This
division,
Vico
says,
was
made
by
the
Jews
themselves
(NS
313).
It
is
thus not
a
philo-
sophical
division
but a
traditional
opinion.
Consistent with his
purpose
of
replacing
old
opinions
by
new
knowledge,
Vico
persistently
ignores
the
division between the
history
of
the
gentiles
and that of
the
Jews,
eventuallycollapsingthe distinctionbetween them and replacingthe theo-
logical
ideas
of
providence
and
grace
by
the
philosophical
idea
of the
ideal
eternal
history
which
holds
universally
for
all nations
(cf.
NS
245,
250,349,393).
Vico's distinction between
the
ordinary
help
from
provi-
dence
for
the
gentiles
and
the
extraordinary
help
from the
true God
for
the
Jews
(NS
313)
is
strikingly
reminiscent of
Spinoza's
distinction
between
the internal
aid
of God
and
the external aid
of God. 10
The
former is whatever human nature
by
its
own
power
alone
can
do
for
preservingits existence, while the latter is whateveraccrues to man's
use
by
the
power
of
external
causes
(TPT
45;
Op. 46).
Both
of
these
reduce to
the
fixed
and
unchangeable
order
of
nature or the
chain of
natural
things
(TPT
44,
cf.
82,89;
Op.
45-6;
82,89).
So
for
Vico,
the
help
of
divine
providence
reduces to
the
unchanging
order
of the corso
of
the
nations.
Both
Spinoza
and
Vico therefore secularize the
divine.
Spinoza
does
so
by
naturalizing
providence
and
identifying
it
with the
course
of
nature,
Vico
by
historicizing
providence
and
identifying
it
with
the course of history.
According
to
orthodox
belief,
a
primary
manifestation
of
divine
providence
in
the
Old Testament
is
God's
covenant with
the
Hebrews.
For
Spinoza,
however,
the
election
and vocation
of
the Hebrews
has
only
a
political
meaning.
It
has to do
with the
temporal happiness
and
advantages
of
sovereignty
TPT 47;
cf.
48;
Op.
48;
cf.
49).
Apart
from
that,
God
is
equally
kind,
merciful,
etc.
to
all
(TPT
49;
Op.
50).
Solomon,
who
speaks
more
rationally
of
God
than
anyone
in the Old
Testament,
taught
that all the
goods
of fortune to mortals were vain
(TPT
39;
Op.
41).11
The
difference
between
Jews
and
gentiles
is
not
based
on the
fact that the Jews
alone had
the
gift
of
prophecy,
for
all
9
This
is
the
real
meaning
of Vico's
phrase,
rational civil
theology
of
divine
providence
(NS
342).
Vico's
reasoning
shows
that
the
theology
of divine
provi-
dence
is
really
a
civil
history
(cf.
NS
352).
10
Vaughan
has
pointed
this
out but not
developed
it;
cf.
op.
cit.,
349-50.
11Cf. Spinoza's account in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione of his
decision
to
dedicate himself to
philosophy
after
experience
taught
me that all
things
which are
usually
found
in common life
are vain
and futile.
Spinoza
Opera,
op. cit.,
II,
5.
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54
JAMES
C.
MORRISON
nations
possessed
prophets.
The
gentile augurs
were true
prophets
and
the Jews themselves were
often deceived
by
false
prophets
(TPT
49-
52; Op. 50-3).12 Vico,
when
discussing
the three
kinds of
reason,
calls
the
first
kind divine
and defines
it as
a
form of
external
speech
to
the
gentiles
through
he
auspices,
the
oracles,
and
other
corporeal
signs,
and
through
the
prophets
and
through
Jesus Christ to
the
Apostles
(NS
948).13
Spinoza
asserts
that
the
prophets always
had some
sign by
which
they
became certain
of
the
things they
were
imagining prophetic-
ally,
that
the
prophets'
revelations
were
always accompanied by
words
and
figures,
and that
only
Moses heard a true voice.
But
God
re-
vealed Himself to Christ's mind immediately, for Christ was not so
much
a
prophet
as the mouth
of
God
(TPT
25,28,64;
Op. 28,30,64).14
According
to
Vico,
the
ignorant
and
vulgar
refer
the
causes of
the
things they
do
not know to the
will of
God without
considering
the means
by
which the divine will
operates
(NS
182).
A
little earlier
he
suggests
that
this
means
s a
confused
idea of
divinity
(NS
178).
Because
of
this
ignorance
of
natural
causes,
the
human
mind
makes
itself the
rule
of
the
universe,
so
that men
ascribe
to the
gods
what
they
them-
selves do (NS 180; cf. 375). Where Spinoza asserts that misconcep-
tions
about
God arise
from
the
view that all
things
in nature act as
men themselves
act,
namely,
with
an
end, 1'
Vico
says
that
because
of
the indefinite nature
of the
human
mind,
wherever
it
is lost
in
ignorance
man makes
himself the measure
of
all
things
(NS
120).
Spinoza speaks
of
men
imagining
miracles,
believing
themselves to
be God's
favorites,
and the
final
cause
for
which God
created and
continually
directs all
things
(TPT
82;
Op. 82).
The
law
and word
of
God
is
used
meta-
phorically for the order and fate of nature (TPT 169; Op. 162). The
idea
of
God
as
legislator
or
prince
is
used
by
Paul
only
as
a concession
to
the weakness
of
the
understanding
of
the
vulgar
(TPT 65; Op.
65).
Such
usage
illustrates
the
method which
depicts
all
things poetically
and
refers
them to
God
(TPT 92;
Op.
91).
In
the same
way,
Vico
speaks
12
Cf.
Spinoza's
reference to
those
who
dream that
nature had
formerly
created
different
kinds of men
(TPT
45-6;
Op. 47).
.
..
All
men,
Jews
as
well as
Gentiles,
have
always
been the
same,
and in
every
age
virtue has been
very
rare
(TPT
166:
Op.
160).
13
As
far as
we can
determine,
Vico refers
explicitly
to
Christ
in
only
two other
places
in
the
New Science.
One
reference
is
to
a
Jesuit who claimed to
have
read
(Chinese?)
books
written
before
the
coming
of
Christ
(NS
50).
In the
other
reference,
Vico
says
that
during
the returned
barbarian times
paintings
of
God, Christ,
and
Mary depicted
them as
exceedingly
large
(NS
816).
14
Cf.
Spinoza's interpretation
of
Exodus VII:
1,
where he
says
that
Aaron,
in
communicating
Moses'
words
to
Pharoah,
acted the
part
of a
prophet,
and
Moses
himself was like a God to Pharoah, or one who plays the part of God (TPT
13;
Op.
15).
15
In
the
Ethics,
Spinoza
calls the will of God the
sanctuary
of
ignorance.
Everyone judges
of
things
according
to the state of his
brain,
or rather mistakes
for
things
the
forms of
his
imagination.
Ethics,
Part
1,
Appendix.
Cf.
TPT
86;
Op.
86.
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VICO
AND
SPINOZA
55
of that
religious
way
of
thinking
according
to
which it was the
gods
who did whatever men
themselves
were
doing
(NS 629;
cf.
922).
III. The
Theological-Political
Treatise is a
critique
of both
religion
and
Scripture,
for
Scripture
is the
record of God's
revelations to
man.
Revelation is
the essential
element
common to Judaism and
Christianity.
The conclusion of
Spinoza's critique
of
Biblical revelation is
that
Scrip-
ture contains no
speculative
philosophical
truths about God
but
only
vulgar
moral
precepts
(TPT
8,190-5;
Op.
9,180-5).
Scripture
does
not
teach
or
claim
to
teach
theoretical
knowledge
but
only practical
obedi-
ence:
it
has
nothing
in
common with
philosophy
(TPT
9;
Op. 10).
Scripture
demands
only
justice
and
charity
in
practice.
Whereas
Spinoza
launches
his
attack
against
Biblical
authority
di-
rectly,
Vico
proceeds
under
the
mask
of
the
pagan
poet
Homer. Homer
is
Vico's
pseudonym
for Moses. '
The first
and
greatest
of
the
pagan
poets corresponds
to
the first
and
greatest
of
the
Hebrew
prophets.
The
question
of
the historical
existence
of Homer
is
the
question
of the his-
torical
existence of
Moses.
The
question
of whether Homer wrote the
Iliad and Odysseyis the question of whetherMoses wrote the Pentateuch.
The
questions
whether Homer was
wise
and whether
his
poems
contain
esoteric
or
philosophical
wisdom are whether
Moses knew
God
better
than
all
other
prophets
and
whether the Pentateuch
contains
true
knowl-
edge
of
the
nature
of
God
(cf.
NS
780).
And
just
as the Homeric
poems
are
two
great
treasure
houses
of
the customs
of
early
Greece
(NS
904),
so
the Old
Testament
should be read as a
treasure house of
the
history
of
the Jews:
their
customs,
institutions,
beliefs,
laws,
etc.
In
short,
the
methodwhich Vico uses to discoverthe true Homer is the same method
to
be used
to
discover the
true
Moses.
The
aim
of
Book
III of
the
New
Science,
Discovery
of the
True
Homer, is,
in
common
with the aim
of
Spinoza's
Theological-Political
Treatise,
to
undermine the
authority
of
Scripture.17
That
explains why
16
Vico
also sometimes uses Homer as a
pseudonym
for all
the
authors
of
Scripture.
From this
point
of
view,
the Iliad
corresponds
to the
Old
Testament
and the
Odyssey
to the New
Testament.
For
example,
he
emphasizes
that the
Odyssey
was
composed
later than
the Iliad
because
it
contains
references to
more
advanced and
refined
customs.
For while in
the latter
violent
passions
pre-
dominate,
in the former there
is
evidence
of
an
increased level of reason. The
hero
of
the
Iliad,
Achilles,
is
the hero
of
violence,
while the hero of
the
Odyssey,
Ulysses,
is
the
hero
of
wisdom
(NS 879).
Similarly,
Spinoza
views
the
Old
Testament
as more
primitive
than
the
New
Testament
because
in
the
latter
apostles
or teachers
of
morality
replace
prophets
or
interpreters
of
God.
Whereas
the
apostles
wrote their
epistles
solely by
the natural
light,
the
prophets
prophesied
by
their vivid
imaginations
(TPT
24-25,161;
Op.
27-28,155).
Paul and
the other
apostles philosophized, but the Jews always despised philosophy (TPT 164;
Op.
158).
17
According
to
Nicolini,
Vico
adopts
in Book III
precisamente
il metodo
instaurato
dal filosofo
d'Amsterdam
e dal mentovato
Simon,
e
perfezionato
dalla
critica
moderna,
nello
sconvolgere
analogamente
la
tradizionale
storia esterna
o
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56
JAMES
C.
MORRISON
Vico
made
it
the central
book. What
initially
appears
as
a
digression-a
discussion
of
the existence and characteristicsof an historical
person-is
in
reality
the center:
a
critique
of
the truth
of
Holy Scripture.
While
the
conclusion of
the
Theological-Political
Treatise
is
that
Scripture
contains
no
philosophical
theoretical
knowledge
but
only vulgar
practical
precepts,
the conclusion
of
Vico's
critique
of the Homeric
poems
is
that
they
con-
tain
no
philosophical
wisdom
but
only
vulgar
opinion
about the
history
and
customs of the Greek
peoples.
The real
content of the
Homeric
poems
is
not
philosophical
but
historical:
they
give
us not
philosophical
truths
but
philological
certainties. .
.
.
The
meanings
of esoteric
wisdom
were intruded into the Homeric fables by the philosophers who came
later
(NS
834).'8
The
Homeric
poems
are an
expression
of the
history
of
the
natural law
of the
gentes
(NS
904).
Vico
argues
that
the
(false)
belief that Homer
was
a
real
historical
individual and the actual author
of
the
works
traditionally
attributed to
him
has
obscured
this
fact
from
historians. This
suggests
that
the
(false)
belief that Moses was
a
real his-
torical
individual and the
actual author
of
the
Pentateuch
has
prevented
historians
from
realizing
that the
Old
Testament
is
an
expression
of the
natural law of the Hebrews. Vico argues that Homer was not an his-
torical
individual but an
imaginative
genus:
Homer
is
a class term
denoting
an indefinite number of historical
individuals.l'
As
the literal
meaning
of
the
name Homer
mplies,
Homer
was
a binder
or
compiler
of fables
(NS 852), '
an
idea
or
a
heroic
character of
Grecian
men
(NS
873),
the
Greek
peoples
were
themselves
Homer
(S 875).
Moses,
viewed as
the
great law-giver
of
the
Hebrew
people,
is
analogous
to
Solon,
the
great
law-giver
of
the
Athenians. Solon too
was
not an
in-
dividualperson but the Athenian plebeians themselves. Moses is to the
strutturale del Vecchio Testamento.
La
Religiosita
di
Giambattista
Vico
(Bari,
1949),
147.
Vaughan
too
maintains that
Vico uses Homer as a screen for
his
critique
of the Bible.
Op.
cit.,
353.
18
Cf.
Spinoza's
criticism
of Maimonides' method of
interpreting Scripture,
according
to which
reason is used
as a standard for
deciding
what a
given
text
means and the prophets were considered supreme philosophers and theologians.
Thus,
if the literal
meaning
of
a
text
is
unreasonable
or
false,
it must be
interpreted
metaphorically.
For
Spinoza,
this
amounts
to
a
distortion
of
Scripture
(TPT
115-17;
Op.
113-15).
Cf.
Section V
below.
19
Nicolini recalls how
Finetti
(an
early
vociferous
critic
of
Vico's
heterodoxy)
noted
that,
once Homer
is
reduced
to
a
carattere
poetico,
non v'e alcuna
ragione
valida
per
non adotterla
anche
nei
riguardi
della
personalita
storica
dell'autore dei
Salmi.
Op.
cit.,
148-49.
20
Vico
derives
homeros
from
homou
(together)
and
erein
(to link)
(NS
852).
Cf. Martin Buber's
surprisingly
Vichian
analysis
of the
name Moses
as
meaning
he who
draws
forth,
which
signifies
Moses as
the
one
who drew
Israel forth
from
the flood. Buber
calls the Mosaic books
an
historical
saga
or
mythisa-
tion of
history,
i.e.,
the
report by
ardent enthusiasts
of that which
has befallen
them.
Moses
(New
York,
1958),
17,36.
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VICO
AND SPINOZA
57
Hebrews
as
Solon
is
to the
Greeks,
Romulus
to
the
Romans,
Thrice-great
Hermes
to
the
Egyptians
(NS 414-6).21
Although Spinoza,
unlike
Vico,
accepts
the
historical
reality
of
Moses,22
he
too
denies
that
Moses
actually
wrote the
Pentateuch.
Just
as
Vico's
Homer is reduced to a
compiler
of
fables,
so
Spinoza
replaces
Moses
by
the editor
Aben
Ezra.
For
Spinoza
the
Pentateuch,
like
Vico's
Homeric
poems,
is
a
complex
collection of written and oral tradi-
tions
extending
over
many
years
and
issuing
from
many
hands and
mouths
(TPT
128-30;
Op.
125-7).
Just
as
Vico's Homer lived
many
years
after
the
events
his
poems
describe
(cf.
NS
804,806),
so
Spinoza's
Mosaic books were written and edited long after the Mosaic period. Ac-
cording
to
Vico's
Chronological
Table,23
he revelation to Moses
at
Sinai
occurred
in
the
year
of the
world
2491.
(Given
that the traditional
year
of
creation was
4004
B.C.,
this
means 1513
B.C.)
The
same table
says
that in
the
year
3290
(=
714
B.C.)
vulgar
letters
[alphabetical
writing]
had
not
yet
been invented.
This
implies
that the
Pentateuch,
at least in its
present
form,
could not have been written
by
Moses.24
Since
alphabetical
writing
is,
according
to
Vico,
always preceded
by
heroic
and
divine writing (or hieroglyphs ), Moses must have been a number
of
theological
poets
who
wrote
fables about the
gods
in a
divine
mental
language
and
imagined
that
all
things
were done
by
the
gods
(NS
933-5;
922,929).
If
we
take this
conclusion and
relate
it
to Vico's
description
of
the
synchronous
structure
of the course the
nations
run outlined
in
Book IV
(cf.
NS
915ff.),
we
may
draw the
following
inferences
about
his
view
of
Hebrew
history during
the
Mosaic
period.
The nature
of
the Hebrews was
poetic
or
creative
(NS 916);
their
customs
were
21Vico remarks that
Homer
was called the founder
of Greek
polity
or
civility (NS
897).
22
In
many respects, Spinoza's interpretation
of
Moses
is
strikingly
similar
to
Machiavelli's
description
of
the
virtuous
prince.
Moses
is
the
great
law-giver,
the
founder
of
the
Hebrew
people,
nation,
and
religion.
For Moses
surpassed
the
others
in
divine
virtue ;
by
his virtue he established
divine
rights
and
prescribed
them
to the
people ;
because of
his
virtue
and at the divine command
he intro-
duced
a
religion
into
the
commonwealth
(TPT
75;
cf.
74,39;
Op.
75; cf. 74,41).
Cf. for example Machiavelli's discussion in Chapter VI of 11 Principe of the
virtu
and
deeds
of the four
great
princes,
Romulus,
Theseus,
Cyrus,
and
Moses.
23
Cf.
the
insert at the
beginning
of Book
I
of
the
New
Science.
24
Nicolini calculates
that
according
to Vico
alphabetical writing
succeeded
hiero-
glyphic
writing
no later than the
7th or 6th centuries B.C. He thus draws
the obvious
conclusion that Vico
believed
that Moses
had
not written the
Pentateuch,
Joshua
the
Book
of
Joshua,
David
the
Psalms,
nor
Solomon the
works associated
with
his name.
For
the events
recorded
in
these
books
actually
occurred,
and were said
to
have oc-
curred,
before
the
development
of
alphabetical
writing.
In
short,
Nicolini infers
that
Vico's chronology of the history of language significava asserire che la materia
anche
di ciascuno
di
codesti libri
santi,
al
pari
di
quella
dei
poemi
omerici,
si fosse
formata
poligeneticamente;
significava,
insomma, aderire,
implicamente
se non
esplicamente,
alle
conclusioni
del Tractatus
theologicus
politicus
dello
Spinoza
e
dell'
Histoire
critique
du
Vieux Testament
del Simon.
Op.
cit.,
145-47.
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58
JAMES
C. MORRISON
tinged
with
religion
and
piety
(NS
919):
their
natural
law was di-
vine, i.e.,
made
or done
by
a
god
(NS
922);
their
government
was
theocratic
(NS
925);
their
jurisprudence
was
a
mystic
theol-
ogy
(NS 938);
the time
of
Moses was
the
religious
times
(NS
976),
etc.
(Cf.
NS
944,948,955.)
The
reader
of the
Theological-Political
Treatise will
recognize
in
the
above
the
basic
characteristics of
Spinoza's
own
view of
the
early
He-
brews.
Further
similarities
between Vico and
Spinoza
also
readily sug-
gest
themselves. Where Vico
notes
that Homer was called the
father of
all other
poets
(NS
900),
Spinoza
follows tradition
in
calling
Moses
the chief of the prophets.
And
when
Vico
says that
Homer was the
source
of
all Greek
philosophies
(NS
901),
Spinoza suggests
that
Moses'
prophecies
became
the basis
of
all
subsequent
theology
(cf.
TPT
7-8;
Op.
9).
Where
Vico
says
that one
of
the
three
chief
aims of all
great poetry,
including
Homer's,
is
to teach the
vulgar
to
act
virtuously
(NS
376),
Spinoza
says
that
Moses'
laws
aimed at
controlling
the stiff-
necked and obstinate Hebrews
(TPT
75;
Op.
75).
Spinoza
speaks
of
the
Hebrews
at the
time
of
Moses as
men
accustomed
to
the
super-
stitions of the Egyptians, crude and sunk in the most wretched slavery
(TPT
38;
Op. 40-1).
For
Vico,
the Hebrew exodus
from
Egypt
would
be
an
instance of
the rebellion of
the
plebs
against
the
patricians
or the
clients
against
the
fathers.
Moses,
like
Solon,
would
have
been
a
leader
of
the
plebs
and
their first
law-giver
(cf.
NS
416).
The
Pentateuch,
as
the
history
of
the
beginnings
of
the
Hebrew
people
and
nation,
would
be a
barbarous and
fabulous
history
of barbarous and bestial men
with
quite
wild
and
savage
natures
(cf.
NS
338,
302,
840).
When
Vico
speaks of the poverty of the Greeklanguagein early times (cf. NS 830),
we recall
Spinoza's complaints
about the
obscurities
and
inadequacies
of
the
ancient
Hebrew
language
(cf.
TPT
108ff.;
Op.
106ff.).
Finally,
many
of
Vico's remarks
about
early
Roman
history
would
be
applicable,
mutatis
mutandis,
to
early
Hebrew
history.
The
most
ob-
vious
example
is
his
lengthy
discussion of
the Roman
Law of the
Twelve
Tables. Vico's
main
concern
is
to
prove
that this law was not
imported
by
the Romans
from
Greece
but was an
indigenous
expression
of
the
naturallaw (sc. natural customs) of the Romans themselves. Similarly,
the
Mosaic
Decalogue
was not
adopted
by
the
Hebrews from
Egyptian
law,
but
was
an
indigenous expression
of
the
natural
customs
of
the
He-
brews.25The
Hebrews,
like all
peoples
in
the
divine
age,
attributed
their
laws
to the
gods.
For
Vico,
however,
this
poetic
myth
should
be cor-
rected
by replacing
God
and
Moses
by
the Hebrew
people.
The stone
tablets
on which
the
Decalogue
was inscribed
are the
poetic equivalent
of
the bronze
tablets
of
the Roman
Law
of
the
Twelve Tables.
They
were
25
In NS
44,
Vico
explicitly
raises
the
question
of
whether
Moses
brought
Hebrew
divine institutions from the
Egyptians;
and in NS
396
he
says
that
Selden
had
failed to
prove
that the Jews
taught
their natural
law to the
gentiles.
Cf. NS
794.
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VICO
AND SPINOZA
59
thus
written,
not
by
the
hand
of
God
or
Moses,
but
by
the Hebrew
peo-
ple
(if
indeed
they
ever
actually
existed).
The
Mosaic
Decalogue
was
formulated
long
after
the Mosaic
period by
several unknown
authors
in
order
to
codify
traditional Hebrew
customs,
just
as
the
Twelve Tables
were
a
later formulation
of
Roman
legal
tradition.
And
just
as the
validity
of
the
Roman law
is
delimited
by
the
geographical
confines of Rome
and
her
territories,
so
the
validity
of
the
Decalogue
is
limited
by
the
temporal
and
geographical
confines
of the Hebrew
state. It is
not a uni-
versal law valid
for
all men
at
all
times,
but a law
only
for
the Hebrews-
just
as
the
Roman
law
was
binding
only
on Roman citizens and
subjects.
This conclusion, at least in its main outlines, corresponds to Spinoza's
interpretation
of
the Mosaic law
as a national law
(TPT
17;
Op. 19)
and
Hebrew
law and
ceremony
generally
as
valid
only
for the Hebrew
state
while
it
existed and
for
the Hebrews when
they
lived within
its
borders. The Hebrew
God
was the
God
of
the
land and
the
laws
of
the Old Testament were revealed
only
to
the Hebrews
(TPT
37;
Op.
39).
In
short,
for Vico
as
for
Spinoza,
the
morality
of
the Old
Testament
is
not the true
morality simpliciter
nor
by
implication,
is
that
of
the
New
Testament. The revelation at Sinai and the Sermon on the Mount are
merely
historically
conditioned
expressions
of the
historical
lives of
par-
ticular
peoples.
They
must therefore be
replaced
by
a
new
moral teaching
and a new doctrine of
the natural
law.
Both
Vico
and
Spinoza,
although
in different
ways, attempt
to effect this
replacement
by
means
of a
new
philosophy.
IV.
The New
Science
and the
Theological-Political
Treatise both
con-
tain a doctrine of natural law. Their respective teachings differfrom one
another
and,
even more
importantly,
from
the traditional
theory
about
natural
law.
Vico
and
Spinoza try
to refute
the traditional
teaching
by
subverting
it,
that
is,
by collapsing
the
distinctions
which
served as its
basis
or
essence.26
For
example,
the traditional
view
contrasts
nature
(physis)
and
custom
(nomos).
The distinction between
the natural
and
the
customary
was the distinction
between
what
exists
independently
of
man
and
what exists as
a result of human
thought
and
activity.
Vico,
however, derives his doctrine of naturallaw (diritto naturale) not from
nature
simply
or
from human nature
(in
contrast
to
human
customs)
but from those
human customs which
are
found
historically
among
all
men: the
natural law is coeval with the
customs of
the
nations
(NS
311;
cf.
134-5).27
Thus,
the distinction between the
natural as
what
exists
everywhere
and
always
among
men,
and
the
customary
as
what
26
The
blurring
and
collapsing
of
basic distinctions
and the
tendency
to reduce
transhuman
phenomena
to the human is
typical
of classical
Sophists.
On
Spinoza's
relation to
sophistic
doctrines,
cf. Hermann
Cohen,
Jiidische
Schriften,
Vol.
III
(Berlin, 1924),
303-04.
27
Cf.
NS 309
as an
example
of how Vico
characteristically
blurs and
collapses
the distinctions
between
diritto and
legge,
costumi and
natura.
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60
JAMES
C. MORRISON
exists
only
in
some
places
and
times,
collapses.
Vico's
central notion
of
the
natural law
of
the
gentes 28-a
single
law
which
is
both a law of
nature (ius naturae) and a law of the peoples (ius gentium)-thus im-
plies
the
reduction
of
political
and moral
right
to historical
fact:
what
ought
to be
is
what
everywhere
and
always
is,
has
been,
or
will
be.
Polit-
ical
philosophy
thereby
becomes an
aspect
of the
philosophy
of
history
or
the
unity
of
philosophy
and
philology.29
Traditional
political philoso-
phy
also rested
on the
opposition
between
right
(ius)
and
power
(poten-
tia).
Spinoza,
however,
identifies
right
and
power.
Natural
right
is
simply
the
power
(conatus)
every
individual
being
has
by
nature
to act
and
per-
sist in its existence (TPT 10; cf. 200-01; Op. 11; cf. 189-90). This
means
that
political
and moral
right
are reduced
to natural
fact:
what
ought
to be is
what
every being
can
do. Political
philosophy thereby
is
derived
from the
philosophy
of nature
or
the
doctrine of
the
unity
of
substance.
Traditional
political philosophy
conceived
natural law
as
a trans-
human
standard,
knowable
by
human
reason,
prescribing
limits to hu-
man
actions.3
Vico
denies,
contrary
to
Spinoza,
that the
natural law
is
known by reason. Rather, it is known by sense, i.e., the common
sense
possessed by
all
peoples
of
what
is
useful
or
necessary
for
life.
Human needs and
utilities
are
the two
sources
of
the natural
law of
the
gentes
(NS
141,142;
cf.
145).
Spinoza
denies
that
a
natural
right
is
a
trans-human
standard
possessing
prescriptive
force in
itself;
for it
depends
on
human
decree
that
men
yield,
or be
compelled
to
yield,
the
right
which
they
have
from nature and bind themselves
to
a certain
plan
of
living
(TPT
57;
Op.
58).31
Spinoza
does
not
say
that
natural
right
is itself the product of human decree. Natural right in the sense of one's
natural
power
and desire
is
given
by
nature.
But
this natural
right
be-
comes
a
political
and
moral
right,
and hence
a
standard
for
action,
only
when men decide to
yield
it to those
who will rule
them,
i.e.,
when
in-
dividual
men
by
a
contract
(pactum)
create
a
ruler or
sovereign
(TPT
10,
cf.
202-05;
Op.
11;
cf.
191-94).32
Since men
have had
to
decree and
establish
most
firmly
to
direct all
things
.
.
.
only by
the dictate
of
rea-
son,
it
follows
that
man
is
not
by
nature
a rational
animal
but
by
com-
28
Vico's
expression
is
diritto
naturale delle
genti.
29
Vico calls the
sixth
principal
aspect
of
the
New Science
a
system
of
the
natural
law
of the
gentes,
which
is a
history
of
human
nature
or a
history
of
the
ideas,
the
customs,
and
the deeds
of mankind
(NS
394,368).
30
Cf.
Hugo
Grotius'
succinct
definition
of the
jus
naturale as a dictatum rectae
rationis.
De
Jure Belli
ac
Pacis,
I,I,X,1.
31
On
Spinoza's
tendency
to reduce
reason to
a
plan
or
project
cf.
Leo
Strauss,
Spinoza's
Critique
of
Religion
(New
York,
1965),
16.
32
The utilitarian
aspect
of
Spinoza's
political thought
and his
theory
of the
compact
are no doubt the reason
for Vico's
contemptuous
description
of
Spinoza's
commonwealth
as a
society
of hucksters
(NS
335).
For
according
to
such
a
view,
the state
is formed
by striking
a
bargain
on
the
basis
of mutual
self-
interest
and
profit.
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VICO
AND SPINOZA
61
pact
(TPT
203;
Op.
191;
my
emphasis).
A
life in
accordance
with
reason
is
not
natural
but
conventional. Human
nature
is so consti-
tuted that all indeed seek their own utility, but not from the dictate of
sound
reason
(TPT
73;
Op.
73).33
Men
do
not
by
nature
pursue
what
is
good,
but
each man
pursues
his
own
self-interest or
what he
judges
is the
greatest good
or the least evil.
Spinoza
adds
that this law is so
firmly
inscribed in human nature that
it
ought
to be
placed among
the
eternal
truths
which no one can
ignore
(TPT
203;
Op.
192).34
For
Vico,
the state is not
a
deliberatecreation
resulting
from a
com-
pact
or
yielding
of
natural
right,
but
develops naturally
from families
or society. Families are the first societies since they consist of the
fathers
and
their socii
(or
dependents).
These
form the
basis of
the
later
political
classes of civil
society,
i.e.,
the
patricians
and
plebs.
The
state
or
civil
society
emerged
not when
isolated
individuals
yielded
their
right
or
power
but
when
the fathers chose
a leader to defend themselves
against
the
rebellion
of their
dependents
who
sought
to
share the natural
rights
already
possessed
by
the
fathers
(NS
583-4;
cf.
554-5).
Civil
power emerged
from
family
authority
(NS
585).
Since
those who
made up the families wereconcerned only with the necessities of life ;
they
did
not
recognize good
faith
(NS 570).
Thus,
a
compact,
which
presupposes
mutual
trust,
was
impossible.
In
other
words,
for
Vico
neither
the
state
nor
society
can
arise from a
compact
because
compacts
presuppose
the state and
society.35
For
both Vico and
Spinoza
the
state
arises from
human
actions.
But for
Vico,
these actions
are not
a
con-
tractual
agreement
against
nature
but historical
responses
to
natural ne-
cessities.
The
decision to found a
state is
not
a decision
to live
rationally
according
to a
plan
rather than
naturally according
to desire and
pas-
sion,
but
is
a natural
response
to natural
needs
and
utilities. While
Spin-
oza
contrasts
human reason and
nature,
Vico coalesces
them;
for
Spinoza
the
state
is
an
artifice,
for Vico it
is
a
natural institution
arising
from
natural customs.
Spinoza
and
Vico also differ
concerning
the
end
or
purpose
of civil
society.
For
Spinoza,
the end
of
every society
and
government
is
that
men
may
live
with
security
and
comfort
(TPT
47;
Op.
48).36
To
achieve
this
end it
is
necessary
to free
everyone
from fear.
Living
se-
33
It
follows from this that the
philosophical
life-or
the
pursuit
of
rational
truth
and wisdom-is also not natural for
most
humans.
Philosophy
is
not
the
fulfillment
of man's inherent nature.
Cf.
Spinoza's
opening
statements in the
Preface
about men
being
naturally
superstitious
(TPT
3-5; Op.
5-7).
34
Cf. Vico's statement
that
legislation
considers
man
as he
is
in order to
turn human vices into virtues
(NS 132).
35
Vico
quotes
with
approval Pomponius:
when the institutions themselves
dictated
it,
kingdoms
were
founded''
(NS 584).
36
Cf.
Spinoza's interpretation
of God's choice
(electio)
of the
Hebrews
and
their
vocation
(vocatio)
in terms of
temporal happiness
and
advantages
(TPT
47;
Op.
48).
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62
JAMES C.
MORRISON
curely
involves
not
only
the
safety
of
the
body
but the exercise
of one's
free reason : therefore the end of a
republic
is
indeed
liberty
(TPT
258-9; Op. 240-1).
For
Vico,
the
aim of
civil
society
was first
to
render
secure
the
lives,
property,
and
rights
of the
family
fathers
against
the
armed threat
of their
dependents
and
ultimately
to make
possible
the
full
deveopment
of
reason and
thus human
nature
itself
(SS
326,554-5,918,
924,927,973,1008).
The
corso
of
the nations is
therefore
fulfilled
in
a
monarchy,
in which the
natural
equality
of all
men
is
actualized and
protected by
law
and institutions
(NS
995-8,1008).
In this
sense,
mon-
archy
for
Vico is both the most natural and the
best
form of
government
because it is consistent
with both
the natural
end
of the
historical
process
and
human
nature.
By
contrast,
Spinoza's
reduction of
right
to
power,
and
hence
natural
right
to natural
power, implies
that
democracy
is
the
most
natural
regime,
for
there
is no natural
hierarchy
of better and worse
and no
natural end of
either
history
or man.
Since
all men
are
naturally
equal,
democracy
is
most
in
harmony
with human nature
(TPT
263;
Op. 245).
And
because
sovereignty
is the
product
of
a
compact,
a
ruling
class
does not exist
because
of
its
natural
superiority
but
by
a
common
convention. Democracy is also the most natural form of government be-
cause
it
is
most
consonant with individual
liberty
(TPT
207;
Op.
195).
For
Vico,
however,
there
is
a
natural
hierarchy
not
only
in
civil
society
but
also
in
the state
of
nature.
This
hierarchy
is
ultimately
de-
termined
by
superior
virtue or
piety,
for
the founders of
the families
and
the
cities were
the
pious
ones whose
fear of the
gods
caused them to set-
tle
in
one
place.37
The fathers
were the virtuous
few,
the natural
aristoi.
In this
sense,
for
Vico
aristocracy
s
natural,
since it is rule
by
the natur-
ally virtuous few over the naturally vicious or bestial many.38But this
natural
inequality
is,
in
the
development
of
the
nations,
replaced
by
the
progressive
emergence
of reason
and
the
demand
of
the
plebs
for
an
equal
share
in
the
rights,
privileges,
and
power
of the
patricians.
This is
accompanied
by
a
weakening
of
the
plebs'
belief
that the
patricians
are
of
a
different
nature from
themselves,
i.e.,
that
they
are descended
from
the
gods.
The old
belief in natural
inequality
is
replaced by
a new
belief based on the
recognition
of
the
sameness
of
nature insofar
as all
men are rational. That is, it is replacedby the belief in a common human
nature
which,
in
its
state
of
perfection,
is
reasonable
and
intelligent
(NS 918).
The
original
natural
inequality
of
piety
is
replaced
by
the
natural
equality
of
reason:
pious
virtue and
justice
become
rational
virtue
and
justice.
37
.
.
.
The
frightful
thought
of some
divinity
..
.
imposed
form
and
measure
on the bestial
passions
of
those lost
men and thus transformed
them
into human
passions
(NS
340;
cf.
177,338,339,376ff.).
Spinoza,
however,
explicitly
denies
that
religion
exists in the natural
state,
in that no one knows from nature
whether he
owes
any
obedience
towards God.
The state
of nature is
without
religion
or law
(TPT
210;
Op.
198).
38
The earliest
kings
were chosen
by
nature,
that
is,
because
of
their
greater piety,
strength,
and
courage
(NS
584).
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VICO
AND
SPINOZA
63
Vico
presents
his rational
civil
theology
of
divine
providence
as a
refutation
of
the doctrine
of chance
of Hobbes
(despite
Hobbes's de-
terminism), Machiavelli,
and
Epicurus,
and the
doctrine
of
fate
in
Spinoza
and
Zeno
(sc.
the
Stoics)
(NS
179,1109).
In
Vico's
refutation,
he
says
he sides with
the
divine
Plato,
the
prince
of
the
political
philosophers
(NS
1109;
cf.
130).
He also
presents
his
philosophy
as
a
refutation
of
the
atheistic
doctrine of
Bayle
and
Polybius,
according
to which
human
society
and
virtue
are
possible
without
religion
and
piety
(NS
179,
1109).
Vico
refutes the
false
dictum of
Polybius
that
if
there
were
philosophers
in
the world
there
would
be no
need
for
reli-
gions (NS 179,1112). Human things cannot be understood without
the
recognition
of
the
essential
role
of
religion
and
religious
belief.
Al-
though
Vico does
not
associate
Spinoza
with
the
atheistic
enlightenment
view
of
Bayle
and
Polybius
that
science or
philosophy
could
replace
reli-
gion,
he
might easily
have done
so.
For the main
purpose
of the
Theo-
logical-Political
Treatise
is
precisely
to show
that
a
republic requires
the
freedom
of
thought
and
expression,
i.e.,
the
freedom
to
philosophize
without
restriction.
Thus a
society
of
atheists
is
not
unqualifiedly
con-
demned. However, a society of philosophersin the sense of rationalmen
living
in accordance
with
a
plan
cf reason
rather
than
the
impulsion
of
natural
desire
is
not
possible,
since it contradicts
human nature.39
For
all
men are
by
nature
superstitious
(TPT
3;
Op
5).
Only
a
very
few
can
perform
the
extremely
difficult
unnatural
feat
of
mastering
their
passions
by
means
of reason.4
Whereas
for
Spinoza
a
society
of
philosophers
is
a
natural
impossibility,
for
Vico it
is
an
historical
impossibility.
So
too
for
a
society
of
atheists.
For
society
presupposes
law and
law
presupposes
religion.
The first society, that of the families, rests on the three princi-
ples
of
religion,
marriage,
and
burial
(belief
in
immortality).
The first
laws
and
institutions
were
believed to be
of divine
origin,
for law
or
juris-
prudence
was
originally
the
science
of
Jove's
auspices
(NS
398).
And
since civil
society
presupposes
families,
it
too rests
on
piety
and
religion
(NS 179).
Finally,
philosophy
presupposes
religion
because
it
presup-
poses
civil
soci