title:
ViolentConflictandtheTransformationofSocialCapital:LessonsFromRwanda,Somalia,Cambodia,andGuatemalaConflictPreventionandPost-conflictReconstruction
author: Colletta,NatJ.;Cullen,MichelleL.publisher: WorldBank
isbn10|asin: 0821344129printisbn13: 9780821344125ebookisbn13: 9780585287881
language: English
subject
Socialconflict--Developingcountries--Casestudies,Socialcontrol--Developingcountries--Casestudies,Socialintegration--Developingcountries--Casestudies.
publicationdate: 2000
lcc: HN980.C642000ebddc: 303.6/09172/4
subject:
Socialconflict--Developingcountries--Casestudies,Socialcontrol--Developingcountries--Casestudies,Socialintegration--Developingcountries--Casestudies.
Pagei
ViolentConflictandtheTransformationofSocialCapital
LessonsfromCambodia,Rwanda,Guatemala,andSomalia
NatJ.CollettaMichelleL.Cullen
Pageii
©2000TheInternationalBankforReconstructionandDevelopment/THEWORLDBANK1818HStreet,N.W.Washington,D.C.20433
AllrightsreservedManufacturedintheUnitedStatesofAmericaFirstprintingMay2000
Thefindings,interpretations,andconclusionsexpressedinthispaperareentirelythoseoftheauthor(s)andshouldnotbeattributedinanymannertotheWorldBank,toitsaffiliatedorganizations,ortomembersofitsBoardofExecutiveDirectorsorthecountriestheyrepresent.TheWorldBankdoesnotguaranteetheaccuracyofthedataincludedinthispublicationandacceptsnoresponsibilityforanyconsequenceoftheiruse.
Thematerialinthispublicationiscopyrighted.TheWorldBankencouragesdisseminationofitsworkandwillnormallygrantpermissiontoreproduceportionsoftheworkpromptly.
Permissiontophotocopyitemsforinternalorpersonaluse,fortheinternalorpersonaluseofspecificclients,orforeducationalclassroomuseisgrantedbytheWorldBank,providedthattheappropriatefeeispaiddirectlytotheCopyrightClearanceCenter,Inc.,222RosewoodDrive,Danvers,MA01923,USA.;telephone978-750-8400,fax978-750-4470.PleasecontacttheCopyrightClearanceCenterbeforephotocopyingitems.
Forpermissiontoreprintindividualarticlesorchapters,pleasefaxarequestwithcompleteinformationtotheRepublicationDepartment,CopyrightClearanceCenter,fax978-750-4470.
AllotherqueriesonrightsandlicensesshouldbeaddressedtotheOfficeofthePublisher,WorldBank,attheaddressaboveorfaxedto
202-522-2422.
LibraryofCongressCataloging-in-PublicationDatahasbeenappliedfor.
Pageiii
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments vii
PartI.Introduction 1
1SocialCapital,SocialCohesion,andViolentConflict:BackgroundandAnalyticalConstructs
3
SocialCapital:AnEmergingConceptualFramework 6
ViolentConflictandItsInterfacewithSocialCapitalandSocialCohesion
12
PartII.TheNexusbetweenViolentConflict,SocialCapital,andSocialCohesion
17
2Cambodia:StateAbsolutism,Alienation,andSocialCapital
19
StudyMethodology 19
StructuralandCognitiveSocialCapital 22
State-SponsoredWarfareandCitizenVictimization 24
SocialCapital,SocialCohesion,andtheLegaciesofViolentConflict
26
3Rwanda:Hate,Fear,andtheDecayofSocialRelations
33
StudyMethodology 33
SocialCohesion,Trust,andViolentConflict 35
TheAnatomyofaGenocide 37
ThePerversionofSocialCapital 39
CooperationwithoutTrust 43
VerticalInfluencesandExternalFactors 49
Pageiv
4GuatemalaandSomalia:ViolentConflictandtheState
51
StudyMethodology 51
SocialResponsibility,SocialInitiative,andViolentConflict
53
Guatemala:TheStateagainstthePeople 56
Somalia:StateDisintegration,Anarchy,andResilience 58
TheImpactofStateandMarketForcesonSocialCohesioninGuatemalaandSomalia
64
5Civic,Market,andStateEngagement:AComparativeAnalysis
71
CopingwithViolentConflict:TheRoleofCivilSocietyduringWarfare
72
MarketForces,Globalization,andViolentConflict 76
StateFailureandCivilWar 78
PartIII.FromCivilWartoCivilSociety 83
6ViolentConflictandPeacebuilding
85
HowtheNatureofWarDeterminestheNatureofPeaceandReconciliation
85
TheEffectsofGlobalizationonSocialCohesion 89
7PoliciesandProgramsforStrengtheningSocialCapital
93
andSocialCohesion
Cambodia:NurturingAssociationsforEconomicGrowthandDevelopment
94
Rwanda:RebuildingFamily,Community,andStateInterrelations
98
GuatemalaandSomalia:ImprovingStateCapacityandCivilSociety
100
8HarnessingSocialCapitalandSocialCohesiontoPreventViolentConflict
107
MediatingMechanisms:Policies,Markets,andCivilSociety
108
Pagev
EnsuringHumanSecurity:ManagingConflictbyConnectingandEmpoweringPeople
112
BuildingResilientCommunities:IntegratingReliefandDevelopment
115
FromPeacebuildingtoNation-Building:DesignsforSustainablePeace,Reconciliation,andDevelopment
121
Notes 124
AnnexLearningfromtheMethodologiesEmployed:MeasuringSocialCapitalwithinaContextofViolentConflict
126
Bibliography 133
Boxes
1Indicatorsofviolentconflict:Cambodia
21
2Buddhism,Cambodianculture,andsocialcapital
27
3Indicatorsofviolentconflict:Rwanda
36
4Indicatorsofviolentconflict:GuatemalaandSomalia
55
5TheBoromaConference:abottom-upapproachtoreconciliation
62
6 73
Civilsocietyandviolentconflict
7Women'svillagebankinginGuatemala:buildingcrosscuttingtiesthroughcredit
75
8Marketpenetrationandviolentconflict
77
9Statepenetrationandviolentconflict
79
10UsingdecentralizationandparticipationtotargettheruralpoorinCambodia
97
11BuildingtrusttorebuildRwanda
101
12Institutionaldevelopmentandstrengthening:theindigenouswomen'sdefensoriainGuatemala
103
13Women,grassrootsmovements,andpeaceinitiativesinSomalia
105
14Reliefandtheperpetuationofviolentconflict
117
15Bridgingthegapbetweenhumanitarianreliefanddevelopment
120
Pagevi
Tables
1Studydefinitionsofsocialcapital
8
2Studyindicatorsofsocialcapital
9
3Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:Cambodia
31
4Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:Rwanda
46
5Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:Guatemala
65
6Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:Somalia
67
7Organizationalintegrityofthestate
81
8Intra-andextracommunityties
82
9Descriptionsofviolentconflicts:fourcasestudies
86
10Comparisonofthefieldsurveys
129
Figures
1Socialcohesion:theintegrationofhorizontalbridgingandverticallinkingsocialcapital
14
2Towardtheintegrationofreliefanddevelopment
119
Pagevii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTSThismonographisbasedonliteraturereviewsandonfieldstudiesconductedinCambodia,Rwanda,Guatemala,andSomalia.TheresearchprojectwasdesignedandmanagedbytheauthorsNatJ.Colletta,manager,PostConflictUnit(PCU),WorldBank,andMichelleL.Cullen,postconflictconsultant,PCU.
TheCambodianandRwandanstudieswerepartofalargerWorldBankSocialCapitalInitiative(SCI)fundedbytheDanishgovernment.GuidancewasprovidedbyChristiaanGrootaert,SCItaskmanager,andThierryvanBastelaer,SCIcoordinator.
TheCambodianresearchteamwasledbyVeenaKrishnamurthyundertheauspicesofCambodianSocialServices,whichalsopreparedthefinalreportforthestudy.FieldresearchersincludedHuonSathea,KoyPharin,PhoSengBan,PrakSomonea,andRosPheak.SpecialthanksareduetoLizandToshiKato,EllenMinnotti,JanuRao,KhySambo,SuonSophiny,andCherylUrashimafortheircontributions.
TheRwandanliteraturereviewwasconductedbyLindiroKabirigi,JeanRugagiNizurugero,andGérardRutazibwa.FieldresearchwascarriedoutbyCallixteKayitaba,AnectoHanyurvinfuraKayitare,ChristineKibiriti,andSpecioseMukandutiye.ElizabethAcul,AntoinetteKamanzi,ThereseNibarere,andAnnaRutagengwaovaprovidedorganizationalassistance.ToniNtagandaKayongaandMarkusKostnercontributedvaluableinputandguidancethroughoutthestudy.
TheGuatemalanandSomalistudieswereconductedbytheItaliansocialresearchorganizationCERFEandwerefundedby
Pageviii
theItaliangovernment.ThefinalreportforthosetwostudieswaspreparedbyAndreaDeclich,CERFE;Lucianod'Andrea,sociologistandscientificdirector,CERFE;andGiancarloQuaranta,sociologistandpresident,CERFE.TheirworkincorporatedtheoreticalandmethodologicalmaterialextrapolatedfromlecturesgivenbyGiancarloQuarantaandLucianod'AndreaattheSchoolofSociologyandHumanSciencesinItaly.
FieldworkinGuatemalawasconductedbyJorgeMarioMartinez,anthropologist.FieldresearchinSomaliawasundertakenbyAbdulRahmanAbdiMaalim,socialscientist.FrancescoAmbrogettihelpedoverseethetwostudiesandactedasaliaisonbetweentheBank'sPost-ConflictUnitandCERFE.
Findingsfromthefourstudieswerediscussedataseminaron"TheDepletionandRestorationofSocialCapitalinWar-TornSocieties,"fundedbytheItaliangovernmentandheldinAlmalfi,Italy,May2123,1999.MaresaBerliri,headofCERFE'sSeminarsDepartment,andChiaraGiorgioftheSeminarsDepartmentorganizedtheevent.AmongtheparticipantswhoprovidedvaluableinsightsonthefourstudieswereAbdulRahmanAbdiMaalim;AlfonsoAlfonsi,deputygeneraldirector,CERFE;AlessandraCancedda,researcher,CERFE;AndreaDeclich;Lucianod'Andrea;VolkerEichener,BochumUniversity;AnectoHanyurvinfuraKayitare;ElkeKochWeser,UniversityLaSapienza;VeenaKrishnamurthy;ThomasP.Lindemann,ruralinstitutionsofficer,FoodandAgricultureOrganization(FAO);JorgeMarioMartinez;EmmaPorio,DepartmentofSociology,AteneodeManilaUniversity;GiancarloQuaranta;MariaNoelVaeza,senioradviseronreconstruction,UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),Guatemala;andMichaelWoolcock,consultant,DevelopmentEconomicsResearchGroup(DECRG),WorldBank.
Wegratefullyacknowledgethecontributionsofthosementionedabove,andweespeciallythankOsmanS.Ahmed,PatriciaCleves,MarkusKostner,MeasNee,PeterUvin,andMichaelWoolcockfortheirinsightfulcomments.Althoughthefieldstudieswerecarriedoutbyselectresearchteamsineach
Pageix
country,thebasicstudydesignandanalysishavebeenshapedbytheauthors'experienceoverthepastseveralyearsinpromotingthesocialandeconomicreintegrationofwar-affectedpopulations.Wetakesoleresponsibilityfortheanalysis,findings,andrecommendationspresentedinthismonograph.
Finally,thisworkwouldhavebeenimpossiblewithoutthecontributionsofthemanyindividualrespondentswhowerewillingandcourageousenoughtotelltheirstoriesaboutthehumandimensionsofviolentconflictintheirsocieties.Wehopethatthismodestexploratoryendeavorprovokesfurtherresearch,policyanalysis,andprogrammaticactiontoenablewar-woundedsocietiestohealandreknitthesocialfabricnecessaryfornurturingreconciliationandachievingenduringpeaceanddevelopment.
Page1
PARTIINTRODUCTION
Page3
1SocialCapital,SocialCohesion,andViolentConflict:BackgroundandAnalyticalConstructsTheColdWar,inwhichsuperpowerssoughttomaintainaglobalbalanceofpowerwithoutresortingtonucleararms,maskedmanylocal,intrastateconflictsbyinternationalizingthem.Whatinactualitywerecivilwarsamongindigenescontendingforlocalpowerwereturnedinto''virtual"internationalconflictsfoughtbyproxy.Externallyfinancedeconomicgrowthandoutsidesupportforauthoritarianregimesconcealeddeeplyrootedinternalethnic,religious,social,andeconomiccleavages.WiththeendoftheColdWar,thisvirtualbubbleburst,leavinganunprecedentednumberofcivilwars.Ofthe108violentconflictsbetween1989and1998,92areconsideredtobeintrastate(WallensteenandSollenberg1996;Sollenberg1998).Consequently,peacekeepingandpeacebuildinghavetakenonnewprominenceastasksfortheUnitedNations.Inthefirst45yearsofitsexistence,theUNspent23percentofitsbudget,oraboutUS$3.6billion,onpeacekeeping.Inthepast10yearsthishasincreaseddramatically;77percentoftheUNbudget(roughlyUS$12.1billionperyear)hasbeenallocatedtomaintainingpeacewithinratherthanacrossnationalborders(Martin1996a).
Unlikeinterstateconflict,whichoftenmobilizesnationalunityandstrengthenssocietalcohesiveness,violentconflictwithinastateweakensitssocialfabric.Itdividesthepopulationbyundermininginterpersonalandcommunaltrust,destroyingthenormsandvaluesthatunderliecooperationandcollectiveac-
Page4
tionforthecommongood,andincreasingthelikelihoodofcommunalstrife.Thisdamagetoanation'ssocialcapitalthenorms,values,andsocialrelationsthatbondcommunitiestogether,aswellasthebridgesbetweencommunalgroups(civilsociety)
1andthestateimpedestheabilityofeithercommunalgroupsorthestatetorecoverafterhostilitiescease.Evenifotherformsofcapitalarereplenished,economicandsocialdevelopmentwillbehinderedunlesssocialcapitalstocksarerestored.
Agrowingbodyofresearchhasexaminedthephenomenonofsocialcapitalinanattempttodefinetheconceptandtheformsitmaytakeandtodescribehowitmayinfluenceandimprovethedevelopmentprocess.Effortshavealsobeenmadetodevelopindicatorsformeasuringsocialcapitalandtoarriveatrecommendationsonhowtoencourageandsupportthisdynamic.Fewstudies,however,haveactuallyanalyzedsocialcapitalandhowitinteractswithviolentconflictanimportantissue,consideringtheriseinthefrequencyofintrastateconflictandtheimportanceofsocialcapitaltosocialandeconomicgrowthanddevelopment(Olson1982;North1990;FedderkeandKlitgaard1998;Grootaert1998;Rodrik1999b;CollierandHoeffler1999).Suchanunderstandingcouldenhancetheabilitiesofinternationalactorsandpolicymakerstomoreeffectivelycarryoutpeacebuildingrelief,reconstruction,reconciliation,anddevelopment.
Inanefforttobetterunderstandtheinteractionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital,theauthors,undertheauspicesofthePost-ConflictUnit,WorldBank,undertookanexploratoryinvestigationoffourconflict-affectedcountriesCambodia,Rwanda,Guatemala,andSomaliaandtheirchangingsocialcapitaldynamics.Thedataforthismonographhavebeendrawnfromextensiveliteraturereviewsandfromeightcommunity-levelstudiesconductedinthefourcountries.
Inaquasi-experimentalstudydesign,twocommunitieswereselectedfromeachcountryonethathadexperiencedhigh-intensityconflictandonewheretheintensityofconflictwaslow.Despitethedifficultyofthetask,everyeffortwasmadetoselectmatchedpairsofcommunities,holdingconstantcommunitysize,ethnicmix,dominantmodeofsubsistence,andsocioeconomicstatus.Thefindingsareclearlylimitedbymodificationsinthemethodologyusedin
Page5
thedifferentcountriesandbytheunevenqualityofdatacollectionineachcommunity.Thesedifferenceswereinpartduetothedifferingcapacitiesofthefieldresearchteamsandthegeneraldifficultiesinundertakingresearchinwar-torncommunities,especiallyonsuchsociallyandpoliticallysensitiveissuesascommunaltrust,socialrelations,andcivicandstateperceptionsanddynamics.Anindicationoftheseverityoftheconflictsinthesecountriesisthattwo,CambodiaandRwanda,wereofficiallydeclaredcasesofgenocide(crimesagainsthumanity)bytheUnitedNations,andone(Guatemala)isconsideredbymanyobserverstohaveconstitutedagenocide.
Onthebasisoftheexploratoryinvestigation,thismonographdiscusseschangesinsocialcapitalresultingfromviolentconflict;theinteractionbetweensocialcapital,socialcohesion,andviolentconflict;andhowcivilsociety,governments,andinternationalactorscannurturethesocialcapitalneededtostrengthensocialcohesionandsopromoteconflictprevention,rehabilitation,andreconciliation.Findingsandrecommendationsfromthesefourstudiesarepreliminary,aseachcasestudywasconductedonanexploratorybasisonly.Thestudyresultsarespecifictothecountriesanalyzed,althoughsomebroadgeneralizationsmayhavewidervalidity.Furtherresearchisneededtoconfirmandsolidifytheresults.(Seetheannexforacomparativesummaryofthemethodologiesemployedandlessonsforsimilarresearchinthefuture.)
Theremainderofthischapterexaminestheconceptsofsocialcapital,socialcohesion,andviolentconflictthatunderlietheframeworksemployedinthefieldstudiesandthesubsequentanalysis.PartIIprovidesanoverviewofthecommunitystudies,includinginformationonstudybackgrounds,historicalperspectives,methodologies,andfindings.PolicyandpracticerecommendationsemergingfromthestudiesarepresentedinPartIII.Throughthisprocess,weattempttooutlinehowsocietalcohesivenesscanbestrengthenedthroughthe
accumulationofhorizontalsocialcapital(thenurturingoftrustandcivicengagementamonglikeanddiversegroups)andverticalsocialcapital(relationsbetweenthestate,market,andcivilsociety)andhowsocialcapitalcanbeacriticalmeansforcombatingsocialfragmentationandviolentconflict.Wethenposit
Page6
whatgovernmentsandinternationalactorscandotohelpwartorncountriesreturntoapathofreconciliation,reconstruction,andsustainablepeaceanddevelopment.
SocialCapital:AnEmergingConceptualFramework
Categorizingandanalyzingsocialcapitalisdifficult,fortherearemanydefinitionsofthetermandwhatitencompasses.Ingeneral,socialcapitalreferstosystemsthatleadtoorresultfromsocialandeconomicorganization,suchasworldviews,trust,reciprocity,informationalandeconomicexchange,andinformalandformalgroupsandassociations.Althoughthereismuchcontentionoverwhatinteractionsandtypesoforganizationconstitutesocialcapital,thereislittledisagreementabouttheroleofsocialcapitalinfacilitatingcollectiveaction,economicgrowth,anddevelopmentbycomplementingotherformsofcapital(Grootaert1998).
Woolcock's(1998)modelofsocialcapitalfacilitatesanalysisacrossvariouslevelsbypresentingacomprehensiveframeworkthatincorporatesfourdimensionsofsocialcapital:strongtiesbetweenfamilymembersandneighbors;weaktieswiththeoutsidecommunityandbetweencommunities;formalinstitutions(includinglawsandnorms);andstate-communityinteractions.
2Theapplicationofthismodelcanhelpenablethedirecttargetingofexternalinterventionstowardspecificdimensionsofsocialcapitaleithernurturingandutilizingexistingstocksorbuildingnewlinksthatuniteaffectedanddisparategroups.
Strongties(integration)formtheprimarybuildingblocksofsociety,unitingnuclearandextendedfamilymembersandneighbors.Theserelations,predominantlybasedonkinship,ethnicity,andreligion,arelargelyprotectionist,defensemechanismsthatformasafetynetfor
basicsurvival.(SeeGranovetter1973fortheconceptofstrongandweaktiesandGittellandVidal1998ontheconceptofbondingsocialcapital.)Weakties(linkages)aremorenetworkedandassociationalandconnectpeopletotheoutsidecommunity.Examplesarelinkswithincivicassociationsandnetworks.Thisdimensionoftenbridgesdifferencesinkinship,ethnicity,andreligion.Thesecross-cuttingrelationsareoften
Page7
affiliatedwithoffensivemeasures,suchascivicengagementandeconomicenterprise,thatgivepeoplethestrategicadvantagetheyneedtomoveahead.
Socialcapitalisalsoexpressedinmorevertical,formalinstitutionsatthemacrolevel.Thisdimensionofsocialcapital(organizationalintegrity)encompassesstateinstitutionsandtheireffectivenessandabilitytofunction,aswellasthelegalenvironmentandsocialnorms.Thelattercanincludeinfluentialandpotentialmechanismsofsocialcontrolsuchasthemedia.Thedegreeofthestate'sintegrityinfluenceswhethercivilsocietycomplements(enhances)orsubstitutesforstateservicesandfunctions.
State-communityrelationsreflecthowleadersandgovernmentinstitutionsareengagedinandinteractwiththecommunity(synergy).Whenanauthoritarianstatepenetratessociety,thereislittlespaceforhealthycivicengagementordevelopmentofnetworks.
Thedefinitionsandindicatorsusedinthefourstudiesfocusedprimarilyoninformalandlocalhorizontalrelationships,suchastrustandcross-cuttingnetworks,andtosomeextentoncertainaspectsofverticalrelationships,particularlystateandmarketpenetration,asimportantfactorsinfuelingconflictandinfluencingtheformationandtransformationofsocialcapital.TheCambodiaandRwandastudiesundertookbalancedinvestigationsofhorizontalandverticalsocialcapital.TheGuatemalaandSomaliastudiestendedtofocusmoreontheverticaldimensionsofsocialcapital.TheconceptsanddefinitionsofsocialcapitalusedasabasisforthefourcountrystudiesstemprimarilyfromtheworksofPutnam,Coleman,Fukuyama,andUphoff.
Putnam'sseminalworkonsocialcapitalelaboratesonthenatureofhorizontalrelations.Socialcapitalconsistsof"thefeaturesofsocialorganization,suchasnetworks,norms,andtrust,thatfacilitate
coordinationandcooperationformutualbenefit"(Putnam1993:36).Communitieswithpositiveeconomicdevelopmentandeffectivegovernmentsarethosesupportedby"networksofcivilengagement,"orcitizenrylinkedbysolidarity,integrity,andparticipation.Thesecivicnetworksfosternormsofreciprocitythatreinforcesentimentsoftrustwithinasocietyandimprovetheeffectivenessofcommunicationsandsocial
Page8
Table1StudydefinitionsofsocialcapitalCambodia Rwanda GuatemalaandSomaliaPutnam:"trust,norms,andnetworks"
Putnam:"trust,norms,andnetworks"
Acomplexsetoffactorsandindexeswasderivedtoenablethemeasurementofeachconcept:civilsociety,socialresponsibility,socialinitiative,andsocialcapital.
Uphoff:structuralandcognitive
Coleman:hierarchyandunequalpowerdistributionofverticalassociations;notnecessarilymutuallybeneficial
Grootaert:institutionsandtherelationships,attitudes,andvaluesthatgoverninteractions
Fukuyama:importanceoftrust,especiallyinrelationtocivicdutyandexchangeofinformation
Measuredas: Measuredas: Civilsociety,thatis,sociallyresponsibleactors,wasconsideredtheenablerofsocialcapital.Socialcapitalwasrepresentedbytwoautonomousdimensions:socialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative.
Socialcohesion,regardedasthedensityandnatureoforganizationsandnetworks(bothverticalandhorizontal)andmembers'levelsofcommitmentandresponsibilitytothesegroups
Socialcohesion,regardedasthedensityandnatureoforganizationsandnetworks(bothverticalandhorizontal)andmembers'levelsofcommitmentandresponsibilitytothesegroups
Trust,withthepropensityforcooperationandexchange(material,labor,ritualistic,andinformational)asitsproxy.
Trust,withthepropensityforcooperationandexchange(material,labor,ritualistic,andinformational)asitsproxy.
Socialresponsibilitywasviewedasaself-defensemechanismofcivilsocietythatattemptedtomitigatesocialandenvironmentalrisks(healthcrises,illiteracy,unemployment,lackofaccesstohighereducation,geographicisolation,conflicts,andsoon).Socialinitiativeencompassedeffortsaimedatgrowthandexpansionratherthanatcontrollingrisks.
Page9
Table2StudyindicatorsofsocialcapitalCambodia Rwanda GuatemalaandSomaliaStructuralsocialcapitalrepresentedby:
Proxiesforsocialcapital:
Twodimensionsmadeupsocialcapital:
Communityeventsactivitiesthatincreaselevelsofsolidarityandcollectiveactionandbuildcollectiveconsciousnessthroughsharedactionssuchasweddings,funerals,andthelike
Type,nature,andorganizationofexchange
Socialresponsibilitytheabilityofcivilsocietytomitigateriskstothepeople.Itwasassumedthatthiscapacitywashigherunderthefollowingconditions:
Informalnetworksloosestructuresunitedaroundacommonsharedpurpose
Natureandorganizationofassistance,mutualaid,andcooperation
Greaterinternaldiversificationincivilsociety
Associationsformalnetworkswithdistinctform,structure,andruleswhoseidentityandgoalsarecommonlyknown
Channelsandmechanismsforinformationalexchange
Greaternumberofactorswithineachtypeofgroup
Villageleadershipofficial(localadministration),traditional(religiousleadersorelders),orinformal(peoplewhocommandrespectonaccountoftheirwealthorcharisma)
Existenceandnatureofassociationsandreasonfortheircreation
Higherqualityofthedifferentcollectiveactors.
Linkswithexternalagenciesvillageorcommunetieswithoutsidenongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs),
Intermarriageandextendedfamilyrelations
Socialinitiativethepotentialofcivilsocietytofacilitateeconomicgrowth.Itwasassumedthatthispotentialwouldbegreaterwith:
churchgroups,andthenationalgovernment.
Intercommunityrelationsandmechanismsforconflictresolution
Greaterdiversificationandqualityoftheactorsincivilsociety
Availabilityandfunctioningofinfrastructure
Greatercertaintythatpositivelocalfactors(listedbelow)areatwork
Trust Lesscertaintythatnormativeobstacles(listedbelow)exist.
Socialprotectionandwelfare;collectiveresponsibility.
Localfactorsincludeconfidenceandtrust;materialopportunities(communicationssuchastelephoneserviceandmail;mobility,providedbyroadsandtransportationsystems;andservices,includingpersonalservices,socialandhealthservices,andfinancialservices);andcognitivecapital,orqualifiedpersonnelwithspecificskillsandknow-how.Normativeobstaclesweredefinedasformal(forexample,law),substantive,organizationalandbureaucratic,socialandcultural,andpoliticalobstacles.
Page10
organization.Trust,improvedcommunications,andtheflowofinformationenhancetheefficiencyofinstitutions(3637).Inthisway,socialcapitalis"aresourcewhosesupplyincreasesratherthandecreasesthroughuseandwhich(ascontrastedtophysicalcapital)becomesdepletedifnotused"(3738).Unlikeconventionalformsofcapital,socialcapitalisapublic,notaprivate,good.AccordingtothedefinitionsinWoolcock'smodel,Putnam'sworkmainlyreferstointegrationandlinkages.
Coleman's(1988)definitionofsocialcapitalisbroader,includingverticalassociationsthatcanbecharacterizedbyhierarchyandanunequaldistributionofpoweramongmembers.Consequently,socialcapitalcanbebeneficialtosomeanduselessorharmfultoothers,dependingonitscharacteristicsandapplication.Socialcapital"isnotasingleentitybutavarietyofdifferententitieswithtwoelementsincommon:thatallconsistofsomeaspectofsocialstructures,andthattheyfacilitatecertainactionsofactorswhetherpersonsorcorporateactorswithinthestructure....Likeotherformsofcapital,socialcapitalisproductive,makingpossibletheachievementofcertainendsthatinitsabsencewouldnotbepossible"(S98).Coleman'sworkcutsacrossvariousdimensionsofWoolcock'smodel,includingintegration,linkages,and,toasmallerextent,stateandmarketsynergywiththecommunity.
Fukuyama(1995)seestrustwithinasocietyasaprimaryfactorinitsprosperity,inherentcompetitiveness,andtendencytowarddemocracy.Trust,inhisview,isakeymeasureofsocialcapitalandisaccumulatedthroughnormsofreciprocityandsuccessfulcooperationinnetworksofcivicengagement.It"ariseswhenacommunitysharesasetofmoralvaluesinsuchawayastocreateexpectationsofregularandhonestbehavior"(153).Reciprocity,civicduty,andmoralobligationareessentialtoasuccessfulandstablesocietyandarethebehaviorsthatshouldemanatefromathrivingcivilsociety.
AccordingtoUphoff(2000),socialcapitalis"anaccumulationofvarioustypesofsocial,psychological,cognitive,institutional,andrelatedassetsthatincreasetheamountorprobabilityofmutuallybeneficialcooperativebehaviorthatisproductiveforothers,notjustone'sself"(p.216).Uphoffbreakssocialcapitaldownintostructuralandcognitivecomponents.Structural
Page11
socialcapitalreferstotherelationships,networks,andassociationsortheinstitutionalstructures,bothverticalandhorizontal,thatlinkmembers.Horizontalrelationshipsarethosethatexistamongequalsornearequals;verticalrelationshipsstemfromhierarchicalorunequalrelationsduetodifferencesinpowerorresourcebases.Cognitivesocialcapitalisthe"drivingforce"behindthesevisibleformsofsocialcapital;itincludesvalues,norms,civicresponsibility,expectedreciprocity,charity,altruism,andtrust.AlldimensionsofWoolcock'sparadigmareencompassedwithinUphoff'sdefinitionofsocialcapital.
Thus,Putnam'sandColeman'sworkemphasizesthehorizontalandverticalaspectsofsocialcapital,whileFukuyama'sworkstressestheimportancetotheformationofsocialcapitaloftrustagrosslydepletedcommodityduringwarfare.Uphoff'sworkfacilitatestheanalysisofsocialcapitalbyseparatingitscognitiveandstructuralaspects.Tofurtherdeepentheanalysisoftherelationshipbetweenconflictandsocialcapital,interactionsatthemacrolevelshouldalsobeconsidered.Thisbroadeningofthedefinitionofsocialcapitalpermitstheinclusionofgovernment,market,anddevelopmentactors,whichhaveadirectimpactonthesocialcapitalenvironmentfacingactorsatthelocallevel,andhelpsidentifymeasurestobeincludedinpolicyandoperationalrecommendations.Thesocialcapitaldimensionscloselyaffiliatedwiththemacroenvironment(notionsoforganizationalintegrityandsynergy)werebrieflyexaminedinthefourcasestudies.
North(1990)andOlson(1982)definesocialcapitaltoincludenotonlytrust,norms,andnetworksbutalsothesociopoliticalenvironmentthatshapesnormsandsocialstructures.InadditiontothelargelyinformalandoftenlocalhorizontalandhierarchicalrelationshipsintheconceptsofColemanandPutnam,thisviewencompassesmoreformalizedinstitutionalrelationshipsand
structuressuchasthegovernment,thepoliticalregime,themarket,theruleoflaw,thecourtsystem,andcivilandpoliticalliberties(Grootaert1998).
Narayan(1999)alsoemphasizestheimportanceofinclusionofthestateinsocialcapitalanalysisinherworkexaminingthedynamicsofcomplementarityandsubstitution.Narayanarguesthatthefocusmustbenotonlyoncivicengagement,ideallychar-
Page12
acterizedbyinclusive,cross-cuttingtiesthatlinkunlikeindividualsandgroups,butalsoontheeffectivenessofthestate.Astrongcivilsocietyfoundedoncross-cuttingtiesthatoperatesinaweakstateenvironmentsubstitutesforthestate'sinadequaciesandhenceisnotamodelcaseforgrowth.Ahighlevelofcivicengagement,combinedwithawell-functioningstate,complementsthestate'sabilitiesandproducesthefertilesoilnecessaryforsocialandeconomicdevelopment.
Althoughtheexactdefinitionofsocialcapitalandtheapproachestakentomeasureitvariedslightlyamongthecasestudies,theparadigmsofsocialcapitalemployedinthefourcountriesstemmedfromthekeyconceptsdescribedabove,mainlythoserelatedtointegrationandlinkages.TheapproachusedinGuatemalaandSomaliadifferedsomewhatfromthoseemployedinCambodiaandRwanda,eachofwhichalsotookaslightlydifferentapproachtowarddefiningandmeasuringsocialcapital.Table1describesthedefinitionsofsocialcapitalemployed,andTable2liststheindicatorsusedbyeachstudy.
ViolentConflictandItsInterfacewithSocialCapitalandSocialCohesion
Tobetterunderstandtheemergenceofviolentconflict,therelationshipbetweensocialcapitalandthecohesivenessofasocietyexpressedintheconstructofsocialcohesion,orthenexusofverticalandhorizontalsocialcapitalandthebalanceofbondingandbridgingsocialcapitalneedstobeexamined.AsBerkmanandKawachi(2000)note,"Socialcapitalformsasubsetofthenotionofsocialcohesion.Socialcohesionreferstotwobroaderintertwinedfeaturesofsociety:(1)theabsenceoflatentconflictwhetherintheformofincome/wealthinequality,racial/ethnictensions,disparitiesinpoliticalparticipation,orotherformsofpolarizationand(2)the
presenceofstrongsocialbondsmeasuredbylevelsoftrustandnormsofreciprocity,theabundanceofassociationsthatbridgesocialdivisions(civicsociety),andthepresenceofinstitutionsofconflictmanagement,e.g.,responsivedemocracy,anindependentjudiciary,andanindependentmedia"(175).
Page13
Socialcohesionisthekeyinterveningvariablebetweensocialcapitalandviolentconflict.Thegreaterthedegreetowhichverticallinkingandhorizontalbridgingsocialcapitalintegrate,themorelikelyitisthatthesocietywillbecohesiveandwillthuspossesstheinclusivemechanismsnecessaryformediatingormanagingconflictbeforeitturnsviolent(seeFigure1).Theweakerthesocialcohesion,theweakerwillbethereinforcingchannelsofsocialization(valueformation)andsocialcontrol(compliancemechanisms).Weaksocialcohesionincreasestheriskofsocialdisorganization,fragmentation,andexclusionandthepotentialforviolentconflict.Buildingcommunityorsocialcapacityisakeydevelopmenttaskforstrengtheningoverallsocialcohesionandtheabilitytomanageandpreventconflict(seeSen1999).
TheworkofJohanGaltung(1996)capturestheintersectionofverticalandhorizontalsocialcapitalbydescribingthestructureofviolenceasconsistingofthreebasicsocialandeconomicphenomena:exclusion,inequality,andindignity.Inmanydevelopingcountries,unequalpatternsofdevelopment,intermsofinvestmentaswellasaccesstoitsopportunitiesorfruits,havebeenamajorsourceofsocietalcleavage.Theprocessofglobalizationintegratesmarketsandvalues,thusfacilitatinggrowth,yetitisalsoasourceofincreasingexclusionandmarginalization,wideningthegapbetweenrichandpoorwithinandamongsocieties,andexacerbatingtheconditionsthatcangiverisetoviolentconflict.Theconsequentexclusionandinequalityhavebeencompoundedbythestruggleforidentityinarapidlychangingworld:traditionalvalues,roles,andinstitutionsareconstantlyunderassaultasaresultofthecommunicationsrevolutionandthepenetrationofmarketsandraisingofexpectationsineventheremotestpartsoftheglobe.Theimpactofmarketpenetrationhasbeenintensifiedbytheweakeningofthestateinthefaceofdwindlingresources,endemiccorruption,andtheriseofcivilsociety,whichcan
complementthestate'srolebutcanalsocompetewithitforlegitimacy.Asaconsequence,warsareincreasinglyfoughtovercontrolofresourcesandpowerbysocialgroupswithinstatesratherthanbystatesthemselves.
Conflictresultingfromexclusion,inequality,andindignitydoesnotinitselfnecessarilyleadtotheeruptionofwidespread
Page14
Figure1Socialcohesion:theintegrationofverticallinkingandhorizontalbridgingsocialcapital
Page15
hostilities.Thetoleranceandcopingcapacitiesofthepoorandmarginalizedarelegendandmanifold.Conflictdoesoftenengenderlarge-scaleviolenceifvariousstructuralconditionsarepresent,suchasauthoritarianruleandalackofpoliticalrights(asinRwandaandGuatemala),stateweaknessandlackofinstitutionalcapacitytomanageconflict(asinSomalia),andsocioeconomicimbalancescombinedwithinequityofopportunityandaweekcivilsociety(asseeninCambodia).Theriskofanoutbreakofviolentconflictincreaseswhentheseconditionsexistconcurrentlyorareexacerbatedbyotherproblems,suchasthemanipulationofethnicorotherdifferences(inreligion,culture,andlanguage),whichcanfurtherfragmentsocietyandintensifytheconflict(CarnegieCommissiononPreventingDeadlyConflict1997;Nathan1998;Reno1998;CollierandHoeffler1999;BerdalandMalone2000).
Socialcapitalcanbereadilypervertedtounderminesocialcohesionandfragmentsocietyforindividualandgroupgain,andthismanipulationhasthepotentialtoleadtoviolentconflict.InCambodia,theAngka(KhmerRougeleaders)employedinclusionarysocialcapitaltostrengthenthegroup'sownresolveandweakenthoseoutsidethegroup.TheRwandacaseillustratesthatpoliticalandeconomicelitesoftenuseidentitytomobilizeandpervertextantsocialcapitalasareadymeansofachievingtheirownends.TheGuatemalastudyrevealsthatgroupsandindividualssuffernumerousindignitiesatthehandsofoppressive,authoritarianregimesandagreed-drivenelitethatsetsonegroup,beitreligious,ethnic,orage-bounded,againstanotherinpursuitofassetsandpower.StrongbondingsocialcapitalwithinSomaliafortifiesclanallegiances,pittingclanagainstclanandimpedingmovestowardpeaceandreconciliation.
Withinthiscomplexmatrixoffactorsunderpinningviolentconflict,twomainfeaturesofsocialcapitalbecomeincreasinglyrelevantaspotentialkindlingforthefireofhostility.Verticalrelationsplaguedby
inequalityandanunequaldistributionofpowerandopportunity(oftenaccompaniedbyexclusionandindignity)caninstigateviolentconflict.Theabsenceofhorizontalrelationsofcross-cuttingtiesbetweenunlikegroupsina
Page16
multiculturalsocietycaneruptintohostilitiesifonegroupisseenasmonopolizingresourcesandpowertothedisadvantageoftheothers.Andif,withinthesegroups,highlevelsofbondingsocialcapitallinkonlylikemembers,differencesinaccesstoresourcesandpowermayfurtheraggravaterelationsandheightentensionsbetweenthoseincontrolandthoseexcluded.Thus,violentconflictistriggeredbythepresenceofstrongexclusionarybondsanddisempowermentcombinedwithalackofhorizontalbridgingandverticallinkingsocialcapital.
Theabovepreceptsdeepenourunderstandingoftherootcausesofconflictandillustratehowvariousformsofsocialcapital,socialcohesion,andviolentconflictinterfacewithseveralconditioningfactors,suchasinequality,indignity,exclusion,andpoorgovernance.Althoughthecommunitystudiesineachcountrytouchedonissuesrelatingtheabovefactorstoviolentconflict,theactualindicatorsusedtoassessviolentconflicttendedtocorrespondtoviolentconflictasmanifestedinsocial,economic,environmental,andpoliticalconditions.Suchindicatorsasnumberofpeoplekilled,lossofaccesstomarkets,damagetobiodiversity,anddisregardforpeaceaccordswereused(directlyorasproxies)toassessviolentconflictratherthanconflictperse,whichmayincludeintrahouseholdcontentionsorcommondisputesoverpropertyorlegalmatters.
Inalleightcommunitiesstudied,violentconflictwasviewedasbothanindependentandadependentvariable(acauseandaneffect)initsrelationshiptosocialcapital.Thatis,socialcapitalcanbeconstructiveandsupportsocialcohesionandthemitigationofconflict,butitcanalsobepervertedtohastensocialfragmentationandtheonsetofviolentconflict.
Page17
PARTIITHENEXUSBETWEENVIOLENTCONFLICT,SOCIALCAPITAL,ANDSOCIALCOHESION
Page19
2Cambodia:StateAbsolutism,Alienation,andSocialCapitalTheaimoftheCambodianstudywastoassesshow20yearsofviolentconflict,whichvariedinintensityandmode,interactedwithextantsocialcapital.Throughouteachphaseoftheconflict,thestatetargetedcommunitiesandindividuals,virtuallywagingwaragainstitsownconstituentswhileconcurrentlydestroyingthesocialfoundationsthattraditionallyserveasthegirdersforstatebuildingandcohesion.Tocompoundmatters,encroachingglobalization,hastenedbypostwarinterventionsforreconstructionandrehabilitation,hashaditsowneffectonsocialcapitalandhascontributedtotransformingtheCambodiansocialfabric.
StudyMethodology
TheCambodianstudy,conductedbySocialServicesofCambodia(SSC),includedaliteraturereviewandsixmonthsoffieldwork.Fieldresearchstaffconsistedofaninternationalresearchdirectorandfivelocalfieldstaff(threemenandtwowomen).BecauseofthepaucityofexperiencedresearchersinCambodia,fieldstaffreceivedextensivetraininginresearchmethodsandskills.Fieldresearchincorporatedinformationfromover12weeksofvillagestaysandparticipantobservation.Duringthefieldworkperiod,variousresearchtechniqueswereemployed,such
Page20
asparticipatorygroupexercises(villagemapping,resourceflowanalysis,wealthranking,andtrendsanalysis)andsemistructuredinterviewswithindividualsandgroups.Thisapproachtofieldresearchallowedgoodrelationshipstodevelopbetweenstaffandvillagers,greatlycontributingtothequantityandqualityoftheinformationobtained.
TheSSCworksinover300differentvillagesintheKompongSpeuprovinceofCambodia,andfromthesevillages12wererandomlychosenaspotentialstudysites.Comparisonsofthevillagesaccordingtovariousconflictindicatorsshowedthatallhadbeenaffectedbytheconflict.Thetwovillagesultimatelychosen,PrasathandPreyKoh,werethesamesize(populationsof651and654,respectively)buthaddifferentexperiencesofconflict.Prasath,thecontrolvillage,experienceddisplacementonlyonce,whereasPreyKohvillagersweredisplacedtwice,anditseemedthatmorepeoplehadbeenkilledtherethaninthecontrolvillage.PrasathappearedtobeaslightlypoorervillagethanPreyKoh,addinganotherdimensionofanalysis.
Inadditiontovillagestaysandparticipantobservation,twohouseholdsurveyswereimplemented,onetoestablishbaselinesocioeconomicinformationandasecondtoexploresocialcapitalissues.Thebaselinesurveyexamineddemographicdetails,landholdings,householdoccupations,andeachhouseholdmember'splaceofresidencebeforeandduringtheconflictperiod.Thesurveywasimplementedinallhouseholdsineachvillage130householdsinPrasathand114inPreyKoh.Personsunderage15makeupabout4344percentofthepopulationineachvillage;about33percentofthevillagepopulationsisbetweentheagesof15and35,andabout2324percentisover35.MostvillagersinbothPrasathandPreyKohwerebornintheirrespectivevillages.Onlyaverysmallpercentageofthepopulationofeithervillagecouldrememberdetailsoflifeduringthepreconflictperiod.
Thesurveytargetingsocialcapitalissueswasimplementedinabout30percentofallhouseholds(39randomlyselectedhouseholdsinPrasathand34inPreyKoh).Thefollowingbehavioralaspectsofsocialcapitalinthepreconflict,conflict,andpostconflictperiodswereexamined:
Page21
Problemsinimprovinglivelihoodandeconomicactivities
Sourcesofinformationonlivelihoodandeconomicactivities
Borrowingandlendingpractices
Ownershipofandlendingpracticesforlivestock,householdequipment,andtools
Laborexchange
Participationingroupsandassociations
Availabilityanduseofservices
Sourcesofassistanceduringcrises
Participationinactivitiesforthecommongood
Welfareofvulnerableindividualsandfamilies.
TheviolentconflictindicatorsusedintheCambodianstudyassessedtheimpact,intensity,anddurationoftheconflict(seeBox1).Cambodia'sexperiencewithviolentconflictwasmanifold,asevidencedbythefactthatCambodianinterviewees
Box1Indicatorsofviolentconflict:Cambodia
Effectsonthepopulation
NumberofpeoplekilledNumberofpeoplephysicallydisabledasaresultofconflictNumberofpeoplementallyaffectedTheextenttowhichviolenceisawayoflifeandisusedtosolveproblemsNumberoffamilymembersenrolledin
thearmyNumberofpeoplewholeftthevillageduringfightingChangesincompositionandsizeofthepopulation
Physicaldamage
Extenttowhichinfrastructure(includinghouses,wells,roads,trees,andtemples)wasdestroyedPhysicaltracesofwar(damagedbuildings,craters,andsoon)AreaoflandinfestedwithminesNumberoftimesvillagewasrelocatedordispersed
NatureoftheconflictDurationoffightinginthevillageTypesofgroupperpetratingtheconflict
Page22
discerneddifferentconflicteras.Theperiodofconflictasdefinedforthestudycomprisedthreeseparateeras,distinguishedbychangesinleadership:LonNol,197075;KhmerRouge,197579;andHengSamrin,197989.
StructuralandCognitiveSocialCapital
ThedefinitionofsocialcapitalusedintheCambodiastudywasbasedprimarilyontheworkofColeman,Putnam,andUphoff.Horizontalandverticalaspectsofsocialcapitalwerestudied,usingamodifiedparadigmderivedfromUphoff'swork.Thus,structuralaspectsofsocialcapitalwereemphasized,althoughinferencestounderlyingcognitivesocialcapitalwerewovenintotheanalysiswhenpossible.
Socialcapitalwasmeasuredwithinthestudycontextbyexamininglevelsoftrust,asevidencedbymeasurestosecurelivelihoodandtoengageinexchange(economic,informational,andsoon),andofsocialcohesion,asindicatedbycollectiveactionandtheprovisionofsocialservicesandwelfare.Socialcapitalwasbrokendownintovariousstructuralcomponents:
Communityevents
Informalnetworks
Associations
Villageleadership
Linkswithexternalagencies.
Aseachstructuralcomponentwasexamined,attemptsweremadetoidentifythecognitivesocialcapitalthatbuttressedthesestructuralforms.
Communityeventsareactivitiesthatincreasefeelingsofsolidarity,strengthensocialcohesion,improvecommunication,providea
learninggroundforcoordinatedactivities,promotecivic-mindednessandaltruisticbehavior,and,throughsharedexperiences,helpformasenseofcollectiveconsciousness.Weddings,funerals,andpagodaactivitiesareclassifiedascommunityevents.
Informalnetworksaremanifestedininnumerableinformalexchangesofinformationandresourceswithincommunities.Theexchangesareforthemostpartspontaneousandunregulatedandaretheoutcomeofindividualinitiativeandentrepreneur-
Page23
ship.Theyarethoughttobeshapedbyvariousfactorswithinthecommunalenvironment,predominantlymarketforces,kinship,andaffinity(naturalbondsthatexistbetweenindividualswholiveclosetogetherorhavesharedinterestsandconcerns).Rice-,water-,andplate-sharinggroupsareallexamplesofinformalnetworks.Onthepositiveside,informalnetworksrepresenteffortsatcooperation,coordination,andmutualassistanceandhelpmaximizetheutilizationofavailableresources.Theyarehighlyvaluableinprovidingindividualswithsupportmechanismsineconomicandsocialendeavors.Thesesameinformalnetworks,however,canbebasedonexploitativerelationshipsinwhichgainsareunevenlydistributed.Informalnetworkscanrunhorizontallyorvertically.
Associationsunitepeople,frequentlyfromdifferingkingroups,whoworktogetherforacommonpurposeandhaveavisibleidentity.Forthemostpart,thesegroupshaveclearlydelineatedstructures,roles,andruleswithinwhichgroupmembersoperate.Associationsnurtureeffortstowardself-help,mutualhelp,solidarity,andcooperation.Theyareregardedasthebuildingblocksofcivilsocietyandareusuallyhorizontal.Themainexampleofanassociationillustratedbythestudywasprovasdei,exchangegroupsthattradegoodsandlabor.
Villageleadershipincludesofficial,traditional,andinformalleaders.Officialleadersincludethecommunalchiefandthelocalgovernmentadministration.Traditionalleadersareusuallypeoplewhoarereveredfortheirreligiousorspiritualattributes(achars)orfortheirage,experience,andknowledge.Informalleaderswieldinfluencebecauseoftheirwealth,specialskills,orcharisma.Officialandtraditionalleadersplaykeyrolesinthepolitical,social,religious,andwelfareactivitiesofthevillagewhileshapingnetworkswithinthecommunityandbetweenthecommunityandtheoutsideworld.
Inthisstudy,verticalsocialcapitalincludestherelationsand
interactionsbetweenacommunityanditsleadersandextendstowiderrelationsbetweenthevillage,thegovernment,andthemarketplace.Thenatureandqualityofleadershipinthecommunitydeterminethelevelandqualityofdevelopmentinthevillage.Toalesserdegree,unequalexchangesinresourcesor
Page24
informationestablishpatron-clientrelationships,addinganotherverticaldimensiontovillagedynamics.
Virtuallyallexternallinkswiththevillagesareconsideredvertical.Externalcommunitylinksincluderelationswiththegovernment,nongovernmentalorganizations(NGOs),andtheprivatesectorormarketplace.
State-SponsoredWarfareandCitizenVictimization
ThirtyyearsofwarfareallbutdestroyedmostformsofsocialcapitalinCambodia,yetthethreadsofviolencepredatetherecentconflictsandarewovendeepinthecountry'spast.SincethefallofthekingdomofAngkor,politicaldisruptionandsuccessiveconflictshaveplaguedCambodia.RelativestabilitywasnotachieveduntiltheimpositionofFrenchrule,whichbeganinthe1850sandendedwiththecountry'sindependencein1954asanewconstitutionalmonarchy.ThekingdomofCambodia,ledbyPremierPrinceNorodomSihanouk,experiencedpoliticalstabilityandeconomicgrowthastheprincepushedforadvancesinhealth,education,andindustry.Towardtheendofthe1960s,however,thecountrybegantodestabilizeasaresultofeconomicdifficulties,corruption,andtheincreasingthreatofcommunism,andsupportforSihanoukdeclined(Becker1998).
Inacoupd'étatin1970,GeneralLonNoloverthrewPrinceSihanouk,whofledtoChina,wherehepubliclyformedanalliancewiththecommunistKhmerRouge.LonNolsoldiersterrorizedthecountryside,splittinganddestroyingvillageswithincombatzones.Concurrently,regionalissuescompoundedtheturbulence;theU.S.-VietnamwarspilledoverintoCambodia,andagrowingcontingentofcommunistscontinuallyclashedwithLonNolgovernmentsoldiers.DuringtheLonNolperiod,AmericanplanesrepeatedlybombedCambodianterritoryinanattempttooustVietnamesecommunists
supposedlyinthearea.Thiscampaignkilledthousandsofinnocentcitizens,destroyednumerousvillages,andrenderedmuchofthelandunusablebecauseofunexplodedordnance,chemicaldefoliation,andlandmines(Ebihara,Morland,andLedgerwood1994;Nee1995).
LonNolwassubsequentlyoustedbytheKhmerRouge,whichinApril1975formedDemocraticKampuchea.Underthe
Page25
guiseofcommunism,theAngka(''TheOrganization,"thesecretivegroupofKhmerRougeleaders),headedby"BrotherNumberOne,"PolPot,initiatedaradicalagrarianrevolution.ThisbreakwiththepastmarkedYearZero,whenmanyaspectsofCambodianlifewerefigurativelyandliterallywipedclean.Peoplewereledfromtheirhomesinthecitiesintothecountryside,wheretheyandtheirruralcounterpartswereorganizedintoworkbrigadesandmadetoprovideforcedlabor.Entirevillagesweredissolvedandrelocated;familieslosttheirhomesandpossessionsandwereoftenseparatedandassignedtodifferentcamps.PeoplewhohadlivedinthecitiesandhadbeenaffiliatedwiththeLonNolgovernmentormilitarywereclassifiedas"new"people,asweretheirfamilies.The"new"peopleweretreatedmuchmoreseverelythanthe"old"peopleruralpeasantsandthosewhohadfallenundertheKhmerRougeearlier.Fragmentationbetween"old"and"new"splitnotonlyneighboringcommunitiesbutalsovillagesand,attimes,families,breakingbothprimarybondsofkinshipandsecondarybridgesofassociation.Thepreferentialtreatmentgiventothe"old"peoplecreatedmuchresentment,althoughbothgroupsgenerallylivedunderunbearableconditionsoverworked,underfed,andterrorizedonadailybasis.Meanwhile,oppositiontotheKhmerRougewasforbidden;dissidentsweretorturedorputtodeath.ThefouryearsoftotalitarianKhmerRougeruleresultedinthegenocideofroughly2millionCambodians,whodiedfrompoliticalkillings,overwork,starvation,anddisease(Bit1991;Nee1995;vandePut1997).Anyremnantofverticalsocialcapitalbetweenthestateandcivilsocietywasshatteredinthewakeofaperverseaccumulationanduseofsocialcapitalformedbyselectcommunistintellectualsandavanguardofunemployed,uneducatedyouth,pittedagainsttheurbaneducated,professional,andbusinesssegmentsofsocietyandtheoldertraditionalpeasantry.
VietnamesetroopsovercametheKhmerRougeandformedthe
People'sRepublicofKampucheainJanuary1979.ThenewVietnamese-influencedgovernment,whichwasseenasacontinuationofexternaldominationoverCambodiansandoftheregionalgeopoliticsoftheU.S.-Vietnamwar,continuedtofighttheKhmerRougethroughoutthenextdecade,perpetuatinginstabilitythroughoutthecountry.Despitethisinsecurity,during
Page26
the10yearsofVietnameserule(theHengSamrinperiod),recoverygraduallybeganasconflictandinsecuritywaned.Progressremainedslow,however,andwasfurtherhamperedbynoncommunistgovernmentsworldwidethatwerewaryoftheVietnameseoccupiersandkeptCambodiainrelativeisolation(Chandler1992;Nee1995).
WiththeVietnamesewithdrawalin1989,thecountrywasrenamedCambodia.PrinceSihanoukreturned,after13yearsofself-imposedexile.AtransitionalgovernmentwasestablisheduntiltheParisAgreementsinOctober1991thattemporarilyformalizedthegovernmentstructure.TheUnitedNationsTransitionalAuthorityinCambodia(UNTAC)oversawthepeaceprocess,reconstruction,andrehabilitation,withmixedresults(Ebihara,Morland,andLedgerwood1994).Electionswerefinallyheldin1993,institutinganewcoalitiongovernmentheadedbyPrinceNorodomRanarridh,withHunSenascopremier.In1997anattemptedcoupdisruptedthedualgovernment,leadingtoastrengtheningofHunSen'scontrol.TheJuly1998electionsleftHunSenincommandoftherecoveringstate.
SocialCapital,SocialCohesion,andtheLegaciesofViolentConflict
DuringtheLonNolregime,traditionalsourcesofsocialcapitalwereseverelyerodedthroughoutCambodia.(SeeBox2foranexampleoftheinterrelationsofcultureandsocialcapitalintraditionalCambodiansociety.)Manyvillageswereforcedtorelocateorweresplitasaresultofwarfare,bombings,andLonNolrecruitment.Withinvillages,exchangeslowed,andsolidarityaroundthetempledissolved.Somefamiliesdidmanagetostayintactdespitemassivedislocation(Nee1995).
TheKhmerRougeusheredinanothereraoforganizedviolencethatincludedsystematicattacksontraditionalCambodiansocietyonnorms,culture,religion,organizations,networks,andeventhefamily.
Communityandfamilymemberswereencouragedtospyonandreportoneachother,destroyingtrustandplantingtheseedsofdeeplyrootedfear.Awaragainstclassdistinctionswaswaged,asattemptstoleveleconomicstatuswere
Page27
Box2Buddhism,Cambodianculture,andsocialcapital
Forthemostpart,Khmervillagelifehaslackedtraditional,indigenousgroupsandnetworksexceptthosebasedonkinshipororganizedaroundthepagoda(Ebihara,Morland,andLedgerwood1994;Cambodia1999).ThenatureofBuddhismandtraditionalCambodianculturalpracticescontributedtothedearthofintercommunitysocialcapitalandtosomeextentfacilitatedtheemergenceofthebrutalLonNolandPolPotregimes.
Buddhismstressesindividualbehaviorasthemeanstopersonalsalvationanddoesnotfosterastrongsenseofcollectivesocialresponsibility.Itdoes,however,linkCambodiansbycreatingastrongsenseofnationalidentityandbyservingasoneofthebasicinstitutionsofsociety.InmanyruralareasofCambodia,thepagoda(wat,ortemple)isaprominentfeatureofcommunityorganizationandistheonlybondingelementofsociallifeoutsidethefamily.Yetregularcontactswiththepagoda,inthepastastoday,didnotnecessarilybuildnetworksofsolidarity.SocialcapitalinCambodiahasbeenessentiallycenteredonprimarylinkswithinthenuclearandextendedfamilies.
ThestrongpresenceofthestateandtherigidityoftheCambodianpoliticalsystemhavealsoinfluencedthedevelopmentofsocialcapital.Roughly80percentofCambodiansarefarmersandliveinruralareas.AccordingtoBuddhistbeliefsandCambodiantraditions,their"lowstatus"istheresultofthemeritsoftheirpastlives.Thissituationisunlikelytochange,forthesameexplanationholdsforthepositionoftherichandpowerful.Thesebeliefsreinforcedthepoliticalstatusquoandtosomeextenthelpedjustifysocialinequalityandinjustice.Politicswasthedomainofroyalty,notfarmers.Ifrulersabusedtheirpower,theyweredestinedtosufferinthenextlifeitwasnotuptothepeopletotakecorrectiveaction.Consequently,peopletendedtofollowrulerswithoutquestion,trustedinthemwholeheartedly,andconsideredthemalmostdivine.ThisisonereasonwhymanyplacedtrustinLonNolsoonafterhetookpower,despitethemeansheusedtoachieveleadership,andwhysomanywerewillingtofollowtheKhmerRougesoldiersintothecountrysidewithoutmuchresistance(Chandler1992).
Page28
institutedbymakingeveryoneanunpaidagriculturallaborer.Bydestroyingallsocial,political,andeconomicinstitutionsinthisextremecommunisticexperiment,thebrutalKhmerRougeregimetransformedanddepletedwhatlittlesocialcapitalhadremainedfromtheLonNolperiod(Bit1991;Nee1995).
Afteradecadeofdestruction,formsofsocialcapitalgraduallybegantoreemergeduringtheHengSamrinperiod.ThisoccurreddespitetheturmoilthatcontinuedtofesteruntiltheendofVietnameserule,markedbyskirmishesbetweentheguerrillasandinvadingtroops,internalmigration,andadisruptionofagriculturethatresultedinwidespreadfamine.TheKhmerRougehadusedcollectivizationasastrategyfortransformingtheeconomyandhadbrokenupfamiliestoworkincooperatives.VietnameseeffortstorebuildCambodiaintheearly1980ssimilarlyfocusedoncollectivistcooperatives,suchasthesolidaritygroupkromSamaki,whichforbadeprivateownershipandencourageddevelopmentthroughcommunalefforts.AlthoughsomeprogressandrecoveryoccurredundertheHengSamringovernment,whenitdidend,Cambodianswelcomedthechange.
ConflictaffectedsocialcapitalinCambodiainmanyways.Someofthesewere:
Thelossofhumanlife
Thedestructionofphysicalinfrastructure,bothpublicandprivate
Thedisruptionofservices
Increasedantagonismanddistrusttowardthestate
Massivechangesintheeconomy,includingchangesinownershipofproperty
Populationdisplacement(increasedmobility)
Thebreakdownofsocialinstitutionssuchasthefamilyandreligion
Poorsecurity;breakdownoflawandorder
Extremephysicalhardshipandpsychologicaltrauma.
Postconflictformsofstructuralsocialcapitalanditscompositiondonotdiffergreatlyfromthosethatexistedbeforethewars.Inbothofthevillagesstudied,communityevents,particularlypagodaactivitiesandreligiousceremonies,mirrorpracticesoftheperiodbeforetheconflict.Norarethereprominentdifferencesinhowvillagemeetingsareheld.
Page29
Informalnetworkscontinuetobeorganizedbykinshipandaffinity,justasbeforethefightingerupted,buttheyareincreasinglybeginningtobeshapedbymarketforces.Nonfarmactivities,particularlysmallbusinessandtrade,arepromotingnewnetworksthatgobeyondthecircleofrelativesandfriends.Thesehaveincreasedtheneedformobilityandinformation,puttingpeopleintouchwiththeworldoutsidetheirvillages.Networksformallybasedontheconceptofmutualaidaregivingwaytonewnetworksbasedonrigidreciprocityandtheneedtoearncashincome,asisevidentinthedecreaseofprovasdei.Thus,informalnetworksarenotdissolvingasaresultoftheravagesofviolentconflictbutarechangingincompositioninresponsetothepowerandpermeatinginfluenceofexternalmarketforces.
Associationssponsoredbythegovernmentorinitiatedbyvillageleadersandthepagodashownovisiblechangesfromthepreconflictperiod,nordolocalassociationalinitiativessuchasricebanks,funeralassociations,andwater-users'groups.Ofthetwostudyvillages,PreyKohexhibitsmoreassociationalactivitythandoesPrasath,primarilybecauseofitshigherlevelofeconomicactivityandenergy.PreyKohsufferedmorefromconflictthandiditscounterpart,yet,despitethedeeperschismbetween"old"and"new"peopleandtheconsequentmoreprominentthreatofthebreakdownoftrustamongvillagers,associationalactivityincreased.Thissuggeststhattheconflictdidnotnecessarilydiminishthewillingnessofpeopletoworktogether.
3
Thereislittledifferencebetweenthetype,roles,andnatureofpreconflictandpresentvillageleadership(includingtraditional,informal,andofficialleaders).Ingeneral,theroleofvillageleadersinPreyKohismorevisiblethaninPrasath,primarilybecausePreyKoh
hasmoreresourcesandbetterlinkswiththeoutsideworld,givingleadersmoreresponsibilities.Prasath,withitssmallresourcebase,haspoorlinkswiththeoutsideworld,andvillageleaders,preoccupiedwithproblemswithintheirownhouseholds,arelessactive.Pagodaactivitiesaremoreorlessatthesamelevelinbothvillages,andeldersandacharsappeartobeequallyactiveinboth.
Variousfactorsseemedtosupporttherevivalofsocialcapital,including:
Page30
Resilienceaninnerstrengththatallowspeopletocontinuetocopeandtorebuildtheirlives
Astrongdrivetowardself-help
ThepowerfulroleplayedbythepagodaandBuddhisttraditionsinshapingtheidentityofpeople,andtheneedtoreestablishthisidentity
Theneedtorestorebasicvillageinfrastructurethathadbeendestroyed
Theknowledgethatthegovernmentwouldnotbeabletoprovidewhatwasneeded.
Itshouldbenotedthatsomeoftherevivalandrestorationtookplacewithintheconflictperiod(underHengSamrinrule)andhascontinuedsincetheninthevillages.
Inthepreconflictperiod,noagenciesotherthanthegovernmentoperatedinthetwovillages.Government-providedservicesandresourceswereverybasicbutmayhavebeenofbetterqualitybeforetheconflictthantheyarenow,particularlyineducationandhealth.Inbothcommunities,statepenetrationisstillweak,andthesubstitutionaleffectsofemergingcivilsocieties,particularlyintheprovisionofbasicservices,areonlybeginningtoemerge.NGOinvolvementinvillagedevelopmentandinprovidingservicesisarelativelynewphenomenonthatbeganintheHengSamrinperiod.TheconflictinCambodiahasresultedinahighlyvisibleandactiveroleforNGOs,particularlyinternationalbodies,althoughinthestudyvillagestheirrolehasbeenintermittent.Amorerecentphenomenonhasbeentheincreasinginvolvementofthebusinesscommunity,especiallyinPreyKoh.Businessesthereareclearlydrivenbytheprofitmotiveandarehighlyexploitativeoftheenvironmentandvillagers.Atpresent,thedevelopmentoflinkswithexternalagenciesinbothvillageslargelydependsoninitiativesfromoutside.
Thesurveyresultsrevealedmixedfindingsabouttherelationsbetweensocialcapitalandviolentconflict(seeTable3).Primary-grouprelationsofafamilialnatureenduredduringconflict(exceptduringKhmerRougerule),servingasadefensiveformofsocialcapitalandprovidinganindigenous,survival-orientedsafetynet.Incontrast,secondary-groupassociationslinkagestomarketpenetrationandoutward-looking,"offensive"forms
Page31
Table3Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:CambodiaHigh-conflictperiod Low-conflictperiod
Highsocialcapital
Strengthofverticalsocialcapital:ManyvillagersjoinedtheLonNolarmyinthebeliefthatitrepresentedthenextgovernment,thusproactivelyshowingallegiancetotheprobablenewrule.
CambodiansputuplittleresistanceagainsttheKhmerRougewhenbeingledintothecountryside.
BondingsocialcapitalwithintheKhmerRougeandtheAngkaallowedthosegroupstoflourishandmaintaincontrol.
Forthemostpart,conflictdidnotchangethestructureofsocialcapitalinPrasathorPreyKohbutsuppressedit.Moststructuralcomponentshaveremainedthesame:Communityeventssuchasweddings,funerals,andpagodaactivitiesInformalnetworkssuchaswater-andrice-sharinggroupsAssociations,includingexchangegroupssuchasprovasdei,whichtradegoodsandlaborVillageleadership:religious,traditional,andofficialExternallinks:governmentand,sincethewar,NGOsandbusinesses.
TherehasbeenmoreassociationalactivityinPreyKohthaninPrasath,duetohigherlevelsofeconomicactivity.Thus,conflictdoesnotseemtobeamajorfactorinthisevolution,sincePrasathwaslessaffectedbytheconflict.
Lowsocialcapital
TheLonNolregimedividedcommunitiesbysometimesforcingrecruitment.TheKhmerRougediditsbesttoeliminateallformsoftradition,religion,norms,family,andorganization.AllstructuresofCambodianlifewereattacked.Villagerswerepittedagainsteachotherand
Informalnetworksareshapedmorebymarketforcesthanbykinshipandaffinity.Oldnetworksbasedonmutualhelparebeingreplacedbynewonesbasedonrigidreciprocityandtheneedtoearncashincome.Nonfarmactivitiesarepromotingnewnetworksthatgobeyondthe
familiesweresplitasthestatewagedwaragainstitspeople.
extendedfamilyandfriends.
Thechangesfromintegrativetiesamongprimarygroups(familialrelations)tolinkagesthataremorenetwork-oriented(associationalrelations)areperceivedbyvillagersasadiminutionofsocialcapital(definedmoreaskinbonds)withinthevillageandasaresultofincreasedmarketpenetration.
Page32
ofsocialcapitalthataremoredevelopmentalthanprotectiveinnaturewerestuntedduringwarfare.
Astheconflictwaned,integrativeprimary-grouprelationsweresupplantedbysecondary-grouplinkages,whichincreasedinintensityandnumber.DespitePreyKoh'sgreaterexposuretoconflict,itsproximitytomarket-penetratingforcestransformedandstrengthenedcertaindimensionsofsocialcapitalinthepostconflictperiod,mainlythemoredevelopment-orienteddimensions.Prasath,stillisolated,ismarginalizedfrommarketpenetration,andsocialcapitalhasremainedencapsulatedinaninward-lookingsetofkin-orientedsocialrelations.TheresearchteampositedthatPreyKoh,whichisclosertothehighway,haseasieraccesstomarketactivities.Bycontrast,PrasathislocatednearthehillsanduntilrecentlyhasbeenplaguedbysporadicviolencefromKhmerRougeattacks.Theimplicationisthatalthoughviolentconflictoftenshapessocialcapitalinfavorofprimarybondingrelationsandaninward-lookingorientationtowardsurvivalintheshort-termemergencyperiod,postconflictmarketpenetrationmayeasilyreversethispatternandleadtomoreoutward-looking,associationalsocialcapitalinthemedium-tolonger-termtransitiontopeace.
TheCambodiacaseillustratestheebbandflowofhorizontalsocialcapital,dependingontherelativepenetrationofthestateandmarketforcesasinstrumentsofverticalsocialcapital.Verticalcohesivenessinthepasthasbeenpromotedbythestateandhasdependedonthesymbolicleadershipoftheking.Thesucceedinglineofoppressive,sociallyfragmentingregimesoftenpervertedextantsocialcapital.Althoughbondsofkinshipremainstrong,bridgingsocialcapitalisnowonlyslowlyemergingandisdoingsoinlargepartinresponsetomarketforces.TheintegrationofstrongbridginghorizontalandintegratingverticalsocialcapitaltoshapeacohesivesocietyremainsachallengetoCambodiaontheroadtosustainablepeaceandeconomic
development.Clearly,thefuturemilestonesonthatroadincludethestrengtheningofcivilsociety,theopeningupofdialoguebetweenthestateandcivilsociety,andprogresstowardanincreasinglyfreepress,atransparentruleoflaw(perhapsthroughtheproposedwarcrimestribunal),thepromotionoflocalelections,andamoreinclusive,participatorydevelopmentprocess.
Page33
3Rwanda:Hate,Fear,andtheDecayofSocialRelationsAlthoughRwandaseemedtobecomeungluedinstantaneouslyinApril1994withtheeruptionofgenocide,theprogressiveweakeningofbridgingsocialrelationsbetweenTutsiandHutuandtheincreasingpenetrationofthestateintocommunalaffairshadbeengoingonfordecades.Inanattempttobetterunderstandtheconflictanditsinteractionswithsocialrelationsandnorms,theRwandacasestudyexaminedhowsocialcapitalinteractedwithconflictintermsbothoftheunravelingofsocialfabricandthestrengtheningofsocialdynamicsamongHututhatenabledthegenocide.AlthoughproblematicverticalandhorizontalrelationswithinRwandaledtothecivilwar,externalfactors,suchasinternationalinterventionsandchangesbroughtaboutbymodernization,alsoaffectedsocialcapitalstocks.
StudyMethodology
TheRwandanstudywasimplementedbylocalconsultantsandentailedbothfieldanddeskresearch.Thefirstphaseofthestudy,theliteraturereview,assessedpertinenthistoricalinformationandoutlinedtraditionalformsofRwandansocialcapital.Fieldresearchintheselectedcommunitieswasconductedbytwoteams,eachconsistingofonemanandonewoman,andincluded
Page34
athree-weekperiodofparticipantobservation,sixweeksofsurveyimplementation,andthreeweeksofinterviewswithassociations,focusgroups,andkeyinformantsinthetwocommunesselected.
ThecommuneschosenfortheevaluationwereGiti,thecontrolsite,whichexperiencedlowlevelsofviolenceanddidnotfeelthefullimpactofthegenocide,owingtoitsownuniqueleadershipandhistoryofcommunalcooperation,andShyanda,thevariablesite,whichexperiencedhighlevelsoforganizedkilling.Bothcommunesareofrelativelycomparablesize:Giti'spopulationis48,000,andShyanda'sis39,000.Theysharethesamelanguage,religion,andcultureandhavesimilarsocioeconomicstatusandmodesofsubsistence,althoughGitihasbeenandismarginallymoreprosperous.IntermarriagebetweenHutuandTutsiwasandremainscommoninbothareas.
AsinCambodia,surveyswereimplementedatthehouseholdlevel,targeting1.5percentofrandomlyselectedhouseholdsinthreesectorsofeachcommune.Eachhouseholdcontained,onaverage,fivepeople.InGiti,114surveyswereconductedandinShyanda,144.Focusgroupsof5to15participantswerelargelymadeupofwidows,orphans,politicians,intellectuals,associations,businesspeople,andmixedgroups.Keyinformantswerechosenfromthetargetgroups.Questionandissueguidesforbothgroupandindividualinterviewswerederivedfromtheinitialsurveyfindings.
Throughoutthestudy,difficultiesemergedbecauseofthesensitivityofthetopicandtherecentnessofthewar.UnlikeCambodia,wheremuchtimehadpassedsincethegenocideandfewpeoplewerestillaroundwhocouldprovideintimatedetails,theRwandangenocidewasfreshinpeoples'minds,andtheunsettlingpresenceofgénocidairesamongthevictimslentanauraoffearandintimidation.Theresearchteamsthereforemadeeffortstospendmoretimethan
originallyscheduledineachcommunetobuildrelations,trust,andacceptancewithresidents.Afterthefieldteamsstrengthenedtheirrelationswithcommunalmembers,discussionsbroadenedtoencompassdetailsoftherespondents'conflictexperiences.
Page35
SocialCohesion,Trust,andViolentConflict
TheoriginalgoaloftheRwandansocialcapitalstudywastoassesshowconflictdepletedsocialcapitalandhowsocialcapitalwasrestoredfollowingtheendofthewar.Aftertheinitialfindingsfromthefieldweresubmitted,however,itbecameevidentthatconflictdidnotnecessarilydepletestocksofsocialcapitalbutinsteadtransformedthemandthatnewformsofsocialcapitalemergedduringperiodsofconflict.Thestudywasthereforebroadenedtoencompassthesevarioustypesoftransformationsandsocialcapitaldynamics,whichwereexaminedbyassessingchangesinlevelsofsocialcohesionandtrust.
Socialcohesionwasmeasuredbythedensityandnatureoforganizationsandnetworks(bothverticalandhorizontal)andbymembers'senseofcommitmentandresponsibilitytothesegroups.Thepropensityforcooperationandexchange(material,labor,ritualistic,andinformational)servedasaproxyfortrust.Inaddition,thestudyattemptedtodevelopindicatorsandmeasuresofbothverticalandhorizontalsocialcapitalthatwerespecificallytailoredforwar-tornsocieties.IndicatorsformeasuringsocialcapitalwerebasedonsocialcapitalconceptsasdescribedbyPutnam,Coleman,andFukuyamaandwereadaptedtothespecificitiesofRwandansociety.Relatedmeasuresexaminedasproxiesforsocialcohesionandtrustincluded:
Channelsandmechanismsforexchangeofinformation
Existenceandnatureofassociationsandthereasonfortheircreation(whetherbasedonsharedinterestsoronprescribedcommonality,suchasfamilialrelations)
Intermarriageandextendedfamilyrelations
Intercommunityrelationsandmechanismsforconflictresolution
Availabilityandfunctioningofinfrastructure
Types,nature,andorganizationofexchangeandinterdependence
Natureandorganizationofassistance,mutualaid,andcooperation(includingsharingofbasicnecessitiessuchaswater,firewood,andsalt)
Socialprotectionandwelfare;collectiveresponsibility.
Page36
Toconfirmthatthesefactorswereconsideredrepresentativeofsocialcapitalnotonlybytheresearchersbutalsobythosebeinginterviewed,surveyquestionsandfocusgroupinterviewssoughttoelicitwhatsocialcapitalmeanttoeachparticipant.Throughoutsurveyimplementationandwitheachfocusgroup,itbecameclearthatparticipantsandresearchershadapproximatelythesamedefinitionofsocialcapital.Althougheachfocusgrouphaditsowninterpretation,thecombinedconceptscoveredalmostallfacetsofsocialcapitalasdefinedforthestudy.Participantsinbothcommunitiesviewedsocialcapitalasincludingmutualassistance,trust,solidarity,civicduty,collectiveaction,protectionofthevulnerable,peacefulcohabitation,andonalargerscale,ajustpoliticalsystemengenderedbythestate.
IndicatorsofviolentconflictinRwandaincludedsocial,economic,environmental,andpoliticalfactors(Box3).Changesinsocialcapitalasaresultofviolentconflictwereassessedovervaryingperiodsoftime(thatis,pre-andpostconflict).During
Box3Indicatorsofviolentconflict:Rwanda
Socialfactors
NumberofpeoplekilledNumberofcommunitiesandfamiliesdestroyedNumberofpeoplephysicallydisabledasaresultoffightingNumberofpeoplerelocated
Economicfactors
DestructionofeconomicinfrastructureLossofaccesstomarketsDamagetoresourcesnecessaryfor
production
Environmentalfactors
ExtenttowhichcropswerelostandfieldsweredestroyedDamagetobiodiversityAreaoflandlaidwasteduetomassmigrationAreaoflandinfestedwithmines
Politicalfactors
DisregardforpeaceaccordsDissolutionofgovernment
Page37
theassessment,theperiodofconflictwasdefinedsolelybytheinterviewees,whoequateditwiththegenocideofAprilJuly1994.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatviolenceandconflicthaveplaguedRwandafordecadesandthatthecivilwarofficiallybeganinOctober1990.Sincetheendofthegenocide,widespreadviolencehascontinued,withrevengekillingsandcivilwaralongRwanda'sbordersandwithintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo(DRC,theformerZaire).
TheAnatomyofaGenocide
The1994massacreskilledmorepeoplemorequicklythananyothermassslaughterinrecordedhistorysome800,000diedwithinathree-monthperiodatthehandsoftheirbrethren(Berkeley1998).Historically,however,ethnichatred,whichfueledthisarmederuption,didnotexistbetweenHutuandTutsi.Duringprecolonialtimes,thetwogroupscoexistedsymbiotically,withcomplementarymodesofsubsistence(nomadicpastoralismandsedentaryagriculture).Theywereneithersimilarnorequal.Distinctionsbetweenthegroupsstemmedfrommembershipindifferentclasses,notfromdissimilarethnicbackgrounds.BeinglabeledHutuorTutsisimplymeantbelongingtoalooselydefinedcategorybasedonoccupationorclass;whereastheHutuwerecultivators,theTutsiwerepastoralistsandgenerallybelongedtotherulingandwarriorclasses.Mostimportant,groupmembershipwasnotstatic(Newbury1988;Prunier1997).
RelationsbetweenHutuandTutsiworsenedundertheBelgiancolonialadministration.BysupportingminorityTutsirule,colonizationfurtherentrenchedsocioeconomicdisparitiesandsolidifiedthedividebetweenthegroupsalong''ethnic"(ratherthanclass)lines.
4Thearbitrarydistinctionsbetweenthegroupsweresharpenedby
colonialmythology,whichrelegatedtheHutucultivatorstoalowerstatusandcategorizedthepastoralTutsiasthesuperiorrulingclass.Acensustakenin1926forcedHutuandTutsitochoosetheir"ethnic"identity.Whathadoncebeenadynamicsystemofclassesbecameastaticsystembasedon"ethnicity,"whichlaterbecamea(much-abused)toolformanipu-
Page38
lationofthemassesbyaneliterulinggroup(Lemarchand1970;Newbury1988;Prunier1997).
Intheearlyandmid-1950s,thecolonialgovernment,underpressurefromtheCatholicChurch,gavetheHutugreateraccesstosocioeconomicandpoliticalsystems.TheincreasinglibertiesextendedtotheHutubecameacauseofconcerntotherulingTutsi,who,asaminority,fearedanuprisingbythemajority.Ethnicpoliticsintensifiedin1959,andthePartyfortheEmancipationoftheHutuPeople(Parmehutu)oustedtheTutsiregimewiththesupportofBelgianforces.SkirmishesbetweenHutuandTutsispreadthroughoutRwanda,killingthousandsandforcingamassiveTutsimigration.TheHutuelite,whichgainedpowerin1961andretaineditwhenthecountrybecameindependentin1962,begantofocusonmarginalizingtheTutsiminority.Traditionalsocialandpoliticalsystemssuchastheroleofeldersandthegacacaconflict-resolutionmechanismwerereplacedbythecentraladministrationasthestatepenetratedeverdeeperintothelivesofthecitizenry.PastoralTutsiculturaltraditionswereprogressivelybanned,andexclusively"Hutu"traditionsbecamemorecloselyidentifiedwithBanyarwandaculture,whichencompassedbothHutuandTutsiaspects(Lemarchand1970;Prunier1997).
SoonaftertheHutuextremiststookpower,TutsirebelgroupsbasedinBurundi,Tanzania,Uganda,andtheDRC(thencalledZaire)begantargetingHutuofficials.Tutsi-ledincursionsintoRwandainitiatedacycleofviolence,massacres,andTutsiflightintoneighboringcountries.Thistragicpatterncontinuedoverthenext30years.ThegovernmentbecameincreasinglyrepressiveagainstTutsi,violatingtheirrightsandinstitutionallyexcludingthemfromeducationalandemploymentopportunities.Sinkingcommodityprices,increasingdebt,andgovernmentcorruptionledPresidentJuvenalHabyarimana'sregimetodeflectattentionfromtheworseningeconomiccrisisby
fuelingtheflamesofethnichatred(Prunier1997).
TutsirebelforcesoftheRwandesePatrioticFront(RPF)invadednorthernRwandainOctober1990,sparkingincreasedinsecurityandkillingsinthearea.Inresponse,Rwandansecurityforcesdistributedarmstolocalcivilianofficials,andthenational
Page39
armywasexpandedtoroughly50,000men.ManyTutsibusinessmen,teachers,andpriestswerearrestedandwereaccused,onthebasisoftheirethnicity,ofcollaborationwiththerebelseveniftheyhadnoconnectionwiththem.TheRPFcontinueditsattackswithinRwanda'sbordersthroughout1991and1992,exacerbatinghatepoliticsandviolentrhetoricagainstTutsi.Atthesametime,PresidentHabyarimanatooksmallstepstowardliberalizingthepoliticalsystem,mainlyinanefforttomaintainhispower,andtherepressionagainsttheTutsilessenedsomewhat.Moredrasticstepstoretaincontrolwereimplementedinlate1992,whentheHabyarimanaregimebegantotrainHutuextremistmilitiagroupsknownastheInterahamweandtheImpuzamugambi,whileitparadoxicallypursuedpeacetalkswiththerebelforcesin1993andearly1994(Prunier1997;Uvin1998).
OnApril6,1994,PresidentHabyarimana'splanewasshotdownoverRwanda'scapital,Kigali.GovernmentforcesandmilitiaimmediatelybeganattackingTutsiandmoderateHutu.Withinthenextthreemonths,brutalkillingsofTutsieruptedthroughoutthecountry.AlthoughsomeHutuwillinglyparticipatedinthemassacres,otherswereorderedorforcedtokill.AcampaignofTutsielimination("clearingthecountryside")targetedindividuals,neighborhoods,and(byfocusingonuniversitiesandhospitals)professions.Roughly2millionrefugeeswereforcedtoleavethecountry,andaround1millionpeoplewereinternallydisplaced.Duringthegenocide,Rwandansocietycollapsedcompletely:businessandagriculturalactivitiesceased,skilledpeopleandtheintelligentsiawereslaughteredorfled,theinfrastructurewaspurposefullydestroyed,andgovernmentoperations,includinglegal,educational,andhealthactivities,completelydissolved(DesForges1999).
AftertheRPFforcestookKigaliinJuly1994,hundredsofthousandsofHutufledtoneighboringcountries,manyofthemdestroyingeverythingintheirpathastheyleft.Refugeecampssetupforthese
Hutumassesinadvertentlysupportedtheradicalgroupsresponsiblefororganizingandperpetratingthegenocide(primarily,theInterahamwe).Meanwhile,Tutsirefugees,fromboththe1994tragediesandthe1959flight,spilledbackintoRwanda.Chaosensuedduringthismassivereturn,and
Page40
muchlooting,pillaging,andsquattingtookplace.Astimepassed,governmentattemptstorepatriateHuturefugeeswereunsuccessful,formanyfearedwidespreadreprisalkillings.
5Finally,in1996,theRPFgovernmentgrewimpatientwiththesecuritythreatwithintheborderingrefugeecampsandforcedthereturnofrefugeesfromneighboringZaire.Soonafterward,over1millionHutureturnedhomefromBurundi,Tanzania,Uganda,andZaire(Prunier1997).
Throughoutthefiveyearssincethegenocide,Interahamweforceshavekeptunited,mainlyhidingonDRCterritory.TheirincursionsintonorthwesternandsouthwesternRwandahavekepttheseregionsrelativelyunstableandcausedthemtolagindevelopment.TheMarch1999localelectionswereamajorstepforwardforthegovernment,fortheyhelpedalleviatecriticismofitslegitimacy.AlthoughRwandahasmademuchprogresssincethewar,manyRwandansarestillhauntedbyitsterror.Securingfoodandshelterhasbeendifficultformanysurvivors.Asalegacyofthegenocide,homelessorphanswanderthestreets,andwidowsandwivesofmeninprisonstruggletomakeendsmeet.Widespreadpovertyandseverelydamagedinfrastructurehampergrowthanddevelopment.Despiteallthis,theRwandanpeopleingeneralseemtohavehopeforthefuture,buttheyworryaboutInterahamweactivitiesintheDRCandaboutthesecurityofRwandanareasalongtheborderwiththatcountry(Prunier1997;Gourevitch1998).
ThePerversionofSocialCapital
Duringthegenocide,socialcapitalatrophiedasthecountry,communities,andfamiliesfellpreytohatredandviolence.Yetintegrativeformsofsocialcapitalincreasedwithinfamiliesfighting
forsurvival,amongindividualsattemptingtosaveorrescueTutsi,andinthesmallMuslimcommunitywithinRwanda,whichnevertookpartinthegenocide.Strong,exclusionarysocialcapitalalsoemergedwithinHutuextremism,withextremelynegativeramificationsforthoseexcludedshowingthatviolencecancoexistwith,orbetheresultof,strongbondingsocialcapitalamongitsperpetrators.6
Page41
AstheformalHutugovernmentbegantosplinter,aprimaryoperatingunitemergedthatcoordinatedthegenocide.CommunitiessplitasorderscallingforHututokillTutsioriginatedfromthecentralgovernmentandwerespreadthroughoutRwandabywayoflocalleaders,whohelpedmobilizethemasses.Ofthenearly60percentoftheRwandanpopulationunderage20,fewhadhopesofobtaininglandorjobs.ThisbleakrealityfacilitatedtherecruitmentofHutuandtheiracceptanceofTutsihatepropaganda.Oncethekillingbegan,HutukillednotonlyTutsiunknowntothembutalsotheirneighborsand,insomecases,evenfamilymembers.Theseindiscriminateyetintimatekillingsledtothedisintegrationofcommunesandfamiliesandfragmentedsocialcohesioningeneral.Theviolencetosomeextentalsofollowedfromthebreakdownofsocietalstructuresbroughtaboutbyearlierhatepropagandaandethnicstrife.AlthoughtherewerenumerousHutuwhohidandsavedTutsi,manyparticipatedinthekillingsoutofasenseofperceivedethnicduty,becauseofloyaltytotheHutu-controlledstate,andinresponsetooutrightthreatsagainsttheirlivesortheirfamilies'lives.Tomakemattersmorecomplex,someTutsiwithHutuphysicalcharacteristicskilledTutsitosavethemselves(Gourevitch1998;DesForges1999).
Invariousways,thegenocidewasapowerfulcommunal-buildingexercise,atleastamongparticipatingHutu.Seekingtopreservetheircontrolandresources,HutuPowergroupsachievedtheirultimatesuccessbymobilizingexclusionaryanddivisivesocialcapitalthatbonded(primarily)unemployed,uneducatedHutuyouthtoformtheInterahamwe.HighlevelsofsocialcapitalexistedbothverticallyandhorizontallyamongHuturanks,whilebridgingsocialcapitalthatlinkedHutuwithTutsiwasallbuteliminated.WithinHutuextremism,state-drivenverticalsocialcapitalfueledthesuccessofcommunal-levelHutugroupsthroughexcellentinformationnetworks,reinventedpasttraditions,andasenseofsolidarity,obligation,and
civicduty(Prunier1997).Socialcapitalwithinthegroupsincreased,aslinksbetweenthemwaned,furthersplittingsociety.Thebridgingsocialcapitalthathadexisted,eventhoughinaweakform,betweendiversecommunalgroupswasnowrapidlytransformedintopurely
Page42
bondingsocialcapitalfoundedonfearandsurvivalasHutuandTutsigroupscoalescedoneachsideofthedivide.
Intheinitialweeksofthegenocide,preciselistsofTutsianddetailsoftheirresidenceshelpedexpeditethekillingsandensurethoroughness.ThemediawereusedtospreadhatepropagandaagainstTutsi.Forexample,RadioetTélévisionLibredesMilleCollinesbroadcastlistsofHutuineachcommunewhohadnotparticipatedinthekillings,publiclypressuringthemtojointhegenocide.SuchmassinformationnetworkskepttheInterahamweinformedonwhohadbeenkilled,whohadnotyetbeenremoved,andwhohadhelpedfacilitatethekillingprocess.Byspreadinghate,fear,suspicion,andgreed,theHutuextremistswereabletowhiptheHutumassesintoamurderousfrenzy(Gourevitch1998;DesForges1999).
ExtremistHutualsogainedafollowingpartlybyinvokingtradition.TheyappealedtoprecolonialRwandansocietyandcooptedexistingvaluestructuresbyreinventingtraditionsandapplyingtheminanewway.Forinstance,thenomenclatureusedbyextremistHutugroupswassimilartothatofprecolonialmilitiasandbloodbrotherhoods.ThepropagandautilizedtofuelHutuactionsreferredtotraditionalsocialcapitalintheformofcooperativelabor(umuganda),whichhadevolvedintoforcedlaborandwasseenasabusivetoHutu.Thesloganofthe1959massacreswasrenewed:tugiregukoraakazi,"letusgoanddothework"(Prunier1997;Gourevitch1998).
Génocidaireswereunitedbythecollectiveactionofkilling,whichhelpedcreatefeelingsofcollectiveconsciousness,commonality,sharedgoals,andsolidarity.Forexample,inKinyarwanda,Interahamwemeans"thosewhoattachtogether,"andImpuzamugambimeans"single-mindedones"or"thosewhohavethesamegoal."ThemanipulationoffearandhatredagainstTutsicreatedsolidarityamongHutu.Forthosewhojoinedinthekillings,thehatepropaganda
againstTutsiwasattractivebecauseitjustifiedtheiractionsandeasedtheirconsciences.Furthermore,massparticipationinthekillingsmadeittremendouslydifficulttoassignguilttoindividuals.Inthewordsofaparticipantinthegenocide,"noonepersonkilledanyoneperson"(DesForges1999:770).
Page43
Thesuccessofthegenocidedependedinpartoncivilians'senseofcivicdutyandonthehistoricalstrengthofthecentralgovernment.Verticalsocialcapital,manifestedinalmostabsolutestatepower,hadhistoricallypenetratedRwandansocietysodeeplyastosupersedehorizontalrelationsorloyalties.Officialsfromthepolice,localadministrations,andmilitaryforceswentdoortodoorrequisitioningmentopartakeintheir"nationalduty"ofeliminatingTutsi,andHutuvoluntarilyorbegrudginglyfollowedtheseorders.KillingTutsiwasportrayedasaHutucivicduty;suchphrasesas"doyourwork"or"itisyourdutytohelpclearthefield"toeradicatetheinyenzi(cockroaches),meaningTutsiwerecurrent.Theimageofkillingasameansofself-defenseagainsttheRPFinvasionwasalsoemployed,withtheresoundingurgencyof"killorbekilled"(Prunier1997).
AlthoughthisperversemanipulationofsocialcapitalmadepossiblethemassrecruitmentofHutu,realsocialandeconomicgainsprovedanaddedincentiveforHutuinvolvement.PopulationdensityinRwandahadattainedincredibleheights;inShyandaforinstance,ithadreached668peoplepersquarekilometerby1989(Prunier1997).Aslandbecamescarcer,droughtandpoorcroppricescompoundedtheeconomiccrisis.TutsieliminationwouldbenefittheHutuwhoparticipatedinthekillingsbydecreasingthenumberofcompetitorsforland,homes,cattle,andotherpossessions.
CooperationwithoutTrust
Beforethegenocide,potentialbridgingsocialcapitalexistedintheformofexchange,mutualassistance,andreciprocity.Typically,withinRwandansocietytherewerefivetypesofassociativegroups:cooperatives;farmers'organizations(smaller,lessformalcooperatives);tontines(rotatingsavingsandcreditassociations)andotherinformalassociations;foreignandlocaldevelopmentNGOs;andchurches(Uvin1998).Althoughthesegroupsmayhavebeen
numerousandwidespread,therelationscreatedbythemwerelargelyexclusionaryandtendednottobridgegroupdivides.ThiswasespeciallytrueofNGOssupportedbyexternalaid.Anopportunitytomanagediversityand
Page44
preventviolentconflictmayhavebeenmissedastheeconomicendsofdevelopmentovershadowedthesocialgoalsofstrengtheningsocialcohesion.
ManyinternationaleffortstosupportandencouragethegrowthofcivilsocietyinRwandaweremadeinthe1980sandearly1990s,andmanyneworganizationsandNGOsappeared,thankstotheseefforts.ThemereexistenceofNGOsandothercivilsocietyorganizations,however,doesnotnecessarilypromotedemocracyorpluralism,nordoesitautomaticallyformbridgingsocialcapitalthatlinksdifferentgroups.Forthemostpart,NGOsinRwandawereapolitical,service-oriented,andcloselyaffiliatedwiththestate.Moreover,therewasnotenoughsocialorpoliticalspaceforcivilsocietytotrulyflourish.AsUvin(1998)notes,extremepoverty,inequality,clientelism,andpoorinformationnetworks,compoundedbythesocial,economic,andpoliticalmarginalizationoftheruralpopulace(themajorityofRwandans),madetheemergenceofanautonomous,highlydevelopedcivilsocietyallbutimpossible.Thus,despitetheabundanceoftheseassociativegroups,thesocialcapitalpresentwasnotsufficientlyinclusivetocounterbalancethehatepoliticsgeneratedbyHutuextremists.
Sincetheendofthegenocide,attemptshavebeenmadetoplaceHutuingovernmentpositionstobalancepoliticalpower,andspacehasbeencreatedforthereemergenceofcivilsocietyactors.ThenewsocialfabricofRwanda,however,iscomplicated,ladenwithsubgroupsandschisms.Forexample,thereisthecontentiousissueoftheresettlementoflargenumbersofreturningHutuandTutsi.Thelatteraredividedbothbythedurationoftheirstayabroadandbywheretheysoughtrefuge.ThosereturningfromUgandaareperceivedasbeingmoreelitistthanthosefromBurundi,whohaveahigherstatusthanreturneesfromtheDRC.TutsiwhostayedinRwandaandsurvivedthegenocidearesuspectedofcollaborationwiththe
génocidaires,foritisdoubtedthatanyTutsicouldhavesurvivedontheirown.TherearealsodivisionsbetweenHutuwhoparticipatedinthekillings,thosewhoaresuspectedofbeinginvolved,andthosewhodidnotparticipate.Thegenocide,whilereinforcingthesplitbetweenHutuandTutsi,alsocreatednewsocialcleavagesthat
Page45
runwithinethnicgroups.Cross-cuttingsocialcapitalshouldbenurturedtolinknotonlyHutuandTutsibutalsothosewithinthesubgroups.Overcomingthenewschismsandreconcilingolddifferencesmaytakegenerations.
ViolentconflictandthepoliticalandeconomicdisintegrationoftheRwandanstatedestroyedwhateverbroad-basedformsofsocialcapitalhadexisted.Theconflictdeeplypenetratedsuchformsofhorizontalsocialcapitalasexchange,mutualassistance,collectiveaction,trust,andprotectionofthevulnerable.Duringtheconflict,verticalrelationswerereinforced;inthepostconflictyears,theserelationshavesuffered(seeTable4).Thus,postconflictsocialcapital,althoughsomewhatmirroringpreconflictconditions,hasundergonechangeindifferentways.
TheuseofcreditinexchangeswascommoninpreconflictRwanda.Thispracticehasdiminishedovertime,inpartduetodecreasedlevelsoftrustasaconsequenceofwarfarebutalsobecauseofincreasingpovertyandthevalueplacedonmoneyandindividualism.Ingeneral,thoseinterviewedfeltthatpeoplehavebecomemorereluctanttogivegiftsandprovidefortheneedsofothers,fortheyarelessconfidentthattheseactswillbereciprocated.
Environmentaldegradation,isolation,andscarcityhavealsocausedexchangetodwindle.DiminishingsoilfertilityandscarcityoflandandwaterinGitihavehurttheproductivityofbothagricultureandcattleherding.Theseconditionshaveledtoadecreaseinsecondaryorassociationalsocialcapitalbydiminishingtheabilitytoexchangegoodsandservices.Duringthegenocide,Gitiisolateditselffromneighboringcommunesoutoffear.Ithasremainedsomewhatdistant,withlimitedexternalmarketpenetration,whichhashamperedeconomicactivity.Asaresult,povertywithinGitiisincreasing,causingevenfurtherreductionsinexchange,mutualassistance,and
giftgiving.
ExtremeandwidespreadpovertyinShyanda,alongwithadeclineintheavailabilityofgoodsandlabor,hashamperedeconomicactivity,primarilybecauseoflossofordamagetoresourcesandtheweakeningofsocialcapitalasaresultoftheconflict.Agricultureisnowalmostthesoleeconomicactivity,butthe
Page46
Table4Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:RwandaHigh-conflictperiod Low-conflictperiod
Highsocialcapital
Protectionacrossethniclines:someHutuhelpedprotectTutsiduringthewar,aswasthecaseinGiti(andsomeTutsiriskedtheirlivestosaveothers).
WithintheInterahamweandbetweenextremistHutu,bondingsocialcapitalunitedgroupsbymanipulatingandemployingexcellentinformationnetworks,collectiveaction,civicduty,solidarity,mutualbenefit,commongoalsandsharedactivity,andtraditions.
Familyrelations(nuclearandextended);intermarriagebetweenHutuandTutsi.
Multiethnicassociations:Old:agriculture,cattleherding(beneficialtocommune)
New:widows'andorphans'groups(exclusive,beneficialtomembersonly).
Gacaca(atraditionalmechanismfordisputemediationanddistributivejustice)inthepre-andpostconflicteras.
Mutualassistance;giftgiving;sharingofbeer,necessities,andcropsresurfacedbutwerenotasprevalent.
Cooperationoncommunalbuildingsandprojectssuchasroadmaintenance.
Lowsocialcapital
Killingwithincommunitiesandfamilies
Cessationbyassociationsandcommunitygroupsofcommunalactivitiessuchasfarmingandeventssuchasmeetingsandmarkets.
Cessationofalmostallgovernmentactivities;noserviceswereprovidedduringthewar.Becauseofthegovernment'sinvolvementinthekillings,moderateHutuand
Divisionswithinfamilies,notjustbetweencommunities(postconflict).
Decreasedsenseoftrustandcandorbetweenindividuals(postconflict).
Perceiveddecreaseinsocialcapitalduetomodernization,individualism,andmonetization.Local-to-globalshiftandmovefromprimarybondstosecondarylinkagesperceivedasdecreaseinsocialcapital.PerceptionthattraditionsbegantodiminishwithcolonizationandtheinfluxofCatholicism.
Tutsihadlittletrustinthegovernment.
Strongverticalsocialcapitalsupersededhorizontalrelationsandalliances..
Page47
ravagesofwarhavedecreasedcropproductivityandmadefewerpeopleavailabletoworkinthefields.Therearealsofewermentocontributetothefinancialandphysicalneedsofthecommunity,asmanyhavebeenkilledorarecurrentlyinprison.Asaresult,theburdenonwomenandchildrenhasincreasedtremendously.
Thisincreasedburdenhasnotbeenoffsetbycooperationandmutualassistance,bothofwhichhavedecreasedinthecommunes.Giti,althoughnotdirectlyaffectedbythefighting,experiencedmuchdamageduringthewar.Largenumbersofdisplacedpersonssoughtrefugeinthecommune,destroyinganddamagingbuildingsandstrainingresources.Now,highlevelsofpovertyhavemadecommunememberslessabletoprovidefortheneedsofothers,andincreasingmonetizationwithinthesocietyhasmadethemlesslikelytogivegiftsandassistance.
Theexistenceandnatureofassociationsandthereasonfortheircreation(whetherbasedonsharedinterestsoronprescribedcommonality,asinfamilialrelations)weredramaticallyaffectedbythegenocideandtheperversionofsocialbonds.Duringtheconflict,especiallyin1994,farmingactivitystoppedacrossthecountry(except,perhaps,forsmalleffortsbyindividualfamilies),andthecooperativeassociationsthatoversawtheseactivitiesdisbanded.Sincethewar,theassociationsandotherinformalnetworkshaverevivedoutofnecessity.Theseorganizations,whichprimarilydealwiththelegaciesofthewar,aregearedtowardvulnerablegroupsandhelpmeettheirownmembers'basicsurvivalneeds.Whereasprewarassociationsstrovetobetterthewelfareofpeopleinternalandexternaltothegroup,theneworganizationsarepredominantlyexclusive,althoughsomeincludebothTutsiandHutu.Forexample,widows'andorphans'associationshaveemergedinbothcommunestoassisteachofthesevulnerablegroups.InGiti,orphans'associationshavearisentoprovidefundsforschooling.InShyanda,despitethe
genocidalexperiencethere,bothHutuandTutsicooperateinwidows'andorphans'associations.Still,thereisanunderlyingfeelingofmistrustandresentment.Inonewidows'associationthatincludesbothHutuwomenwhosehusbandsareinprisonandTutsiwomenwhosehusbandswerekilledduringthewar,
Page48
memberswhowereinterviewedstatedthattheyworktogether,butonlyfortheirsurvival.Theydonotfeelthattheycandealorspeakwitheachotheropenly.Thisguardedorlimitedcross-cuttingsocialcapitalhasemergedoutofsharedcircumstances,isolation,andnewsocialcleavages,nottrust.
Manyofthoseinterviewedfeltthatthedissolutionoffamilies,whichhasoccurredinbothcommunes,hasledtothecreationofthenewtypesofassociation.Tosomeextent,peoplehaveturnedtoassociationstomakeupfortheirlackoffamilyties,whichwereattimesstrengthenedduringtheconflictbut,overall,weregreatlyharmedasaresultoftheextremestowhichviolencewascarried.Respondentsalsonotedthatrelationsbetweenfamiliesjoinedthroughmarriagehavebeengreatlyweakened:in-lawscannolongerrelyoneachotherforsupportandassistance.Eventhenuclearfamilyhasfailedtoadegree.Fathersandbrothersaredeadorinjail,andmothers,strugglingtofilltheroleofthemissingmen,oftencannotmeettheneedsoftheirchildren.Somechildrenaresentawayfromhometolivewithextendedfamilyortowanderthestreetsinhopesthataidorreligiousorganizationswillbeabletoassistthem.
Accordingtorespondents,intermarriagestilloccursbetweenHutuandTutsiinGitiandShyanda,butitisoftencriticizedinthewakeofthegenocide.CommunemembersinGitiarereluctanttomarrythoseoutsidetheirowncommuneforfearofmarryingintoamurderousfamily.
Thus,mostdimensionsofhorizontalsocialcapitalwerenegativelyaffectedbythewar,yetinthepostwarperiodtheyarebeingrevivedinvariousformstohelprestoresomesenseofnormalcy.Exchangewithinandbetweengroupsisoccurringagainbutatalowerlevelandinalteredforms,asaresultoftheconflictanditslegacy,aswellasmodernizingfactors.Feelingsofsolidarity,asevidencedbyactsof
mutualassistanceandcollectiveaction,havealsodwindled;whentheydopersist,theirmotivationshavechanged.Vulnerablegroupsareprotected,butmorebyself-helpthanthroughacommunityefforttosupportthem.Andtrust,akeyelementinsocialcapital,isstilllackingtoalargeextentinbothcommunesor,ifpresent,isfragile.
Page49
VerticalInfluencesandExternalFactors
VerticalrelationsinRwandahavetraditionallyhadagreatinfluenceoversociety.Tutsikingswereconsideredalmostdivineandwerereveredandfollowedfaithfully.Withindependenceintheearly1960s,thisverticalcontrolcontinuedasHutupowerwasconsolidatedinastrongcentralgovernment.Traditionalandinformallocalleadershipdissipatedandwasreplacedbyadministratorsappointedbythenationalgovernment.
StrongverticalinfluencemayhavehelpedspareGitiduringthegenocide,thankstotheactionsofitsburgomaster,orcommunalhead,whoforbadekillinginhiscommune.GitiwasalsoanearlypointofentryfortheRPF.Conversely,inShyanda,whichinitiallyescapedviolenceandinfactservedasaTutsirefuge,killingsbegansoonafterordersweredispatchedbytheactingprimeminister,aHutufromtheregion,whovisitedthecommunetoreproachitforitsfailuretomountagenocidalresponse.Inthiscase,strongverticalalliancesoverpoweredhorizontalallegiance,withtragicresults(DesForges1999).Sincethewar,theofficialcommunalleadershiphasmaintainedhighlevelsofcontroloverthecommunes.Localleadershipremainsundercentralcontrol,althoughthenationalgovernmentismakingstrongeffortstodecentralize.
Accordingtomanyofthoseinterviewed,socialcapitalhasalsobeentransformedbyfactorsexternaltowarfaremainlythoserelatedtomodernization:marketpenetration,monetization,andindividualismand,moreindirectly,changesstemmingfromcolonialismandthehistoricalinfluenceoftheCatholicChurch.Studyparticipantsfeltthattherehadbeenadecreaseinthelevelandachangeinthenatureofbothprimarybondingrelationsandsecondarybridginglinkagesinbothcommunes.Themajorityofthoseinterviewedviewed''traditional"socialcapitalaslocalized,primary
relationsamongextendedfamilyandsmallcommunitiesthatprovidedwelfaremechanismsandsocialprotection.Participantsinthestudyfeltthatmovestowarddevelopmentalandeconomiclinkageswiththoseoutsidethecommunityhadweakenedprimarysocialcapital.Interest-
Page50
ingly,participantsdidnotconsiderthestrengtheningofintercommunalrelationsandtradeandtheriseofnewformsofassociationsasthecontinuationofsocialcapital,albeittransformed;rather,theyviewedthesechangesasanerosionoftheRwandansocialfabric.Accordingtothoseinterviewed,increasingmonetizationandindividualism,aswellaswidespreadandworseningpoverty,weretoblameforthedecreaseinmutualassistanceandgiftgivingwithincommunes.Overall,externalfactorstotheconflict,andtheconflictitself,wereconsideredreasonsforthemanytransformationsofsocialcapitalinRwandasincetheprewarperiod.
TheshapingofsocialcapitalinRwandaisclearlyatacrossroads.Thechallengeistobalanceeconomicdevelopmentwithsocialdevelopmentinamannerthatenablesthenationtofinditswayoutofthedarknessofpovertywhilebothencouragingsocialrelationsthatcrossclass,ethnic,andgenderdividesandpreservingtheprimarytiesthatserveasthebedrockofsocietallife.Inclusivestateinstitutionsandconflict-managementmechanismsneedtobeencouragedandsupportedforacohesivesocietytothrive.Manypositivesignsofstepsinthisdirectionhavealreadyemerged,suchasthebridgingwidows'andorphans'associations;governmentmovestowarddecentralizationandincreasingparticipation;therevivalofgacaca;andamoreaccountableciviladministration.
Page51
4GuatemalaandSomalia:ViolentConflictandtheStateThenatureanddurationofconflictinGuatemalaandSomaliaprovidedifferingcontextsfortheanalysisoftheinterrelationsofsocialcapitalandconflictineachcountry.ThewarinGuatemalaspannedalmostfourdecades.There,anabsolute,oppressivestatetargetedindigenousgroupsandpeasantsandpolarizedrelationsbetweenthestateandthepredominantlyMayanpeasantry.InSomalia,bycontrast,theturmoilmountedoverthespanofadecade.FailedstatepoliciesthatbloatedthemilitaryandthecivilserviceandcoerceddivisivenessamongSomalisspedthegovernment'sdissolutionandtheconsequenteruptionofclanwarfare.Thesedifferingsituationsledtoconsistentorsimilarfindings,especiallyregardingthewaysinwhichstateandmarketforcesinteractwithviolentconflictandsocialcapitaltoshapesocialcohesionordisintegration.
StudyMethodology
ThestudiesinGuatemalaandSomaliawereconductedbyCERFE,anItalianresearchNGOthathashadprolongedfieldexperienceinbothcountries.Researchbeganwithaliteraturereviewthatanalyzedmaterialsonthecountries'historiesandonworkrelatedtosocialcapital.Duringthisphase,surveystobeusedinthefieldweredraftedandweretranslatedintoSpanishandSomali.Fieldresearch,whichwasconductedbetweenJuly1998
Page52
andFebruary1999,wasledbyCERFEstaffandwasimplementedbyalocalfieldmanagerandindigenousinterviewers.Eachin-countrygroupreceivedextensivetrainingonthetoolstobeutilizedandonsurveyimplementation.Pretestswereusedtorefinethesurveybeforeitsimplementation.
AsintheCambodiaandRwandastudies,twotownswerechosenineachcountry,onelessaffectedbyconflictandtheothermarkedbyintenseconflict.InSomaliathetownofHargeisaexperiencedmoretraumaandviolencethanitscounterpart,Boroma.(BothareinSomaliliandinthenorthwest,anareathathasafunctioninggovernment,stateinstitutions,andcivilsocietyassociationssuchascouncilsofelders,NGOs,andreligiousorganizationsthatbridgesocialdivisions.)InGuatemalathetownofNebajexperiencedmoreconflictthandidPuertoBarrios.Althougheffortsweremadetoselectmatchedpairs,controllingforthelevelofviolence,thereweredifficultiesindemographicallypairingthetowns.Consequently,therearediscrepanciesinsize,ethniccomposition,andsocioeconomiclevels.Hargeisahasapopulationof295,000,with141identifiedcivilsocietygroups,andBoromahasapopulationof64,000,with63identifiedcivilsocietygroups.PuertoBarrioshasapopulationof82,000(170identifiedcivilsocietygroups);Nebajhasapopulationof55,000(187identifiedcivilsocietygroups).
IncontrasttothestudiesinCambodiaandRwanda,whichdistinctlyendeavoredtoassesspre-andpostconflictsocialcapital,CERFEfocusedmoreonmakingadetailedsketchofthepresentpostconflictcivilsocietywithineachcountryandonmeasuringitsabilitytoprovideservicesandeconomicopportunityforitscommunities,especiallywithregardtoverticallypenetratingstateandmarketengagement.Thisorientationmeshesnicelywiththefailed-statesyndromefrequentlyascribedtoSomaliaandtheoppressive-stateframeworkappliedtoGuatemala(ZartmanandKremenyuk1995).
Thefirstphaseofthefieldresearchsoughttoidentifythesociallyresponsiblecollectiveactorsthattogethermadeupcivilsocietybycontributingtothewell-beingofthecommunity.Eighty-fiveorganizationsweresurveyedinHargeisa,44inBoroma,51inNebaj,and50inPuertoBarrios.Interviewswere
Page53
conductedwithkeyinformants,leadersatthelocallevel,andcivilservants.Inthesecondphase,CERFEstudiedthequalityofleadershipinaselectednumberofthesegroups.Atotalof84leadersinbothcountrieswasinterviewed.Inthefinalphase,organizationswerestudiedindepth20inGuatemalaand21inSomaliaandtheirleaders(totaling41)wereinterviewed.Alsoquestionedinthefinalphasewere52keyinformantsand94citizenswhowerenotmembersoftheorganizationsbeingstudied.(Copiesofthesurveyinstrumentsareavailablefromtheauthorsonrequest.)
SocialResponsibility,SocialInitiative,andViolentConflict
CERFEestablishedasingleframeworkandmethodologyforexaminingsocialcapitalinGuatemalaandSomalia.
7Theconceptofsocialcapitalwasrestrictedtocivicengagementintheprotectionanddevelopmentofcommunities,encompassingsocialcapitalatthecommunallevelthatincludesboththeprotectivefunctionsofprimary-grouprelationsandthedevelopmentaspectsofsecondarycross-cuttingrelations.Themodeldoesnotassessprimaryorbondinglevelsofsocialcapital,suchaskin-basedandtightlyknitcommunalrelationships,perse.Instead,itfocusesoncivilsociety'sprotectiveprovisionofbasicsurvivalneedsanditsabilitytocreatefertilegroundforeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.
AccordingtoCERFE'sapproach,socialcapitalisthepresenceoftwoautonomousdimensionsofcivilsociety:socialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative.Civilsocietyisdefinedasasetofcollectiveactorsgearedtowardsocialactionthatincludes(butisnotconsideredexclusiveto)actorsfromschools,churches,themedia,theprivatesector,NGOs,anduniversities.Suchsocialactioniseither"welfare"or"development"oriented.
Socialresponsibilityisseenascivilsociety'scapacitytoactasaself-defensemechanismforthecommunityatlarge,providingpeoplewithsocialprotectionorwelfarewhensocietyisthreatenedbysuchrisksashealthcrises,illiteracy,unemployment,lackofaccesstohighereducation,geographicisolation,andcon-
Page54
flict.Thisabilityisconsideredtobeaffectedbythedegreeofdiversificationwithincivilsocietyandthenumberandqualityofcivilsocietyactors.
Socialinitiativeisviewedascivilsociety'sengagementineffortstowardeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.Thispotentialdiffersaccordingtothediversificationandqualityofactors,localfactors,andnormativeobstacles.Localfactorsconsistofconfidenceandtrust,materialopportunities(communications,mobility,infrastructure;andeducation,banking,andhealthservices)andcognitivecapital(qualifiedpersonnelwithspecificskills).Normativeobstaclesincludefactorsthatareformalorlegal,substantive,organizationalandbureaucratic,socialandcultural,orpoliticalinnature.Socialinitiativeisdefinedasameasureofaspecificqualityofcivilsociety;thatis,itsorientationtowardeconomicdevelopment.Inthisregard,itiscivilsociety,nototherentities,thathasgreaterorlessersocialinitiative.
Together,levelsofsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiativemakeupthelargerconstructofsocialcapital.Civilsocietycantendtowardsocialresponsibilitythatisinsularandmoreprotectiveinnature,asisoftenthecaseinconditionsofintenseviolentconflict,whentrustisatapremium.Alternatively,itcanpossesssocialcapitalthatismorenetworked,outward-looking,anddevelopmentorientedorisgearedtowardsocialinitiative,asmaybethecaseinperiodsofpeaceandsecurity.Thesetwoaspectsofsocialcapital(muchlikethenotionsofbondingandbridgingsocialcapital)mayvaryintheirinterplaywithconflict,thequalityofcivilsociety,andthepenetrationandroleofthestateandmarketforces.Inthisway,thestudyexaminescivilsocietyasacompositeoftwotypesofsocialcapitalthatmaysubstitutefororcomplementstateandmarketrolesandfunctions,revealingthedegreeofsocialcohesiontheintersectionbetweenstate-andmarket-drivenverticalorlinkingsocialcapitalandcivilsocietydrivenhorizontalorbridgingsocialcapital.
Theviolentconflictindicators(seeBox4)employedinGuatemalaandSomaliawerechosenbytheresearcherstoenablecomparisonoftheeffectsoftheconflictsinthetwocountries.Despitetheproblemsinascertainingtheexactperiodofconflict,variousindicatorswereestablishedtoassesstheconflicts,suchasactsof
Page55
Box4Indicatorsofviolentconflict:GuatemalaandSomalia
Possessionbycommoncitizensofweaponsforself-defenseShootingsoverthepast12monthsOutbreaksofviolencecausedbythepresenceofarmedtroopsEvacuationofstaffsofinternationalbodiesoverthepast12monthsKidnappingofpeoplefornoncriminalreasonsNeedforforeignerstousearmedescortsRaidsorpillagingHumanrightsviolationsViolenceagainst,ordisappearanceorkidnappingof,politicians,unionists,andotherpublicrepresentativesUnlawfulexecutionsArmedoutbreaksamongrepresentativesofpartiesandpoliticalmovementsCrowdviolenceorriotsPoliceinterventionstorepresspublicdemonstrationsHighlevelsofcommoncrime,suchastheft,robbery,actsofviolence,organizedcrime,andmurder;presenceofillicittradingPresenceofroadblockscontrolledbyarmedsoldiersPresenceofarmedtroopsExistenceofunsafeareasPresenceoforganizationsdevotedtoself-
defenseofthepopulationPresenceofdeathsquadsDisruptionofeducationandhealthservicesdeliveryDestructionofinfrastructureandnaturalresourcesLossofmarketandfinancialresourcesPresenceofrefugeesanddisplacedpopulations
violence,thepresenceofarmedtroops,anddamagetoinfrastructureandmarketforces.
Theperiodsofconflictselecteddifferedinlength.ThewarinGuatemalalasted35years,makingitdifficulttoassesspreconflictsocialcapital.Totakethisintoconsideration,theconflictperiodwasassociatedwiththetimeofthemostintensefighting,198083.TheSomaligovernmentfellonlyeightyears
Page56
ago,butconditionshadbeendeterioratingsincetheendoftheOgadenwarwithEthiopiain1976,andintervieweeshaddifficultyindescribingthepreconflictperiod.
Guatemala:TheStateagainstthePeople
The35yearsofcivilwarinGuatemalaresultedinroughly180,000killings,40,000"disappearances,"thedestructionofmorethan400villages,internaldisplacementofover1millionpeople,andtheflightof100,000refugeestoneighboringcountries.Severesocial,economic,andpoliticalexclusionwasacatalystfortheprotracted,brutalconflict,andtheseexclusionaryissuesremainonlypartiallyresolvedafterthepeaceaccord.Currenttensions,asbefore,arefirmlyrootedintheexceedinglyinequitabledistributionofresources;70percentofthearablelandbelongsto3percentofGuatemalans,androughly80percentofthepopulationlivesinpoverty(Costello1995).
Thecivilwarbeganin1960withafailednationalistuprisingagainstcorruptionbyarmyofficers,whothensoughtrefugeinruralareasandformedaguerrillaarmy.ThemovementwasinitiallyalignedwithCubanrevolutionaryforcesandwasconsolidatedwithinLadino(Spanish-speaking)regions.
8However,"overthenexttwodecades,politicalandsocialreformsbecamearallyingpoint,withtheindigenouspopulationsplayingamajorrole"(Kostner,Nezam,andScott1997:2).Ethnicdifferenceswereattherootoftheunequaldistributionofresources,whichwasrigidifiedbytheracist,exclusivepoliticalstructurethatpromotedLadinointerestsandculture.Mayancommunitiesbecamepoliticizedasaresponsetothesehistoricalinjusticesandtheinfluenceofliberationtheology.Manyoftheguerrillamovements,althoughledbydisenfranchisedLadinos,recruitedlargenumbersofMayansandwerebasedinindigenoushighlandareas.ByincorporatingMayanconcerns
intotheirprogramforstruggle,guerrillaforcesaugmentedtheirtroopsandwidenedthescopeoftheircause.
Demandsforgreaterfreedomanddemocracyinthemid-tolate1970sweremetwithnewwavesofrepression,involvingmassacres,deaththreats,andtheassassinationoflocalleaders
Page57
andactivists.WarfarebecameevenmorebrutalandviciousandwastargetedtowardeliminatingtheMayanpeoplelivinginareaswheretheguerrillasoperated.Entiresectorsofthepopulationbecamemilitarytargetsforthestate.In198183alone,over100,000civilianswerekilled.Itwasinthisperiodthatmostoftheinternaldisplacement,forciblerelocations,andrefugeemovementscausedbythewartookplace.Concurrently,ahighlanddeforestationcampaignwasundertakentoremovephysicalcoverforguerrillas.Ashostilitiesmounted,theguerrillagroupsandtheCommunistGuatemalanWorkersParty(PGT)alignedin1982toformtheGuatemalanNationalRevolutionaryUnion(URNG).Bythistime,however,thepoorlyarmedguerrillaswereunabletodefendtheirsupportersintheruralhighlandsagainstthefullweightofmilitaryviolence(Costello1995).
Thelarge-scalemassacresweregenerallyoverby1984.ThearmysetupnewbasesthroughouttheMayanheartlandandgreatlyincreaseditsownwealthbyseizingproductivelandandimportantstateinstitutions.Itconsolidatedcontroloverruralpopulationsbysettingupmodelgovernmentvillagesthatreceivedreturningrefugeesanddisplacedpeople.Thearmyalsoorganizedanintensemilitarizationcampaign,recruitingcivilianmalesovertheageof16intocivildefensepatrols(PACs).Althoughrecruitmentwassupposedlyvoluntary,thosewhorefusedwereconsideredguerrillasympathizers.ThePACsguardedtowns,verifiedvillagers'identification,reportedanysuspiciousactivities,andassistedinsearchesforguerrillamovements;theyconsequentlyincreasedthedivisionsandsuspicionswithinindigenouscommunities.ThePACsreachedtheirheightinthemid-1980s,whentheyhadabout900,000members(Costello1995).
Throughouttheearly1980s,thegovernment'scounterinsurgencycampaignsexacerbatedtheoriginalcausesoftheconflict.Displacementandresettlementworsenedalreadygravelandscarcity
anddistributionproblems.Inaddition,thepoliticalstructurewasfarfromdemocratic,forarmyandmilitarycommissionersweretheonlystaterepresentativesinthehighlands.Cityauthoritieswereobligedtorequirepriorapprovalforgatheringsofmorethantwopeople.Centralizationofpowercontinuedtoincrease,andtherewasatotalabsenceofaccountability.
Page58
Indigenousgroupsandthoseinruralareasborethebruntofthesemountinginjustices.
Atransitiontowardpeacebeganaroundthemid-1980swiththeadoptionofanewconstitution,theelectionofacivilianpresident,andtheintroductionofpoliticalpluralismandpersonalliberties.Concurrently,preparationsweremadefornegotiations,involvingconsultationswithpoliticalparties,theprivatesector,religiousgroups,academics,laborunions,andothermembersofcivilsociety.FormaldiscussionsbetweentheURNGandthenewlyformedgovernmentcommissionforpeace(COPAZ)beganin1991,andin1994civilsocietywasbroughtintothenegotiations.Thefinalpeaceagreement,signedinDecember1996,broughttogetheraccordsondemocratization,humanrights,displacedpopulations,indigenousrights,socioeconomicissues,andtheroleofcivilsocietyandthemilitary.
Somalia:StateDisintegration,Anarchy,andResilience
InGuatemalastatewarfareagainstthepeopleresultedinthecentralizationofgovernmentpowerandreactionarypoliciesofviolenceandfearasameansofmaintainingcontrol;inSomaliaitledtothedisintegrationofthestate.
FromthetimeitoverthrewSomalia'sciviliangovernmentin1969,themilitarygovernmentofGeneralSiadBarreengagedinsystematicrepressionandeliminationofcivilsocietyactorsinanattempttomaintainabsolutecontrolForthefirstdecade,thiswasdonethroughtheideologyof"scientificsocialism,"whichcalledforthesuppressionofprivateinitiative,theunderminingofanyformofcivilactionnotsanctionedbythestate,andthedismantlingofcentersoftraditionalauthority(bondingsocialcapital).ThepublicexecutionofreligiousleadersfordisagreeingwithBarreontheinterpretationoftheQuran
wasamajorturningpointincommunity-governmentrelationsinthishighlyreligioussociety,greatlydeepeningpublicfearanddistrustofthegovernment.ThealienationofsocietywasfurtherentrenchedbythewidespreadarrestsofWestern-trainedintellectuals,theimprisonmentofthosesuspectedofdisloyalty,theestablishment
Page59
of''orientationcenters"fortheindoctrinationofthepopulation,andtheholdingofmassralliestopropagatethe"revolutionaryideology."Thesegovernmenteffortssoughttoreengineerthesocietyandcultivateapersonalitycultalongthelinesofcertaincommunistregimes.Thisfurthererodedthetraditionalvaluesthatprovidedthefoundationsforsocialcohesion.Aubiquitoussecurityapparatuscreatedfearandsuspicionamongindividualsandgroups.Thefiringofcivilservants(oftenthemostcompetentones)suspectedoflessthantotalloyaltytothe"revolution"severelyunderminedstateinstitutionalcapacityandintegrity.Thesemeasureshadtheeffectofhighlycentralizingauthority,degradingstateinstitutions,andunderminingcivilsocietyandinformalsocialrelations.
AftertheU.S.S.R.backedEthiopiainthe197778OgadenwarbetweenSomaliaandEthiopia,theBarregovernmentswitchedalliancesfromtheEasternsocialistbloctotheWest.Tomaintainpower,theregimeabandonedsocialistrhetoricandsolicitedandobtainedthesupportoftheUnitedStates.Concurrently,itsoughtthesupportofsomeclansandtargetedcertainotherclansforcollectivepunishment,strikingoutagainsttheMajerteenclanofthenortheast(someofwhosememberswereimplicatedinamilitarycoupin1978).Ascorched-earthcampaigntargetingbothpeopleandtheirmeansoftheirlivelihoodwasbeguninthisarea.TheabsenceofanymeaningfulreactionbyotherSomalistotheplightoftheirbrethrenreflectedboththepervasivefearofthegovernmentandanunravelingofcross-cuttingsocialtiesandtraditionalvalues.Thegovernment'sactionsdemonstratedthatanyformoforganizedoppositionwouldbemetwithmaximumforce,andmanypeopleremaineddocile.In1988afull-scalemilitaryassaultwaslaunchedagainsttheIssakclaninnorthernSomalia(presentSomaliland),destroyingallthemajorurbancentersandscatteringmostoftheurbanpopulationintoEthiopiaasrefugees.Thearmysystematicallydestroyedorlootedallvaluable
assetsinmosturbancentersandspreadantipersonnelminestopreventthereturnofrefugees.
Despiteitseffortstomaintainpower,theBarregovernment,withitslegitimacyforfeitedandthearmydisintegrating,collapsedin1991.Itsdissolutionunleashedthelegaciesofdecades
Page60
ofrepression:"acultureofvengeance,"areadysupplyofweaponsacquiredthroughColdWarpolitics,intenseinterclanhatreds,andafailedeconomyinwhichclansfoughtoverwhatfewresourceswereleft(Menkhaus1998:22021).BythetimeBarrefledthecapitalinJanuary1991,somemembersofthearmedforceswerealreadyengagedinlootingembassiesandpublicproperty.Warlordsdrewonbondingsocialcapitaltocreateprivatearmies,mainlymadeupoffellowclanmembers,thatdominatedgroupswithnoaccesstoweapons.(Thesharedexperienceinturnreinforcedthebondswithinthearmedgroups.)ViolentconflicteruptedacrossSomaliaovercontrolofeconomicresourcesandvisibleassets:theportandairportofthecapital,Mogadishu;richagriculturallands;andthesouthernportcityofKismayo.
Thesuddencollapseofaninternationallyrecognizedstatewithoutanyexternalforceorthreatwasauniqueeventinthehistoryofnations.Theself-inflictedimplosionbroughtmiserytomillionsofSomalis,settingoffaprolongedfamineandmassstarvationandusheringinadecadeofanarchyandviolence.Theseeventsnotonlydestroyedtheassetbaseofthecountryandtheaccumulatedgainsofgenerations;theyclaimedhundredsofthousandsoflivesandledtothedisplacementofthousandsofSomaliswithinandoutsidethecountry'sboundaries.
State-sponsoredviolenceandthesystematicdestructionofsocialcapitalduringBarre'smilitarydictatorshipnotonlyplantedtheseedsofthedisintegrationofthestatebutalsonurturedintergroupenmities.Nosocietalgluewaslefttoholdthenationtogetheroncetheformalstatestructurescollapsed.Thedisintegrationofthestateresultedinadifferentkindofviolencedecentralized,clan-based,anddrivenbythedesiretosettleoldscoresorthestruggleoverresources.Violencewasofteneitheranarchicorledbywarlordswhohadbeenabletoappropriatesignificantcachesofweaponry.
TheearlierexperienceduringthemilitarycampaignagainstHargeisaandothercities,whenmanymembersofthearmedforcesengagedinlootingatconsiderablegainandwithoutbeingheldaccountable,mayhavedemonstratedthepotentialbenefitsandlowrisksoflooting.Theinterclanconflictsthatfollowedweremainlyovercontrolofresources.Warlordsrecruitedun-
Page61
educated,armedyoungmentofueltheir"economiesofplunder"(Menkhaus1998:221).Theserenegadegroups,whosenewstatusandwealthwouldevaporateifpeaceandstabilitywererestored,haveworkedtoundermineUNandotherpeaceefforts(AdamandFord1998).
Externalpeaceeffortsrepeatedlyfailedduetoalackofunderstandingofthesituation.Negotiationsinvolvedmembersofthe16recognizedfactionsbattlingthroughoutSomalia,butexternalactorsfailedtorealizethatthesefactionslackedthelegitimacytoruleevenovertheterritorytheyclaimed.Theabilitytogovernhaddevolvedtoamuchmorelocallevel.TheUNmissionleftSomaliain1995withoutsuccessfullyestablishinganationalgovernment.Anarchy,however,didnotensue.Sincethen,violentconflicthasplaguedpartsofsouthernSomalia,butithasremainedlocalized.
Althougheffortstosetupacentralizedgovernmentfailed,someareasnotably,theself-proclaimedSomalilandRepublic(theformerBritishSomaliland)inthenorthwestandPuntlandinthenortheasthavereestablishedmarkets,servicesandservicedelivery,andminimalformsofgovernance.(Box5describesasuccessfulgrassrootsinitiativetocreatelocalgovernmentstructures.)ThisprogresshadbeendrivenbytraditionalSomaliauthoritiessuchaseldersandreligiousleaders,businessmen,andwomen'sassociations(Menkhaus1998).Relativepeaceandsecurityandahighdegreeofsocialresponsibilityandcivicaction,includingavibrantprivatesector,continuetoprevailinthosetwoareas.Coincidentally,theseareashadalsobeenthetargetsofwidespreadgovernmentatrocitiesagainstthecivilianpopulation.Thesharedexperienceofvictimizationmayhavecontributedtoabuildupofbondingsocialcapitalinthesetwoareas.
Theemergenceofmarketforces,eveninareaswhereopenconflict
continues,oftentendstomitigateconflictandraisethecostoflooting;ownersofprivatepropertyarelikelytoseekredress,withthesupportofrelativesandclanmembers,andtopursueperpetrators.Exchangeofgoodsandservicesbetweenclansandareasencouragescross-cuttingtiesandcreatesavestedinterestinminimizingopenconflict.Marketshavealsobeenable
Page62
Box5TheBoromaConference:abottom-upapproachtoreconciliation
Inrecentyears,anumberofreconciliationconferencesandotherinitiativesaimingatbringingtogetherthewarringfactionsinSomaliahavebeensponsoredbyvariousparties,includingtheUN,theOrganizationofAfricanUnity(OAU),theArabLeague,andneighboringcountriesbutnonesucceeded.Substantialamountsofdonormoneywerespentinorganizingtheseconferences.Theparticipantsweremainlythevariousfactionleaders,manyofthemresponsibleforpastorongoingtragedies,andthemeetingswereoftenheldinoverseaslocations.Therewasusuallynocommunityorgrassrootsparticipationintheselectionofparticipantsoreveninsettingtheagenda.Theconferencesweremainlytop-to-bottominitiatives,withthefactionsusuallyposturingforexternalaudiencesratherthantalkingtoeachother.
AcontrastingcasewasaconferenceheldinBoroma,Somaliland,in1995attendedbyabout2,000delegatesrepresentingpracticallyallthemaincommunities,clans,andlocalities.Theconference,patternedaftertraditionalpeacemeetings,lastedformorethanthreemonths,withoutatimelimit.Itwaslocallyorganizedandfinanced,anditaddressedgrievancesanddifferences
atthelocallevelbeforemovingtoformalgovernanceissues,statestructures,andpower-sharingarrangements.Attheendoftheconference,apresidentandaparliamentwereelected,andvariousinterclanconflictsweresettled.TheBoromaconferencesucceededwherelarger,externallydriven,top-downconferencesdidnot.
toprovideessentialgoodsandservices,sometimesmoreeffectivelythanwhentherewasaninternationallyrecognizedgovernment.Theabsenceofrestrictivegovernmentpolicieshastendedtoencouragecompetitionandentrepreneurship.
Infrastructureservicessuchastelecommunications,power,andtransportation,includingairwhichhadbeenprovidedbythepublicsectorarenowprovidedbythelocalprivatesector.EfficienttradingsystemshaveenabledSomalitraderstopenetratemarketsinneighboringcountriesandremaincompetitive.Theprivatesector,whichisseldomboundbyregionalandtribalorclandivisions,actsasanintegratingfactor.Thelivestocktrade
Page63
(thelinchpinoftheSomalieconomy),moneytransfer,transportation,andtelecommunicationsareallinterregionalandthereforehighlyintegrative.Privateactivityhasbeenmostactiveinareaswhererelativesecurityprevails.ThusthereisarelativelyvibrantprivatesectoraroundthenortheastportofBosaso(inPuntland)andinSomaliland.InHargeisa,Somaliland,forexample,therearefourcompetingtelephoneserviceproviderswithratesthatareinternationallycompetitive.Thereisarelativeboominrealestateandconstruction,andefficienttradeandbankingservices.Alocalprivateairline(DalloAirlines)linksHargeisanotonlywithothercitiesofSomaliabutalsowithseveralinternationaldestinations:Jeddah,Dubai,AddisAbaba,andDjibouti.Amoneytransfercompany(Dahabshil),startedbyalocalentrepreneur,hasbranchesinmanypartsoftheworldandconnectsSomalisinthediasporawithrelativesathome.ItcantransfermoneyfrommostmajorcitesinEurope,NorthAmerica,andtheMiddleEasttorelativesanywhereinSomalia,orbetweendifferentlocalitiesinsideSomalia,withinacoupleofdays.
Civilsociety,includingreligiousorganizations,andclaneldershaveplayedasignificantroleinmediatinginterclanconflictsandencouragingcross-cuttingactivities.Religiousgroups,whichareactiveevenwherehostilitieshavenotyetceased,haveprovidedhealthandeducationservicesandhaveinsomeinstancessuppliedfoodtoorphansandpoorfamilies.Thesegroupsoftentranscendclanandregionallines,thushelpingstrengthencross-cuttingsocialcapital.TheroleofcivilsocietyincontainingconflictismostevidentinSomaliland,wheretraditionalleadershipandauthorityhaveremainedrelativelyintact,despitetheeffortsofthelastcentralgovernmenttosubvertit.Clanleadersareoftenmosteffectiveinbuildingbondingcapitalbetweenmembersofagroupandmediatingconflictwithinthatgroup,buttheyhavealsobeensuccessfulinmediatingandcontainingconflictbetweengroupsandclansinareasofrelativecalm.
Thesetraditionalleadershavebeenthemainelementinrestraininginterclanconflictandinlayingthebasisfortheemergenceofcivilauthority.Theyareleasteffectiveinareaswherethereisstillopenconflictorthatarerunbywarlords.
Page64
TheImpactofStateandMarketForcesonSocialCohesioninGuatemalaandSomalia
TheSomaliandGuatemalangovernmentsbothstruckoutagainsttheirpeoplesintheirattemptstomaintaincontroloverpowerandresources.IndigenousandruralgroupsinGuatemalafoughttogainpolitical,economic,andsocialrightsand,inparticular,accesstoland.Campaignsbythegovernmenttoeradicatethe"enemy"ledtoyearsofviolenceacrosstheGuatemalancountryside.Socialinitiativemovesbycivilsocietyfinallyusheredinpeaceafteralmostfourdecadesofwarfareandextermination.
TheSomaligovernmenttriedtosuppressallformsofoppositionandintheprocessfellintoanarchy,withclanbattlingclanoverpower.Tocounterthischaos,sociallyresponsiblereligiousgroupshaveprovidededucationandhealthservices.AlthoughhostilitieshavenotceasedinSomalia,varioustypesofsocialinitiativehaveemerged.Manywomen'sgroupshavetriedtopromotepeacemaking,andglobalization,especiallyintheformofmarketpenetration,hasfacilitatedsuccessfulmovestowardstabilityinthenorthwesternandnortheasternregions.
Accordingtoconventionalwisdom,thehigherthecapacityofcivilsocietyforsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative,thehigherthelevelofsocialcapital.Thestudyresultsshowhowtheeffectofconflictonthetwodimensionsofsocialcapitaldifferedinthecountriesstudied(seeTables5and6).
Thestudyresultsrevealtherelationshipbetweenthedevelopmentofcivilsocietyandviolentconflictisnottotallypredictable.Warcausesthedecayand,inseveresituations,theweakeningofcivilsociety,particularlybyreinforcingbonding,inward-lookingsocialcapitalinthequestforsurvivalofteninadvertentlyunderminingcross-cutting
socialcapitalthatmaybridgediversecommunalgroups.Yet,asthisstudyindicates,insomesituationscivilsocietymaycontinuetobeactive,ormaythriveevenasfightingcontinues,byprovidingwelfareandprotectionservicesinvolatileregionsthussupplantingprimaryrelations,andinmoresecureareas,creatingthespaceandconnectivitythatmarketforcesrequire.
Page65
Table5Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:GuatemalaHigh-conflictperiod Low-conflictperiod
Highsocialcapital
Emergenceofgroupsthatprovidedsocialwelfareandprotectivemechanismsduringandimmediatelyafterconflict,suchasthenumerousNGOsandothercivilsocietygroups.
Religiousleaderswholedliberationtheologymovementsandwho,withtheirfollowers,wereoftentargetedbythestatefortheirbeliefsandactions.
OrganizationsofGuatemalanwomenwhounitedtopromotepeacemaking.
TraditionalMayaninstitutions,suchasMayaspirituality,thatprovidedasafetynetforcommunitiesaffectedbyviolence,andnationalMayaorganizationsthatunitedtofightfortherecognitionoftheirrightsduringthepeacenegotiationsandinthereconstructionprocess.
TraditionalGuatemalanstructures,suchasthealcaldesauxiliares,whowereelectedbytheircommunitiesandwerechargedwithrepresentingtheminthemunicipalgovernment.Theyhadsomeadministrative,judiciary,andpolicefunctionsandwerechargedwithlocaldisputeresolution.
Lowsocialcapital
Targetingofthestate'sownconstituentsduringthewar.Thiswasacentralpolicyofthemilitaryauthoritiesandwasfacilitatedbythebreakdownofthelegalsystemanddemocraticcontrols,whichthenallowedtheviolationofhumanrights.Humanrightsviolationsoftentooktheformofprivateviolenceimplementedbysecretandparamilitaryorganizationsonordersfromhighpoliticalfigures.Inmostcases,theviolencetookplaceawayfromthetheaterofwar,oftenstrikingpeoplenotdirectlyinvolvedineitherpoliticalaffairsorguerrillawarfare.Thesystemimplementedtoperpetratethesecrimeswasdeeplyrootedinthecountry.Thismilitarypolicyfurthererodedrelationsbetweenthepeopleandthegovernment.
DiscriminationagainsttheMayas,whichhasbeen,andremains,imbeddedinGuatemalanculture,preventingthecreationofcross-cuttingsocialcapital.
Lackofcross-cuttingsocialcapital,evidencedbythehistoricallypoorrelationsbe-
(Tablecontinuesonnextpage)
Page66
Table5(continued)High-conflictperiod Low-conflictperiod
Schismswithincommunitiesassomevillagersjoinedgovernment-supportedcivildefensepatrols(PACs).ThePACs,alongwithmilitarycommissars,replacedthetraditionalalcaldesauxiliares.
tweenindigenousgroupsandtheLadinos.Althoughsocialcapitalwithineachgroupmayhavebeenhighorstable,thelackofbridgingsocialcapitalhaspreventedunderstandingbetweenthem.
Adverseeffectsonothersocialstructuresandtraditionalfigures.Elders,whoseauthorityhadalreadybeenweakenedbyCatholiccatechists,werefurtherunderminedbyrepression.Cofradias,traditionalreligiousstructures,losttheirabilitytocarryontheircomplexritualsduringthewar,andtheirleaders(mayordomos)lostmuchoftheirauthority.
Page67
Table6Interactionsbetweenviolentconflictandsocialcapital:SomaliaHigh-conflictperiod
Low-conflictperiod
Highsocialcapital
EmergenceofadefactogovernmentinHargeisaabletoprovideservicesandorder.
Increasedmarketpenetrationthroughthediaspora,promotingcross-cuttingties.
Emergenceofwomen'sinitiativesduringtheconflict,unitingclansthroughtradeandeconomicactivities("Green-Linemarkets").
Provisionbyreligiousinstitutionsofservicessuchaseducationand
Somalieldersfromdifferentclansmanagedandresolvedconflictbyusingasguidancecustomarylawsthatregulatedandcurbedpotentialconflictwithinorbetweenclans.EldersthusretainedacriticalfunctioninSomalisocietythroughtheirimportantroleinnegotiationswithothergroupsandasmediatorsfortheirowncommunities.Intheory,eldersdidnothaveauthoritativepowertodeterminetheoutcomeofaconflict;rather,theyrepresentedthepreferencesoftheirclans.
Allianceofclansthroughmarriage,whichestablishedsocialandeconomictiesbetweenthegroups.
healthcarethatthegovernmentwasunabletoprovide.
Lowsocialcapital
DissolutionofthestategovernmentofSomalia.
Clashesbetweenclansvyingforcontrolofpower,territory,andresources.
Inabilityofclanstosuccessfullynegotiateapeaceagreementdespitenumerousinternational,regional,andlocalefforts.
ThechronicdisconnectbetweentheSomalistateanditspeople.Lackofgovernmentorganizationalintegrityandsynergisticrelationsthroughoutthecountry'sindependence,exceptforashortperiodofafewyears.
Page68
Socialresponsibilityandthelevelofviolentconflictdidseemtobepositivelycorrelated.StudyresultsrevealedthatthesocialresponsibilityofcivilsocietyseemedtobemoreactiveinbothNebajandHargeisathanincommunitiesnotastraumatizedbywar.Thisdevelopment,whichwasattributedtotheneedtosecurebasicneedsandensuresurvival,emergedinbothconflictareasduringorsoonaftertheconflict.Thus,warwouldseemtohaveapositiveimpactonmobilizingfamiliesandtightlyknitcommunitiestobecomesociallyresponsibleinensuringcommunalprotectionandsurvival,predominantlywelfarefunctions.
Theresultsofthestudyfailedtoexplainunambiguouslyhowconflictaffectedsocialinitiativethatis,civilsociety'sabilitytonurtureeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.Ingeneral,levelsofsocialinitiativewereaffectedlessbyconflictthanbyotherfactors,primarilyconfidence,materialopportunities,cognitivecapital,andnormativeobstacles.(Itshould,however,benotedthatconflictdoesdirectlyaffectthesefactorsandthusindirectlyinfluencessocialinitiative.)PuertoBarriosandHargeisahadrelativelyhighsocialinitiativelevelsdespitemixedexperienceswithconflict.(PuertoBarrioswaslesstraumatizedthanNebaj,whileHargeisawasexposedtomoreconflictthanBoroma.)AreasonforthismixedresultmaybethatPuertoBarriosandHargeisaarelargerthantheircounterpartsand,perhapsbecauseoftheirsize,havehigherlevelsofmarketpenetration.PuertoBarriossufferedlessdamagetoitsinfrastructure(roadsandcommunications)thandidNebaj,whileHargeisa'sinfrastructurebenefitedfromanengagedandactivediasporacommittedtoreinvestinginandrebuildingnorthernSomalia.Theseoutsidecontacts,incombinationwithweakstatepenetrationand,therefore,fewerfinancialregulations,expeditedgrowthinHargeisa.This,inturn,providedanopeningfortheformationofbridgingsocialcapitalthroughthemarketplace.
Overall,thestudyfindingsappeartoillustrateinterestingfacetsofthetwodimensionsofsocialcapitalsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative,orhorizontalsocialcapitalinresponsetovaryinglevelsofstateandmarketpenetration(verticalsocialcapital).Ofthetwohard-hittowns,Nebajhadahighsocialresponsibilitylevelandalowsocialinitiativelevel,whereas
Page69
Hargeisahadhighlevelsofsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative.PuertoBarrioshadlowerlevelsofsocialresponsibilityandhigherlevelsofsocialinitiative,andBoromaexhibitedlowerlevelsofbothsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative.
ThefindingsinGuatemalastemfromvaryingdegreesofstatepenetrationanddemographics.Nebajwasoneofthemainareaswherethearmyfullyprosecuteditscounterinsurgencystrategy,withPACsbeingestablishedinallcommunities.Thetown,whichisroughly95percentMaya-Ixil,turnedinwardinresponsetothediscriminatoryandviolentpracticesofthestate.PuertoBarrioswaslesstouchedbyviolence,hadamoremixedLadinoandMayanpopulation(withsomeblacksandGarifunas,orblackCaribs),andwaslessaffectedbystatepenetrationthroughthecounterinsurgencyeffortsthanitscounterpartNebaj.Itscoredhighonsocialinitiativebutlowonsocialresponsibility.Thistranslatesintospecifictypesofhorizontalandverticalsocialcapitalthatdifferedbetweenthetowns,withNebajexemplifyingprimarybondingsocialcapitalandPuertoBarriostiltingtowardbridgingsocialcapital.
Inshort,wheretherewasspace,civilsocietyinGuatemalareactedbyformingbridgingsocialcapital.Wheretherewasdiscriminationandoppression,civilsocietycontractedintoinsular,bondingsocialcapital.Insomecases,traditionalMayaninstitutions,suchasMayanspiritualityandcommunitystructures,providedasafetynetforthosemostaffectedbyviolence,whilenationalMayanorganizationsunitedtofightfortherecognitionoftheirrightsduringthepeacenegotiationsandinthereconstructionprocess.
Thus,althoughtheremaybesomeinteractionbetweensocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative,theyappeartodivergeduringheightenedperiodsofconflict,withakindofsurvivalistretreatintoprimarybondingsocialcapitaltakingplaceespeciallyamongthe
discriminated-againstMayanpopulation.ThisisnotunlikethebehaviorofCambodians,andtheTutsiofRwandaduringtheheightoforganizedstateviolenceinthosesocieties.
Inexaminingcivilsociety'scapacityforsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiativeinGuatemalaandSomalia,theroleofthestateandmarketforcesisevident.Mappingthefunctionsand
Page70
responsibilitiesofcivilsocietyrevealedtheinadequaciesandthestrengthsofthestateandtheinvolvementoftheexternalmarket.Civilsocietyinbothcountriessubstitutedforstaterolesbybecomingthemainproviderofsafetynetsandbasicservices,especiallyforvulnerablegroupsinthecontextofafailedstate(inSomalia)andanoppressive,exclusionarystate(inGuatemala).InSomalia,andtoalesserextentinGuatemala,theeffectsofglobalization,intheformofexternalverticalmarketpenetrationandthespreadoftechnology,facilitatedtheformationofbridginghorizontalsocialcapitalandtheestablishmentofrelativepeaceanddevelopmentbymakingpossiblesocialspace,exchange,andeconomicgrowth.
Onthebasisoftheseinitialfindings,acloserexaminationofsocialcapitalastheabilityofcivilsocietytoengageinsocialresponsibilityandsocialinitiative,andtheinterrelationsofthesedimensionswithstateandmarketpenetration,isneededtoshedlightonthecomplexprocessofindigenoussurvival,reconstruction,development,and,ultimately,reconciliationintheaftermathofvaryingdegreesofviolentconflict.
Page71
5Civic,Market,andStateEngagement:AComparativeAnalysisCivic,market,andstateengagementunderconditionsofviolentconflicthavevaryingeffectsonoverallsocialcapitalformationandsocietalcohesion.AswastrueinCambodiaandRwanda,thedegreetowhichtheoverallsocialcohesionofGuatemalaandSomaliaisrealizedwillbeafunctionoftheintegrationofhorizontalsocialcapitalintheformofathrivingcivilsociety(bridging)andstrongprimaryrelations(bonding)withverticalsocialcapital,manifestedindynamic,inclusivestateandmarketengagement.Thisnexus,inturn,manifestsitselfinamyriadofcross-cuttingsocialandinstitutionalrelationsthatcanserveaconflictmanagement,mediation,andmitigation(prevention)function,thebasisforlastingpeaceandsustainabledevelopment.Ineachofthefourcasestudies,civicengagementemergedbothduringandimmediatelyaftertheconflictintheformofmobilizationofsocialprotectionoractivitiesforgrowthanddevelopment.Marketactivitiesemergedinthemorestableregionsofcountriesplaguedbyconflictorintheimmediateaftermathperiodandenabledbridging,intercommunityrelations.Theinterfaceofthestatewithsocialcapitalandconflictiscomplex;boththeoverpoweringpresenceofthestate(inCambodia,Rwanda,andGuatemala)anditsabsence(inSomalia)ledtothedisruptionofmostsocialrelations.
Page72
CopingwithViolentConflict:TheRoleofCivilSocietyduringWarfare
Manifestationsofsocialcapitalemergedduringconflictorimmediatelyafterthecessationofhostilitiesintheformoflocal,internalcopingmechanismsthatprovidedwelfareandsocialprotectionineachcountrystudied(seeBox6).Inthisregard,conflictseeminglyspurredintegrativesocialcapitalgearedtowardmitigatingriskswithinthecommunity.Interestingly,thisoccurrednotonlywithinnuclearandextendedfamiliesbutalsowithinthebroadercommunity,encompassingcivilsocietyactors.Thissocialcapitalbasedonprimaryassociationsresembledwhathadexistedinthepreconflictperiod,withslightvariationsonthepreviousforms.
Bothbondingandbridgingsocialcapitalemergedwithincivilsocietyintheformofmovestowardwelfareandsocialprotectionand,tosomeextent,growthanddevelopment(suchaseffortstoexpeditethepeaceprocess).DuringtheHengSamrinperiodinCambodia,astheconflictbegantowane,traditionaltypesofsocialcapital(forexample,pagodaandfuneralassociations)revived,informssimilartothosebeforetheconflict.InRwanda,newassociationsofwidowsandorphansemergedtoprovidemutualassistanceshortlyafterthegenocideceased,takingupthetraditionalrolesoffamiliesincaringforthesevulnerablegroups.InGuatemala,Mayanwomen'sassociationsemergedduringthewarandservedasacatalystforthepeaceprocess,whileindigenousgroupsunitedthroughtherecreationofinstitutionsforself-protectionandpromotion,suchastheComunidadesdePoblaciónenResistencia(CPR).Andinthemidstofnationalconflict,religiousinstitutionsinSomaliahaveestablishedschoolsandprovidedhealthservices.
Civicreactionstoconflictanditslegaciescopingmechanismsvariedbycountryandtypeofwarfare.Ingeneral,copingmechanismscanbe
internalorexternalandtraditionallyrangefromhorizontalsocialcapitalrelations,suchasfamily,extendedfamily,orclans,tomorebridgingformalandsometimesverticalorganizationssuchasreligiousgroups,localgovernments,andmarkets.
Page73
Box6Civilsocietyandviolentconflict
Cambodia
IntraditionalCambodiansociety,groupsthatlinkednon-kinwerefew.Inbothvillagesexaminedforthestudylow-conflictPrasathandhigh-conflictPreyKohsomeformsofcivilsocietyactorsexistedbeforethewar,butduringtheconflict,alltypesofcivilsocietyactorsceasedtoexist.Afterthecessationofhostilities,civilsocietyactors,notablyNGOsinvolvedinsocioeconomicdevelopment,increasedinnumberandfunction.
Rwanda
ManyeffortsweremadetostrengthencivilsocietyinRwandainthelate1980sandearly1990s,inthestudyvillagesofShyandaandGitiasinotherplaces.Yettheexistenceofcivilsocietyactorsbeforetheconflictincludingcooperatives,creditgroups,church-relatedorganizations,andNGOsdidnotleadtothegrowthofcross-cuttingsocialcapital,asevidencedbytherapidexplosionofthegenocide.CivilrelationsbetweenHutuandTutsiquicklyevaporatedoncethestateorderedTutsielimination.Aprimaryreasonwasthenarrowserviceorientationofthegroups,whichweremainlyapolitical.Democracy,inclusion,andtolerancedidnot
automaticallyresultfromthegroups'mereexistence;thesequalitiesneedtobeactivelyfostered.Inthepost-genocidesetting,newcivilsocietyactorsareexclusiveinthattheybenefitonlytheirmembers,buttheyhaveservedtoempowerthevulnerable(mainlywomenandorphans).
Guatemala
Duringthewar,Guatemalanwomen'sorganizationswereavaluablecatalystforthepeaceprocess.Tiredofwarfareandtheresultingdestitutionandtragedy,thesegroupsbegantolobbyforapeacefulsolutionbyunitingandinvolvingrelevantactors.Theconflicthasalsospurredthegrowthofnumerousassociationsofindigenouspeopletoprotecttheirexistence,wayoflife,andinterests.ThishasoccurredthroughoutGuatemala,includingbothstudysites,NebajandPuertoBarrios.Thepurposesofthegroupsrangefrompursuingpoliticalactivitiestopromotingeconomicinitiativestospurincomegenerationinthesemostlyimpoverishedruralregions.
Somalia
Inbothstudysites,HargeisaandBoroma,religiousinstitutionshavearisentomakeupforthedearthofstatehealthandeducationservices.Manywomen'sgroupshavesteppedtotheforefrontofthepeaceeffort,linkingwarringclansthroughexchangeand
women'speacediscussions.CivilsocietyinnorthernSomaliahasflourishedasaresultofthedemandforservicesandmarketopportunitiesintheabsenceofstateprovision,regulation,andcontrol.
Page74
Internalmechanismsincludesocialunits,localreligiousinstitutions,localpoliticalorganizations,andeconomicsystems.
Thesocialunit,whichincludesnuclearandextendedfamilies,isthestrongestandmostbasicofallinternalcopingmechanisms.Incrises,familiesfirsthelpthemselves,thentheirrelatives,andthentheirneighbors.Duringthetransitionfromwartopeace,thefamilyisthesocialunitthatismostlookedtoforemotionalrecovery.
Religiousinstitutions(churches,mosques,andtemples)oftenprovideleadership,comfort,andemotionalsupportindisasters.Duringreconstruction,theyareanexcellententrypointforexternalactors,sincetheyallowdirectaccesstothecommunitythroughpreexistingknowledge,relations,andcommunicationschannels.
Localpoliticalorganizationsmayprovideleadership,superviseexternalinterventionduringacrisis,andassistwithplanningandimplementationduringreconstruction.
Economiccopingmechanismsfallintothreetypes:informal,interpersonaleconomicrelationships;patronage;andmutualassistanceorganizationssuchascooperativesandlaborunions.Duringwarfareorcrisis,interpersonaleconomicrelationshipsmayemergeaspartofthewartimeeconomy,asisthecasewithmuchoftheentrepreneurshipinnorthernSomalia.Reconstructioneffortscantargettheseinformalrelationsthroughmacropolicyandcanhelpspurlocalgrowththroughmicrocreditefforts(seeBox7).Mutualassistanceorganizationssuchascooperativesshouldbesoughtoutasnaturalcounterpartsinthedeliveryofemergencyreliefandinlonger-termreconstruction.
ExternalmechanismsincludenonlocalorganizationssuchasNGOs,religiousgroups,politicalorganizations,economicinstitutions,socialandeconomicdevelopmentorganizations,and,insomecases,the
nationalgovernment.AsCuny(1994:84)statesinhisseminalwork,''Theeffectivenessofexternalmechanismsdependslargelyupontheirabilitytounderstandanddealwithculturalconstraintswithinthehostsociety,theirviewofdevelopment,andtheirabilitytocommunicateeffectivelywiththe
Page75
Box7Women'svillagebankinginGuatemala:buildingcross-cuttingtiesthroughcredit
InthehighlandsofGuatemala,awar-ravagedarea,socialcapitalhasbeenrestoredandisbeingtransformedthroughvillagebanking.There,theexpansionofsocialnetworksamongruralandsemiurbanmarginalizedwomenispayingfinancialandsocialdividends.Oftenoverlookedinstudiesofmicrofinanceprogramsistheimportanceofusingsocialandassociationalarrangementstopromotegroupsolidarityasameansofovercomingthehighcostoflendingtoclientswithfewassets.Workinginhigh-conflictsituationswhereviolenceanduncertaintyunderminetrustandconfidenceisdifficult.Humanitarianassistanceprogramscancompoundtheproblemthroughpaternalisticapproaches,turningonceself-reliantcitizensintopassivebeneficiaries.
Invillagebanks,trustplaysanenormouslyimportantroleinkeepingoperationsefficient,reducingtransactioncosts,andsmoothingrelations.Witheachsuccessfulcycleoflendingandrepayment,thestockofsocialcapitalgrows,astrustandconfidencearedeepened.StaffmembersofFINCA,theNGOfacilitatingtheGuatemalanbankingprogram,transfersits
stockofsocialcapital(networksandrelationships),aswellasitsfinancialaccountingandbankingknow-how,toMayanwomen.Theprogramlinkstheclientstootheractorsandtoprivateandpublicinformation.Ineffect,ittransformstheirexistingbondingsocialcapitalintoabroaderbridgingsocialcapitalthat,inturn,hasspin-offeffectsonproductionandmarketingand,ultimately,onincomeandwell-being.
Source:Humphreys-BebbingtonandGomez(2000).
victims."Thesegroupsmaybecomeinvolvedduringthedisaster,inthetransitionphase,inreconstruction,orinlonger-termdevelopment.Althoughthisgroupofexternalmechanismsdoesnotdirectlyincludecivilsociety,itdoesinterfacewithmanycivilsocietyactors.
Inacrisis,peopleusuallyturntothatwhichismostfamiliar,andthiscanenhancecopingmechanisms'efficacyandabilitytooperate.Ingeneral,lesscomplexsocieties,suchasruralcultures,haveshorterrecoveryperiods.Inruralsettings,externalmechanismsaremoreeffectiveandefficientiftheyoperatethrough
Page76
existinginternalmechanisms.Overlyintrusiveexternalinterventionsmayinadvertentlyinjureordisplaceinternalcopingmechanismsordecreasetheireffectivenessortheirabilitytofunction.Inmorecomplexurbansettings,itislesslikelythatinternalcopingmechanismswillbeutilized.Externalmechanismsthenbecomemoreappropriateforintervention.
Crisesmayseverelystrainindigenouscopingmechanisms,whetherinformalorformal,buttheydonotdestroythem.Often,conflictanddisasteracttoreinforcethesemechanismsandforcelocalorganizationstoimprovetheirabilities.Amajorconcernisthatexternalinterventionsmayignorelocal,spontaneouscopingmechanisms,disrupttheinternalgroups'abilitytofunction,and,insomecases,damagethelocalcopingfabric,underminingthecredibilityoflocaleffortswithinthecommunity.Thus,additiveratherthansubstitutionalstrategiesarethepreferredcourseofactionduringthetransitionfromemergencytodevelopment.
Asevidencedinearlierchapters,variousformsofsurvival-basedsocialcapitaldidemergefromwithinthesocietyduringorimmediatelyaftertheconflict,andthesevariedaccordingtothenatureofconflictthatplaguedeachcountry.Effortstoreconstructsocialcapitalinthepostwarenvironmentmustbuildfromtheseindigenous,spontaneouscopingmechanisms,whicharealreadyinplaceandfunctioning.
MarketForces,Globalization,andViolentConflict
Soonafterhostilitiesceased,newsecondarylevelsofbridgingassociationalsocialcapitalemerged,forgingthelinksnecessaryforgrowthanddevelopment(seeBox8).InHargeisa,Somaliprivateentrepreneurs(primarilyfromthediaspora)initiatedbusinessactivitiestoreinstateservicessuchascommunicationsandpublic
transportation,whilewomen'sgroupsopenedmarketsthatallowedexchangebetweenwarringclans.InPreyKoh,Cambodiantransportationentrepreneursfacilitatednewbusinesstiesbetweenhaulersandvegetableproducers.Intheimmediatepostconflictperiod,linkagesexternaltoprimarygroupstendedtoproliferate,encouragedbythepotentialinvolvement
Page77
Box8Marketpenetrationandviolentconflict
Cambodia
Bothvillageswererelativelyunexposedtotheeffectsofglobalizationandmodernizationinthepreconflictperiod.Forthemostpart,theonlyexternalactororinfluencewasthegovernment,whichprovidedafewbasicservicesineachvillage.Farming,mostlycarriedonbyindividualfamilies,continuedtobethemainactivity.Exchangeprimarilyinvolvedlaborandgoods,butsomeexchangesformoneydidtakeplace.
Prasathhaslittleeconomicactivityexceptfortradewithinthevillageinlocalagriculturalproductsandnecessities.Ingeneral,theareahadfewerresourcesthanPreyKoh,anditsproximitytoamountainous,forestedregionmakesitmorepronetosurpriseattacks.PreyKoh,closertoamainroadandthereforetomarketactivities,hasdeepermarketpenetrationandmoreexternalties.
Rwanda
BothShyandaandGitiwererelativelypoorcommunes.Mosttypesofexchangewereinagriculturalproductsand,tosomeextent,livestock.Scarcityoflandandcattle,as
wellasincreasinglanddegradation,becameproblemsaspopulationlevelscontinuallyrose.Thefallofcoffeepricesinthelate1980sfurtheraggravatedtheworseningeconomicconditions.Credit,giftgiving,andmutualassistancedecreasedasimpoverishmentgrew.
Inbothcommunes,modernizationandmonetizationhavecontinuedtotransformformsofsocialcapital.Heightenedindividualismandtheincreasedvalueplacedonmoneyhaveledtodiminishinginvolvementinactivitiestobenefittheoverallcommunityandtogreaterreluctancetoextendcredit.Mutualassistancehasalsodecreasedtoadegree.Asmoneyhasbecameamoreintegralpartofcommunalliving,peoplehavetendedtolockuptheirbelongings,perhapscreatingasenseofmistrustorlackofsecurity.
Guatemala
ThemarkethadlittleeffectineitherNebajorPuertoBarriosbeforethewar,probablybecauseofgovernmentpoliciesthatfocusedongrowthanddevelopmentinurbancentersanddidnotencouragemarketaccessanddevelopmentincertainruralareas.NebajisandhasbeenrelativelymoreisolatedthanPuertoBarriosfromeconomicactivities,exceptforthoseassociatedwithfarming.
Somalia
EconomicactivityhasemergedinbothHargeisaandBoromadespitetheconflictthatcontinuestoplaguethesouthernregionsofSomalia.MuchofthisneweconomicgrowthanddevelopmenthastakenplaceincommunicationsandtransportationandhasbeeninitiatedbytheSomalidiaspora.Thewaractuallyspurredeconomicgrowthanddevelopmentintheregion,probablybecausetherewaslessstatecontrol,lessregulation,andfewertraderestrictions.
Page78
ofadiaspora,theabsenceofstateregulationandcontrol,andthedisruptionoftraditionalconstraintsorofoverlyrestrictivegrouployalties.
ThefindingsfromtheRwandaandCambodiastudiessuggestthatmodernizationhasalsoaffectedthetransformationofthestructureofsocialcapital.Overall,localperceptionsofsocialcapitalfocusedprimarilyonwhatwasdeemed"tradition"(traditionalnorms,values,andcustoms)andthesocialcapitalconceptsaffiliatedwithbonding,orprimarysocialcapital.Interviewees'definitionsofsocialcapital,forthemostpart,didnotextendtoexternallinkages(thatis,tothestate'seffectiveness,capacitytofunction,orconnectednesstothecommunity).Participantsviewedmovestowardestablishinglinkagesasaweakeningoftheirsocialcapital.VillagersinPreyKohandPrasathandcommunemembersinGitiandShyandaallfeltthatmarketpenetrationandmonetizationhaderodedlocaltrustandmutualassistance.Inotherwords,astheysawit,movestowardglobalizationhaddissolvedtraditionalsocial,political,andeconomicstructures.Manystatedthattheythoughtmarketpenetrationhadaffectedsocialcapitalintheirsocietiesmorethanhadconflict,intermsoftheshiftoffocusfromfamilialandintracommunitytiestointercommunityrelations.
Thetransformationalreadysetinmotionbytrendstowardglobalizationineachcountrywasacceleratedbyconflictandtheresultingbreakinthenormalfunctioningofsocialcapitalsystems.Oppressiveandexploitativesecondaryrelationsandlinkagesresultedindiminishedtrustandweakenedsocialcohesion.ExternalinterventionssuchashumanitarianreliefandNGOssteppedin,tovaryingdegreesfromcountrytocountry,tofillthetraditionalprotectionandservice-supplyingrolestypicalofkinandstate.
StateFailureandCivilWar
Alackoforganizationalintegrityandsynergyofthestate,orpoorverticalsocialcapitalrelations,wasakeycauseofeachconflictexamined(seeBox9).Ineachcasethegovernmentdidnothavetheabilitytoperformstandardstaterolesandwasremote
Page79
Box9Statepenetrationandviolentconflict
Cambodia
Duringtheconflict,statepenetrationwasequallydeepinthehigh-conflictvillage(PreyKoh)andthelow-conflictvillage(Prasath).Thestatewasdistantfrombothvillagesinthepreconflictperiod,providingonlyafewbasicservicestoeither.DuringtheLonNolandKhmerRougeregimes,thestateexertedconsiderablepressureoncommunities.ManyvillagerswereforcedtojointheLonNolranks;somejoinedvoluntarilyforfearofbeingassociatedwiththe"losing"sideiftheydidnot.StatepowerundertheKhmerRougewasabsolute,andallformsofreligion,culture,tradition,organization,andfamilyweredestroyed.Peoplewereherdedfromthecitiesintoruralcampstoworkoncommunalfarms.Punishmentforanybreachofconductwassevere.WhentheKhmerRougetookoverPrasathandPreyKoh,thosewhohadbeenaffiliatedwiththeLonNolarmywerepunished,andvillagersweresplitbetween"old"and"new"people,accordingtohowlongtheyhadbeenunderKhmerRougecontrol.The"old"peoplereceivedprivilegesinpreferencetothe''new"people,dividingthevillageandincreasingasenseofdistrust.
Rwanda
Traditionally,thecentralgovernmenthasexertedextremecontroloverRwandans.
Highconflict.AfterthegenocideeruptedinKigaliandnearbyareas,manyRwandansfledtoShyanda,whichwasknownforsolidHutuandTutsirelations.However,followingavisitfromtheactingprimeminister,sensitizationsessionswereheldamongHutu,andkillingsofTutsibeganonthesameday.
Lowconflict.TheburgomasterinGiti,unlikemanycommunalleadersthroughoutRwanda,wasactuallyfromthecommuneandwasfamiliarwithhisconstituents.Whenkillingsbrokeoutontheedgeofhiscommune,heunitedHutuandTutsitosafeguardTutsiinGiti.ThecommunewasalsosparedthehatepoliticstypicalthroughoutRwandafromtheearly1960sonward.ItsshiftingadministrativetieswiththeprefecturesofKigaliandByumbaweakenedthechainofauthoritybetweenthecenterandthecommune,andthisdistanceaffordedGitithespacetorefusetojoininthekillings.Inaddition,ByumbawasanearlypointofreentryfortheRPF,whichprotectedmembersofitsethnicgroup.
Guatemala
Duringthewar,systematicviolationsofhumanrights,mostofthembythestateagainstthepeople,tookplaceinbothNebajandPuertoBarrios(aselsewhereinGuatemala).Thebreakdownofthelegalsystemandofdemocraticcontrols,whichallowedtheviolationofhumanrights,becameacentralpolicyofthemilitaryauthorities.Often,humanrights
(Boxcontinuesonnextpage)
Page80
Box9(continued)
violationstooktheformofprivateviolence,implementedbysecretandparamilitaryorganizationsonordersfromhighpoliticalfigures.Theviolencetookplaceawayfromthebattlefieldinmostcases,strikingpeoplenotdirectlyinvolvedineitherpoliticsorguerrillaactivities.
Thegovernmenthadahistoryofrepressionandviolenceagainstindigenouspeoplesandpeoplelivinginruralareas,especiallyiftheyweresuspectedofbeingaffiliatedwiththeguerrillas.Governmentruleenforcedhighlypoliticalandexclusionaryeconomicandsocialpolicies,givingasmallminorityalmostabsolutepoliticalpowerandcontrolovermostresources.ThegovernmentalsomadeeffortstosplitcommunitiesbyrecruitingvillagersasmembersofthePACs.
Somalia
SiadBarreattemptedtodestroyallclan-basedsocialinstitutionsbyrenamingclanleaders"peacekeepers"andincorporatingthemintothestatebureaucracy.HeattackedSomalitraditionsbytryingtoclaimabsolutesocialandpoliticalcontrol.Theregimesoughttocreatedependenceonthestateinitsstrategytoreplacetheclansystem.Bothcitieschosenforthestudyare
innorthernSomalia:Hargeisa,thecapitalofSomaliland,whereadefactogovernmentthatprovidesorderandserviceshasbeenoperatingsince1991,andBoroma,whichhasalocalgovernmentstructure.EvenwhilewarcontinuesintherestofSomalia,somegrowthanddevelopmenthasoccurredinthenorthernregion.Sincethereisnocentralgovernment,thelegalsysteminbothHargeisaandBoromaisweak;thus,spaceformoretraditionalconflict-resolutionmechanismssuchastheuseofeldersasinformalmediatorsofdisputeshasemerged.
fromitsconstituents,whetherbecauseofanarchyorauthoritarianrule(seeTable7).InCambodiaandRwandastatepenetrationwassometimesideologicallydriven,butitsconsistentgoalwastheretentionofpowerbythepoliticaleliteunderconditionsofincreasinginequality,exclusion,andindignity.BoththeLonNolandKhmerRougeregimesweredistantfromtheirconstituentsyetsoughttocontrolandregulatethem.InRwandathedisconnectbetweenthehighlycentralized,authoritariangovernmentandthesubjugatedmassesthelackofsynergyledtothedissolutionofstabilityandtheeruptionofhostilities.TheGuatemalangovernment,plaguedbycorruption,wasbentonretainingpowerandoncontinuedexploitationandthuswashighlyrepressiveanddictatorial,withthemilitaryinthevan-
Page81
Table7OrganizationalintegrityofthestateSynergy:stateandcommunityinterface Statecapacityandeffectiveness
Low HighLow Anarchy
(collapsedstates)Somalia
Inefficiency,ineffectiveness(weakstates)Rwanda
High Predation,corruption(roguestates)GuatemalaandCambodia
Cooperation,accountability,flexibility(developmentalstates)
Source:BasedonWoolcock(1998).
guardofstatepenetration.AcorruptandpredatorySomalistate,withlittleconnectiontothelocallevel,dissolvedasaresultofdysfunction,leadingtoarmedchaos.AlthoughthetypeofconflictandtheindigenousmanifestationsofsocialcapitalwerequitedifferentinGuatemalaandSomalia,lackoforganizationalintegritycontributedtotheviolenceinboth.Relationsbetweengovernmentandpeoplewereone-sided,withthegovernmentmaintainingabsolutepoweruntilwarfarebrokeout.
Thesamesocialdynamicsthatenableactorstoengageinintegrativerelationsorlinkagesforpositiveoutcomescanalsoresultintheformationofgroupswithverynegativeeffects,suchasyouthmilitiasor,inthespecificstudyinstances,theAngka,theInterahamwe,GuatemalanPACs,andSomalirenegadeclans.Strongsocialdynamicsandbondingwithinthesegroups,primarilymanipulatedandmobilizedbythegovernment(exceptinSomalia),madepossiblethegroups'success.Thenegativeeffectsofthisstrongperversesocial
capitalweremanifestedinexclusion,hatepropaganda,repression,and,eventually,slaughter.
InCambodiaafterthewarandinRwandabeforethewar,externalforcesofglobalizationledvillagerstoinitiatemoreexternallinkagesinthecourseofeffortstonourishcivilsociety.AsconflicteruptedinRwanda,hatepropagandageneratedbythestateencouragedHututobandtogetheragainstTutsiwithintheir
Page82
Table8Intra-andextracommunitytiesLinkages(extracommunitynetworks)
Integration(intracommunityties)
Low HighLow Anomie
CambodiaAmoralfamilialismSomalia
High AmoralindividualismRwandaandGuatemala
Economicadvancement
Source:BasedonWoolcock(1998).
communitiesandfamilies.Hutupowerthrivedontheresultingamoralindividualism,whichplacedallegiancetothestateaboveanycommunityorfamilialloyalties.InsomeregionsofSomalia,movestowardglobalizationpushedpeopletostrengthenandincreasinglydependonfamilialties.InGuatemala,fierceclanalliances,combinedwithweaklinkstoothercommunities,ledtotheestablishmentofamoralfamilialismandthusaggravatedandperpetuatedclanwarfare.SolidarityamongrebelsandindigenousgroupsinGuatemalaranhigh,asdidallegiancewithinthegovernmentandmilitarytotheirown.Governmentpolicyactedtorupturelocalcommunitiesbypittingvillageragainstvillagerincertainareasofthecountry,disruptingstrongintragroupties(seeTable8).
Thus,civic,market,andstateengagement,andhowitinterrelatedwithconflict,hadvastramificationsforthetransformationofallfourdimensionsofsocialcapital.Theidealsituationisabalancebetweencivilsocietyandstateandmarketpenetrationthatnurturesprimarybonds,encouragesbridging,cross-cuttingties,andsupportsstatefunctioningandthestate'srelationstoitspeople.Itisthemixofthese
horizontalcross-cuttingtiesandverticallinkagesthatformsthebasisfortruesocialcohesion.
Page83
PARTIIIFROMCIVILWARTOCIVILSOCIETY
Page85
6ViolentConflictandPeacebuildingThenatureofconflictshouldbetakenintoaccountinshapingthestructureofpeacebuildinginterventions(relief,reconstruction,andreconciliation)afterhostilitiescease.Analysisofconflictandtherelatedcopingmechanismsprovidemappingsofextantsocialcapitalrelationsandofthetypesofsocialcapitalthatmayneedtobeencouragedordiscouraged.Theseinsightscanbeanimportantfoundationfordevelopmentefforts.Inaddition,thepolitical,economic,andsocialmilieuofthepostconflictcountryshouldbeconsideredinthedesignofinterventions.Themilieuincludesthestageofthelocal-to-globaltransitionanditseffectsonpowerconstellations,economicexchange,andsocialrelations.
HowtheNatureofWarDeterminestheNatureofPeaceandReconciliation
TheconflictsthathaveplaguedCambodia,Rwanda,Guatemala,andSomaliahavevariedinduration,intensity,andnature(seeTable9).Cambodiaexperienced20yearsoffighting,with4intenseyearsofciviliansufferingatthehandsofthestateduringtheKhmerRougeperiod.ExternalwarfareinVietnamexacerbatedthesituation,makingthecountrypronetosporadicbombingsandinvasionsbyforeigntroops.InRwanda,simmeringtensions,beginningwiththeemergenceofviolencein1959,
Table9Descriptionofviolentconflicts:fourcasestudiesCambodia Rwanda Guatemala
DurationTheconflictspannedtwodecades,dividedintotheLonNolera(197075),KhmerRougerule(197579),andtheHengSamrinregime(197989).
SporadichostilitieshaveplaguedRwandasince1959.OfficiallythecivilwarbeganinOctober1990,withthegenocidetakingplacefromApriltoJune1994.
Typifiedbyguerrillawarfare,theconflictspannedfourdecades,withthemostintensefightingoccurringduringtheearly1980s.
Nature IntheLonNolandKhmerRougeperiods,thestatebrutallyattackeditspeople.SkirmishescontinuedintheHengSamrinera.Externalandregionalfightingexacerbatedthesituation.
Thestateorchestrated"ethnic"cleansingbymobilizingimpoverishedmassesaroundethnic-basedhatepolitics.Thispolicyledtogreatdivisionatthelocallevel,withinthecommunity,andwithinextendedandnuclearfamilies.
Theconflictprimarilytooktheformofguerrillawarfare,withthestatemainlytargetingindigenousandruralpopulations(thosemostmarginalizedandexcludedfromsociety).Somestatemobilizationatthelocalleveldidoccur,dividingcommunitiesanderodingtrust.
IntensityOfthe20yearsofconflict,10yearswerehighintensity.Communitiesandfamiliesweredividedandforcedtodohardlabor.Livingconditionswereharsh,andtorturefordissentwascommon.Over2millionpeoplediedduringthewarsasaresultofdirectcombat,bombingbyU.S.planes,state-inducedfamine,torture,ordisease.
SporadicskirmishesthroughoutRwandawerecommonaftertheRwandesePatrioticFrontinvadedinOctober1990.Thegenocidemarkedtheheightofthewarfare,withover800,000peoplekilledinthreemonths.Tutsimen,women,andchildrenwereslaughteredwithmachetes,andsomeHutudiedinreprisalkillings.
Thewarwaxedandwanedoverfourdecadesandwasmarkedbyextremehumanrightsviolations.Massacres,disappearances,andtorturewerecommon,withthestatebeingthemainperpetratoroftheseactions.Governmentandrebelpenetrationwithinvillagesdepletedtrustwithinandbetweencommunitiesandthestate.
Page87
explodedinagenocidethatleftsome800,000deadinathree-monthperiodofbrutalmassacres.TheconflictinGuatemala,typifiedbyguerrillawarfareagainstarepressivestate,flaredupandsubsidedbyturnsforalmost40years.Numeroushumanrightsviolations,includingtortureanddisappearances,thoroughlydissolvedtrustinthestateandsplitcommunitiesalongthelinesofrealorperceivedalliances.ThedissolutionofthestateinSomaliaasaconsequenceofgrossmisallocationofresourcesandpowerhascreatedavacuuminwhichclansvieforcontrolofpowerandassets.YetpocketsofpeacehaveemergedandSomaliahasstartedontheroadtorecovery.
Despitethesevaryingexperienceswithviolentconflict,therootsoftheconflictshavesomecommondenominators.Oneunderlyingthreadistheinequality,exclusion,andindignitythatresultedaselitesmanipulatedpolitical,social,andeconomicresourcestoretaincontrolduringthelocal-to-globaltransition.Asecondsimilarityistheturmoilleftinthewakeofthetransition.Thecombinedpolitical,social,andeconomicinstabilityresultingfromchangesassociatedwiththistransitionfromastate-centrictoanopensociety,fromtraditionaltonationalorinternationalstructures,andfromacentrallyplannedtoamarketeconomywithincreasingexternalmarketpenetrationfacilitatedtheemergenceofhostilitiesineachcountry.Thethirdcommonalityistheimpactofthelocal-to-globaltransitiononthenatureandstructureofsocialcapitalandtheresultingsocialcohesionorfragmentationineachaffectedcountry.
Intraditionalsocieties,systemsofeconomicproductionandexchangenurturesocialinteractionsthatserveasthebasisforcommunalsocialorganization.Throughrepeatedexchangeatthecommunitylevel,economicinteractionisembeddedinsocialrelations,helpinggroupstocohereandimpartingasenseoftrustandreciprocity.Asglobalization,ortheamalgamationofcapitalismanddemocracy,transcendscommunalborders,economicinteractionisdisembedded
fromsocialrelationsthroughtransactionsthataremoreopenandlesspersonal.Thisreformationofsocialsystemsinvolvesashiftinsocioeconomicandpoliticalorganizationfromthecommunaltothenationalorinternationallevel,transformingthestructureofatraditional
Page88
society'ssocialcapitalbasefromafamilialtoanassociationalfoundation.Political,economic,andsocialarenasexpand,replacingthesenseofcommunitybuiltonprimaryfamilialrelationshipswithastructureofsecondaryassociationsthatmakeupabroadercivilsociety.Localpowerconstellationsarereplacedbythoseatthemesoormacrolevel.Duringthistransformation,traditionalsocialmechanismsformediatingconflictandpeacefullyreconcilingdifferencestypicallybecomeweakened,alongwithothertraditionalstructuresandroles.
Organizationalchanges,particularlyasmanifestedinemergingmarketandstateforces,havefacilitatedtheexpansionofeconomicandpoliticalinteractions,creatingaglobalinterdependencethatpermeateseventhemostremotepocketsofcivilization.ThisdevelopmentisincreasingthepressurefornationstoworkwithinWesternsystems.Althoughcapitalismanddemocracymaymakepoliticalandeconomicresourcesmoreequallyavailableandincreasepersonalfreedomandjustice,theadoptionofthesesystems,particularlytheinstitutionalunderpinnings,canbeslowandwrenchingduringperiodsoftransformation.Theconfluenceoftraditionandmodernizationisturbulent,butmoreoftenthannot,ifitisrelativelyslow-movingandiseffectivelymanaged,ittakesplacewithoutcivilwar.Insomenations,however,thechangesarefarfrompeaceful.Therapidlocal-to-globalshiftcreatessocietalfissures,alienatingmanypeopleandstrippingthemoftheiridentity,status,power,andaccesstoresources.Thisoftenresultsinadestabilizationoftraditionalsocialstructures(societalfragmentation)andthecreationofpowervacuumsinthesocial,economic,andpoliticalrealms,ripeforexploitationandabuse(Newbury1988).
Itisagainstthisbackdropofsocial,economic,andpoliticaltransformationthatmodernviolentconflictsmustbeviewed.ChangesthathaveunfoldedovercenturiesintheWesthavebeenadopted,
imposed,andenforcedwithindecadesinmanynon-Westernnations.DuringtheColdWar,bipolarpoliticsimposedadegreeofinternationalstabilization,butmanycountriesstillfellvictimtothelocal-to-globaltransitionandtheassociatedideologicaldebate.BipolarpoliticsaggravatedtheconflictinGuatemalaandtosomeextentincreasedthehostilitiesbecauseofthe
Page89
politicalandfinancialsupportprovidedbytheUnitedStatestoaseriesofrepressivegovernments.ColdWarpoliticsalsogavebirthtothewarinCambodia,whereasevereanti-Westernplatformledtoanextremistcommunistexperimentthatvictimizedmillions.SomaliawasalsoshapedbyColdWarpolitics,asSiadBarreshiftedsidesbetweentheEasternblocandtheWest,buildingandmaximizinghismeansofdomesticcoercionthroughcontinuousmilitarization.AftertheColdWar,globalculturalpoliticsspecifically,FrenchmilitaryassistancetotheoppressiveHabyarimanaregimefueledandprolongedtheconflictinRwanda.
TheEffectsofGlobalizationonSocialCohesion
Thelatenteffectsofthelocal-to-globaltransitionofteninadvertentlynourishtheseedsofinequalityandexclusionalreadyplanteddeepwithineachsocietybycolonialismandpost-independencepoliticalelites.Strongsocietieswithinclusionarysocialcapitalparticularlyasmanifestedinconflict-mediatinginstitutionssuchasanefficientandnoncorruptbureaucracy,anindependentandeffectivejudiciary,afreepress,andinstitutionalizedmodesofsocialinsurance(safetynetprovisions)aremorelikelytobeabletopreventorwithstandthesocioeconomicandpoliticalshocksassociatedwithglobalization(Rodrik1999b;Easterly2000a,2000b).However,asthepastdecadeandthefourcasestudieshavedemonstrated,manynationsareunabletowardoffhostilities,fortheiralreadyunderdevelopedsocialcapitalbasehasbeenfurtherweakenedbythelocal-to-globaltransitionandalienatedbystateoppressionandmanipulation.AsSmithandNaimobserve:
Deadlyconflicthasbeenglobalized.Nowar,nomatterhowlocal,canbefullyunderstood(orprevented)withoutlookingtothelocalimpactofglobalmarkets,theglobalarmstrade,thetransborderloyaltiesofkinshipandtradition,thefearsandinterestsofotherpeopleandgovernments,and
thegrowinginfluencesofnonstateparticipants
Page90
(whethermercenariesorDoctorsWithoutBorders,AmnestyInternationalorAlcoa).Andjustastelevisioncommunicatesthewickednessofwartoaglobalaudience,normsofhumanrightsandgoodgovernanceacquireanewandglobalauthority.(SmithandNaim2000:21)
Ifglobalizationpreparesthegroundformoredisparitiesandconflict,buildingcross-cuttingsocialcapitalbecomesevenmoreimperativeformanagingandpreventingconflict.Strongandeffectivehorizontalandverticalsocialcapitalbridgesgroupswithinandbetweencommunitiesandlinksthestatewithacivilsocietythatshouldplayaroleinconflictmanagementandmediation.Whenthatsocialcapitalisabsent,conflictcanescalateintoviolence,andsocietyisliabletoretreatintoabonded,primarysurvivalistmodeaspreexistingsocialcleavagesaremanipulatedandexacerbated.
InCambodiastateactorsprimarilywagedwaragainstarelativelyuninvolved,tradition-boundcitizenry.UndertheKhmerRouge,''new"peoplewerepittedagainst"old,"anddominationwasachievedbyrhetoric,fear,andcoercion.WhereasideologyfueledtheCambodianconflict,identitywasthedrivingforceinRwanda.AsmallelitegroupmanipulatedthemassesbyusingtheTutsiminorityasscapegoatsforeconomicwoes,transforminggrievancesintogreedandhatred.Relationswereseveredbetweenthegovernmentandcommunities,withincommunities,andinsomecaseswithinfamilies.Socialcapitalinbothcaseswasmanipulatedandtransformedtomeetthepoliticalandeconomicneedsofsmallgroupsthatusedtotheirownadvantagethechangesinpowerconstellations,exchange,andsocialconditionsbroughtaboutbyglobalization.
TheGuatemalanstatewagedaviciouswaragainstitspeople,primarilythepoliticallyandsocioeconomicallymarginalizedandexcludedindigenousandruralpopulations.Governmentefforts,backedbyexternalsupporttohelpcrushthe"communistic"guerrillamovement,splitthepopulacethroughtheformationofcivildefense
patrols(PACs),dividingcommunalallegiancesand
Page91
loyalties.TheseactionsfurthererodedanyhorizontaltiesthatmayhavebridgedLadinoandnon-Ladinogroupswhileensuringthatnewlinkageswouldnotform.
InequalityandexclusioncausedthecollapseoftheSomaligovernment.MassiveamountsofsmallarmsandweaponsonhandasalegacyofColdWarpoliticsintheregionfacilitatedtheeruptionofviolenthostilities.Localizedwarsravagedthecountry.Yetsomehow,withinthischaos,ministatesemerged,withtheirownformsofgovernment,offeringservicesandorderinthefaceofanarchy.InthenorthernregionofSomaliabusinessesgrewanddevelopedasaresultofrapidmarketexpansionandincreasingdemand,withtheSomalidisasporaconnectinglocaltoglobalactors.
Ineachoftheseconflicts,thestatecommandeerednationalpowerandsupportedexclusionaryandunequalpoliticalregimes.Tostrengthenstatehegemony,governmentactorswagedwaragainstconstituentsandengagedindivisiveploys,blockingtheformationofcross-cutting,bridgingsocialcapital,whileutilizinginstabilitythatmayhaveresultedfromtheeffectsofglobalizationtofurthertheircause.Thestructureoftheconflictsthatensuedhadramificationsforthewaysocialcapitalwastransformedineachcountryandwillinturnaffectfuturestrategiesforsupportingsocialcapitalduringreconstructionandreconciliationefforts,aswellasreliefdelivery.
Socialcapitalrelationsatthemacrolevel(thegovernment'sabilitytofunctionanditsrelationtothelocallevel)needtobeaddressedinpostconflictpeacebuildingandreconstructionmeasuresineachofthecountriesstudied.Institutionsshouldservetomanageconflictbyadjudicatingdisputeswithinaframeworkoftransparentrulesandprocedures.Trustinthestateneedstoberebuilt,andleaderswillhavetoprovetheirlegitimacybyinstitutingjustandtransparentpolitical,social,andeconomicsystemsthatareinclusiveandparticipatory.
Statesynergy,ormacro-microrelations,shouldbeanintegralpartofthedevelopmentprocess.Inaddition,thestatewillneedtotakestepstosecureitselffromtheshocksincurredthroughtheglobalizationprocessandensurethatthereisnotaregression
Page92
intoconflict.Violentconflictrootedinexclusionarygovernancecreatestheveryneedforstrategiesofempowerment(Deacon2000).
Relationsbetweencommunitiesandbetweenunlikeorwarringfactionsneedtobeestablishedtoimprovethenecessarylinkagesforeconomicgrowthandthedevelopmentofcivilsociety.Primaryandsecondaryrelationswithinfamiliesandcommunitiesshouldbenourished,eventhoughthisisthelevelmostdifficulttotargetfromamacroperspective.Iftheenvironmentforsocialcapitalisrenderedconduciveforthegrowthofcivilsocietybyallowingfreedomofpress,speech,andassembly,andifenoughspaceiscreatedtoallowcivilsocietytoflourish,improvedgovernment-communityrelationswillfollow.
Becausethenatureandcausesofwararecountry-specificandpeculiartoeachcountry'suniquesituation,effortsforrelief,reconstruction,andreconciliationneedtotakenoteofthesedifferences,acknowledgethevariationsinhowthesocialfabricwasdamagedbyeachspecificconflict,andassesshowthesocialthreadsremainingaftertheconflictcanbeutilizedtohelpfacilitatethelargerpeaceprocesses.Thosedimensionsthatwerespecificallytargetedandabusedduringconflict,whetherintegration,linkages,organizationalintegrity,orsynergy,andthosethatemergeinresponsetocrisisshouldlaythefoundationforpeacebuildingandsustainabledevelopment.
Page93
7PoliciesandProgramsforStrengtheningSocialCapitalandSocialCohesionSocialcapitalcantakemanyformsandservediversefunctions,dependingonitsnatureanduse.Itcancontributetosocialcohesionorspursocialfragmentation.Itcanbeasourceofmutualaidandprotectioninthefaceofviolentconflict,or,justasreadily,itcanbepervertedtomobilizeunemployedyouthintomilitiaandbringabouthorrendousactsofgenocide.Socialcapitalcanhelpbridgeandmitigatetheexclusiverelationsthatcreatetheconditionsforconflict,oritcanreinforcehighlyexclusionarybondssuchasthosethatexistwithingangsorextremistethnicgroups.Itcansubstituteforstateandmarketfailuresorcomplementtheirprovisionofbasicprotectionorsafetynets.
Thus,socialcapitalisadouble-edgedswordwithregardtoconflictanddevelopment.Violentconflictcandestroyprimarybonds,undercuttingindigenoussocialcapitalasaformofsocialprotection.Butbyweakeningsuchprimarybonds,conflictcancreateopportunitiesforbridgestoothernetworksandcandisplacerelationsthattendtobuilddependency,limitaccesstonewinformationandopportunities,andretardchange.Undersuchconditions,socialcapitalcanserveasakeysourceofreconciliationandreconstructionindividedsocietiesthroughtheformationofbroadanddiversenetworks.Thedevelopmentofcivic
Page94
institutionsthatcutacrosstraditionalbondingsocialcapitaltoformnewlinkscrossingethnic,religious,age,income,andgenderlinescanprovidethebasisforthemediation,conflict-management,andconflict-resolutionmechanismsthatallsocietiesrequiretosustainpeaceanddevelopment.Finally,anewgovernmentpresentstheopportunitytoimprovegovernmentabilityanddeepencommunityrelations.Fordevelopmentassistancetobesuccessful,itmustfocusonbuildingsuchsocialcapitalasanintegralpartofanyconflict-preventionmeasureorpeople-centeredreconstructioneffort.
Numerouspolicyandoperationalrecommendationsforinternationalactorsconcernedaboutstrengtheningsocialcohesionbybuildingsocialcapitalcanbedrawnfromthefourcountrystudies.Thischapterpresentsrecommendationsforspecificinterventionsgearedtowardeachstate.(ForfurtherdiscussionseeMartin1996b;AdamandFord1998;Uvin1998;Nee2000.)
Cambodia:NurturingAssociationsforEconomicGrowthandDevelopment
ThedestructionoftheCambodiansocialfabriccausedbythevariousconflictsistragicandhashaddevastatingeffects,yetthecommunitieshaveremainedresilientevenwhileinexileinrefugeecampsinneighboringcountries.Reconstructioneffortsshouldbuildontheexistingprimaryrelationsandcopingmechanismsthatemergedduringthewar.Externalinterventionsshouldseektofacilitateadditionallinkagesgearedtowardeconomicgrowthanddevelopmentandtointensifycivicengagementamonggroupsandbetweenlocalgroups,thegovernment,andmarketforces.
Attemptstosupportcooperation,participation,andgroupsolidaritymaynotbeimmediatelyappropriateduringinitialdevelopmentefforts.ThedissolutionoftrustwithinCambodiansocietywasadirect
consequenceofthesocietalfragmentationbroughtaboutbytheLonNolgovernmentandbytheKhmerRouge'scampaigntomanipulatepeopleandretaincontrol
Page95
throughcoercion,suspicion,andfear.Inthepostwarera,ifthislackoftrustisnotacknowledgedandaddressed,truereconstructioncannottakeplace.Untiltrustisrebuilt,attemptstoencouragesolidarityandgroupcooperationmaybackfirebyremindingCambodiansoftheKhmerRouge'scommunalworksandthecollectivismofthekromSamakiundertheHengSamrinregime(Nee1995).Externalinterventionsmustbesensitivetothesemattersandallowcooperationtooccurspontaneously,supportingeffortsthatcreatenetworksamongpeopleandbuildaresponsiveandresponsiblecivilsociety.
Effortstoencourageparticipationbyconveningmeetingsinvillagesmaybeinadvertentlycounterproductive.Villagersmayattendmeetings,butoftentheydosobecauseofperceivedcoercion,notoutoffreewill.MeetingscalledbyexternalactorsarereminiscentofPolPotdays,whenvillagersexpectedtolistentopoliticalpropaganda,notparticipate.Furthermore,thesetypesofmeetingtendtoalienatethepoor,whospendthemeetingthinkinghowtheywillgettheirnextmealandresentthisuseoftheirtime(Nee1995).Ownershipofinitiativesiscriticaltobuildingsustainablecross-cuttingsocialcapital.
Developmentorganizationsneedtorecognizeandactonsuchthreatstosocialcapitalasacutepoverty,increasingpopulationpressure,degradationofresources,andtheemergenceofamarketeconomyintheabsenceofappropriateregulation,theruleoflaw,andsafetynetsforpoorhouseholds.Anyexternaldevelopmenteffortsintheseareasshouldbedesignedtoenhancethestate'scapacityanditsabilitytorelatetocitizensandcommunitiesinademocraticmanner.
Overall,Cambodianslacktheeconomicandsocialinfrastructureneededtocracktheshellofpoverty.Tobuildthisinfrastructure,communityparticipationandgrassrootsinstitutionsareneeded,butforthemostpart,thesefeaturesareabsentinCambodiansociety.Both
couldbefacilitatedbythestrongpresenceofsecondarysocialcapitallinkages.Decentralization,localownership,andparticipationworkonlyifcommunitiesaresociallycohesive,appropriatelyorganized,anddemocratic.Developmentactorsshouldcapitalizeontheexistingpagodanetworks,which
Page96
areorganizedandcohesive.Self-helpgroupsarealsoincreasinginpopularityandnumber(Cambodia1999).
Currentformsofsocialcapitalrelatedtothevillageeconomyensurebasicsurvivalandalivelihoodforsomepeople(socialprotection)andallowexploitationofpeopleandresourcesbyothers.Extantsocialcapitalshouldbeencouragedtomatureintoamoreresponsiblemanagementofavailableresources,basedonprinciplesofequityandsustainability.Ifpossible,developmentactorsshouldavoidorminimizeinterventionsthatreinforcethenegativeelementsofexistingsocialcapital.Thisimpliesshunningeffortsthatfocusonverticalplanningwithoutputtinginplaceaccompanyinghorizontalstructuresandaccountabilitytolowerlevels.Currently,itismoreimportanttostrengthenCambodia'shorizontalsocialcapital,encompassingbothfamilialandassociationalrelations,thantofocusonverticalsocialcapitalsuchaseffortstostrengthengovernmentcapacityalthoughworkinthisareaisalsoneeded,particularlyineffortstoeliminatecorruptionandbuildjusticeanddemocracy.
Thecurrentroleofsocialcapitalintherealmofsocialservicesandwelfareisgearedtowardmeetingthecommunity'sownneeds,buttoaverysmallandinadequateextent.Externalagenciesmuststepintosupplementthisroleand,intheprocess,allowsocialcapitaltoeffectivelyuseandshapeservices,movingfromsocialprotectiontoservicedelivery.TheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme'sCarrereProjectandtheWorldBank-financedNortheastVillageDevelopmentProject(NVDP)aregoodexamplesofeffortstobuildlocalcapacityandsocialcapitalintothedevelopmentprocess.(SeeBox10fordetailsontheNVDP.)Thesearesecond-generationcommunityfundorsocialdevelopmentapproachesinwhichcommunityresourcesaremanaged,notthroughintermediaryagentsbutbythevillageitself,buildingonexistinginstitutionsandrelationsandcreatingnewones.Thegoalistoconnecttomarketsandcreatea
formofsocialcapitalthatarisesfromcommunitytraditionsandculturalandfamilialsolidaritybutthatalsoinvolvespeopleofdiversebackgroundsinnumerousoverlappingandreinforcingrelationshipscreatedbyrepeatedandpredictableeconomicandsocialexchanges.
Page97
Box10UsingdecentralizationandparticipationtotargettheruralpoorinCambodia
AnumberofruraldevelopmentprojectshavebeeninitiatedinCambodiaduringthereconciliationandreconstructionperiodthatbeganin1992,andtheyhavehadapositive,althoughlimited,impact.Atoppriorityofthecurrentnationaldevelopmentstrategyistospreadthebenefitsofdevelopmentmorewidelytoruralareas,where90percentofpoorhouseholdslive.Todate,theCambodiangovernmentanditsresponsiblelineagencieshavehadlittleon-the-groundexperiencewithplanning,managing,andcoordinatingruraldevelopmentprojects.ThedevelopmentobjectiveoftheNortheastVillageDevelopmentProject(NVDP)istointroducedecentralized,participatory,povertyreductionorientedruraldevelopmentapproachesinsomeofthepoorestareasofCambodiaandtoprovidethegovernmentwithexperienceinmanagingsuchprograms.Experienceofthiskindwillbeneededtoformulateandcarryoutacohesivenationalstrategyforruraldevelopment.TheNVDPwillalsowidentheWorldBank'sexperienceindealingwithdecentralized,participatoryprojects.
Bytargetinginstitutional,social,andeconomicissues,theNVDPwillattempttoenhanceruraldevelopmentandnaturalresourcemanagement,improvehumanresources,reducepoverty,andstrengtheninstitutionalcapacity.Inaddition,theNVDPisdesignedtoincreasethecapacityofprovincialgovernmentofficestohelplocalcommunitiesplanandmanagesmallruraldevelopmentsubprojects.Localcommunedevelopmentcommitteeswillbeexpectedtotakeonanincreasedlocalgovernmentrole,assistedbyworkingsystemsandtrainedpersonnel,incarryingoutparticipatoryruralappraisal.Theprojectwillhelpprovidepeopleintheareawithcommunityinvestmentsneededtoimprovetheirincomes.Throughparticipationinvillagedevelopmentcommittees,thepooresthouseholdswillbeabletomaketheirneedsknown.OpportunitieswillbecreatedforlocalNGOsandcontractorstodevelopactivitiesinthearea.
ThegoaloftheNVDPistohelpreaffirmCambodians'trustinthegovernmentandenhancethegovernment'slegitimacywhileincreasingitsorganizationalintegrity.Throughdecentralization,thegovernmentwillnurturemoresynergisticrelationswithruralcommunities,furtheramelioratingitsrelationswiththevillages.Participationinthedevelopmentprocesswillbuildlocal
capacity,helpstrengthenbridgingandbondingsocialcapitalties,improvelocalconflict-resolutionmechanisms,andstrengthenfaithandtrustinthegovernment.
Source:WorldBank(1999).
Page98
Rwanda:RebuildingFamily,Community,andStateInterrelations
SincetheendofthewarinRwanda,thegovernmenthasmadegreatstridestowardreconcilinggroupsandtakinginitiativestoencouragegrowthanddevelopment.However,muchworkremainstobedone:thecountryisimpoverished,andRwandansopenlyassertthatjusticetowardthoseresponsibleforthegenocidehasnotbeencarriedout.AlthoughHutuandTutsihavebandedtogethertorebuildtheirlives,theydonothaveagreatdealoftrustineachother.Recommendationsfromthestudyincludeimprovingthestate'sorganizationalintegrity,linkages,and,mostimportant,synergywiththecommunitylevel.ApriorityinsocialcapitaldevelopmentinRwandamustbetodilutethepotencyofethnic,tribal,andreligiousidentitiesbycreatingmeaningfulrelationsamongindividuals,civilsocietyorganizations,andthestate.
OwingtotheperceivedineffectivenessoftheInternationalCriminalTribunalforRwandaandthecommonviewthatitwillbeunabletoadministerjustice,effortshavebeenmadetoreinstategacaca,atraditionalsystemofjusticeexercisedbyagroupofcommunityelders,tohelpprocessgenocidecrimes.Thespecificsofhowthismechanismwouldworkinconjunctionwiththetribunalarestillunderdiscussion.ManyRwandansseethisprocedureastheonlyhopeforreconciliation,anditwouldprovideamuch-neededvenueforbothHutuandTutsitorelatetheirexperiencesandvoicetheirconcerns.Internationalactorsshouldfindsomemeansofsupportingthisprocessbutwithcaution.Eldersandsageschosenfromthecommunemaybebetterabletohandlerulingsandsentencingofthegénocidaires,sincetheyknowthesituationandthepeoplefirsthand.Thereis,however,adangerofsubjectiverulingsandinabilitytoconductfairtrialsincertaincommunes.Nevertheless,attemptsshouldbemadetoseekindividualaccountability,thushelpingtodiminishthe
tendencytoascribecollectiveguilttoallHutu(DesForges1999).
AsinCambodia,therewasmuchsensitivitytothemanipulationoftraditionalcollectiveactioninthiscaseumuganda,ortraditionalcooperativelabor,whichhadbeentransformedintoforced
Page99
laborandwhichmanyfelthadbeenpervertedbytheHabyarimanaregime.Trustincollectiveorganssuchascooperativeswillhavetobegraduallybuiltfromthegroundupsothattheseorgansareseenas"people'scooperatives"thatthepeoplethemselves,ratherthanthegovernment,initiated.
Anotherkeyfactorinthereconstructionofintra-andintercommunityrelationsistheestablishmentofafreeandobjectivemedia.Thegenocidewasabletospreadsoquicklyandeffectivelybecauseofpropagandaissuedbybiased,extremistradioprograms,journals,andweeklypapers.EffortstoensureeffectiveandfairmediamayhelppreventarecurrenceofviolencebylinkingHutuandTutsionceagaininacohesiveRwandanidentityandmaythushelpholdthegovernmentaccountable.
EffortstobuildcivilsocietyinRwandafailedinthepast,astherapidexplosionofgenocidalkillingsshowed.Manygroupsandorganizationssupportedbyinternationalagenciesfailedbecausetheseeffortswereoverfunded,toorapidlycreated,andartificiallyimposedandhadpoorinformationnetworksandaccountability(Uvin1998).FacilitatingthecreationofNGOsisnotjustamatteroffreeingthespacenecessaryfortheirexistencebutalsoofusingthesegroupstogobeyondtheboundariesoffamily,ethnicgroup,andlocationasthebasisforgroupcohesion.Thestateauthoritarianandpermeatingmostaspectsofcivilsocietywasunabletooperateinademocratic,inclusivemanner.Sociallearningandsocialchange,notjustthepresenceofnumeroustypesoforganizations,arerequiredtomakeupahealthycivilsociety.
Theprocessofdevelopingsocialcapitalwithincommunitiesandbetweenconstituentsandthestatetakesalongtime.Itmustbeinitiatedinternally,anditrequiresagradualincreaseintheabilityandwillingnesstoshapethepoliticalsphere.Pluralismanddemocracy
mustbepromotedalongwithsocialcapitalinitiatives.Throughthisprocess,peoplegainconfidenceintheirabilitytooperatewithinthepublicarena.Associetybecomesmoreopen,networksofcommunicationandcooperationarisebetweenandamongcommunities,whiledivisionsbasedonethnicity,religion,gender,andregionareovercome.Knowledgeofpoliticsandpoliticalworkingsincrease,asdoskillsinconflict
Page100
mediation,compromise,andnegotiation.Thistypeofgrowthrequiresspaceandtime,neitherofwhichwasavailableinRwanda.ThewaycivilsocietyemergedearlierinRwanda,almostwhollyguidedbyexternalmechanismsandgoals,mostlikelyhurtratherthanhelpedsocialandpoliticalgrowthanddevelopment.Becausecivilsocietygroupswerenotheldaccountableforpromotingdemocratization,theirexistenceoftenworsenedratherthanimprovedHutu-Tutsirelations.Civilsociety'sstronglinksandtiestothegovernmentmeantthatwhatdiddevelopinRwandawasratherexclusive(Uvin1998).
Projectsthatdecentralizestatepowerandincreaseparticipationbycivilsocietyactorsandindividualsshouldbeimplementedtohelprebuildfaithinthecentralgovernmentandencouragecooperationamongconstituents.Community-drivenreconstructionapproachessuchastheWorldBankCommunityReintegrationandDevelopmentProject(describedinBox11)areattemptingtocreatethespacefordevelopmentofsocialcapitalthatcantranscend''ethnic"linesthroughincreasedparticipationandthatnotonlyunitegroupswithincommunitiesbutalsolinkcommunitiestothestatethroughdecentralization.Jointcommunitydecisionmakingtoassessandprioritizecommunityneedsanddetermineandmanagetheallocationofresourcestoaddresstheseneedscanbeapowerfulsourceofreconciliationthroughreconstruction.Onemaingoalistobuildlocalinstitutionsthatpromoteinclusivedevelopmentbygivingpeopleavoiceandthatarecapableofcreatingthesocialinfrastructurenecessaryforconflictmediation.
GuatemalaandSomalia:ImprovingStateCapacityandCivilSociety
TheconflictsinGuatemalaandSomaliainflictedmuchdamageonthestructure,legitimacy,andcredibilityofthestate.Policiesforrebuildingsocialcapitalineachcountryshouldfocusfirstonimprovingthestate'sabilitytofunctionandonclearlydelineatingits
role.Therehabilitationofthestatecanthenserveasthefoundationforthefurtherdevelopmentofcivilsocietyactorsandthebuildingofcross-cuttingtiesbetweenclans(Somalia)and
Page101
Box11BuildingtrusttorebuildRwanda
Thisisthefirsttimethatweareaskedwhatweneed.Ifthisistheapproachthisgovernmentistaking,wewillfinallybeabletodevelopourcountry.Acommunityelder,ontheCommunityReintegrationandDevelopmentProject
Sincecomingtopower,andparticularlysincethemassivereturnofrefugeesin199697,Rwanda'sGovernmentofNationalUnityhasfacedregionalsecurityissuesthathavehinderedpeacefuldevelopment.Todismantlethelegacyofcentralizeddecisionmaking,thegovernmentinitiatedaninclusivecommunity-levelapproachtodevelopment.ThisapproachisdesignedtoinvolveRwandanscloselyinthemanagementoftheirownaffairsandtogivelocaladministrativestructurestheprimaryresponsibilityfordevelopmentactivities.
TheWorldBank'sCommunityReintegrationandDevelopmentProject(CRDP),approvedinDecember1998,supportsthisapproach.Itassistswar-affectedcommunities,returnednationals,andothervulnerablegroupsthroughcommunity-basedreconstruction,reintegration,anddevelopment,anditstrengthensthecapacityofcommunitiesandlocalandnationaladministrationsto
implementdevelopmentsubprojects.TheCRDPfocusesonthreetasks:transferringdecisionmakingandexpenditureauthorityfromthecentraltothecommunitylevel;buildingpartnershipsbetweenlocaladministrationsandlocalpopulationsforsectoralplanningandprojectimplementation;andbuildingtrustandcooperationwithinandbetweenlocalgovernmentandthelocalpopulation.
TheCRDPwaspreparedwiththeparticipationoflocalcommunities.Itfullyinvolvesthenationalgovernmentwhileensuringthatsubprojectsarechosen,implemented,andevaluatedlocally.Thisapproachisexpectedtoimproveeffectivenessandsustainabilitybyincreasingbothgovernmentandlocalsupport.Theprojectwillempowerruralpopulationstomakechoices,increaseself-reliance,revitalizelocaleconomies,andbringcommunitiestogetherthroughlocaldecisionmakingonandinvolvementindevelopmentactivitiesorsubprojects.
TheCRDPissupportedbyaUS$5millionlearningandinnovationcredit,anewBanklendinginstrumentdesignedtotestonasmallscalethefeasibilityofalargerproject.Theprojectisbeingimplementedin12communeswithacombinedpopulationofapproximately500,000.Ifsuccessful,itwillbereplicatedelsewhereinthecountry,
helpingtobuildamorepeacefulRwanda.
Source:WorldBank(1998).
Page102
betweenindigenousandruralgroupsandLadinos(Guatemala).Governmentsfoundedontransparency,accountability,anddemocraticprincipleswillbeabletomakegreaterheadwayinsocialandeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.InGuatemalathisprocessiswellunderway.InSomaliathereisnoofficialstategovernment,butdefactogovernmentsdoexistinthenorthernregions,andsuccessintheseareasmaypavethewayforstabilityintherestofSomalia.
Socialcapitalpoliciesandprojectsshouldstrivetobuildlinkagesamongcommunitiesandbetweencommunitiesandthegovernment.TheGuatemalangovernmentandthelocalgovernmentsinnorthernSomaliashouldfocusonincreasingthenumberofactorsincivilsocietyandshouldespeciallysupportthoseactorsthatadheretoidealsofequalityandinclusion.Increasedsupportshouldthereforebegiventogrowingenterprisesandfor-profitactorsinsocialinitiatives.Inaddition,horizontalnetworksbetweendifferenttypesofactorsshouldbecreated.Trainingforgovernmentrepresentativesinpartnershipskillsanduseofthemediatoprovideinformationoncivilsocietywillalsohelpfurtherintercommunityandgovernment-communityrelations.Normativeobstaclesthatimpedethedevelopmentofsocialcapitalcanbereducedbyconflict-resolutioninitiatives,suchaslobbyingforlegislativereform,developingformalunderstandingsbetweencivilsocietyactorsandthegovernment,andsimplifyingbureaucraticprocedures.Athrivingcivilsocietymayemergeasaresultofgovernmentsupportforanincreaseintheweight,diversity,andqualityofcivilsocietyactors,alongwithimprovementoflocalopportunitiesandconfidenceinsocialrelations.
MostdevelopmenteffortsinGuatemalahavebeenaimedatimprovingthestate'scapacityandeffectiveness.Policiesinsupportofsociety'seffortstoraiserevenues,controlsocialrisks,reducepoverty,andprovidesocialprotectiontocitizenswillhelpstrengthenprimarylevelsofsocialcapital(seeBox12).Policiesthatsupportcommunity
empowermentandproductiveinitiativesmaybeconsideredtosupportsecondarysocialcapital.Thus,therearetwodistinctspheresofaction:welfareeconomicpoliciesandsocialdevelopmentpolicies.
Page103
Box12Institutionaldevelopmentandstrengthening:theindigenouswomen'sdefensoriainGuatemala
Historically,indigenouswomeninGuatemalahavesufferedtwofolddiscrimination:asindigenouspeopleandaswomen.Theywereparticularlyvulnerableduringtheinternalviolentconflict.Toaddresstheseissues,thegovernmentofGuatemalaestablishedtheOfficefortheDefenseofIndigenousWomen'sRights(Defensoria)underthePresidentialOfficeforHumanRights(COPREDEH).ThiswasthefirstpostconflictinitiativeinGuatemalatoincorporateindigenousparticipationintothemanagementandadministrationofapublicinstitution.
ThemainobjectivesoftheDefensoriaareto(a)assistinthedevelopmentofpublicpoliciesandprogramsaimedatpreventinganddefendingagainstdiscriminationandatabolishingallformsofviolenceagainstindigenouswomen;(b)providesocialservicesandlegaladvicetowomenvictimsofviolence,discrimination,sexualharassment,andotherviolationsoftheirrights;(c)design,coordinate,andimplementtrainingprogramsanddisseminateinformationonindigenouswomen'srights;and(d)proposelegalreformsregardingindigenouswomen's
rights.
Tocarryoutthesetasks,theDefensoriawillhaveanationalofficeandeightregionalofficesmanagedandadministeredbyindigenouswomen;aconsultativecouncilcomposedofrepresentativesofthe24indigenouslinguisticcommunitiesofGuatemala;acoordinatingcouncilmadeupofmembersofthemainindigenouswomen'sorganizations;andaninterinstitutionalcommissionthatincludesasmembersthevice-ministerswhowillimplementtherecommendationsoftheDefensoriaineachministry.
ThisprojectwillpromotetheinclusionofoneofGuatemala'smostexcludedgroupsandwillbuildindigenouswomen'scapacitytointerfacewithexternalactorsandrepresenttheirowninterests.Itwillimprovesocialcapitalbothwithinthegroupandbetweenthegroupandgovernmentoffices.
ItismoredifficulttoforecasthowstateformationmayevolveinSomalia.However,itisclearthatthepenetrationofmarketforces,especiallyinHargeisa,hascreatedabroadlynetworkedassociationalformofsocialcapitalthathasservedthecommunitywellintheprocessofreconciliationandreconstruction.Bycontrast,inareaswheremarketpenetrationislimitedandtradi-
Page104
tionalclanstructurescontrolassociationalbehavior,hopesfortranscendingthesituationofviolentconflictappeardim.
MuchofthesupportgiventoSomaliatorebuildsocialcapitalandfacilitatereconstructionshouldbefocusedontheemergingeconomicsector.TradebetweenregionsinSomaliaisdeveloping,andexportsoftraditionalproductssuchaslivestockandbananasareincreasing.Mobilityisnotdirectlyhindered:airlinesareoperating,andfuelforairplanesisavailable.Communicationsarefunctioning,financialtransfersarepossible,andconsumergoodsandfoodareonhand.Thus,effortsshouldbedirectedtowardsupportingthefurtherdevelopmentoflinkagesorexternallyorientedsecondaryrelations,whichwillhelptheeconomicsectorexpand.Meanwhile,politicalinstitutionshaveemerged,primarilyatthelocallevel.Internationaleffortstosupportindigenousinstitutions,ortherevivalofSomaligovernmentcapacityandcommunityrelations,shouldencouragetheseinstitutionstodevelopspontaneouslyaslongastheyarepluralistic,inclusionary,andtolerant(AdamandFord1998).
AlthoughmanyinternationalactorshaveattemptedtoinitiatepeacemakinginSomalia,lastingpeacewillhavetocomeaboutasaresultofinternaldesireandcapacity,asinGuatemala,wherewomen'sgroupsactedasacatalystinthepeaceprocess.Inthepast,externalinfluenceshavecausedmajorproblemswithinSomalia,despitegoodintentions.Forexample,ColdWarpoliticsfosteredafocusonmilitarydevelopment,resultinginaforceof120,000soldiersforanationwith7million8millionpeople.Onecouldalsoarguethatsincetheconflictbegan,externalaidhasexacerbatedthesituationinsteadofprovidingrelief.Manydonorpaymentsmeanttobuyprotectionforaiddeliveriesinsteadwenttopurchasearms(AdamandFord1998).
DonorsseektoencourageSomaligroupstocometogetherinsomeunitarystructure,atleastpartlybecauseitiseasiertodealwitha
singleentitythanwithcompetingfactions.Thisgoalmaybeunderstandableandlogical,butitmaybethatdonor-drivenattemptstobringunityhaveactuallyincreasedfragmentation;linkinginternationalpromisesofaidtounitarygovernancehasincreasedtheamountofspoilstobewonthroughcompetition.
Page105
Box13Women,grassrootsmovements,andpeaceinitiativesinSomalia
ThedissolutionofthestateandthedisappearanceofstateservicesinSomaliahaveignitedmuchcommunitydevelopmentactiononthelocallevel.Thesegrassrootsmovementsnotonlystrivetoprovideservicesbutalsofacilitatetradeandthepromotionofhumanrightsanddemocracy.Moreoftenthannot,theeffortshavebeeninitiatedbywomen,whohavebeenempoweredasaresultoftheconflictinSomaliaandwhoalsoplayanaturalroleaspeacemakers.
Somalisocietypracticesexogamy;awomenleavesherfamilyandhometomarryintoanotherclan.Somaliwomen,withnoclanoftheirown,havetraditionallymediatedandmitigatedconflictsbetweentheirhusbands'andfathers'clans.Thisculturalpracticehasmadeconflictmediationamongclansanaturalprogressionformanywomen.Thehardshipsofwarhavealsoforcedwomentobecomemoreresponsiblefortheirownandtheirfamilies'livelihoods.Manymenhavebeenlostinthefighting,andwomenhavepickeduptheburdenofthemen'shomeresponsibilitieswhilekeepingupwiththeirownduties.Perhapspeaceeffortslookingtolong-termsolutionsshouldfocusmoreon
grassrootswomen'smovementsthanonmalepoliticalleaders.
RecentworkshopsheldbytheCenterfortheStrategicInitiativesofWomenhavebroughttogetherwomenfrommanydifferentclansinSomalia.Throughthesharingofcommonwarfareexperiences,thewomenhavebecomeevenmoreunitedacrossclanlinesintheireffortsforpeace.Anexampleoftheirresolveisthe"Green-Line"marketactivities,inwhichSomaliwomencrossoverintootherclans'territoriestoexchangegoodsanddiscusspeaceinitiatives.ExternaleffortstomakepeaceinSomaliamustlearntofocusonbottom-upmethodsthatassistgrassrootsmovements(whichareprimarilyheadedbywomen),offersupporttoareasthathavealreadyachievedpeace,andworkonisolatingdestabilizingelementssuchasthewarlordmafiososwhohaveblockedpeacemovementsoutoffearoflosingmoney,power,andstatus(PrendergastandBryden1999).
GeneralrecommendationsforinterventioninSomaliaincludeimprovingdonorcollaborationinsupportoflocalautonomy;establishingapower-sharingstructurethathelpsdecentralizepower;encouragingincreasedrolesforwomen(seeBox13);usingIslamasameanstounitethepeopleandtoestablishinstitu-
Page106
tionsforbuildingcivilsociety;encouragingafreeandunregulatedmarketeconomy;creatingspaceforlocaladaptationsofexternaltechnologiesandmanagementsystems;makinguseoftraditionalinstitutionsforlandmanagement,conflictmediation,andlegaladjudication;supportingafreepress;andimprovingandnurturingregionallinkstoenhancesecurityintheHornofAfrica(AdamandFord1998).
Page107
8HarnessingSocialCapitalandSocialCohesiontoPreventViolentConflictTheinterfaceofsocialcapitalwiththeintegrationofverticalandhorizontalrelationsandcross-cutting,bridgingtiesdetermineslevelsofsocialcohesionandasociety'scapacitytomanageconflict.Truesocialcohesionreflectsasocietywiththemeanstowithstandinternalandexternalshockswhilesuccessfullymanagingdiversityandconflictinginterestswithinthecountry.Asevidencedinthecasestudies,therearethreemainmechanismsthatcanhinderorencouragetheeruptionofhostilities:policies,markets,andcivilsociety.Thesemediatingmechanismshelpshapethesocialrelationsofasociety,bothinformallyandformally.Theyhavethepotentialtodestroyorbuildcommunitiesandtofuelordefuseviolentconflict.PeterBergerhasobserved,
Inthenewpoliticalera,theculturalresourcesthatleadtosocialcohesionandthelimitsofthatcohesioninoursocietiesareoftheutmostimportance.Itwillbetheprimarytaskofsocietiestopromotesocialcohesionasthebasicsourceofeconomicdevelopmentandecologicalsensibility(Berger1998).
Page108
MediatingMechanisms:Policies,Markets,andCivilSociety
Policies.Ingeneral,statepolicies(or,forthatmatter,thepoliciesandprogramsofinternationalagenciesorNGOs)forsupportingsocialcapitalshouldparallelthebasicpreceptsestablishedforgoodgovernance.Thatis,theyshouldbeinclusive,equitable,andempowering.Iftheyarenot,statepoliciescandescendintostate-drivenwarfare.TheexampleofRwanda,wherestatepoliciesoncitizens'rights,property,educationalaccess,andemploymentinthecivilserviceweregearedtowardisolatingandmarginalizingtheTutsiillustratesalltoowellhowpoliciescandividecommunitiesandleadtoviolentconflict.
Whenpursuingpostconflictdevelopmentorrecovery,governmentsshouldnotrusheconomicreformpoliciestomeetoutsideexpectations,forthatcoulddivertattentionfromthemorecriticaltaskofbuildinggovernmentinstitutions,theruleoflaw,democraticrights,andsocialsafetynetsbasedontherestorationofsoundrelationships(socialcapital).Thetimingandsequencingofpolicyreformarecritical.Economicpolicyreformwithoutattendantcreationofinstitutionalcapacityandreformofsocialpolicycanonlyfomentsocialfragmentationandtherecurrenceofviolentconflict.Itwillbenecessarytocarefullyshapetheformationofpoliciesatthetopandsocialpracticesatthebottom(connectingthemacrowiththemicrolevel).Theaimisfortheselevelstoreinforceoneanotherandworktowardmendingthesocialfabric,slowlyreversingingrainedhatredandassistinginthehealingandformationoftrustasanindispensableingredientinanation'scohesiveness,stability,andeconomicdevelopment.Theadmonitionto"getthepoliciesright"maystillbevalid,butitisnotsufficient."Gettingthesocialrelationsright"isnecessaryforavoidingviolentconflict.
Developmentorganizations,whetherinvolvedinconflictprevention
orinreconstructionefforts,shouldadoptpoliciesthathelpstrengthenandrebuildresponsiveverticalsocialcapitalatthestatelevel,intermsofthatstate'scapabilities,role,andlinkstocommunities.Suchpoliciesincludeestablishingimpartialitywhilemaintainingado-no-harmmentality,investinginorgani-
Page109
zationsofthepoor,andprovidingincentivesforgoodgovernancebyencouragingpositivepoliticalreformtoreduceinequityandtoimprovebasicservices,theruleoflaw,andpoliticalandeconomicparticipation.Rodrik's(1999b)research,buttressedbyothers(Rodriguez1977;Shah1998;Easterly1999),hasempiricallydemonstratedthatcountrieswhichexperiencesharpdropsingrowtharethosewithdividedsocieties(asmeasuredbysuchindicatorsasinequalityandethnicfragmentation)andlackinginthefundamentalinstitutionsnecessarytomediateconflictanefficient,noncorruptbureaucracy,anindependentjudiciary,afreepress,andavibrantcivilsociety.
Statepoliciesthatareblindtosocialanalysispoliciesthatreducesubsidiestothevulnerableintheaftermathofwar,privatizestateassetsintoaninstitutionalvacuum,raisetaxesregressively,reduceorincreasesubsidiesinfavorofoneoranothergroup,downsizeanalreadyunderpaidorunpaidcivilserviceorarmy,andrepatriaterefugeesordemobilizecombatantswithoutthecapacityorresourcestoprovideatransitionalsafetynetoremployment-generatingopportunitiesarehigh-riskventures.AsStory(1998)notedinsummingupexperiencewithstructuraladjustmentandethnicityinRwanda,thecriticalfactorsaretheextenttowhicheconomicdifferentiationandcompetitionare"ethnicized"andtheimpactofadjustmentismediatedthrough(andpossiblyreinforcing)divisionsassociatedwithparticularethnicgroups.AlthoughtheRwandangenocidecannotbeattributedtoadjustmentpoliciesperse,alessonthatcanbedrawnfromtheexperienceisthatapeople'sexpectationsofhowadjustmentwillaffectthemisasimportantastheeventualimpactitself.Aclimateofeconomicuncertainlykindledbythememoryofhistoricalinjusticescanreadilyshapepresent-dayfears,settingthestageforviolentconflict.
Markets.Thepenetrationofmarketsintosocietycanfostersecondary
networksofsocialcapital.InnorthernSomalia,globalization,intheformofexternalmarketpenetrationandthespreadofknowledge,information,andtechnology,hasfacilitatedpeaceeffortsbyenablingexchangeandeconomicgrowthdespiteadverseconditions.TheconnectivityoftheSomaliadiaspora,
Page110
easyaccesstoports,telecommunications,andaccesstocapital(throughelectronictransmittalofremittances)haveallfacilitatedthisgrowth,linkedgroupswithinthenorthernregion,andcreatednewsocialandeconomicbridges.Weakstatepenetration(especiallyinHargeisa)hasalsoenabledthisdevelopmentofmarketforces,removingthethreatofoverregulationandaninefficientbureaucracy.Thedriveofthemarkethashelpedformcross-cuttinglinksinnorthernSomaliaandencouragegovernmentalandinstitutional(civilsociety)development,whichhavereinforcedeachotheraspotentialconflict-mediatingmechanisms.Bycontrast,wehaveseenhowmarketisolationinPreyKoh,Cambodia,hasreinforcedinward-lookingbondsandagenerallackofsocialcapacitytocompeteinthemarketplace,sometimesleadingtoawideningofthegapbetweenrichandpoorthroughexploitationratherthandevelopment.Improvingthequalityofacommunity'ssocialcapitalanditsabilitytodealconfidentlywithchangingmarketaccessduringtransitioncanbecriticaltothedevelopmentofthecommunity.
Civilsociety.Anactivecivilsocietythatprotectstherightsoftheindividualandofgroupswhileengagingandholdingthestateaccountabletotheruleoflawisanotherimportantmediatingforce.Assomeobserversnote,Cambodiatodayhasonlymovedfromawarwithoutjusticetoapeacewithoutjustice.Yearsoffactionalwar,aheavilyarmedpopulace,acorruptjudiciaryandpoliceforce,andaninefficientbureaucracyallcontributetoacultureinwhichviolenceisstillthepreferredwayofgettingthingsdone(Faulder2000).
ThePolPotregimepurposelydestroyedCambodiancivilsocietyinanattempttoeraseallformsoftraditionalbonds,fromkinshiptoreligionandthearts,andtodestroymodernbridgesbytargetingprofessionalssuchasteachersanddoctors.ApervertedbondingformofsocialcapitalemergedintheformoftheAngka,''TheOrganization,"whichconsistedofaformerlyexcludedgroupsemiliterate,unemployed
youthsledbyahandfulofextremistintellectuals(whohadalsobeenexcluded).TheAngkaperpetratedoneofthecruelestgenocidesinmodernhistory.Trustbetweenindividualsvirtuallydisappearedaspeople
Page111
werereducedtospyingandinformingononeanotherandtoobeyingtheruleswithoutquestion.Thecommonsayingthenwas,"Ifyouwanttosurvive,youmustpretendtobedeafandmute"(Nee2000).
ThecombinedeffectsofcenturiesoffeudalismandmilitarismhaveleftCambodiancommunitieswithweaksociallinks.SomestudentsofCambodianvillagelifeevenquestionwhetherCambodianvillagesmayberegardedascommunitiesinarealsense(Vijghenandothers1966;Ebihara1976).Thebreakdownofbasiccommunityvalues,norms,andsocialrelationshipsandtheongoingsocialviolencehavevirtuallydestroyedsocialcohesioninCambodia.Undersuchcircumstances,peopletendtotakecareofthemselvesratherthanthinkofothers.Thetaskaheadistorevitalizethefunctioningofexistingsocialstructures,incorporatingthemintothemainstreamofdevelopmentbyempoweringpeopletoparticipateindecisionsabouttheirowncommunities'needs,resources,andactionsinshort,buildingacivilsocietycapableofmediatingbetweenindividuals,groups,andthestate.
Themediacanhelpcivilsocietytothrive.Afreepressenablespublicexpressionandinformsthepublicofgovernmentactions.DuringthegenocideinRwanda,themedia,insteadofdefusingconflict,ignitedandinflamedethnichatred.StateradioandtelevisionwentsofarastobroadcastlistsofHutuineachcommunewhohadnotparticipatedinthekillings,therebypubliclypressuringthemtojointhegenocide.
Bycontrast,thenonprofitorganizationSearchforCommonGround,whichworksforsocietalconflictresolutionintheUnitedStatesandelsewhere,isusingthemediatobuildbridgingtiesinRwanda'sneighbor,Burundi.Theretoo,animositiesbetweenHutuandTutsihaveledtothousandsofdeaths,andhateradiohasbeenusedtoinciteethnicviolence.In1995,SearchforCommonGroundlaunchedStudioIjambo("wisewords,"inKirundi)asaradioproductioncenter
whereHutuandTutsijournalistsworktogethertoprovidebalancednews,features,andevensoapoperas.Thestudioislocatedinthecountry'scapital,Bujumbura.Since,asalistenersurveyindicated,99.98percentofBurundiansconsiderthemselvestoberegularradio
Page112
listeners,thismediumisanimportantmeansofcounteractinghatepropagandawithamessageofunderstandingandreconciliation.
9
Insocietiesintransitionfromviolentconflicttopeaceandfromcrisistosustainabledevelopment,thetransformationofsocialcapitalthatstrengthenssocialcohesioncanplayacriticalroleinthetransitionfromwelfare-oriented,protectionistrelieftoanactivistdevelopmentorientation.Statepolicies,markets,andcivilsocietycanallcontributetoordetractfromthisprocess.Inthisperspective,communitiesareviewednotjustasvictimswithneedsbutassurvivorswithcapacities.
EnsuringHumanSecurity:ManagingConflictbyConnectingandEmpoweringPeople
InRwanda,inastarkexampleofsocialcapitalgoneawry,HutuelitewereabletomobilizeexclusionaryanddivisivesocialcapitalthatbondedHutuprimarilymaleunemployedanduneducatedyouthintosuchgroupsastheInterahamwe.WhilesomeHutuwillinglyparticipatedinthemassacres,otherswereorderedorforcedtokill.WithinHutuextremism,bonding,exclusivesocialcapitalpoweredthegroups'successbyprovidingexcellentinformationnetworksandasenseofsolidarity,obligation,andcivicduty.Butsocialcapitalcanalsoformbridges,enablingcross-cuttingandinclusiveties,suchasthoseamongtheindigenousGuatemalanwomen'sgroupsthathaveunitedtosustainpeaceefforts.Forexample,seeBox12inchapter7,whichdescribedtheformationoftheOfficefortheDefenseofIndigenousWomen'sRights(Defensoria),thefirstpostconflictinitiativeinGuatemalatoincorporateindigenousparticipationintothemanagementandadministrationofapublicinstitution.Thecreationoflinksbetweenexcludedgroupsandgovernmentofficesisanexample
oftheoptimalapplicationanduseofsocialcapitalstocks.
Whatconditionsreinforceexclusionarybondingsocialrelations,andwhatconditionsnurtureinclusionarybridgingsocialrelations?Howcansocietiescopewithnormativeconflictsunderconditionsofpluralismanddiversity?Howdoestheebband
Page113
flowofsocialcapitalworktoholdasocietytogetherorfragmentit?Thesecriticalquestionsarekeytounderstandingtheroleofsocialcapitalinpromotingsocialcohesionandconflictmanagementasabasicsourceofeconomicdevelopmentandhumanprogress.Connecting,empowering,andintegratingpeopleandorganizationsarebasictransformativeactionsthatemergefromouranalysistoshedlightonthesequestions.
Connections.Physicalrehabilitationandreconstructionhingeonsocialreconciliation,whichsuccessfullyconnectsadversarialgroups.InRwanda,forexample,sincetheendofthegenocideattemptshavebeenmadetoplaceHutuingovernmentpositionstobalancepoliticalpower.Meanwhile,spacehasbeencreatedforthereemergenceofcivilsocietyactors.YetthenewsocialfabricofRwandaiscomplicated,withsubgroupsandschismsthatwilltakegenerationstoheal.Cross-cuttingsocialcapitalneedstobenurturedtolinknotjustHutuandTutsibutalsothosewithinsubgroups.Buthopeprevailsasassociationsofwidowsandfemaleheadsofhouseholdsbridgeethniclinestoformnewsocialcapital.
InnorthernSomalia,thediasporahasfacilitatednotonlyaneconomicconnectednesstoglobalmarkets,buthastransformedsocialrelationshipsamonglocalclansbystrengtheningcross-cuttingtiesthroughmarkettransactionsandopenchannelsofcommunication.
Empowerment.Decentralizationandparticipationcanempowerpeopletotakeoverdevelopmentandgivethemasenseofcontrolovertheirfuture.Todismantlethelegacyofcentralizeddecisionmakingandbegintoforgethesebridginglinks,theRwandangovernmentinitiatedaninclusivecommunity-drivenapproachtodevelopmentfoundedontheconceptsofparticipationanddecentralization.ThisapproachisdesignedtoinvolveRwandanscloselyinthemanagementoftheirownaffairsandtogivelocaladministrativestructuresthe
primaryresponsibilityfordevelopmentactivities,thusnotonlyempoweringthegroupsbutalsoencouragingthemtoworktogethertobuildtheirconnectedfutures.
Page114
Effortsbyinternationalactorstobuildandstrengthencivilsocietymustbeaccompaniedbyeffortstoimproverespectforpluralism,tolerance,andparticipatory,democraticprinciples.Equalityamongsocialgroupsthatpromotestiescuttingacrossethnicity,clans,gender,age,religion,andpoliticalideologiesisnecessaryifqualitycivicengagementistoflourish.Suchcivilsocietybindstogetherpotentiallydisintegrativeelements,buildingnew,cohesivesocialidentitieswhilekeepingbondingelementsofcommunalidentityinbalance.
Whilecross-cuttingtiesarebeingestablished,assessmentsmustalsobemadeofexistingbondingsocialcapitalbases,andcaremustbetakenthatexternaleffortsdonoterodethem.Oncetheselocalcopingmechanismsareidentified,theymustbeincorporatedintothereconstructionprocess.Externalinterventionsneedtobesensitivetoindigenousorganizationsandbecarefulnottowipeoutthegroups'owneffortsandtheirtendenciestowardself-reliance.Rather,theyshouldstrengthenindigenouscapacities,especiallytobridgetonewroles,functions,andrelationships.Internationalactorsshouldensurethattheirdevelopmenteffortsdonotnurtureorencouragedependencythroughthemannerinwhichleadership,money,know-how,ormaterialsareprovided.Localactorsshouldnotbeinadvertentlyundercutbyexternalfundingforgovernmentprojectsalreadybeinghandledlocally.Developmentactorsmustbecarefulnottoundermineconfidenceininternalandexternalcopingmechanisms;theyshouldnurturethesemechanisms'capacitytohandleand,infact,leadeffortstowardchange.Externalinterventionshouldnotbecomeadisincentivetoself-help,norshouldprojectdesignandimplementationweakentheauthorityandprestigeoflocalleaders.Donoreffortsshouldseektogobeyondthepreceptof"donoharm"to"dosomegood,"enhancingcommunityself-esteemandself-reliancethroughthedevelopmentofsocialcapacityforinformalparticipationandcollectiveaction.
Thegoalofbuildingcapacityatthelocallevelshouldbetoimproveaccesstoinformationandtransparencyindecisionmakingandtoenhancelocalleaders'skillsinobtaininginformation,empoweringdecisionmaking,buildinglocalalliances,resolvingconflicts,andimplementingprojectssoasto
Page115
facilitatedecentralizationefforts.Caremustbetakenthatdevelopmentorreliefeffortsatthelocalleveldonotobscureunderlyingpoliticalrealitiesandunintentionallymaskcontradictionsandinadequacieswithinthesociety.Inhostileenvironments,extantsocialcapitalbasesshouldbeusedforpeacebuildinginitiatives,andpositiveinformationshouldbeprovidedtogroupsunderstresstodispelnegative,hate-filledpropaganda.(TheWorldBank'sRwandaCommunityReintegrationandDevelopmentProjectisanexampleofaconstructiveapproach;seeBox11inchapter7.)
BuildingResilientCommunities:IntegratingReliefandDevelopment
Buildingresilientcommunitiesinthewakeofviolentconflictisessentialtosustainablepeaceanddevelopment.Integrationcanoccuronmanylevels,fromthecooperationofdiversegroupsinstrengtheningsocialcapitalandconstructingcivilsocietytotheintegrationofstatesandcitizensthroughmarketsandpoliciesallplayingtheirrespectiverolesintransformingsocialcapitalandenhancingenduringsocialcohesion.
Duringthepostconflictperiod,whenatransitionfrominitialhumanitarianrelieftolonger-termdevelopmenttakesplace,theintegrationofpoliciesandoperationsoccursonmanydifferentlevels,withvaryingsuccess.Governmentactors,aswellasexternalinternationalorganizations(suchasbusinesspersons,donors,andNGOs)aretypicallyinvolvedinonewayoranotherintherelationshipbetweenhumanitarianreliefanddevelopmentandthusplayakeyroleinhelpingtointegrateactivities.
Itisbecomingincreasinglyclearthatreliefagenciesmustfocusmoreonsustainablesolutions,takingadevelopment-orientedapproachtotheprovisionofhumanitarianassistance,whiledevelopmentagenciesneedtohelpremedythedeficiencies(in,forexample,politicalwill,
financing,knowledge,andorganization)inthetransitionfromrelieftodevelopment.Onthebasisofstudiesexaminingsocialcapital,twoprimaryrecommendationsemergethatcouldhelpimprovethestrategiesandoperationsofbothinternationalactors.
Page116
1.Reliefshouldnotstrengthenbondingassociationsattheexpenseofbuildingbridgingnetworks.Alltoooften,reliefinadvertentlyfuelsconflictandreinforcesundemocraticprocesses,particularlywhenaccessandgoods(food)becomeinstrumentsofwar(GoodhandandHulme1999).Humanitarianactors,whilesupportingprimaryrelations,canacttostifle,oratleastdonotencourage,thedevelopmentofthelinksandtiesnecessarytoprogresstomoresustainabledevelopment.Ifnotcarefullyimplemented,reliefcanstrengthenprimarysocialcapitalandyetpreventreconciliationbystrengtheningexclusionarybondingties.Reliefcancatertoindividualratherthancommunityneeds,thuslesseningsocialcohesionand,consequently,grouptrust,normsofreciprocity,andsolidarity.Reliefcankeeppeoplealive,butinworst-casescenariositcanunintentionallypromotepolarizationandmoreconflict(Box14).
Therealchallengeinthetransitionisthefinebalancebetweensavinglivesandprovidingsustainablelivelihoodsthatconsciouslycreatesbridgingsocialcapitalwhileprovidingreliefandrehabilitation.Itisnotenoughtoprovidefood;doingsocansubtlybuilddependenceandasenseofentitlement.Agenciesmustworktoempowerthevictimstotakebacktheirownlivesandbecomeactiveproducersoffoodagain,buildingasenseofself-relianceandresponsibility.Repatriationofrefugeeswithoutsocialandeconomicreintegrationandwithoutprovidingopportunitiesformutualunderstanding,learning,andearningisarecipeforfurtherimpoverishment.Emergencydrugsandmedicaltreatmentintheabsenceofhealthservicesandsocialsecuritymaysustainlifebutwillnotendsuffering.Thecreationofsustainabilitythatpreventsdependencestemsfromtheemergenceofbridginglinkages,whichunitedisparatecommunitiesineffortsforsocialandeconomicgrowthanddevelopment.
Humanitariananddevelopmentactorsshouldjointlyassessexistingbondingsocialcapitalbasesandtakecarethattheirexternaleffortsdo
noterodethemnorblindlyreinforcethemattheexpenseoffacilitatingcross-cuttingties.Socialassessmentorconflictanalysis,includingtheexplicitrecognitionofunderlyingsocietalcleavagesassourcesofsocialconflictandtension,shouldbeacoreaspectofpreparingforassistance.Suchanalysisshould
Page117
Box14Reliefandtheperpetuationofviolentconflict
ShortlyafterthegenocideinRwanda,refugeecampsinZairewereplaguedwithlargenumbersofgénocidaireswhousedinnocentHutumassesasshieldsfromRwandaPatrioticFrontforcesbentonretributionandinternationalactorsconcernedwithpunishingtheegregioushumanrightsabusesofthegenocide.Besidesprovidingastableenvironmentandshelter,humanitarianagencieskeptHutuPowermemberswellfed.Malnutritionratesinthecampswerefarlowerthananywhereelseintheregiononapar,infact,withthoseinWesternEurope.GeneralmedicalcarewasalsoequaltothebestavailableincentralAfrica.Peoplelivingnearthecampsspokeenviouslyofrefugeeentitlements,andseveralsaidtheyhadpretendedtoberefugeestogainadmissiontocampclinics.AccordingtoGourevitch(1998:27071):
Afterhavingallessentiallivingexpensescoveredbycharity,campresidentswerefreetoengageincommerce,andaidagenciesfrequentlyprovidedenticementslikeagriculturalsuppliestodoso.ThemajorcampsinZairequicklybecamehometothebiggest,best-stocked,andcheapestmarketsintheregion.ZaireanscameformilestoshopchezlesRwandais,whereatleasthalfthetradeappearedtobeinhumanitarianaid
stuffsbeans,flour,andoil,spillingfromsacksandtinsstampedwiththelogosofforeigndonors.And,astheInterahamweandex-FAR[soldiersoftheformergovernmentarmy]steppeduptheirattacksontheTutsiherdsmenofNorthKivu,theGomacampmarketsbecamefamousforincrediblycheapbeef.(16566)
Presidedoverbytheex-FAR,andbytheInterahamwe,thecampswererapidlyorganizedintoperfectreplicasoftheHutuPowersamecommunitygroupings,sameleaders,samerigidhierarchy,samepropaganda,sameviolence.Inthisregime,thehumanitariansweretreatedratherliketheservicestaffataseedymafia-occupiedhotel:theyweretheretoprovidefood,medicine,housewares,anauraofrespectability.
focusonpatternsofdistributionofresourcesandshouldemphasizeinclusivenessofopportunitiesandvoiceamonggroupsaswellasindividuals.Oncetheselocalnetworksandassociationsareidentified,theyshouldbeincorporatedintotheprocess
Page118
ofreconstruction.Evenwhenthewebofextantsocialcapitalrelationsisused,internationalactorsmustbewaryofoverloadingtheabilitiesoflocalstaffwithoutprovidingcommensuratecapacity-buildingandtechnicalsupport.Assistance,whetherhumanitarianordevelopmentoriented,shouldbeadditive,notsubstitutional.Ironically,thesamebondingsocialcapitalthat"enables"peopletosurviveviolentconflictcanbecomea"disabling"elementfordevelopment.
2.Inthetransitionalphasefromhumanitarianrelieftodevelopment,longer-termdevelopmentalactorsshouldbemoresensitiveaboutthesupportofphysicallinkagesattheexpenseofintegrativerelations.Lackofbasicinfrastructure,particularlytransportation,communication,power,andwatersupply,isamajorhurdleforsustainabledevelopment."Wherearoadpasses,developmentfollowsrightonitsheels,"saidanoldmaninCameroon(Narayanandothers2000).Transportationandcommunicationlinksbothincreasephysicalandsocialconnectednessandeffectthepricesobtainedforcropsandproducts.Roads,eventothenextvillage,areseenasexpandingpeople'soptionsandaccesstoservices.Accesstocleandrinkingwaterandtowaterforirrigationisfrequentlyseenasmarkingthedivisionbetweenthenonpoorandthepoor(Narayanandothers2000).
Yetinthisdrivetodevelop,communitymemberscanbegintofeeldisconnectedfromtheirownfamiliesandthusperceivetheirintegrativerelationstobediminishing.Globalization,whileencouragingopenmarketsandthegrowthofbridgingnetworks,canworsenthisconditionduringpostconflictphases.Developmenteffortsshouldtrytonurtureactivitiesthathelpmaintainintegrativelinksinthecommunity,unitingmembersofnuclearandextendedfamiliesandneighborsbyencouragingcross-cuttingassociationalbehavior,whetherthroughsuchactivitiesassportsandpopularcultureorthroughtheethnicmakeupoflocalgovernmentsandenterprises.
AsFigure2illustrates,bondingsocialcapitalandrelatedhumanitarianassistancetendtoaddressthe"legacy"ofconflict(displacement,famine,disease,anddeath),whilesocialandeconomicdevelopmentthatbuildsbridgingsocialcapitaladdresses
Page119
Figure2Towardtheintegrationofreliefanddevelopment
Page120
theunderlying''causes"ofconflict(inequity,exclusion,andindignity).Akeysocialdevelopmenttaskforhumanitariananddevelopmentagenciesistoconsciouslybuildbridgingandlinking(horizontalandvertical)socialcapitalwithincommunitiesandbetweenthestateandcivilsocietywhenprovidingreliefandrehabilitationthatisnotsimplysupply-drivenandpromotesacopingratherthanchangeorientation.
TheBrookingsinitiativedescribedinBox15offersapromisingapproachtoclosingthegapbetweenreliefanddevelopment
Box15Bridgingthegapbetweenhumanitarianreliefanddevelopment
TheUnitedNationsHighCommissionerforRefugees(UNHCR),theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme(UNDP),andtheWorldBankrecentlyinitiatedaprogram,spurredbyaninitiativeoftheBrookingsInstitution,toeasethediscontinuitybetweenshort-termhumanitarianassistanceandlonger-termdevelopmentinterventions.Thetransitionperiodfromhumanitarianassistanceandconflicttodevelopmenteffortsandpeaceiscomplicatedbyasetofsocioeconomic,political,andpsychologicalchallengeswithinanuncertainsecurityenvironment.Currentresponsestothesechallengesareinadequatebecauseofthedifferentapproaches,institutionalarrangements,andfundingsystemsofthetwotypesofactors.Humanitarianassistanceisoftenunsustainable,and
donorsoftenlackinterestinthetransitionperiod.
Thearbitrarycompartmentsofhumanitarianactivitiesanddevelopmentdonottransferwelltoreal-worldsocieties,wherethefragilityofpeaceandthepersistenceofviolencemakeitdifficulttodrawdistinctionsbetweenthe"conflict"and"postconflict"periods.Humanitarianoperationsfocusonquickresponseandshort-termplanning,whiledevelopmentagenciesareoftenslowandinflexible.Bothtendtofocustoomuchonmandatesratherontheneedsofthoseaffectedbywar,andneitherseemstorelyontheknowledgeandexpertiseoftheotherthatmayhelpimproveoperations.Toaddressthisgap,multilateralandbilateralinstitutionsmustbecomemorecoherentintheirstrategiesandoperations.TheUNHCR,theUNDP,andtheWorldBankhavethereforesetouttoestablishrecommendationsonhowtolinktheiroperationsandpoliciestoaddressthisshortcoming.TherecentjointmissiontoSierraLeone,Liberia,andGuineamakespossibleagroundingofmandatesintherealitiesofthesubregion.Takingasubregionalperspective,itsfocusonsuchcross-borderissuesasrefugeeandarmsflows,naturalresources,andsecurityconcernsisbringingaboutsynergyandimprovedcoordinationofpoliciesand
programsontheground.
Page121
duringthecriticaltransitionfromwartopeace.Sensitivityregardingself-relianceandsocialdevelopmentisvitalwhenprovidingrelief.Reliefanddevelopmentshouldnotbeseenassequentialprocesses.Notionsofacontinuumarelongdead.Humanitarianreliefprovidesawindowofopportunityforbuildingbridgingsocialcapitalandfacilitatinganenvironmentofgoodgovernanceanddemocraticopenness.Itisavehiclewhenlinkedwithdevelopmentforbuildingcommunicationandtrustacrossethnic,religious,sectoral,andpoliticallines.Theintegrationofreliefanddevelopmentinterventions,startingwithasharedsetofprinciplesandacommonassessmentoflocalneedsandcapacities,isakeyingredientinclosingthegaps,strengtheningsocialcapitalandsocietalcohesion,andpreventingtherecurrenceofviolentconflict.
FromPeacebuildingtoNation-Building:DesignsforSustainablePeace,Reconciliation,andDevelopment
Thechallengeofnation-buildingremainsapressingissueforthenewmillenniumasnewstatespresideoveroldsocietiesandunyieldingsocialdivisions.Theprocessofdecolonizationcontinues;nationalelitesthatonlyrecentlyachievedtheirownindependencefromforeignrulehavetodealwithdissentingcommunitiesthatnowdemandautonomyorevenindependence.Thetaskofdrawingonoldtraditions,values,andmythstocreateanewnationiscomplexandfraughtwithdifficulty.Yetsuchnewlyformed"imaginedcommunities"somehowhavetosetasideprimordialloyaltiesofbondedsocialcapitalmanifestedinreligion,clan,ethnicity,andlocality,tobetransformedintosociallycohesive,functioningnations(Shoesmith2000).Likenation-building,socialcohesionhastobebuiltbrickbybrick,fromthebottomup,perhapshorizontallyfirstandthenvertically.Byatfirstovertlytackling"safe"subjectssuchasthecommunitymanagementofbasicservicesschools,healthcenters,and
soonitispossibletoaddressthebuildingofcross-cuttingsocialcapitalby"stealth"(Khin-SandiLwin2000:3;CollettaandNezam1999).
Reconciliationitselfisaprocessofrebuildingsocialcapital.Itrequiresthecreationofpoliticalspaceandsocialrelationships
Page122
forpeacefulengagementacrossandwithinsocietalcleavagesbetheyethnic,religious,gender,age,income,orlocality,andbetweennationalandlocallevels.
Anticipatorythinkingbasedonthewillingnesstolistenandlearnandtomakefew,ifany,assumptions,isthekeytosuccessforthoseworkinginconflict-affectedcountries.Peacebuildingis,atitscore,civil-societybuilding.Measuresofcivicengagement,alongwithhumansecurityandgovernmentefficacy,transparency,andstability,arefundamentalsocialcapitalindicatorsforcomprehensivereconstruction.Socialnetworksandorganizationsareessentialassetsintheportfolioofresourcesdrawnonbythewar-affectedtomanageriskandtakeadvantageofopportunities.Peacebuildinginvolvesnotonlyeconomicreconstruction,ortherebuildingofphysicalinfrastructureandeconomicstabilization,butalsothefundamentalrevitalizationofpositivesocialcapitalandthestrengtheningofsocialcohesion.Thesolutionstoconflictpreventionlienotonlyindemilitarizationandinjump-startingtheeconomy,althoughtheseareimportant.Theyliealsoingoodgovernancetheruleoflaw,justice,andhumanrightsandinstrengtheningsocialcapitalateverylevel.Thecrucialchallengeistobuildsocietalcapacityformanagingdiversityandpreventingsocialcapitalfrombeingtransformedintoaninstrumentofexclusionandviolentconflict.Thisintegralcomponentofrehabilitation,reconstruction,andreconciliationcanbeaccumulatedonlyoveryearsofsupportandnourishment.Itthusrequireslong-term,flexibleapproachesthatallowadaptationtointerimchange.
Intheend,thevoicesofthewar-affectedcryoutforanewkindofsecurity,ahumansecuritydevoidofoppressionandfear,devoidofhunger,andrichwithopportunity,thatempowersthemtotakeresponsibilityanddecisionsthatimpacttheirownlives.Resilientcommunitiesrelyonallformsofresponsibilityandsocialcapital:
bondingprimarytiesforprotectionandsurvivalintimeofcrisis;bridginglinksforactionanddevelopmentintimeofhope;efficientandfunctionalbureaucraciesandtransparentnormsandrules;andsynergisticgovernment-communityrelationsthatallowcivicengagementtothriveastheultimateguar-
Page123
antoragainstviolentconflict.Developmentneedstonurtureandtransformsocialcapitalinordertocreateandmaintainthemechanismsandinstitutionsnecessaryforstrengtheningsocialcohesion,managingdiversity,preventingviolentconflict,andsustainingpeaceandreconciliation.
Page124
NOTES1.Whilethereisarangeofdefinitionsforcivilsociety,weusethetermtomeananetworkofcross-cuttingrelationsandinstitutionsofthepeoplethathavecapacitytoorganizeandengageinpubliclifeanddecisionmaking.
2.TheconceptofstrongandweaktiescanbetracedtoGranovetter(1973).
3.MeasNee(privatecommunication,March28,2000)notesthatPrasathhasstrongersocialcapitalandsocialcohesionandalessmarkedgapbetweenrichandpoor(atalowerincomelevelthaninPreyKoh).SocialdivisionsaremoreprominentinPreyKoh,wheremarketpenetrationisadvancedandtheopportunitiestoescapepovertyaregreater.
4.TheHutuaresaidtocompriseabout85percentoftheRwandanpopulation,theTutsiroughly14percent,andtheTwa,1percent.Traditionallyhowever,thesefigureshavebeenbasedonthenumberofcowsownedandthusmaynotbeaccurate(Prunier1997).
5.Manyrevengekillingsdidtakeplacethroughoutthegenocideandintheperiodimmediatelyfollowing,asTutsislaughteredHutuinretaliationfordeathsintheirfamilies.Althoughtheexactnumbersarenotknown,thenumbersofHutumurderedbynomeansmatchthoseofTutsikilled(Prunier1997;DesForges1999).
6.Forasimilarconclusiononsocialcapitaldynamicswithinmilitias,gangs,andguerrillagroups,seeWorldBank2000:45.
7.CertainmodificationshavebeenmadeinCERFE'soriginalterminologytohelpassimilateCERFE'sconceptstothesocialcapitalcanonandfacilitatecomparisonwiththeothercasestudies.
Originally,CERFEdefinedcivilsocietyastheenablerofsocialinitiative,orprotectiverelationsandriskmitigation(socialresponsibility,asdefinedhere),andofsocialcapital,ortheabilitytoinitiateeconomicgrowth(socialinitiative,asdefinedhere).Inthismonograph,CERFE'snotionsofsocialinitiativeandsocialcapitalarecombinedtorepresenttwodiffer-
Page125
entdimensionsofamoretraditionalconceptofsocialcapitalthatincludesbothdefensiveandoffensiverelations,moreakintothegeneralconstructsofbondingandbridgingsocialcapital.SeeCERFE(1998,1999).
8.LadinoisagenerictermappliedtothosenotofMayandescent.
9.SeetheSearchforCommonGroundWebsite,<www.sfcg.org>.
Page126
ANNEX:LEARNINGFROMTHEMETHODOLOGIESEMPLOYED:MEASURINGSOCIALCAPITALWITHINACONTEXTOFVIOLENTCONFLICTUsingWoolcock'sfourdimensionsofsocialcapital,comparativeanalysisofthedefinitionsandindicatorsofsocialcapitalemployedbythecountrystudiesrevealstheadvantagesanddisadvantagesofeachmethodandsuggestshowotherexternalresearchmayhavefurtheredunderstanding.Suchareviewalsoillustratesthestudies'contributionstotheconceptualization,assessment,andmeasurementofsocialcapital,illuminatesareasofomission,andhelpsspecifyandfocuspotentialinterventionsfordirectlyaffectingdifferentdimensionsofsocialcapitalintheprocessesofreconciliationandreconstructionofwar-tornsocieties.
ThedefinitionsandindicatorsofsocialcapitalusedintheCambodiaandRwandastudiesallowedanin-depthlookattwobasicdimensionsofsocialcapital:integrationandlinkages.TheCambodianstudyfocusedoncommunityevents,informalnetworks,associations,andvillageleadership,whichhelpedillustratethematrixofsocialrelationswithinPrasathandPreyKoh.Linkswiththegovernmentandwithexternalagencieswerebrieflycovered,revealingthenatureofverticalrelationsand,toamuchlesserdegree,theorganizationalintegrityofthestateanditssynergisticrelationswithcommunities.ThestudyinRwandaprimarilyfocusedonintegrationwithinthecommune.
Page127
Variousaspectsofintracommunalrelationswereexamined,suchasexchange,thepresenceofassociationsandgroups,intermarriageandextendedfamilyrelations,conflict-resolutionmechanisms,trust,andcollectiveresponsibilitytowardvulnerablegroups.Intercommunityties,orlinkages,wereexaminedintermsofexchange,intermarriage,andcooperationbetweenneighboringcommunes.Verticalrelationswiththelocaladministrationwerealsoassessed,sheddingsomelightonthelevelsofsynergyinRwanda,andtheanalysisoftheconflictrevealedthestate'slackoforganizationalintegrity.
TheparadigmemployedbyCERFEinGuatemalaandSomaliaalsofacilitatedtheanalysisofbothintegrationandlinkages.Socialresponsibility,orhowwellcivilsocietycanprotectpeoplefromriskandadversity,wasexaminedalongwithcivilsociety'ssocialinitiative,orpotentialtohaveapositiveeffectoneconomicdevelopmentandgrowth.Thistwo-prongedapproachtoanalyzingthecapacityofcivilsocietyencompassedbothbondingandbridgingsocialcapital,withinandbetweencommunities.Initsquesttolumpallsocialcapitaltogetherundertherubricofcivilsociety,however,theCERFEmodellargelyignoredtheimportanceofbondingsocialcapitalmanifestedinkinshipandinformalnetworksandgroups,notablyindigenousgroupsinGuatemalaandclanstructuresinSomalia.
Althoughthefourstudiesrevealedmuchaboutthemicroaspectsofsocialcapital,theywereonlyabletoforeshadowthemacroissuesdisclosedinthenotionsofstateandmarketpenetration.Overall,themodelsusedinallthecasestudiesdidnotallowforsufficientgatheringofdataonverticalelementsofsocialcapitalrelatedtostateorganizationalintegrityorsynergy.TheRwandanandCambodianstudiestangentiallycoveredfacetsofsynergyandorganizationalintegrity,butmainlythroughtheiranalysesofconflict.Byilluminatingthecapacityandfunctionofcivilsociety,theCERFE
model,althoughitdidnotfocusonorganizationalintegrityorsynergyperse,didshedlightonthesetwomacrosocialcapitaldimensions.Whencombinedwithabroaderexaminationofgovernmentrolesandabilitiesandofhowthegovernmentrelatestothecommunityindefiningandfulfillingtheseroles,CERFE'sfindingshelpedillustratehowcivil
Page128
societyoperatedinconjunctionwiththestatebyeithersubstitutingfororcomplementinggovernmentaction.
Thebalancebetweenthefourdimensionsofsocialcapitalintegration,linkages,organizationalintegrity,andsynergyiscritical,for,accordingtoWoolcock,suchbalanceproducesthemostfertilegroundforstabilityandsustainablesocialandeconomicdevelopmentandgrowth.Thisbalanceistheessenceofsocietalcohesion.Alapseinanyonedimensiondoesnotnecessarilypreventsocioeconomicdevelopment,butitcouldmeanthatgrowthishampered.Consequently,effortstonurturesocialcapitalandhencepromotesocialandeconomicadvancesmustconsidereachofthefourdimensionsofverticalandhorizontalsocialcapital.Inordertocapturethefullimpactofsocialcapitalformationonsocialcohesiveness,futurestudiesshouldincorporateamoreholisticanalysistoensurethateachdimensionisaddressed.Thisbroadeningofconceptualanalysisshould,however,beaccompaniedbyaspecificdefinitionofsocialcapitalandclearandpreciseindicatorssoasnottoincreasevaguenessandambiguityalongwithscope.
StrengthsandWeaknessesoftheSurveyMethodologies
Themethodologiesemployedinthestudieshavetheirstrengthsandweaknesses(seeTable10foranoutlineofthesurveymethods).TheCambodiananalysisusedquantitativedatatoestablishdemographicbackgroundinformationonthecommunitiesandparticipatoryqualitativeresearchtoexaminemoresubstantivesocialcapitalissues.Participantswerequestionedthroughsurveysandinindividualandgroupexercisesthatincludedmapping,diagram,andrankingexercises.Theuseofacombinationofmethodstogatherdataenabledthetriangulationoffindings.Asaresult,thefinalreportpresentedaclearanddetaileddescriptionofsocialcapitalanditsrelationtoconflictinPreyKohandPrasath,whileintegratingtheparticipants'
perceptions.
TheRwandastudyimplementedaqualitativesurveyandstrovetointegrateparticipants'perspectivesontheconcepts,definitions,andindicatorsofsocialcapitalandconflict.The
Page129
Table10ComparisonofthefieldsurveysCambodia Rwanda Guatemala
andSomaliaLiteraturereview
JuneSeptember1998
JuneSeptember1998 FebruaryJuly1998
FieldstaffPredominantlylocal;threemenandtwowomen;ledbyexternalinternationalconsultant.
Local,equallydividedbetweenmenandwomen;overseenbytheWorldBank'sPost-ConflictUnitandtheWorldBankResidentMission.
Local;staffledbyinternationalNGO(CERFE)withextensivefieldpresenceineachcountry.
FieldworkSeptember1998February1999
October1998May1999 September1998February1999
Twosurveys:onetoestablishbaselinesocioeconomicinformation(allhouseholds130inPrasathand114inPreyKoh),andasecondtoinvestigatesocialcapitalfactors(about30percentofhouseholds,randomlyselected39inPrasathand34inPreyKoh).Furtherqualitativedatagatheredthroughvillagestaysandparticipant
Householdsurveyscovering1.5percentofhouseholds,randomlyselected,inthreesectorsofeachcommune(114householdsinGitiand144householdsinShyanda).Eachhouseholdcontainedfivepeople,onaverage;Gitihasapopulationof48,000andShyandaapopulationof39,000.Thesurveystructurewasbasedonfindingsintheinitialliteraturereviewandthreeweeksofparticipantobservationineachcommune.Dataanalysisfromthesurveysisstillinprocess.Focusgroupandkeyinformantinterviewsineachcommune.Focus
Thefirstphaseoffieldresearchwasdesignedtoidentifythosesociallyresponsiblecollectiveactors(organizations)thatmakeupcivilsocietyineachstudytown:Hargeisa(Somalia):85Boroma(Somalia):44Nebaj(Guatemala):
observation(12weeks);participatorygroupexercisessuchasmapping,resourceflowanalysis,wealth
51PuertoBarrios(Guatemala):50Interviewswereconductedwithkeypersons,localleaders,andcivilservants.Hargeisahasapopulationof295,000(141civilsocietygroups)andBoroma,64,000(63civilsocietygroups).Puerto
(tablecontinuedonnextpage)
Page130
(tablecontinuedfrompreviouspage)
Table10(continued)Cambodia Rwanda GuatemalaandSomaliaranking,andtrendanalysis;andindividualandgroupsemistructuredinterviews.
groupscontained5to15participantsandtargetedmixedgroups,widows,orphans,politicians,intellectuals,associations,andbusinesspeople.Keyinformantswerechosenfromthefocusgroupstoelaborateonspecificdetails.Interviewguidesforbothgroupandindividualinterviewswerederivedfrominitialsurveyfindings.
Barrioshasapopulationof82,000(170civilsocietygroups),andNebajhasapopulationof55,000(187civilsocietygroups).Thesecondphasefocusedonthequalityofleadershipinaselectednumberoforganizations;84leadersinbothcountrieswereinterviewed.Inthethirdphase,20organizationsinGuatemalaand21inSomaliawerestudiedindepth.Atotalof41organizationleaders,52keypersons,and94citizenswasquestioned.
ConstraintsDifficultiesstemmedfromthetimeelapsedsincethepreconflictperiodmorethan30yearsago.Fewpeoplewereoldenoughtorecallwhatday-to-dayexistencewaslike,andmemorieshadfaded.
Thesensitivityofthetopicandtherecentnessofthewarmeantthatthesubjecthadtobeapproachedslowlyandindirectly.Afterthefieldteamgainedthetrustofcommunalmembers,respondentsfreelydiscussedtheirconflictexperiences.
Thecomplexityofthemodelutilizedandthelongdurationofconflictineachcountrymadeitdifficulttogetapictureofthechangesinthevariablesovertime.
Page131
researchwasparticipatoryandwasledbylocalconsultants.Itconsequentlyyieldedaverythickdescriptionofsocialcapitalwithinthecommunesfromtheparticipants'pointofviewwithoutmuchcontaminationbyexternalfactors.Itdidnot,however,supplymuchquantitativedatatofacilitateanalysisandcrosscountrycomparison.
TheapproachtakeninGuatemalaandSomaliayieldedalargeamountofquantifiabledatabutsparsequalitativeinformation.Tofacilitatecomparisonofthetwocases,thesurveyusedsetdefinitionsofsocialcapitalandconflictasprovidedbyexternalresearchers.Thestudydidnotexaminethepresenceandinteractionsofsocialcapitalandconflictovertimeandthereforeprovidedonlyasnapshotofthecurrentstateofcivilsocietyineachcountry.Althoughitwasdifficulttoascertainhowparticipantsviewedtheissuesunderscrutiny,asthereislittlequalitativeexplanatorypowerinthemethodology,thefour-countrycomparativeworkshopwasextremelyusefulinenhancingtheexplanatorypowerforresearchfindingsandassessingthemethodologiesthemselves.
LessonsforFutureResearch
Twoofthethreemainconstraintsonthefourstudiesthesensitivityofthesubjectandthetimeelapsedsincethepreconflictperiodareconstant.Anothermajorlimitation,thetimeandresourcesallottedfortheresearch,canbealtered.Futurestudiesshouldallowmoretimeforfieldresearch,especiallyinviewofthesensitivityofthetopic.Asisoftenthecase,budgetsarelimitingfactorsinthescopeandscaleoffieldinquiry.Theprimaryconstraintoncomparativeanalysisofthefourcasestudiesisthedifferenceintheapproachesutilizedinthestudies.GuatemalaandSomaliaemployedthesamemethodology,butitdifferedsomewhatfromthoseusedinCambodiaandRwanda,whichalsodifferedfromeachother.Factorsrelatingtomethodology,suchasthetimeallottedtodeskandfieldresearchandthesize,
qualifications,andcompositionoffieldteams,alsovaried.Finally,somecasesreliedonquantitativedata,whileothersfocusedheavilyonqualitativedata.
Page132
Asapreliminaryexerciseinresearchontherelationbetweensocialcapital,socialcohesion,andviolentconflict,theprojectyieldedsomerecommendationsforfuturestudies.Theyincludethefollowing:
Employthesamedefinitionsandindicatorsofsocialcapitalandconflictineachcase.Inthepretest,afewcountry-specificindicatorsmaybeaddedtodeepentheanalysis,buttheuseofanoriginalsetofindicatorsappliedtoeachcasewillallowafirmercomparisonandgeneralizationoffindings.
Combinesurveyswithparticipatorymethodssuchasindividualandgroupexercisesusingdiagram,ranking,andmappingexercises,thusmakingtriangulationpossible.
Creativelyintegratequantitativeandqualitativedata.Useinitialqualitativedatatodesignaquantitativesurvey.Theresultscanthenbereaffirmedthroughsubsequentqualitativeresearch.
Matchthemodelofsocialcapitalemployedtothedesiredoutcomes.Forinstance,ifthegoalistoproducerecommendationsforgovernmentaction,thesocialcapitalparadigmshouldincludeaspectsoforganizationalintegrityandsynergy,withafocusofallfourdimensionsonthedegreeofsocialcohesivenessandsubsequentmanagementofconflict.
Thevariationincasestudymethodsaddstothedifficultyofmakingquantitativecomparisonsacrossdatasets.Onthepositiveside,thequalitativecomparativeanalysisisrichininsights,generatingahostofobservationsandrecommendationsforfuturepolicyandprogrammaticactionsdesignedtostrengthensocialcapitalasakeyingredientinreconciliation,relief,reconstruction,anddevelopment.
Page133
BIBLIOGRAPHYAdam,Hussein,andRichardFord,withAliJimaleAhmed,AbdinasirOsmanIsse,NurWeheliye,andDavidSmock.1998.RemovingBarricadesinSomalia:OptionsforPeaceandRehabilitation.Peaceworks24.Washington,D.C.:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace.
Becker,Elizabeth.1998.WhentheWarWasOver:CambodiaandtheKhmerRougeRevolution.NewYork:PublicAffairs.
Berdal,Mats,andDavidMalone.2000.GreedandGrievance:EconomicAgendasinCivilWars.Boulder,Colo.:LynneRienner.
Berger,PeterL.,ed.1998.TheLimitsofSocialCohesion:ConflictandMediationinPluralisticSocieties.Boulder,Colo.:WestivewPress.
Berkeley,Bill.1998.''JudgementDay."TheWashingtonPostMagazine(October11):10-15,25-29.
Berkman,LisaF.,andIchiroKawachi,eds.2000.SocialEpidemiology.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
Bit,Seanglim,ed.1991.TheWarriorHeritage:APsychologicalPerspectiveofCambodianTrauma.ElCerrito,Calif.:SeanglimBit.
Cambodia,Kingdomof,MinistryofPlanning.1999.CambodiaHumanDevelopmentReport1999:VillageEconomyandDevelopment.PhnomPenh.
CarnegieCommissiononPreventingDeadlyConflict.1997.PreventingDeadlyConflict:ExecutiveSummaryoftheFinalReport.NewYork:CarnegieCorporationofNewYork.
CERFE.1998."TheDepletionandRestorationofSocialCapitalin
War-TornSocieties:Phase2--SomaliaandGuatemala.FirstProgressReport."StudyconductedfortheWorldBank.
Page134
.1999."CivilSociety,SocialInitiativeandSocialCapitalinSomaliaandGuatemala.FinalReport."StudyconductedfortheWorldBank.
Chandler,David.1992.BrotherNumberOne:APoliticalBiographyofPolPot.Boulder,Colo.:WestiviewPress.
Coleman,JamesS.1988."SocialCapitalintheCreationofHumanCapital."AmericanJournalofSociology94(Supplement):S95-S120.
Colletta,NatJ.,andMarkusKostner.2000."ReformingDevelopmentCooperation:FromReconstructiontoPrevention."Forum:SpecialIssueonWar,Money,andSurvival(February):96-99.InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross:Geneva.
Colletta,NatJ.,andTaiesNezam.1999."FromReconstructiontoReconciliation:TheNatureofWarDeterminestheNatureofPeace."DevelopmentOutreach1(2):5-8.
Collier,Paul.1998."SocialCapitalandPoverty."SocialCapitalInitiativeWorkingPaper4.EconomicallyandSociallySustainableDevelopmentNetwork,WorldBank,Washington,D.C.Availableat<http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/wkrppr>.
Collier,Paul,andAnkeHoeffler.1998."OnEconomicCausesofCivilWar."OxfordEconomicPapers50(October):563-73.
.1999."Justice-SeekingandLoot-SeekinginCivilWar."WorldBank,Washington,D.C.Availableat<http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/justice.htm>.
Costello,Patrick.1995."Guatemala.Displacement,ReturnandthePeaceProcess."Writenet(U.K.).Availableat<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wrightm.htm>.
Cuny,FrederickC.1994.DisastersandDevelopment.Dallas:IntertectPress.
Deacon,Robert.2000."GlobalizationandSocialPolicy:TheThreatofEquitableWelfare."OccasionalPaperNo.5,March2000.Geneva:UnitedNationsResearchInstituteSocialDevelopment.
DesForges,Alison.1999."LeaveNonetoTelltheStory":GenocideinRwanda.NewYork:HumanRightsWatch;Paris:InternationalFederationofHumanRights.
Easterly,William.1999."LifeduringGrowth:InternationalEvidenceonQualityofLifeandPerCapitaIncome."PolicyResearchWorkingPaper2110.MacroeconomicsandGrowth,DevelopmentResearchGroup,WorldBank,Washington,D.C.
.2000a."CanInstitutionsResolveEthnicConflict?"DevelopmentEconomicsVicePresidency,WorldBank,Washington,D.C.Availableat<http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdmg/grthweb/institutions.htm>.
Page135
.2000b."TheMiddleClassConsensusandEconomicDevelopment."DevelopmentEconomicsVicePresidency,WorldBank,Washington,D.C.Availableat<http://www.worldbank.org/html/prdmg/grthweb/midclass.htm>.
Ebihara,MayM.,CarolA.Morland,andJudyLedgerwood,eds.1994.CambodianCulturesince1975:HomelandandExile.Ithaca,N.Y.:CornellUniversityPress.
Faulder,Dominic.2000."AStateofInjustice:ViolenceandImpunityAreAliveandWell."AsiaWeek(March3).
Fedderke,Johannes,andRobertKlitgaard.1998."EconomicGrowthandSocialIndicators:AnExploratoryAnalysis."EconomicDevelopmentandCulturalChange46(3):455-89.
Fukuyama,Francis.1995.Trust:TheSocialValuesandtheCreationofProsperity.NewYork:FreePress.
Galtung,Johan.1996.PeacebyPeacefulMeans:PeaceandConflict,DevelopmentandCivilization.InternationalPeaceResearchInstitute,Oslo.ThousandOaks,Calif.:SagePublications.
Gissinger,Ranveig,andNilsPetterGleditch.1999."GlobalizationandConflict:Welfare,Distribution,andPoliticalUnrest."JournalofWorldSystemsResearch5:274-300.
Gittell,Ross,andAvisVidal.1998.CommunityOrganizing:BuildingSocialCapitalasaDevelopmentStrategy.ThousandOaks,Calif.:SagePublications.
Goodhand,Jonathan,andDavidHulme.1999."NGOsandPeace-buildinginComplexPoliticalEmergencies:AnIntroduction."WorkingPaperNo.1.UniversityofManchesterandINTRAC.
Gourevitch,Philip.1998.WeWishtoInformYouThatTomorrowWe
WillBeKilledwithOurFamilies.NewYork:Farrar,StrausandGiroux.
Granovetter,MarkS.1973."TheStrengthofWeakTies."AmericanJournalofSociology78:1360-80.
Grootaert,Christiaan.1998."SocialCapital:TheMissingLink?"SocialCapitalInitiativeWorkingPaper3.EnvironmentallyandSociallySustainableDevelopmentNetwork.WorldBank,Washington,D.C.Availableat<http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/scapital/wkrppr>.
Gurr,TedRobert.Forthcoming.PeoplesversusStates.Washington,D.C.:UnitedStatesInstituteofPeacePress.
Humphreys,Bebbington,Denise,andArelisGomez.2000."RebuildingSocialCapitalinPostconflictRegions:Women'sVillageBankinginAyacucho,Peru,andinHighlandGuatemala."PaperpresentedatmeetingoftheLatinAmericanStudiesAssociation,Miami,March16.
Page136
Kawachi,Ichiro,andLisaF.Berkman.2000."SocialCohesion,SocialCapital,andHealth."InLisaF.BerkmanandIchiroKawachi,eds.,SocialEpidemiology.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
Khin-SandiLwin.2000."ConflictManagement:ExperiencesofInternationalandRegionalOrganizations."PaperpresentedattheAsianDevelopmentBank-WorldBankRegionalConsultationon"SocialCohesionandConflictManagement,"Manila,March16-17.
Kostner,Markus,TaiesNezam,andColinScott.1997."FromCivilWartoCivilSociety:TheTransitionfromWartoPeaceinGuatemalaandLiberia."Post-ConflictUnit,WorldBank,Washington,D.C.
Krishnamurthy,Veena.1999."TheImpactofArmedConflictonSocialCapital:AStudyofTwoVillagesinCambodia."StudyconductedfortheWorldBankbySocialServicesofCambodia.SocialServicesofCambodia:PhnomPenh.
Lemarchand,René.1970.BurundiandRwanda.NewYork:Praeger.
Martin,Keith.1996a."NewMeasuresinConflictPrevention."CanadianForeignPolicy/LaPolitiqueétrangèreduCanada4(1):139-43.
.1996b."RethinkingForeignPolicy:FromManagingtoPreventingConflict."PolicyOptions/Politiques17(3,April):30-34.
Menkhaus,Ken.1998."Somalia:PoliticalOrderinaStatelessSociety."CurrentHistory(May):220-33.
Nafizer,E.W.,F.Steward,andR.Vayrynen,eds.2000.TheOriginofHumanitarianEmergenciesintheThirdWorld.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
Narayan,Deepa.1999."BondsandBridges:SocialCapitalandPoverty."PolicyResearchWorkingPaper2167.PovertyDivision,
PovertyReductionandEconomicManagementNetwork,WorldBank,Washington,D.C.
Narayan,Deepa,RajPatel,KaiSchafft,AnneRademacher,SarahKoch-Schulte,RobertChambers,MeeraShah,andPattiPetesch.2000.VoicesofthePoor.3vols.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.
Nathan,Laurie.1998."CrisisResolutionandConflictManagementinAfrica."Papercommissionedforaconferenceon"TheNexusbetweenEconomicManagementandCivilSocietyinCountriesEmergingfromWarintheSADCRegion,"sponsoredbytheCentreforConflictResolutionandtheWorldBankPost-ConflictUnit,CapeTown,SouthAfrica,October11-13.
Nee,Meas.1995."TowardsRestoringLife:CambodianVillages.ToldbyMeasNee;withJoanHealyasListenerandScribe."OverseasServiceBureau,Melbourne,Australia.
Page137
.2000."ConflictandPeaceinCambodia:SomeLessonsLearnt."PaperpresentedatAsianDevelopmentBank-WorldBankRegionalConsultationon"SocialCohesionandConflictManagement,"Manila,March16-17.
Newbury,Catharine.1988.TheCohesionofOppression:ClientshipandEthnicityinRwanda1860-1960.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.
North,DouglasC.1990.Institutions,InstitutionalChange,andEconomicPerformance.NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
Olson,Mancur.1982.TheRiseandDeclineofNations:EconomicGrowth,Stagflation,andSocialRigidities.NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUniversityPress.
Prendergast,John,andMattBryden.1999."WarandPeaceinSomaliaandSomaliland:AReportoftheCenterfortheStrategicInitiativesofWomen."CenterfortheStrategicInitiativesofWomen,Washington,D.C.
Prunier,Gérard.1997.TheRwandaCrisis:HistoryofaGenocide.NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress.
Putnam,RobertD.1993."TheProsperousCommunity:SocialCapitalandPublicLife."AmericanProspect13:35-42.
Reno,William.1998.WarlordPoliticsandAfricanStates.Boulder,Colo.:LynneRienner.
Richards,Paul.1995.FightingfortheRainForest:War,YouthandResourcesinSierraLeone.London:JamesCurrey.
Rodriguez,MelaniaP.1977."SocialCapitalinDevelopingSocieties:ReconsideringtheLinksbetweenCivilAgency,EconomyandtheStateintheDevelopmentProcess."WorkingPaper.InstituteofSocial
Studies,TheHague.
Rodrik,Dani.1999a.TheNewGlobalEconomyandDevelopingCountries:MakingOpennessWork.Baltimore,Md.:JohnsHopkinsUniversityPress.
.1999b."WhereDidAlltheGrowthGo?ExternalShocks,SocialConflict,andGrowthCollapses."JournalofEconomicGrowth4(4,December):385-412.
Sen,Amartya.1999.DevelopmentasFreedom.NewYork:Knopf.
Shah,Anwar.1998."BalanceandResponsiveness:LessonsaboutDecentralization."WorldBank,OperationsEvaluationDepartment,Washington,D.C.
Shoesmith,Dennis.2000."ImplementingAutonomy:Laws,Religion,andCulture."Paperpresentedatconferenceon"AutonomyandDemocracyinAsiaandthePacific,"Darwin,Australia,March1-3.
Page138
Smith,Gordon,andMoisesNaim.2000.AlteredStates:Globalization,SovereigntyandGovernance.Ottawa:InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre.
Sollenberg,Margareta,ed.1998."StatesinArmedConflict1998."Report54.DepartmentofPeaceandConflictResearch,UppsalaUniversity,Sweden.
Story,Andy.1998."StructuralAdjustmentandEthnicity:AFrameworkforAnalysisandaCaseStudyofRwanda."WorldBank,Washington,D.C.Processed.
Uphoff,Norman.2000."UnderstandingSocialCapital:LearningfromtheAnalysisandExperienceofParticipation."InParthaDasguptaandIsmailSerageldin,eds.SocialCapital:AMultifacetedPerspective,215-52.SociologicalPerspectivesonDevelopmentseries.Washington,D.C.:WorldBank.
Uvin,Peter.1998.AidingViolence:TheDevelopmentEnterpriseinRwanda.WestHartford,Conn.:KumarianPress.
vandePut,Willem.1997."CommunityMentalHealthProgram.FactsandThoughtsontheFirstYears:1February1995-1October1996."TransculturalPsychosocialOrganization(Amsterdam),PhnomPenh.
Vijghen,John,andothers.1966."CustomsofPatronageandCommunityDevelopmentinaCambodianVillage."CambodiaResearchersforDevelopment,InstituteforSocialResearchandTraining,PhnomPenh.
Wallensteen,Peter,andMargaretaSollenberg.1996."ArmedConflict,ConflictTermination,andPeaceAgreements1989-96."JournalofPeaceResearch33(3,August):339-58.
Woolcock,Michael.1998."SocialCapitalandEconomicDevelopment:TowardsaTheoreticalSynthesisandPolicy
Framework."TheoryandSociety27(2):151-208.
WorldBank.1998."ProjectAppraisalDocumentonaProposedLearningandInnovationCreditintheAmountofSDR3.7Million(US$5.0Million)totheRwandeseRepublicforaCommunityReintegrationandDevelopmentProject."CountryDepartment9andHumanDevelopment4,AfricaRegion,Washington,D.C.
.1999."ProjectAppraisalDocumentonaProposedLearningandInnovationCreditintheAmountofSDR3.6MillionEquivalenttotheKingdomofCambodiaforaNortheastVillageDevelopmentProject,April30,1999."RuralDevelopmentandNaturalResourcesSectorUnitandEastAsiaandPacificRegion,Washington,D.C.