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VIII. Art 915-959 [disinheritance]Seangio vs. Reyes
DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D.
SEANGIO and VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, petitioners, vs. HON. AMOR A. REYES, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 21, Manila, ALFREDO D.
SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO,
ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR
D. SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO,SHIRLEY D. SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D.
SEANGIO-OBAS and JAMES D.
SEANGIO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AZCUNA, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari 1 with application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order seeking the nullification of the orders, dated
August 10, 1999 and October 14, 1999, of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 21 (the RTC), dismissing the petitionfor probate on the ground of preterition, in the consolidated
cases, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 and SP. Proc. No.
99-93396, and entitled, " In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of
Segundo C. Seangio v. Alfredo D. Seangio, et al." and " In the
Matter of the Probate of the Will of Segundo C. Seangio v. Dy
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Yieng Seangio, Barbara D. Seangio and Virginia Seangio."
The facts of the cases are as follows:
On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for
the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 98-90870 of the RTC, and
praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
Seangio-Santos as special administrator and guardian ad litem
of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.
Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed
Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended that: 1) DyYieng is still very healthy and in full command of her
faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo executed a general power of
attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage
and exercise control and supervision over his business in the
Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and qualified to
serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she
is a certified public accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a
holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting oneof the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view
of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in
the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate
proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by
the proceedings for the probate of the will.
On April 7, 1999, a petition for the probate of the holographic
will of Segundo, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 99-93396, wasfiled by petitioners before the RTC. They likewise reiterated
that the probate proceedings should take precedence over SP.
Proc. No. 98-90870 because testate proceedings take
precedence and enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 2
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The document that petitioners refer to as Segundo's
holographic will is quoted, as follows:
Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana
Tantunin ng sinuman
Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa
naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila at
nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at
disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko
ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong anak
na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naging
lapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalitang masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si
Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko
at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa
ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako nasa
ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw. IaEScC
Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni
Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang nakuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los
Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon
pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad ito
ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa mga
may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.
At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at
ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel
Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at
ng anak ko si Virginia.
Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin
si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan
ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si
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Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi
siya makoha mana.
Nila[g]daan ko ngayon ika 20 ng Setyembre 1995
sa longsod ng Manila sa harap ng tatlong saksi. 3
(signed)
Segundo
Seangio
Nilagdaan sa harap namin
(signed)
Dy Yieng Seangio (signed)
Unang Saksi ikalawang saksi
(signed)
ikatlong saksi
On May 29, 1999, upon petitioners' motion, SP. Proc. No. 98-
90870 and SP. Proc. No. 99-93396 were consolidated. 4
On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal
of the probate proceedings 5 primarily on the ground that the
document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo
does not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased
and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article
783 of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the
will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance by thedecedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all
other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as heir,
devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would
result to intestacy. Such being the case, private respondents
maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to
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rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred
from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and
ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the
face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentarydisposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss
contending that: 1) generally, the authority of the probate court
is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of
the will; 2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not
the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) disinheritance constitutes a
disposition of the estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule onpreterition does not apply because Segundo's will does not
constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or
more compulsory heirs. 6
On August 10, 1999, the RTC issued its assailed order,
dismissing the petition for probate proceedings:
A perusal of the document termed as "will" by
oppositors/petitioners Dy Yieng Seangio, et al.,clearly shows that there is preterition, as the only
heirs mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia.
[T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the
New Civil Code thus applies. However, insofar as
the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned,
Article 854 does not apply, she not being a
compulsory heir in the direct line.
As such, this Court is bound to dismiss this
petition, for to do otherwise would amount to an
abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court in the
case of Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court
[155 SCRA 100 (1987)] has made its position
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clear: "for . . . respondents to have tolerated the
probate of the will and allowed the case to
progress when, on its face, the will appears to be
intrinsically void . . . would have been an exercise
in futility. It would have meant a waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court
could have denied its probate outright or could
have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the
testamentary provisions before the extrinsic
validity of the will was resolved (underscoring
supplied).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motionto Suspend Proceedings is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit. Special Proceedings No. 99-93396
is hereby DISMISSED without pronouncement as
to costs. aDHCEA
SO ORDERED. 7
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC
in its order dated October 14, 1999.
Petitioners contend that:
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED IN
EXCESS OF HER JURISDICTION OR WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND DECIDED A QUESTION
OF LAW NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE IN ISSUING THE
QUESTIONED ORDERS, DATED 10 AUGUST
1999 AND 14 OCTOBER 1999
(ATTACHMENTS "A" AND "B" HEREOF)
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CONSIDERING THAT:
I
THE RESPONDENT JUDGE, WITHOUT EVEN
COMPLYING WITH SECTIONS 3 AND 4 OF
RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT ON THE
PROPER PROCEDURE FOR SETTING THE
CASE FOR INITIAL HEARING FOR THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
JURISDICTIONAL FACTS, DISMISSED THE
TESTATE CASE ON THE ALLEGED
GROUND THAT THE TESTATOR'S WILL IS
VOID ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE OF THE
EXISTENCE OF PRETERITION, WHICH
GOES INTO THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF
THE WILL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS
A SETTLED RULE THAT THE AUTHORITY
OF PROBATE COURTS IS LIMITED ONLY
TO A DETERMINATION OF THE EXTRINSIC
VALIDITY OF THE WILL, I.E., THE DUE
EXECUTION THEREOF, THE TESTATOR'S
TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY AND THE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE REQUISITES OR
SOLEMNITIES PRESCRIBED BY LAW;
II
EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS THEAUTHORITY TO RULE UPON THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE WILL OF THE
TESTATOR, IT IS INDUBITABLE FROM THE
FACE OF THE TESTATOR'S WILL THAT NO
PRETERITON EXISTS AND THAT THE WILL
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IS BOTH INTRINSICALLY AND
EXTRINSICALLY VALID; AND,
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE WAS DUTY BOUND
TO SUSPEND THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE
INTESTATE CASE CONSIDERING THAT IT
IS A SETTLED RULE THAT TESTATE
PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER
INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
Petitioners argue, as follows:
First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4
of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which respectively mandate
the court to: a) fix the time and place for proving the will when
all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and
cause notice of such time and place to be published three
weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a
newspaper of general circulation; and, b) cause the mailing of
said notice to the heirs, legatees and devisees of the testatorSegundo;
Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of
an heir, but rather, as its title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-
Aalis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedent's
will and the holographic will on its face is not intrinsically
void;
Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners
and private respondents alike, with the sole exception of
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Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic
will since there was no institution of an heir;
Fourth, inasmuch as it clearly appears from the face of theholographic will that it is both intrinsically and extrinsically
valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the
hearing of the testate case; and,
Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case
will work injustice to petitioners, and will render nugatory the
disinheritance of Alfredo. CDAHaE
The purported holographic will of Segundo that was presented
by petitioners was dated, signed and written by him in his own
handwriting. Except on the ground of preterition, private
respondents did not raise any issue as regards the authenticity
of the document.
The document, entitled Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana,
unmistakably showed Segundo's intention of excluding hiseldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his estate for the reasons that
he cited therein. In effect, Alfredo was disinherited by
Segundo.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the Civil Code
requires that the same must be effected through a will wherein
the legal cause therefor shall be specified. With regard to the
reasons for the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo inhis document, the Court believes that the incidents, taken as a
whole, can be considered a form of maltreatment of Segundo
by his son, Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or descendant under
Article 919 of the Civil Code:
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Article 919. The following shall be sufficient
causes for the disinheritance of children and
descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been foundguilty of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the
testator of a crime for which the law
prescribes imprisonment for six years or
more, if the accusation has been found
groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been
convicted of adultery or concubinage with
the spouse of the testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud,
violence, intimidation, or undue influence
causes the testator to make a will or to
change one already made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support
the parents or ascendant who disinherit
such child or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed,
by the child or descendant ; 8
(7) When a child or descendant leads adishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the
penalty of civil interdiction.
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Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the
document executed by Segundo can be considered as a
holographic will.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the CivilCode, must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand
of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may
be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
Segundo's document, although it may initially come across as a
mere disinheritance instrument, conforms to the formalities of
a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated andsigned by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose
mortis causa 9 can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative
disposition of the latter's property, the disinheritance of
Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other
words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the
property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who wouldsucceed in the absence of Alfredo. 10
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the
will of the testator, expressed in the form and within the limits
prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in
succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain
and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of
the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that itcannot be given effect. 11
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one
who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in the present case,
should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an
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expert, taking into account the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. 12
In this regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even
if captioned asKasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana
, was intendedby Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by
him in accordance with law in the form of a holographic will.
Unless the will is probated, 13 the disinheritance cannot be
given effect. 14
With regard to the issue on preterition, 15 the Court believes
that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited
in the will. It was, in the Court's opinion, Segundo's lastexpression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs,
with the sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not
institute an heir 16 to the exclusion of his other compulsory
heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners,
Virginia, in the document did not operate to institute her as the
universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to
the altercation between Segundo and his son, Alfredo. HSEIAT
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo's
holographic will, and that the law favors testacy over intestacy,
the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of
the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is
probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may
be rendered nugatory. 17
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have
allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that
testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the
decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
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same purpose. 18
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21, dated August 10,
1999 and October 14, 1999, are set aside. Respondent judge isdirected to reinstate and hear SP Proc. No. 99-93396 for the
allowance of the holographic will of Segundo Seangio. The
intestate case or SP. Proc. No. 98-90870 is hereby suspended
until the termination of the aforesaid testate proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.||| (Dy Yieng Seangio v. Reyes, G.R. Nos. 140371-72, November
27, 2006)Art. 960-977Rosales vs Rosales
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V.
ROSALES. IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner ,
vs. FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNAROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX
ROSALES and ANTONIO ROSALES,
respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and
Paul G. Gorres forrespondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; WILLS AND SUCCESSION; INTESTATE
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SUCCESSION; INTESTATE OR LEGAL HEIRS;
CLASSIFICATION. — Intestate or legal heirs are classified
into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own
right, and those who inherit by the right of representation.Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his own
right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the
Civil Code, or by the right of representation provided for in
Article 981 of the same law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; DAUGHTER-IN-LAW, NOT AN
INTESTATE HEIR OF HER SPOUSE'S PARENT. — There
is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law.
The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her
to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right or by
the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which
relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014)
enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a
decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The
conspicuous absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms
Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the
surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would
have so provided in the Code.
3. ID.; ID.; WIDOW OR WIDOWER MENTIONED IN
ARTICLE 887 OF THE CIVIL CODE REFERS TO
SURVIVING SPOUSE. — Petitioner argues that she is acompulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of article
887 of the Civil Code. the aforesaid provision of law refers to
the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving
spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not
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apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; SURVIVING SPOUSE CONSIDERED A
THIRD PARTY WITH RESPECT TO ESTATE OF
PARENT-IN-LAW. — Indeed, the surviving spouse isconsidered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-
law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v.
Salas, to wit: "We hold that the title to the fishing boat should
be determined in Civil Case No., 3597 (not in the intestate
proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L.
Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to
his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third personwith respect to his estate. . . . . " (Emphasis supplied).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF REPRESENTATION; BLOOD
RELATIONSHIP; BASIS THEREOF. — Article 971
explicitly declares that Macikequeroz Rosales is called to
succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does
not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person
represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales,but the latter whom his father would have succeeded.
Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she
has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; INCHOATE RIGHT TO ESTATE
EXTINGUISHED BY DEATH OF HEIR. — Petitioner
contends that at the time of the death of her husband Corterio
Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the propertiesof Petra Rosales as compulsory heirs. Be that as it may, said
right of her husband was extinguished by this death that is why
it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from
Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed
from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
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D E C I S I O N
GANCAYCO, Jp
:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of
First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether the
widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit
from the latter, her mother-in-law. prLL
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26,
1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of Cebu City, diedintestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato T.
Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and
Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased
her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his
widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of
the deceased has an estimated gross value of about Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court
appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix of the said
estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issuedan Order dated June 16, 1972 declaring the following
individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their
respective share of the estate —
Fortunato T. Rosales (husband) 1/4; Magna
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R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox
Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales (son),
1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Orderdated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in
getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving
spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law
together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of theaforementioned Orders. The trial court denied her plea. Hence
this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our
resolution. First — is a widow (surviving spouse) an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law? Second — are the Orders of the trial
court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the
estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups,
namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who
inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate
heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of
intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by theright of representation provided for in Article 981 of the same
law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are;.
"Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall
always inherit from him in their own right,
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dividing the inheritance in equal shares."
"Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and
descendants of other children who are dead,
survive, the former shall inherit in their own right,and the latter by right of representation."
"Art. 982. The grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have
died, leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining
to him shall be divided among the latter in equal
portions."
"Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives
with legitimate children or their descendants and
illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower
shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child."
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that awidow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-
law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles
her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her own right or
by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code
which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978
to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate
heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir.
The conspicuous absence of a provision which makes adaughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more
confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make
the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it
would have so provided in the Code. LLjur
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Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance
with the provisions of Article 887 of the Civil Code which
provides that:
"Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with
respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents
and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural
children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article
287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5
are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither
do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation
must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of
the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from
them in the manner and to the extent established
by this Code."
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the
deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse
(widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply
to the estate of a parent-in-law.
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Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as
regards the estate of the parent-in-law. We had occasion to
make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to wit:
"We hold that the title to the fishing boat shouldbe determined in Civil Case No. 3597 (not in the
intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee
thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-
law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person
with respect to his estate. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil
Code aforecited does not support petitioner's claim. A careful
examination of the said Article confirms that the estate
contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The
estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V.
Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the
estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws ashare of the inheritance by the right of representation as
provided by Article 981 of the Code. llcd
The essence and nature of the right of representation is
explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil Code, viz —
"Art. 970. Representation is a right created by
fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree
of the person represented, and acquires the rights
which the latter would have if he were living or if
he could have inherited.
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"Art. 971. The representative is called to the
succession by the law and not by the person
represented. The representative does rot succeed
the person represented but the one whom the
person represented would have succeeded."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is
called to succession by law because of his blood relationship.
He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person
represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales,
but the latter whom his father would have succeeded.
Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as shehas no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her
husband Carterio Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent
right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be
that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by
his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who
succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He
did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions,
We find it unnecessary to pass upon the second question posed
by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold,
that a surviving spouse is not an intestate heir of his or herparent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the petitioner.
Let this case be remanded to the trial court for further
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proceedings. LLjur
SO ORDERED.
||| (Intestate Estate of Rosales v. Rosales, G.R. No. L-40789,
February 27, 1987)