dr tim taylor interdisciplinary ethics applied centre university of leeds 1

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The Proper Role for Well-being in Public Policy Dr Tim Taylor Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre University of Leeds 1

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Page 1: Dr Tim Taylor Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre University of Leeds 1

The Proper Role for Well-being in Public Policy

Dr Tim TaylorInterdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre

University of Leeds

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Page 2: Dr Tim Taylor Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre University of Leeds 1

IntroductionIn recent years, the long standing dominance of economic

growth as the main target of government policy and measure of national progress has increasingly been challenged.

The assumption that GDP can be taken as a proxy for national well-being is no longer tenable in the light of empirical research (e.g. Easterlin 1974).

In parallel, the burgeoning body of empirical research on well-being has led many to reject earlier assumptions that it is not measurable.

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Page 3: Dr Tim Taylor Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre University of Leeds 1

IntroductionAgainst this background some influential commentators have

argued that governments should aim to maximise happiness (e.g. Layard 2005).

However, a number of objections have been raised to the idea that happiness, or well-being, should be maximised – or even promoted – by governments.

In the light of those objections, it is timely to examine the question of whether, and how, governments should take account of well-being in determining policy.

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Page 4: Dr Tim Taylor Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre University of Leeds 1

Ethical/Ideological ObjectionsSome object in principle to the idea that well-being should be

promoted by governments. These objections reflect views associated with political

liberalism, such as:The idea that well-being is properly the concern of individuals,

not governments, who should not presume to judge what constitutes a good life for a person.

The view that not everyone values well-being (or values it to the same extent) and therefore promoting well-being is unfair to those who value other things. (Wren-Lewis 2013)

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Ethical/Ideological ObjectionsHowever, as far as matters of principle are concerned, I argue that: a) well-being, by definition, has value for each individual, and well-

being - or its constituents - are in practice valued by all or most individuals. Thus, is the role of government is to serve its citizens, well-being is a proper concern of government policy.

b) as a minimum, well-being should be respected by governments – they should take into account predictable adverse consequences for well-being in determining policy.

c) governments should also promote well-being, at least in principle: the prospect of a positive impact on well-being is a valid consideration that should be taken into account in determining policy.

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Ethical/Ideological ObjectionsBUT:d) governments should not seek to maximise well-being at the

expense of other values. Other considerations, such as human rights, the environment and fairness in distribution, also have a claim to be taken into account in determining policy.

e) liberal concerns about individual sovereignty and freedom of choice bear on how well-being should be promoted (avoiding hard paternalism).

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Other IssuesBeyond ethical and ideological issues, there are also a range

of other objections that have been raised to the idea that governments should seek to promote well-being.

These fall into two broad categories:Conceptual and technical issues concerning what well-being is

and how it should be measured.Political and practical issues: doubts about whether governments

would, in practice, genuinely attempt to promote well-being, whether they would succeed in doing so, and whether this would be desirable.

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Page 8: Dr Tim Taylor Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre University of Leeds 1

Conceptual/Technical IssuesLayard and others talk about ‘maximising happiness’. But it

is debatable whether happiness as measured by SWB researchers is the standard by which we should measure people’s lives: others dispute this (e.g. Sen 1987).

‘Well-being’ is a less question-begging term. However, this does not remove the problem. There are a number of competing theories of what well-being consists in (of which the hedonistic theory assumed by Layard is only one) (Duncan 2010).

So there is controversy and uncertainty about what it is, exactly, that should be promoted and measured.

Page 9: Dr Tim Taylor Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre University of Leeds 1

Conceptual/Technical IssuesEven if there agreement could be achieved about what to

measure, there are difficulties concerning how to measure it.All current measures of happiness and well-being are either

subject to debate or have known limitations. Thus, for example, some think that the value of happiness or life-satisfaction as a measure of well-being is vitiated by the fact that people adapt to their circumstances (e.g. Sen 1987).

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Conceptual/Technical IssuesHowever, we do not need to resolve the intractable

disagreements between rival theories to make progress on the measurement of well-being.

I have argued that we can identify a broad area of common ground, not on what well-being consists in but on what I call the ‘markers’ of well-being (Taylor 2014, 2015).

These are things which, from different theoretical perspectives, can be recognised as either constitutive, productive or indicative of well-being and therefore relevant for the purposes of measurement.

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Page 11: Dr Tim Taylor Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre University of Leeds 1

Conceptual/Technical IssuesIdentifying common ground between rival theories on the

markers of well-being provides a principled rationale for a theory-neutral approach to well-being in the context of public policy.

That common ground is likely to include both subjective (e.g. happiness) and objective (e.g. health).

The theory-neutral approach therefore implies a broadly-based approach to measurement, with a range of objective and subjective measures.

A broadly-based measurement strategy also helps to mitigate the weaknesses of individual measures – subjective and objective measures can complement each other. 11

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Political and Practical IssuesA further concern about measurement is whether

governments can be trusted not to manipulate well-being indices (Frey and Stutzer 2010).

The best way to protect against manipulation of well-being (and other) data by government is to locate responsibility for gathering this data outside the government chain of command.

In the UK, for example, under the Statistics and Registration Service Act 2007 the Office for National Statistics is independent of government and overseen by the UK Statistics Authority which reports directly to parliament.

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Page 13: Dr Tim Taylor Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre University of Leeds 1

Political and Practical IssuesMore widely, can politicians be relied upon to promote well-

being (Frey and Stutzer 2010)?There is no single answer to this – individual politicians will

vary in their commitment to well-being. It remains to be seen how widespread, sincere and durable

political commitment to well-being will be. But the more that well-being becomes established in the

public consciousness, the more likely it is that politicians in democracies will be motivated to promote it.

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Page 14: Dr Tim Taylor Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre University of Leeds 1

Political and Practical IssuesSome worry that a focus on well-being is likely to have adverse

consequences elsewhere (Duncan 2010, Van der Rijt 2014). There are less grounds for such concerns in the case of a broadly-

based approach to well-being than for a narrower focus on happiness (Bache, Reardon and Anand 2015).

I have argued that governments should not seek to not maximise well-being but to promote it alongside other values. This would further reduce the risk of adverse consequences.

But of course it is still true that a focus on well-being would imply some lessening of emphasis on other things, such as GDP. And arguably, that’s how it should be!

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Political and Practical IssuesThere is, as yet, little clear-cut evidence of increases in well-being as a

result of government intervention (although these are relatively early days). It is possible that rising expectations might counteract the effect of such intervention (Duncan 2010).

But it is not clear that this would be the case – in some countries well-being indicators have slowly but steadily increased. The speculation does not seem to be a sufficient reason to avoid any attempt to promote well-being.

Even if the speculation were to prove true, it would not mean that there is nothing that government can do to promote well-being. Rather, it would suggest an emphasis on sustaining rather than increasing well-being – on mitigating the effects of factors which would otherwise reduce well-being.

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ConclusionsThere are no good ethical reasons why governments should not concern

themselves with well-being, at least to some extent: in principle, they should respect well-being, taking into account likely adverse impacts of policy; and promote it if possible.

Well-being should not, however, be maximised or treated as the sole end of policy – other values such as human rights, autonomy and fairness also have legitimate claims.

Controversy concerning the definition and measurement of well-being can be addressed by: identifying common ground between different theories adopting a broadly-based approach to measurement. ensuring the political independence of data-gathering organisations.

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ConclusionsThese are relatively early days: it remains to be seen how far, and how

effectively, governments can and will promote well-being. We can expect extensive debate before a way forward emerges.

Though it is prudent to examine the motives and practice of governments closely, there are no compelling reasons to assume ab initio that they can never be trusted to promote well-being, or that doing so will have unacceptable consequences elsewhere.

“Understanding wellbeing as a wicked problem … steers us towards deliberation and scrutiny as central to the agenda … cautions us against expecting to find a panacea, but can take us beyond irresolvable disputes by pointing to the need for pragmatic and legitimate government action.” (Bache, Reardon and Anand 2015).

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Page 18: Dr Tim Taylor Interdisciplinary Ethics Applied Centre University of Leeds 1

ConclusionsFinally, some tentative thoughts on what might be a possible and

legitimate role for well-being in public policy in the light of these thoughts:Use of well-being data as a tool for evaluating policy and identifying

possible areas for intervention;Well-being as a constraint on government action – likely adverse effects on

well-being (e.g. of unemployment) taken into account;Intervention to mitigate adverse effects on well-being of other factors.Intervention aimed at increasing well-being primarily indirect and

facilitative - creating conditions conducive to well-being, rather than trying to impose it.

Avoidance of ‘hard’ paternalism and respect for other values (e.g. the environment).

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References

Bache, Ian, L. Reardon and P. Anand. “Wellbeing as a Wicked Problem: Navigating the Arguments for the Role of Government” Journal of Happiness Studies DOI 10.1007/s10902-015-9623-y (2015).Duncan, G. “Should happiness-maximization be the goal of government?” Journal of Happiness Studies 11 (2010).Easterlin, R. “Does economic growth improve the human lot? Some empirical evidence.” In David and Reder (eds.) Nations and households in economic growth: Essays in honour of Moses Abramovitz. New York: Academic Press Inc. (1974).Frey, B. and Stutzer, A. “Happiness and Public Choice” Public Choice 144 (3–4): 557–73. (2010)Layard, R. Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. London: Penguin (2005).Sen, A. On Ethics and Economics. Oxford: Blackwell. (1987)Van der Rijt, J-W. “The Political Turn Towards Happiness.” In Soraker et. al. (eds) “Well-being in Contemporary Society”. Cham: Springer 2014Taylor, T. “Towards Consensus on Well-being.” In Soraker et. al. (eds) “Well-being in Contemporary Society”. Cham: Springer 2014.Taylor, T. “The Markers of Wellbeing: A basis for a Theory-neutral Approach”. International Journal of Wellbeing Vol 5, No 2, 2015. Wren-Lewis, S. “Well-being as a Primary Good: Towards Legitimate Well-being Policy” Philosophy and Public Policy Quarterly 31:2 (2013).

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