draft fouo – do not distribute 1 defense science board task force assessing progress in...

1DRAFT FOUO – Do not distribute

DRAFT FOUO – Do not distribute

Defense Science Board Task ForceAssessing Progress in Transformation

of the Department

Executive Brief



Enterprise TransformationDefense Secretary’s Transformation Objectives

• “Uncertainty is the defining characteristic of today’s

strategic environment”• …”Need for a changed defense establishment – one

postured both for extended conflict and continuous transformation”

• “We will continually adapt to how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business and work with others”

• “Transformation is not only about technology” .. “also about changing the way we think about challenges and opportunities; adapting the defense establishment to that new perspective”

Quotes from National Defense Strategy (March 05); emphasis added



Transformation to Do What

• Project the potential of globally applied military force to defend the homeland and its interests- Hold at risk of destruction any serious threat to the US anywhere

in the world alone or with allies- Be capable of effective stability and reconstruction operations- Be capable of extensive support for homeland security and

disaster response• Apply this potential to:

- Influence allies, and other potential partners - Shape the intentions and actions of potential adversaries- Defeat adversaries with military power when necessary

• Provide the management competence to:- Gain the resources to provide the needed capability- Provide confidence in the body politic that it is being well served- Attract the needed quality people into the service of the

Department – government and industry



Bottom Lines for the Department’s Transformation

The Department:• Has produced revolutionary progress in capabilities to

conduct major combat operations and is on a path of continuing transformation in these capabilities

• Has become a learning, adaptive enterprise in transforming other operational capabilities -- using the experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and global counter-terrorism campaigns for this purpose

• Has much work to do to transform the way the enterprise does business

The engines of change driving transformation in combat capabilities are broadly applicable



Some Needed Key Actions to Transform the Enterprise

• Enforce accountable responsibility for roles in force capability building - balance influence among providers and users

• Establish a Business Plan to discipline resource allocation to mission purposes

• Restructure concept development and JCIDS to focus priorities on warfighters’ capability needs

• Modify the acquisition system to deliver capabilities on time and on cost

• Form a Joint Logistics Command to create an end-to-end supply chain

• Lead a multi-agency concept development and national-level campaign planning process

• Create a process to identify and deal with disruptive challenges

• Direct the human resource strategy to meet the demand for increased performance - military and civilian



Study Approach

Assess enterprise-wide progress • Front End processes

- Business practices o Acquisition structure and practices

- Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System- Joint concept development

• Joint force development• Defense industry • Human resources • Multi-agency Integration



Front End Processes

• Three critical front-end processes are intended to allocate resources to capability needs, guide priority choices, and provide an operational basis for needs- Business practices to allocate resources to mission purposes

(PPBE process)o Acquisition structure and practices to efficiently support capability

needs

- Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)

- Joint Concept Development and Experimentation (JCD&E)

• Overall Assessment: as currently implemented, these structures and processes are not effective in serving transformation objectives



Business Practices Assessment

• The Department does not have an effective multi-year business plan that relates resources to mission purposes

• The capability needs process continues to be dominated by the Force Providers and the Joint Staff (e.g. JCIDS, JROC)

• The Department has a set of business system “stovepipes” rather than the needed integrated system

• The Force Providers are not clearly accountable for acquiring approved capabilities


DRAFT FOUO – Do not distributeBusiness PracticesBusiness Plan

Authority & Accountability

CJCSJoint Staff

SecDefOSD

CombatantCommands

ForceProviders

• Defense Strategy• Assign Missions

• Conduct joint operations• Develop operational concepts• Identify needed capabilities• Assess capability of solutions

• Advise SecDef• Joint Concepts & Doctrine• Oversee operational planning• Assess strategies & support

• Choose solutions • Allocate resources• Oversee Program execution• Enforce the Business Plan

• Provide and sustain ready forces • Propose solutions• Systems engineering• Execute programs• Integrate DOTMLPF

• Enforce Accountability in the Priority Decision Process

Accountability Lead



Creating and Executing the Business PlanDefine, assign, (o) adjust missions (j)

Develop Joint Concepts (j)

Identify Capability Gaps (c)

Propose Solutions – DOTMLPF (f)

Analyze & Choose Solutions (o)

Integrate into the Business Plan (o)

Execute Programs (f) & Monitor BP (o)

SecDef/OSD (o)

CJCS/Joint Staff (j)

Force Providers (f)

COCOM (c)

Resource Constrained

(f)

(j)

(c)



Resource Allocation Metrics - Recommendations

Defense Agencies

Services

CoCom 6, etc.

CoCom 5

CoCom4

CoCom 3

CoCom2

CoCom1 Allocations

Year 1

Year 2, etc.

• Account for resources by mission and by force and support provider

Other Support

TOTAL: $400B

The SecDef should create a small direct-reporting cell to move beyond current processes to create and maintain:

• A metric-based, multi-year plan that specifies what is to be done in output terms, when, and with what resources – to discipline:- Allocating resources to mission purpose- Constraining plans to intended resources- Plan execution by Force Providers with OSD oversight- Measuring progress against plan objectives

• Enforce the roles assignment in the force building process• Require that Combatant Commanders make inputs on priorities in a resource constrained context with tradeoffs

within their mission account

SubtotalsNeeds to be about right to serve the intended purpose

Subtotals

Accounting



Business PracticesBuilding and Managing the Business Plan

• Establish a small standing group co-chaired by the DepSecDef and Vice CJCS, reporting to the Secretary - Manned by individuals from Comptroller, USD (AT&L), USD

(I), USD(Policy), PA&E, J-8, and Services- Monitor current execution and prepare the updated future

years business plan

• Use the current structure to manage the POM process and budget issues process- Create a formal and mandatory process for COCOM inputs to

the Service POM process through the Service component commands to the Services as well as directly to the Secretary’s standing group

- Standing Group to present the SecDef/DepSecDef with a coherent matrix of issues.



Acquisition is the weak link in the Transformation chain

• Need to give Force Providers – civilian and military leadership - clear responsibility and accountability

for delivering approved capabilities• Delivering capability on cost and

schedule requires spiral development adjustments as technical challenges emerge

• The quadrant of senior military shown in the dotted square are the

most competent for performance tradeoffs, but are not accountable in the current acquisition organization

Acquiring Approved CapabilitiesAssessment and Recommendations

SecDefDepSecDef

DefenseAcq. Exec.

SecretaryUndersecretary

Service Chief

Materiel Cmnd

PEO**

Program Mgr

COCOM

ServiceComponent

CJCS

Reporting chain Coordination/ support

Service Acq.

Exec.



Acquiring Approved CapabilitiesAssessment and Recommendations

SecDefDepSecDef

DefenseAcq. Exec.

SecretaryUndersecretary*

Service Chief

Materiel Cmnd

PEO**

Program Mgr

COCOM

ServiceComponent

CJCS

Reporting chain Coordination/ support* Undersecretary as Acquisition Exec

** Dual-hatting PEO requires waiver

Acquisition is the weak link in the Transformation chain

• SecDef should restructure acquisition to:

• Give Force Providers – civilian and military leadership - clear responsibility and accountability for delivering approved capabilities

• Make the quadrant of senior military shown in the dotted square accountable for performance tradeoffs to achieve capability needs

- Performance trade-offs in a spiral development construct are essential to deliver capabilities on time and on cost



Acquisition Recommendations

USD (AT&L) should recast the development/production process

• Limit initial spiral development to designs providing:- A useful increment of military capability where there is high

confidence in achieving cost, schedule, and performance goals- Grow capabilities as operational experience, technology

maturation, and program experience dictate• Move from requirements based execution to judgment

based execution- Force acceptable capability trade-offs based on shared

operational judgment (providers and users) to maintain cost and schedule as development challenges emerge and new capability needs and opportunities are identified



Joint Capabilities Integration and Development SystemAssessment & Recommendations

• JCIDS purpose was to help ensure that joint needs – material and non-materiel - are addressed in response to capability needs identified by warfighters– Still deficient in Combatant Command influence – The process is still dominated by the Force Providers and the Joint

Staff– The process is trying to serve too many purposes - bogged down with

assessment of a wide range of materiel capabilities rather than focusing on key gaps in meeting joint commander needs

The CJCS should:• Task the JCIDS and focus the JROC to serve the CJCS need

to advise the SecDef on priorities for joint capabilities across the spectrum of DOTMLPF- Focus the JCIDS and the JROC on key problems in joint capability- Leave the detailed assessment of programs to other existing processes



Joint Concepts DevelopmentRoles of Joint Concepts

• To provide the intellectual underpinning for operational transformation through experiments, exercises, operational experience – leading to “how we fight”

• To guide Force Development

Both kinds must be responsive and dynamic to provide the basis for adaptive forces that can meet the demands of an unpredictable operational environment



Iraqi FreedomCapability basedEffects (output) based Mass effects Distributed operationsParallel operationsIntegrated joint operationsInterdependentJoint firesNetworked information flowSelf-synchronizing C2Control informs intentMinimum footprint - rich reachback

Desert Storm• Threat based …….………….• Force based …………………• Mass forces………………….• Contiguous operations …….• Sequential operations ……..• De-conflicted service ops …• Interoperable ……………….• Organic heavy firepower ….• Vertical Information flow …..• Hierarchical C2 ………….....• Control executes intent …...• Rich forward support ……...

A rich set of emerging operating concepts from studies, wargames, experiments, and operational experience

Joint Concepts DevelopmentSome Transforming “How to Fight” Concepts

for Major Combat Ops

DRAFT FOUODo not distribute



Joint Concepts DevelopmentRecommendations

SecDef and CJCS:• Connect the joint concept process to capability needs to

the resource allocation process • Focus on the critical set of problems identified by the

COCOMs and senior DoD leadership- Select 2-3 to initially refocus and then evolve the concept

development effort• Demand competition of ideas and promote discovery

through continuous experimentation with multiple solutions considered (among blue and versus Red)- Hold JFCOM accountable with its JCD&E “Lead and Coordinate”

responsibilities - Increase multi-agency and international participation

• Assign a major role to regional combatant commands in problem definition, concept development and operational assessment- Create JCD&E support positions at COCOMs



Disruptive Challenges - Recommendations

SecDef should:• Set “disruptive” threshold high

- Focus on truly threatening rather than chasing excursions

• Create a process that includes- Red teaming to identify technically feasible and adaptive

threats- Net assessment to consider the effect of these threats and

organize them for decision makers

• Embed the process into DoD (and Intel community) and demand products that inform decision making

• Assign the responsibility for the continuing program to USD (AT&L)- Ensure that the process focuses on capabilities, not just

technology



Joint Force DevelopmentLogistics - Assessment

• Logistics in the DoD is big business- Some $67B in inventory - employing over 1 million people

• Responsiveness is well below world class- Distribution of in stock items averages 21 days in DoD versus 1 to

3 days in large world class commercial operations• Logistics transformation highly dependent on process and

personnel transformation supported by integrated business systems – need to:- Eliminate/reduce internal transactions- Align financial incentives with optimizing end-to-end processes –

the output- Integrate business processes

o Currently supported by over 600 disparate information systems o Impeding rather than enhancing business transformation

- “Systems architectures” reflect legacy practices (not “best practices”)



Logistics - Recommendations

SecDef create a Joint Logistics Command• Responsible for global end-to-end supply chain • Include TransCom mission, DLA, Service logistics and

transportation commands as components to JLC • Regional Combatant Commanders to retain operational

control of the flow of in-theater logistics• Program Managers retain responsibility for lifecycle

logistics support plan and configuration control• Developing an integrated logistics information system is

essential• Appoint an external advisory board of industry experts



Human Resources Military HR - Assessment

• Military HR System- Has produced outstanding leaders and warfighters- Successful transition to and leveraging of the all-volunteer forceBut is not postured to meet future needs - Current career rules are inefficient and inflexible based on a “one size fits

all” model – arbitrary career profiles governed by DOPMA- 20-year retirement creates incentives contrary to the needs of the

Department- The system values youth over experience - separating individuals with

much needed experience at the height of their effectiveness- The system has not properly manned specialty occupations, e.g.

acquisition executives, foreign area officers, IT specialists- Today’s operations demand increased responsibility at lower levels

o They are demonstrating extraordinary aptitude for learning on the flyo Technology multiplies the effects controlled by individuals, e.g., company

grade officers controlling divisions’ worth of firepower and brigades’ worth of territory



Human ResourcesRecommendations

The SecDef should:• Accelerate and implement the ongoing redesign of the

military career system to leverage experience and emphasize performance

• Aggressively pursue implementation of the National Security Personnel System to give DoD management control of the civilian human resource

USD (Personnel and Readiness) should:• Develop a reserve forces model that improves predictability

for reserve forces’ active duty commitments• Provide an effective mechanism and process to keep

employers of reserve members serving on active duty informed on changes in commitments

• Create a strategic focus on meeting the needs for language skills and cultural understanding



Recommendation - Personnel Use

SecDef should • Direct (consistent with the

President’s Management Plan #5):- Use military people for military

functions only- Use civilian government personnel

for inherently governmental functions only

- Use civilian contractors with competitive sourcing for other functions

Military personnel use(Thousands)*Occupation

Maint/Eng

Admin

Combat

Services, Supply, etc.

Total

1996

445

119

324

152

1,599

2005

402

207

296

127

1,370

* PA&E Categories



Emerging Transformation DriverAssessment

• Growing cadre of military personnel with empowering experiences in theater - Some have succeeded simultaneously as warriors, mayors, security

providers, service providers, trainers, infrastructure builders, non-kinetic operations practitioners, the public face, and more …

- Without guiding concepts or doctrine and with little direction, but with support, from above

• This cadre can be a major force for change in DoD- Impatient with business-as-usual, input-dominated processes- Not confounded by ambiguity and uncertainty

• Subsequent assignments should leverage their experience so they continue to be effective change agents - There is high demand in private business for people with these

experiences and capabilities



RecommendationsEmerging Transformation Driver

The SecDef should task the Service Chiefs to:• Identify and track (via a specialty qualification) these differentially

experienced individuals • Manage and assign these personnel to positions enabling them to

be change agents for transformation• Empower them and set conditions for their success



Multi-agency IntegrationAssessment

• Robust multi-agency integrated planning is needed to produce executable multi-level campaign plans to include:- Campaign plans to serve major strategic objectives, e.g., WMD

Proliferation, Militant Islam, China, SAVE (Struggle Against Violent Extremists)

- Campaign plans for a range of places and issues to achieve specific strategic objectives, e.g., N. Korea, Iran, Maritime Interdiction, Covert Action, pop-up contingencies

• These potential operations range from long-term shaping through strengthening capacity and institutions, to stabilization and reconstruction operations before, during, and after combat



RecommendationsMulti-agency Integration

The SecDef should lead the National Security Council effort to create a mechanism to:

• Provide the President with a five-year National Security Strategic Plan (NSSP) that:- Identify the places and issues requiring multi-agency campaign

plans- Establishes the strategic objective of each- Details the end-state and metrics- Assigns specific taskings with key performance parameters

• Establish standing multi-agency oversight groups and task forces for the NSC for each selected place or issue. - Each task forces is to produce a multi-agency campaign plan

• With OMB, conduct a review process within the normal annual budget cycle to ensure that resource allocations and expenditures match the selected priorities and plans


DRAFT FOUO – Do not distributeRecommendations

Multi-agency Integration (cont)

SecDef should strengthen DoD capacities for effective integrated multi-agency operations by:

• Developing doctrine that guides military support of civilian agency diplomatic and economic solutions to strengthen nation-states.

• Creating mechanisms for responsive DoD support of the multi-agency planning processes.

• Adapt joint planning processes for multi-agency inputs and to inform multi-agency integrated (MAI) planning

• Structure DoD’s training and education system to include the Services professional education to reflect these new requirements.

• Establish criteria so that the officer promotion system rewards MAI education and experience in a manner similar to joint education and experience.



Bottom Lines for the Department’s Transformation

The Department:• Has produced revolutionary progress in capabilities to

conduct major combat operations and is on a path of continuing transformation in these capabilities

• Has become a learning, adaptive enterprise in transforming other operational capabilities -- using the experiences in Afghanistan, Iraq, and global counter-terrorism campaigns for this purpose

• Has much work to do to transform the way the enterprise does business

draft fouo – do not distribute 1 defense science board task force assessing progress in...

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