DUE PROCESS(Note: Ichong - Romualdez cases refer to Consti notes)PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATION SATELLITE V. ALCUAZFACTS:PHILCOMSTAT seeks to annul Order by Commissioner Jose Alcuaz of NTC (which directs provisional reduction of the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain lines by 15% with reservation to make further reductions later), for being violative against undue delegation of leg power and denial of procedural and substantive due process of law.PHILCOMSTAT granted a franchise for establishing station for international satellite communications; also w/ authority to construct and operate ground facilities as needed to deliver telecomm satellite system. Also the sole signatory of the Phis.in INTELSTAT and INMARSTAT.EO 196 placed PHILCOMSTAT under control of NTC re regulation of facilities and services as well as fixing the rates. NTC then filed app to continue operating and maintaining facilities s.t the law.NTC was given provisional authority to continue operating for 6 months and was extended to another 6 months but NTC directed the petitioner to reduce rates to 15%, HENCE the ISSUE. HELD:I. Petitioner contends that the EO 546 and 196 do not contain rate-fixing power placing petitioner under jurisdiction of NTC and thus constitutes undue delegation of leg power.Court said no. In delegation of rate-fixing power, only the standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the admn authority is the rate be REASONBALE AND JUST.Based on the said Eos , NTC is empowered, among other, to determine and prescribe rates pertinent to the operation of public service communications.II. Contention on violation of procedural due process because it was issued motu proprio, W/O NOTICE to petitioner and W/O BENEFIT OF HEARING.Respondents admit that the app of policy like fixing of rates is quasi-judicial than quas-leg. Hence notice is not reqd.Accdg to SC, contention of PHILCOMSTAT meritorious. NOTE: Where the function of admin body is legislative, no need for notice and hearing as a GENERAL RULE. But where a public admin body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, the persons whose rights and ppty may be affected is entitled NOTICE and HEARING.HOW IS IT CONSIDERED QUAS-JUDICIAL? Said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and no other Initital eval on rates reduction made without affording petitioner benefit of explanation No rationalization offered which prompted as much as 15% reductionThe Court favors petitioner that immediate reduction would adversely affect its operations and quality of its service. Notably, the petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which NTC based its report.NOTE: Rate-fixing power may not be exercised UNREASONABLY and in a CONFISCATORY MANNER. It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has NO AUTHORITY to make such order WITHOUT first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order be TEMPORARY or PERMANENT and IMMATERIAL whether made upon complaint, summary investigation, etc.III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is CONSFISCATORY in that its implementation would virtually result in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure of business.CONTENTION by respondent: Franchise confers NO vested right; what it has is only privilege or license which may be revoked at wil..But such grant CANNOT be revoked unilaterally absent showing that it is for common good must be FAIR and REASONABLE (tests of substantive due process).Power to regulate is NOT the power to destroy. Therefore, any regulation which operates as an effective confiscation of ppty is VOID being REPUGNANT to constitutional GUARANTIES of due process and equal protection of laws.TEST OF REASONABLENESS: Rates must not be so low as too confiscatory or too high as to be oppressive.METHOD EMPLOYED IN DETERMINING REASONABLENESS:1. FAIR return upon the value of the ppty to the public utility.2. CompetitionORDER VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS NULL AND VOID. Proceed w the hearing

ANG TIBAY v. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONSFACTS:- Toribio Teodoros claim, that a shortage of leather soles in Ang Tibay made him temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union Inc, was FALSE.- Supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., form work- That Torinio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, and unjustly unfavoring National Workers Brotherhood.Ang Tibay filed an opposition both to the motion for recon of CIR and the motion for new trial of National Labor Union.HELD:Motion for New TrialCIR a special court which is more of an admin board than part of the judicial system. It has jurisdiction over the Phils., to consider, investigate, decide, and settle controversies between employers and employees or labourers, and regulate relations between them.In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes.CIR may be free from rigidity in procedural reqts but does NOT mean that it can entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential reqts of DUE PROCESS in trials and investigations ofa admin character.CARDIINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS:1. The right to a hearing presentation of case and submission of evidence in support thereof.2. Tribunal must consider the evidence presented. WHY? Because the right to adduce evidence without the court considering it is VAIN.3. Support/basis of decision a decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. Principle emanates that the genius of the government is contrary to the unlimited power. LAW is both a GRANT and LIMITATION upon power.4. Evidence must be SUBSTANTIAL substantial evidence. It means such relevant evidence as reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support conclusion.5. The decision must be rendered based on the evid. presented at the hearing CIR may refer any industrial or agril dispute to a local board of inquiry, provincial fiscal, justice of the peace and may DELEGATE powers as may deem necessary.6. CIR must act on its independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy should not just accept deicison or view of a subordinate.RULING: It would be better served if the movant present at the hearing referred to in his motion . MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL IS GRANTED. REMANDED TO CIR.

ATENEO v. CAPULONGFACTS:Students who are being refused admission to Ateneo have been found guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. This attracted much publicity due to death of one of the neophyte (Leonardo Villa) and serious physical injuries inflicted on another (Bienvenido Marquez) during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis.Dean Cynthia del Castillo then created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee to investigate the death of Villa. It was clear from their reports that there was a violation of the said Rule.The Board found the respondents guilty of hazing. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, the Pres.of the said university, imposed a penalty of dismissal to the students.The respondent-students filed with RTC a petition for certiorari alleging that they were currently enrolled as students and theres lack of due process.The students were not allowed to take exams but respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate students and conduct special exams. Hence, this civil action questioning the order of respondent judge.HELD:The Court granted the petition and reversed the order of respondent judge ordering readmission of the students. Respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion when e ruled that respondent students have been denied procedural due process. De Guzman case is apropos to the instant case stating standards to be satisfied in the imposition of a disciplinary sanctions:1. Students must b informed in writing of the nature of accusation against them2. That they have the right to answer the charges against them w/ assistance of a counsel, if desired3. They shall be informed of evidence against them4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official to hear and decide caseThe above reqts were met by the school.NOTE: Disciplinary cases involving students need not necessarily include the RIGHT TO CROSS EXAMINATION. Administrative proceedings to investigate the hazing incident need not be clothed with judicial proceeding. It is enough that there was NOTICE.Respondent-students contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is FAR from truth because the Order on Feb 14, 1992 clearly states that it was reached after receiving written statements and hearing testimonies of several witnesses.EXCEPTION TO THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES: happens when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, the issue is W/N RESPONDENT STUDENT HAVE BEEN AFFORDED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS PRIOR TO DISMISSAL FROM PETITIONER UNVIERSITYEssential elements of freedoms by J. Felix Frankfurter: (1) Who may teach; (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be taught; (4) who may be admitted to study.Academic freedom - freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words, with the right of individuals in university communities, such as professors, researchers, etc.Socrates: To follow the argument wherever it may leadFRANKFURTER FORMULATION: 1. What shall be taught, e.g., curriculum2. Who may be admitted to studyNote: Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. (Art. XIV, Sec. 5 [2]) since it is a dynamic concept, let the court alone develop further parameter of such.Note: Admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon the school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student and NOT a right.Hohfeldia terms: students have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school.Religious education an education which inculcates duty and reverence.RULING: DISMISSAL AFFIRMED.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE v. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCILFACTS:Before the Court are 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of R.A 9372 (or Human Security Act of 2007).Following the effectivity of such law, petitioner and others filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition. HELD:The petitions fail.Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. (Sec. 1, Rule 65 RC)In the present case, the dismal absence of the first 2 requisites, which are the most essential (in judicial review) renders the discussion of the last 2 superfluous. Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy.Note: Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution.A FACIAL INVALIDATION OF A STATUE IS ALLOWED ONLY IN FREE SPEECH CASES - WHEREIN CERTAIN RULES OF CONSTIL LITIGATION ARE RIGHTLY EXCEPTED.Petitioners assail that the definition of the crime of terrorism is intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the govt to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous.OSG: void-for-vagueness or overbreadth find no app in the present case since these doctrines apply onlky to free speech cases; RA 9372 regulates conduct, NOT speech.The Court clarifies OSG answer. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan:The word intervene in Sec.5 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague. SC said that the overbreadth and void-for-vagueness have special app only for free-speech cases.Romualdez v. COMELEC: Facial invalidation of a criminal statute is not appropiiate. Subject election offense is couched in a precise language.Estrada case (J. Mendoza): A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of the possibility of chilling effect upon protected speech. History in U.S First Amendment cases (doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases)Note: The above rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.WHEN IS STATUTE VAGUE? when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.REPUGNANT TO CONSTI IN 2 RESPECTS:1. It violates due process for failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid2. It leaves enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying to its provisions and becomes arbitrary flexing of govt muscle.OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE Decrees that the Govtl purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally s.t state regulations may not be achieved by means w/c sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the areas of protected freedoms. Assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.As-applied challengeFacial invalidation

Challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigantsAn examination of the entire law pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

*If a facial challenge to a penal statue is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. NO PROSECUTION WOULD BE POSSIBLE.The Court emphasized that the word unlawful demand in said law seeks to penalize conduct and NOT speech.NOTE: Utterances not elemental but inevitably INCIDENTAL to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful CONDUCT nor the essence of the whole conduct NOT speech.RULING: NEITHER ACTUAL CHARGE NOR CREDIBLE THREAT OF PROSECUTION. PETITIONS DISMISSED.

EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS- simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated (denotes classification) should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. EQUALITY AMONG EQUALSREQUIREMENTS (classification must not be arbitrary):1. It must be based upon substantial distinctions.2. It must be germane to the purposes of the law.3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only.4. It must apply equally to all members of the class.

PEOPLE v. VERAFACTS:Petitioners herein and HSBC are respectively the plaintiff and offended party, and respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng, one of the defendants, convicted of a crime and whose motion for new trial was denied by Judge Vera and CA. The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation. Fiscal of Manila and private prosecution opposed to the granting of probation against accused, alleging, among others, that Act No. 4221 (Old Probation law: endows provincial boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their provinces undue delegation of leg power) is violative of Sec. 1, Art. III, guaranteeing equal protection of the laws for the reason that its applicability is NOT uniform thru out the Islands.Counsel for the defendant filed an exception to the resolution denying probation and notice to file a motion for recon. However, due to numerous postponements of the hearing, petitioners came to court to put an end to what they alleged as an indeterminable proceeding.Petitioners alleged that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction.CONTENTION: Even if Manila were considered as province, ACT 4221 would not be applicable to it because it does not provide for the salary of a probation officer as reqd by Sec. 11 thereof.ACT 4221, a law providing a system of probation for persons 18 and above, is unconstitutional because it is violative of Sec. 1, Art. III, guaranteeing equal protection of laws because it confers upon the provincial board of each province the ABSOLUTE DISCRETION to make said law operative. It constitutes an unlawful and improper delegation of powers and that it enlarges the powers of CFI without uniformity.HELD: The discretion vested to provincial board is arbitrary because it is absolute and unlimited. It is bound by no rule. It need not give any reason whatsoever for refusing or failing to appropriate any funds for the salary of the probation officer.The various provincial boards are, in effect, endowed with the power of suspending the operation of the Probation Law.Thus, Sec. 11 of said law has an improper and unlawful delegation of legislative authority to the provincial boards UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.Does it violate equal protection?Equal protection pledge of the protection of equal laws.In the case at bar, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but NOT in the latter.Ergo, persons similarly situated, in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is OBNOXIOUS DISCRIMINATION.SC: We see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits of such denial.RULING: ACT 4221 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND VOID.

ICHONG v. HERNANDEZPertinent ruling:DOES THE LAW DENY THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS?Court: The aliens interest in this country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution in his hands. (ex. Utter disregard of the welfare of the consumer, manipulations, lacks loyalty, etc.) VALID REASON for the state to prefer national over alien.What is the sufficient basis or distinction? Classification is ACTUAL, REAL, AND REASONABLE, and all persons of one class are treated alike thus, the legislature ACTED WITHIN ITS PREROGATIVE and cannot declare that it transcends the limit of equal protection. (NOTE: Legislative has wide scope of discretion; with reasonable basis not purely arbitrary; existence of fact must be assumed; one who assails has the burden to prove- Lindsley v. National Carbonic GasIs Citizenship a valid ground for classification?YES. In Smith Bell & Co. v. Natividad, the validity of Act. No. 2761 was in issue, ownership of vessels engaged in coastwide trade limited to Filipinos and Americans only because of the existing conditions DID NOT VIOLATE the equal protection clause. The purpose of which was to encourage Phil. Shipbuilding and safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers (illegal traders). Thus a valid police power.Gibbons v. Ogden: Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids classification for such would require a higher degree of protection for them as a class. issue on LICENSINGCommonwealth v. Hana: statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers provided no one can obtain a license UNLESS he is a U.S citizen- why? To limit the business for those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order, and happiness of the community.

VILLEGAS v. HIU CHIONGFACTS:Petition for certiorari to review decision of respondent Judge Francisco Arca declaring NULL AND VOID the Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of Manila.THE ORDINANCE:*Prohibits an ALIEN: To be employed in any place of employment OR to be engaged in any kind of trade, business or occupation (whether permanent, temporary or casual) within the City of Manila WITHOUT first securing an employment permit from the mayor of Manila which costs P 50.00 W/ exception to persons employed in the diplomatic/consular missions, technical assistance programs of the govt, working in hteir respective households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or denomination, NOT PAID monetarily or in kind.Private respondent, then employed in Manila filed a petition for preliminary injunction and to declare such ordinance null and void. Judge issued injuction.Petitioner Mayor Villegas filed a petition.HELD:The Contention of petitioner that said ordinance is NOT a purely tax or revenue measure but a police power due to its regulatory in nature is UNTENABLE.First part of Ordinance which is the permit process is VALID but the payment requirement of P50.00 is NOT REGULATORY but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in exacting the said amount for aliens. purpose is to raise money in the GUISE of regulation.P50.00 IS unreasonableI. It fails substantial diff.in situation among individual aliens reqd to pay it. Again, although the equal protection clause does not prohibit classification, it is imperative that the same must be REAL and SUBSTANTIAL having a REASONABLE RELATION to the subject of the said legislation.II. No standards set for the exercise of the Mayor are laid down in the ordinance. NO POLICY to set up standard to guide or limit the mayors action = NO PURPOSE to be attained by requiring a permit (i.e., no purpose to be attained, enumerates no conditions for its grant, etc.) ARBITRARY AND UNRESTRICTED POWER to GRANT or DENY.Therefore, Ordinance is VOID for failure to contain or suggest any standard or criterion that will guide the mayor in the exercise of the power granted him.VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTIONRequiring a person a permit before he can be employed by a Mayor who can refuse or withhold at will such permit is tantamount to denying him the basic right of the people to engage in a means of livelihood.Once an alien is admitted, he CANNOT be deprive of life w.o due process. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is GIVEN TO ALL PERSONS.RULING: Petition denied.

PEOPLE v. CAYATFACTS:The accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, was sentenced by the justice of the peace of P5 (subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency)Crime: possession of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.SEC. 2: it is unlawful for any native citizen to buy, receive, possess, or drink ardent spirits. Ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors, other than those nave wines they are accustomed to. Duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular, etc. to seize and destroy liquors found in possession of any member of a non-Christian tiribe.SEC.3: FINES AND PENALTIESHELD:The guaranty of equal protection is not violated by a leg based on reasonable classification which consists of 4 requirements:1. Real or substantial classifications the term non-Christian tribes refers, not to religious belief, but to the geographical area, and more directly to the natives of the Phils. of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.RATIONALE: To meet the peculiar existing conditions in the non-Christian tribes.2. Germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition to buy, receive, receive, possess, or drink such liquors is designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. BACKDROP: the free use of highly intoxicated liquors by the non-Christian tribes have resulted in lawlessness and crimes hampering the govt to raise the standard of life and civilization.3. The law is not limited to its app to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. Civilization of people is a slow process and that had in hand with it must go measures of protection and security4. Equal application to all its members. - Unfairness in its operation against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of of their degree of culture is not an argument.VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS. Destroying liquors NOT a violation of due process. To constitute due process, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This is true when much must be left to the discretion of administrative officials.DUE PROCESS:1. That there shall be law prescribed in harmony w the general powers of the leg dept of the govt2. That it shall be reasonable in its operation3. That it shall be enforced accdg to the regular methods of procedure prescribed4. That it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a classPURPOSE OF ACT 1639: to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and eventually hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. RULING: Petition denied.

DUMLAO v. COMELECFACTS:Petition seeking to enjoin COMELEC from implementing BP 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of sec. 4 of BP 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. SEC. 4 - any retired provincial, city or municipality who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected , shall not be qualified to run for the same elective office form which he has retired.CONTENTION: Classification is purely arbitrary and therefore a class legislation.Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of BP 52 and 53.HELD:I. Contention of Dumlao is belied by the fact that equal protection of the laws is s.t rational classification. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are s.t compulsory retirement.To require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office may or may not be a reasonable classificationSC held that there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired. The need for new blood assumes relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for govt work is present and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable.II. In the constitutional provision, in all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until contrary is proved., ad shall enjoy right to be heard by himself and counsel.The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him.Filing of charges is considered as prima facie evidence and therefore REBUTTABLE.RULING: Sec. 4, BP 22 is valid. Sec. 4, BP 52 is null and void.

HIMAGAN v. PEOPLEFACTS:

Petitioner, a policeman was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to 90 days.

Respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated.

Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days. He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

HELD:The language of the law is clear that suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is 6 years shall last until termination of the case.Also, there is nothing in RA 6975 (DILG Act of 1990) that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the 90 day period not terminated. Shall not construed as mandatory.RATIONALE OF CLASSIFICATION:

Policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case.

QUINTO v. COMELECFACTS:In preparation for the 2010 elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 8678 the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sec. 4 of Resolution No. 8678 provides that

Any person holding a public appointive office or position x x x shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy (automatic resignation) however it exempts those elected officials saying that Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.

Sec. 66 of BP Blg. 881, or the Omnibus Election Code, reads: x x x Any person holding a public appointive office or position x x x shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Petitioners were appointive officers of the government who were planning to run in the 2010 elections sought the nullification of Sec. 4(a) on the ground, among others, that it is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled in their favor. This prompted the COMELEC to file an MRHELD:Section 4(a) of Resolution 8678, Section 13 of RA 9369, and Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code Do Not Violate the Equal Protection ClauseIn Farias, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al.

We held, however, that the legal dichotomy created by the Legislature is a reasonable classification, as there are material and significant distinctions between the two classes of officials. Consequently, the contention that Section 14 of the Fair Election Act, in relation to Sections 66 and 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, infringed on the equal protection clause of the Constitution, failed muster. In said case, the Court ruled that:

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I, Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take (sic) part in any election except to vote. Under the same provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral activities.

By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this classification.

Therefore, insofar as government employees are concerned, the correct standard of review is an INTEREST-BALANCING APPROACH, a means-end scrutiny that examines the closeness of fit between the governmental interests and the prohibitions in question.

BIRAOGO v. PHIL. TRUTH COMMISSION