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What makes an idea thinkable? The impact of Sophist

philosophy on the politics of the Peloponnesian war

Ebert, Cilia

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2

What Makes an Idea Thinkable?

The Impact of Sophist Philosophy on the Politics of the Peloponnesian War

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author or the university to which it was submitted. No quotation from it, or information derived from it may be published without the prior written consent of the author or university, and any information derived from it should be acknowledged. Cilia Ebert

School of Government & International Affairs

Politics Department

University of Durham

June 2007

1 5 MAY 2008

\

0 .

'-.. ..

Contents

1 Introduction

1.1 Scope ..

1.2 Contents .

1.3 Method and sources .

2 The relationship between Presocratic thought and Sophist Moral Rela-

tivism

2.1 Background •••• 0 0

2.2 Being- What is there?

2.3 Knowledge - What can we know about it?

2.4 Relativism and Subjectivism

2.5 Four pillars make a building

3 The influence of Sophist philosophy on Athenian foreign policy during

the Peloponnesian War

1

1

3

7

11

11

14

19

25

32

35

3.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

3.2 How Athens instrumentalises Sophist philosophy to shape the international

system ................ .

3.2.1 Subjectivism and self-interest

3.2.2 Relativism and the Might is Right doctrine .

4 What makes a thought thinkable?

37

37

43

69

4.1 Fifth Century sense structure and its impact on political thinking and

political action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

4.2 How does Sophist philosophy influence political thinking in 5th Century

Athens? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

4.2.1 The impact of the Sophist rejection of Presocratic ontology on his-

torical enquiry and the concept of the politicaL . . . .

4.2.2 The instrumentalisation of Epistemological Scepticism.

4.2.3 Subjectivism and Moral Relativism . . . . . .

4.2.4 The concept of justice and the Law of Nature

4.2.5 The use of rhetoric in Athenian politics ....

4.3 Why did Political Realism emerge in Fifth Century Athens?

4.3.1 Historical context

4.3.2 Cultural context

72

76

78

79

85

90

90

93

5 Athens: The relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy101

5.1 Background . . . . . 101

5.2 Athenian democracy 101

5.3 Athenian political culture and its impact on politicians 106

5.4 Rhetoric and Sophist teaching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

5.5 The impact Athenian political culture on foreign policy 127

6 Conclusion 133

7 The Bibliography 139

Chapter 1 Introduction

The Peloponnesian War is a clash of two Greek superpowers competing for both mili­

tary superiority and regional influence. Athens and Sparta have different political systems

(democracy vs. oligarchy) and each polis has a specific political culture (participatory vs.

hierarchical). But most importantly, Athens and Sparta differ significantly with respect

to their foreign policies. Sparta employs then conventional arguments of power to justify

her belligerent policies. In contrast, the reasoning of the Athenian reveals a new approach

to foreign policy. Athenian politicians claim that in international relations, Might is Right

and that moral considerations do not apply to conflicts of unequal powers. This line of

reasoning and its rigid execution throughout the Peloponnesian War provoke resentment

and resistance amongst other Greek city states, who claim that Athenian policies violate

the long established traditions of Greek warfare. It is the aim of this essay to estab­

lish why these Athenian policies known as Political Realism developed in Fifth Century

Athens1 and which historical, cultural and political factors provided the ground for this

development.

1.1 Scope

In the course of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians develop a foreign policy that

establishes the supremacy of power over moral concerns. This approach to politics is

called Political Realism. It is a policy backed by rhetoric, justified by relativism and

buttressed by force. Our enquiry explores why and how Political Realism emerges in

Fifth Century Athens. Firstly, we are interested in the intellectual, historical and cultural

origins of this political philosophy and in the relationship between these factors. Secondly,

we aim to understand Athenian Political Realism based on a comprehensive analysis of its

intellectual foundations. We attempt to determine the relation between philosophy and

1Throughout the rest of this essay we will refer to the Fifth Century BCE simply as the Fifth Century

1. Introduction 2

political thinking on the one hand, and between political thinking and political action on

the other. We will examine the extent to which the ideas that Athenian Political Realism

is based on are rooted in contemporary Presocratic and Sophist philosophy, while also

establishing how these ideas translate into political actions. Finally, we seek to describe

Athenian political culture in order to determine the role it plays in the transformation of

politics. Political culture is influenced by the structure and by the characteristics of the

Athenian democratic system, as well as by the type of politicians the system produces. We

argue that ideas alone cannot bring about a change in foreign policy. In order to have an

impact on politics, ideas need to be related to political institutions, the decision-making

processes and the political culture of a given state.

Our analysis will shed light on two intriguing questions. These are: What makes

an idea thinkable? and What makes an idea realisable? While the first question is

concerned with the intellectual history of Political Realism, the second question relates

to the historical context which allows Political Realism to flourish. In chapters 1 and 2

we examine the first question, while in chapters 3 and 4 we look at the second question.

In chapters 1 and 2 we aim to reveal the connections between different ideas on the one

hand, and the links between ideas and politics on the other hand. We ask: how do new

ideas surface? To what extent are new ideas linked to already existing ones? How and

in which manner can ideas influence politics? Can philosophical concepts be applied to

the political sphere and if so, how are they transformed in the process? Our working

hypothesis is that Athenian Political Realism would not have been thinkable without

Sophist Moral Relativism which in turn is closely related to Presocratic Philosophy. At

the same time, we are aware that the intellectual origins of Political Realism do not

explain the ability of Athens to implement her realist policies. In order to address this

issue, chapters 3 and 4 deal with the historical factors that contribute to the development

of Political Realism. We conjecture that both the Athenian political system and the

type of politician it produces influence her foreign policies. Athenian domestic political

culture determines her relations with other poleis. With this two-dimensional analysis,

we attempt to give a credible explanation for Athens' pursuit of Realist Policies during

the Peloponnesian War.

1. Introduction 3

1. 2 Contents

Nearly 2,500 years after its emergence in Fifth Century Athens, Political Realism still

influences the foreign policies of many modern states. Indeed, contemporary political

thinkers and politicians frequently refer to the Athenian historian Thucydides as the father

of Political Realism. But while phrases and passages of his History of the Peloponnesian

War are routinely quoted, the political philosophy of the text is often ignored as are the

historical, cultural and intellectual circumstances. As a result, our knowledge of Athenian

Political Realism is for the most part incomplete and inaccurate. In order to address this

problem, we propose to study Athenian Political Realism as a comprehensive body of

thought.

The Peloponnesian War is widely regarded as 'the product of its reporter'. 2 Although

we agree with Finley that the History of the Peloponnesian War reflects Thucydides'

perspective, we assert that it is more instructive to regard it primarily as a product of its

historical context.

The second half of the Fifth Century has been described as 'the greatest age of

Athens'. 3 Democratic reforms, social and political change and thriving intellectual ac­

tivity create a climate in which established patterns of life and experience dissolve in

favour of new ones. Traditional beliefs and values are questioned as new intellectual cur­

rents compete for recognition. This dynamic atmosphere coupled with freedom of speech

attracts intellectuals from all over the Greek World to Athens. Amongst them is a group

of teachers who educate young men in the art of rhetoric. The newly formed democratic

structures create a need for a new kind of education. Athenian democracy requires cit­

izens from all social backgrounds to hold office and to participate in the political life of

the polis. In order to join the public debate in the Assembly, to propose policies, and

to defend themselves in court if necessary, Athenian citizens require the rhetorical skills

taught by the Sophists. Although rhetoric in itself is not a new discipline, for the first

time it is instructed and employed as a political technique.

Despite the fact that most of the Sophists teach rhetoric, it would be wrong to consider

2 lVLI. Finley, introduction to Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War (London, Penguin Books,

1972), p. 9 3 G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.1

1. Introduction 4

them as a homogenous group of thinkers. We subscribe to Guthrie's view that

to claim that philosophically they had nothing in common is to go too far. They shared the

general philosophical outlook described... _under the name of empiricism, and with this went

a common scepticism about the possibility of certain knowledge, on the ground both of the

inadequacy and fallibility of our faculties and of the absence of a stable reality to be known.

All alike believed in the antithesis between nature and conventions. They might differ in their

estimate of the relative value of each, but none of them would hold that human laws, customs

and religious beliefs were unshakeable because rooted in an unchanging natural order.4

Within the framework of our analysis, we are mainly concerned with two aspects of

Sophist thinking and teaching. On the level of philosophy, we are interested in Scepticism

and in the Sophists' questioning of absolute knowledge. On the level of politics, we

explore the implications of this philosophy on Sophist teaching as well as on the politics

inspired by it. By analysing the link between Sophist Epistemological Scepticism, Moral

Relativism and the art of rhetoric we seek to understand the ways in which Sophist ideas

influence Athenian political life. Our main hypothesis is that by instructing Athenian

citizens in the art of oration, the Sophists contribute to the transformation of Athenian

political culture both in the domestic and in the international sphere. As Sinclair points

out, the Sophists 'differed widely in their methods, doctrine and subject-matter, but

their presence in Athens and their educational activity there demonstrated the connection

between politics and culture, the profound influence of the education of the citizens on

the nature and value of the State. '5 The Sophists teach their students how to argue

convincingly, regardless of their actual conviction. Applied to politics, this technique

serves as an instrument of persuasion and manipulation: it allows politicians to win public

support for any policy. As a result, instead of revolving around the content of different

policies, political debates resemble rhetoric competitions. And since both domestic and

foreign policies are determined by majority votes in the Athenian Assembly, all policy

areas are subject to the influence of rhetoric. Through the instruction of rhetoric and

4W.C.K. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,

1969), p. 47/8 5T.A. Sinclair, 'Socrates and His Opponents' in C.J. Classen (ed.), Sophistik (Darmstadt, Wis-

senschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976), p. 71

1. Introduction 5

its application, the Sophists shape the characteristics of the democratic decision-making

process, which in turn influences policy contents as well as the general conception of

politics.

By shaping Athenian political culture, Sophist philosophy has a major impact both

on the way the Athenian political system functions and on Athenian foreign policy. Our

analysis will demonstrate that the impact of Athenian political culture on foreign policy

is twofold. Firstly, in international conflicts, the Athenians use rhetoric to defend their

actions. By imitating the patterns of the domestic political discourse Athens aims to

convince her adversaries that her policies are advantageous for both sides. Secondly, the

philosophical assumptions on which rhetoric is based facilitate the Athenian Might is

llight approach to international relations. The Sophists' Epistemological Scepticism and

their Moral Relativism provide the intellectual framework for Political Realism in Athens.

Our enquiry approaches Athenian Political Realism from four distinct but related

perspectives. Chapter 1 examines the relationship between Presocratic and Sophist ideas.

We analyse the extent to which Sophist Moral Relativism can be regarded as a response

to Presocratic thinking. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we will trace the links

between Presocratic and Sophist ontology. We ask how we can account for the Sophist

rejection of the Presocratic conceptions of Being and what the philosophical consequences

of this refutation are. We then consider Sophist epistemology and its relationship to

Presocratic ontology. Finally, since ontology and epistemology together provide the basis

for Sophist Relativism and Subjectivism, we examine their interplay. It is our hope

that investigating the philosophical background of Sophist Moral Relativism will help us

understand why and how it emerged.

Chapter 2 deals with the impact of Sophist philosophy on Athenian foreign policy dur­

ing the Peloponnesian War. We will study the extent to which Sophist Subjectivism and

Moral Relativism influence Athenian foreign policy by comparing philosophical fragments

with the political speeches recorded in Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War.

We seek to know if there is any evidence that the Athenians apply Sophist ideas to the

political sphere, and if this is the case, how can we explain it?

While the first two chapters are concerned with the relationship between ideas both

on the philosophical and on the political level, the third and the fourth chapters seek a

1. Introduction 6

broader perspective. This is reflected in the type of sources we consult as well as in our

overall approach. In chapters one and two we focus on primary sources (i.e. Presocratic

and Sophist fragments and extracts from Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War).

Once we have established the relationship between Sophist philosophy and Presocratic

thinking, as well as the connections between Sophist ideas and Athenian foreign policy,

we refer to the historical context to substantiate our assertions. Chapter 3 thus analyses

the historical, cultural and political context of Athenian Political Realism and addresses

our central question liVhat makes a thought thinkable? We will examine the way in which

Athenian politicians instrumentalise Sophist ideas and seek to explain why the historical

circumstances allow them to do so.

Finally, chapter 4 will scrutinise the impact the Athenian political system, its political

culture and her politicians have on both the conduct and content of foreign policy. We

conjecture that there is a link between the functioning principles of Athenian democracy

and the type of foreign policy pursued by Athens. The democratic institutions established

by the reforms of Ephialtes and Pericles produce a particular way of conducting politics

which requires a particular type of politician. Both have a considerable impact on the

domestic as well as on the international politics of Athens.

1.3 Method and sources

As highlighted above, the analyses in chapters 1 and 2 are based entirely on primary

sources. It is our view that any further analysis must proceed methodologically from

this starting point. We have to make sense of the primary material first, in order to

broaden our perspective and to contextualise it. Additionally, for those of us not versed

in Ancient Greek it becomes essential to consult and compare different translations of the

original sources. By doing so we may gain a thorough understanding of the original frag­

ments, while simultaneously increasing our awareness of the multidimensionality of their

meaning. In our study of Presocratic philosophy, we have relied mainly on Waterfield's6

6 R. Waterfield, The First Philosophers: The Presocratics and Sophists (Oxford, Oxford University

Press, 2000)

1. Introduction 7

translation of presocratic fragments, while also consulting the translations of McKirahan 7

as well as Kirk and Raven's8 translations. When studying Sophist philosophy, our main

sources are Freeman's translation of Diels' Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker9 and Gagarin

and Woodruff's Early Greek Political Thought 10. We have also studied the Platonic dia­

logues in which some of the Sophists are portrayed, including the opening dialogue of the

Republic. As to how the fragments are numbered, we have decided to use each author's

own system.

Like all scholars of ancient Greek philosophy, we find ourselves in the difficult position

of trying to reconstruct an entire philosophical tradition from what can be described as

very meagre and often inconclusive evidence. In the case of the Sophists, this challenge

is exacerbated by the fact that Plato, our main contemporary source, is highly sceptical

of the Sophists and therefore likely to misrepresent Sophist ideas. These inauspicious

circumstances serve to challenge the analytical skills and creative thinking of any scholar

of Sophist philosophy. Given the fragmentary nature of Presocratic and Sophist writings,

every scholar will understand the extant sources in his/her own way. Though we are aware

of the views of others, we have primarily focused on our own interpretations, supporting

them with as much evidence and explanations as necessary. Rather than indicating a

disregard for established ideas, our approach is born out of necessity since two important

relationships have been noticeably overlooked by scholars in the field. These are: the

relation between Presocratic philosophy and Sophist thinking and the connection between

Sophist philosophy and Athenian Political Realism.

As for our analysis of Athenian foreign policy during the Peloponnesian War, our

primary source is Thucydides' narrative of the events. In the History of the Peloponnesian

War Thucydides describes the events of the war as well as the policies of the states that

participate in it. His aim is to produce an objective account of the historical developments,

distilled from various subjective perspectives: 'And with regard to my factual reporting of

7R.D. McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1994) 8 G.S. Kirk and J.E. Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,

1966) 9K. Freeman, Ancilla to The Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1948)

10M. Gagarin and P. Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought from Homer to the Sophists (Cambridge,

Cambridge University Press, 1997)

1. Introduction 8

the events of the war I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came

my way, and not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present

myself at the events which I have described or else I heard of them from eye-witnesses

whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible.' 11 Despite his efforts

to establish the facts, Thucydides recognises that his historical enquiry is influenced as

much by his own subjectivity as that of other witnesses. This is particularly evident in

the case of the political speeches Thucydides recounts to explain the sequence of events:

'in this history I have made use of set speeches... I have found it difficult to remember

the precise words used in speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants

have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as

possible to the general sense of the words that were actually used, to make the speakers say

what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation. '12 Although Thucydides' account

may not always be fully accurate or objective, it is the only source that can provide an

insight into the politics of the Peloponnesian War. We have therefore decided to treat his

representation of Athenian politics both as possible evidence of the actual events and as

a reflection of what kind of policies would have been thinkable in the second half of the

Fifth Century.

While chapters 2 and 3 are based on primary sources, the third and fourth chapter

make reference to secondary sources in order to broaden our spectrum of analysis. This

contextualisation will hopefully shed light on the connections between circumstances and

politics and demonstrate that Athenian foreign policy cannot be divorced from its context.

The rationale behind dividing our discussion into two methodologically distinct parts

is the following: in the first two chapters we build our main thesis based on our analysis

of the primary sources. Once we have explored the intellectual framework of Political

Realism, chapters 4 and 5 focus on the factors that support this framework. This twofold

approach will allow us to explain why Political Realism was thinkable and realisable in

Fifth Century Athens.

11 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 1, section 22, lines 9-14 (hereafter cited as

1.22.9-14) 12Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.22.1-8

Chapter 2

2.1 Background

The relationship

between Presocratic

thought and Sophist

M oral Relativism

In order to understand Sophist thought properly, we ought to study it in the context of

Fifth and Sixth Century philosophy. The relationship between Presocratic and Sophist

ideas has conventionally been described in rather general terms. Most classical scholars

have emphasised the differences in approach, focus and subject matter of the two philo­

sophical currents. However, the extent to which one way of thinking developed out of the

other has not been examined thoroughly yet.

The Presocratics are preoccupied with the scientific contemplation of nature. Their

aim is to determine the nature of reality and its relationship to sensible phenomena. This

quest for stability and an underlying unity in a universe which consists of a superficially

mutable and unstable plurality fails on two accounts. First, their individual interpreta­

tions of natural phenomena are mutually exclusive. Second, their idea of truth does not

stand up to closer scrutiny. As Burnet puts it.

Science had done all it could to make the world intelligible, and the result was a view of reality

in fiat contradiction to the evidence of the senses. Apparently it was not this world science

explained but another one altogether. What then, are we to say about this world? ... After all,

that world is a product of human thinking, and how can we tell that thought is not as misleading

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 10

as sense is said to be? 13

As a consequence of this dilemma, in the second half of the Fifth Century, common

sense revolts against the remoteness and the incomprehensibility of the world as the

physicists present it and philosophers begin to direct their thoughts towards human life.14

The Sophists can be credited for shifting the focus of philosophy from nature to men and

society. Their methods are empirical instead of deductive and aim to generate subjective

knowledge for practical and political purposes rather than pursuing knowledge for its own

sake. The Sophistic debate deals with all aspects of human activity; it is a sustained

attempt to establish a rational structure or framework within which questions can be

answered. 15

This chapter explores to what extent specific Sophist ideas are rooted in Preso­

cratic philosophy. Guthrie has characterised the fundamental connection between the

two strands of thought accurately:

In spite of the shift of interest from natural phenomena to human affairs, there are nevertheless

existential connexions between the Presocratic tradition and the new intellectual ferment gen-

erated by the Sophists... The Presocratics [are] preoccupied with the nature of reality and its

relation to sensible phenomena. This question of the relation between reality and appearance

remains at the root of things, and in one form or another constitutes the fundamental difference

between rival philosophies [i.e. Sophist philosophy vs. Socratic/Platonic philosophy]. On the

one hand we have a complex of ideas whose basis may be loosely summed up in such terms as

empiricism, positivism, phenomenalism, individualism, relativism and humanism. Appearances

are constantly shifting, from one moment to the next and between one individual and another,

and they themselves constitute the only reality. In morals this leads to "situational ethics",

an emphasis on the immediately practical and a distrust of general and permanent rules and

principles ... 16

Ultimately, our aim is to establish a link between Sophist philosophy and Athenian Po-

13 J. Burnet, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato (London, Macmillan, 1932), p. 105 14W.C.K. Guthrie, The Greek Philosophers from Thales to Aristotle (London, Methuen and Co Ltd.,

1967), p. 63 15G.B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 174 16Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 4

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 11

litical Realism. We will therefore focus on those aspects of Sophist thinking that are

intimately related to Political Realism. Our central aim is to understand to what extent

the Moral Relativism of the Sophists (i.e. what Guthrie calls 'situational ethics') is rooted

in Presocratic philosophy.

There are three guiding questions that will help us determine this relationship: 1. To

what extent and in which ways have the Sophists built on Presocratic thought? 2. Which

Sophist ideas would have been inconceivable without Presocratic ideas? 3. In which

respects does Sophist philosophy vary from Presocratic philosophy? We will analyse the

connections between specific ideas to identify various areas of continuity and of progress

of thinking.

Sophist Moral Relativism rests on four pillars. The first and most fundamental pillar

represents ontological reflections: What is there? This is closely related to the second

pillar concerned primarily with epistemology: what can we know about it? Relativism

is embodied in the third pillar: if there is no secure knowledge, nothing is either true or

false. The last pillar establishes man as the measure of all things: without universal truths,

there is but individual perspectives. Erecting the first pillar is a necessary precondition

for constructing the second and so on. Each pillar constitutes an indispensable axiom

of the theory of Moral Relativism. Our task is to examine each individual pillar and its

relationship to Presocratic ideas. We will demonstrate that Presocratic thought has an

important impact on the more elementary first two pillars. However, with the increasing

complexity of Sophist thought as embodied in the third and fourth pillars, Presocratic

influence fades. In other words, Presocratic philosophy is crucial for Sophist ontology

and epistemology. Although it requires both ontology and epistemology as a basis, Moral

Relativism in itself is influenced only indirectly by Presocratic ideas.

2.2 Being- What is there?

Though he is certainly not the only Sophist to reflect on and write about Being, Gorgias'

treatise On Not Being is indisputably the most comprehensive and most influential extant

source of Sophist ontology. Scholars still debate whether Gorgias meant the treatise to be

serious or ironic. In any case, his original refutation of fundamental ontological questions

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 12

expresses his scepticism towards all knowledge. As de Romilly notes, 'this possibly playful

exercise in polemics is thus in line with more serious philosophical critiques, and . . . in

that it sweeps aside everything that seemed secure or even thinkable, it opens the door

to scepticism in all forms. m The playfulness of Gorgias' argument does not obscure the

serious content thereof. We agree with Guthrie who suggests that one should look behind

appearances and appreciate the philosophical depth of the treatise: 'It is a parody with

serious intent, showing that the opponent's own arguments could be used to prove the

opposite of their conclusions. '18 What is interesting for our discussion is that On Not

Being provides evidence of the extent to which the Sophists borrow from and respond

to Presocratic ideas, and thus illustrates the close relationship between Presocratic and

Sophist philosophy. In Gorgias' treatise we detect the roots of Sophist Radical Scepticism,

which is essentially a reaction to the extreme Rationalism of the Eleatics. 19 Gorgias

displays the absurdity of Eleatic logic by inverting it and thus proving what Parmenides,

the central Eleatic philosopher, denies; that it is and it is not both exist. By disproving

Parmenides, Gorgias dismantles the underlying assumptions of all natural philosophers:

that behind the apparent changing and unstable natural world, there is a substance, a

non-sensible reality.

Gorgias develops four arguments about Being that are inherently connected to Preso­

cratic ideas. His reasoning reflects not only his familiarity with post-Parmenidan Preso­

cratic thought, but is based on Parmenides' ideas. The purpose of Gorgias' ontological

discussion is to exhibit the inaccuracies of Eleatic philosophy. He disproves Parmenides'

assumptions using mostly his own philosophical concepts (and to a lesser extent the con­

cepts of Zeno and of Melissus). Gorgias thus reveals the fundamental difference between

essential and accidental Being; he opposes Parmenides' self-existent or absolutely existent

Being with his own conditional or relative Being. 20

Gorgias' first claim is that whatever there is, it is not possible for it to either be or not

be. Being and Not-Being are the same. As a consequence, 'things no more are than are

17J. de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 97 18W.K.C. Guthrie, 'The First Humanists', Proceedings of the Classical Association, Vol. 65 (1968), p.

22 19 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 8 20 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 193

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 13

not. 121 With this assumption, Gorgias follows in Parmenides' philosophical footsteps while

simultaneously disproving his central tenet. According to Parmenides, there are only two

conceivable ways of thinking about the world: 'There is the way "that it is and that it

cannot not be": This is the path of Trust, for Truth attends it. Then there is the way

"that it is not and that it must not be": This, as I show you, is an altogether misguided

route. For you may not know what-is-not - there is no end to it - Nor may you tell of it. '22

For Parmenides, Being and Not-Being are distinct: 'That which is there to be spoken and

thought of must be. For it is possible for it to be, but not possible for nothing to be. '23 If

we can think of something coherently, it can exist. It is not possible for Nothing to exist,

since what is not cannot be thought of. If something does not exist we cannot know it

or express it in words, there is nothing to be known or to be expressed; nothing is true

of the nonexistent. Gorgias deconstructs the mutual exclusivity of Parmenides' Being

and Not-Being by demonstrating that it is in fact possible to think of Not-Being. As a

logical consequence, Not-Being, just as Being, must exist. This circular argument leads

Gorgias to conclude what Parmenides disputes: things can be or not be, be something or

be nothing.

Gorgias' second argument revolves around the coming into being of things. His rea­

soning is firmly based on the ideas of both Melissus and Zeno and makes reference to

Parmenidan philosophy. Gorgias' initial assertion is that 'if there is anything, it is either

unborn or born. '24 He proceeds to demonstrate that neither of these claims is true. In

order to prove that it is impossible for it to be unborn, he starts from Melissus' assertion

that to be unborn, it needs to be unlimited. Melissus says 'But as it always exists, so too

it must always be unlimited in magnitude. '25 Gorgias shows that it cannot be unlimited

because this would mean that it is anywhere. And it cannot be anywhere since what is

unlimited is indivisible; it cannot be in different places at the same time (i.e. in itself and

in something else). In order to substantiate this point further, Gorgias borrows from the

argument Zeno makes about space. Zeno holds that the idea of a local place is absurd;

21 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 18a, p. 207 22Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F3, p. 58 23McKirahan, Philosophy before Socrates fr. 11.6, p. 153 24Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18a, p. 207 25Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F3, p. 84

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 14

since everything is in something else. Every place is in another place which is in another

place still and so on ad infinitum. Hence whatever is cannot be anywhere, and must

therefore be nowhere. But if it is nowhere, concludes Gorgias, it cannot be unborn but

must be nothing.

Having proven that Being is not unborn; Gorgias argues that it cannot be born either.

His argument reiterates Parmenides' belief that the birth of Being from either Being or

Not-Being is inconceivable. In Parmenides' view, Being cannot come into being from Not­

Being because the latter does not exist. Furthermore, since Not-Being has no properties,

nothing can develop from it. Likewise, Being cannot develop from Being because Being

is singular, uniform and thus unchangeable; there is no other Being that Being could

be created from. Melissus reinforces the Parmenidan line of argument: 'Whatever was,

always was and always will be. For if it came to be, it is necessary that before it came

to be it was nothing. Now if it was nothing, in no way could anything come to be out of

nothing. '26 Although Gorgias ultimately reaches the same conclusions as Parmenides and

Melissus, his reasoning is slightly different: in his view, nothing can be born from either

Being or Not-Being because neither of these can be changed. He agrees with Parmenides

and Melissus that nothing can be born from Not-Being if Not-Being is not anything.

However, unlike the Presocratics, Gorgias allows for the possibility that Not-Being is

something. Ultimately, this has no effect on his overall argument because even if N at­

Being were Being, nothing could be born from it for the· same reason that nothing can

be born from Being. Gorgias therefore concludes 'So if there is anything, it is necessarily

either unborn or born, and since both of these are impossible, it follows in fact that it is

impossible for there to be anything. >27

Instead of adopting Parmenides' notion of Being, Gorgias reveals that his thinking

lacks consequentiality. Parmenidan philosophy, despite the distinctness of its approach,

betrays the influence of Presocratic Monism. The idea that Being is one and unchanging

is reminiscent of the single principle of the Monists. In fact, it can be argued that

Parmenides' concept of Being merely replaces the ruling principle or prime matter of

earlier thinkers. This would explain Parmenides' insistence on the singularity of Being.

26 McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates, fr. 15.1, p. 292 27Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18a, p. 207

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 15

Within the Presocratic frame of thinking, the dualism of Being (i.e. Being and Not-Being)

is inconceivable.

Gorgias' third and final claim is that 'if there is anything, it is one or more [in num­

ber].'28 He argues 'that there could not be a one, since what is truly one is incorporeal

in so far as it has no magnitude. '29 As we have just discussed, the idea that the world is

made of one substance or one principle is characteristic of Presocratic thought. However,

Gorgias' assertion that in order to be one Being has to be incorporeal seems reminiscent

of the Pythagorean concept of numbers. According to the Pythagoreans, numbers (which

are incorporeal) are analogues of things and constitute the whole universe: 'Since, then,

the whole natural world seemed basically to be an analogue for numbers, and numbers

seemed to be the primary facet of the natural world, they [the Pythagoreans] concluded

that the elements of numbers are the elements of all things, and that the whole universe is

harmony and number. '30 Against the backdrop of Pythagorean thought, it is not entirely

implausible that Gorgias' may be arguing along the following lines: presocratic Monism

only makes sense if it refers to numerical singularity. But if Being is analogue to the

number one, it is incorporeal. And since this would imply that Being has no magnitude,

Being cannot be one. Solmsen shows that Gorgias' rejection of the oneness and of the

multitude of Being can also be explained without reference to the Pythagoreans: 'Being

might be either one or many. But if it is one, it would have to subsist as a body, a

quantity, or something else that is divisible and thus would no longer be one; and if many,

we must regard the many as a sum of ones, but as the one has been disproved, the many

cannot exist either. '31

Gorgias thus rejects Parmenides' notion of the oneness of Being: 'And so it should

either entirely be, or not be at all. '32 Implicitly, Gorgias' conclusion that 'if there is not a

one, there could not be a many and if there is neither a one nor a many, there is nothing. '33

incorporates Parmenides' claim that if Being is not one, it cannot be anything. Finally,

28Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18a, p. 207 29Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18a, p. 207 30Waterfield, The First Philosophers, T25, p. 102 31 F. Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment (Princeton, Princeton University

Press, 1975), p. 12 32Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F8, p. 59 33Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18a, p. 208

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 16

we can understand Gorgias' argument as contradicting not only the ontological but also

the epistemological singularity. Rejecting Monism essentially means rejecting a singular

truth. Whether this truth is embodied in a single principle or in a singular existence (i.e.

Being) Gorgias discards both approaches.

Gorgias concludes his ontological investigation with explaining why Being is unchange­

able. In his view, Being cannot change because this implies that something that did not

exist previously comes into existence, while something that used to be ceases to exist.

Being is treated as a property of things rather than as a condition. Gorgias' reasoning

reinforces merely what Parmenides wrote earlier: 'It stays in the same state and in the

same place, lying by itself, And so stays firmly as it is. '34 With his treatise On Not Being,

Gorgias completes Parmenides' half-hearted departure from pre-Parmenidan Presocratic

thought. Gorgias challenges the Eleatic assertion of a single changeless Being grasped by

an infallible reason. This has wide-ranging consequences for Sophist philosophy. If Being

and Not-Being are identical and nothing is, there is no permanent truth to be known and

all that is left are various opinions.

The various connections between Parmenides' and Gorgias' conceptions of Being reveal

the extent to which Presocratic thinking influences Sophist ontology. The Sophists are

familiar with Presocratic ideas and use them as a basis on which to build their own

concepts. Despite the fact that some of their ideas overlap, the Sophists ultimately reject

Presocratic thought using it as ·a stepping stone for their own philosophy.

Generally speaking, it is rather difficult to reconstruct the exchange of ideas between

the Sophists and the Presocratics in the Fifth Century. Very few Sophist fragments contain

cross-references to Presocratic thought as obvious as those in Gorgias' On Not Being.

That is why his treatise is crucial to understanding the Presocratic influence on Sophist

ontology. The comprehensiveness of On Not Being allows for a more thorough enquiry

than any other Sophist fragment. Though other Sophists also deal with ontology, the

evidence is too scarce to draw wide-ranging conclusions. Bearing this in mind, we conclude

from our analysis of Gorgias' treatise On Not Being that Sophist ontology develops from

Presocratic conceptions of Being.

34Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F8, p. 60

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 17

2.3 Knowledge- What can we know about it?

Epistemology and ontology are inherently related. Essentially, knowledge is about What­

Is and What-Is-Not. All other knowledge is derivative. Parmenides' basic tenet what

can be spoken and thought of can possibly be illustrates this relationship perfectly. Being

cannot be separated from the knowledge of Being and vice versa. This is the starting point

of Sophist Epistemology. Protagoras espouses Parmenides' claim in asserting that 'It is

not possible to think what is not. '35 This reiteration of Parmenidan philosophy reflects the

predominance of his thought in the early Fifth Century. While the Sophists ignore most

of the early Presocratics, they make a point of either supporting or refuting Parmenides'

philosophy. Parmenidan thought serves as a common starting point for different Sophist

epistemologies. This proves our initial claim: whether Presocratic ideas are rejected or

embraced, they are incorporated into Sophist philosophy.

In On Not Being, Gorgias contradicts Parmenides' statement, claiming that it is pos­

sible to think of things that do not exist, for example chariots racing in the sea. Although

at first sight this appears to be a refutation of Parmenides, it merely shows that Gorgias

and Parmenides work on different assumptions. For Parmenides, thinking and Being are

co-extensive. He states: 'Thinking and the thought that it is are the same. For not with­

out what is, in which it is expressed, will you find thinking; for nothing else either is or will

be except that which is. '36 We can only think of a thing as it is. Being is not existential

(we can think of things that do not exist) but predicative (we can know something and

think of something only if it has some attribute) and veridical (we can only ever know

something that is the case). According to this understanding of thinking, it is impossible

for us to think of or to know an entity without attributes. In fact, Waterfield points out

that the Greek word Parmenides uses for 'thinking' carries connotations of 'recognition',

which implies that what we think of is something out there to be recognised, not a fanci­

ful object such as a unicorn or chariots in the sea.37 Parmenides' notion of Being makes

thinking about something that does not exist impossible. Gorgias, however, who aims

to dispose of the concept of Being altogether, purposefully challenges both Parmenides'

35Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18, p. 186 36McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates, fr. 11.8, p. 154 37Waterfield, The First Philosophers, p. 50

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 18

epistemology and its underlying ontology.

In Gorgias' view, rational thinking and sensual perception are equally fallible: 'just as

there is no more reason for things we see to be the case (merely because we see them), so

things we see are no more likely to be the case than are things we have in mind. '38 We

have no reason to believe that our mind grasps reality more accurately than our senses. In

fact, we cannot rely on either since 'The nature of true things is not evident [to the senses];

so that even if they are the case, these things would not be knowable, at any rate not by

us. '39 With this statement, Gorgias challenges commonly held Presocratic assumptions

and Parmenides' philosophy in particular. While most of the Presocratics agree with

Gorgias that truth is not accessible to the senses, they insist that it is perceived by the

rational mind. Presocratic philosophy is driven by the belief that through the application

of proper philosophical concepts and methodology, one can comprehend the true reality

of things. Gorgias' claim that everything can be thought (even What-Is-Not) but that

nothing necessarily exists or is true is a direct challenge to Parmenides' philosophy.

By questioning the attainability of knowledge altogether, Gorgias follows in the foot­

steps of Xenophanes, the father of Scepticism. In Xenophanes' opinion, it is impossible

for us to attain truth: 'No man has seen nor will anyone know the truth about the gods

and all things I speak of. For even if a person should in fact say what is absolutely the

case, nevertheless he himself does not know, but belief is fashioned over all things [or,

in the case of all persons].'40 Neither with our senses nor with our mind can we gain

knowledge of the truth. We might discover the truth accidentally (i.e. 'what is absolutely

the case'), but we have no means of establishing whether it is actually true. Belief is all

there is.

Notwithstanding the fact that Xenophanes would have difficulties proving the truth­

fulness of his own statement, he - and this distinguishes him from the Sceptic Sophists -

seems to believe that there is such a thing as a truth. First of all he does not deny that

there might be a truth. More importantly, his term 'what is absolutely the case' comes

very close to describing an objective reality. If we interpret the above fragment in this

38Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18b, p. 208 39Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18b, p. 208 40McKirahan, Philosophy Before Socrates, fr. 7.19, p. 66/7

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 19

way, Xenophanes is situated between Presocratic and Sophist thinking: like his fellow

Presocratics, he believes that there is an underlying truth; at the same time, his Scepti­

cism of the attainability of knowledge makes him doubt that this has any consequences

for our knowledge of the world. Finally, the paradoxical notion that there is a truth but

that we cannot know it, sets him apart from Presocratics and Sophists alike.

Xenophanes' and Gorgias' Epistemological Scepticism is juxtaposed to Presocratic

ideas of knowledge. Though most of the Presocratics doubt the evidence of the senses,

their enquiries are nevertheless based on the observation and on the interpretation of

natural phenomena. In their view, the rational mind compensates for the elusiveness of

sense perception and gives us access to the truth.

Presocratic epistemology is a result of Presocratic ontology and methodology. Given

that their main object of study is nature, it is not surprising that most of the Presocrat­

ics come up with a natural principle or substance to explain reality. They believe that

everything can be reduced to a first principle or prime matter. Nothing exists beyond

and outside of this first principle. Consequently, our knowledge is restricted to it. These

Sophist epistemologies, which are based on natural principles (Pythagoras, Heraclitus,

Parmenides and some of the post-Parmenidan thinkers are notable exceptions) are char­

acterised by a fundamental contradiction. On the one hand, the senses are considered as

an inadequate tool for understanding the world's functioning principles. This conviction

is amply illustrated by Anaxagoras, who holds that 'The weakness [of the senses] means

that we are incapable of discerning the truth. '41 On the other hand, the Presocratics de­

rive their first principles from the (subjectively perceived) natural world. This is a major

flaw in Presocratic thought: just as perceptions of the natural world differ, so do inter­

pretations thereof. As a result, the Presocratics do not agree on what the first principle

or substance actually is. As Guthrie points out: 'Each believed himself to be nearest to

the truth, but were there any solid grounds for trusting one rather than another?'42 This

and the rather speculative character of their theories43 ultimately deal the final blow to

presocratic philosophy. Confronted with these deficiencies, post-Parmenidan Presocratics

41 Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F20, p. 130 42Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 11 43 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 15

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 20

and Sophists alike dismiss sense perception as an inadequate means to discover the truth.

Against the backdrop of this intellectual context, Parmenides' approach should be

regarded as the tabula rasa of Presocratic philosophy. His radically new way of thinking

manoeuvres Presocratic philosophy out of the impasse in which it is stuck: without the

means to determine which of the various interpretations of reality is true, it is bound to

stagnate. Despite their emphasis on rational thinking, the attempt of the early Preso­

cratics at providing a coherent answer to the question What is there? ultimately fails due

to the subjectivity of their various approaches.

The different philosophies of Parmenides, Melissus and the Sophists are a reaction to

this failure as well as an attempt to develop theories which compensate for the deficiencies

of the philosophy of their contemporaries. They try to answer questions that confound the

early Presocratics, while also asking questions which the latter fail to address altogether.

Distancing himself from the methodology of his predecessors, Parmenides establishes

a new way to conceptualise knowledge. He introduces deductive arguments and relies

on pure reasoning to analyse the nature of logical subjects. This allows him to ask

new questions: what conditions must existing things satisfy? Is reality what our senses

tell us it is? This approach fundamentally changes the parameters of philosophy. Some

Presocratics and most Sophists follow in Parmenides' methodological footsteps. Although

Parmenides' philosophy may be subject to a lot of disputes, what is important is that none

of his successors can ignore or bypass his philosophy. Within the context of our analysis,

his most important legacy is that his ideas allow Sophist philosophy to transcend the

confined realm of Presocratic thought.

Besides dealing with Parmenides' explicit ideas, the Sophists also examine the conse­

quences of his thought. In addition to studying the possibility of knowledge, they reflect

on the universality and on the communicability of knowledge.

Protagoras discusses the relationship between sensual perception and objective knowl­

edge. The following is attributed to him: 'It is manifest to you who are present that I am

sitting; but to a person who is absent it is not manifest that I am sitting; whether or not

I am sitting is obscure.'44 This thought mirrors Anaxagoras' observation 'Appearances

44Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 21, p. 187

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 21

are a glimpse of the obscure. '45 And it highlights the considerable influence of Presocratic

ideas on Sophist concepts of knowledge and sense perception. For Anaxagoras, the true

nature of things is obscure. But if everything is obscure, how do we know that there is

such a thing as the true nature of things/of reality? If our senses only perceive appear­

ances, how do we know that there is something behind these appearances? If all we know

is that what we see is but appearances, what do we actually know?

Protagoras suggests that although sense perception can give us evidence of things as

they manifest themselves (i.e. him sitting) this evidence is not universally valid. Two

people, one of which sees Protagoras sitting while the other does not, will not be able to

establish whether or not he is sitting. The one who sees Protagoras sitting cannot prove

that this is actually the case while the other has no means of finding out the truth without

witnessing it. Someone who does not witness the manifestation of a thing has no means

of knowing whether this thing exists or not. As a result, it is impossible to establish the

true reality of things. Nobody really knows whether Protagoras is sitting or not, though

all of us have our own private knowledge thereof.

Protagoras' paradigm addresses one of the fundamental issues of epistemology. Whereas

most of the Presocratics work on the assumption that there is a true reality of things, and

therefore ask What are all things made of? (In Protagoras' example this would translate

into: is he sitting or not?). Protagoras discards these kinds of questions by giving an

unequivocal answer: we just do not know.

This argument is commensurate with Gorgias' final statement in On Not Being. Bring­

ing his and the argument of Protagoras to its logic conclusion, Gorgias argues that even

if we could know anything, we would not be able to communicate it or agtee-·nn·it. He

asks: 'Even if they [things] were knowable, how could anyone make them evident to an­

other? How could someone express in words what he has seen? Or how could such a

thing become evident to someone who has heard the other speak of it, but has not seen

it himself?'46 The essence of his reasoning is that the existence and the properties of a

thing cannot be communicated because a thing is (a) not equivalent to the notion of it;

(b) one thing cannot exist at the same time in several minds; and (c) two people's notions

45 Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers, fr. 537, p. 394 46Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18c, p. 208

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 22

of one thing are not necessarily identical. Antiphon makes a similar claim: 'Someone

who says one thing does not in fact have one thing in mind, nor does one thing exist

for him, neither something that the one who sees best sees with his sight nor something

that the one who knows best knows with his mind. '47 A thing as it is, a thing said and

a thing in mind are neither (necessarily) identical nor is there a causal relationship be­

tween them. This is where Parmenides' deductive reasoning reaches its limit. We might

be able to make a statement about a thing, but this does not presuppose that we have

an idea about it and it does not mean that this thing actually exists. Neither the most

effective sight nor intellectual capacity can assist us in proving the existence of a thing.

Antiphon thus refutes Parmenides' claim that a thing which can be thought must exist,

and thereby dissolves the connection between our rational mind/thinking capacity and

reality. Whereas the Presocratics rely on the rational mind, the Sophists' fundamental

doubt includes thinking itself.

Sophist philosophy systematically deconstructs Presocratic notions of the world. In­

stead of replacing Presocratic concepts (i.e. the first principle, prime matter or unchange­

able Being) with their own, the Sophists reject the Presocratics' entire framework of

thinking. If there is no universally valid knowledge, searching for an underlying reality

or examining the relationship between Being and Not-Being is a futile exercise. In the

Sophist world view truth and reality are uncertain. All we can do is come to terms with

the plurality of perceptions, interpretations, and meaning.

2.4 Relativism and Subjectivism

The most significant implication of Sophist epistemology is that there are no universal

or absolute standards of knowledge. All knowledge is limited to individual experience;

transcendent knowledge is impossible. The criteria of judgment are thus relative, varying

with subjects. 'It is our own feelings and convictions that measure or determine the limits

and nature of reality, which only exists in relation to them and is different for every one

of us. '48 The existence and the properties of things can only be determined in relation

47Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 7a, p. 244 48 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. III, p. 184

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 23

to the person who perceives them or thinks about them. A thing does not exist as such

but is as it is perceived. There is no reality behind nor independent of appearances:

being is identical to appearing. Hence Subjectivism implies Relativism and vice versa.

Subjectivism is the inescapable consequence of Relativism.

The Moral Relativism of the Sophists, which denies absolute standards of Right and

Wrong, is intricately related to Presocratic conceptions of the natural world. Presocratic

doubts of the order and stability of the physical world and the rejection of divinity in

favour of chance and natural necessity of causes, are seized upon by the Sophists and

transformed into the relativity of ethical conceptions. 49

Sophist philosophy is fragmentary and our understanding of Relativism is dominated

almost entirely by what remains of Protagoras' writings. It would therefore be inadequate

to classify all Sophists as Relativists. However, a thorough analysis of Protagoras' ideas

that takes into account the relevant Presocratic and Sophist influences will allow us to

establish the significance of Relativism for Sophist thought.

Protagoras' initial claim is that 'On every subject there are two logoi [speeches or

arguments] opposed to one another. '50 These two opposed arguments represent the mul­

tiplicity of perspectives on the world. Protagoras suggests that all arguments that can

possibly be made about a given subject are equally valid. No statement can be consid­

ered either true or false. And in the absence of a universal truth, contradictions between

arguments cannot be resolved.

In Protagoras' view, and this distinguishes him from his Presocratic predecessors, it is

impossible to determine whether or not there is such a thing as a single truth. While the

Presocratics reduce the complexity of the world to a single principle, Protagoras insists

that we face the multidimensionality of things because this is the only reality accessible to

us. His line of argument about the good illustrates the complexity of Relativist statements:

I know many things that are not beneficialunbeneficial to humans: foods and drinks and drugs

and thousands of other things: and others that are beneficial. Some are neither beneficial nor

harmful to humans, but are beneficial to horses, some only for cattle, and others for dogs ... But

49 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. III, p. 59 50Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 24, p. 187

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 24

so various and many-sided a thing is the good, that even when we human beings use oil, it is

good for the outside parts of the body, but the same oil is very bad for our insides. 51

Protagoras' way of reasoning is reminiscent of Heraclitus' theory of the identity of

opposites. Heraclitus believes that things are composed of opposites. And given that

everything is relative, even opposites are identical. Heraclitus illustrates this claim with

real-life examples. The value of things depends on both the context and the perceiving

subject: 'Sea: water most pure and most tainted, drinkable and wholesome for fish, but

undrinkable and poisonous for people'52 or 'Donkeys would prefer refuse to gold'53 and

'Pigs prefer filth to clean water.'54 Everything is relative: 'A man is thought as foolish

by a supernatural being as a child is by a man. '55

Within the framework of Relativism we can no longer make general statements about

things but need to be specific about particular circumstances and relationships. Since

there are many different truths, both the applicability and the validity of our knowledge

are necessarily limited. Against the backdrop of this complexity, Protagoras approaches

knowledge rather pragmatically. His argument about good and bad can be summarised

as follows. (i) We do not know whether there is such a thing as the good. (ii) We cannot

say that a thing is either good or bad. (iii) All we can do is establish whether a thing is

good or bad in a particular context and relative to other things. Instead of searching for

the universal meaning of the good, we should be concerned with the particular cases of

goodness and badness that life confronts us with.

A contemporary unknown source discusses the same problem:

[1] Double arguments are put forward by intellectuals in Greece concerning good and bad.

Some say that good is one thing and bad another, while others say that the same thing can be

both/that good and bad are the same thing, and that something may be good for some but bad

for others or sometimes good and sometimes bad for the same person. [2] I myself agree with the

latter, and my investigation will begin with human life and its concern with food and drink and

sex; for these things are bad for someone sick but good for someone healthy who needs them ...

51 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 11, p. 185 52Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F15, p. 39 53Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F17, p. 39 54Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F18, p. 40 55Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F19, p. 40

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 25

[3] Sickness, moreover, is bad for the sick but good for doctors ... [6] a victory is good for the

winner but bad for the losers ... 56

This unknown author, whose writings have been associated with various Sophists57 ,

agrees with Protagoras' notion of value judgements and illustrates the implications of

Relativist arguments. A thing (i.e. water) can be good for one thing (i.e. the roots of a

tree) and bad for another (i.e. the sprouts of a tree). The value of a given thing can only

be established with respect to another thing. It does not make sense to say that a thing

is good or bad per se. Even if it could be shown that a thing is good with respect to all

other things, this would not imply that it is generally or universally good, that is, that it

is of a different quality or kind than a thing which is only good for some things.

As this discussion regarding the good and the bad illustrates, Relativism has three

important implications. First, neither the existence nor the properties of things can be

generally established. Second, reality is not uniform but multi-dimensional and contra­

dictions are impossible. Third, each of us makes their own reality. Let us consider each

of these aspects in turn.

1. We can neither establish whether or not things exist at all, nor determine what they

are. In fact, we do not even know whether things have a real existence as opposed to an

apparent existence. All we can say is that a thing can take on many different appearances.

Protagoras is believed to have said: 'Each thing is no more such than such. '58 This is

clearly a reference to Gorgias' ontological claim 'things no more are than are not. '59 If

the existence of things cannot be proven, it logically follows that we cannot determine

their properties either. Each thing appears differently to different people and we have

no justification for saying that it is as X sees it rather than as Y sees it. Appearances

are all there is. And it is impossible for us to transcend these appearances. In this

view, Protagoras, just as the Presocratics before him, paints a picture of a world in flux.

But in contrast to the Presocratics, he does not assume that things change; instead he

56Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, pp. 296-7 57Untersteiner points out that this fragment echoes numerous doctrines and themes reminiscent of

Sixth and Fifth Century philosophers as diverse as Heraclitus, Protagoras, Gorgias, Hippias, Prodicus

and Socrates. See M. Untersteiner, The Sophists (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1954), p. 304ff. 58Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 26, p. 187 59 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 18a, p. 207

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 26

asserts that they are multi-dimensional. It is this fundamental change of perspective,

which distinguishes Sophist from Presocratic thinking: while for the Presocratics, things

are the starting point for their analysis of reality, for Protagoras it is human beings and

their individual perspective. In the eyes of the Sophists, it is pointless to ask (as the

Presocratics do) whether things really are this or that or how they have changed from

one thing into another, because we simply cannot know. Each of us only knows what she

sees and that is it. What appears to me is because it appears to me. What I see exists

primarily for me, and is different for everybody else. As Protagoras writes: 'Each of us

has his own private perceptions, and what appears exists only for that person to whom

it appears. '60

2. In a multidimensional world where 'Each thing is to me such as it appears to me,

and is to you such as it appears to you'61 all attempts at communicating different views

of reality to one another are futile. We cannot make sense of the world collectively; each

of us is limited to his or her own perspective. In this respect, Protagoras' philosophy

reflects Gorgias' epistemological argument about the incommunicability of knowledge. It

explains why Protagoras asserts that 'It is not possible to contradict.'62 If all perceptions

are private, it is impossible to contend that something is wrong or untrue and that its

opposite is right or true. All perceptions are true because falsification is impossible.

Subjective perceptions, by their very nature, cannot be disputed. Since we have neither

access to other people's perspectives nor to what these refer to, we can make no meaningful

statements. As a result, all communication is reduced to the art of persuasion.

3. In Protagoras' view, Relativism implies the inviolability of individual perspectives.

The Sophists replace the objectivity of Presocratic world views and their weak notion of

subjectivity with radical and uncompromising subjectivity. Protagoras holds that 'Man

is measure of all things, of those things that are, that they are, and of those things

that are not, that they are not. '63 Although the meaning of this fragment has been

debated from the Fifth Century up to the present day64 , it is now widely agreed that

60Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 19, p. 186 61 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 17, p. 186 62Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought fr. 25, p. 187 63Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, DK 1, p. 171 64See Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 17lff.

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 27

man refers to each individual rather than mankind as a single entity. 65 As opposed to the

Presocratics, Protagoras is not concerned with the existence of things but with the way

things are, i.e. their predicates. The existence of things is not uniform and cannot be

universally determined. Things exist because we perceive them, i.e. they exist through

our perception rather than having an existence independent of us. Things are as we

perceive them, both qualitatively and temporally speaking. Things exist for as long as

they are being perceived, and they have the qualities that we perceive them to have.

However, Presocratics and Sophists have a distinct view of subjectivity. For the

Sophists, both sense perception and thinking are inherently linked to the individual sub­

ject, i.e. the person who perceives something or thinks about something. This view

contrasts with the Presocratics' rather simplistic conception of subjectivity.

The Presocratics do not seem to acknowledge that the subjective perceptions of indi­

viduals may differ. Instead, they establish an opposition between rational thinking and

subjective (sense) perception as such. In their view, the world is in flux: things come into

being, change and perish. This perception is subjective since it is the result of our human

capacity. However, it does not necessarily bear a relation to the objects we perceive.

Solely our minds can grasp the truth, which is objective because it lies within the objects

of perception.

Parmenides introduces a slightly different form of Subjectivism to Presocratic thinking.

His philosophy is based on the assumption that Being and Not-Being are determined by

what we as human beings can or cannot think. Hence the existential make-up of the world

cannot be understood without reference to our Being (we need to exist in order to think)

and our capacity (we need to think for things to exist). Parmenides' Subjectivism is

similar to pre-Parmenidan Subjectivism in that it refers to human beings as such without

considering different individual perspectives. At the same time, it differs from other

Presocratic views because subjectivity is inherently linked to our Being.

Challenging these rather simplistic ideas, the Sophists assert that the subjective per­

ception of things pertains to the individual. Two people can have: (i) different perceptions

of the same thing(s); (ii) different perceptions of different thing(s); (iii) the same percep­

tion of the same thing(s); or (iv) the same perception of different thing(s). Even if two

65 See Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 86

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 28

people have the same perception of a thing, this does not prove the existence or the

specific qualities of this thing. There is no causal relationship between what we see and

what is. The true reality of things cannot be established by perception. We do not know

whether there is such a thing as a true reality of things; and if there is, what it is and

what relationship it bears to sense perception.

The fundamental difference between the Presocratic and the Sophist approach is that

unlike the Sophists, the Presocratics do not seem to regard the potential disparity be­

tween individual sense perceptions as important. In their view sense perception is a

general aspect of human capacity which produces a more or less homogenous picture of

the natural world. The Sophists, on the other hand, emphasise the individual nature of

sense perception.

We therefore argue that the 'weak' form of Subjectivism spelled out in Presocratic

thought is brought to a radical conclusion by the Sophists. Gorgias exploits the flaws of

Parmenidan ideas and by introducing the paradigm of individual perspective changes the

conception of thinking as well as conception of subjects.

2.5 Four pillars make a building

After having examined the different pillars which support the theory of Moral Relativism,

we would now like to demonstrate how these elements, i.e. ontology, epistemology, Rel­

ativism and Subjectivism, relate to the overall framework of Moral Relativism. Just as

a house is more than a number of columns held together by a roof, Moral Relativism

transcends its individual components. It is a philosophical framework, which prescribes

how to make sense of the world.

In order to understand this framework, we have traced its roots in Presocratic thinking.

We proceed from the assumption that new ideas develop from previous ideas. Whether

new ideas imply a rejection, refutation or reinforcement of prevailing ideas or whether

they can transcend their origins, they inherently refer to the ideas they originate from.

The contextualisation of Sophist thinking is therefore crucial to our understanding of the

philosophical foundations of Moral Relativism.

Moral Relativism is the Sophist response to Presocratic ontology and epistemology.

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 29

This response is multi-faceted and can be divided into different interdependent compo­

nents. By eradicating the distinction between Being and Not-Being, the Sophists destroy

the fundamental tenet of post-Parmenidan Presocratic ontology. On the ruins, they build

their own theory which is centred on Epistemological Scepticism. If Not-Being and Being

are identical, nothing meaningful can be said about the existence of things. True knowl­

edge is impossible and individual claims compete with one another. In the light of this,

questions like What is there? and What can we know about it? are no longer relevant.

What begins as a deconstruction of Presocratic ontology eventually culminates in the re­

jection of ontology altogether. The Epistemological Scepticism produced by this rejection

leads to Relativism, which the Sophists apply not only to the sphere of knowledge but

also to the world of morals. If there is no single truth, there can be no universal morality

either. Experience reveals that moral norms differ from polis to polis and from culture

to culture. And neither the gods nor science nor in fact philosophy can provide one with

universal standards to guide one's actions. What is Right and what is Wrong must be

determined individually.

2. Presocratic thought and Moral Relativism 30

Chapter 3

3.1 Background

The influence of Sophist

philosophy on Athenian

foreign policy during

the Peloponnesian War

Our analysis of the relationship between Sophist philosophy and Realist Athenian policy

seeks to address two questions. How does the intellectual environment influence the realm

of politics? Is there a direct link between philosophical concepts and public policies?

We will show that Sophist philosophy provides the intellectual foundations for Political

Realism. In fact, we will argue that Political Realism is the political response to Sophist

philosophy. Within the realm of politics, Realism gives an answer to the fundamental

question Sophist epistemology confronts us with: how do we make sense of the world

knowing that there are no absolute values to rely upon? In a world in which true knowledge

is unattainable, there are no universal values to guide our actions. Without objective

standards as a frame of reference, various subjective perspectives compete with each

other. Nothing is absolute: everything is relative.

What are the political implications of this world view? The History of the Pelopon­

nesian War by Thucydides illustrates how the Athenians apply Sophist Epistemological

Scepticism to the political sphere. Athens uses the multiplicity of meaning established

by the Sophists as an instrument of power. In theory, the perspectives of different states

perspectives may coexist; but in reality, different world views compete for superiority. In

the end, how the stronger party interprets reality will prevail. As an imperial superpower,

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 32

Athens can both portray her own views as universally valid and assert them through the

use of force. The History of the Peloponnesian War demonstrates how Athens uses both

methods to force her Might is Right doctrine upon inferior states.

In Athens, the political interpretation of Sophist philosophy has three dimensions.

First, there is the dominant role of self-interest in politics. In the absence of absolute

values, relative values prevail. And with the self as the only valid frame of reference,

individuals and states make judgements relative to themselves. It logically follows that a

state's policies are primarily determined by self-interest. Secondly, the lack of a frame of

reference has implications for morality. If there is no universal morality, moral judgements

only reflect particular interests. Rhetoric and physical force serve as tools to reinforce

these interests. Third, without true knowledge, one is forced to be guided by experience

only. On the basis of our experience of the world, we can determine the laws of nature

on which we ought to act as a matter of prudence.

In this chapter we illustrate how philosophy and politics are intertwined in Athenian

foreign policy. We will contrast Sophist fragments with Athenian political speeches. At

the beginning of his History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides explains the origin of

these speeches:

In this history I have made use of set speeches some of which were delivered just before and others

during the war. I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches

which I listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my

method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were

actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation.66

Whether or not Thucydides' speeches are entirely accurate is not crucial. What is

important is that for him, they are representative of Athenian attitudes towards foreign

policy. In this respect, we side with Connor, who argues:

Modern scholars have sometimes contended that the speeches are practically free compositions

by Thucydides himself, with no basis in historical fact. Yet many of the speeches are carefully

drawn and even individualized - suggesting that Thucydides not only mastered the situation

sufficiently to know what arguments would be necessary, but also knew his characters well

66Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.22.1-8

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 33

enough to determine the style and approach they would use... My disposition is to admit that

Thucydides normally kept as close as he could to the general line of approach of a speaker, even

though he had to guess about the exact wording.67

For our discussion, the degree of accuracy is not as relevant as the underlying political

attitudes and principles revealed by the speeches. Our aim is to understand Athenian

foreign policy as crystallised in Thucydides' speeches assuming that 'by means of his

speeches Thucydides places a situation in a larger perspective, connecting the present

with the past and the future but also relating specific decisions to overriding interests,

general rules, or basic political principles. '68

3.2 How Athens instrumentalises Sophist philosophy

to shape the international system

3.2.1 Subjectivism and self-interest

Protagoras' philosophy is the cornerstone of Subjectivism. He asserts that 'Man is the

measure of all things, of those things that are, that they are, and of those things that

are not, that they are not. '69 In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates interprets this doctrine

as follows: 'Socrates: Then does he [Protagoras] mean something like this, that as each

thing appears to me, so it is to me, and as it appears to you, so it is to you - you and

I being "man"? Theaetetus: Yes, that is what he means. '70 We as individuals are the

ultimate arbitrators of both the existence and of the properties of things. Each of us

creates his or her own reality which is beyond anyone's reach. What I hold to be true

may very well be untrue for someone else and vice versa. There is thus no point in trying

to reconcile different perspectives; we simply have to deal with the fact that we interpret

reality differently. Self-interest is thus a corollary of Subjectivism. In a world where

people know only their individual perspective; they have no reason to pursue any ends

67W.R. Connor, The New Politicians Of Fifth-Century Athens (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Com-

pany, 1992), p. 95 68Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment, p. 32 69Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 15, p. 186 70Plato, Theaetetus translated by M.J. Levett (Glasgow, University of Glasgow Press, 1977), 152a7-10

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 34

but their own.

The Athenians apply this Subjectivism to the political sphere. They equate Protago­

ras' 'man' with the state and compare each man's self-interest to a state's self-interest.

Since Relativism induces individuals and states alike to consider only their own inter­

est, the Athenians regard self-interest as the prime motivational force behind a state's

policies. In the Fifth Century, this idea becomes the central tenet of Athenian policy

and sets new standards in international relations. Thus Sophist philosophy serves as an

intellectual foundation as well as a justification for Athenian policy. The History of the

Peloponnesian War illustrates how Athens spreads the paradigm of self-interest through­

out the Greek World. Guthrie notes how seldom the orators of Thucydides, who aim to

persuade, see any point in appealing to considerations or right, justice or other normally

accepted moral standards: 'it is taken for granted that only an appeal to self-interest is

likely to succeed.m At the Debate at Camarina, which takes place in 415/4 BCE, the

Athenians claim that ultimately, people follow their own interests: 'We know that when

people are frightened and suspicious they enjoy for the moment an argument that fits in

with their feelings, but in the end, when it comes to the point, they act in accordance

with their interests. >72 In the Athenian view, rational thinking requires people to act in

their self-interest; any other course of action would be irrational.

The same holds for states. In international relations, it is reasonable for states to

pursue their self-interest since it is the only way to secure their safety. In fact, it appears

that for the Athenians, the state's need of security justifies any policy: they assert that

'no one can be blamed for looking after his own safety in his own way. '73 The superior

importance of security is written into the relations between Greek city states. Once it

has been established that acting in one's own interest is rational, states inevitably expect

other states to pursue only their own interest. And since it is taken for granted that the

self-interests of different states are per se irreconcilable, every state is forced to pursue its

interests at any cost not to put its security in jeopardy.

These ideas are reflected in the Melian Dialogue (416/5 BCE), in which the Athenians

71 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 85 72Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.83.15-19 73Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.83.10-11

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 35

assert that leaving the path of self-interest involves unnecessary dangers: 'You seem to

forget that if one follows one's self-interest one wants to be safe, whereas the path of

justice and honour involves one in danger. '74 By giving relative/subjective values (i.e.

self-interest), priority over universal values such as justice, the Athenians remain faithful

to Sophist philosophy. At the same time, they make a clear distinction between the

rules that apply to international relations and those valid for domestic politics. In the

Mytilenian Debate ( 427 BCE), the Athenian politician Diodotus, who holds that it would

be in Athens' best interest not to destroy the Mytilenians, says: 'this is not a law-court,

where we have to consider what is fit and just; it is a political assembly, and the question

is how Mytilene can be most useful to Athens. '75 In his view, the decisions of a political

assembly should not be confused with the rulings of a court of law. Whereas the latter are

supposed to bring about justice, the former cannot be expected to meet moral standards.

On the contrary, they are driven by expediency. This is emphasised by Diodotus earlier

in his speech:

The question is not so much whether they [the Mytilenians] are guilty as whether we are making

the right decision for ourselves. I might prove that they are the most guilty people in the world,

but it does not follow that I shall propose the death penalty, unless that is in your interests; I

might argue that they deserve to be forgiven, but should not recommend forgiveness unless that

seemed to me the best thing for the state. 76

This statement exemplifies how Realist policies combine Relativism with expediency.

What is Right and what is Wrong is relative to the state's interest. Any other standards

such as just desert or proportionality are subordinated to this one criterion.

However, despite their conviction that states are justified in pursuing policies of self­

interest, the Athenians recognise that the extent to which states can actually realise their

interests depends on their power position. During the Debate at Camarina (415/4 BCE),

Euphemus, an Athenian representative, suggests that the greater a state's power, the more

ruthless its pursuit of self-interest. 'When a man or a city exercises absolute power the

logical course is the course of self-interest, and ties of blood exist only when they can be

74Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.107.1-3 75Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.44.18-20 76Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.44.3-9

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 36

relied upon; one must choose one's friends and enemies according to the circumstances on

each particular occasion. 777 . In this view, states have no obligations to other states. Even

when they enter into relations with one another, they do it purely out of self-interest.

However, how can we explain the existence of alliances? Do they not prove that the

common interest of states can override their distinct self-interests? Thucydides, describing

the forces gathered in Sicily to either conquer or to defend the island, provides a negative

answer to that notion. He claims: 'They stood together not because of any moral principle

or racial connection; it was rather because of the various circumstances of interest or of

compulsion in each particular case. '78 Thucydides then lists the various parties involved

and explains their respective motivations for supporting one side rather than the other.

As it turns out, ethnic ties are a factor in some cases but insignificant in others, many

states are compelled to serve in an alliance, and some receive pay or expect quick personal

profits from it. In addition to these rather pragmatic reasons, Thucydides also mentions

goodwill, friendship and hatred as grounds for joining an alliance. He shows that although

the circumstances of interest differ in each case, all states act according to what is in their

best interest. Even states which are forced to support others do so because the penalty

of not complying is worse than submitting.

Now that we have explored the Athenian view of the supreme importance of self­

interest in politics, it is useful to ask to what extent this dogma is shared by other

Greek city states. In fact, the Athenian approach to international relations meets fierce

resistance by other poleis. Their criticism, however, has a very limited impact on Athenian

policy and the paradigms of international relations established by Athens. The fact that

other states have no choice but to deal with the self interest paradigm demonstrates the

Athenian control of the international agenda. States joining the discourse on the rights

and wrongs of state behaviour are restricted to the intellectual framework established by

the Athens.

Which alternative approaches to international politics do other states propose? The

Plataeans, after having surrendered their long besieged city to the Spartans, try to con­

vince their vanquishers that state policies need not be informed by self-interest. Since

77Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.85.1-5 78Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 7.57.3-6

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 37

they opposed Xerxes in the Persian Wars, they claim to have been amongst those states

which 'instead of meeting the invasion by acting in the interests of their own safety, chose

the path of daring, of danger, and of honour. '79 However, instead of commending the

Plataeans for jeopardising their safety in the name of Greece, the Spartans threaten to

punish them for having supported the wrong side, namely the Athenians. The Plataeans

protest: 'now we are in fear of losing our lives for this very same conduct, for having

chosen to do the right thing with regard to Athens rather than the profitable thing with

regard to Sparta. Yet the same principles should be made to apply throughout, and it

should be recognised that true policy consists not only in safeguarding one's immediate

interests, but in seeing to it that a brave ally can feel certain of one's gratitude. '80 In the

Plataeans' view, loyalty towards an ally is as important as a state's self-interest. They ask

the Spartans to honour their reliability, rather than condemning it because their course

of action was detrimental to Sparta. But the Spartans refuse to recognise the Plataeans'

ulterior motives. From their perspective, what is relevant is whether Plataea supported

Sparta or Athens. Loyalty in itself is not important; only loyalty to Sparta counts. Their

verdict on Plataean policies is determined by Spartan self-interest only. Each Plataean is

asked 'Have you done anything to help the Spartans and their allies in the war?'81 And

as each man replies 'No', he is put to death immediately.

While the Plataeans refuse to accept the superior role of self-interest in international

relations, the Melians try to uphold universal principles at first but eventually adapt their

reasoning to the Athenian world view: 'since you will not let us mention justice, but tell

us to give in to your interests, we, too, must tell you what our interests are and, if yours

and ours happen to coincide, we must try to persuade you to the fact. '82 The Melians

realise that to confront Athens they need to use Athenian arguments. By submitting to

the logic of self-interest they hope to find common ground between the Athenian and their

own position. These examples show the influence of the Athenian approach to politics

on the relations between Greek poleis. Whether or not states subscribe to the paradigm

of self-interest, when dealing with other powers they have no choice but to cloak their

79Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.56.23-25 80Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.56.27-33 81 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.68.12-13 82 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.98.2-5

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 38

arguments in it.

The discourse on self-interest in the History of the Peloponnesian War reflects the

interplay between Relativism and the power structures of the Greek World. It reveals

that the influence of a policy is inherently linked to the power of those who advocate it.

The Athenians exploit Relativism to justify and to sustain their superiority. They are

convinced that each state is the 'measure of things' and therefore acts in its own interest.

Within a Relativist framework of thinking, this assumption is as valid or as invalid as

any other. But since Athens is in a (power) position to impose her version of the truth

on other states, it becomes the centre of political discourse and state policy in the Greek

world.

As a superpower, it is in Athens' interest to represent what suits herself as a general

rule. Hegemons do not need to be concerned with the demand of other states. In the

Mytilenian Debate in 427 BCE, the Athenian general Cleon characterises the interests of

an imperial power 'To feel pity, to be carried away by the pleasure of hearing a clever

argument, to listen to the claims of decency are three things that are entirely against the

interests of an imperial power.'83 And, as the Athenians would argue, any other state in

their position would act in the same way.

3.2.2 Relativism and the Might is Right doctrine

Our analysis of the impact of Sophist Relativism on the policies pursued in the Pelopon­

nesian War should not be based exclusively on a comparison of philosophical fragments

and political speeches. To understand why certain policies are put in place we also need to

consider the complex system of political forces and power structures in the Greek World:

policies are not made in a vacuum. They are the products of political culture, historical

circumstances, and are instruments of national interest.

As we have suggested above, Athens' power position is the key to an understanding of

the policies pursued in the Peloponnesian War. Athens emerges from the Persian Wars

( 499-448 BCE) as an imperial power capable of shaping the international agenda and

imposing its interests through the use of force. Most importantly, Athenian politicians

83Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.40.9-11

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 39

set the standards of foreign policy and thereby reconstruct the international system in

line with Athenian interests.

We have already discussed how the Athenians translate Sophist Subjectivism and the

self-referential judgements it entails into the dominant role of state interest. We will now

focus our attention on the influence of Relativism on the system of international relations

as a whole.

The law of nature

Sophist Epistemological Scepticism is a reaction to Eleatic ontology. Parmenides realises

that the 'Way of Seeming' is false and yet he maintains that rational thinking will lead us

to the truth. Gorgias and Protagoras radically reject this view; they hold that knowledge is

impossible. Gorgias says: '[Anything you might mention] is nothing; if it were something,

it would be unknowable; and if it were something and knowable, it could not be made

evident to others. '84 Protagoras explores the consequences of Gorgias' Epistemological

Scepticism. He argues that knowledge is relative and private: 'Each thing is to me such

as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you. '85

Without universally valid knowledge we have to act upon assumptions drawn from

experience. Philosophic doubt is counterbalanced by fact-facing pragmatism: as a mea­

sure of prudence, it is reasonable to expect things to remain as they have always been

and people to act as they usually do. As we will see, in the eyes of the Athenians, expe­

rience reveals that the weak have always been ruled by the strong. This observation is

interpreted as a law of nature, which governs not only the relationship between humans

but also the relations between states.

The question whether natural (physis) or man-made laws (nomos) ought to govern

human conduct is widely debated in the Fifth Century. Some of the Sophists are on the

side of physis,

thinking not so much about physis of the physical universe as about the promptings and impulses

that were part of man's organisation as a creature. They were interested in the urges that usually

were repressed by the rules or laws that society imposed... they... deplored or derided the legal

84Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18, p. 206 85Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 17, p. 186

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 40

restraints placed upon human desires to maximise the products of such emotions as greed,

power-hunger, lust and cruelty, all of which seemed to be more probable parts of man's natural

organisation than the agreements to exercise restraint and reasonableness which were laws.86

Burnet describes the wide-ranging consequences that the opposition between nomos and

physis has for morality: 'By ... insisting on the opposition between Law and Nature, they

[the Sophists] tended to do away with the distinction between right and wrong. If that

distinction is not rooted in nature, but depends solely on human laws and institutions,

it is valid only for as long as we choose to recognise it. On the other hand, if we appeal

from human law to a supposed higher law, the law of Nature, all restraint is abolished.'87

Ultimately and paradoxically, it is man who defines what nature's law prescribes: 'so

beginnt der Mensch nun, die Welt aus dem Bewusstsein seiner selbst aufzubauen: An

Stelle der Gottheit ist es der rationale Mensch, der die ethischen Normen gibt, die sich iiber

das positive Recht erheben. Die selbstbewusste Personlichkeit ist Quelle des rationalen

Naturrechts .. .'88 In contradiction with Relativist claims, the Law of Nature is as absolute

as the traditional divine laws: 'da auch die entgotterte Welt des erkenntnistheoretischen

Relativismus ein Absolutes nicht entbehren kann, [wird] bald die Natur gegen das Gesetz,

bald dieses gegen jene ins Feld [ge]fiihrt. '89

For a number of Sophists, however, the requirements of a city's nomoi take precedence

over any supposed Natural Laws. The word nomos may be translated as law, convention

or custom; it is a prescriptive and normative term that refers to the behaviour of humans:

'nomos as law is legally prescribed norm, and nomos as convention is norm prescribed

by convention. '90 Protagoras is the most prominent advocate of the obedience to man­

made laws. In Plato's dialogue named after him, Protagoras tells a myth to demonstrate

that man has an innate capacity to develop and live in a society regulated by laws.

The Anonymous Iamblichi, a fragment of unknown authorship written in a style and on a

subject typical of the Sophist period, claims that 'people cannot live without laws (nomoi)

86H.D. Rankin, Sophists, Socmtics and Cynics (London, Croom Helm, 1983), p. 81 87Burnet, Greek Philosophy - Thales to Plato, p. 122 88V. Ehrenberg, Polis und Imperium (Ziirich, Artemis Verlag, 1965), p. 366 89V. Ehrenberg, Polis und Imperium, p. 367 9°Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 112

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 41

and justice (dike). '91

For the purpose of our analysis, we do not need to further elaborate on this debate

as the main issues will be amply highlighted in the course of our discussion of Athenian

politics.

The Athenian notion of Natural Law is intricately linked to Thrasymachus' view of

justice as expressed in his opening statement in Plato's Republic: 'Justice is nothing other

than the advantage of the stronger. '92 Irrespective of whether or not Plato represents

Thrasymachus' views accurately, what is relevant for us is that he seems to have used

him to represent views which gain considerable currency in Fifth Century Athens.93 It is

debatable whether Thrasymachus' definition of justice represents a moral judgement or a

factual statement. Guthrie defends the latter view convincingly: 'All governments make

laws in their own interest, and call that justice. Those are the facts: praise or blame

does not enter into it.'94 We agree, adding only that though Thrasymachus' declaration

is probably a descriptive statement, it can easily be turned into a prescriptive one, as is

demonstrated by the Athenians. This is the point of intersection between fact and value.

Experience provides us with (historical) facts (i.e. the weak are ruled by the strong) but

it is our interpretation of these facts that turns them into value judgments (i.e. Might is

Right). And this is exactly what Callicles, a central character in Plato's Gorgias does.

Apart from his appearance in this dialogue Callicles has left no trace in recorded history.

He is represented by Plato as a young aspiring Athenian politician who hosts Sophists in

is house but is not a Sophist himself. In his opinion, justice is expressed in nature: 'But

I believe that nature itself reveals that it is just for the better man to have a larger share

than the worse, and the more powerful than the less powerful. This is clearly shown to

be so everywhere, both for the other animals and for whole cities and tribes of human

beings: that justice has been decided in this way, for the better man to rule the worse and

91 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 7, p. 295 92Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 3, p. 255. It is widely agreed that this

particular statement most likely represents the position held by the historical Thrasymachus. However,

the same cannot be said of Plato's representation of his ideas in the rest of dialogue. See Kerferd, Sophistic

Movement, p. 120ff. 93J. Beversluis, Cross-Examining Socrates (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 222 94Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 93

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 42

to have a larger share. '95 For Callicles, nature provides man with normative prescriptions

for human life. 'That which nature reveals not only is but must be... That which is

discovered in the laws of actual events is established as a law of necessity in the sphere of

individual and social ethic. '96 For Thrasymachus it is a fact that the strong rule, whereas

Callicles believes that it would be right for them to rule. He holds that human laws are

made by a majority of the weak.

Conventions, on the other hand, are made, in my opinion, by the weaklings who form the

majority of mankind. They establish them and apportion praise and blame with an eye to

themselves and their own interests, and in an endeavour to frighten those who are stronger and

capable of getting the upper hand they say that taking an excess of things is shameful and wrong,

and that wrongdoings consist in trying to have more than others; being inferior themselves, they

are content, no doubt, if they can stand on an equal footing with their betters. That is why by

convention an attempt to have more than the majority is said to be wrong and shameful, and

men call it wrongdoing; nature, on the other hand, herself demonstrates, I believe, that it is

right that the better man should have more than the worse and the stronger than the weaker. 97

Both Thrasymachus and Callicles believe that the nomoi of a polis are made by a dom­

inant, self-interested party. In line with Callicles, Antiphon contrasts nomos with the

requirements of physis in the following way:

For the requirements of the laws are supplemental but the requirements of nature are necessary;

and the requirements of the laws are by agreement and not natural, whereas the requirements

of nature are natural and not by agreement. Thus someone who violates the laws avoids shame

and punishment if those who have joined in agreement do not notice him, but not if they do.

But if someone tries to violate one of the inherent requirements of nature, which is impossible,

the harm he suffers is no less if he is seen by no one, and no greater if all see him; for he is

harmed not in reputation but in truth. I enquire into these things for the following reason, that

most things that are just according to law are inimical to nature. 98

95Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 2, pp. 310-11 96 Untersteiner, The Sophists, p. 330 97Plato, Gorgias translated by W. Hamilton and C. Emlyn-Jones (London, Penguin Books, 2004),

483b4-dl 98 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 7, p. 245

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 43

Antiphon associates nature with truth. As long as he follows the requirements of nature,

man is true to himself. Ultimately, this implies a rejection of life in the polis, which

is structured by man-made laws: 'So riChtet sich der egoistische Wille des Individuums

gegen den Nomos, aus dem hemmungslosen Utilitarismus des Einzelmenschen erwachst

die Theorie, welche die vollige Verneinung der Polis bedeutet. '99 Callicles' and Antiphon's

advocacy of the supremacy of nature provides the intellectual foundations for the Might

is Right doctrine.

Though it is reasonable for the Athenians to adopt this particular view of Natural

Law, this does not apply to weaker city states. They do not see why it would be just for

them to serve the interests of the stronger. Hence they dispute the validity of Athens'

experience and protest against the value judgements that result from it.

The first notion of a Natural Law surfaces at the very beginning of the History of the

Peloponnesian War. In 432 BCE, Sparta summons her allies to debate whether Athens

has acted aggressively and broken her treaties with Sparta. After various complaints

against Athens have been voiced, the Athenian representatives come forward to defend

their city's policies:

We have done nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in accepting an empire

when it was offered to us and then in refusing to give it up. Three very powerful motives prevent

us from doing so - security, honour and self-interest. And we were not the first to act in this

way. Far from it. It has always been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong; and

besides, we consider that we are worthy of our power. Up till the present moment you, too,

used to think that we were; but now, after beginning to calculate your own interest, you are

beginning to talk in terms of right and wrong. Considerations of this kind have never yet turned

people aside from the opportunities of aggrandizement offered by superior strength. Those who

really deserve praise are the people who, while human enough to enjoy power, nevertheless pay

more attention to justice than they are compelled to do by their situation. 100

It is noteworthy that at this point, the Athenians do not speak of a Law of Nature yet but

merely point out that their actions agree with human nature and with the rule that the

weak should be subject to the strong. Their emphasis on the facts of nature is enforced

99Ehrenberg, Polis und Imperium, p. 372 100Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.76.9-23

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 44

by rejecting considerations of justice. From Athens' perspective, and this is reminiscent

of Callicles' views, value-talk is a rhetorical instrument employed by the weaker party

because it cannot pursue its aims through the use of power. For states strong enough

to overcome any resistance, morality is secondary. This is re-emphasised later in the

speech; when international relations are described in the following way: 'the fact being, of

course, that where force can be used there is no need to bring in the law. '101 Although the

Athenians pride themselves on treating their allies fairly by settling disputes over contracts

in impartial law courts, they nevertheless stress that it would be in their power to resolve

these quarrels by force. Departures from this rule do not change this fundamental truth;

on the contrary, they reinforce it. The fact that Athens chooses to treat her subjects as

equals102 is a reflection of her power. Despite the Athenians' attempt to gain credit for

what they see as benevolent rule, both their allies and enemies are well aware that Athens

does not hesitate to reach her aims by force if she needs to.

Though the Athenians represent the requirements of nature as universal, this does

not prevent them from criticising other states for their power-induced behaviour. In the

Mytilenian Debate in 427 BCE, Cleon reproaches the Mytilenians for taking sides with

Athens' enemies and for acting with calculated aggression. In his eyes the Mytilenians,

'made up their minds to put might first and right second, choosing the moment when they

thought they would win, and then making their unprovoked attack upon us. '103 Although

the Athenians justify their own courses of action with Might is Right arguments, they

do not consider them valid for weaker states. According to Cleon, the right policy for

Mytilene would have been not to revolt from Athens who has treated her subject 'with

the greatest consideration.llD4 The Mytilenian Debate reveals the ways in which Athenian

politicians use Relativism to their own advantage. The purpose of the Might is Right

doctrine is to justify Athenian policies; it is only valid for whom and for as long as Athens

pleases. The more powerful can determine what is right, and they are the only ones who

can legitimately put might first. In that sense, Mytilene's revolt is wrong because it harms

Athenian interests and since Mytilene is weaker than Athens, the Mytilenians have no

101Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.77.7-8 102Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.77 103Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.39.20-23 104Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.39.9-10

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 45

right to put might first.

In the Melian Dialogue ( 416/5 BCE), which Guthrie calls 'the most famous example

of amoral realism' 105, Athenian advocacy of the Law of Nature reaches its climax. It is

difficult to believe that such a dialogue actually took place as 'the setting and the nature

of the brief exchanges of arguments are intrinsically unconvincing as the descriptions of

an incident. We cannot be absolutely certain that the actual negotiations did not assume

some like or comparable form; but it is most improbable. '106 However, Kennedy ought to

be quoted at length in order to explicate the undisputed significance of the dialogue:

The dialogue performs no practical, political function, but that does not necessarily prove its

lack of historicity, for its function in Thucydides' work, and perhaps in fact, was intellectual.

Things must be talked out first, an attempt at persuasion must be made, the events must be

understood, there must be no doubt that expediency is in operation ... He wrote it to explain the

incident of Melos and to express the specific truth for the comprehension of future readers. 107

At the beginning of the dialogue the Athenians advise the islanders to adjust their

policies to their power position: 'we recommend that you should try to get what is possible

for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really think; since you know as

well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of

justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what

they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.'108 At the

debate at Sparta in 432 BCE, the Athenians have claimed that it is only human to enjoy

power. In Melos, they represent the maximisation of power as the ultimate goal of foreign

policy. In their view, it is a fact that the strong exploit their power to the full and this is

how it should be. This attitude echoes Callicles' perspective on self-gratification:

For how can a man be happy who is in subjection to anyone whoever? I tell you frankly that

what is fine and right by nature consists in this: that the man who is going to live as a man

ought should encourage his appetites to be as strong as possible instead of repressing them,

and be able by means of his courage and intelligence to satisfy them in all their intensity by

105 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 85 106Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, p. 116 107G. Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 50 108Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.89.8-14

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 46

providing them with whatever they happen to desire.109

What at first appears to be a description of reality (i.e. the weak have always been ruled

by the strong) in fact carries a prescriptive meaning (i.e. therefore, the weak should be

ruled by the strong).

The Athenian emphasis on the conduct of 'practical people' and on the 'power to

compel' reveals their Realist attitude. In their eyes, international relations are neither

determined by values nor by universal laws; the outcome of disputes is solely decided by

power. This Law of Nature is not primordial; it expresses the facts of life.

Towards the end of the dialogue, the Athenians finally reveal the origin of their Might

is Right paradigm:

Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men lead us to conclude that it is a general and

necessary law of nature to rule whatever one can. This is not a law that we made ourselves, nor

were we the first to act upon it when it was made. We found it already in existence, and we shall

leave it to exist for ever among those who come after us. We are merely acting in accordance

with it, and we know that you or anybody else with the same power as ours would be acting in

precisely the same way. 110

The initial argument of human nature ('our knowledge of men') is now complemented by

a reference to the divine ('our opinion of the gods'). This is not new: associating universal

laws with the divine has a tradition in Greek thought. For Heraclitus, all human laws

are nourished by the logos, the one divine law of the universe: 'Those who speak with

intelligence must stand firm by that which is common to all, as a state stands by the law,

and even more firmly. For all human laws are in the keeping of the one divine law; for

the one divine law has as much power as it wishes, is an unfailing defence for all laws,

and prevails over all laws. '111

The Athenian reference to the divine is also a response to the Melians' earlier claim that

the gods will support them because they stand for 'what is right against what is wrong. ' 112

Turning to the gods for support of specific policies or military campaigns is common

109Plato, Gorgias, 491e5-492a4 110Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.105.4-12 111 Waterfield, The First Philosophers, F12, p.39 112Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.104.4-5

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 47

practice amongst the Greeks. When the Spartans are about to invade Epidaurus in 419-8

BCE, they turn back at the border because their frontier sacrifices are unfavourable. 113

Omens and oracles guide Greek warfare at all times. Classical armies employ highly paid

soothsayers to consult the gods every step of the way. An army cannot move from home or

camp, cross a river or engage in combat until it is declared that the signs are favourable.

War is banned from sacred places as well as during sacred periods; armies are supposed to

stay clear of temple precincts and estates. However, religion is often cynically exploited

and its rules stretched to suit military ambitions. 114 Ultimately, military commanders can

override religious concerns with an appeal to patriotism, glory or necessity - piety and

expediency are effectively combined. 115 Against this background, it is not surprising that

the Athenians deem it appropriate to endow the Law of Nature with divine approval.

By representing the Law of Nature as necessary, Athenian thinking betrays the in­

fluence on ethics of the natural sciences of the day. Necessity as a cosmological force

runs through Presocratic thought, in the Western tradition (Parmenides, Empedocles,

the Pythagoreans) with almost mystical or theological overtones, but in Ionian Rational­

ism it appears as a mindless natural force. This association of necessity with nature is

used as an argument by the opponents of customary laws, which they represent as an

attempt to thwart natural forces that is rightly doomed to failure. 116

However, it is clear that the Athenians consider neither nature's nor divine support as

essential. Despite the fact that they appeal to something beyond themselves, i.e. expe­

rience, the necessities of nature and the divine, it is clear that ultimately, it is their own

interpretation that matters ('our opinion ... and our knowledge ... lead us to conclude').

The Athenians establish their version of reality as a universal truth claiming that they did

not make this 'general and necessary law of nature' themselves. However, they know that

given the self-interested behaviour of states, only the powerful will choose to act according

to the Law of Nature because they profit from it. The Law of Nature will prevail because

both the weak and the strong act in accordance with it: the strong do so because it is

profitable and the weak are forced into compliance.

113Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.55 114H. van Wees, Greek Warfare - Myths and Realities (London, Duckworth, 2004), p. 119/20 115van Wees, Greek Warfare- Myths and Realities, p. 121 116 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 100

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 48

In the Fifth Century, the various written laws of different cities and cultures contrast

with unwritten laws, which are either attributed to the divine or to the forces of nature.

What the Athenians represent as a Law of Nature falls into the category of unwritten

laws. By ascribing the Law of Nature both to the gods and to nature, they hope to

endow it with as much authority as possible. In Rhetoric, Aristotle distinguishes between

particular and common laws, which he defines as follows:

There are two kinds of law, one particular and one common. By particular laws I mean those

determined by each people in relation to themselves, and these again are divided into written

and unwritten; by laws that are common I mean those in accordance with nature. For in fact

there is a common idea of what is just and unjust in accordance with nature, which all men

divine to some extent, even if there is neither sharing in it nor agreement between them.117

The Athenian understanding of the Law of Nature corresponds to Aristotle's definition

of a common law. In the Melian Dialogue, for example, the Athenians try to convince

the islanders that the Natural Law is universal. They use the idea of a Natural Law

that supposedly expresses 'a common idea of what is just and unjust in accordance with

nature', to conceal that their Might is Right policy cannot claim universal validity but are

in fact an unwritten particular law, 'determined by each people in relation to themselves'.

As Jaeger points out,

by making the Athenians justify the right of the stronger through the law of nature, and trans­

form God from the guardian of justice into the pattern of all earthly authority and force, Thucy­

dides gives the realistic policy of Athens the depth and validity of a philosophical doctrine ...

The principle of force forms a realm of its own, with laws of its own, neither abolishing the

traditional nomos nor admitting its superiority, but simply distinct and separate from it.118

In the non-philosophical practical sphere, the dichotomy between nomos and physis is re­

placed by a more complex relationship. Backed by military might, the Athenians establish

their own interpretation of how force and justice interact: when two powers are equally

strong, justice prevails. When unequal powers confront each other, justice is brought

about by force. Thus the Athenians dissolve the contrast between nomos and physis:

117 Aristotle, Rhetoric, 137b4-9 cited by Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 113 118W. Jaeger, Paideia vol.! (Oxford, Gilbert Highet, 1939) quoted by Untersteiner, The Sophists, p.

324

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 49

both justice and force become nomoi of physis. As Rankin observes,

we entertain belief about the gods; whereas about mankind we can be certain ... Note that the

word used by the Athenians for "the gods" is not the personalised plural, but the abstract to

theion "that which is divine", or "the divine". It is impersonal, conceptualised, uninterested.

And as a cosmic influence it is all the more easily associated with the "necessary impulse of

nature" that urges mankind towards domination. The phrase used by Thucydides to describe

this urge is physis anankaia, "compelling or compulsive nature" - a phrase which matches the

seemingly paradox "law of nature" nomos physeos of Gorgias. Aggression is the activating

principle not merely of human nature, but also of probably divine nature and cosmic nature. 119

It has been convincingly argued120 that given the historical circumstances of Athens'

position at the outset of the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians would not have acted any less

ruthless without Sophist arguments to support their course of action. In 416 BCE Athens

has been at war for 15 years, and the loss and hardship caused influence her policies.

However,

By casting this description of the opposed interests of the two contending parties in so distinctly a

sophist mould, Thucydides informs us of the theoretical support given by sophistry, an offshoot

of the highest Hellenic culture, to deeds of unconscionable barbarism... only arguments of

expediency are relevant. The fact that the fate of real people is under discussion (it is not

mere talk in some rich Athenian's house) brings the "Melian Dialogue" to an intense pitch of

tragedy. 121

The Athenian line of argument is the ultimate fusion of Relativism with Realism: What

is expedient for Athens is represented as universally just with reference to a purportedly

Natural Law. The Melian Dialogue epitomises the skill with which Athens applies Sophist

Relativism to the political sphere.

The role of power in international relations

The idea that the relations between states are determined primarily by their power rela­

tionship is at the heart of Political Realism and a recurring theme in Thucydides' History

119Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, p. 120 120Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, p. 120 121 Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, p. 121

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 50

of the Peloponnesian War. If power structures are the defining feature of international

relations, how are they established? In the Debate at Sparta in 432 BCE, the Athenians

provide an answer to this question. Defending the empire they gained in the course of the

Persian Wars, they argue that power structures are produced by the interplay of historical

circumstances and state policies:

We did not gain this empire by force. It came to us at a time when you [the Spartans] were

unwilling to fight on to the end against the Persians. At this time our allies came to us of

their own accord and begged us to lead them. It was the actual course of events which first

compelled us to increase our power to its present extent: fear of Persia was our chief motive,

though afterwards we thought, too, of our own honour and our own interest. 122

All states seek to increase their influence. They seize every opportunity to improve their

power status and are sometimes compelled by the circumstances to augment their power.

Power is a relative concept which expresses the relationship between states; it can either

be forcefully gained by the stronger party or peacefully ceded by the weaker. Athens

alleges that her allies have asked for her leadership and willingly ceded some of their

power. Given that these states hope to be protected by Athens, it is in their best interest

to do so; the urge to survive overrides all other considerations.

For the Athenians, power is a zero-sum-game; which means that the power one state

gains another one (or more) inevitably looses. This view is also held by Critias who

regards strength as a relative concept: 'Those who live close by are not sorry to see a

neighbour engaged in factional strife: if weaker, they will be less likely to be subjected

to their rule; if of equal strength, they will become relatively stronger; and if already

stronger, they can now subject them more easily. '123 In this logic, Athens' post-Persian

Wars supremacy is made possible by Sparta's weakness and inevitably results in Spartan

inferiority. As a consequence of Sparta's unwillingness to continue fighting against the

Persians, Athens seizes the opportunity to take on the leadership of the Greek World.

The Spartans are well aware that their rival's power increase is equivalent to their own

loss of power; hence they attempt to de-legitimise Athens' ascendancy.

Given that states see the conflict over power as a zero-sum game, international relations

122Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1. 75.4-10 123 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 26, p. 270

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 51

are characterised by fierce competition between states and a ruthless race to the top.

Critias' writings give us an idea of the hostile political environment of the Fifth Century.

His advocacy of war reveals the fierceness of the power struggle in the Greek World:

I will show you it is good to heed those who are urging war, and second that it is necessary.

If we knew how to recognise powers that are by nature hostile to this land, we would have

recognised them and taken precautions before suffering any harm; we would have used every

device to render them weaker and ourselves stronger, understanding that a power that is hostile

by nature will remain peaceful only if it is unable to inflict harm. 124

During the debate on the Sicilian Expedition in 415 BCE, Alcibiades, one of the

designated Athenian commanders, argues accordingly: 'The fact is that we have reached

a stage where we are forced to plan new conquests and forced to hold on to what we

have got, because there is a danger that we ourselves may fall under the power of others

unless others are in our power. '125 Power is dynamic; it fluctuates between power holders.

Rival states have to assess their power status permanently to further expand their power.

One state's might is another state's impotence. State power is challenged constantly and

needs to be safeguarded against outside threats. In order to prevent subjugation, states

conquer their adversaries pre-emptively. The more power a state has, the more energy its

leaders need to invest in maintaining the status quo.

In the Melian Dialogue (416/5 BCE), the Athenians explain why an imperial power

has to display strength permanently: 'those who still preserve their independence do so

because they are strong, and [that) if we fail to attack them it is because we are afraid.

So that by conquering you we shall increase not only the size but the security of our

empire. We rule the sea and you are islanders, and weaker islanders too than the others;

it is therefore particularly important that you should not escape. '126 The mightier the

subdued state, the more Athens gains in reputation and in power. If a supreme power

like Athens misses an opportunity for aggrandizement, this is seen as a sign of weakness.

Supremacy is the ultimate goal of foreign policy. Sometimes it is more expedient

for Athens to set up alliances than to use force. In the Dispute over Corcyra in 433

124Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 26, p. 268 125Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.18.19-22 126Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.97.2-8

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 52

BCE, the Corcyraeans try to convince Athens that an alliance with their island would

be in their self-interest: 'Your [Athens'] aim, no doubt, should be, if it were possible,

to prevent anyone else having a navy at all: the next best thing is to have on your

side the strongest navy that there is.' 127 Alliances are based on considerations of power

and common interest. Instead of building on mutual trust, they rely on fear. This is a

consequence of the permanent state of war in the international sphere, which negatively

shapes a state's perception of other states and makes fear a prime motive of foreign policy.

During the Revolt of Mytilene in 428-7 BCE, the ambassadors of the Lesbian city

describe the characteristics of their alliance with Athens in the following words: 'And in

an alliance the only safe guarantee is an equality of mutual fear; for then the party that

wants to break faith is deterred by the thought that the odds will not be on his side.' 128

Further on, they add: 'In most cases goodwill is the basis of loyalty, but in our case fear

was the bond, and it was more through terror than through friendship that we were held

together in alliance. And the alliance was certain to be broken at any moment by the first

side that felt confident that this would be a safe move to make. '129 For states to enter

an alliance, the fear on the other side has to be equally strong for both partners. If there

is an imbalance of fear, the stronger party will eventually break the alliance. Since each

party waits for the other to grow weaker, alliances are unstable and temporary by nature.

Van Wees draws a slightly different picture of alliances among Greek states in the Fifth

Century. He believes that the success and durability of an alliance depends on the shared

interests and the genuine goodwill of both sides. However, he agrees that when interests

change or good intentions evaporate, an alliance is liable to be abandoned quite quickly,

since few states are both able and willing to keep reluctant allies in line by force. Those

who try, like the Athenians, are resented as 'tyrants'. 130

The level of fear a state induces in other states is the best indicator of its power status.

At the Debate at Sparta in 432 BCE, the Corinthians characterise Sparta's foreign policy

in this way: 'You Spartans are the only people in Hellas who wait calmly on events,

127Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.35.27-30 128Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.11.7-10 129Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.12.6-11 130van Wees, Greek Warfare Myths and Realities, p. 15

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 53

relying for your defence not on action but on making people think that you will act. '131

While the Corinthians claim that this policy will ultimately fail to safeguard the city's

security, the Spartan king Archidamus holds that deterrence is the key to a state's power

status. Once a state has demonstrated its power and incited fear amongst its allies and

enemies alike, it does not necessarily have to use military force to prevent aggression.

States regularly instrumentalise fear in order to keep their enemies at bay. At the

launching of the Sicilian Expedition in 415 BCE, Nicias, the Athenian commander, sug­

gests that inducing fear in the Sicilians is more effective than conquering the island:

The best way for us to make ourselves feared by the Hellenes in Sicily is not to go there at all;

and the next best thing is to make a demonstration of our power and then, after a short time,

go away again. We all know that what is most admired is what is farthest off and least liable to

have its reputation put to the test; and if anything went wrong with us, they would immediately

look down on us and join our enemies here in attacking us. 132

When a state is too weak to defeat an enemy, calculated demonstrations of power may pro­

duce a sufficient level of fear to avoid open conflict. The psychological instrumentalisation

of fear is as powerful a weapon as real military strength.

As a consequence, fear can effectively produce a more stable international environment

than mutual respect or trust. At the Debate at Camarina in 415/4 BCE, Euphemus, the

Athenian representative, tries to convince the Camarinaeans to join the Athenian alliance.

He describes the effects of Athenian dominance on international politics:

you ought to grasp and make full use of everything in our interventionism and our general

character which fits in with your interests, and you should reflect that these characteristics of

ours, so far from doing harm to all alike, are to the majority of the Hellenes a positive blessing.

It is something which has its effect on all men everywhere, even in places where we are not

established, because the possibility of our intervention is always something to be considered

both by those who fear aggression and those who are actually planning an aggressive move; the

former can hope for our help, the latter must reflect that, if we do intervene, their enterprise is

likely to be a dangerous one; so in both cases we make ourselves felt: the ·potential aggressor

131Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.69.23-25 132 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.11.16-23

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 54

is forced, even against his own will, to behave reasonably, and those who might have been his

victims are saved without having to exert themselves. Do not reject this security which all who

ask can have and which is now available to you.133

As the Greek hegemon, Athens provides her allies with security produced by fear of

Athenian intervention. A superpower's deterrence potential has a pacifying effect on its

sphere of influence.

Given that states constantly compete for power, how does the relationship between

equal powers differ from that between unequal powers? In the international system,

states are ranked according to their relative power. More often than not, the relationship

between states is characterised by inequality in strength. As has been demonstrated

above, the Athenians hold that the relations between unequal states are ruled by what

they call the Law of Nature: 'we recommend that you should try to get what is possible

for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really think; since you know as

well as we do that, when these matters are discussed by practical people, the standard of

justice depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what

they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.' 134

However, when two powers of equal strength confront each other, it is in their best

interest to consider the other parties' objectives and to find a solution which is beneficial

for both sides. In the years of the Pentecontaetia ( 479-435 BCE), Themistocles advises the

citizens of Athens to fortify her walls in order to protect the city against outside attack.

This puts Athens in a favourable position when confronting her rivals. Themistocles is

well aware that 'it was only on the basis of equal strength that equal and fair discussions

on the common interest could be held. '135

The power structures of the Greek World in the Fifth Century have an impact on

both the content and on the success of Athenian policies. Athens instrumentalises Sophist

philosophy to strengthen her superiority and to create an international environment con­

ducive to her interests. The political theory which underlies Athenian policies is built

on Relativism. For an imperial power, it makes sense to conduct politics based on the

133Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.87.14-32 134Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.89.8-14 135Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.91.34-35

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 55

assumption that the rightness of policies is relative to the state that pursues them. In

any case, Athens' power status allows her to pursue any policy she wants. Due to her

dominance, Realist politics become the paradigm other states are forced to abide by. For

the Athenians, Sophist Relativism serves to justify the status quo while realist policies

are used to preserve it.

Moral Relativism in international relations

The Epistemological Scepticism of the Sophists combined with their radical Relativism

has far-reaching implications for morality. In the framework of Sophist thinking all moral

values are equally valid or invalid and it is pointless to assert the superiority of one over

the other. In the Dissoi Logoi, an anonymous treatise of uncertain date which shows some

resemblance to Protagoras' thinking, an unknown author discusses the concept of Right

and Wrong:

Double arguments are also put forth concerning right and wrong; and some say that right is one

thing and wrong another, but others that the same thing is right and wrong. And I shall try to

support this position. First I shall say that it is right to lie and deceive; one could even assert

that it is shameful and wicked to do these things to enemies but not to close relatives. Take

parents, for example. If you need to give a drug to your father or mother to eat or drink, and

they are unwilling, isn't it right to give it in their porridge or their drink and not tell them it is

there?136

What is right and what is wrong can only be determined in relation to the circumstances

and to the individuals concerned. Moral judgements vary from case to case. Furthermore,

they reflect a specific individual perspective which is subjective and can therefore be

neither challenged nor disproved. While one person may consider it right to deceive her

parents if it is for their own good, another might condemn the same action as wrong.

Protagoras describes the philosophical consequences of Subjectivism: 'Each thing is to

me such as it appears to me, and is to you such as it appears to you. '137 We live in

parallel universes composed of individual perspectives. And since each individual is the

sole measure of his values moral disputes are inevitable and insoluble.

136Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 3, p. 301 137Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 17, p. 186

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 56

Moral Subjectivism applies to individuals and city states alike. In Protagoras' view,

a city is the only judge of her policies: 'Whatever each city judges to be just and fine,

these things in fact are just and fine for it, so long as it holds these opinions. '138 Justice

has only a temporary meaning; it is valid until the city changes its views. Justice is not

universal; something might be just for one city but unjust for another city. And what

seems right in one situation might be considered wrong in another. The author of the

Dissoi Logoi argues that even breaking into a public building is right if your father is

imprisoned in it. 139

In the History of the Peloponnesian War the discourse on morality in international

relations is centred on two opposing views. The Athenians hold that there are no universal

standards of justice and that the relations between states are governed by the Law of

Nature. Athenian allies and enemies alike criticise this approach and try to establish

general rules that in their opinion ought to govern a state's policies.

In the Dispute over Corcyra in 433 BCE, the Corinthians claim that states ought to

observe the rules of reciprocity in their dealings with one another. Athens should treat

Corinth the same way Corinth has treated Athens: 'you ought to behave towards us as

we have behaved towards you. '14° Knowing that Athenian politicians are most receptive

to arguments of security and self-interest, the Corinthians add: 'The power that deals

fairly with its equals finds a truer security than the one which is hurried into snatching

some apparent but dangerous advantage. '141 They hold that amongst equals, fairness is

advantageous to all. Their ideal of fairness is not universal; it does not apply to states

of unequal might. Unfortunately for them, this is probably why the Athenians ignore

Corinth's appeals and choose to pursue their immediate self-interest: she enters into an

alliance with Corcyra despite violating her treaty obligations with Corinth.

At the debate marking the end of Plataea in 427 BCE, the Plataeans condemn Athe­

nian standards of justice: 'If you are going to take as your standards of justice your own

immediate advantage [ ... ], you will stand confessed as people who are more interested

138Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 14, p. 186 139Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 3, p. 302 140Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.42.3-4 141Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.42.18-43.1

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 57

in pursuing your own interests than in judging sincerely between right and wrong. '142

Athens' opponents refuse to accept that Athenian politicians have decided once and for

all what is just: whatever suits their own interests. In their eyes, right and wrong and

just and unjust are practical concepts only. It is the facts on the ground that decide

what is morally right for Athens. And this is precisely where the Athenian approach to

international politics differs from that of other poleis. The majority of Greek city states

seem to think that there are universal moral values; and the behaviour of states should

be governed by rules based on these values. For example, the Plataeans demand that the

principles of international relations should be applied consistently: 'the same principles

should be made to apply throughout, and it should be recognised that true policy con­

sists not only in safeguarding one's immediate interests. '143 To them, self-interest is not a

moral principle and therefore not a 'true policy'. These approaches to politics could not

be any more different. And since there is no common ground between Realist and moral

arguments, their advocators inevitably clash.

Unlike the Athenians, the Spartans resort to universal concepts of Right and Wrong in

order to justify their often ruthless policies. In 424 BCE, Brasidas, after having marched

against their city tries to convince the Acanthians to cut their bonds with Athens and join

Sparta's alliance against the Athenians. Faced with their reluctance he threatens them:

I came here to help you and could not make you understand it. I shall lay waste your land and

try to bring you over by force. And, once this point has been reached, I shall not consider that

I am doing anything wrong. I shall consider that I have two good reasons on my side which

force me to take this action: first, I must prevent Sparta from suffering from the money which

you, our friends, will go on paying to the Athenians, if you refuse to join us; secondly, I must

not allow the Hellenes to be hindered by you from throwing off their chains. [ ... ] We Spartans

are only justified in liberating people against their own will, because we are acting for the good

of one and all alike. We have no imperialistic ambitions; our whole effort is to put an end to

imperialism, and we should be doing wrong to the majority, if we were to put up with your

142Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.56.8-12 143Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.56.30-33

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 58

opposition to the independence which we are offering to all. 144

For Brasidas, the ends justify the means. Whether a particular course of action is right

or wrong is determined by its ulterior motives. Although he clearly argues in terms

of Sparta's interest (i.e. preventing Sparta from suffering and depriving the Hellenes

of their freedom), he puts a moral spin to it. Claiming to be acting for 'the good of

one and all alike', he adorns his policies with the legitimacy of higher moral ends. The

Athenians, however, dismantle their rival's value-talk asserting that 'the Spartans are

most conspicuous for believing that what they like doing is honourable and what suits

their interests is just. ' 145 Indeed, this is the fundamental difference between Athens' and

Sparta's approach to politics. The Spartans may or may not genuinely believe in the

importance of justice and morality in international affairs. Either way, they use moral

principles to justify their self-interested policies. The Athenians, on the other hand,

refrain from employing value arguments altogether because they fundamentally question

their validity. Although they make use of the concept of justice, they do not ascribe a

universal rather a particular value to it, i.e. the fact that it suits their own interests. In

contrast to the Spartans, the Athenians openly admit that their policies are guided by

self-interest only.

The conflict over the role of moral considerations in international politics culminates

in the Melian Dialogue (416/5 BCE). At the beginning of the debate, the Athenians define

its purpose. They warn the Melians: 'if you have met here for any other reason except

to look the facts in the face and on the basis of these facts to consider how you can save

your city from destruction, there is no point in our going on with this discussion. '146 With

this statement, the Athenians communicate clearly that they do not intend to engage in

a value discussion about the rights and wrongs of their policies. They assert that each

state should seek to maximise its gains given its relative power position. The Melian reply

defies this realist paradigm:

Then in our view (since you force us to leave justice out of account and to confine ourselves to

self-interest) - in our view it is at any rate useful that you should not destroy a principle that is

144Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 4.87.14-28 145Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.105.21-23 146Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.87.2-5

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 59

to the general good of all men - namely, that in the case of all who fall into danger there should

be such a thing as fair play and just dealing [ ... ] And this is a principle that affects you as much

as anybody, since your own fall would be visited by the most terrible vengeance and would be

an example to the world.147

Though the Melians pretend to ignore all considerations of justice, they merely cloak

their moral argument under the concepts of self-interest and utility. They argue that it

cannot be in Athens' interest to disregard a principle she may profit from in the future.

Since power is temporary, all states will eventually benefit from the principle that states

in danger should be dealt with fairly and justly. Up to this point, the Melian argument

meets the requirements of Political Realism. However, their reference to the general good

of all men clearly transcends the boundaries of self-interest and expediency. It betrays

the Melians' real conviction: that the relations between states should be governed by

principles that benefit the international community as a whole.

It is not surprising that the Athenians only respond to the Realist dimension of the

Melian argument. Contrary to what the Melians believe, Athens is not concerned with

long term effects but focuses on her immediate interest. What is good and what is bad for

her empire is decided now; only facts that have an impact on the present state of affairs

are relevant. For the Athenians, the best possible solution to the conflict would be the

surrender of the island: 'We do not want any trouble in bringing you into our empire,

and we want you to be spared for the good both of yourselves and of ourselves. '148 The

Melians reply: 'And how could it be just as good for us to be the slaves as for you to be

the masters?'149 The Athenians assert: 'You, by giving in, would save yourselves from

disaster; we, by not destroying you, would be able to profit from you. '150 The Athenians

and the Melians have very different ideas of how their conflict could be resolved. The

Melians expect the dispute to be settled fairly. Any solution ought to be equally beneficial

for both sides. From the Athenian perspective, the Melians are in a weaker position and

therefore have to accept a suboptimal resolution. Where there is an imbalance of power,

there is no room for fairness: 'This is no fair fight, with honour on one side and shame

147Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.90.1-10 148Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.91.10-12 149Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.92.1-2 150Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.93.1-3

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 60

on the other. It is rather a question of saving your lives and not resisting those who are

too strong for you. '151 This is a question of power as well as a measure of prudence since

'if one follows one's self-interest one wants to be safe, whereas the path of justice and

honour involves one in danger. '152 Though the Athenians realise that their policies do

not conform to conventional notions of justice, they consciously choose to ignore them.

Firstly, because they profit from it. Secondly, because they can. From a realist point

of view, the path of self-interest promises more safety than any international law could

possibly provide. And Athens' supremacy guarantees that she will be able to impose these

policies with force.

Athens' approach to international relations challenges Greek traditions and customs.

This is amply illustrated by a number of references to the customary laws that seem

to have conventionally governed the relations between Greek city states. At the debate

preceding the end of Plataea in 427 BCE, the Plataeans justify their resistance against

the Thebans, who have seized their city in the period of a religious festival as follows: 'we

acted rightly and in accordance with the general law that one is always justified in resisting

an aggressor. '153 This reference to a general law indicates that the international system

composed of Greek poleis is not entirely unregulated. There appears to be a vague set of

rules widespread enough for states to appeal to them in international conflicts. However,

what this body of law consists of is difficult to establish.

There are also hints towards the existence of Hellenic law, referred to by Ehrenberg as

'interhellenisches Volkerrecht' and described by Guthrie as unwritten laws based on moral

principles believed to be universally valid, or alternatively valid all over the Greek world.

'Their authors were the gods, and no breach of them could remain unpunished. They

were already closely connected with the natural world, for to contrast man with nature

instead of seeing him as a part of it is a modern rather than a Greek habit.' 154 These

notions might be identical with the general law mentioned by the Plataeans. Further on

in their speech, the Plataeans pledge: 'we surrendered to you voluntarily, stretching out

151Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.101.1-4 152Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.107.1-3 153Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.56.5-7 154Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 129

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 61

our hands as suppliants, and Hellenic law forbids killing in these circumstances. '155

When Athens is defeated at Delium in 424/3 BCE, a Boeotian herald comes before the

Athenians and delivers the following message: 'that the Athenians had done wrong and

transgressed against Hellenic law. It was a rule established everywhere that an invader

of another country should keep his hands off the temples that were in that country. The

Athenians, however, had fortified Delium and were living in it.' 156 The law or general rule

that the Boeotians refer to relates to religious customs. It points to the fact that there

must have been certain agreements establishing respect for each city's customs. When

fully weighed however, the evidence is too scarce to allow us to draw conclusions as to

the dissemination and validity of such a Hellenic law.

For our purposes, it suffices to point out that the relations between Greek states in

the Fifth Century seem to be somewhat governed by an oral customary or traditional

law, which is no doubt uncodified. As the above examples illustrate, this law is believed

to be universally valid and is attributed to the gods. This is the fundamental difference

between the unwritten laws the Athenians refer to and those invoked by their rivals.

Whereas other Greeks regard the moral principles which underlie the unwritten laws as

emanating from the gods, the Athenians defend a secular view of these laws which gains

ground by the middle of the Fifth Century. Instead of the divine, an impersonal nature

is the source behind the unwritten laws, whose decree is nevertheless absolute, and their

neglect inevitably punished as the laws of the gods used to be. But they do not necessarily

follow the precepts of traditional morality, for under the influence of mechanistic scientific

theories the natural world is no longer subject to moral government. 157 The contrast

between the traditional theistic and the Athenian secular conception of the unwritten

laws explains the refusal of the Greek states to abandon long-established rules of conduct.

Athenian politics run counter to Greek conventions in a radical and uncompromising

way. Their policies demarcate the transition from a religious to a secular view of law and

spark off intense debates on which rules should govern international affairs.

In our discussion, we have demonstrated that Sophist philosophy and Political Realism

155Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.58.13-15 156Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 4.97.10-14 157 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. III, p. 130

3. Sophist philosophy and Athenian foreign policy 62

are intricately linked. Athens' policies become more accessible once we interpret them in

the light of Sophist philosophical concepts. The Athenians use the framework of Sophist

philosophy to develop a new way of conducting politics. Epistemological Scepticism, Rela­

tivism and Subjectivism allow Athenian politicians to justify their self-interested policies.

Combined with Athens' super power status, this approach to international politics pro­

vides the basis of Athens' dominance and tightens the Athenian grip on the world of

Greek city states.

Chapter 4 What makes a thought

thinkable?

4.1 Fifth Century sense structure and its impact on

political thinking and political action

Thus far, we have related Sophist ideas to political concepts and policies. We have demon­

strated that the origins of Athenian Political Realism can be traced to the philosophical

ideas developed by the Sophists in the Fifth Century. What is the significance of these

findings? We hypothesise that without Sophist philosophy, Political Realism would not

have been thinkable.

In order to substantiate this claim, we will shed light on it from two angles. First,

we will explore the connections between Sophist philosophy and Political Realism on the

level of ideas. Second, we will examine the facilitating role of the Athenian cultural and

intellectual context. It is our aim to establish which factors contribute to the transfer

of ideas from the philosophical to the political sphere. We aim to understand how the

intellectual environment influences which policies are thinkable or conceivable, proposed,

and put into practice.

4.2 How does Sophist philosophy influence political

thinking in 5th Century Athens?

In order to understand why Political Realism emerges at the time of the Peloponnesian

War, we need to relate it to its intellectual, historical and cultural context. At the

time, the Athenian intellectual sphere is predominantly shaped by Sophist philosophy. In

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 64

the previous chapter we have shown that Political Realism is influenced significantly by

Sophist assumptions, concepts and ideas. We will now justify this claim arguing that in

fact, Realist policies are Sophist ideas applied to the political sphere.

The impact of Sophist thought on Political Realism is not limited to a small number of

philosophical ideas that serve as forerunners to certain political concepts. Rather, Political

Realism as a whole is profoundly influenced by Sophist philosophy, which permeates all

aspects of Athenian intellectual life.

But how is this transfer of ideas from philosophy to politics actually realised? So far,

we have examined the relationship between specific philosophical concepts and particular

policies. We have established that a considerable number of Sophist fragments can be

directly linked to policies pursued by the Athenians during the Peloponnesian War. In

these cases at least, Political Realism and Sophist philosophy are closely related. But is

this evidence enough for an inherent relation between the two bodies of thought? With

the purpose of further substantiating our initial findings, we will now embark on a more

complex task. Since the explicit links between individual ideas have already been estab­

lished we will now focus on the relation between entire bodies of thought. By treating

both Political Realism and Sophist philosophy as intellectual entities rather than as mere

groupings of ideas, we hope to buttress three fundamental claims: the first is that Political

Realism is the inevitable political consequence of Sophist thinking. Secondly, we assert

that philosophy gets translated into politics not at the level of individual ideas but on the

level of entire bodies of thought. Having developed out of Sophist philosophy, Political

Realism is more than a conglomeration of unconnected policies, it is a political philoso­

phy. Finally, the emergence and the success of Realist policies reveal the influence Sophist

philosophy has on Athenian society, culture and attitudes. It proves that in a democracy,

politics need to be responsive to a society's sense structure in order to be successful.

Before we begin to study entire bodies of ideas let us consider some preliminary

thoughts on the development of ideas. To understand an idea properly, we need to be

aware of how it developed. All ideas have a genealogy: they grow out of and are in­

fluenced by previous ideas. Even so-called original ideas, which per definitionem depart

from traditional conceptions, develop with reference to the latter. Their originality is only

significant with respect to their intellectual context.

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 65

Analysing a single idea's lineage does not necessarily imply tracing the origin of each

of its components; rather, it means locating an idea within the context of its family tree.

For example, studying the genealogical ancestry of an individual teaches us who his or her

closest relations are. We can also learn about the individual's family history preceding

his or her life. We can determine the relationships between people and find out where

they originated from, how many children they have had and when they died. The same

method can be applied to trace the origin of an idea.

However, this family tree model can be misleading as it suggests that ideas develop in

a linear and causal way. But in fact, rather than supporting a supposed objective order

and a chronological hierarchy of ideas, this model allows for a multi-faceted approach to

the development of ideas. There are various ways of deriving and contextualising an idea

and competition between different interpretations of such a 'genealogical path' can be

very productive. We have to bear in mind that there is no single correct way of relating

one idea to other ideas. On the contrary, the strength of the family tree model lies in its

multi-dimensionality which allows for a co-existence of different interpretations.

We also have to bear in mind that the family tree model does not imply a qualitative

progression of ideas. Ideas are not necessarily more complex or more sophisticated than

their precursors. In order to avoid this logical pitfall, it may be helpful to envision the

family tree model as a mosaic of ideas. Every idea adds something to the existing pool

of ideas without the new ideas necessarily superseding the old ones. New ideas broaden

the mosaic of ideas and diversify the overall pattern.

With this approach we hope to shed some light on the complex relationship between

Sophist ideas and Political Realism. It will help us understand the connections between

ideas as well as those between clusters of ideas.

The influence of Sophist philosophy on Realist politics is manifested on four levels.

On the intellectual level, the Sophists' rejection of Presocratic ontology has a significant

impact on how history and politics are conceived. Epistemological Scepticism, the logical

consequence of this rejection, is used by Athenian politicians to legitimise their Realist

policies. This is done in three ways: Firstly by translating Sophist Subjectivism into

Moral Relativism. Secondly by using the Law of Nature as a justification for Athenian

Might is Right politics. And lastly by employing rhetoric as an instrument of power.

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 66

4.2.1 The impact of the Sophist rejection of Presocratic ontol­

ogy on historical enquiry and the concept of the political

The starting point of Sophist philosophy is the dismissal of all ontological questions. The

Sophists realise that it is impossible to determine the relationship between Being and Not­

Being and that the only way out of this deadlock is to declare ontological questions per

se as unsolvable. Thereby, they successfully manoeuvre philosophy out of the impasse of

Presocratic thought. The implications of this fundamental shift are radical and significant.

If Being and Not-Being are indeterminate categories, there are no ultimate truths to

comprehend and our knowledge is by definition limited.

The Sophist rejection of what are central philosophical questions in the eyes of the

Presocratics is a turning point not only for philosophy in particular but for Greek thinking

in general. Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War provides evidence of the impact

of these intellectual transformations on both the discipline of historical writing and on the

conception of the political in Fifth Century Athens. The History of the Peloponnesian

War exhibits two closely related phenomena. On the one hand the conception of political

events changes, while on the other, policies are conducted differently.

Against the backdrop of Sophist thought, the study of history is transformed. Just

as the Sophists abandon ontology, Thucydides abandons myth. In Herodotus' Histories,

written in the first half of the Fifth Century, myths and actual events are intertwined, while

in the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recounts facts instead of legends

and portrays human beings rather than heroes. What distinguishes his description of the

Peloponnesian War from earlier historical accounts is that he deliberately puts politics at

the centre of his narrative. This is a reflection of the focus on human action introduced

by Sophist philosophy. Unlike Herodotus, Thucydides refrains from associating politics

with divine intervention and does not represent political conflicts as strife between gods,

semi-gods and humans. He claims that his description of political events is based purely

on facts. In the introduction to the History of the Peloponnesian War Thucydides stresses

his reliance on factual evidence: 'And with regard to my factual reporting of the events

of the war I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came my

way, and not even to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 67

myself at the events which I have described or else I heard of them from eye-witnesses

whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible. '158 Thucydides

interprets the accounts of witnesses in a rational way. He establishes causal relationships

between events, and ascertains a chronological order. He is well aware of the novelty

of his approach. This explains why he feels the need to warn his audience: 'And it

may well be that my history will seem less easy to read because of the absence in it

of a romantic element. It will be enough for me, however, if these words of mine are

judged useful by those who want to understand clearly the events which happened in the

past... '159 For him, the events of the war have an objective reality; they are produced by

men and can thus be known by men. Given his own biography, he feels in the position

to understand the war adequately: 'I lived through the whole of it, being of an age

to understand what was happening, and I put my mind to the subject so as to get an

accurate view of it. '160 Solmsen highlights the centrality of reason in Thucydides' enquiry:

'No ancient historian has the same confidence that by using his reason to the fullest extent

he recovers the "truth". '161 Although rational reasoning and analysis are compatible with

Sophist thought, Thucydides' approach nevertheless conflicts with Sophist philosophy.

For the Sophists, there is no objective reality which means that there can be no universal

knowledge of past events. In Thucydides view, objective knowledge of the past is possible.

Through the use of reason, the historian can reconstruct the actual course of events from

various subjective accounts. However, the disagreement between Sophist philosophy and

Thucydides' historical enquiry is balanced by a more fundamental congruity between

the two. In the same way that Sophist philosophy deconstructs the transcendental (i.e.

the notion of the universal categories Being and Not-Being), Thucydides discards any

transcendental meaning of reality. His insistence that there is no ulterior meaning behind

the reality of facts and events reflects Sophist influence and revolutionises the Greek

conception of the past.

The Sophist rejection of ontology is reflected in the political realm as well. Yet again,

the History of the Peloponnesian War illustrates this change. And since Thucydides is

158Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.22.9-14 159Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.22.17-22 160Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.26.23-25 161 Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment, p. 175

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 68

both an Athenian citizen and an Athenian general who writes for an Athenian audience,

we can reasonably assume that his perspective is representative of a wide-ranging change

in Athenian political culture. He would not have written a rational historical narrative

had he not been convinced that his readership would be interested in a factual account of

political events. As an Athenian citizen, Thucydides is influenced by the Athenian political

culture. As a general, he has the power to shape that political culture. As a historian,

he is in a position to reinforce a certain notion of history and politics. Hence studying

Thucydides' perspective helps us explore the links between the Sophist abandonment of

ontology and the re-conceptualisation of politics.

The Fifth Century is a watershed for the conception of historical and political events.

In Pericles' Funeral Oration in 431/0 BCE we find clear evidence that there is a widespread

desire amongst the Athenians to know the truth about the past: 'We do not need the

praises of a Homer, or of anyone else whose words may delight us for the moment, but

whose estimation of facts will fall short of what is really true. '162 This shift allows Thucy­

dides to introduce a new narrative perspective. With the History of the Peloponnesian

War this new narrative is firmly established and will go on to influence the subsequent

intellectual discourses.

Thucydides represents the new factualism and pragmatism that characterise politics

in the Fifth Century. In a world in which questions of existence are no longer relevant,

politics need to focus on the practical issues of life. At the beginning of the Melian

Dialogue in 416/5 BCE, the Athenians inform their adversaries that their conflict can

merely be resolved on the basis of facts: 'if you have met here for any other reason except

to look the facts in the face and on the basis of these facts to consider how you can

save your city from destruction, there is no point in our going on with this discussion.' 163

They stress that in political disputes, only factual arguments are valid: 'Then we on

our side will use no fine phrases saying, for example, that we have a right to our empire

because we defeated the Persians, or that we have come against you now because of

the injuries you have done to us - a great mass of words that nobody would believe. '164

162Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.41.15-18 163Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.87.2-5 164Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.89.1-5

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 69

Furthermore, the Athenians describe themselves as a 'practical people' 165 who think that

political decisions are determined by considerations of power rather than by morality. The

pragmatism of Athenian politicians is also reflected in their attitude towards politicians.

In the Mytilenian Debate in 427 BCE, Clean states that 'as a general rule states are

better governed by the man in the street than by intellectuals. '166 In his view, Athenian

politics require a certain type of politician. Clean also asserts that political decisions

should be based on facts only. He reproaches his audience for being too easily deluded

by political speeches and not being capable of considering the facts that lie before them.

These examples demonstrate how the Athenians reach their foreign policy aims. First,

they pressure other states into conducting their political affairs according to their own

pragmatic standards. Second, they seek to transform international relations by spreading

their own political model. The forcefulness with which they pursue these aims betrays

their strong belief in the transferability of their own political standards.

The transformation of politics in the Fifth Century is initiated by Athens. In the same

way that Sophist philosophers cast aside fundamental ontological questions, Athenian

politicians discard non-factual matters in the political sphere.

Yet what is the relationship between the conception of political events and the con­

duct of politics? There are three possible answers to this question. We could assert that

the way politics is conducted has an impact on how it is perceived. This would imply

that Thucydides' perspective on the politics of the Peloponnesian War differs from former

historical accounts because of the unique characteristics of Fifth Century politics. Then

again, it could be argued that Thucydides' distinct perspective as a historian determines

his representation of politics. And since we cannot prove the accuracy of his account,

it is very possible that his description of Fifth Century politics reflects his own perspec­

tive rather than what actually took place. However, the most reasonable answer to the

question would be to emphasise the inseparability of political conduct and the conception

of politics. Trying to establish which side has a bigger impact on the other will not be

fruitful. Instead, we should conceive of both phenomena as two sides of the same coin.

Changes in the conception and in the conduct of politics are part of the fundamental

165Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.26.11 166Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.37.21-22

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 70

transition processes which characterise the Fifth Century. Neither of these changes can

be understood without reference to the broader changes that take place in the polis.

4.2.2 The instrumentalisation of Epistemological Scepticism.

The Epistemological Scepticism of the Sophists implies that it is impossible for us to

know anything beyond ourselves. As a consequence, our different views of reality cannot

be resolved. From Thucydides' account of Athenian policies during the Peloponnesian

War, we can reconstruct how the Athenians translate these philosophical assumptions

into politics.

The Athenians instrumentalise Sophist thought to advance their city's interest. They

subscribe to the view that each individual, and hence each state, has their own distinct

perspective. And just as individual views clash on the domestic level, so too do state views

clash in the international realm. But while for Sophist philosophy these contradictions are

unsolvable per se, the Athenians resolve them through force: Athens compels other city

states to submit to the Athenian interpretation of politics, i.e. that the strong should rule

the weak. Though on the surface this policy seems to run counter to Sophist philosophy, it

actually reflects a Sophist way of thinking. The Athenian reasoning is as follows: though

theoretically any perspective or policy is equally valid or invalid, one can present one's

view as universally valid and the more powerful can force the less powerful to accept their

interpretation of reality. This attitude reflects a specific aspect of Protagorean philosophy.

Despite Protagoras' insistence that individual views cannot be refuted, he claims that one

can convince someone else of one's own perspective. He replaces truth and falsehood with

advantage and disadvantage, and the Athenians follow in his footsteps.

Now it could be argued that it is primarily due to the distribution of power among

Greek city states that Athenian politicians can pursue their Might is Right policy. We,

however, assert that although the balance of power is no doubt favourable to Athenian

dominance, it is not the central factor determining the formulation of Athenian policies.

While Athenian power makes Political Realism realisable, it is Sophist philosophy which

makes it thinkable. Athenian supremacy is clearly not a blank cheque for any kind of

policy.

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 71

Why do Athenian politicians employ Sophist concepts to justify their policies? The

most reasonable explanation is that Athenian democracy requires them to. Since all

political strategies are discussed and voted on in the assembly, Athenian politicians and

generals need to argue their case in public in order to gain political support. And since

Athenian sense structure is strongly influenced by Sophist philosophy, it is reasonable

for them to propose policies compatible with it. This is reinforced by the fact that

democratic states need to legitimise their actions. Since domestic conflicts are resolved

by debate, democratic politicians are expected to justify their state's external use of

force with arguments as well. Finally, legitimising her policies is an instrument of soft

power which Athens employs to win the minds of those that will eventually be conquered

by force. For all these reasons, it makes sense for Athenian politicians to justify their

policies with reference to the intellectual framework of Sophist philosophy. Rather than

the policies as such it is the underlying way of thinking which exposes Sophist influence

on Athenian foreign policy.

4.2.3 Subjectivism and Moral Relativism

As a corollary of Epistemological Scepticism, all knowledge is subjective. As individuals

we are not bound by any external authority; all our judgements are valid because they

emanate from our private perspective. Protagoras defines the essence of Subjectivism

as follows: 'A human being is measure of all things, of those things that are, that they

are, and of those things that are not, that they are not. '167 He applies the same logic

to states: 'Whatever each city judges to be just and fine, these things in fact are just

and fine for it, so long as it holds these opinions. '168 These fragments clearly reveal the

political dimension of Sophist philosophy. Protagoras explores the point of intersection

between morality and political morality. He applies philosophical standards to politics

thereby revealing the inherent association of the two realms.

What about the application of this political philosophy? The Athenians seem to draw

several conclusions from Sophist Subjectivism. First and foremost, Subjectivism ensures

the validity as well as the legitimacy of their self-interest policies. It provides the ground

167Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 15, p. 186 168 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 14, p. 186

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 72

for Moral Relativism which, backed up by force, becomes the ultimate tool of Athenian

foreign policy. In putting Might is Right arguments at the centre of their policies, the

Athenians treat justice as a relative concept. As long as their policy of dominance is right,

i.e. beneficial for Athens, it is justified. Any other claims such as an appeal to universal

morality or justice are dismissed as arguments inspired by the self-interest of other states.

Hence the Athenians adopt and implement Protagoras' claim that each city determines

her own standards of justice and rectitude.

4.2.4 The concept of justice and the Law of Nature

In Plato's Gorgias, Callicles, who may or may not have been a historical figure, develops an

argument about justice which is closely associated with the teachings of the Sophists. His

notion of justice is based on the distinction between nature (physis) and custom (nomos)

and provides a philosophical justification for the Athenian Law of Nature. His argument

is set against the backdrop of the nomos vs. physis debate of the Fifth Century, which, as

Guthrie demonstrates, enters into most questions of the day: 'Discussion of religion turned

on whether gods existed by physis - in reality - or only by nomos; of cosmopolitanism,

on whether divisions within the human race are natural or only a matter of nomos; of

equality, on whether the rule of one man over another (slavery) or one nation over another

(empire) is natural and inevitable, or only by nomos; and so on.'169 While for the men

of classical times, the nomoi applicable to all mankind are believed to emanate from the

divine, the Sophists emphasise the antithesis of the two concepts in the moral and in the

political sphere. Nomos acquires two meanings: the usage or custom based on traditional

or conventional beliefs as to what is right or true, and the laws formally drawn up and

passed, which codify 'right usage' and elevate it into an obligatory norm backed by the

authority of the state. 170

Both Antiphon and Hippias are advocates of physis; they think that nature should

take precedence over custom. Hippias, whose views are expressed in Plato's Protagoras,

describes the fundamental dichotomy between nature and custom: 'I believe that you

men who are present here are all kinsmen, family members, and fellow citizens by nature

169Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, pp. 55-56 170Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, pp. 56-57

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 73

(phusis) though not by custom (nomos). For by nature like is kin to like, but custom is

a tyrant over human beings and forces many things on us that are contrary to nature. ml

Antiphon establishes the primacy of nature over custom:

Justice, therefore, is not violating the rules of the city in which one is a citizen. Thus a person

would best use justice to his own advantage if he considered the laws (nomoi) important when

witnesses are present, but the consequences of nature (phusis) important in the absence of

witnesses. For the requirements of the laws are supplemental but the requirements of nature

are necessary; and the requirements of the laws are by agreement and not natural, whereas the

requirements of nature are natural and not by agreement. Thus someone who violates the laws

avoids shame and punishment if those who have joined in agreement do not notice him, but not

if they do. But if someone tries to violate one of the inherent requirements of nature, which is

impossible, the harm he suffers is no less if he is seen by no one, and no greater if all see him;

for he is harmed not in reputation but in truth. I enquire into these things for the following

reason, that most things that are just according to law are inimical to nature. For rules have

been made for the eyes, what they should and should not see, and for the ears, what they should

and should not hear, and for the tongue, what it should and should not say, and for the hands,

what they should and should not do, and for the feet, where they should and should go, and for

the mind, what it should and should not desire. Thus the things from which the laws dissuade

us are in no way less congenial or akin to nature than the things towards which they urge us.

For living and dying both belong to nature, and for humans living is the result of advantageous

things, whereas dying is the result of disadV'antageous things. The advantages laid down by the

laws are bonds on nature, but those laid down by nature are free. 172

Though Antiphon insists on a fundamental opposition between nature and law, he does

not go as far as referring to any laws of nature. Rather than developing a notion of

natural justice, he refers to the 'requirements of nature', a more general term which

seems to express merely a factual condition.

Callicles' argument reiterates the claims of Hippias and of Antiphon while also exam­

ining its consequences for life in the polis. We have chosen to represent his argument in

its entirety (while omitting certain repetitions) in order to expose the conclusiveness of

171 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 5, p. 216 172 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 7b, p. 245

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 74

his reasoning.

By nature whatever is worse, such as suffering injustice, is more shameful; and it is only by

custom (nomos) that doing injustice is worse... In fact, I think it is people who are weak -

common people - who make the laws. It's for themselves and their own advantage that they

make the laws they make... They are afraid of the people who are stronger and have the power

to take more than their share, and so to keep them from taking more than their share they

say that taking more than one's share is shameful and unjust. Since they are weaker, I believe

they are pleased to have an equal share. That is why people say, by custom, that it is unjust

and shameful to try to have a bigger share than the common people, and they call this "doing

injustice". But I believe that nature itself reveals that it is just for the better man to have

a larger share than the worse, and the more powerful than the less powerful. This is clearly

shown to be so everywhere, both for the other animals and for whole cities and tribes of human

beings: that justice has been decided in this way, for the better man to rule the worse and to

have a larger share. What other kind of justice did Xerxes plead when he invaded Greece, or his

father, when he invaded Scythia? And one could name any number of similar examples. Now

I believe that it was in accordance with the nature of justice that these men acted thus, and

yes, by Zeus, in accordance with the law of nature - though probably not in accordance with

this law we make. We take our own best and strongest when they are young like lions, and we

mould them into slaves, bewitching them with incantations, saying that [everyone] should have

an equal share and that this is what justice and nobility require. I believe, however, that if a

man is born with a nature that is good enough he will shake all this off and burst through and

escape. He will trample on our written stuff and magic tricks and incantations and on all those

laws that are against nature. The slave will rise and show himself our master, and the light of

natural justice will shine from him.173

Callicles seeks to demonstrate that the requirements of man-made law are contrary to

the requirements of nature. In his view, true justice is reflected in the natural world and

should prevail over the justice established by men. Just as the lion takes the biggest prey,

strong men are justified in obtaining a bigger share than they would deserve according to

the standard of equality. Callicles depicts man as a self-interested creature who seeks to

173Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 2, pp. 310-11

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 75

maximise his benefits. The weak join forces to impose a system of justice on the strong,

which guarantees equal benefits for all. Thereby, they obtain more than they would

have under the reign of the strong and the strong loose what they would have gained by

suppressing the weak. Just as customary justice serves the interests of the weak, natural

justice serves the interests of the strong. And since the Law of Nature overrides customary

laws, Callicles calls upon men born with a good nature to shake off the yoke of civilisation

in order to rule and reap the benefits of dominion. Nature prescribes men to seek the

maximum gratification of all their desires and the naturally superior ought to lead a life

without self-control or self restraint. Just as physis triumphs over nomos, Might is llight.

It is noteworthy 174 , that the term 'law of nature' which Callicles uses to justify Xerxes'

invasion of Greece, includes an untranslatable particle in Greek which signifies that the

term is new. This may be if not the earliest surely one of the earlier mentions of a Natural

Law in Greek thought.

Since the idea of the Law of Nature plays such an eminent role in Fifth Century

philosophical debates it is not surprising that it finds resonance in the political sphere.

An analysis of the political discourse in the History of the Peloponnesian War reveals the

similarity of philosophical and political arguments. Thucydides describes Fifth Century

politics as a battlefield on which the conflict between Natural Law and customary laws

is fought. Athenian politicians support the Law of Nature and seem to embrace the

conviction expressed in Gorgias' Encomium of Helen: 'For by nature the stronger is not

restrained by the weaker but the weaker is ruled and led by the stronger: the stronger

leads, the weaker follows. 7175

At the outset of the war, the Athenians claim: 'It has always been a rule that the

weak should be subject to the strong; and besides, we consider that we are worthy of our

power.'176 From the Athenian point of view, their power alone is justification enough for

their supremacy and for any policy which further strengthens it. This rather biased per­

spective on justice in international relations is challenged by the advocates of customary

law. In 424/3 BCE, shortly after the Athenian fortification of Delium, conflict ensues with

174See Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, p. 311 175Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, p. 192 176Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1. 76.14-15

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 76

the Boeotians due to Athens' alleged desecration of the city's temples. The Boeotians

deliver the following message to the Athenians: 'that the Athenian had done wrong and

transgressed against Hellenic law. It was a rule established everywhere that an invader

of another country should keep his hands off the temples that were in that country. The

Athenians, however, had fortified Delium and were living in it. They were doing all the

things that men do on unconsecrated ground ... '177 The Boeotians base their claims on

a customary rule or law that seems to have regulated the conduct of Greek city states.

The Athenians reply that 'they had done nothing wrong with regard to the temple, nor

would they do any harm to it in the future, if they could help it; it was not with any

such intentions that they had occupied the temple in the first place, but only to use it

in self-defence against the Boeotians, who were the real aggressors ... '178 Although on the

surface, the Athenians seem to respect what both sides refer to as Hellenic law; they

clearly consider it to be secondary to their city's self-interest, i.e. self-defence against the

Boeotians. They agree to respect Hellenic law when possible, but indicate that they feel

justified in overriding it should the circumstances require them to do so. The Athenians

believe that in times of war, even the gods would tolerate the transgression of customary

laws: 'it was reasonable to suppose that even the god would look indulgently on any

action done under the stress of war and danger ... ' 179 With (assumed) divine approval,

man-made laws can be transcended with impunity. The customary law can thus be over­

ridden by either divine or Natural Law. Whatever arguments they use, it is clear that

for the Athenians, their own power and the permanent conflict between states justify any

course of action.

The Melian Dialogue in 416/5 BCE shows that in addition to questioning the validity

of customary law, the Athenians reject the appeals made by other states to universal

laws. The Melians attempt to convince their adversaries that there are rules from which

all states benefit: 'Then in our view (since you force us to leave justice out of account and

to confine ourselves to self-interest) - in our view it is at any rate useful that you should

not destroy a principle that is to the general good of all men - namely, that in the case

177Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 4.97.10-15 178Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 4.98.2-7 179Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 4.98.21-23

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 77

of all who fall into danger there should be such a thing as fair play and just dealing [ ... ]

And this is a principle that affects you as much as anybody ... '180 These arguments cannot

change the fundamental conviction that Athens' foreign policy is based on. As Diodotus,

an Athenian politician says: 'Cities and individuals alike, all are by nature disposed to

do wrong, and there is no law that will prevent it. '181 Given this outlook on the nature

of states, Athenian politicians rely mainly on the strength of their polis and on the only

law that they can enforce: the Law of Nature. For Athens, politics is not about justice,

it is about usefulness; and the Law of Nature is very useful to Athenian imperial aims.

However, it is noteworthy that within the polis, Athenian citizens seem to pledge alle­

giance to both codified and unwritten laws. In his Funeral Oration, Pericles describes the

Athenian attitude towards written and unwritten laws as follows: 'We give our obedience

to those whom we put in positions of authority, and we obey the laws themselves, espe­

cially those which are for the protection of the oppressed, and those unwritten laws which

it is an acknowledged shame to break. '182 While the Athenians understand that obedience

to both customary and natural laws is necessary for a polity to function properly, they

realise that this does not apply to the international sphere. In the anarchical international

system, each state is free to secure its benefit in its own way. There are two dimensions

to this. First of all, in a world where man is the measure of all things, he is only bound

by his particular idea of justice expressed in his laws. And as conceptions of justice differ

from polis to polis, the concept of justice (as everything else) becomes relative. Secondly,

once god-given laws are replaced with man-made ones, moral values come to be seen as

merely customary and thus also relative. Laws no longer reflect eternal divine will but

temporary human interests. In the absence of universal moral standards what man can

impose on his fellows is determined by practicability and expediency.

4.2.5 The use of rhetoric in Athenian politics

The epistemological foundations of rhetoric are provided by Gorgias' claim that knowledge

is generally unattainable, relative at best and impossible to communicate: '[Anything you

180Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.90.1-9 181Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.45.7-9 182Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.37.19-22

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 78

might mention] is nothing; if it were something, it would be unknowable; and if it were

something and knowable, it could not be made evident to others. '183 From a philosophical

standpoint, arguments about truth are futile. Just as one's knowledge is doubtful, so too

is the knowledge of others. And while one may think that we can communicate our

version of reality to others and vice versa, in the end no one can establish the existence

of anything. Antiphon describes our fundamental ignorance as follows: 'Someone who

says one thing does not in fact have one thing in mind, nor does one thing exist for

him, neither something that the one who sees best sees with his sight nor something that

the one who knows best knows with his mind.' 184 According to Gagarin and Woodruff,

'Antiphon seems to mean that a single spoken word does not refer to a single object

in the speaker's mind or in the real world; no such object could be seen by the person

with the best eyesight or known by the person with the best mind. '185 Neither existence

nor knowledge itself can be proven by the mere fact that we can speak about things.

Contradicting arguments can be made about everything, including truth. The Dissoi

Logoi, a compilation of texts written by known and unknown writers in the late Fifth or

early Fourth Century, demonstrate how this is achieved:

Double arguments are also put forth concerning truth and falsehood. One of them says a false

statement is one thing and a true statement another, but others say that on the contrary, they

are the same. I say the latter. First, they are spoken with the same words; second, whenever

a statement is made, if things turn out just as was stated, then the statement is true, but if

they do not turn out, the same statement is false. For example, a statement accuses someone of

temple-robbery: if the act took place, the statement is true, but if it didn't take place, it is false,

and the same for the statement of the defendant. In fact, the courts judge the same statement

both false and true. Thus it is clear that the same statement, whenever falsehood is present in

it, is false, but whenever truth is present, is true ... 186

Although there is a certain conception of truth in this fragment (that is truth is what

really happened), the salient point is that, philosophically speaking, a statement can be

183Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 18, p. 206 184Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 5, p. 244 185 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, p. 244 186Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 4, p. 303

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 79

both true and false, depending on reality. When this reality cannot be established, it

becomes impossible to distinguish truth from falsehood.

In rhetorical arguments, truth does not refer to ultimate or universal knowledge but is

synonymous with the subjective perspective of the speaker. Gorgias' Encomium of Helen

demonstrates that truth can become an instrument of rhetoric. Before defending Helen,

Gorgias makes some general statements about the characteristics of speeches. He claims

that a speech ought to be truthful: 'For a city the finest adornment is a good citizenry,

for a body beauty, for a soul wisdom, for an action arete, and for a speech truth; and

the opposites of these are indecorous. '187 Revealing the truth (i.e. his version of the

truth) a speaker frees his audience from ignorance: 'My only wish is to bring reason to

the debate, eliminate the cause of her bad reputation, demonstrate that her detractors

are lying, reveal the truth, and put an end to ignorance. '188 The speaker's claim to

truth gives him the ability to change the opinions of his audience: 'It [speech] can stop

fear, relieve pain, create joy, and increase pity. How this is so, I shall show; and I must

demonstrate this to my audience to change their opinion. '189 Rhetoric is both a product

of Epistemological Scepticism and a method to deal with its consequences. Whether or

not reality is what one thinks it is one needs to act on certain assumptions in order to

avoid complete paralysis. Arguments with others cannot establish the truth; they can

merely establish whose truth prevails. All one can do is try to persuade others of one's

perspective. Rhetoric is the skill with which one gains a comparative advantage over

one's contenders; it allows one to establish one's truth as ultimate truth. Rhetoric is best

described as 'the capacity to persuade others; or a practical realisation of this ability; or,

at least an attempt at persuasion, successful or not. '190 It is a mode of communication

with a distinct purpose: to get others to do what we want. For Gorgias, persuasion is an

instrument of power which can be identified with force 'persuasion, which has the same

power, but not the same form as compulsion. When added to speech, [it] indeed molds

the mind as it wishes. '191 Gorgias destroys the traditional polarity between force and

187Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, p. 191 188Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, p. 191 189Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, p. 192 190R. Wardy, The Birth of Rhetoric (London, Routledge, 1996), p. 1 191 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, p. 193

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 80

persuasion which prevails in the culture of ancient Greece:

When Gorgias abolishes the distinction between force and persuasion, he undermines the faun-

dation on which rested the basic Greek division between ways of getting people to do things.

Why does this matter so much? ... civilised Greeks do (or rather should) fall back on it [violence]

only as a last resort, and only when circumstances justify the use of force. Greeks, and demo­

cratic Athenians first and foremost, are civilised rather than barbarian in part because they

try to channel violent tendencies into the persuasive, if competitive, negotiations permitted by

logos ... 192

Rhetoric is an instrument used to implement self-interest policies. Those skilled in the

art of rhetoric know how to adopt their speech to fit their purpose. Critias describes the

effects of rhetoric saying: 'A good character is more certain than a law, for a speaker

could never distort it, whereas he often abuses a law, shaking it up and down with

arguments. '193 Arguments are used as weapons by those who are rhetorically skilled to

fight for superiority. Whose truth prevails solely depends on the ability of the speaker.

As Alcidamas points out, a good speaker needs to train his ability to persuade: 'Now,

to speak appropriately, on the spot, on whatever topic is proposed, to be quick with an

argument and ready with the right word, and to find just the right speech to match the

current situation and people's desires- all this is not within the natural ability of everyone

nor the result of whatever education one happens to have had. '194

The Sophist theory of rhetoric profoundly influences Athenian politicians. The politi­

cians realise that though it is impossible to resolve contradictions between different ver­

sions of reality, one party can try to persuade the other to adopt her perspective. In the

international sphere, where the relations between states are determined by their relative

power, rhetoric becomes an instrument of domination. In the Peloponnesian War, the

Athenians employ both physical force and political arguments to win their enemies over.

Rhetoric serves as a means to justify Athenian policies, i.e. to persuade the other side

that Athenian actions are right and legitimate. Through the use of rhetoric, Sophist

Epistemological Scepticism is instrumentalised to support Athenian Realist policies.

192Wardy, The Birth of Rhetoric, p. 44 193Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 2, p. 260 194 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 2, p. 277

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 81

The Athenians use the notion of Natural Law as a vehicle to represent their own

perspective on justice as a universal truth. This is consistent with the primacy of self­

interest that underlies Athenian politics:

if you follow my advice, you will be doing the right thing as far as Mytilene is concerned and

at the same time will be acting in your own interests; if you decide differently, you will not

win them over, but you will be passing judgement on yourselves. For if they were justified in

revolting, you must be wrong in holding power. If, however, whatever the rights or wrongs of

it may be, you propose to hold power all the same, then your interest demands that these too,

rightly or wrongly, must be punished.195

Rhetoric also allows for flexible policy-making. What a state deems right today may

be considered wrong tomorrow and rhetoric may reconcile contradictory policies. What

is more, Athens applies different standards to herself than to other states. For example,

while Athenian politicians pursue Might is Right politics ruthlessly, they do not allow

other states to do the same. In the Mytilenian Debate in 427 BCE, Cleon argues at

first that Mytilene would have been justified to go to war in order to gain power, and

later on condemns Mytilene's Might is Right politics. This is a perfect example of how

the Athenians conceal their double standards with rhetorical skill. 'Now, to act as they

acted is not what I should call a revolt (for people only revolt when they have been

badly treated); it is a case of calculated aggression, of deliberately taking sides with our

bitterest enemies in order to destroy us. And this is far worse than if they had made war

against us simply to gain power. '196 On the one hand, Cleon pretends to apply uniform

standards to state politics, whether Athenian or not (i.e. all states have the right to go

to war to increase their power). On the other hand, the Athenians punish other states

for pursuing the same policies as them. Later on in his speech, Cleon reproaches the

Mytilenians for having put Might over Right: 'They made up their minds to put might

first and right second, choosing the moment when they thought they would win, and

then making their unprovoked attack upon us. '197 This example amply demonstrates how

Athenian politicians use rhetoric to buttress their power position. Athens unilaterally

195Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.40.25-33 196Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.39.10-15 197Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.39.20-23

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 82

establishes standards of conduct in the international sphere that serve her own interests

only and fortify her hegemony.

By imposing their own approach to politics on all other states, Athenian politicians

shape the international political discourse and establish the rules of the political game.

Athens makes the international sphere hers knowing that no other state is powerful enough

to challenge her dominant position. By allowing only herself to put Might first and Right

second, Athens seeks to cement the prevailing order forever.

Rhetoric plays a central role in Athenian power politics. The use of rhetoric in political

arguments spills over from the domestic sphere that is the Athenian political assemblies,

to the international realm. Sophist philosophy influences the Athenian political system

and produces a new form of politics. What characterises this new form of politics will be

scrutinised in the following section.

4.3 Why did Political Realism emerge in Fifth Cen­

tury Athens?

As we have seen, studying the intellectual context of Fifth Century Athens enhances

our understanding of the roots of Political Realism significantly. Let us now broaden our

perspective by taking into consideration the historical and cultural factors that play a role

in the development of Political Realism. We will sustain our twofold claim that Political

Realism could not have emerged outside of Athens or at any other period of time. It is

not a coincidence that Political Realism develops when it does and where it does.

4.3.1 Historical context

Political realism is an approach to politics unlikely to develop without the context of

supreme power. Had Athens not emerged from the Persian Wars as Greek hegemon, she

would not have been able to develop Might is Right politics. Let us outline briefly the

historical context of the second half of the Fifth Century. In the course of the Persian

Wars ( 499-448 BCE), the balance of power in the Greek World fundamentally shifts:

The Delian League, an alliance between Athens and other Greek city states, provides

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 83

Athens with an extended sphere of influence while Sparta, her main rival is weakened

considerably. Victory over the Persians shapes Athens' self-image and nurtures her will

to power: 'They had been the leaders of the Greek resistance and borne the brunt of the

Persian attack, and their consciousness of strength developed into an urge to dominate

the rest and turn their former allies into subjects.'198 Gradually, Athens expands her

power by restructuring the international sphere according to her interests:

During the wars, she had assumed the place of leader of all the Greeks engaged in the struggle

against the barbarians, and she had retained that position ever since. She had organised the

former allies into a confederation - the Delian League - and gradually, being the only wealthy

states as well as the only one with a navy, she had seized the chance of the slightest show of

recalcitrance to impose her law by force. The confederation had become her empire.199

This move is a real historical revolution since 'for the first time, a Greek polis trans­

formed leadership over her allies into direct control and imperial rule. This meant, above

all, that the Athenians introduced an amount of military, administrative, and political

centralization that was unheard of in the world of Hellenic poleis. ' 200 Athens builds up a

system of political dominion consisting of three components. First, Athenian magistrates

are installed in the majority of the cities of the empire. Second, Athens confiscates land

and distributes it to Athenian colonists. Third, all important law courts are moved to

Athens. However, the Athenian empire is based essentially on her naval power. Raaflaub

highlights the inherent connection between the two: 'In fact, naval and imperial power

were interconnected: the Delian League provided both the necessary resources to main­

tain a fleet and the coastal support network that was indispensable to allow this fleet to

move freely throughout the Aegean and far beyond, while its existence and the Athenians'

determination to use it usually sufficed to keep the empire together. '201 Due to the con­

tributions of her allies Athens can afford a war fleet of 300 triremes (Fifth Century battle

ships) and maintain a continued military presence in the Aegean. Athenian naval capa-

198 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, pp. 17-18 199de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 19 200K. A. Ra.aflaub, 'The Transformation of Athens in the Fifth Century' in D. Boedeker and K.A.

Ra.aflaub (eds.), Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens (Cambridge, Harvard Uni­

versity Press, 1998), p. 16 201 Raaflaub, 'The Transformation of Athens in the Fifth Century', p. 17

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 84

bilities revolutionise Greek warfare. Conventional hoplite warfare, which is traditionally

conducted in intervals of several years, is replaced by naval actions which last for weeks,

months or even years. This allows Athenian generals to carry out extensive long-term

campaigns to expand Athens' sphere of influence.

But how are these excessive military actions funded? Gomperz explains the intimate

link between Athens' military and economic power:

Athens, resting on her sea-power, became the head of a confederacy which gradually transformed

the conditions of economic as well as political life. She enjoyed lucrative commercial monop­

olies; she derived a rich income from the tolls, and from the tributes and judiciary fees of the

confederates; and, finally, the confiscated lands of a renegade ally would fall to her from time to

time for repartition. 202

As a major maritime trade hub and with her colonies established throughout the Greek

world, Athens develops an economy of empire: 'Greece as a whole in the fifth century B. C.

would appear to have surpassed all previous periods in the products of agriculture, in­

dustry and trade. But the transformation at Athens amounted to an economic revolution

which has been described as a passing from the economics of a city state to the economics

of empire.'203 At the outset of the Peloponnesian War, Athenian power is incontestable.

It is based firmly on both military and economic might, the two being dependent. Ulti­

mately, at least in Thucydides' view, it is this very strength which causes the war between

Athens and Sparta. As written at the beginning of the History of the Peloponnesian War,

'What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this

caused in Sparta.'204 At the Debate at Camarina in 415/4 BCE, the Athenians ascribe to

the same logic claiming that building their empire was a security measure: 'We therefore

deserve the empire which we have, partly because we supplied to the cause of Hellas the

largest fleet and a courage that never looked back . .. partly because we wanted to have

the strength to hold our own in relation to the Peloponnesians. '205

In the first book of the History of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides describes how

202H. Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhetorik (Stuttgart, B.G. Teubner Verlagsgesellschaft, 1965), p. 382 203Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 15 204Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.23.27-29 205Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.83.1-6

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 85

the steady growth of Athenian power causes alarm throughout the Greek world, especially

amongst Sparta and her allies. Initially, they are concerned with the fortification of

Athens, which they regard as a sign of the city's ill intentions:

When the Spartans heard of what was going on they sent an embassy to Athens. This was partly

because they themselves did not like the idea of Athens or any other city being fortified, but

chiefly because they were urged by their allies, who were alarmed both by the sudden growth of

Athenian sea-power and by the daring which the Athenians had shown in the war against the

Persians. 206

Soon afterwards, they are told by the Athenian leader Themistocles that they should be

'prepared to recognize that the Athenians were capable of making up their own minds

about their own interests and about the interests of the rest of Hellas. '207 The Athenians

'thought it better that their city should be fortified; it was better for their own citizens

and also would be an advantage to the whole alliance; for it was only on the basis of equal

strength that equal and fair discussions on the common interest could be held. '208

The essence of Athenian politics is foreshadowed at the very beginning of the Pelopon­

nesian War. Through military and economic strength, Athens acquires the independence

which allows her to act without considering other states. Since no other Greek alliance

is as strong as the Delian League, and no other single state can challenge Athens within

this league, there can be no common interest, only self-interest.

Athens' strength can account for her ability to execute Might is Right policies. But it

does not explain why the Athenians pursue a particular type of policy. Taken individually,

neither power nor supremacy produces Political Realist attitudes. Though hegemony may

facilitate a ruthless foreign policy, it does not necessarily have to be justified with realist

arguments. In our view, it is the interplay of historical with cultural factors that allows

the Athenians to apply Sophist ideas to the political sphere.

206Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.90.1-6 207Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.91.24-27 208Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.91.31-34

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 86

4.3.2 Cultural context

The relationship between Fifth Century Athenian culture and Sophist philosophy can be

described as symbiotic. Athenian culture provides an environment which allows Sophist

philosophy to flourish, and Sophist ideas have a significant impact on Athens' cultural

framework. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this work to reconstruct the interplay

between Sophist philosophy and Athenian culture. Instead, we will highlight only those

cultural aspects which facilitate the influence of Sophist ideas that serve as a basis for

Athenian Political Realism.

The Sophists are attracted by the cultural and political climate in Athens, which

allows them to develop and to disseminate their ideas:

All these thinkers, with their new ideas, were born along by the same impetus, an impetus that

accounts for their common success. But the fact remains that it is in Athens that we find them

all. It was to Athens that they came, here that they found a welcome, and here that they exerted

a profound influence ... Without doubt, the vogue for the Sophists only came about thanks to a

catalyst which Periclean Athens alone could provide. 209

In Athens, the Sophists find the freedom and the intellectual openness that provide a

breeding ground for their new ideas. As Wallace points out, 'Democratic Athens did

not create the sophistic movement, but certainly welcomed it, elite and demos alike. '210

The importance of the cross-fertilisation between Athenian culture and Sophist philosophy

should not be underestimated. The Sophists absorb and react to contemporary intellectual

movements. As teachers, they are in regular contact with Athenian opinion-makers. As

orators, they are exposed to the ideas held by their audiences. However, we cannot

go as far as Gomperz who equates the Sophists with their audiences by describing the

relationship between the two as follows: 'Dependent as they were on their public, they

necessarily became the mouthpiece of ideas which, if not dominant, were at least rising into

predominance. '211 To some extent the Sophists are the mouthpieces of contemporaneous

Athenian intellectual currents. And by asserting that their philosophy could not have

209de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 18 210R.W. Wallace, 'The Sophists in Athens' in D. Boedeker and K.A. Raaflaub (eds.), Democracy, Em-

pire, and the Arts in Fifth-Centu'T"!J Athens (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 214 211 Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhetorik, pp. 415-16

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 87

developed outside of Athens, we do attribute a considerable role to Athenian culture.

However, it is clear that ultimately, Sophist thought transcends the particular movements

of its time.

Value crisis

The most fundamental development of the Fifth Century is the transition from traditional

to more modern ways of thinking, which is expressed in a value crisis. 'It was a period

of profound social and political changes . . . Established patterns of life and experience

were dissolving in favour of new patterns. Beliefs and values of previous generations were

under attack. The sophistic movement gave expression to all this. m 2 The outbreak of

the Peloponnesian War exacerbates this crisis further and initiates a tangible reversal of

values. Thucydides describes the Hellenic world towards the end of the Fifth Century:

But war is a stern teacher; in depriving them of the power of easily satisfying their daily wants,

it brings most people's minds down to the level of their actual circumstances ... To fit in with the

change of events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings. What used to be described

as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage one would expect to find

in a party member; to think of the future and wait was merely another way of saying that one

was a coward; any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one's unmanly character;

ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action.

Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man, and to plot against an enemy behind his back

was perfectly legitimate self-defence. 213

This value crisis breeds ruthless and ambitious men such as Alcibiades, about whom

Thucydides writes: 'For most people became frightened at a quality in him which was

beyond the normal and showed itself both in the lawlessness of his private life and habits

and in the spirit in which he acted on all occasions. '214 In times of war, man's perspective

on life is forced to change. Accepted norms are reversed as a matter of expediency. 'In

the troubled circumstances of the late fifth century established moral canons were ignored

212 Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 1 213Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.82.18-21; 26-36 214Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.15.15-18

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 88

and men altered the accepted meanings of moral terms to conform to their actions. '215

The Sophists contribute to the ongoing crisis of morality by questioning time-honoured

beliefs and values. Their criticism is all-encompassing: 'In principle, nothing was any

longer taken for granted, and the fact that something was commonly practiced did not

in the least protect it from criticism. This criticism . . . spared neither the official religion

nor institutions, laws, or conceptions of justice on which the structure of the city-state

was based. '216 The Sophists' fundamental Scepticism which has been described previously

reflects a critical attitude towards authority reinforced by the social and political life of

the Fifth century. The processes of change at work in Athens have a profound impact

on the way people conceive of themselves and of the society they live in. In a period of

transition, everything and anything can be called into question. On the one hand, this

doubt widens the scope of individual freedom. On the other, it can lead to moral anarchy,

which Guthrie sees as the logical conclusion of Sophist thought. 217

Humanism

As a result of the widespread critical attitude towards the divine and the mythical, the

Fifth Century also witnesses the emergence of a humanism that puts human beings in the

centre. This change in perspective has an influence on all spheres of life. In politics, the

victory against the Persians increases the confidence of the Greeks. Military success is no

longer attributed to divine will or intervention, but to human capacity instead. With the

growth of Athenian democracy, men see themselves increasingly as responsible for their

city's destiny. The political system empowers citizens to influence domestic political life

as well as the foreign policy of their polis.

This focus on human action and human capacity is reflected in all disciplines. In

the realm of historical enquiry, Herodotus aims to produce a rational record of the past

which does not recount mythical legends but represents the human world. Rather than

concerning himself with the founding of towns and the genealogies of heroes, he criti­

cally scrutinises the accounts of eye witnesses in a bid to represent events of the past

215Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 94 216Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment, p. 3 217Guthrie, 'The First Humanists', p. 21

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 89

objectively. Thucydides goes even further than his predecessor in attempting to explain

political behaviour by analysing the interplay of reason and irrationality in human na­

ture.218 In literature, the great tragedians Euripides and Sophocles put an emphasis on

human skills and technical inventions such as speech, writing, hunting, fishing, architec­

ture, the domestication of animals, medicine, mathematics etc. 219 In the figurative arts,

monsters and all animals except the horse disappear in the course of the first half of the

Century. They are replaced by the human figure which is captured in its vibrant reality.

In brief, as human beings become the centre of interest there are fundamental changes in

every field of thought.

According to de Romilly, the trend towards anthropocentrism and rationality begins

long before the Sophists arrive in Athens and in fact prepares the ground for their actions

and success. 220 She describes the Sophists' interaction with the cultural context of the

Fifth Century as follows: 'the Sophists clearly fulfilled an expectation and were part of a

deep process of evolution that was finding expression in many different fields at this time.

Thinkers and writers in Greece were now tending to allot a greater place than before to

human beings and reason... Philosophy shifted its attention from the universe to man

himself, and from cosmogony to morality and politics. '221

First and foremost, Sophist humanism is a reaction against the natural philosophers.

The Sophists abandon the Presocratic study of nature and of the universe in order to focus

on the realities and problems of human life. As practical men, the Sophists concentrate

on the issues that really matter: how to manage one's own affairs and political matters

(indeed, this is what Protagoras professes to teach). They establish the relevance of

philosophy for everyday life, freeing it from the inconsistencies and contradictions of

Presocratic thought. For the Sophists, putting human beings in the centre has radical

implications for the way man conceives of himself. There is no higher authority than

the human; man is the measure of all things. Sophist Subjectivism epitomises the trend

towards humanism in the culture of Fifth Century Athens; it takes humanism to the

extreme.

218See Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.45.2-3 and 7-9; 6.24.5 ff. 219Guthrie, textitA History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 18 220de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 16 221 de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 11

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 90

Individualism

It is not just human beings in general but the individual as such that is granted a special

place in Fifth Century Athens. Whereas traditionally, the individual is less important

than the family, clan or tribe, the reforms instituted by Pericles and Ephialtes put the

individual at the centre of the political process. As Athenian citizens, all men are eligible

for public office and are free if they so wish to pursue a political career. Sophist teaching

reflects these developments and helps to produce the politicians needed by the state. We

agree with Ehrenberg that it is primarily the practical side of Sophist philosophy that

buttresses the development of individualism: 'Deutlicher als selbst die extremste Theorie

(die fiir sich genommen auch in sehr anderer Zeit moglich ware) macht es die plotzlich

und machtvoll in Erscheinung tretende Praxis der Sophisten, dass nunmehr wirklich der

einzelne Mensch in den Mittelpunkt des Denkens wie der Tat geriickt ist. '222

However, we should certainly not confuse the individualism of the Fifth Century with

that of our own society. As Solmsen points out, the Athenian state still plays a dominant

role:

But for the fetters thus removed from the feet of the individual there had been substituted the

over-all and binding authority of the Athenian state. The lesser loyalties had been swallowed up

in the greater but the individual still counted for little. He was, however, content to do so for

the moment. He had great personal freedom, little or no state-interference with his private life

or with his efforts to make money for himself and his family or even with his plans to dispose of

his gains. He had no reason to resent the paramount authority of a city which so provided for

his needs, and of which he felt himself to be a part. When therefore we speak of individualism

as manifesting itself about the middle of the fifth century, it is not associated with any assertion

of the rights of man, stillles an attack on the rights of the polis. Indeed the self-assertiveness of

the individual and eagerness for better education were indications of a desire to serve the city,

as well as to win honour and distinction for oneself in doing so. 223

222Ehrenberg, Polis und lmperium, p. 367 223Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment, p. 70

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 91

Cultural Relativism

The cultural relativism prevalent in Fifth Century Athens is induced by increased contact

with other cultuJes and a change of attitude towards them: 'Often adduced as a cause

of the new humanism is the widening of horizons through increasing contacts with other

peoples, in war, travel and the foundation of colonies. These made it increasingly obvious

that customs and standards of behaviour which had earlier been accepted as absolute

and universal, and of divine institution, were in fact local and relative. '224 Although

contact with the barbarians is nothing new for the Greeks and their awareness of other

people's customs and traditions is enhanced by Herodotus' detailed descriptions of other

cultures, it seems that the Fifth Century nevertheless marks a turning point in Greek self­

perception. This is due to a number of factors. First of all, the establishment of the Delian

League increased personal and commercial intercourse between Athens and distant parts

of Greece significantly. As a result, the Athenians become familiar with certain manners

and customs of other Greek people. Secondly, the geographical extension of the Athenian

Empire means that Athens is more exposed to non-Creeks at her borders. Thirdly, during

the Persian Wars, the Athenian tradition to incorporate the cults of vanquished people

into her own challenges the autocracy of established faiths. As Gomperz rightly observes,

'the foundation of all criticism is comparative observation'. 225 Being exposed to other

cultures raises awareness of human diversity and uniqueness. This can lead to rejection or

to acceptance. In the case of Athens, it seems to have encouraged the critical examination

of Athenian traditions. The atmosphere of insecurity that results from this introspection

provides the fertile ground on which the Sophists can sow Moral Relativism and Athenian

politicians can proclaim that every city decides what is right for her.

In this section, we have sought to substantiate our claim that Political Realism is

intricately linked to the historical and cultural context of Fifth Century Athens. It is this

context which allows the Athenians to translate Sophist philosophy into foreign policy.

224Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 16 225 Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhetorik, p. 384

4. What makes a thought thinkable? 92

Chapter 5

5.1 Background

Athens: The

relationship between

domestic politics and

foreign policy

In order to establish why Political Realism develops in Athens in the Fifth Century we need

to examine thoroughly which historical circumstances facilitate its emergence. Having

previously highlighted the historical preconditions for Athens' power status, we will now

focus on Athenian democracy and its impact on the city's foreign policy. We will show

that the Athenian political system gives rise to a specific political culture which in turn

produces a particular type of politician, both of which have a decisive impact on Athenian

foreign policy.

5.2 Athenian democracy

At the beginning of the Fifth Century, around 462 BCE, Athenian democracy under­

goes radical democratic reforms instituted by Ephialtes and Pericles, two eminent public

figures. They introduce a series of laws stripping the ancient Areopagus Council of all

political and of most judicial powers. In doing so, they limit the extensive regulatory

authorities of the Council, which are 'not derived from any formal grant of the people,

but have their source in immemorial antiquity and are sustained by general awe and rev-

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 94

erence. '226 The Council's remaining powers are negligible; they include jurisdiction in

homicide cases, the care of the sacred olive-trees of Athena, and a voice in the supervision

of the property of the Eleusinian deities. 227 From this point onwards, Athens' adminis­

tration is supervised by the people. The powers of the Areopagus are divided between

the Council of the Five Hundred on the one hand and the Assembly and the Heliaea on

the other. 228 The Council of the Five Hundred becomes the chief executive organ of the

people. This paves the way for full democracy, that is the exercise of sovereignty by the

majority of the people. With these reforms, Ephialtes and Pericles succeed in translating

the 'democratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians'229 into institutional change.

Democratic control and transparency increase at all levels of the political system: in the

public administration, in the judicature, and in the executive.

In the administration, the institutions which represent the Athenian people are now

in charge of regulating the behaviour of public officials. 'Any magistrate can be relieved

of his office in the course of his term if his conduct is found unsatisfactory at a monthly

review. 723° Control is kept in the hands of both the Council of the Five Hundred and the

Assembly to prevent the special influence any individual politician may have.

In court, the Athenian people are in charge of all juridical matters: all civil and

criminal cases are dealt with in dikastic assemblies. 231 As a consequence, the archon's

role in jurisdiction is substantially curtailed. He 'no longer delivers a verdict, but holds

only a preliminary hearing, at which the depositions of witnesses are taken and the relevant

laws are cited. The whole thing is then sealed up and delivered to the court, where the

archon presides but takes no substantive part in the proceedings at all. '232

On the level of public policy-making, the introduction of lot and pay is the key element

of democratic reform. Both the archons and the members of the Council of Five Hundred

are now determined by lot from all eligible citizens, rather than from elected candidates.

Archonship and membership of the Council of Five Hundred is turned into paid office,

226G. Grote, History of Greece Vol. V (London, John Murray, 1849), p. 482 227J.B. Bury, A History of Greece (London, Macmillan, 1970), p. 347 228N.G.L. Harnmond, A History of Greece (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 288 229Grote, History of Greece, Vol. V, p. 476 230 A. Andrewes, Greek Society (London, Penguin Books, 1991), p. 194 231 Grote, History of Greece, Vol. V, p. 480 232 Andrewes, Greek Society, p. 197

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 95

which means that candidacy is no longer restricted to the two richest classes. It is now

not only legal but practically possible for the poorer citizens to give up their time to

public affairs. 233 In Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War, Pericles describes

the equality Athenian citizens enjoy in his Funeral Oration: 'Our constitution is called

a democracy because power is in the hands not of a minority but of the whole people.

When it is a question of settling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when

it is a question of putting one person before another in positions of public responsibility,

what counts is not membership of a particular class, but the actual ability which the man

possesses. '234 As Guthrie notes, the Athenian democratic system naturally encourages

the belief that one man's opinion is as good as another's and that as citizens; all Athe­

nians are equally competent in the art of government.235 However, Adkins demonstrates

convincingly that due to the Athenian value system, Athenians continue to attribute arete

to those of noble birth and wealth, thereby preventing citizens from lower social strata

from acquiring high political positions.236 Andrewes adds that the poor remain largely

excluded from political office for very practical reasons: 'Being a councillor takes a lot

of time, and, though the developed democracy pays its councillors, it does not pay them

very much. No really poor man would want to serve ... '237 What is true of public officials

is also true for politicians; most of whom

at least during the middle decades of the [fifth] century, are relatively well-to-do. The demands on

their time are normally sufficient to exclude most poor farmers, day labourers, or artisans. of only

moderate means from any extensive political career. Pericles and Cimon had extensive estates;

Thucydides' mother was probably a Thracian princess; the families of Cleinias and Callias were

notorious for their wealth. Even the allegedly poor politicians, Ephialtes and Aristides, were

probably poor only by comparison to the often extraordinary wealth of their competitors.238

In Athens, a well-established family, a strategic marriage and personal wealth continues to

233Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. III, p. 19 234Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.37.3-9 235 Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 19 236 A.W.H. Adkins, Moml Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece (London, Chatto & Windus,

1972), p. 141ff. 237 Andrewes, Greek Society, p. 188 238 Connor, The New Politicians Of Fifth-Century Athens, p. 76

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 96

play an important role in politics. However, reforms instituted by Ephialtes and Pericles

establish formal equality between Athenian citizens. In reality, there may not be equal

opportunities to become a politician or to hold office, but at least any citizen may speak

and vote in the Assembly, which passes laws, declares war and concludes treaties. 239 The

core of politics, (i.e. political decision-making), is taken from the hands of a few officials

and given to the people. Particular (and often partial) judgement is replaced by collective

decisions: 'The distrust of experts and confidence in the collective judgment of ordinary

men was the essence of democracy. [ ... ] political decisions were taken after noisy debate in

the primary assembly, which all could attend if they chose. '240 In practice, only a fraction

of those eligible would turn up to Assembly meetings: 'Not indeed that in Athens more

than a small proportion habitually attend - at a time when there may have been as many

as 45,000 qualified voters, it is rare for as many as 5,000-6,000 to exercise their right- but

it is clear that men of all classes do attend. The principle that no one should be denied

that right is the essential principle of democratic freedom and equality.'241 As public

participation in the political process increases, politics become more accessible and as a

result public opinion is more widely reflected in political decisions.

As the responsibilities of each Athenian citizen increase, more and more people gain

experience in the world of politics. Hammond describes the wide-ranging functions of

those who serve as councillors:

The 500 Councillors, changing annually and appointed by lot, dealt with an astonishing amount

of business: the preparation of the agenda for the Assembly; the scrutinizing, directing, and

preliminary auditing of all magistrates; the administration of state finance, buildings, festivals,

docks, and naval and military establishments; the selection of citizens to undertake liturgies;

the assessment and collection of tribute; and in time of war the preliminary decision on urgent

matters of strategy and diplomacy.242

The 1400 magistrates carry out a wide variety of administrative duties whereas the 6000

Heliasts deal only with cases affecting Athens and her allies. All citizens are involved in

239Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 19 240 Andrewes, Greek Society, p. 202 241 Andrewes, Greek Society, p. 69 242Hammond, A History of Greece, p. 330

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 97

their city's politics. As a result, Athenian society is highly politicised:

the citizens possessed an experience of the details of political and judicial administration which

has never been paralleled in an ancient or modern state. Moreover, this experience is spread

through all classes in the citizen community by the use of the lot, the rotation of office, and the

disregard of property qualification except in the candidature for a few magistracies. 243

Despite the fact that professional politics and high office remain rather exclusive, the

introduction of lot and pay empowers the entire Athenian electorate through political

participation. In his Funeral Oration in 431/0 BCE, Pericles describes the political par­

ticipation of Athenian citizens as follows: 'Here each individual is interested not only in

his own affairs but in the affairs of the state as well: even those who are mostly occu­

pied with their own business are extremely well-informed on general politics - this is a

peculiarity of ours: we do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics is a man

who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all. '244 The politics

of the city state concern all. And since the people are sovereign, one cannot be a citizen

without taking part in the political process. This distinguishes Athens from other Greek

city states and is the main characteristic of its political culture.

5.3 Athenian political culture and its impact on politi-. c1ans

How does the democratisation of political culture affect the political system? First, the

nature of public decision-making changes. As the institutions charged with making de­

cisions become more representative of the Athenian public, policies need to be agreed

upon by a more heterogeneous group of people. This makes finding a consensus more

difficult and turns every decision into a battlefield of competing opinions. Secondly, the

new democratic institutions require a specific type of politician. To win political debates,

politicians have to be convincing orators trained in the art of public speaking and rhetoric.

Let us contextualise these assertions by examining how the political system functions

243Hammond, A History of Greece, p. 330 244Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.40.6-11

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 98

and in which ways it shapes political agents. The History of the Peloponnesian War pro­

vides examples of the characteristics of public decision-making in Fifth Century Athens.

Political decisions are the result of a process of open debate followed by a public vote: 'We

Athenians, in our own persons, take our decisions on policy or submit them to proper

discussions: for we do not think that there is an incompatibility between words and

deeds; the worst thing is to rush into action before the consequences have been properly

debated. '245 These procedures ensure that all policies are fully supported by the public.

However, the quest for consensus is not always easy as public opinion can change rapidly.

This is exemplified in 427 BCE, when Athens decides to punish her revolting Mytilenian

subjects severely, the public demands that this policy be reconsidered shortly afterwards:

Next day, however, there was a sudden change of feeling and people began to think how cruel

and how unprecedented such a decision was... Observing this, the deputation from Mytilene

which was in Athens and the Athenians who were supporting them approached the authorities

with a view to having the question debated again. They won their point the more easily because

the authorities themselves saw clearly that most of the citizens were wanting someone to give

them a chance of reconsidering the matter. 246

In the debate that ensues, Cleon, one of the leading Athenian political figures at the

time, condemns frequent changes of opinion as the fundamental weakness of Athenian

democracy:

Personally I have had occasion often enough already to observe that a democracy is incapable of

governing others, and I am all the more convinced of this when I see how you are now changing

your minds about the Mytilenians... when you give way to your own feelings of compassion you

are being guilty of a kind of weakness which is dangerous to you... And this is the very worst

thing- to pass measures and then not to abide by them.247

In Cleon's view, a strong democracy is characterised by the capacity to act:

I am amazed at those who have proposed a reconsideration of the question of Mytilene, thus

causing a delay which is all to the advantage of the guilty party. After a lapse of time the injured

245Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.40.12-16 246Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.36.17-19;20-26 247Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.37.1-4;7-9;15-16

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 99

party will lose the edge of his anger when he comes to act against those who have wronged him;

whereas the best punishment and the one most fitted to the crime is when reprisals follow

immediately. 248

Cleon is contradicted by Diodotus, probably 'a private citizen whose outrage at the

policy makes him stand and oppose it. He becomes a temporary politician and wins his

case by the cogency of his cause and the cleverness of his speech. '249 Diodotus role in the

Mytilenian Debate demonstrates that the flexible and simple model of Athenian politics

allows individual citizens to have an impact on domestic and foreign policies without the

support of the public or of political parties. The ability, capacity and readiness of Athenian

citizens to speak up about issues of public concern is one of the major characteristics of

Athenian democracy; it ensures that the public voice is always heard. 250 In this vein,

Diodotus contradicts Cleon and claims that it lies in the nature of democratic decision-

making to reconsider important issues if necessary: 'I do not blame those who have

proposed a new debate on the subject of Mytilene, and I do not share the view which we

have heard expressed [i.e. Cleon's view], that it is a bad thing to have frequent discussions

on matters of importance. '251 He points to the positive effects of having prolonged political

debates: 'Haste and anger are, to my mind, the two greatest obstacles to wise counsel

- haste, that usually goes with folly, anger, that is the mark of primitive and narrow

minds. '252 Furthermore, Diodotus emphasises that policies are made up of both words

and actions, which are inherently connected: 'And anyone who maintains that words

cannot be a guide to action must be either a fool or one with some personal interest at

stake ... '253

There is no doubt that Cleon has a point criticising the frequent changes of public

opinion as they can be detrimental to public policy. Due to fluctuations in public opinion,

Athenian politics lacks consistency and continuity. For politicians, this means that both

their policies and their popularity can be very short-lived. Pericles complains about this

248Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.38.1-7 249Connor, The New Politicians Of Fifth-Century Athens, p. 23 250J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 176 251Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.42.1-4 252Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.42.4-6 253Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.42.6-8

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 100

in his Funeral Oration: 'As for me, I am the same as I was, and do not alter; it is you

[the audience] who have changed. What has happened is this: you took my advice when

you were still untouched by misfortune, and repented of your action when things went

badly with you; it is because your own resolution is weak that my policy appears to

you to be mistaken. '254 Pericles experiences the extent to which political careers are at

the whim of public opinion. Every politician's influence depends fundamentally on his

public support, which is unpredictable. After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians

around 430, the Athenians are indecisive regarding their city's future course of action.

This is reflected in their attitude towards Pericles: 'They began to blame Pericles for

having persuaded them to go to war and to hold him responsible for all the misfortunes

which had overtaken them... they were then in a state of utter hopelessness, and all

their angry feelings turned against Pericles. '255 'The general ill feeling against Pericles

persisted, and was not satisfied until they had condemned him to pay a fine. Not long

afterwards, however, as is the way with crowds, they re-elected him to the generalship and

put all their affairs into his hands. '256 Pericles' case exemplifies the fate of Fifth Century

politicians whose power is not only dependent on the people but resides ultimately in

their rhetorical capacities. On the one hand 'the skilful speaker in Athens has a source

of power that frees him from many of the encumbrances of the old style of politics. He

can be more independent, he can neglect, even offend, influential groups, he might even

dare to bypass the old process of building up alliances through the often aggravatingly

slow sequence of discussion, concession, compromise, and coordination. '257 On the other

hand,

through his eloquence a politician can swiftly attain a lofty position in the city - but a perilous

one. What rhetoric gives, rhetoric can take away. If that technique can elevate him to the

pinnacles of power, it can also abandon him to sudden gusts of popular fancy and plunge him

quickly to the depths of obscurity, or to the chastisements of the assembly or the law courts. 258

But regardless of its influence on the success or failure of politicians, the power of the

254Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.61.5-10 255Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.59.4-9 256Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.65.11-15 257Connor, The New Politicians Of Fifth-Century Athens, p. 117 258Connor, The New Politicians Of Fifth-Century Athens, p. 117

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 101

demos is neither omnipotent nor immune to the establishment of quasi-autocratic struc­

tures. If a politician wins the hearts and minds of the public, the rule of the people can

easily turn into the rule of one. Thucydides describes Pericles' extraordinary talent for

controlling the people's will which allows him to become primus inter pares:

Pericles, because of his position, his intelligence, and his known integrity, could respect the

liberty of the people and at the same time hold them in check. It was he who led them, rather

than they who led him, and, since he never sought power from any wrong motive, he was under

no necessity of flattering them: in fact he was so highly respected that he was able to speak

angrily to them and to contradict them... So, in what was nominally a democracy, power was

really in the hands of the first citizen. 259

However,

neither Pericles nor any other politician in ancient Athens can be sure of a lasting and unshaken

rule. If one man manages to hold power for a long time, it is because of his ability, his skill, his

agility in manoeuvring, not because he is unchallenged. The inadequate surviving accounts of so

many political figures, our ignorance of many men of the second rank, the inevitable tendency for

the unsuccessful rival to disappear from the pages of history tempt and deceive us. There are no

long periods of tranquil dominance in fifth century Athens; politics is regularly and vigorously

polycentric. 260

In addition to the problems highlighted, making decisions in public assemblies has a

number of other undemocratic side effects. For example, since a public vote does not

allow for differentiated decisions, public speakers have a disproportionately high impact

on policies. A speaker's policy suggestions are usually rejected as a whole or adopted

as a whole: 'Their [Athenians] reply to the Spartans was the one that he [Pericles] had

suggested, both on the main issue and on the separate points ... '261 As a consequence, the

democratic ideal of political equality amongst citizens is not fully realised; citizens in the

audience do not have the same influence on policies as public speakers.

Another serious problem with decision-making based on public votes is that the ma­

jority often pressure the minority into compliance. This is what happens at the launching

259Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2.65.35-41; 44-46 26°Connor, The New Politicians Of Fifth-Century Athens, p. 69 261Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.145.2-4

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 102

of the Sicilian expedition in 415 BCE: 'The result of this excessive enthusiasm of the

majority was that the few who actually were opposed to the expedition were afraid of

being thought unpatriotic if they voted against it, and therefore kept quiet. '262

Despite its numerous dysfunctional aspects, we believe that on the whole, the political

system of Athens is democratised by the reforms of Pericles and Ephialtes. As institutional

structures and political culture change, so do political agents. They have to adapt to new

political procedures and find ways to partake in and influence the political discourse. In

order to be successful, politicians in Fifth Century Athens need to be persuasive speakers

who can convince their audience with personal integrity and rhetorical skills. As Andrewes

highlights 'at Athens, no man exercises power longer than he can persuade the assembly

that his views are right, and he has to go on convincing the same or a slightly different

audience, time after time, without respite. '263 The fluidity of a politician's power base

requires him to establish permanent ties with parts of the electorate:

a political career ... would require influence in the various assemblies of the city ... He would need

some sort of power base, men that would listen to him and men he could rely upon. To win the

support he needed he would turn to citizens whose interests and attitudes he shared, to men

of the same economic and social class, and above all to those he had known longest and most

intimately, his own family. 264

Also, establishing oneself as a 'man of the people' ensures a broad power base:

in the late fifth century it is possible to acquire political power by direct appeal to the citizenry

without the tedious apprenticeship imposed by the system of political friendship, without the

slow aggregation of alliances and coalitions. A man can win prominence by offering to protect

the interests of the demos, by presenting himself as a prostates tou demou ["one who stands

before the people"], and through his success as a rhetor ["one who speaks"] become the leader

of the people, the demagogos. 265

However, politicians must be men of action as well as masters of rhetoric:

Kenntnisse im Bereich der politischen Verhaltnisse der Gegenwart und der Vergangenheit, da-

262Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 6.24.18-21 263 Andrewes, Greek Society, p. 202 264Connor, The New Politicians Of Fifth-Century Athens, p. 10 265Connor, The New Politicians Of Fifth-Century Athens, p. 119

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 103

raus resultierende Einblicke in politische Zusammenhiinge und vor allem die Fiihigkeit, Folgen

etwaiger Aktivitiiten richtig abzuschiitzen, ferner natiirlich die Fiihigkeit, seine Mitbiirger von

dem, was man als das Beste = Niitzlichste erkannt hat, zu iiberzeugen, so classes auch ihnen als

das Beste erscheint, also iiberzeugungskraft und das heisst: rhetorische Fiihigkeiten, schliesslich

fiir den aktiven Politiker sicher auch so etwas wie Entschluss- und Tatkraft. '266

Pericles is the perfect example of a politician whose power is expressed in both his actions

and in his oratory skills. On his first appearance in the History of the Peloponnesian

War, Thucydides describes Pericles as follows: 'Among the speakers was Pericles, the son

of Xanthippus, the leading man of his time among the Athenians and the most powerful

both in action and debate.' 267 In his reply to the Spartan Ultimatum in 432-1 BCE,

Pericles proves his powers of persuasion: 'This is the right reply to make and it is the

reply that this city of ours ought to make. '268

Given that very few people are born with a natural talent for both action and debate,

and given that it is more difficult to convince people of a certain policy than putting it

into practice, aspiring politicians focus on their ability to persuade. How are they trained

and by whom?

5.4 Rhetoric and Sophist teaching

The main effect of democracy on the Athenian political culture is the broadening of partici­

pation in the political process. Before the reforms of Pericles and Ephialtes are introduced,

politics is dominated by the wealthy. But as Athenian institutions are democratised, cit­

izens from all social backgrounds enter the political arena. Whether in the Assembly

or in the Council of the Five Hundred, whether as public administrators or as private

individuals standing trial- citizens have to be able to speak in public and argue their case

convincingly. The faculty of persuasive speech is a vital skill for all citizens in all political

positions and concerns all political activities and tasks. Bury describes how central speech

266K. Daring, 'Die politische Theorie des Protagoras' in G.B. Kerferd (ed.), The Sophists and

their Legacy - Proceedings of the Fourth International Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy (Hermes

Einzelschriften 44; Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner Verlag, 1981), p. 114 267Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.139.25-27 268Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 1.144.20-21

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 104

is to any political process:

The institutions of a Greek democratic city presupposed in the average citizen the faculty of

speaking in public, and for anyone who was ambitious for a political career it was indispensable.

If a man was hauled into a law-court by his enemies and did not know how to speak, he was like

an unarmed civilian attacked by soldiers. The power of expressing ideas clearly and in such a

way as to persuade an audience was an art to be learned and taught. But it was not enough to

gain command of a vocabulary; it was necessary to learn how to argue, and to exercise one's self

in the discussion of political and ethical questions. There was a demand for higher education.269

Traditional Athenian education lacks a systematic curriculum. Boys up to the age of 14

are taught a combination of one or many of the following subjects: arithmetic, athletics,

music, dancing, reading and writing. This education does not prepare citizens for the

political life in the democratic polis. It is the political ambitions of young men of wealth

in particular, that create a demand which conventional teachers cannot meet.

And the path to power ... lay open to the man whose speech carried conviction and who could

claim expert knowledge. Such an education would certainly fit a man for political life at Athens.

So if any man, citizen or stranger, was able to provide such an education, he would find in

Athens a splendid and lucrative field for his lectures and demonstrations and an audience eager

to learn and willing to pay. To political power and material prosperity is added a demand for

political education, and in this triple combination we have the soil in which much of fifth century

political thought grew.270

In the absence of institutions of adult learning the educational gap is filled by a group

of teachers who travel about to give general instructions in the art of speaking and in

the art of reasoning, and, out of their encyclopaedic knowledge, lecture on all possible

subjects. 271 These instructors are the Sophists who charge fees for their lessons. They

do not confine themselves to teaching but participate in public affairs and diffuse their

knowledge and ideas through written treatise.

But what kind of education do the Sophists offer? 'What the sophists were able to offer

was in no sense a contribution to the education of the masses. They offered an expensive

269Bury, A History of Greece, p. 241 270Sinclair, 'Protagoras and Others', p. 68 271 Bury, A History of Greece, p. 386

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 105

product invaluable to those seeking a career in politics and public life generally, namely

a kind of selective secondary education, intended to follow on after the basic instruction

received at school. '272 This kind of teaching is a great innovation which challenges the

conventional Athenian conceptions of education. As de Romilly points out 'the very idea

that intellectual teaching could have a practical use was a totally novel one to Athens.

It was, furthermore, an idea that implied social change ... '273 But although the idea that

political skills can be taught offers citizens of both high and low birth the prospect of

excelling in public life, in reality, only the wealthy have the means to profit from Sophist

teaching. 'Their teaching was costly and aimed only at those rich enough to pay for it:

the aristocrats, whose families had long been predominant in Athens and who must have

been particularly concerned to retain or recover their influence. '274

The teaching methods employed by the Sophists vary. They travel widely in the

Greek world and teach in different cities. Some of them appear at great festivals to

introduce their work to the public. Displays are held in private houses, public spaces or

at communal games. A Sophist often gives a display on a prepared theme from a written

text and occasionally invites the audience to question him. Most of the instruction is

given in small circles, seminars or public lectures. Students have to study and criticise

the writings of poets, analyse forms of speech, learn to speak briefly in question and

answer exercises and train themselves to defend either side in an argument. Due to the

lack of sources, it is difficult to establish the exact scope of Sophist teaching. And since

we cannot deal with every Sophist individually, our analysis is based on generalisations

which try to capture what the Sophists have in common as teachers of rhetoric. Rankin

describes what characterises the Sophists as teachers:

Sophists in this sense were people who professed to teach "wisdom" and "virtue" for a fee. They

were a profession, but not a homogenous one. Their main points in common were that they

were paid for their teaching and that they based their teaching upon developed uses of language

for imparting skill in argument and persuasion. Whether an individual Sophists' claim was to

teach arete (virtue) or merely some argumentative technique or way of arranging language in the

272Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 17 273de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 54 274de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 213

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 106

most impressive or convincing style, his concern was with the human realm and the association

of man with man in the competitive life of Greek society.275

We may gain a more accurate view by studying how the Sophists conceive of them­

selves. Again, we rely on Plato's account of their profession. In Protagoras, Socrates

addresses Protagoras: 'While others hide this profession, you advertise yourself openly

to all the Greeks, calling yourself a sophist, proclaiming yourself a teacher of education

and of arete, the first to believe he deserves to be paid for his teaching. '276 Socrates has

reservations regarding the intentions of these new teachers and is suspicious of their pro­

fession for charging fees. In Kerferd's view 'it was not the fact that they charged fees as

such which gave offence, it was the fact that they sold instruction in wisdom and virtue.

These were not the kind of things that should be sold for money; friendship and gratitude

should be sufficient reward. '277 Thus the Sophists embody the fundamental change in

values of the Fifth Century. Earlier on in Protagoras, Protagoras justifies his profession

as follows:

So if any one of us is even a little bit better at helping others advance towards arete, he should

be welcomed. I believe that I am one of these, that I do a better job than others do in helping a

person become fine and good, and that I am worth the fee I charge and even more, as the pupil

himself judges. That is why I have set up this system for determining my fee: when someone

has studied with me, he pays the sum I charge if hes willing; if not, he goes to a temple, makes

an oath as to how much he declares the lessons to be worth, and pays that much. 278

In Plato's Theaetetus, Socrates imagines how Protagoras may have described his task as

a teacher: 'the wise man replaces each pernicious convention by a wholesome one, making

this both be and seem just. Similarly the professional teacher who is able to educate his

pupils on these lines is a wise man, and is worth his large fees to them. In this way we are

enabled to hold both that some men are wiser than others, and also that no man judges

what is false. '279 As there is evidence for both views it cannot be established whether

the Sophists see themselves as teachers of rhetoric or of both arete and rhetoric. While

275Rankin, Sophists, Socratics and Cynics, p. 14 276Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 2, p.174 277Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 25 278Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 10, p. 184 279Plato, Theaetetus, 167c8-d4

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 107

Protagoras claims that his teaching makes men better, in M eno, Plato represents Gorgias

as a teacher of rhetoric rather than of arete: 'I especially admire Gorgias for this, Socrates:

you would never hear him promising this [i.e., that he is a teacher of arete]; in fact, he

laughs at others he hears make such promises. He thinks one should make men skilful at

speaking. '280 In Plato's Gorgias, the Sophist confirms the assertion that he trains orators:

'Socrates: Then we are to say that you can make others what you are yourself? Gorgias:

That is precisely what I profess to do at Athens and elsewhere. '281 'Socrates: ... You

say that you can make an orator of anyone who wishes to learn from you? Gorgias: Yes.

Socrates: And consequently in all matters he will be able to get his way before a mass of

people not by teaching but by convincing? Gorgias: Certainly. '282

Within the framework of this analysis, we are primarily interested in the teaching

of rhetoric and the implications for the political culture of Athens. It is clear that 'all

the leading Sophists were deeply concerned with it [rhetoric], in its forensic, political and

epideictic branches, both as active practitioners and as teachers, systematizers and writers

of rhetorical books. '283 Although the Sophists 'were not the pioneers of rhetoric, [but]

they were certainly ready to step in and supply the demand for it. '284

We would like to focus on the link between Sophist teaching and Athenian politics.

Because 'behind the art of rhetoric as it was ultimately fashioned lies the art of being a

politician, that is, of being a politician specifically as politicians functioned in Athenian

democracy. '285 Behind the intimate association of rhetoric and politics we can see the

philosophical foundations of Sophist thought. And since our analysis seeks to establish

links between philosophy and politics, we must bear in mind that these links are crys­

tallised in the theory and practice of rhetoric. Rhetoric serves both as a bridge between

philosophy and politics and as a vehicle for the dissemination of Sophist thought: 'Rhetoric

teaches from the first that what matters is not what is the case, but what appears, what

280Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 12, p. 205 281 Plato, Gorgias, 449b1-4 282Plato, Gorgias, 458e6459a1 283Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. III, p. 176 284Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 179 285H. Yunis, 'The Constraints of Democracy and the Rise of the Art of Rhetoric' in D. Boedeker and

K.A. Raaflaub (eds.), Democracy, Empire, and the Arts in Fifth-Century Athens (Cambridge, Harvard

University Press, 1998), p. 229

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 108

men can be persuaded of. It is the "art of logos", which is not only speech and argument

but also appearance or belief as opposed to fact, and its goal is persuasion. '286 Rhetoric is

much more than simply a new way of conducting politics. It is a fundamental change in

the perspective people have on political activity and has a substantial impact on political

processes and outcomes. With their teaching, the Sophists contribute dramatically to the

transformation of Athenian politics. As foreigners, they are not allowed to participate in

Athens' political life; but through their students, they exert a considerable influence on

Athenian democracy.

Protagoras highlights the inherent connection between rhetoric and politics:

If he comes to me he won't learn about anything but what he came for. And that is good

judgment about domestic matters, so that he may best manage his own household, and about

political affairs, so that in affairs of the polis he may be most able both in action and speech.

Socrates: Am I following what you say? I think you mean political knowledge [i.e. the knowledge

of how to run a polis or city], and you promise to make men good citizens. Protagoras: That is

exactly what I proclaim. 287 In order to be good democratic citizens, men need to be capable of

participating successfully in public affairs.

As we have demonstrated above, in Athens public speaking is a key political skill:

The chief instrument of government in practically the whole of Greece was the power of the

tongue. More than this. It was not merely in the council-chamber and the popular assembly

that the efficacy of speech was supreme. In the law court too, where hundreds of jurymen would

sometimes be sitting together, words were the universal weapons, the clever manipulation of

which was more than half of the battle. The gift and faculty of speech were the sole road to

honour and power ... It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the art of speech should have

been cultivated for the first time in the democratic communities of that age as a profession, and

that it should have assumed a prominent if not actually the first place in the education of the

young.288

In Plato's Gorgias, the Sophist describes the power that rhetorical skill confers upon those

who are in command of it.

286Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 179 287 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 4, p. 175 288T. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (London, John Murray, 1901), p. 382/3

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 109

Gorgias: I mean Socrates, what is in truth the greatest good, which confers on everyone who

possesses it not only freedom for himself but also the power of ruling over his fellow citizens.

Socrates: What do you mean by that? Gorgias: I mean the ability to convince by means of

speech a jury in a court of justice, members of the Council in their Chamber, those attending

a meeting of the Assembly, and any other gathering of citizens whatever it may be. By the

exercise of this ability you will have the doctor as your slave, the trainer as your slave, and that

businessman of yours will turn out to be making money not for himself but for another - for

you, in fact, who have the ability to speak and to convince the masses. 289

In On Sophists by Alcidamas, we read that in addition to being powerful, skilled

speakers are also held in high esteem by their fellow citizens: 'Often events unexpectedly

present opportunities, and at these times those who are silent will appear contemptible,

whereas we observe that those who speak are held in honour by others for having god-like

intelligence. '290 Given the importance of rhetoric skills, it is obvious that orators will

require a special education. 'Now, to speak appropriately, on the spot, on whatever topic

is proposed, to be quick with an argument and ready with the right word, and to find

just the right speech to match the current situation and people's desires - all this is not

within the natural ability of everyone nor the result of whatever education one happens

to have had. '291 Furthermore, rhetorical skills need to be practised:

I am not recommending that one speak offhandedly. I think public speakers should choose in

advance their arguments and overall organisation, but the actual words should be supplied at

the time of speaking ... Thus, whoever desires to become a skilful public speaker and not just an

adequate maker of speeches, and wishes to make best use of his opportunities rather than speak

with verbal precision, and is eager to procure the goodwill of the audience on his side rather

than its resentful opposition, and who further wishes that his mind be relaxed, his memory

quick, his forgetfulness hidden, and is eager to achieve an ability with speeches commensurate

with the needs of his life - it would be reasonable for him to practice extemporaneous speaking

on every possible occasion. 292

289Plato, Goryias, 452d5-e9 290Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 2, p. 278 291 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 2, p. 277 292Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 2, p. 283

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 110

Despite being a fervent advocate of rhetorical education, Alcidamas also warns public

speakers against losing sight of the purpose of their speech. Political debates should not

obstruct political processes or harm public institutions. Public speakers should not be

driven by personal considerations but must contribute to the public interest:

I have often thought and wondered, gentlemen, about the intentions of public speakers. Why on

earth do they come forth so readily and give us advice, when they bring no benefit to the public

welfare but offer a great deal of slander against each other and carelessly throw out arguments

that are quite inappropriate to the present situation? Every one of them says he only wants to

gain a reputation, but some also demand payment and give their advice to whichever side they

think will pay them more. And if someone in the camp does wrong or harms the public interest

while getting rich himself, we can see that one on thinks anything of it293

In Gorgias, Socrates, who is notoriously critical of Athenian democracy, asks Gorgias

whether oratory is only about conviction 'Socrates: ... if I understand you correctly, you

are saying that oratory is a maker of conviction, and that this is the sum and substance

of its whole activity... Gorgias: ... the definition which you have given seems to be quite

adequate; that sums up oratory. '294 Proceeding from this definition, Socrates denounces

the adverse effects of oratory on political decision-making.

Now, what are we to think of the oratory addressed to the Athenian people and to the assemblies

of free men in other cities? Do the orators in your opinion speak always with an eye to what

is best, and make it the constant aim of their speeches to improve their fellow-citizens as much

as possible, or do they too set out merely to gratify the citizens, sacrificing the public interest

to their own personal success, and treating the assemblies like children, whom their only object

is to please, without caring at all whether their speeches make them better or worse? Callicles:

There is not simple answer to this question as there was to the other, for some speakers are

moved in their speeches by a regard for the public interest, and some are as you describe.295

We find similar reflections in the History of the Peloponnesian War, which provides

us with invaluable insights into Athenian political culture. For example, the Mytilenian

Debate in 427 BCE reveals different perspectives on the conduct of political debates.

293Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 3, p. 284 294Plato, Goryias, 453a3-9 295Pfato, Goryias, 502el-503a6

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 111

Clean, one of the most powerful men in Athens, argues against using rhetoric in matters

concerning the state. In his view, rhetorical arguments should not be admitted into

political discussions, since both the speakers and the audience may mistake them for

reality: 'As for the speech-makers who give such pleasure by their arguments, they should

hold their competitions on subjects which are less important, and not on a question

where the state may have to pay a heavy penalty for its light pleasure, while the speakers

themselves will no doubt be enjoying splendid rewards for their splendid arguments. '296

Clean claims that the main problem with democratic decision-making is that people are

too easily influenced or even deluded by rhetoric. When political decisions are taken in

assemblies, people tend to forget that words and speeches refer to the real world:

You have become regular speech-goers, and as for action, you merely listen to accounts of it; if

something is to be done in the future you estimate the possibilities by hearing a good speech on

the subject, and as for the past you rely not so much on the facts which you have seen with your

own eyes as on what you have heard about them in some clever piece of verbal criticism. 297

Clean's attitude towards rhetoric is reminiscent of Gorgias' characterisation of the power

of logos: 'The power of speech has the same effect on the disposition of the soul as the

disposition of drugs on the nature of bodies. Just as different drugs draw forth different

humours from the body ... so too with words: some cause pain, others joy, some strike

fear, some stir the audience to boldness, some benumb and bewitch the soul with evil

persuasion. '298 Clean argues that, politics, instead of dealing with issues, is in danger of

being reduced to a competition in rhetoric:

Any novelty in an argument deceives you at once, but when the argument is tried and proved

you become unwilling to follow it; you look with suspicion on what is normal and are the slaves

of every paradox that comes your way. The chief wish of each one of you is to be able to make a

speech himself, and, if you cannot do that, the next best thing is to compete with those who can

make this sort of speech by not looking as though you were at all out of your depth while you

listen to the views put forward, by applauding a good pint even before it is made, and by being

as quick at seeing how an argument is going to be developed as you are slow at understanding

296Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.40.15-21 297Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.38.18-24 298Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 1, p. 193

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 112

what in the end it will lead to. 299

Surprisingly, Cleon and Socrates share a similar perspective on the motivation of public

orators, although the latter attacks them from a different angle:

... Now, what are we to think of the oratory addressed to the Athenian people and to the

assemblies of free men in other cities? Do the orators in your opinion speak always with an eye

to what is best, and make it the constant aim of their speeches to improve their fellow-citizens

as much as possible, or do they too set out merely to gratify the citizens, sacrificing the public

interest to their own personal success, and treating the assemblies like children, whom their only

object is to please, without caring at all whether their speeches make them better or worse?300

Cleon insists that public assemblies are not capable of making reasonable policy decisions:

What you are looking for all the time is something that is, I should say, outside the range of

ordinary experience, and yet you cannot even think straight about the facts of life that are before

you. You are simply victims of your own pleasure in listening, and are more like an audience

sitting at the feet of a professional lecturer than a parliament discussing matters of state301

Clean's criticism of the way politics are conducted in democratic assemblies is of par­

ticular interest. Comparing the decision-makers in Athens to the passive audience of a

professional lecturer, he implies that a political assembly should not be confused with a

Sophist classroom. Although young Athenians are trained by the Sophists to participate

in speech competitions, Cleon emphasises the fundamental difference between practising

rhetorical skills and giving a speech in a public assembly. Even though at first, it seems

as if he is arguing against the use of rhetoric in politics altogether, what he is really crit­

icising is the lack of realism that rhetoric usually entails. Speeches need to be persuasive

but they must not put style before content. A political debate can only be meaningful

and productive if those that participate in it realise exactly what it is: a mechanism to

make public policies.

Diodotus disagrees with Clean and argues that the words employed by public speakers

299Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.38.24-35 300Plato, Gorgias, 502el-503a2 301 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.38.35-41

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 113

are related to reality as well as to actions:

And anyone who maintains that words cannot be a guide to action must be either a fool or one

with some personal interest at stake; he is a fool, if he imagines that it is possible to deal with

the uncertainties of the future by any other medium, and he is personally interested if his aim is

to persuade you into some disgraceful action, and, knowing that he cannot make a good speech

in a bad cause, he tries to frighten his opponents and his hearers by some good-sized pieces of

misrepresentation. 302

He maintains that democratic decision-making can function if political speakers respect

a certain code of conduct:

The good citizen, instead of trying to terrify the opposition, ought to prove his case in fair

argument; and a wise state, without giving special honours to its best counsellors, will certainly

not deprive them of the honour they already enjoy; and when a man's advice is not taken, he

should not even be disgraced, far less penalised. In this way successful speakers will be less likely

to pursue further honours by speaking against their own convictions in order to make themselves

popular, and unsuccessful speakers, too, will not struggle to win over the people by the same

acts of flattery. 303

Just like Clean, Diodotus is concerned with the hidden motives and the personal interest

of the speakers, which he fears may have an unduly influence on their speeches. Public

speakers must not betray their convictions. Diodotus argues that they will only refrain

from doing so if losing an argument does not mean losing one's honour. In order for the

state to benefit from public debates, arguments must be evaluated irrespective of who

makes them. Diodotus goes on reasoning that there are a number of other problems with

public speech-making. He claims that suspicion of a speaker's personal interest prevents

the unbiased assessment of his views: 'Then, too, if a man gives the best possible advice

but is under the slightest suspicion of being influenced by his own private profit, we are so

embittered by the idea (a wholly unproved one) of this profit of his, that we do not allow

the state to receive the certain benefit of his good advice. '304 As a consequence, public

speakers have no choice but to deceive their audience in order to succeed: 'So a state of

302Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.42.6-14 303Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.42.28-36 304Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.43.2-7

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 114

affairs has been reached where a good proposal honestly put forward is just as suspect

as something thoroughly bad, and the result is that just as the speaker who advocates

some monstrous measure has to win over the people by deceiving them, so also a man

with good advice to give has to tell lies if he expects to be believed. '305 An atmosphere

of general mistrust is engendered, in which even patriotic acts fall suspect of self-interest:

'And because of this refinement in intellectuality, the state is put into a unique position; it

is only she to whom no one can ever do a good turn openly and without deception. For if

one performs a patriotic action, the reward for one's pains is to be thought to have made

something oneself on the side. '306 Finally, after having enumerated the various deficiencies

of public policy-making, Diodotus tries to rehabilitate the role of public speakers. In his

view, public speakers should be trusted because they have greater insight into matters of

public concern:

Yet in spite of all this we are discussing matters of the greatest importance, and we who give you

our advice ought to be resolved to look rather further into things than you [i.e. the audience]

whose attention is occupied only with the surface - especially as we can be held to account for

the advice we give, while you are not accountable for the way you receive it. For indeed you

would take rather more care over your decisions, if the proposer of a motion and those who voted

for it were all subject to the same penalties. As it is, on the occasions when some emotional

impulse on your part has led you into disaster, you turn upon the one man who made the original

proposal and you let yourself off, in spite of the fact that you are many and in spite of the fact

that you were just as wrong as he was. 307

By praising the competence of public speakers, Diodotus echoes Protagoras' conviction

that some men are better than others at giving good advice. In Plato's Theaetetus,

Socrates represents the view of Protagoras: 'I certainly do not deny the existence of both

wisdom and wise men: far from it. But the man whom I call wise is the man who can

change the appearances - the man who in any case where bad things both appear and are

for us, works a change and makes good things appear and be for us. '308 According to this

305Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.43.7-12 306Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.43.12-17 307Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.43.17-29 308Plato, Theaetetus, 166d6-11

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 115

notion 'a combination of natural gifts and good training begun in early youth will produce

citizens whose advice will be better worth seeking than the average. '309 Unfortunately,

Protagoras does not elaborate on what makes the wise man distinguish good things from

bad things. He also fails to explain why citizens should entrust their lives to someone

simply because he is the most skilful at 'changing appearances'.

In order to defend the position of public speakers, Diodotus highlights that unlike the

people who vote in favour of a particular decision public speakers are held accountable

for the policies they propose. They therefore carry much more responsibility and are thus

easier to blame than those who merely follow them. With his speech, Diodotus justifies

why in a democracy, public issues should be discussed and voted on in public assemblies.

For the political process to function, public speakers must focus on content rather than on

style in order not to hide their agenda. The audience has four primary responsibilities: it

should (i) not mistrust public speakers but rather scrutinise whether the state can obtain

good advice from them. (ii) They should not misinterpret every patriotic act as motivated

by self-interest. (iii) They should not penalise speakers for losing an argument. (iv) They

must be aware that they themselves are responsible for the policies they vote in favour

of. If both speakers and audiences abide by these rules, the democratic decision-making

process will produce optimum results. Whether or not Diodotus' appeal is eventually

successful, we do not know. However, we may conclude from the above discussion that

the Athenians are well aware of the deficiencies of the decision-making culture in Athens.

The fact that eminent politicians attempt to minimise the adverse effects of rhetoric in

public debates, shows the significant influence of rhetoric education in Athenian political

culture. Diodotus' 'criticism of the audience as demoralised and Cleon's attack on its bad

habits are in no way mutually exclusive. They converge to show how sadly tendencies

of recent origin defeat the purpose for which the democratic assembly with its discussion

and deliberation exists. '310 Solmsen adds another dimension to our analysis by drawing

attention to the fact that 'Thucydides knew the weaknesses of the contemporary Athenian

assemblies from personal experience. He knew the aura popularis and what it was capable

of doing. We here read his own bitter recollections of habits that he had observed or indeed

309Sinclair, 'Protagoras and Others', p. 85 310Solmsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment, p. 40

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 116

experienced. Thucydides loved Athens but was not in love with Athenian democracy. '311

As we have shown previously, rhetoric forms an integral part of Sophist philosophy. It

is the inescapable consequence of Epistemological Scepticism and Relativism. Protagoras

asserts that 'On every subject there are two logoi [speeches or arguments] opposed to

one another.' 312 Contradicting statements can be made about every subject without

the possibility of resolving disagreement. Whereas in philosophy different arguments

can coexist, in politics they need to be resolved. The problem discussed by Cleon and

Diodotus is that public speakers do not seem to be interested in reconciling their policy

propositions. Instead, they follow the Sophist assumption that subjective perceptions- by

their very nature -, cannot be disputed. As a result, political debates are reduced to the

art of deception. Rather than aiming for a policy which benefits their polis, politicians

use rhetoric as an instrument of power. As Ober points out 313 , this attitude reflects the

standard ethical code prevalent in Greek culture. According to him, this ethical code

consists of two prescriptions. (i) The first is the principle of reciprocity: one should help

one's friends and harm one's enemies. The help received from and the damage done by

other states should be paid back in at least equal but preferably, in greater measure.

(ii) The second principle is that of antagonism: one must seek pre-eminence over rivals

in ongoing agonistic contests. The Sophists teach a particularly strong and naturalized

version of these standard ethics314 and equip their students with the practical techniques

for securing victory over their rivals. Hence the functioning principles of rhetoric and

political arguments are not rooted in Sophist philosophy alone but also reflect the deep­

seated ethical attitudes predating philosophical thought. This accounts for both the

success of rhetoric and for the way in which it is employed in the political sphere.

The fact that with rhetorical training the Sophists do not only make men skilful at

speaking but also diffuse their own philosophy, creates a paradox: on the one hand, the

Athenian political system creates a demand for rhetorically able men and thus for Sophist

education. On the other hand, Sophist teaching conveys philosophical concepts which

actually affect the democratic decision-making process negatively. Rhetoric paralyses the

3 l1Sohnsen, Intellectual Experiments of the Greek Enlightenment, p. 41 312 Gagarin and Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, fr. 24, p.187 313 0ber, Mass and Elite in Democmtic Athens, p. 192 3140ber, Mass and Elite in Democmtic Athens, p. 192

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 117

political process rather than helping it to produce policies. It is this relationship between

the political system and Sophist teaching that helps us understand the link between

Sophist thinking and Political Realism. Outside this philosophical and political context,

Realist policies are not thinkable.

5.5 The impact Athenian political culture on foreign

policy

In previous chapters, we have analysed the characteristics of Athenian foreign policy and

established a relationship between politics and the cultural and intellectual context of the

Fifth Century. In this chapter, we have demonstrated that in Athens, the political system

produces a specific political culture and a particular type of politician. It is our assertion

that these three aspects have a considerable impact on foreign policy.

The political system creates decision-making processes which combine public opin­

ion with the political leadership of the few. Both domestic and foreign policy issues are

discussed and determined in the Assembly, where rhetorically apt politicians try to win

public support through persuasion. Politics is inherently linked to rhetoric and this rela­

tionship has crucial consequences for both domestic and foreign policy. First, politics is

highly unstable. Rather than representing a specific approach to politics, politicians use

their rhetorical skills to propose whatever policy they believe will succeed. Likewise, the

Athenian public changes its opinion frequently. Second, politics is not necessarily about

content. Politicians can use rhetoric as an instrument of power. Rhetoric allows them to

persuade their audience of any policy, no matter whether it is in the city's interest or not.

Third, the central role of rhetoric in politics favours a particular type of politician likely

to undermine democratic rule. In a democracy, the power of persuasion may translate

into real power, and thus sow the seeds of despotism.

We have seen that Athenian foreign policy is characterised by Political Realism. On

the one hand, Realist policies are inherently linked to Sophist ideas prevalent in the

intellectual and cultural climate of Fifth Century Athens. On the other hand, Political

Realism is widely accepted and supported because it reflects the principles embodied by

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 118

Athenian political culture. The philosophical foundation of rhetoric - the idea that truth

is what we can be persuaded to believe in, is mirrored in the Athenian conviction that

as long as a city thinks a certain policy is right, it is therefore just. The Athenian public

supports Realist foreign policies because they embody the same principles as domestic

politics. Furthermore, Athenian politicians use the same rhetorical methods to convince

their own Athenian as well as foreign audiences.

The History of the Peloponnesian War provides us with various examples of public

decision-making on issues of foreign policy. Foreign policy decisions are made on two

levels: at home and abroad In the majority of cases, policies are decided domestically.

Before Athens deploys generals, soldiers and triremes to the battlefield, their mission is

determined by a public assembly. This is the case when the Athenians reconsider their

decision to punish the Mytilenians in 427 BCE: 'So an assembly was called at once.

Various opinions were expressed on both sides, and Clean, the son of Cleaenetus, spoke

again. '315 Although all citizens are free to express their views and a number of them

certainly make use of this right, Thucydides chooses not to represent the various opinions

voiced at the assembly. Instead, he relates only the speeches by Clean and Diodotus

in order to familiarise the reader with the views of the most influential politicians from

both ends of the political spectrum. Though his noticeable omissions make it difficult

to reconstruct the entire course of the political debate, we may infer the central issues.

What is most important for our analysis is that when foreign policy is determined by an

assembly, the political process is democratic and transparent.

But foreign policy does not always originate from democratic decision-making pro­

cesses. Thucydides reveals that during the Peloponnesian War, foreign policy decisions

are often made on the battlefield or in direct confrontation with the enemy. The Melian

Dialogue shows that the leading Athenian politicians and generals often formulate policies

in direct response to their enemies. In this case, Athens' body politic does not participate

in the decision-making process; policy formulation is left to politicians.

On both levels, i.e. in public assemblies and in direct disputes with the enemy, Athe­

nian politicians employ rhetoric to argue their point. Rhetoric is a common element of

foreign policy decision-making, regardless of whether policies are arrived at democratically

315Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.36.26-28

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 119

or not.

Hence Athenian foreign policy shares its main characteristic with that of Athenian

domestic politics: all decisions made in political disputes are influenced by rhetorically

skilled politicians. There are two reasons for the prevalence of rhetoric on both levels; one

is political the other philosophical. Firstly, since domestic and international politics are

conducted by the same politicians, they use identical methods to influence the political

discourse. Politicians such as Clean or Diodotus acquire rhetorical skills in domestic

politics before they are entrusted with foreign policy. The prevalence of rhetoric in the

formulation of Athenian foreign policy can be explained by examining the background of

the political personnel. Secondly, the use of rhetoric across the political spectrum indicates

that the philosophical dimensions of rhetoric are prevalent in the domestic as well as in

the international sphere. On both levels, the use of rhetoric is based on the assumption

that there is no universal truth. Since there is no truth to be established, the outcome

of political processes depends on the rhetorical skill with which political arguments are

brought forward. Politicians trained in rhetoric do not believe that there is a single

right way of conducting politics. In every dispute, they try to convince their audience to

implement their suggested policy. The Might is Right logic of Athenain foreign policy is

woven into the mechanisms of rhetoric - both are produced by Sophist Epistemological

Scepticism. This explains why the Athenians, despite their military superiority, even

bother to engage their enemies in political debates. They believe that might makes

right both militarily and politically. Athenian military superiority puts her politicians

in a position from which they may dictate the terms of international relations. And

the rhetorical superiority of her politicians allows them to justify any policy. Athens

contenders are thus defeated on both levels; they lose the physical contest as well as the

political battle.

The Melian Dialogue shows how skilfully the Athenians master political debates. At

the outset of their encounter, they force the Melians into accepting their rules of debating:

'Suppose that you, too, should refrain from dealing with every point in detail in a set

speech, and should instead interrupt us whenever we say something controversial and

deal with that before going on to the next point? Tell us first whether you approve of

5. Athenian domestic and foreign policy 120

this suggestion of ours. '316 Though the Athenians pretend they are doing the Melians a

favour by refraining from holding a set speech and by allowing the Melians to interrupt

them, it is evident that it is the Athenians who profit from these rules. In fact, they are

so convinced that these rules are beneficial to their argument that they threaten to call

off the debate if the Melians do not abide by them: 'If, however, you do as we suggest,

then we will speak on.'317 The Melian Dialogue is a perfect example of the dual nature

of Athenian power. Athens' Might is Right policies are played out at two levels: on

the military level, her superiority brings success at war. At the political level, military

superiority is represented as a justification for Might is Right policies. By arguing with

rhetorical superiority, Athenian domination remains unchallengeable.

In this section, we have explained why Athenian democracy inevitably produces Real­

ist foreign policies. Our reasoning can be summarised as follows: The Athenian political

system engenders a specific way of conducting politics. Policy decisions are made in demo­

cratic assemblies in which politicians seek to influence public opinion and the outcome

of public votes. In order to persuade their audiences, politicians need to be rhetorically

skilled. Athens' foreign policy is made in the same institutions and by the same politicians

as her domestic policy. As a consequence, rhetoric is used in domestic and international

affairs alike. In both circumstances, it is an instrument of power. In the domestic sphere,

public decisions are dominated by those politicians who due to their rhetorical training

can convincingly argue their point. In the international sphere, rhetoric serves to justify

Might is Right policies while conveying a Might is Right attitude at the same time.

In Athens, rhetoric is much more than a political instrument. It conveys a certain

attitude to politics which influences not only the conduct of politics but also the content

of policies. Without the democratic institutions and the political culture they create,

Athenian Political Realism is inconceivable.

316Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.85.7-11 317Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 5.87.5-6

Chapter 6 Conclusion

Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War is a milestone not only for historiog­

raphy but also for political thought. The importance of Thucydides' contribution to the

study of history is undisputed. He introduces standards to historiography that are valid

to this day. The most important amongst those is the necessity of representing historic

events objectively and without the distortions of personal judgement. However, it has

often been overlooked that Thucydides' work is also crucial for our understanding of po­

litical thinking. It allows us to study the relationship between ideas and foreign policy as

well as their effect on international relations. By analysing the political speeches and the

descriptions of Athenian decision-making processes in the History of the Peloponnesian

War we can reconstruct the development and the characteristics of Athenian Political

Realism. And since this is the first historic text in which politics is described as a distinct

sphere, the insights such an analysis provides have wide-ranging implications for political

theory.

The political speeches attributed by Thucydides to the Athenians and to their adver­

saries serve as a starting point of our work. We have explored the policies proposed in

these speeches in order to expose the underlying notion of politics and of international

relations. We have seen that the Athenian perspectives on power, the relations between

states, and foreign policy, differ significantly from that of both her allies and enemies.

With the aim of explaining this difference, we have studied the background of Athenian

foreign policy. One cannot isolate politics from history, culture or philosophy. In fact it

is the interplay of these factors that allows us to answer the question that is at the heart

of our discussion: What makes a thought thinkable? It is perhaps the most basic and the

most fundamental question in the discipline of intellectual history. We have attempted to

answer it in the context of a specific foreign policy put in place during a specific histori­

cal period. This has been a very difficult task for various reasons: first of all, the extant

sources in general and Presocratic and Sophist fragments in particular, are incomplete and

6. Conclusion 122

thus not always conclusive. As a result, the evidence supporting our assumptions may be

at times a little scarce. Secondly, it is impossible to reconstruct events that took place

2,400 years ago with absolute exactness, especially since we must rely on only one source.

Thirdly, we ought to be aware that our understanding of the Greek World is limited per se.

We interpret Greek ideas, politics and policies from our 20th Century vantage point and

inevitably apply contemporary standards and values. We should therefore bear in mind

that any historical and intellectual enquiry is limited. But this does not imply that we

cannot make meaningful statements about the Greek world. On the contrary: exploring

the complex world of an ancient historic period allows us to transcend our own time and

culture-bound perspectives. We may assume a new vantage point from which we can see

other periods while simultaneously gaining a new perspective on our contemporary world.

This is the rationale behind studying intellectual history: without an understanding of

how ideas emerged, any discussion of contemporary ideas is futile.

What is so intriguing about Political Realism is that it comes into being as a result

of a very complex combination of historical, political and cultural factors. At the same

time, Realist policies re-appear in later periods and under different historic circumstances.

Political Realism transcends time. Although this is not unusual in the history of ideas,

it remains to be established whether the circumstances that facilitate the re-emergence

of Political Realism bear any resemblance to its origins. Unfortunately, to explore this

question is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, our enquiry certainly provides

the ground for a comparative study which would address it. Our analysis of the origins

of Political Realism is a precondition for understanding the development of Realist ideas

through time.

Our key motive for undertaking this study has been the perception that the discipline

of international relations ignores the importance of the historic, cultural and intellectual

background of foreign policy. However, we think that the question What makes a policy

thinkable? is central to the study of international relations. If we can explain why

a particular foreign policy emerged in the past, it will improve our understanding of

contemporary policies and may even allow us to predict the development of these policies.

Furthermore, the awareness of intellectual history enables us to establish connections

between ideas and to recognise patterns of thinking. For example, by expanding our

6. Conclusion 123

analytical horizon in the way described, we can examine how Political Realism changes

over time.

The central conclusion of this thesis is that the Fifth Century witnessed the birth of

a set of ideas implemented in the form of Political Realism. The fascinating question is

how the two are related. Did Political Realism emerge because historic circumstances

facilitated its realisation? Or did Political Realism shape the circumstances so that the

ideas it was based on could be realised? Our discussion has shown that with respect to

Political Realism, the relationship between cause and effect is multi-dimensional rather

than straightforward. Hence instead of focussing on what came first, the ideas or the

possibility of implementing them, we should regard both factors as part of the complex

system which produced Athenian Political Realism.

In fact, the interplay of different factors often proves to be more significant than the

impact they have individually. De Romilly emphasises the role thinkers play in shaping

history: 'In the absence of particular material or political circumstances, the influence

of thinkers might remain relatively limited; conversely, however, without the thinkers

the situation itself would not evolve in such a clear-cut or radical manner. Through

their thinking, their analyses, and the meaning or new emphasis that they give to words,

thinkers too have a hand in the creation of history. '318 On the one hand, the Sophists

provide the intellectual and moral basis for a certain kind of thinking and for certain

actions. On the other hand, they can only formulate their ideas because Athenian culture

at the time allows them to do so. As a result, Athenian society uses Sophist ideas to

exonerate their self-interested behaviour they thus firmly establish as the mainstream

rule of action: 'the Sophists had disseminated ideas from which it was possible for anyone

to extract a justification or argument in favour of a practical course of action. '319

Considering another element in the complex politics of Athens, one could also argue

that had Athens not been at war, Athenian society would not have been receptive to

Relativism. Thucydides describes the impact of war: it triggers a reversal of values.

But war is a stern teacher; in depriving them of the power of easily satisfying their daily wants,

it brings most people's minds down to the level of their actual circumstances ... To fit in with the

318de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 139 319de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, p. 148

6. Conclusion 124

change of events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings. What used to be described

as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage one would expect to find

in a party member; to think of the future and wait was merely another way of saying that one

was a coward; any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one's unmanly character;

ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action.

Fanatical enthusiasm was the mark of a real man, and to plot against an enemy behind his

back was perfectly legitimate self-defence. Anyone who held violent opinions could always be

trusted, and anyone who objected to them became a suspect. To plot successfully was a sign of

intelligence, but it was still cleverer to see that a plot was hatching.320

Without this transformation of values and moral standards induced by the state of war,

the Athenian people would not have supported the Realist policies of their political and

military leaders.

For scholars of international relations, it is essential to understand the various factors

since it is important to comprehend the birth of an idea that has influenced the foreign pol­

icy of states and international relations throughout history and to this day. We conjecture

that the longevity of Political Realism is due only partly to the recurrence of analogous

historical circumstances. A more plausible explanation is that Political Realism allows

for a particular side of human behaviour to be expressed, that is ubiquitous and persists

regardless of time and place. Our hypothesis is that when a number of critical factors

come together, politicians and states will pursue Realist policies. In the case of Athens,

we have shown that her power status, her political system, the politicians produced by it

as well as the intellectual and cultural climate of the day facilitated the formulation and

the implementation of Realist policies. Taking any of these factors as a starting point, one

could argue, that if state acquires a position of supremacy, she is more likely to pursue

a Might is Right strategy in her external relations. Likewise, we could assert that in

societies suddenly confronted with the beliefs and the values of others, one might expect

Relativist attitudes to develop. We could also claim that in democracies characterised

by wide public participation, rhetoric will be necessary and almost certainly spill over to

the realm of foreign policy. And there is little doubt that in turn, rhetoric will change

the way politics is conducted. In this sense, Fifth Century Athens is exemplary but not

320Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 3.82.18-21, 26-39

6. Conclusion 125

exceptional. It serves as a template for similar historical situations without being an

absolute model. What we have learnt from studying Athenian Political Realism is that

the foreign policy of a state is dependent on the historical, political and cultural context.

But once a policy is put in place, it transcends this background and acquires a meaning

of its own which can be revived at any subsequent point in time.

The fact that Political Realism has remained influential to the present day is inherently

linked to the circumstances of its emergence. As we have shown, Realist policies are

based on Sophist thinking, which marks the beginning of modern philosophy. As Guthrie

observes, reading the Sophists 'one feels that there is hardly a question under discussion

today which was not argued out on both sides some 2,4000 years ago ... '321 This is due to

the fact that

With the change that came over philosophy in the fifth century, we are plunged into a discussion

of questions which are as relevant now as they were when first raised by the Sophists. Whatever

we may think of the Sophistic movements, we must all agree that [ ... ] no intellectual movement

can be compared with it in the permanence of its results, and that the questions which the

Sophists pose have never been allowed to lapse in the history of Western thought down to our

day.322

Before the Sophists, intellectual enquiry is focused on the natural world while moral

contemplation is confined to the religious sphere and to traditional values and customs.

The Sophists are the first thinkers to focus on human activity and on society. Their

philosophy lays the foundations for a re-conceptualisation of human action. This new

approach allows Thucydides to establish politics as a subject in its own right. Therefore,

the birth of politics coincides with the birth of Political Realism. Sophist philosophy

liberates man from the bonds of religion: 'Man loses his respect for the actual and the

given as such, he will accept nothing as true which he has not himself approved, he will

act only on the basis of his own judgment.'323 Thucydides portrays men, people and

states as agents shaping their own destiny. Before there is a theory of the state, there is

321 Guthrie, 'The First Humanists', p. 24 322 A. Lesky, A History of Greek Litemture (London, 1966) quoted by Guthrie, A History of Greek

Philosophy Vol. Ill, p. 3 323Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p.9

6. Conclusion 126

a theory of political action. It has proven to be so important that politicians still abide

by it and academics continue to study it to this day.

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