e from the chancellor’s desk xcelenphilja.judiciary.gov.ph/files/bulletin/bul43.pdf4 philja news...

PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSJuly-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009

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July to September 2009 Volume XI, Issue No. 43

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SUPREME COURT

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FFFFFrom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’s Desks Desks Desks Desks Desk

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As we go into the last quarter of 2009, let us all push together for a well-rounded andstrong performance for the entire year.

With your cooperation, we have successfully done our first-ever Stratplan and wemapped out directions and specific objectives for the years ahead. As shown in our teambuilding activities, all things can be accomplished as long as we do things together.

Congratulations to Justice Delilah V. Magtolis and the rest of our team for the success inthe adoption of new specific guidelines on the fees for lecturers, panelists, and other membersof our seminars and workshops and special thanks to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and theSupreme Court for approving the same as well as the officials of the DBM headed by SecretaryRolando G. Andaya, Jr.

The PHILJA Training Center in Tagaytay is finally taking shape. Last week the PDC-PICteam went there and held an on-site meeting where the Committee viewed and selected thematerials to be used in the rooms, hallways and other areas. Congratulations to PDC-PICand our contractors, engineers, consultants, security guards, especially our on-site ManagerMrs. Emily Vasquez. Special thanks to Founding Chancellor Emeritus Justice Ameurfina A.Melencio Herrera who continues to help us in PDC-PIC and other sensitive areas of concern.

On September 30, 2009 we will have our Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno DistinguishedLecture Series on the subject of the Peace Process. Featured as Speakers are Mr. Kelvin Ongof the United Nations and Prof. Edmundo G. Garcia of International Alert. This will be atAteneo de Manila Law School in Rockwell, Makati. It will be viewed by the participantsthrough video (courtesy of MISO and Atty. Emmanuel Caparas and his team), in the Ateneode Davao and in De La Salle, Bacolod City.

PHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWS2

55th Orientation Seminar Workshop for NewlyAppointed Judges

Date: June 30 to July 9, 2009Venue: Manila Pavilion Hotel, ManilaParticipants: 28 newly appointed judges namely:

A. NEW APPOINTMENTS

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS

NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION

Hon. Ismael T. DuldulaoRTC Br. 197, Las Piñas CityHon. Armando C. VelascoRTC Br. 263, Marikina City

REGION IIIHon. Cesar L. AganonRTC Br. 63, Tarlac City

REGION IVHon. Iluminado M. Dela PeñaRTC Br. 28, Sta. Cruz, Laguna

REGION IVHon. Julieto F. FabreroMTC Sta. Cruz, Mindoro Occidental

REGION VIHon. Ana Marie T. MasMTC San Jose, Antique

Hon. Antonina M. Calderon-MagturoRTC Br. 94, Boac, MarinduqueHon. Aida C. SantosRTC Br. 7, Batangas CityHon. Jose C. FortunoRTC Br. 48, Masbate

REGION VIHon. Nelson J. BartolomeRTC Br. 8, Kalibo, AklanHon. Manuel O. Cardinal, Jr.RTC Br. 49, Bacolod City, Negros OccidentalHon. Romeo B. CasalanRTC Br. 13, Culasi, AntiqueHon. Montalid P. Patnubay, Jr.RTC Br. 9, Kalibo, Aklan

REGION VIIIHon. Filotea M. EstorninosRTC Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES

REGION VIHon. Evelyn D. ArsenioMTCC Victorias City, Negros OccidentalHon. Alma N. Banias-DelfinMTCC Roxas City, CapizHon. Cyclamen J. FernandezMTCC Kabankalan City, Negros OccidentalHon. Allan Francisco S. GarcianoMTCC Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS

REGION IIIHon. Mildred S. Villaroman-HernalMTC San Antonio, Nueva Ecija

MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS

REGION IIIHon. Franco Paulo R. AragoMCTC Dinalupihan-Hermosa, BataanHon. Marion Jacqueline P. Poblete-VillespinMCTC Bagac-Morong, Bataan

REGION IVHon. Ma. Socorro A. VistaMCTC Teresa-Baras, Rizal

REGION XHon. Kimal M. SalacopMCTC Trento-Sta. Josefa-Veruela, Agusan del Sur

B. PROMOTIONS

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT


Hon. Ofelia L. CaloRTC Br. 211, Mandaluyong City

REGION IIIHon. Amor M. Dimatatac-RomeroRTC Br. 50, Guagua, Pampanga

REGION VIHon. Jeffrey David AlmalbisRTC Br. 14, Roxas City, CapizHon. Danilo R. AmisolaRTC Br. 57, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental

REGION XIIHon. Anisah A. UmpaRTC Br. 2, Iligan City, Lanao del Norte

PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSJuly-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009 3

Seminar-Workshop on CEDAW and GenderSensitivity

Development Partners: CGRJ; Sub-Committee on Trainingand Capacity Building; Ateneo Human RightsDate: July 9 to 10, 2009Venue: Bohol Tropics, BoholParticipants: 63 judges and clerks of court of Bohol

Development Partners: CGRJ; Sub-Committee on Trainingand Capacity Building; Sandiganbayan; AHRCDate: July 16, 2009; August 13, 2009Venue: Sandiganbayan, Quezon CityParticipants: 87 Sandiganbayan personnel - 41(1st Batch);46 (2nd Batch)

Development Partners: CGRJ; Sub-Committee on Trainingand Capacity Building; Court of Tax Appeals; AHRCDate: July 24, 2009; July 31, 2009Venue: Sulo Hotel, Quezon CityParticipants: 117 CTA personnel- 62 (1st Batch); 55 (2nd

Batch)

Development Partners: Sub-Committee on Training andCapacity Building; AHRCDate: August 10 to 11, 2009Venue: Court of Appeals Auditorium, ManilaParticipants: 47 Executive and Vice Executive judgesand branch clerks of court of NCJR

Multi-Sectoral and Skills-Building Seminar-Workshop on Human Rights Issues: ExtralegalKillings and Enforced Disappearances

Development Partner: CHR; USAID; TAFDate: July 16 to 17, 2009Venue: Pryce Plaza Hotel, Cagayan de Oro CityParticipants: 61 comprising CA Justices, RTC judges ofthe 10th Judicial Region, prosecutors, andrepresentatives of the CHR, PNP, AFP, IBP, civil society,and Office of the Ombudsman for the Military.

Date: August 18 to 19, 2009Venue: Garden Orchid Hotel, Zamboanga CityParticipants: 56 comprising RTC judges of the NinthJudicial Region, prosecutors, and representatives ofthe CHR, PNP, AFP, IBP, civil society, and Office of theOmbudsman for the Military.

Competency Enhancement Training for Judgesand Court Personnel in Handling Child Abuseand Trafficking Cases

Development Partners: CPU-Net; International JusticeMission CebuDate: July 21 to 23, 2009Venue: Cebu Parklane International Hotel, Cebu CityParticipants: 59 selected judges and court personnel,including PAO lawyers, prosecutors, and members ofthe PNP of Cebu, Mandaue and Lapu-Lapu City.

Development Partners: CPU-Net; UNICEFDate: August 18 to 20, 2009Venue: Fontana Leisure Parks, PampangaParticipants: 68 selected judges and court personnel,including PAO lawyers, prosecutors, and members ofthe PNP of Regions 2 and 3

Date: September 15 to 17, 2009Venue: Waterfront Insular Hotel, Davao CityParticipants: 65 selected Judges and court personnel,including PAO lawyers, prosecutors, and members ofthe PNP of Regions 10 and 11.

Seminar-Workshop for Executive Judges andVice Executive Judges

Development Partners: USAID; ABA-ROLIDate: July 21 to 23, 2009Venue: Hotel Vida, PampangaParticipants: 52 executive judges and vice executivejudges of Regions I, II and III

Date: August 18 to 20, 2009Venue: Summit Ridge Hotel, Tagaytay CityParticipants: 45 executive and vice executive judges ofRegions IV and V

Seminar-Workshop on Dangerous Drugs Lawfor Judges, Prosecutors and Law Enforcers ofRegions IX, X, XI and XII

Development Partner: DDBDate: July 28 to 30, 2009Venue: Royal Mandaya Hotel, Davao CityParticipants: 106 judges, prosecutors and law enforcers

13th National Convention and Seminar of thePhilippine Association of Court Employees(PACE)

Date: July 1 to 3, 2009Venue: Cebu International Convention Center,Mandaue CityParticipants: 3,160 comprising clerks of court,stenographers, court interpreters, court socialworkers, sheriffs, process servers and other courtpersonnel from all over the Philippines


Launching of Justice on Wheels, Mobile Court-Annexed Mediation, and InformationDissemination through a Dialogue amongBarangay Officials with the Chief Justice andother Court Officials

Development Partners: Committee on Justice on Wheels;Province of Nueva EcijaDate: July 31, 2009Venue: Wesleyan University Gym, Nueva EcijaParticipants: 662 barangay officials of Nueva Ecija

Development Partners: Committee on Justice on Wheels;Province of Nueva VizcayaDate: August 1, 2009Venue: Ammungan Hall, Capitol CompoundBayombong, Nueva VizcayaParticipants: 308 barangay officials of Nueva Vizcaya

Development Partners: Committee on Enhanced Justiceon Wheels; Tuguegarao CityDate: August 23, 2009Venue: Regional Government Center, Tuguegarao CityParticipants: 195 barangay officials of Tuguegarao City

Development Partners: Committee on Enhanced Justiceon Wheels; Batangas CityDate: September 5, 2009Venue: Days Hotel, Batangas CityParticipants: 143 barangay officials of Batangas City

Development Partners: Committee on Enhanced Justiceon Wheels; Lucena CityDate: September 11, 2009Venue: Quezon Convention Center, Lucena CityParticipants: 667 barangay officials of Lucena City

Development Partners: Committee on Enhanced Justiceon Wheels; Province of Camarines NorteDate: September 12, 2009Venue: Provincial Capitol Building, Daet, CamarinesNorteParticipants: 164 barangay officials of Camarines Norte

16th Orientation Seminar-Workshop for NewlyAppointed Clerks of Court

Date: August 11 to 14, 2009Venue: Sulo Hotel, Quezon CityParticipants: 39 newly appointed clerks of court namely:

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS


Atty. Fernando R. AmorRTC Br. 131, Caloocan CityAtty. Dolly Rose R. BolanteRTC Br. 209, Mandaluyong CityAtty. Elmer N. CabbatRTC Br. 133, Makati CityAtty. Ma. Czarina D. Castro-AltaresRTC Br. 21, ManilaAtty. Rhodalyne E. DapulRTC Br. 34, ManilaAtty. Carmela Joy R. De GuzmanRTC Br. 23, ManilaAtty. Ederlita V. De GuzmanRTC Br. 14, ManilaAtty. Joan M. Dela Cruz-LoboRTC Br. 64, Makati CityAtty. Jean Susan V. Desuasido-GillRTC Br. 204, Muntinlupa CityAtty. Levi N. DybongcoRTC Br. 172, Valenzuela CityAtty. Myrell G. GargalloRTC Br. 200, Las Piñas CityAtty. Mary Ann Charisma C. GutierrezRTC Br. 49, ManilaAtty. Rey P. InciongRTC Br. 10, ManilaAtty. Esidora Agnes L. Liwag-Dela CruzRTC Br. 276, Muntinlupa CityAtty. Ivy P. MabansagRTC Br. 126, Caloocan CityAtty. Nelia G. MartinRTC Br. 91, Quezon CityAtty. Joey V. PacienciaRTC Br. 48, ManilaAtty. Rechie N. Ramos-MalabananRTC Br. 16, ManilaAtty. Amador B. Rebato, Jr.RTC Br. 45, ManilaAtty. Roda B. RigosRTC Br. 152, Pasig CityAtty. Jonah P. RiveraRTC Br. 20, ManilaAtty. Raya Avariza V. Saber-De ZunigaOCC, Las Piñas CityAtty. Dominador O. SantiagoRTC Br. 103, Quezon CityAtty. Maila D. SantosRTC Br. 80, Quezon City


Atty. Myra Nimfa R. SolidumRTC Br. 78, Quezon CityAtty. Benedict S. Sta. CruzRTC Br. 225, Quezon CityAtty. Rommel H. SumedcaRTC Br. 101, Quezon CityAtty. Cheryl Ann A. TungpalanRTC Br. 65, Makati CityAtty. Ma. Milagros G. Uy-MapuriOCC, Muntinlupa CityAtty. Jewelyne Jovette B. Valenton-CarreonRTC Br. 33, ManilaAtty. Fides C. VictorioRTC Br. 143, Makati CityAtty. Guyla A. VistaRTC Br. 37, Manila

METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS


Ms. Maricris L. AqueMeTC Br. 17, Manila CityAtty. Vilma C. CarillaMeTC Br. 79, Las Piñas CityAtty. Lourdes E. ConcepcionMeTC, Br. 71, Pasig CityAtty. Raquel F. Guerrero-DiañoMeTC Br. 45, Pasay CityAtty. Dante Gil D. GumpalOCC, Makati CityMr. Miguel C. InfanteMeTC Br. 78 Parañaque CityAtty. Maria Josephine C. PabroaMeTC Br. 18, Manila City

9th National Convention and Seminar of the RTCClerks of Court Association of the Philippines(RTC-COCAP)

Date: August 25 to 27, 2009Venue: Grand Men Seng Hotel, Davao CityParticipants: 354 RTC Clerks of Court

10. Atty. Beniluz E. Engracial11. Atty. Marrietta T. Galdo12. Atty. Rosemarie E. Buendia-Garde13. Atty. Placido A. Garde, Jr.14. Atty. Nereo Raymundo T. Joaquin, Jr.15. Atty. Maria Luna Llena G. Lanticse16. Atty. Ali Joseph Ryan C. Lloren17. Atty. Rufus G. Malecdan, Jr.18. Atty. Eliud T. Pailagao, Jr.19. Atty. Nelison U. Pajarillo-Salcedo20. Atty. Evelyn Georgina R. Pangilinan-Paler21. Atty. Rosalie D. Platil22. Atty. Jerlie L. Requerme23. Atty. Leah M. Sajulga24. Atty. Judy A. Sia-Galvez25. Atty. Edwin B. Tabaranza26. Atty. Leizl B. Villanueva27. Atty. Lissa Belle Villanueva28. Atty. Edgardo M. Villareal II

11th Convention Seminar of the MetropolitanTrial Court Judges Association of the Philippines(MeTCJAP)

Theme: The Expanded Role of the First Level Courts:Increasing Access and JusticeDate: September 23 to 25, 2009Venue: Pearlmont Inn, Cagayan de Oro CityParticipants: 156 MeTC judges

18th Pre-Judicature ProgramDate: September 14 to 24, 2009Venue: VIP Hotel, Cagayan de Oro CityParticipants: 28 lawyers

1. Atty. Rosemarie D. Anacan-Dizon2. Atty. Renie Gloria M. Ariño3. Atty. Yvonne C. Artiaga4. Atty. Anthony L. Awa5. Atty. Susan S. Azares6. Atty. Benjamin C. Belarmino, Jr.7. Atty. Ma. Theresa A. Camannong8. Atty. Anabel Carmen S. Casiño-

Baluran9. Atty. Carolyn C. Damasing


Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno SecondDistinguished Lecture, Series of 2009

Development Partners: ADMU; UNDP; OPAPPDate: September 30, 2009Venue: Ateneo de Manila Law School, Makati CityParticipants: Makati Site – 203 participants comprisingSC, CA, SB, and CTA Justices, selected judges of theNCJR, SC and other government officials,representatives from development partners, academe,and media; Davao Site – 72 participants comprisingjudges and clerks of court of Davao del Sur, Davao delNorte, Compostela Valley, representatives fromdevelopment partners, and academe; Bacolod Site –132 participants comprising judges and clerks ofcourt of the Provinces of Negros Occidental,representatives from government and non-government offices, academe and media

MEDIATION

Court-Annexed Mediation

Preparatory Meeting with Justices, Clerks ofCourt, Division Clerks of Court and TrainedMediators of the Court of Appeals Cagayande Oro on Appeals Court Mediation

Date: July 17, 2009Venue: Pryce Plaza Hotel, Cagayan de Oro CityParticipants: 61 comprising CA-CDO Justices,clerks of court, division clerks of court andmediators

Work Orientation for PMC Unit Staff andBriefing of Assistant Clerk of Court andDivision Clerks of Court on Cagayan de OroAppeals Court MediationDate: August 13, 2009Venue: Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro CityParticipants: 17 comprising CA-CDO AssociateJustices, CA lawyers, Assistant Clerk of Court,Division Clerks of Courts, selected JudicialRecords Division staff, Appeals CourtMediation-Cagayan de Oro and PMC-CAMstaff

Advance/Refresher Course for Mediators(SOCSARGEN Mediation Program)Date: September 11-12, 2009Venue: Phela Grand Hotel, General Santos CityParticipants: 29 mediators

JUDICIAL MOVES

Supreme CourtSupreme CourtSupreme CourtSupreme CourtSupreme Court

HON. MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justiceappointed on August 6, 2009

HON. ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justiceappointed on August 7, 2009

HON. JOSE MIDAS P. MARQUEZ

Deputy Court Administratorappointed on August 12, 2009

ATTY. MA. LUISA L. LAUREA

Division Clerk of Courtappointed on August 28, 2009


Court of AppealsCourt of AppealsCourt of AppealsCourt of AppealsCourt of Appeals

HON. MANUEL M. BARRIOS

Associate JusticeCebu

appointed on July 14, 2009

HON. SAMUEL H. GAERLAN

Associate JusticeCebu


HON. DANTON Q. BUESER

Associate JusticeCagayan De Oro


HON. LEONCIA R. DIMAGIBA

Associate JusticeCagayan De Oro


HON. MA. CRISTINA G. CORTEZ-ESTRADA

Presiding Justiceappointed on July 2, 2009

Also, the Metrobank Foundation Lecture willbe given by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen of theUniversity of the Philippines College of Law atthe University of the Philippines on October 21,2009.

Meanwhile, our seminars and workshops forjudges, court personnel and lawyers continue infull blast, including the Enhanced Justice onWheels Program where PHILJA participates byway of information dissemination andmediation. The last ones we attended with theChief Justice were in Tuguegarao City, BatangasCity, Lucena City and Daet City. To date, E-JOWhas resulted in 2,501 inmates released, 11,900barangay officials given certificates for attendingthe seminar-workshops and 5,086 casessuccessfully mediated.

Our PMCO inauguration and blessing of thenewly refurbished office went very well lastSeptember 9, 2009 with the Chief Justice as SpecialGuest and Speaker. Congratulations to PMCOheaded by Justice Marina L. Buzon.

Our development partners continue tosupport us. Scott Ciment, Esq., of ABA-ROLIinformed us that they are ready to fund a seriesof seminars, workshops on the Speedy TrialHandbook (which they will also print), theelection cases under the new Automated ElectionLaw, and the new small claims court rules.

The World Bank visiting team arrived for aseries of meetings on September 22-26 anddiscussed the remaining Judicial Reform projectsincluding those involving PHILJA.

Thank you, here’s more power to us all.

Adolfo S. AzcunaChancellor

SandiganbayanSandiganbayanSandiganbayanSandiganbayanSandiganbayan

FFFFFrom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’rom the Chancellor’s Desks Desks Desks Desks Desk

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAWProhibited acts and transaction of public officialsand employees

Section 7 of RA No. 6713 generally provides forthe prohibited acts and transactions of public officialsand employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them fromengaging in the private practice of their professionduring their incumbency. As an exception, a publicofficial or employee can engage in the practice of his orher profession under the following conditions: first, theprivate practice is authorized by the Constitution orby the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, ortend to conflict, with his or her official functions.

The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for aperiod of one year after the public official or employee’sresignation, retirement, or separation from publicoffice, except for the private practice of professionunder subsection (b)(2), which can already beundertaken even within the one-year prohibitionperiod. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with respect to anymatter before the office the public officer or employeeused to work with.

The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on theprinciple that public office is a public trust; and serveto remove any impropriety, real or imagined, whichmay occur in government transactions between aformer government official or employee and his or herformer colleagues, subordinates or superiors. Theprohibitions also promote the observance and theefficient use of every moment of the prescribed officehours to serve the public.

Parenthetically, in the case of court employees,Section 7(b)(2) of RA No. 6713 is not the onlyprohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of theCode of Conduct for Court Personnel also applies. Thelatter provision provides the definitive rule on the“outside employment” that an incumbent court officialor court employee may undertake in addition to hisofficial duties:

Outside employment may be allowed by the headof office provided it complies with all of thefollowing requirements:

(a) The outside employment is not with a personor entity that practices law before the courtsor conducts business with the Judiciary;

(b) The outside employment can be performedoutside of normal working hours and is notincompatible with the performance of thecourt personnel’s duties and responsibilities;

(c) That outside employment does not requirethe practice of law; Provided, however, that courtpersonnel may render services asprofessor, lecturer, or resource person in lawschools, review or continuing educationcenters or similar institutions;

(d) The outside employment does not requireor induce the court personnel to discloseconfidential information acquired whileperforming official duties;

(e) The outside employment shall not be withthe legislative or executive branch ofgovernment, unless specifically authorizedby the Supreme Court.

Where a conflict of interest exists, mayreasonably appear to exist, or where theoutside employment reflects adversely onthe integrity of the Judiciary, the courtpersonnel shall not accept outsideemployment. (Emphasis supplied)

In both the above discussed aspect of RA No. 6713and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is covered;the practice of law is a practice of profession, whileCanon 3 specifically mentions any outsideemployment requiring the practice of law. In Cayetanov. Monsod, the Supreme Court defined the practice oflaw as any activity, in and out of court, that requiresthe application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,training and experience. Moreover, the Court ruledthat to engage in the practice of law is to perform thoseacts which are characteristics of the profession; topractice law is to give notice or render any kind ofservice, which device or service requires the use inany degree of legal knowledge or skill. Under bothprovisions, a common objective is to avoid any conflictof interest on the part of the employee who maywittingly or unwittingly use confidential informationacquired from his employment, or use his or herfamiliarity with court personnel still with theprevious office.

After separation from the service, Section 5,Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnelceases to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents,but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of RA No. 6713continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty.Buffe’s situation falls under Section 7.

A distinctive feature of this administrative matteris Atty. Buffe’s admission that she immediatelyengaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) ofRA No. 6713. The Supreme Court finds it noteworthy,too, that she is aware of this provision and only objects


to its application to her situation; she perceives it tobe unfair that she cannot practice before her old office– Branch 81 – for a year immediately after resignation,as she believes that her only limitation is in matterswhere a conflict of interest exists between herappearance as counsel and her former duties as Clerkof Court. She believes that Section 7(b)(2) givespreferential treatment to incumbent public officialsand employees as against those already separatedfrom government employment.

Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As theOCAT aptly stated, she interprets Section 7(b)(2) as ablanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court topractice law. The Court reiterated what was explainedabove, that the general rule under Section 7(b)(2) is tobar public officials and employees from the practiceof their professions; it is unlawful under this generalrule for clerks of court to practice their profession. Byway of exception, they can practice their profession ifthe Constitution or the law allows them, but noconflict of interest must exist between their currentduties and the practice of their profession. As alsomentioned above, no chance exists for lawyers in theJudiciary to practice their profession, as they are infact expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of theCode of Conduct for Court Personnel from doing so.Under both the general rule and the exceptions,therefore, Atty. Buffe’s basic premise is misplaced.

As the Supreme Court discussed above, a clerk ofcourt can already engage in the practice of lawimmediately after her separation from the service andwithout any period limitation that applies to otherprohibitions under Section 7 of RA No. 6713. The clerkof court’s limitation is that she cannot practice herprofession within one year before the office where heor she used to work with. In a comparison between aresigned, retired or separated official or employee, onthe one hand, and an incumbent official or employee,on the other, the former has the advantage becausethe limitation is only with respect to the office he orshe used to work with and only for a period of oneyear. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save onlywhere specifically allowed by the Constitution andthe law and only in areas where no conflict of interestsexists. This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffe’s basicpremises.

(Brion, J., Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe,Former Clerk of Court – Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon– On the Prohibition from Engaging in the PrivatePractice of Law, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC, August 19,2009.)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (continued) CIVIL LAWPresumption of death is established by law underthe Civil Code; Art. 256 of the Family Code hasno retroactive effect if it impairs vested right.

Under the Civil Code, the presumption of death isestablished by law, and no court declaration is neededfor the presumption to arise. Since death is presumedto have taken place by the seventh year of absence,Sofio is to be presumed dead starting October 1982.

Consequently, at the time of petitioner’s marriageto Virgilio, there existed no impediment to petitioner’scapacity to marry, and the marriage is valid underparagraph 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code.

Further, considering that it is the Civil Code thatapplies, proof of “well-founded belief” is not required.Petitioner could not have been expected to complywith this requirement since the Family Code was notyet in effect at the time of her marriage to Virgilio.The enactment of the Family Code in 1988 does notchange this conclusion. The Family Code itself states:

Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effectinsofar as it does not prejudice or impair vestedor acquired rights in accordance with the CivilCode or other laws.

To retroactively apply the provisions of the FamilyCode requiring petitioner to exhibit “well-foundedbelief” will, ultimately, result in the invalidation ofher second marriage, which was valid at the time itwas celebrated. Such a situation would be untenableand would go against the objectives that the FamilyCode wishes to achieve.

In sum, the Supreme Court held that the petitionmust be dismissed since no decree on the presumptionof Sofio’s death can be granted under the Civil Code,the same presumption having arisen by operation oflaw. However, declared that petitioner wascapacitated to marry Virgilio at the time theirmarriage was celebrated in 1985 and, therefore, thesaid marriage is legal and valid.

(Nachura, J., Angelita Valdez v. Republic of thePhilippines, G.R. No. 180863, September 8, 2009.)

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(P300,000.00) Pesos shall be exempt from paymentof legal fees.

The legal fees shall be a lien on any judgmentrendered in the case favorable to the indigentlitigant unless the court otherwise provides.

To be entitled to the exemption herein provided,the litigant shall execute an affidavit that he andhis immediate family do not earn a gross incomeabovementioned, and they do not own any realproperty with the fair value aforementioned,supported by an affidavit of a disinterested personattesting to the truth of the litigant’s affidavit. Thecurrent tax declaration, if any, shall be attached tothe litigant’s affidavit.

Any falsity in the affidavit of litigant or disinterestedperson shall be sufficient cause to dismiss thecomplaint or action or to strike out the pleading ofthat party, without prejudice to whatever criminal

liability may have been incurred.

The clear intent and precise language of theaforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court indicatethat only a natural party litigant may be regarded as anindigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc.,being a corporation invested by the State with ajuridical personality separate and distinct from thatof its members,1[4] is a juridical person. Among others,it has the power to acquire and possess property of allkinds as well as incur obligations and bring civil orcriminal actions, in conformity with the laws andregulations of their organization. As a juridical person,therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption fromlegal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants.

That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. isworking for indigent and underprivileged people is ofno moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitlypremised the free access clause on a person’s poverty, acondition that only a natural person can suffer.

There are other reasons that warrant the rejectionof the request for exemption in favor of a juridicalperson. For one, extending the exemption to a juridicalperson on the ground that it works for indigent andunderprivileged people may be prone to abuse (evenwith the imposition of rigid documentationrequirements), particularly by corporations andentities bent on circumventing the rule on payment ofthe fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance with thedocumentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the courts.

(Bersamin, J., Re: Query of Mr. Roger C. Prioreschi ReExemption from Legal and Filing Fees of the GoodShepherd Foundation, Inc., A.M. No. 09-6-9-SC, August19, 2009.)

REMEDIAL LAWIndigent litigant; juridical person not qualifiedas indigent litigant

The basis for the exemption from legal and filingfees is the free access clause, embodied in Section 11, ArticleIII of the 1987 Constitution, thus:

SEC. 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicialbodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be

denied to any person by reason of poverty.

The importance of the right to free access to thecourts and quasi-judicial bodies and to adequate legalassistance cannot be denied. A move to remove theprovision on free access from the Constitution on theground that it was already covered by the equalprotection clause was defeated by the desire to giveconstitutional stature to such specific protection of thepoor.

In implementation of the right of free access underthe Constitution, the Supreme Court promulgatedrules, specifically, Section 21, Rule 3, Rules of Court, andSection 19, Rule 141, Rules of Court, which respectivelystate thus:

SEC. 21. Indigent party. — A party may be authorizedto litigate his action, claim or defense as an indigentif the court, upon an ex parte application and hearing,is satisfied that the party is one who has no moneyor property sufficient and available for food, shelterand basic necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption frompayment of docket and other lawful fees, and oftranscripts of stenographic notes which the courtmay order to be furnished him. The amount of thedocket and other lawful fees which the indigent wasexempted from paying shall be a lien on anyjudgment rendered in the case favorable to theindigent, unless the court otherwise provides.

Any adverse party may contest the grant of suchauthority at any time before judgment is renderedby the trial court. If the court should determineafter hearing that the party declared as an indigentis in fact a person with sufficient income or property,the proper docket and other lawful fees shall beassessed and collected by the clerk of court. Ifpayment is not made within the time fixed by thecourt, execution shall issue for the payment thereof,without prejudice to such other sanctions as thecourt may impose. (22a)

SEC. 19. Indigent litigants exempt from payment of legalfees. – Indigent litigants (a) whose gross income andthat of their immediate family do not exceed anamount double the monthly minimum wage of anemployee and (b) who do not own real propertywith a fair market value as stated in the current taxdeclaration of more than three hundred thousand

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CIVIL LAWNullity of marriage; psychological incapacity;guidelines in the interpretation and applicationof Article 36 of the Family Code

Republic v. Court of Appeals laid down the guidelinesin the interpretation and application of Article 36 ofthe Family Code, thus:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of themarriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubtshould be resolved in favor of the existenceand continuation of the marriage and againstits dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in thefact that both our Constitution and our lawscherish the validity of marriage and unity ofthe family. Thus, our Constitution devotes anentire Article on the Family, recognizing it “asthe foundation of the nation.” It decreesmarriage as legally “inviolable,” therebyprotecting it from dissolution at the whim ofthe parties. Both the family and marriage areto be “protected” by the state.

x x x x

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacitymust be (a) medically or clinically identified,(b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficientlyproven by experts and (d) clearly explained inthe decision. Article 36 of the Family Coderequires that the incapacity must bepsychological – not physical, although itsmanifestations and/or symptoms may bephysical. The evidence must convince thecourt that the parties, or one of them, wasmentally or psychically ill to such an extentthat the person could not have known theobligations he was assuming, or knowingthem, could not have given valid assumptionthereof. Although no example of suchincapacity need be given here so as not tolimit the application of the provision under theprinciple of ejusdem generis, nevertheless suchroot cause must be identified as apsychological illness and its incapacitatingnature fully explained. Expert evidence maybe given by qualified psychiatrists and clinicalpsychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existingat “the time of the celebration” of themarriage. The evidence must show that theillness was existing when the partiesexchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestationof the illness need not be perceivable at suchtime, but the illness itself must have attachedat such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to bemedically or clinically permanent or incurable.Such incurability may be absolute or evenrelative only in regard to the other spouse,not necessarily absolutely against everyoneof the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacitymust be relevant to the assumption ofmarriage obligations, not necessarily to thosenot related to marriage, like the exercise of aprofession or employment in a job. Hence, apediatrician may be effective in diagnosingillnesses of children and prescribing medicineto cure them but may not be psychologicallycapacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation ofmarriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bringabout the disability of the party to assumethe essential obligations of marriage. Thus,“mild characteriological peculiarities, moodchanges, occasional emotional outbursts”cannot be accepted as root causes. The illnessmust be shown as downright incapacity orinability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,much less ill will. In other words, there is anatal or supervening disabling factor in theperson, an adverse integral element in thepersonality structure that effectivelyincapacitates the person from reallyaccepting and thereby complying with theobligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must bethose embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of theFamily Code as regards the husband and wifeas well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the sameCode in regard to parents and their children.Such non-complied marital obligation(s) mustalso be stated in the petition, proven byevidence and included in the text of thedecision.

(7) Interpretations given by the NationalAppellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the CatholicChurch in the Philippines, while not controllingor decisive, should be given great respect byour courts. It is clear that Article 36 was takenby the Family Code Revision Committee fromCanon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,which became effective in 1983 and whichprovides:

The following are incapable ofcontracting marriage: Those who areunable to assume the essentialobligations of marriage due to causesof psychological nature.

(Continued on NEXT page)

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CIVIL LAW (continued)

Since the purpose of including such provisionin our Family Code is to harmonize our civillaws with the religious faith of our people, itstands to reason that to achieve suchharmonization, great persuasive weightshould be given to decisions of such appellatetribunal. Ideally — subject to our law onevidence — what is decreed as canonicallyinvalid should also be decreed civilly void.This is one instance where, in view of theevident source and purpose of the FamilyCode provision, contemporaneous religiousinterpretation is to be given persuasive effect.Here, the State and the Church — whileremaining independent, separate and apartfrom each other — shall walk together insynodal cadence towards the same goal ofprotecting and cherishing marriage and thefamily as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecutingattorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General toappear as counsel for the state. No decisionshall be handed down unless the SolicitorGeneral issues a certification, which will bequoted in the decision, briefly stating thereinhis reasons for his agreement or opposition,as the case may be, to the petition. TheSolicitor General, along with the prosecutingattorney, shall submit to the court suchcertification within 15 days from the date thecase is deemed submitted for resolution ofthe court. The Solicitor General shall dischargethe equivalent function of the defensor vinculicontemplated under Canon 1095.

The guidelines incorporate the three basicrequirements earlier mandated by the Court in Santosv. Court of Appeals: “psychological incapacity must becharacterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence,and (c) incurability.” The foregoing guidelines do notrequire that a physician examine the person to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, theroot cause may be “medically or clinically identified.”What is important is the presence of evidence that canadequately establish the party’s psychologicalcondition. For indeed, if the totality of evidencepresented is enough to sustain a finding ofpsychological incapacity, then actual medicalexamination of the person concerned need not beresorted to.

In this case, the Court agrees with the Court ofAppeals that the totality of the evidence submitted bypetitioner failed to satisfactorily prove that respondentwas psychologically incapacitated to comply with theessential obligations of marriage. The root cause ofrespondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not

sufficiently proven by experts or shown to bemedically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(Peralta, J., Digna A. Najera v. Eduardo J. Najera, G.R.No. 164817, July 3, 2009.)

Easement; definition of; kinds of easement;extinguishment of easements

An easement is a real right on another’s property,corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of thelatter must refrain from doing or allowing somebodyelse to do or something to be done on his property, forthe benefit of another person or tenement. Easementsare established either by law or by the will of theowner. The former are called legal, and the latter,voluntary easements.

x x x x

x x x the opening of an adequate outlet to a highwaycan extinguish only legal or compulsory easements,not voluntary easements like in the case at bar. Thefact that an easement by grant may have also qualifiedas an easement of necessity does not detract from itspermanency as a property right, which survives thetermination of the necessity. A voluntary easement ofright of way, like any other contract, could beextinguished only by mutual agreement or byrenunciation of the owner of the dominant estate.

x x x x

x x x a voluntary easement of right of way is likeany other contract. As such, it is generally effectivebetween the parties, their heirs and assigns, except incase where the rights and obligations arising from thecontract are not transmissible by their nature, or bystipulation or by provision of law.

x x x x

x x x It is settled that the registration of thedominant estate under the Torrens system withoutthe annotation of the voluntary easement in its favordoes not extinguish the easement. On the contrary, itis the registration of the servient estate as free, that is,without the annotation of the voluntary easement,which extinguishes the easement.

(Quisumbing, J., Unisource Commercial andDevelopment Corporation v. Joseph Chung, Kiat Chungand Kleto Chung, G.R. No. 173252, July 17, 2009.)


Tort case under Article 2176 of the Civil Code;proofs necessary; cause of action under Article 26;action for malicious prosecution; what must bealleged

Basic is the legal principle that the nature of anaction is determined by the material averments in thecomplaint and the character of the relief sought.Undeniably, Gregorio’s civil complaint, read in itsentirety, is a complaint based on quasi-delict underArticle 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code,rather than on malicious prosecution.

In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of theCivil Code, the plaintiff has to prove by apreponderance of evidence: (1) the damages sufferedby him; (2) the fault or negligence of the defendant orsome other person to whose act he must respond; (3)the connection of cause and effect between the fault ornegligence and the damages incurred; and (4) thatthere must be no preexisting contractual relationbetween the parties.

On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Codegrants a cause of action for damages, prevention, andother relief in cases of breach, though not necessarilyconstituting a criminal offense, of the following rights:(1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personalsecurity; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to socialintercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to peaceof mind.

A scrutiny of Gregorio’s civil complaint revealsthat the averments thereof, taken together, fulfill theelements of Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of theCivil Code. It appears that Gregorio’s rights topersonal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peaceof mind were infringed by Sansio and Datuin whenthey failed to exercise the requisite diligence indetermining the identity of the person they shouldrightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently fundedchecks. This fault was compounded when they failedto ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thusdepriving her of the opportunity to controvert thecharges, because she was not given proper notice.Because she was not able to refute the charges againsther, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) countsof violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Although she was neverfound at No. 76 Peñaranda St., Legaspi City, the officeaddress of Alvi Marketing as stated in the criminalcomplaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested byarmed operatives of the PARAC-DILG at her cityresidence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, whilevisiting her family. She suffered embarrassment andhumiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and


she had to spend time, effort, and money to clear hertarnished name and reputation, considering that shehad held several honorable positions in differentorganizations and offices in the public service,particularly her being a Kagawad in Oas, Albay at thetime of her arrest. There exists no contractual relationbetween Gregorio and Sansio. On the other hand,Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 ofthe Civil Code, for its vicarious liability, as employer,arising from the act or omission of its employeeDatuin.

These allegations, assuming them to be true,sufficiently constituted a cause of action against Sansioand Datuin. Thus, the RTC was correct when it deniedrespondents’ motion to dismiss.

Sansio and Datuin are in error when they insistthat Gregorio’s complaint is based on maliciousprosecution. In an action to recover damages formalicious prosecution, it must be alleged andestablished that Sansio and Datuin were impelled bylegal malice or bad faith in deliberately initiating anaction against Gregorio, knowing that the chargeswere false and groundless, intending to vex andhumiliate her. As previously mentioned, Gregorio didnot allege this in her complaint. Moreover, the factthat she prayed for moral damages did not changethe nature of her action based on quasi-delict. Shemight have acted on the mistaken notion that she wasentitled to moral damages, considering that shesuffered physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, woundedfeelings, moral shock, and social humiliation onaccount of her indictment and her sudden arrest.

Verily, Gregorio was only acting within her rightwhen she instituted against Sansio and Datuin anaction she perceived to be proper, given the factualantecedents of the case.

(Nachura, J., Zenaida R. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals,Sansio Philippines, Inc., and Emma J. Datuin, G.R. No.179799, September 11, 2009)

Compromise Agreement; prohibitions; status andfiliation of a child cannot be the subject ofcompromise

The Compromise Agreement between petitionerand respondent, executed on February 18, 2000 andapproved by RTC-Branch 9 in its Decision datedFebruary 21, 2000 in Special Proceeding No. 8830-CEB,obviously intended to settle the question of petitioner’s



status and filiation, i.e., whether she is an illegitimatechild of respondent. In exchange for petitioner andher brother Allan acknowledging that they are notthe children of respondent, respondent would paypetitioner and Allan Two Million Pesos (P2 million)each. Although unmentioned, it was a necessaryconsequence of said Compromise Agreement thatpetitioner also waived away her rights to futuresupport and future legitime as an illegitimate child ofrespondent. Evidently, the Compromise Agreementdated February 18, 2000 between petitioner andrespondent is covered by the prohibition under Article2035 of the Civil Code.

Advincula v. Advincula has a factual backgroundclosely similar to the one at bar. Manuela Advincula(Manuela) filed, before the Court of First Instance (CFI)of Iloilo, Civil Case No. 3553 for acknowledgment andsupport, against Manuel Advincula (Manuel). Onmotion of both parties, said case was dismissed. Notvery long after, Manuela again instituted, before thesame court, Civil Case No. 5659 for acknowledgmentand support, against Manuel. The Supreme Courtdeclared that although Civil Case No. 3553 ended in acompromise, it did not bar the subsequent filing byManuela of Civil Case No. 5659, asking for the samerelief from Manuel. Civil Case No. 3553 was an actionfor acknowledgment, affecting a person’s civil status,which cannot be the subject of compromise.

It is settled, then, in law and jurisprudence, thatthe status and filiation of a child cannot becompromised. Public policy demands that there beno compromise on the status and filiation of a child.Paternity and filiation or the lack of the same, is arelationship that must be judicially established, andit is for the Court to declare its existence or absence. Itcannot be left to the will or agreement of the parties.

Being contrary to law and public policy, theCompromise Agreement dated February 18, 2000between petitioner and respondent is void ab initio andvests no rights and creates no obligations. It producesno legal effect at all. The void agreement cannot berendered operative even by the parties’ allegedperformance (partial or full) of their respectiveprestations.

Neither can it be said that RTC-Branch 9, byapproving the Compromise Agreement, in its Decisiondated February 21, 2000 in Special Proceeding No.8830-CEB, already made said contract valid and legal.Obviously, it would already be beyond the jurisdictionof RTC-Branch 9 to legalize what is illegal. RTC-Branch9 had no authority to approve and give effect to aCompromise Agreement that was contrary to law and


LAND REGISTRATION LAWHomestead Patent and Free Patent distinguished;Torrens system not a mode of acquiring titles toland

In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Courtdistinguished a Homestead Patent from a Free Patent,to wit:

Homestead Patent and Free Patent are some ofthe land patents granted by the government underthe Public Land Act. While similar, they are notexactly the same. A Homestead Patent is oneissued to: any citizen of this country; over the ageof 18 years or the head of a family; who is not theowner of more than 24 hectares of land in thePhilippines or has not had the benefit of anygratuitous allotment of more than 24 hectares ofland since the occupation of the Philippines by theUnited States. The applicant must show that hehas complied with the residence and cultivationrequirements of the law; must have residedcontinuously for at least one year in themunicipality where the land is situated; and musthave cultivated at least one-fifth of the land appliedfor.

On the other hand, a Free Patent may be issuedwhere the applicant is a natural-born citizen of thePhilippines; not the owner of more than 12 hectaresof land; that he has continuously occupied andcultivated, either by himself or through hispredecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts ofagricultural public lands subject to disposition forat least 30 years prior to the effectivity of RepublicAct No. 6940; and that he has paid the real taxesthereon while the same has not been occupied byany person.

It bears stressing that a Homestead Patent, onceregistered under the Land Registration Act, becomesas indefeasible as a Torrens Title. Verily, Section 103of PD No. 1529 mandates the registration of patents,and such registration is the operative act to conveythe land to the patentee, thus:

public policy, even if said contract was executed andsubmitted for approval by both parties. RTC-Branch9 would not be competent, under any circumstances,to grant the approval of the said CompromiseAgreement. No court can allow itself to be used as atool to circumvent the explicit prohibition underArticle 2035 of the Civil Code.

(Chico-Nazario, J., Joanie Surposa Uy v. Jose Ngo Chua,G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009.)


TAXATION LAWTax sale of real property; deposit of amount of salejurisdictional requirement

Section 83 of PD No. 464 states that the RTC shallnot entertain any complaint assailing the validity ofa tax sale of real property unless the complainantdeposits with the court the amount for which the saidproperty was sold plus interest equivalent to 20percent per annum from the date of sale until theinstitution of the complaint. This provision wasadopted in Section 267 of the Local Government Code,albeit the increase in the prescribed rate of interest to2 percent per month.

In this regard, National Housing Authority v. IloiloCity holds that the deposit required under Section 267of the Local Government Code is a jurisdictionalrequirement, the nonpayment of which warrants thedismissal of the action. Because petitioners in this casedid not make such deposit, the RTC never acquiredjurisdiction over the complaints.

(Corona, J., Spouses Francisco and Betty Wong andSpouses Joaquin and Lolita Wong v. City of Iloilo,Romeo Manikan as City Treasurer of Iloilo, MelanieUy and the estate of Felipe Uy, G.R. No. 161748, July 3,2009.)

SEC. 103. x x x The deed, grant, patent or instrumentof conveyance from the Government to thegrantee shall not take effect as a conveyance orbind the land but shall operate only as a contractbetween the Government and the grantee and asevidence of authority to the Register of Deeds tomake registration. It is the act of registration thatshall be the operative act to affect and convey theland, and in all cases under this Decree, registrationshall be made in the office of the Register of Deedsof the province or city where the land lies. The feesfor registration shall be paid by the grantee. Afterdue registration and issuance of the certificate oftitle, such land shall be deemed to be registered landto all intents and purposes under this Decree.(Emphasis supplied)

The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titlesto lands; it is merely a system of registration of titlesto lands. However, justice and equity demand thatthe titleholder should not be made to bear theunfavorable effect of the mistake or negligence of theState’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicityin a fraud or of manifest damage to third persons. Thereal purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title toland and put a stop forever to any question as to thelegality of the title, except claims that were noted inthe certificate at the time of the registration or thatmay arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrityof the Torrens system shall forever be sullied by theineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials,who are ordinarily presumed to have regularlyperformed their duties.

The general rule that the direct result of a previousvoid contract cannot be valid will not apply in thiscase as it will directly contravene the Torrens systemof registration. Where innocent third persons, relyingon the correctness of the certificate of title thus issued,acquire rights over the property, the Court cannotdisregard such rights and order the cancellation ofthe certificate. The effect of such outright cancellationwill be to impair public confidence in the certificate oftitle. The sanctity of the Torrens system must bepreserved; otherwise, everyone dealing with theproperty registered under the system will have toinquire in every instance as to whether the title hadbeen regularly or irregularly issued, contrary to theevident purpose of the law. Every person dealing withthe registered land may safely rely on the correctnessof the certificate of title issued therefor, and the lawwill, in no way, oblige him to go behind the certificateto determine the condition of the property.

(Nachura, J., Rabaja Ranch Development Corporationv. AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System, G.R.No. 177181, July 7, 2009.)

LAND REGISTRATION LAW (continued)

CORPORATION LAWDeath of a shareholder; heirs do not automaticallybecome shareholders of the corporation

Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do notautomatically become stockholders of the corporationand acquire the rights and privileges of the deceasedas shareholder of the corporation. The stocks must bedistributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, andthe transfer of the stocks must be recorded in the booksof the corporation. Section 63 of the Corporation Codeprovides that no transfer shall be valid, except asbetween the parties, until the transfer is recorded inthe books of the corporation. During such interimperiod, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of thestocks, the executor or administrator duly appointedby the court being vested with the legal title to thestock. Until a settlement and division of the estate iseffected, the stocks of the decedent are held by theadministrator or executor. Consequently, during suchtime, it is the administrator or executor who is entitledto exercise the rights of the deceased as stockholder.

Thus, even if petitioner presents sufficient evidencein this case to establish that he is the son of Carlos L.Puno, he would still not be allowed to inspect



REMEDIAL LAWExclusive appellate jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan

Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, hisremedy should have been an appeal to theSandiganbayan. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of RepublicAct No. 8249 (RA No. 8249), which further defined thejurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, reads:

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellatejurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions ororders of the regional trial courts whether in theexercise of their own original jurisdiction or of theirappellate jurisdiction as herein provided. (Emphasisours)

There is nothing in said paragraph which canconceivably justify the filing of Balaba’s appeal beforethe Court of Appeals instead of the Sandiganbayan.Clearly, the Court of Appeals is bereft of anyjurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba seeks toappeal.

In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Courtruled:

An error in designating the appellate court is notfatal to the appeal. However, the correction indesignating the proper appellate court should bemade within the 15-day period to appeal. Oncemade within the said period, the designation ofthe correct appellate court may be allowed evenif the records of the case are forwarded to theCourt of Appeals. Otherwise, the secondparagraph of Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules ofcourt would apply. The second paragraph ofSection 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads:

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court ofAppeals shall not be transferred to theappropriate court but shall be dismissedoutright. (Emphasis ours)

(Carpio, J., Irenorio B. Balaba v. People of thePhilippines, G.R. No. 169519, July 17, 2009.)

Petition for Certiorari strictly within 60 days

As a rule, an amendment by the deletion of certainwords or phrases indicates an intention to change itsmeaning. It is presumed that the deletion would nothave been made if there had been no intention to effecta change in the meaning of the law or rule. Theamended law or rule should accordingly be given aconstruction different from that previous to itsamendment.

If the Court intended to retain the authority of theproper courts to grant extensions under Section 4 ofRule 65, the paragraph providing for such authoritywould have been preserved. The removal of the saidparagraph under the amendment by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that therecan no longer be any extension of the 60-day periodwithin which to file a petition for certiorari.

The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No.07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse)of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay acase or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting theparagraph allowing extensions to file petition oncompelling grounds did away with the filing of suchmotions. As the Rule now stands, petitions for certiorarimust be filed strictly within 60 days from notice ofjudgment or from the order denying a motion forreconsideration.

In granting the private respondents’ motion forextension of time to file petition for certiorari, the Courtof Appeals disregarded A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. Theaction amounted to a modification, if not outrightreversal, by the Court of Appeals of A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC. In so doing, the Court of Appeals arrogated to itselfa power it did not possess, a power that only the Courtmay exercise. For this reason, the challengedresolutions dated August 7, 2008 and October 22, 2008were invalid as they were rendered by the Court ofAppeals in excess of its jurisdiction.

(Corona J., Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court ofAppeals, Aries C. Caalam and Geraldine Esguerra, G.R.No. 185220, July 27, 2009.)

Summary judgment; when allowed; genuineissue; its concept

In Solidbank Corp. v. CA, the Court, explaining whensummary judgment may be allowed, wrote:

Summary judgment is a procedural deviceresorted to in order to avoid long drawn outlitigations and useless delays. When thepleadings on file show that there are no genuineissues of fact to be tried, the Rules of Court allows

respondent’s books and be entitled to receive dividendsfrom respondent, absent any showing in its transferbook that some of the shares owned by Carlos L. Punowere transferred to him. This would only be possibleif petitioner has been recognized as an heir and hasparticipated in the settlement of the estate of thedeceased.

(Nachura, J., Joselito Musni Puno (as heir of the lateCarlos Puno) v. Puno Enterprises, Inc., represented byJesusa Puno, G.R. No. 177066, September 11, 2009.)

CORPORATION LAW (continued)


REMEDIAL LAW (continued)

a party to obtain immediate relief by way ofsummary judgment. That is, when the facts arenot in dispute, the court is allowed to decide thecase summarily by applying the law to the materialfacts.

Conversely, where the pleadings tender a genuineissue, summary judgment is not proper. A“genuine issue” is such issue of fact which[requires] the presentation of evidence asdistinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrivedor false claim.

Rule 34, Section 3 of the Rules of Court providestwo requisites for summary judgment to beproper: (1) there must be no genuine issue as toany material fact, except for the amount ofdamages; and (2) the party presenting the motionfor summary judgment must be entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law.

Elaborating on the concept of a “genuine issue,”the Supreme Court held in Asian Construction andDevelopment Corporation v. Philippine Commercial IndustrialBank, as follows:

Under the Rules, summary judgment isappropriate when there are no genuine issues offact which call for the presentation of evidence ina full-blown trial. Even if on their face the pleadingsappear to raise issues, when the affidavits,depositions and admissions show that such issuesare not genuine, then summary judgment asprescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matterof law. The determinative factor, therefore, in amotion for summary judgment, is the presenceor absence of a genuine issue as to any materialfact.

A “genuine issue” is an issue of fact which requiresthe presentation of evidence as distinguishedfrom a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.When the facts as pleaded appear uncontestedor undisputed, then there is no real or genuineissue or question as to the facts, and summaryjudgment is called for. The party who moves forsummary judgment has the burden ofdemonstrating clearly the absence of any genuineissue of fact x x x. Trial courts have limitedauthority to render summary judgments and maydo so only when there is clearly no genuine issueas to any material fact. When the facts as pleadedby the parties are disputed or contested,proceedings for summary judgment cannot takethe place of trial.

From the foregoing provisions andpronouncements, it is clear that summary oraccelerated judgment is proper only when, based onthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, andafter hearing, it is shown that save as to the amount ofdamages, there is no veritable issue regarding any

material fact in the action and the movant is entitledto judgment as a matter of law. Conversely, where thepleadings tender an issue, that is, an issue of fact theresolution of which calls for a presentation of evidence,as distinguished from an issue which is sham orcontrived, summary judgment is not proper.

(Velasco, Jr., J., D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. DuvazCorporation, G.R. No. 155174, August 4, 2009.)

Extrajudicial foreclosure under Act No. 3135 asamended; writ of possession during the pendencyof the period of redemption; exception to thegeneral rule.

The general rule is that upon proper applicationand proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possessionto the purchaser of the foreclosed property at a publicauction sale becomes a ministerial duty of the court.

However, as in all general rules, there is anexception. In Roxas v. Buan, the Supreme Courtexplained thus:

In the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estatemortgages, possession of the property may beawarded to the purchaser at the foreclosure saleduring the pendency of the period of redemptionunder the terms provided in Section 6 of Act No.3135, as amended (An Act to Regulate the Sale ofProperty Under Special Powers Inserted In orAnnexed to Real Estate Mortgages), or after thelapse of the redemption period, without need of aseparate and independent action (IFC ServiceLeasing and Acceptance Corp. v. Nera, G.R. No. L-21720,January 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 181). This is founded onhis right of ownership over the property which hepurchased at the auction sale and his consequentright to be placed in possession thereof.

This rule is, however, not without exception. UnderSection 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court,which was made applicable to the extrajudicialforeclosure of real estate mortgages by Section 6Act No. 3135, the possession of the mortgagedproperty may be awarded to a purchaser inextrajudicial foreclosures “unless a third party isactually holding the property adversely to thejudgment debtor.” [Emphasis supplied.] (Clapano v.Gapultos, G.R. Nos. 51574-77, September 30, 1984,132 SCRA 429, 434; Philippine National Bank v. Adil,G.R. No. 52823, November 2, 1982, 118 SCRA 110;IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corp. v. Nera,supra.) As explained by the Court in IFC ServiceLeasing and Acceptance Corp. v. Nera, supra:

x x x The applicable provision of Act No. 3135 isSection 6 which provides that, in cases in whichan extrajudicial sale is made, “redemption shall




be governed by the provisions of Sections 464 to466, inclusive, of the Code of Civil Procedure in sofar as these are not inconsistent with theprovisions of this Act.” Sections 464-466 of theCode of Civil Procedure were superseded bySections 25-27 and Section 31 of Rule 39 of theRules of Court which in turn were replaced bySections 29-31 and Section 35 of Rule 39 of theRevised Rules of Court. Section 35 of the RevisedRules of Court expressly states that “If noredemption be made within 12 months after thesale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled toa conveyance and possession of the propertyx x x.” The possession of the property shall begiven to the purchaser or last redemptioner bythe officer unless a party is actually holding theproperty adversely to the judgment debtor. (Id. at184-185; Emphasis in the original.)

Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Courtreferred to above had been further revised, and is nowSection 33 of the same Rule, which reads:

SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expirationof redemption period; by whom executed or given.– If no redemption be made within one year fromthe date of the registration of the certificate ofsale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyanceand possession of the property; x x x.

Upon the expiration of the right of redemption,the purchaser or redemptioner shall besubstituted to and acquire all the rights, title,interest and claim of the judgment obligor to theproperty as of the time of the levy. The possessionof the property shall be given to the purchaser orlast redemptioner by the same officer unless athird party is actually holding the propertyadversely to the judgment obligor. (Emphasissupplied)

In an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property,when the foreclosed property is in the possession of athird party holding the same adversely to thedefaulting debtor/mortgagor, the issuance by the RTCof a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser of thesaid real property ceases to be ministerial and may nolonger be done ex parte. But, for the exception to apply,the property must be possessed by a third party; andsuch possession must be adverse to the debtor/mortgagor.

(Chico-Nazario, J., Top Art Shirt Manufacturing,Incorporated, Maximo Arejola and Tan Siu Kheng v.Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company and the Courtof Appeals, G.R. No. 184005, August 4, 2009.)

Writ of preliminary injunction; grant thereof isdiscretionary but should be with extreme caution

The instructive ruling in Manila International AirportAuthority v. Court of Appeals states:

Considering the far-reaching effects of a writ ofpreliminary injunction, the trial court should haveexercised more prudence and judiciousness inits issuance of the injunction order. We remindtrial courts that while generally the grant of awrit of preliminary injunction rests on the sounddiscretion of the court taking cognizance of thecase, extreme caution must be observed in the exerciseof such discretion. The discretion of the court a quoto grant an injunctive writ must be exercisedbased on the grounds and in the manner providedby law. Thus, the Court declared in Garcia v. Burgos:

It has been consistently held that there isno power the exercise of which is moredelicate, which requires greater caution,deliberation and sound discretion, ormore dangerous in a doubtful case, thanthe issuance of an injunction. It is thestrong arm of equity that should never beextended unless to cases of great injury,where courts of law cannot afford anadequate or commensurate remedy indamages.

Every court should remember that an injunctionis a limitation upon the freedom of action of thedefendant and should not be granted lightly orprecipitately. It should be granted only when the courtis fully satisfied that the law permits it and theemergency demands it.” (Emphasis in the original)

(Carpio, J., Tanduay Distillers, Inc. v. Ginebra SanMiguel, Inc., G.R. No. 164324, August 14, 2009.)

Fresh Period Rule

As early as 2005, the Court categorically declaredin Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by virtue of the powerof the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create newprocedural rules in all courts, the Court is allowing afresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice ofappeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the orderdismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motionfor reconsideration. This would standardize theappeal periods provided in the Rules and do awaywith the confusion as to when the 15-day appealperiod should be counted. Thus, the Court stated:

To recapitulate, a party-litigant may either file hisnotice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of theRegional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15days from receipt of the order (the “final order”)denying his motion for new trial or motion forreconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period



may be availed of only if either motion is filed;otherwise, the decision becomes final andexecutory after the lapse of the original appealperiod provided in Rule 41, Section 3.

The foregoing ruling of the Court was reiteratedin Makati Insurance Co., Inc. v. Reyes, to wit:

Propitious to petitioner is Neypes v. Court of Appeals,promulgated on September 14, 2005 while thepresent Petition was already pending before us.x x x

x x x x

With the advent of the “fresh period rule,” partieswho availed themselves of the remedy of motionfor reconsideration are now allowed to file anotice of appeal within 15 days from the denial ofthat motion.

The “fresh period rule” is not inconsistent withRule 41, Section 3 of the Revised Rules of Courtwhich states that the appeal shall be taken “within15 days from notice of judgment or final orderappealed from.” The use of the disjunctive word“or” signifies disassociation and independenceof one thing from another. It should, as a rule, beconstrued in the sense which it ordinarily implies.Hence, the use of “or” in the above provisionsupposes that the notice of appeal may be filedwithin 15 days from the notice of judgment orwithin 15 days from notice of the “final order,”x x x.

x x x x

The “fresh period rule” finally eradicates theconfusion as to when the 15-day appeal periodshould be counted – from receipt of notice ofjudgment or from receipt of notice of “final order”appealed from.

Taking our bearings from Neypes, in Sumaway v.Urban Bank, Inc., we set aside the denial of a noticeof appeal which was purportedly filed five dayslate. With the fresh period rule, the 15-day periodwithin which to file the notice of appeal wascounted from notice of the denial of the thereinpetitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

We followed suit in Elbiña v. Ceniza, wherein weapplied the principle granting a fresh period of 15days within which to file the notice of appeal,counted from receipt of the order dismissing amotion for new trial or motion for reconsiderationor any final order or resolution.

Thereafter, in First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bankof the Philippine Islands, we held that a party-litigantmay now file his notice of appeal either within 15days from receipt of the original decision or within15 days from the receipt of the order denying themotion for reconsideration.

In De los Santos v. Vda. de Mangubat, we appliedthe same principle of “fresh period rule,”expostulating that procedural law refers to theadjective law which prescribes rules and formsof procedure in order that courts may be able toadminister justice. Procedural laws do not comewithin the legal conception of a retroactive law,or the general rule against the retroactiveoperation of statutes. The “fresh period rule” isirrefragably procedural, prescribing the mannerin which the appropriate period for appeal is to becomputed or determined and, therefore, can bemade applicable to actions pending upon itseffectivity, such as the present case, without dangerof violating anyone else’s rights. (Emphasis supplied)

The retroactivity of the Neypes rule in cases wherethe period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date ofpromulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, wasclearly explained by the Court in Fil-Estate Properties,Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus:

The determinative issue is whether the “freshperiod” rule announced in Neypes couldretroactively apply in cases where the period forappeal had lapsed prior to September 14, 2005when Neypes was promulgated. That question maybe answered with the guidance of the generalrule that procedural laws may be given retroactiveeffect to actions pending and undetermined at thetime of their passage, there being no vested rightsin the rules of procedure. Amendments toprocedural rules are procedural or remedial incharacter as they do not create new or removevested rights, but only operate in furtherance ofthe remedy or confirmation of rights alreadyexisting.

Sps. De los Santos reaffirms these principles andcategorically warrants that Neypes bears the questedretroactive effect, to wit:

Procedural law refers to the adjective law whichprescribes rules and forms of procedure in orderthat courts may be able to administer justice.Procedural laws do not come within the legalconception of a retroactive law, or the generalrule against the retroactive operation of statues– they may be given retroactive effect on actionspending and undetermined at the time of theirpassage and this will not violate any right of aperson who may feel that he is adversely affected,insomuch as there are no vested rights in rulesof procedure.

The “fresh period rule” is a procedural law as itprescribes a fresh period of 15 days within whichan appeal may be made in the event that the motionfor reconsideration is denied by the lower court. Following the rule on retroactivity of procedurallaws, the “fresh period rule” should be applied topending actions, such as the present case.


Inhibition of Judges; types of inhibition

Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. — No judgeor judicial officers shall sit in any case in which he,or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested asheir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which heis related to either party within the sixth degree ofconsanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within thefourth degree, computed according to the rules ofthe civil law, or in which he has been executor,administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or inwhich he has presided in any inferior court whenhis ruling or decision is the subject of review,without the written consent of all parties in interest,signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion,disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just orvalid reasons other than those mentioned above.The first paragraph of the section relates to themandatory inhibition of judges; the second, to theirvoluntary inhibition.

The discretion referred to in the second paragraphis a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily tothe judges’ sense of fairness and justice. Indeed, as theCourt held in Pimentel v. Salanga, judges may not belegally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. However,when suggestion is made of record that they might beinduced to act with bias or prejudice against a litigant

Also, to deny herein petitioners the benefit of the“fresh period rule” will amount to injustice, if notabsurdity, since the subject notice of judgment andfinal order were issued two years later or in theyear 2000, as compared to the notice of judgmentand final order in Neypes which were issued in 1998. It will be incongruous and illogical that partiesreceiving notices of judgment and final ordersissued in the year 1998 will enjoy the benefit of the“fresh period rule” while those later rulings of thelower courts such as in the instant case, will not.

Since this case was already pending in this Courtat the time of promulgation of Neypes, then, ineluctably,the Court must also apply the foregoing rulings to thepresent case. Petitioner is entitled to a “fresh period”of 15 days—counted from May 19, 2003, the date ofpetitioner’s receipt of the Order denying his motionfor reconsideration of the RTC Decision— within whichto file his notice of appeal. Therefore, when he filedsaid notice on May 29, 2003, or only 10 days after receiptof the Order denying his motion for reconsideration,his period to appeal had not yet lapsed.

(Peralta, J., Rodrigo Sumiran v. Spouses GenerosoDamaso and Eva Damaso, G.R. No. 162518, August 19,2009.)


arising out of circumstances reasonably capable ofinciting such a state of mind, they should conduct acareful self-examination. Magistrates should exercisetheir discretion in a way that the people’s faith in thecourts of justice is not impaired. They should,therefore, exercise great care and caution beforemaking up their minds to act or withdraw from asuit. If, after reflection, they resolve to voluntarilydesist from sitting in a case in which their motives orfairness might be seriously impugned, their action isto be interpreted as giving meaning and substance tothe second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of theRules of Court.

Nonetheless, while the rule allows judges, in theexercise of sound discretion, to voluntarily inhibitthemselves from hearing a case, it provides that theinhibition must be based on just or valid reasons. Inprior cases interpreting this rule, the most recent ofwhich is Philippine Commercial International Bank v. SpousesWilson Dy Hong Pi, etc., et al., the Court noted that themere imputation of bias or partiality is not enoughground for inhibition, especially when the charge iswithout basis. Acts or conduct clearly indicative ofarbitrariness or prejudice has to be shown. Extrinsicevidence must further be presented to establish bias,bad faith, malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition topalpable error which may be inferred from thedecision or order itself. Stated differently, the bareallegations of the judge’s partiality will not suffice inthe absence of clear and convincing evidence toovercome the presumption that the judge willundertake his noble role of dispensing justice inaccordance with law and evidence, and without fearor favor. Verily, for bias and prejudice to be consideredvalid reasons for the involuntary inhibition of judges,mere suspicion is not enough. Let it be further notedthat the option given to a judge to choose whether ornot to handle a particular case should becounterbalanced by the judge’s sworn duty toadminister justice without fear of repression.

In the case at bar, petitioner, aside from his bareallegations, has not shown that Judge Quijano-Padillahad been biased and partial against a particular partyin the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-99-37219. Thejudge even acknowledged in the inhibitory order thatthe motion for her disqualification contained nostatement of specific act or acts that would show herpartiality or bias in the treatment of the case. Hervoluntary inhibition was only on account ofdispelling any doubt and perception of bias on thepart of petitioner. Clearly, therefore, no just and validreason supports the inhibition of Judge Quijano-Padilla.


The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruledadversely against petitioner in the resolution of themotion to dismiss, which this Court later reversed inG.R. No. 160753, is not enough reason, absent anyextrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, to concludethat the judge was biased and partial againstpetitioner. As the Court has emphasized in Webb v.People, the remedy of erroneous interlocutory rulingsin the course of a trial is not the outrightdisqualification of a judge, for there is yet to come ajudge with the omniscience to issue rulings that arealways infallible. The courts will close shop if wedisqualify judges who err, for we all err.

Finally, the Court noted that if it were to affirmthe inhibitory order in this case, then it would beopening the floodgates to a form of forum-shopping,in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judgemore sympathetic to their causes.

(Nachura, J., Jimmy Barnes a.k.a. James L. Barnes v.Teresita C. Reyes, Elizabeth Pasion, Ma. Elsa C. Garcia,Imelda C. Trillo, Ma. Elena C. Dinglasan, and RicardoP. Crisostomo, G.R. No. 179583, September 3, 2009.)

Petition for certiorari does not lie to review aninterlocutory order

It is the settled rule that certiorari does not lie toreview an interlocutory order, but only a finaljudgment or order that terminates the proceedings.Certiorari will be refused where there has been no finaljudgment or order and the proceeding for which thewrit is sought is still pending and undetermined inthe lower court. Indeed, a writ of certiorari is notintended to correct every controversial interlocutoryruling unless the ruling is attended by grave abuse ofdiscretion or tainted by whimsical exercise ofjudgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, for thefunction of certiorari is limited to keeping an inferiorcourt within its jurisdiction and to relieving personsfrom its arbitrary acts – acts that courts or judgeshave no power or authority in law to perform.

Instead, the proper remedy for the petitioner is toproceed in the action until judgment, which, oncerendered, might then be reviewed on appeal, alongwith the assailed interlocutory order. As long as thetrial court acted within its jurisdiction, its alleged errorcommitted in the exercise of its jurisdiction amountedto nothing more than an error of judgment that isreviewable by a timely appeal, not by a special civilaction of certiorari.

(Bersamin, J., Jowett K. Golangco v. Jone B. Fung, G.R.No. 157952, September 8, 2009.)

Handwriting experts not indispensable inexamining handwriting or signatures

It is settled that handwriting experts, while useful,are not indispensable in examining or comparinghandwritings or signatures. For Section 22 of Rule132 of the Rules of Court provides:

The handwriting of a person may be proved byany witness who believes it to be the handwritingof the person because he has seen the personwrite, or has seen writing purporting to be hisupon which the witness has acted or beencharged, and has thus acquired knowledge ofthe handwriting of such person. Evidencerespecting the handwriting may also be given bya comparison, made by the witness or the court, withwritings admitted or treated as genuine by theparty against whom the evidence is offered, orproved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the

judge. (Underscoring supplied)

Complementing the said provision is Section 50 of Rule130 of the Rules of Court which allows the receptionof the opinion of a witness, like Judge Laviña, for whichproper basis is given, as evidence regarding ahandwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity.

(Carpio Morales, J., Progressive Trade and ServiceEnterprises v. Maria Milagrosa Antonio and SecundinaM. Cebrero, G.R. No. 179502, September 18, 2009.)


The PHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA Bulletin is published quarterly by theResearch, Publications and Linkages Office of thePhilippine Judicial Academy, with office at the 3rd Floorof the Supreme Court Centennial Building, Padre FauraSt. cor. Taft Ave., Manila.Telephone No. 552-9524; Telefax No. 552-9621;E-mail address: [email protected];Website address: http://[email protected]

JUSTICE ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

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PHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinPHILJA BulletinRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARS22

SUPREME COURTRESOLUTION of the COURT En Banc datedSeptember 1, 2009, on A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR)

Pursuant to En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC dated August 28, 2009, the Court Resolved toAPPROVE A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR): Re Rule on theExemption from the Payment of Legal Fees of theClients of the National Legal Aid Committee (NCLA)and of the Legal Aid Offices in the Local Chapters ofthe Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

The Rule on the Exemption from the Payment ofLegal Fees of the Clients of the NCLA and of the LegalAid Offices in the Local Chapters of the IBP shall takeeffect after 15 days following its publication in anewspaper of general circulation.

September 01, 2009.

(Sgd.) PUNO, CJ, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO,CARPIO, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CHICO-NAZARIO, VELASCO, JR., NACHURA, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DELCASTILLO, ABAD, JJ.

RULE ON THE EXEMPTIONFROM THE PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES

OF THE CLIENTS OF THENATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID (NCLA)

AND OF THE LEGAL AID OFFICESIN THE LOCAL CHAPTERS OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP)

ARTICLE IPURPOSE

SECTION 1. Purpose. – This Rule is issued for the purposeof enforcing the right of free access to courts by thepoor guaranteed under Section 11, Article III of theConstitution. It is intended to increase the access tojustice by the poor by exempting from the payment oflegal fees incidental to instituting an action in court,as an original proceeding or on appeal, qualifiedindigent clients of the NCLA and of the legal aid officesin local IBP chapters nationwide.

ARTICLE IIDEFINITION OF TERMS

SECTION 1. Definition of important terms. – For purposesof this Rule and as used herein, the following termsshall be understood to be how they are defined underthis Section:

(a) “Developmental legal aid” means therendition of legal services in public interestcauses involving overseas workers, fisherfolk,

farmers, laborers, indigenous culturalcommunities, women, children and otherdisadvantaged groups and marginalizedsectors;

(b) “Disinterested person” refers to the punongbarangay having jurisdiction over the placewhere an applicant for legal aid or client ofthe NCLA or chapter legal aid office resides;

(c) “Falsity” refers to any materialmisrepresentation of fact or any fraudulent,deceitful, false, wrong or misleading statementin the application or affidavits submitted tosupport it or the affidavit of a disinterestedperson required to be submitted annuallyunder this Rule which may substantiallyaffect the determination of the qualificationsof the applicant or the client under the meansand merit tests;

(d) “Legal fees” refers to the legal fees imposedunder Rule 141 of the Rules of Court as anecessary incident of instituting an action incourt either as an original proceeding or onappeal. In particular, it includes filing or docketfees, appeal fees, fees for issuance ofprovisional remedies, mediation fees, sheriff’sfees, stenographer’s fees (that is fees fortranscript of stenographic notes) andcommissioner’s fees;

(e) “Means test” refers to the set of criteria usedto determine whether the applicant is one whohas no money or property sufficient andavailable for food, shelter and basic necessitiesfor himself and his family;

(f) “Merit test” refers to the ascertainment ofwhether the applicant’s cause of action or hisdefense is valid and whether the chances ofestablishing the same appear reasonable; and

(g) “Representative” refers to the personauthorized to file an application for legal aidin behalf of the applicant when the saidapplicant is prevented by a compelling reasonfrom personally filing his application. As arule, it refers to the immediate familymembers of the applicant. However, it mayinclude any of the applicant’s relatives or anyperson or concerned citizen of sufficientdiscretion who has first-hand knowledge ofthe personal circumstances of the applicantas well as of the facts of the applicant’s case.

PHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSPHILJA NEWSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSRESOLUTIONS, ORDERS AND CIRCULARSJuly-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009July-September 2009 23

ARTICLE IIICOVERAGE

SECTION 1. Persons qualified for exemption from paymentof legal fees. – Persons who shall enjoy the benefit ofexemption from the payment of legal fees incidental toinstituting an action in court, as an original proceedingor on appeal, granted under this Rule shall be limitedonly to clients of the NCLA and the chapter legal aidoffices.

The said clients shall refer to those indigentsqualified to receive free legal aid service from the NCLAand the chapter legal aid offices. Their qualificationsshall be determined based on the tests provided inthis Rule.

SEC. 2. Persons not covered by the Rule. – The followingshall be disqualified from the coverage of this Rule.Nor may they be accepted as clients by the NCLA andthe chapter legal aid offices.

(a) Juridical persons; except in cases covered bydevelopmental legal aid or public interest causesinvolving juridical entities which are non-stock, non-profit organizations, non-governmental organizations and people’sorganizations whose individual members willpass the means test provided in this Rule;

(b) Persons who do not pass the means and merittests;

(c) Parties already represented by a counsel departe;

(d) Owners or lessors of residential lands orbuildings with respect to the filing ofcollection or unlawful detainer suits againsttheir tenants; and

(e) Persons who have been clients of the NCLA orchapter legal aid office previously in a casewhere the NCLA or chapter legal aid officewithdrew its representation because of afalsity in the application or in any of theaffidavits supporting the said application.

SEC. 3. Cases not covered by the Rule. – The NCLA andthe chapter legal aid offices shall not handle thefollowing:

(a) Cases where conflicting interests will berepresented by the NCLA and the chapterlegal aid offices; and

(b) Prosecution of criminal cases in court.

ARTICLE IVTESTS OF INDIGENCY

SECTION 1. Tests for determining who may be clients ofthe NCLA and the legal aid offices in local IBP chapters.– The NCLA or the chapter legal aid committee, as thecase may be, shall pass upon requests for legal aid bythe combined application of the means and merit testsand the consideration of other relevant factorsprovided for in the following sections.

SEC. 2. Means test; exception. – (a) This test shall bebased on the following criteria: (i) the applicant andthat of his immediate family must have a grossmonthly income that does not exceed an amountdouble the monthly minimum wage of an employeein the place where the applicant resides and (ii) hedoes not own real property with a fair market valueas stated in the current tax declaration of more thanThree Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000).

In this connection, the applicant shall execute anaffidavit of indigency (printed at the back of theapplication form) stating that he and his immediatefamily do not earn a gross income abovementioned,nor own any real property with the fair valueaforementioned, supported by an affidavit of adisinterested person attesting to the truth of theapplicant’s affidavit. The latest income tax return and/or current tax declaration, if any, shall be attached tothe applicant’s affidavit.

(b) The means test shall not be applicable toapplicants who fall under the developmental legal aidprogram such as overseas workers, fisherfolk, farmers,laborers, indigenous cultural communities, women,children and other disadvantaged groups.

SEC. 3. Merit test. – A case shall be consideredmeritorious if an assessment of the law and evidenceat hand discloses that the legal service will be in aidof justice or in the furtherance thereof, taking intoconsideration the interests of the party and those ofsociety. A case fails this test if, after consideration ofthe law and evidence presented by the applicant, itappears that it is intended merely to harass or injurethe opposite party or to work oppression or wrong.

SEC. 4. Other relevant factors that may be considered. –The effect of legal aid or of the failure to render thesame upon the rule of law, the proper administrationof justice, the public interest involved in a given caseand the practice of law in the locality shall likewisebe considered.

RESOLUTION on A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC (IRR) (continued)



ARTICLE VACCEPTANCE AND HANDLING OF CASES

SECTION 1. Procedure in accepting cases. – The followingprocedure shall be observed in the acceptance of casesfor purposes of this Rule:

(a) Filing of application – An application shall bemade personally by the applicant, unless thereis a compelling reason which prevents himfrom doing so, in which case his representativemay apply for him. It shall adheresubstantially to the form made for thatpurpose. It shall be prepared and signed bythe applicant or, in proper cases, his dulyauthorized representative in at least threecopies.

Applications for legal aid shall be filedwith the NCLA or with the chapter legal aidcommittee.

The NCLA shall, as much as possible,concentrate on cases of paramount importanceor national impact.

Requests received by the IBP NationalOffice shall be referred by the NCLA to theproper chapter legal aid committee of thelocality where the cases have to be filed or arepending. The chapter president and thechairman of the chapter’s legal aid committeeshall be advised of such referral.

(b) Interview – The applicant shall be interviewedby a member of the chapter legal aid committeeor any chapter member authorized by thechapter legal aid committee to determine theapplicant’s qualifications based on the meansand merit tests and other relevant factors. Heshall also be required to submit copies of hislatest income tax returns and/or current taxdeclaration, if available, and execute anaffidavit of indigency printed at the back ofthe application form with the supportingaffidavit of a disinterested person attesting tothe truth of the applicant’s affidavit.

After the interview, the applicant shall beinformed that he can follow up the action onhis application after five working days.

(c) Action on the application – The chapter legalaid committee shall pass upon every requestfor legal aid and submit its recommendationto the chapter board of officers within threeworking days after the interview of theapplicant. The basis of the recommendationshall be stated.

The chapter board of officers shall reviewand act on the recommendation of the chapterlegal aid committee within two working daysfrom receipt thereof; Provided, however, that inurgent matters requiring prompt orimmediate action, the chapter ’s executivedirector of legal aid or whoever performs hisfunctions may provisionally act on theapplication, subject to review by the chapterlegal aid committee and, thereafter, by thechapter board of officers.

The action of the chapter board of officerson the application shall be final.

(d) Cases which may be provisionally accepted.– In the following cases, the NCLA or thechapter legal aid office, through the chapter’sexecutive director of legal aid or whoeverperforms his functions may accept casesprovisionally pending verification of theapplicant’s indigency and an evaluation of themerit of his case.

(i) Where a warrant for .the arrest of theapplicant has been issued;

(ii) Where a pleading has to be filedimmediately to avoid adverse effects tothe applicant;

(iii) Where an appeal has to be urgentlyperfected or a petition for certiorari,prohibition or mandamus filed has to befiled immediately; and

(iv) Other similar urgent cases.

(e) Assignment of control number – Uponapproval of the chapter board of officers of aperson’s application and the applicant is foundto be qualified for legal assistance, the case shallbe assigned a control number. The numberingshall be consecutive starting from January toDecember of every year. The control numbershall also indicate the region and the chapterhandling the case.

Example:

(f) Issuance of a certification – After an


1 For purposes of the Rule, the following abbreviations shall beused to refer to the various regions of the IBP: NL - NorthernLuzon, CL - Central Luzon, GM - Greater Manila, SL - SouthernLuzon, B - Bicolandia, EV - Eastern Visayas, WV - WesternVisayas, EM - Eastern Mindanao and WM - Western Mindanao.


application is approved and a control numberduly assigned, the chapter board of officersshall issue a certification that the person (thatis, the successful applicant) is a client of theNCLA or of the chapter legal aid office. Thecertification shall bear the control number ofthe case and shall state the name of the clientand the nature of the judicial action subject ofthe legal aid of the NCLA or the legal aid officeof a local IBP chapter.

The certification shall be issued to thesuccessful applicant free of charge.

SEC. 2. Assignment of cases. – After a case is given acontrol number, the chapter board of officers shall referit back to the chapter legal aid committee. The chapterlegal aid committee shall assign the case to any chaptermember who is willing to handle the case.

In case no chapter member has signified anintention to handle the case voluntarily, the chapterlegal aid committee shall refer the matter to the chapterboard of officers together with the names of at leastthree members who, in the chapter legal aidcommittee’s discretion, may competently render legalaid on the matter. The chapter board of officers shallappoint one chapter member from among the list ofnames submitted by the chapter legal aid committee.The chapter member chosen may not refuse theappointment except on the ground of conflict of interestor other equally compelling grounds as provided inthe Code of Professional Responsibility,2 in which casethe chapter board of officers shall appoint hisreplacement from among the remaining names in thelist previously submitted by the chapter legal aidcommittee.

The chapter legal aid committee and the chapterboard of officers shall take the necessary measures toensure that cases are well-distributed to chaptermembers.

SEC. 3. Policies and guidelines in the acceptance andhandling of cases. – The following policies andguidelines shall be observed in the acceptance andhandling of cases:

(a) First come, first served – Where both the

complainant/plaintiff/petitioner anddefendant/ respondent apply for legal aid andboth are qualified, the first to seek assistanceshall be given preference.

(b) Avoidance of conflict of interest – Whereacceptance of a case will give rise to a conflictof interest on the part of the chapter legal aidoffice, the applicant shall be duly informed andadvised to seek the services of a private counselor another legal aid organization.

Where handling of the case will give riseto a conflict of interest on the part of the chaptermember assigned to the case, the client shallbe duly informed and advised about it. Thehandling lawyer shall also inform the chapterlegal aid committee so that another chaptermember may be assigned to handle the case.For purposes of choosing the substitutehandling lawyer, the rule in the immediatelypreceding section shall be observed.

(c) Legal aid is purely gratuitous and honorary –No member of the chapter or member of thestaff of the NCLA or chapter legal aid officeshall directly or indirectly demand or requestfrom an applicant or client any compensation,gift or present for legal aid services beingapplied for or rendered.

(d) Same standard of conduct and equaltreatment – A chapter member who is taskedto handle a case accepted by the NCLA or bythe chapter legal aid office shall observe thesame standard of conduct governing hisrelations with paying clients. He shall treatthe client of the NCLA or of the chapter legalaid office and the said client’s case in a mannerthat is equal and similar to his treatment of apaying client and his case.

(e) Falsity in the application or in the affidavits –Any falsity in the application or in theaffidavit of indigency or in the affidavit of adisinterested person shall be sufficient causefor the NCLA or chapter legal aid office towithdraw or terminate the legal aid. For thispurpose, the chapter board of officers shallauthorize the handling lawyer to file theproper manifestation of withdrawal ofappearance of the chapter legal aid office inthe case with a motion for the dismissal of thecomplaint or action of the erring client. Thecourt, after hearing, shall approve thewithdrawal of appearance and grant the


2 This is based on the principle that legal aid is not a matter of

charity. It is a means for the correction of social imbalances thatmay and often do lead to injustice, for which reason it is a publicresponsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public service should,therefore, underlie all legal aid offices. The same should be soadministered as to give maximum possible assistance to indigentand deserving members of the community in all cases, mattersand situations in which legal aid may be necessary to forestallan injustice (Section 1, Article I, Guidelines on Legal Aid). Theaforementioned principle is likewise a primary basis of the Rule

on Mandatory Legal Aid Service. (Continued on NEXT page)



motion, without prejudice to whatevercriminal liability may have been incurred.

Violation of this policy shall disqualify theerring client from availing of the benefits ofthis Rule in the future.

(f) Statement in the initiatory pleading – To availof the benefits of the Rule, the initiatorypleading shall state as an essentialpreliminary allegation that (i) the partyinitiating the action is a client of the NCLA orof the chapter legal aid office and thereforeentitled to exemption from the payment of legalfees under this Rule and (ii) a certified true copyof the certification issued pursuant to Section1(e), of this Article is attached or annexed tothe pleading.

Failure to make the statement shall be aground for the dismissal of the action withoutprejudice to its refiling.

The same rule shall apply in case the client,through the NCLA or chapter legal aid office,files an appeal.

(g) Attachment of certification in initiatorypleading – A certified true copy of thecertification issued pursuant to Section 1(e), ofthis Article shall be attached as an annex tothe initiatory pleading.

Failure to attach a certified true copy ofthe said certification shall be a ground for thedismissal of the action without prejudice toits refiling.

The same rule shall apply in case the client,through the NCLA or chapter legal aid office,files an appeal.

(h) Signing of pleadings – All complaints,petitions, answers, replies, memoranda andother important pleadings or motions to befiled in courts shall be signed by the handlinglawyer and co-signed by the chairperson or amember of the chapter legal aid committee, orin urgent cases, by the executive director oflegal aid or whoever performs his functions.

Ordinary motions such as motions forextension of time to file a pleading or forpostponement of hearing and manifestationsmay be signed by the handling lawyer alone.

(i) Motions for extension of time or forpostponement – The filing of motions forextension of time to file a pleading or forpostponement of hearing shall be avoided as

much as possible as they cause delay to thecase and prolong the proceedings.

(j) Transfer of cases – Transfer of cases from onehandling lawyer to another shall be affectedonly upon approval of the chapter legal aidcommittee.

SEC. 4. Decision to appeal. – (a) All appeals must bemade on the request of the client himself. For thispurpose, the client shall be made to fill up a request toappeal.

(b) Only meritorious cases shall be appealed. If thehandling lawyer, in consultation with the chapterlegal aid committee, finds that there is no merit to theappeal, the client should be immediately informedthereof in writing and the record of the case turnedover to him, under proper receipt. If the client insistson appealing the case, the lawyer handling the caseshould perfect the appeal before turning over therecords of the case to him.

SEC. 5. Protection of private practice. – Utmost careshall be taken to ensure that legal aid is neither availedof to the detriment of the private practice of law nortaken advantage of by anyone for purely personal ends.

ARTICLE VIWITHDRAWAL OF LEGAL AID AND

TERMINATION OF EXEMPTION

SECTION 1. Withdrawal of legal aid. —The NCLA or thechapter legal aid committee may, in justifiableinstances as provided in the next Section, direct thehandling lawyer to withdraw representation of aclient’s cause upon approval of the IBP Board ofGovernors (in the case of the NCLA) or of the chapterboard of officers (in the case of the chapter legal aidcommittee) and through a proper motion filed in Court.

SEC. 2. Grounds for withdrawal of legal aid. –Withdrawal may be warranted in the followingsituations:

(a) In a case that has been provisionally accepted,where it is subsequently ascertained that theclient is not qualified for legal aid;

(b) Where the client’s income or resourcesimprove and he no longer qualifies forcontinued assistance based on the means test.For this purpose, on or before January 15 everyyear, the client shall submit an affidavit of adisinterested person stating that the client andhis immediate family do not earn a grossincome mentioned in Section 2, Article V, norown any real property with the fair marketvalue mentioned in the same Section;


(c) When it is shown or found that the clientcommitted a falsity in the application or in theaffidavits submitted to support theapplication;

(d) When the client subsequently engages a de partecounsel or is provided with a de oficio counsel;

(e) When, despite proper advice from the handlinglawyer, the client cannot be refrained fromdoing things which the lawyer himself oughtnot do under the ethics of the legal profession,particularly with reference to their conducttowards courts, judicial officers, witnesses andlitigants, or the client insists on having controlof the trial, theory of the case, or strategy inprocedure which would tend to result inincalculable harm to the interests of the client;

(f) When, despite notice from the handling lawyer,the client does not cooperate or coordinatewith the handling lawyer to the prejudice ofthe proper and effective rendition of legal aidsuch as when the client fails to providedocuments necessary to support his case orunreasonably fails to attend hearings when hispresence thereat is required; and

(g) When it becomes apparent that therepresentation of the client’s cause will resultin a representation of conflicting interests, aswhere the adverse party had previouslyengaged the services of the NCLA or of thechapter legal aid office and the subject matterof the litigation is directly related to the servicespreviously rendered to the adverse party.

SEC. 3. Effect of withdrawal. – The court, after hearing,shall allow the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office towithdraw if it is satisfied that the ground for suchwithdrawal exists.

Except when the withdrawal is based onparagraphs (b), (d) and (g) of the immediately precedingSection, the court shall also order the dismissal of thecase. Such dismissal is without prejudice to whatevercriminal liability may have been incurred if thewithdrawal is based on paragraph (c) of theimmediately preceding Section.

ARTICLE VIIMISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. Lien on favorable judgment. – The amount ofthe docket and other lawful fees which the client wasexempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgmentrendered in the case favorable to the indigent, unlessthe court otherwise provides.

In case, attorney’s fees have been awarded to theclient, the same shall belong to the NCLA or to thechapter legal aid office that rendered the legal aid, asthe case may be. It shall form part of a special fundwhich shall be exclusively used to support the legalaid program of the NCLA or the chapter legal aid office.In this connection, the chapter board of officers shallreport the receipt of attorney’s fees pursuant to thisSection to the NCLA within 10 days from receiptthereof. The NCLA shall, in turn, include the data onattorney’s fees received by IBP chapters pursuant tothis Section in its liquidation report for the annualsubsidy for legal aid.

SEC. 2. Duty of NCLA to prepare forms. – The NCLAshall prepare the standard forms to be used inconnection with this Rule. In particular, the NCLA shallprepare the following standard forms: the applicationform, the affidavit of indigency, the supporting affidavitof a disinterested person, the affidavit of a disinterestedperson required to be submitted annually underSection 2(b), Article VI, the certification issued by theNCLA or the chapter board of officers under Section1(f), Article V and the request to appeal.

The said forms, except the certification, shall be inFilipino. Within 60 days from receipt of the forms fromthe NCLA, the chapter legal aid offices shall maketranslations of the said forms in the dominant dialectused in their respective localities.

SEC. 3. Effect of Rule on right to bring suits in formapauperis. – Nothing in this Rule shall be considered topreclude those persons not covered either by this Ruleor by the exemption from the payment of legal feesgranted to clients of the Public Attorney’s Office underSection 16-D of RA No. 9406 to litigate in forma pauperisunder Section 21, Rule 3 and Section 19 Rule 141 of theRules of Court.

SEC. 4. Compliance with Rule on Mandatory Legal AidService. – Legal aid service rendered by a lawyer underthis Rule either as a handling lawyer or as aninterviewer of applicants under Section 1(b), ArticleIV hereof shall be credited for purposes of compliancewith the Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service.

The chairperson of the chapter legal aid office shallissue the certificate similar to that issued by the Clerkof Court in Section 5(b) of the Rule on Mandatory LegalAid Service.

ARTICLE VIIIEFFECTIVITY

SECTION 1. Effectivity. – This Rule shall become effectiveafter 15 days following its publication in a newspaperof general circulation.



ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 120-2009

In the interest of an administration of justice andpursuant to the Court Resolution dated January 27,2004 in A.M. No. 03-08-02-SC, the following trialjudges are hereby DESIGNATED as Executive Judgesand Vice Executive Judge, in the Municipal TrialCourts, effective immediately and to continue untilDecember 31, 2010, unless their designations aresooner revoked or otherwise extended by this Court.

MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTSSECOND JUDICIAL REGION

CAGAYANLAL-LO

Hon. ANDREW U. BARCENAExecutive JudgeHon. ACHILLES ARISTOTLE C. BULAUITANVice Executive Judge

THIRD JUDICIAL REGION

PAMPANGAGUAGUA

Hon. EDA D. ERAExecutive Judge

FOURTH JUDICIAL REGION

LAGUNASAN PEDRO

Hon. RALPH S. ARELLANOExecutive Judge

RIZALBINANGONAN

Hon. LILIAN D. PANONTONGANExecutive Judge

September 9, 2009.

(Sgd.) REYNATO S. PUNO Chief Justice

(Sgd.) LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

(Sgd.) CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

(Per Revised A.M. No. 99-12-08-SC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 81-2009

TO: ALL JUDGES OF FIRST AND SECOND LEVELCOURTS

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION OF ALL PETITIONS FORINCLUSION/EXCLUSION OF VOTERS WITHINTHE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD PRESCRIBEDUNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189, AS AMENDED

In Resolution No. 8603 promulgated on May 28,2009, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) inorder to accomplish the pre-election activities inpursuit of its mandate to conduct clean, honest,orderly, peaceful, credible and informed electionsthrough the use of Automated Election System, andby virtue of the power vested in it by the Constitution,the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Act No. 8189,and other election laws resolved to amend Sections 5,28, and 29 of the Resolution No. 8514, which shall beread as follows:

SEC. 5. Procedure in case of Defective DCM and/orIts Peripherals. – a) In case the Data CapturingMachine (DCM) and/or its peripherals aredefective during the registration period, theaccomplished application forms shall be acceptedwith the condition that the applicants shall returnfor the taking/capturing of their biometrics. Forthis purpose, the applicant shall be given untilOctober 31, 2009 to have his biometrics captured.

SEC. 28. Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the List.– Any person whose application for registrationhas been disapproved by the ERB or whose namehas been stricken out from the list may file withthe court a petition to include his name in thepermanent list of voters in his precinct at anytime but not later than November 30, 2009. It shallbe supported by a certificate of disapproval ofhis application and proof of service of notice ofhis petition upon the ERB. The petition shall bedecided within 15 days after its filing.

x x x x

SEC. 29. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from theList. – Any registered voter, representative of apolitical party or the EO, may file with the court asworn petition for the exclusion of a voter fromthe permanent list of voters giving the name,address and the precinct of the challenged voterat any time but not later than December 4, 2009.The petition shall be accompanied by proof ofnotice to the ERB and to the challenged voter andshall be decided within 10 days from its filing.

x x x x



TO: ALL JUDGES OF THE FIRST AND SECONDLEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: FIGHT AGAINST FIXERS

For the information and guidance of all concerned,quoted hereunder is a pertinent portion of Civil ServiceCommission Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 2009dated February 11, 2009:

CSC Memorandum Circular No. 17 datedDecember 8, 2008 enjoined government agenciesto fully disseminate RA No. 9485 and its IRR,including its provisions against fixers. The CSCand the OMB also initiated last month the “Fix theFixers Campaign” to underscore government’sfirm resolve against fixing activities.

To sustain interest and ensure wider participationof the public, all government agencies aredirected to adopt the CSC Anti-Fixer Campaigntarpaulin banner and Fix the Fixer calling card,which provide the following telephone hotlines ofthe Office of the Ombudsman: 0926-6994703,(02)9274102 and (02)9272404; and the CSC:TextCSC at 0917-8398272 and (02)9320111, whereincidents of fixing should be reported.

The banners are to be posted at the mostconspicuous places or where governmentfrontline services are provided; the cards are fordistribution to the public. x x x

In the same Resolution the COMELEC resolvedfurther to appeal to the Honorable Chief justice of theSupreme Court, through the Court Administrator forthe issuance of a directive to all judges of the MunicipalTrial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts to resolveall petitions for inclusion/exclusion of voters, andjudges of the Regional Trial Courts in case of appeal todispose the same within the reglementary periodprescribed under RA No. 8189.

In view of the foregoing, strict observance of thereglementary period to resolve all petitions forinclusion/exclusion of voters is hereby enjoined.

July 6, 2009.

(Sgd.) JOSE P. PEREZ Court Administrator

OCA CIRCULAR NO. 81-2009 (continued)

In consonance with the above circular, all judgesof the first and second level courts are hereby enjoinedto post the anti-fixer campaign posters (instead ofbanner) in conspicuous places within their respectivecourt buildings and distribute the Fix the Fixer callingcards to the public.

Attached are sample of the anti-fixer campaignposters and calling cards.

For strict compliance.

July 28, 2009.



TO: ALL JUDGES, CLERKS OF COURT/ACCOUNTABLE OFFICERS

SUBJECT: DOCKET FEES FOR COMPULSORYCOUNTERCLAIMS

It has reached the attention of this Office that somecourts are collecting docket fees for compulsorycounterclaims based apparently on a portion of thedecision in Korea Technologies Co. Ltd. v. Alberto A. Lerma,etc., et al., G.R. No. 143581, January 7, 2008 which statedthat:

On July 17, 1998, at the time PGSM filed its Answerincorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES,



it was not liable to pay filing fees for saidcounterclaims being compulsory in nature. Westress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 underSection 7 Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid incompulsory counterclaim or cross-claim. (Emphasisours)

Please be informed that the second sentence of thequoted portion of the decision, more specifically thatin bold font, has been deleted in a revised issuance.

For the guidance of all concerned, the Resolutionof this Court in A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC dated September21, 2004 suspending payment of filing fees forcompulsory counterclaims remains in effect. For readyreference, the resolution reads as follows:

The Court further Resolved to AFFIRM the actionsof the Honorable Associate Justices, in its informalmeeting held on September 20, 2004, andSUSPEND the new rates of the legal fees underRule 141, effective September 21, 2004, viz:

(a) Solemnization of marriage;

(b) Motions; and

(c) Compulsory counterclaims.

August 13, 2009.



TO: ALL JUDGES

SUBJECT: STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THEPROVISIONS OF RA NO. 9344, PARTICULARLY ONTHE CUSTODY OF A CHILD IN CONFLICT WITHTHE LAW AND EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT

It has come to the attention of this Office that thereremain a number of courts that fail to strictly observepertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 entitled“An Act Establishing A Comprehensive Juvenile Justice andWelfare council under the Department of Justice, AppropriatingFunds Therefor and for Other Purposes.”

Accordingly, Family Courts and single-sala courtshandling cases involving children in conflict with thelaw are REMINDED to STRICTLY OBSERVE the

provisions of RA No. 9344. Quoted hereunder are thepertinent provisions, which the courts should notdisregard:

SEC. 34. Bail. – For purposes of recommendingthe amount of bail, the privileged mitigatingcircumstance of minority shall be considered.

SEC. 35. Release on Recognizance. – Where a childis detained, the court shall order:

(a) the release of the minor on recognizanceto his/her parents and other suitableperson;

(b) the release of the child in conflict withthe law on bail; or

(c) the transfer of the minor to a youthdetention home/youth rehabilitationcenter.

The court shall not order the detention of achild in a jail pending trial or hearing of his/hercase.

SEC. 36. Detention of the Child Pending Trial. –Children detained pending trial may be releasedon bail or recognizance as provided for underSections 34 and 35 under this Act. In all othercases and whenever possible, detention pendingtrial may be replaced by all alternative measures,such as close supervision, intensive care orplacement with a family or in an educationalsetting or home. Institutionalization or detentionof the child pending trial shall be used only as ameasure of last resort and for the shortestpossible period of time.

Whenever detention is necessary, a child willalways be detained in youth detention homesestablished by local governments, pursuant toSection 8 of the Family Courts Act, in the city ormunicipality where the child resides.

In the absence of a youth detention home, thechild in conflict with the law may be committed tothe care of the DSWD or a local rehabilitationcenter recognized by the government in theprovince, city or municipality within thejurisdiction of the court. The center or agencyconcerned shall be responsible for the child’sappearance in court whenever required.

SEC. 37. Diversion Measures. – Where the maximumpenalty imposed by law for the offense with whichthe child in conflict with the law is charged isimprisonment of not more than 12 years,regardless of the fine or fine alone regardless ofthe amount, and before arraignment of the childin conflict with the law, the court shall determinewhether or not diversion is appropriate.





TO: ALL JUDGES AND CLERKS OF COURT OF THEFIRST AND SECOND LEVEL COURTS

SUBJECT: DISCOUNT ON FILING FEES INFORECLOSURES INITIATED BY ALL SPECIALPURPOSE VEHICLE

Quoted hereunder is a portion of the Resolutionof the Supreme Court En Banc dated July 7, 2009 inA.M. No. 09-6-250-RTC (Re: Request of Atty. AnnaRosario Paner for Clarification on the Applicabilityof Section 15 of RA No. 9182 as Amended by RA No.3343), to wit:

b) GRANT all Special Purpose Vehicle a 50percent discount on the filing fees for anyforeclosure initiated by the Special PurposeVehicle in relation to any non-performing assets(NPA) acquired from any financial institutions (FI),as prescribed by the Rules of Court on Filing Fees.

You are therefore directed to apply the grant ofdiscount to all Special Purpose Vehicle on theirpetitions for judicial and extrajudicial foreclosures.

September 15, 2009.


SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Oncethe child who is under 18 years of age at the timeof the commission of the offense is found guiltyof the offense charged, the court shall determineand ascertain any civil liability which may haveresulted from the offense committed. However,instead of pronouncing the judgment of convictionthe court shall place the child in conflict with thelaw under suspended sentence, without need ofapplication: Provided, however, That suspension ofsentence shall still be applied even if the juvenileis already 18 years of age or more at the time ofthe pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and afterconsidering the various circumstances of thechild, the court shall impose the appropriatedisposition measures as provided in the SupremeCourt Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with theLaw. – Upon the recommendation of the socialworker who has custody of the child, the courtshall dismiss the case against the child whosesentence has been suspended and against whomdisposition measures have been issued, and shallorder the final discharge of the child if it findsthat the objective of the disposition measureshave been fulfilled.

The discharge of the child in conflict with the lawshall not affect the civil liability resulting fromthe commission of the offense, which shall beenforced in accordance with law.

SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with theLaw to Court. – If the court finds that the objectiveof the disposition measures imposed upon thechild in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled,or if the child in conflict with the law has willfullyfailed to comply with the conditions of his/herdisposition or rehabilitation program, the child inconflict with the law shall be brought before thecourt for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached18 years of age while under suspended sentence,the court shall determine whether to dischargethe child in accordance with this Act, to orderexecution of sentence, or to extend thesuspended sentence for a certain specified periodor until the child reaches the maximum age of 21years.

SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. – The child inconflict with the law shall be credited in theservices of his/her sentence with the full timespent in actual commitment and detention underthis Act.

SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative toImprisonment. – The court may, after it shall haveconvicted and sentenced a child in conflict withthe law, and upon application at any time, placethe child on probation in lieu of service of his/hersentence taking into account the best interest ofthe child. For this purpose, Section 4 ofPresidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known asthe “Probation Law of 1976,” is hereby amendedaccordingly.

For strict compliance.

August 20, 2009.


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Competency Enhancement Training for Judges andCourt Personnel Handling Child Abuse andTrafficking CasesOctober 6-8, Tacloban CityNovember 24-26, Manila

Convention-Seminar of the Philippine JudgesAssociation (PJA)October 14-16, Manila

Planning Dialogue with the Executive JudgesOctober 15, Manila

Sixth Metrobank Foundation Professorial ChairLectureOctober 21, Quezon City

Eight Multi-Sectoral Seminar-Workshop onAgrarian Justice for the Province of NegrosOrientalNovember 10-12, Dumaguete City

17th Orientation Seminar-Workshop for NewlyAppointed Clerks of CourtNovember 10-13, Manila

Seminar-Workshop on CEDAW and GenderSensitivity for Selected Judges, Clerks of Court andLegal Researchers of Zamboanga del NorteNovember 18-19, Dipolog City

Seminar-Workshop on Deposit Insurance,Banking Practices, and Bank Conservatorship,Recievership, and LiquidationNovember 24-25, Cebu City

Seminar on Speedy Trial and Disposition of CasesNovember 26, Cebu CityDecember 3, Manila

Convention-Seminar of the Philippine TrialJudges League, Inc. (PTJLI)November 26-28, Manila

Seminar-Workshop on Comparative Analysisbetween the Family Code and the MuslimPersonal LawsDecember 1-3, Legaspi City

Orientation-Seminar for Newly AppointedJudgesDecember 1-10, Manila

Roundtable Discussion on Children in Conflictwith the LawDecember 3, Manila

Personal Security Training for JudgesDecember 8-10, Tagaytay City

18th Orientation Seminar-Workshop for NewlyAppointed Clerks of Court for Regions 6-12December 8-11, Cebu City

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