early eighteenth-century british moral philosophers and ...university of st andrews 26.04.2017. 2...

EARLY EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH

MORAL PHILOSOPHERS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF VIRTUE

Emma Veitch

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD at the

University of St Andrews

2017

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1

Early eighteenth-century British moral philosophers

and the possibility of virtue.

Emma Veitch

This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment for the degree of PhD

at the University of St Andrews

26.04.2017.

2

Abstract

ThegeneralaimofthisthesisistofurtherunderminetheconventionthatBritish

moralphilosophyoftheearlyeighteenthcenturyisbestconceivedasastruggle

betweenrationalistandsentimentalistepistemologies.Iarguethatthe

philosophersconsideredhere(SamuelClarke,FrancisHutcheson,GilbertBurnet,

JohnBalguyandJohnGay)situatedtheirmoralepistemologieswithinthewider

frameworkofanattempttoprovethe‘reality’ofvirtueintermsofvirtuebeing

anachievable,practicalendeavour.Tothisend,theywereasmuchconcerned

withtheattributesthatmotivatedorcausedGodtocreateinthewaythathedid

–hiscommunicableattributes-astheywerewithourownnaturalmoral

abilities.ImaintainthatthisconcernledClarke,BurnetandBalguytolook

beyondarationalistepistemologyinanattempttoaccountforthepractical

possibilityofmoralaction.IclaimthatitledHutchesontodevelopamoral

theorythatreflectedarealisttheisticmetaphysicsthatwentsomewaybeyond

anappealtoprovidentialnaturalism.IarguethatitledGaytotrytosynthesise

theapproachesofrivalmoralschemesinordertoofferaunifiedaccountof

agencyandobligation.Thethesishasthreekeyobjectives:1)toexaminethe

relationshipofrationalismtoobligationandmotivationintheworkofClarke,

BurnetandBalguy,and2)toexploretherelativerolesofsenseandjudgmentin

themoralepistemologiesofHutcheson,Burnet,BalguyandGayandto(re)

examinethenatureofHutcheson’smoralrealism,and3)toinvestigatethe

theisticmetaphysicalclaimsmadebyallpartieswithrespecttotheirarguments

aboutmoralrealism.

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1. Candidate’s declarations: I, Emma Veitch hereby certify that this thesis, which is approximately 80,000 words in length, has been written by me, and that it is the record of work carried out by me, or principally by myself in collaboration with others as acknowledged, and that it has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree. I was admitted as a research student in October 2013 and as a candidate for the degree of PhD in October 2013; the higher study for which this is a record was carried out in the University of St Andrews between 2013 and 2017. (If you received assistance in writing from anyone other than your supervisor/s): I, …..., received assistance in the writing of this thesis in respect of [language, grammar, spelling or syntax], which was provided by …… Date 17.04.17 signature of candidate 2. Supervisor’s declaration: I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate for the degree of PhD in the University of St Andrews and that the candidate is qualified to submit this thesis in application for that degree. Date 17.04.17 signature of supervisor 3. Permission for publication: (to be signed by both candidate and supervisor) In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I understand that I am giving permission for it to be made available for use in accordance with the regulations of the University Library for the time being in force, subject to any copyright vested in the work not being affected thereby. I also understand that the title and the abstract will be published, and that a copy of the work may be made and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker, that my thesis will be electronically accessible for personal or research use unless exempt by award of an embargo as requested below, and that the library has the right to migrate my thesis into new electronic forms as required to ensure continued access to the thesis. I have obtained any third-party copyright permissions that may be required in order to allow such access and migration, or have requested the appropriate embargo below. The following is an agreed request by candidate and supervisor regarding the publication of this thesis: PRINTED COPY a) No embargo on print copy [X] b) Embargo on all or part of print copy for a period of … years (maximum five) on the following

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• Publication would be commercially damaging to the researcher, or to the supervisor, or the University

• Publication would preclude future publication • Publication would be in breach of law or ethics

c) Permanent or longer term embargo on all or part of electronic copy for a period of … years (the request will be referred to the Pro-Provost and permission will be granted only in exceptional circumstances).

Supporting statement for electronic embargo request if greater than 2 years: ABSTRACT AND TITLE EMBARGOES An embargo on the full text copy of your thesis in the electronic and printed formats will be granted automatically in the first instance. This embargo includes the abstract and title except that the title will be used in the graduation booklet. If you have selected an embargo option indicate below if you wish to allow the thesis abstract and/or title to be published. If you do not complete the section below the title and abstract will remain embargoed along with the text of the thesis.

a) I agree to the title and abstract being published YES b) I require an embargo on abstract NO c) I require an embargo on title NO

Date 17.04.17 signature of candidate signature of supervisor Please note initial embargos can be requested for a maximum of five years. An embargo on a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Science or Medicine is rarely granted for more than two years in the first instance, without good justification. The Library will not lift an embargo before confirming with the student and supervisor that they do not intend to request a continuation. In the absence of an agreed response from both student and supervisor, the Head of School will be consulted. Please note that the total period of an embargo, including any continuation, is not expected to exceed ten years. Where part of a thesis is to be embargoed, please specify the part and the reason.

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Acknowledgments

IwouldverymuchliketothankmysupervisorProfessorJamesA.Harrisforhis

excellentadviceatallstagesofthisthesis.Hehasbeenpatient,kindand

encouragingthroughout,andhiscommentsonthevariousdraftsofvarious

chaptershavebeeninvaluable.Iwouldalsoliketothankmysecondsupervisor

ProfessorRichardWhatmore.Thethesiswouldnothavebegunwithouthis

supportandpracticalhelp.Idiscussedsomeoftheargumentsinthematerial

presentedonHutchesonandLockeatanearlystagewithProfessorKnud

Haakonssen.Iwouldliketothankhimforhishelpandguidance.

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TableofContents

Chapter1:Introduction:‘Aninquiryintotheunderstandingpleasantanduseful’

.....................................................................................................................................................................7

Chapter2:SamuelClarkeandthe‘mightymotives’………………………………………...39

Chapter3:Hutcheson’smethodandGod’scommunicableattributes………………75

Chapter4:Hutchesonandthe‘thirdkindofperception’………………………………...115

Chapter5:GilbertBurnetandJohnBalguy:‘Rationalandsensibleagents’…..…158

Chapter6:JohnGay:‘RestingPlaces’……………………………………………………………193

Chapter7:Conclusion..................................................................................................................218

Bibliography.....................................................................................................................................222

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Chapter1

Introduction:‘Aninquiryintotheunderstandingpleasantanduseful’.1

InthisintroductorychapterIdiscusshowthesubjectmatterofthethesisarose,

setoutitsaims,andexplainhowthefulfilmentofthoseaimsmakesa

contributiontoscholarship.Iwillthenprovidesomebackgrounddetailofthe

approachestoepistemologytakenbyseventeenth-centurythinkers,whosework

settheparametersforthedebatethatfollowedintheearlyeighteenthcentury.I

willclosewithabriefsummaryofthecontentofeachchapter.

ThebeginningofthethesisThereisanhistoriographicalmethodthatchampionstheincongruousfactasthe

startingpointforhistoricalresearch.Anomalousdetailsareprizedassignsof

deeper,obscurelayersofculturalmeaning.Theyfunctionlikethetipsof

hermeneuticicebergs.This‘methodofclues’insiststhatacertainlevelof

coherenceorrationalityunderwriteshumanbehaviour.Thedisclosureof

another,lessvisiblecontext,isrequiredinordertoresolveapparentlyirrational

orcounter-intuitivethoughtorbehaviour.2

Theinterpretationofhistoricalphilosophicaltextsmight,Isuppose,alsobegin

byinvestigatingtheapparentlyanomalousorcontradictoryparts.Irrespectiveof

anyongoingassessmentoftruth-value,orthepotentialofcertainthemesto

contributetocurrentpreoccupations,thatwhichseemstobediscordantcan

promptthere-framingofatext.Thisinvolvestheassumptionthatanyapparent

contradictionsshouldbeviewedashavingbeennon-apparenttotheauthor.Not

1JohnLocke,“TheContents,”inAnEssayconcerningHumanUnderstandinged.P.H.Nidditch2ForsummariesoftheItalianmicro-historicalapproachsee,forexample,GeorgG.Iggers,HistoriographyintheTwentiethCentury:FromScientificObjectivitytothePostModernChallenge(Middletown,WesleyanUniversityPress,1997).GiovanniLevi,“OnMicrohistory,”inNewPerspectivesonHistoricalWriting,ed.PeterBurke(Cambridge,PolityPress,2001).Theyborrow(ed)heavilyfromCliffordGeertz’scross-culturalhermeneutics.CliffordGeertz,TheInterpretationofCulture:SelectedEssays(NewYork:BasicBooks,1973).

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becausetheauthorwasunawareofanydefectintheirargument,butbecause,at

thetimeofwriting,thechargeofinconsistencywouldhavebeenrejectedinthe

firstplace.Withinintellectualhistory,atleastintheveryfirstinstance,this

approachputstoonesideappealstoindividualorgrouppsychology,adopted

personasorpoliticalperformativityasexplanatoryaccountsofinconsistency.

Iofferthisasasmalljustificationforthefactthatthestartingpointsforthis

researchwereacoupleofunrelatedfeaturesoftheargumentofSamuelClarke,

andthedebateaboutFrancisHutcheson’smoralsensetheorythatIdidn’t

understand.First,IunderstoodClarketohavebeenarationalistandaleading

representativeofSelby-Bigge’s‘intellectualschool’.3OnClarke’saccount,the

secondaryliteraturesaid,weweresupposedtobeabletodotherightthing,just

becauseweknewitwastherightthingtodo(withoutreferringtoScripture)and

that,therefore,weoughtreallytodoit.Whythen,Iwondered,inthesecondof

hisBoylelectures,didClarkeappeartobequitesoobsessedwiththeneedforus

tounderstandtherealityoftherewardsandpunishmentsthatawaitedusinthe

afterlife?4ItwasnotthatthispartofClarke’sworkhadgoneunnoticed.Clarke’s

advertingtothepracticalforceofabeliefindivinejusticehadbeenpointedout

butthisseemedtohavebeentidiedawayintotheclaimthatitwassimplya

motivationalaidforthedegenerate,orthecognitivelycompromised.5Ikept

returningtoClarke'ssecondBoylelecture.Clarke,Ithought,didnotappearto

havesuggestedthatabeliefinthepainsandpleasuresofafuturelifefunctioned

merelyasasupportforthoseofuswhowereespeciallygiventovice.Onthe

contrary,itseemedtomeasifClarkehadinsistedthatnoneofour(post-

lapsarian)morallivescouldgetofftheground,inpracticalterms,withoutour

holdingthesebeliefs.Inwhichcase,Clarke’srationalism,atleastinsofarasIhad

understoodit,mightbeopentoqualification.3LewisA.Selby-Bigge,BritishMoralists(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1897).4SamuelClarke,ADiscourseontheUnchangeableObligationsofNaturalReligion,andtheTruthandCertaintyoftheChristianRevelation,8thed.(London:Knapton,1732).HenceforthNaturalReligion.5Thespecificsarediscussedinchapter2,butIrefertoJeromeB.Schneewind,TheInventionofAutonomy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),310-327,andTerenceIrwin,TheDevelopmentofEthics:AHistoricalandCriticalStudy.VolumeII:FromSuareztoRousseau(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2008),372-306.SeeD.O.Thomas“ReasonandRevelationinSamuelClarke’sepistemologyofMorals,”EnlightenmentandDissent16(1997):114-135,foramorenuanceddiscussionofthisaspectofClarke’swork.

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WhenIeventuallymovedontoClarke’sdefenders,GilbertBurnetandJohn

Balguy,IfoundthatitwasBurnetwho,intheparticularcontextofanexchange

ofletterswithHutcheson,triedtoexplainhowarationalappreciationofthe

moralityofanactionoughttobeabletomotivateustoactuallyperformthat

action(althoughhealsoallowedthatplentyofothernaturalmotivationalfactors

mostoftendidmoveustovirtue).6Balguy,ontheotherhand,appearedtobe

evenclosertoClarke,asIunderstoodhim.Balguyhadinsistedthatwewere

undertwosortsofobligation–onemoralandtheotherreligious.Itwasthe

thoughtofourreligiousobligationandnotourmoralobligationalone,Balguy

claimed,thatactuallymotivatedourmoralbehaviour.ForClarkeandBalguy

then,prudentialconsiderationsofonesortoranotherappearedtobekeyto

explainingtheactualoccurrenceofmoralaction.Tobesure,theyarguedthatour

knowledgeofwhatwasvirtuousandwhatwasnot,oughttohavebeenableto

motivateus.YetClarkeandBalguyseemedtometohaveclaimedthatin

practice,atleastasthingshadstoodsincetheFall,thisknowledgealonewas

insufficient.Attheveryleast,theyseemedtohaveinsistedthatitcouldnotlead

ustothesortofregularvirtuethatwouldbeacceptabletoGod.

Myothernigglingqueryconcernedtheapparentproliferationofoperational

definitionsofamoral‘sense’fromtheoristswhoveryobviouslysupportedrival

moralschemes.Inhisfourtreatises,Hutchesonhadlookedtoourexperienceof

moralthoughttoaccountformoralepistemology.7Theimmediate,affective,

involuntarynatureofourmoralreactionssuggestedtohimthatan‘inward’

6IhaveusedthePeacheditionofthecorrespondencebetweenHutchesonandBurnet.“TheCorrespondencebetweenGilbertBurnetandFrancisHutcheson,”inIllustrationsontheMoralSense,ed.BernardPeach(CambridgeMass.:TheBelknapPressofHarvardUniversityPress,1971),199-247.HenceforthCorrespondence.JohnBalguy,TheSecondPartofTheFoundationofMoralGoodness;IllustratingandEnforcingthePrinciplesandReasoningsContainedintheFormer.BeinganAnswertoCertainRemarksCommunicatedbyaGentlemantotheAuthor,(1729),14-15.HenceforthSecondPart.7Thesefourtreatiseswerehisfirsttwoinquiriesintobeautyandvirtue,firstpublishedtogetherin1725,andrevisedin1726,1729and1738,asAnInquiryintotheOriginalofOurIdeasofBeautyandVirtue,ed.WolfgangLeidhold(Indianapolis:LibertyFund,2004),andhislatertwotexts,firstpublishedtogetherin1728,andrevisedin1730,and1742,asAnEssayontheNatureandConductofthePassionsandAffections,withIllustrationsontheMoralSense,ed.AaronGarrett(Indianapolis:LibertyFund,2002).Henceforth,variously,fourtreatises,Inquiries,Inquiry,Essay/IllustrationsorEssayandIllustrations.

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sense,ratherthanreason,suppliesouroriginalideasofvirtue.Thismoralsense

respondsselectivelytotheappearanceofbenevolentintention.Itappearedthat

intheimmediateaftermathofHutcheson’searlypublicationstherehadbeen

somethingofarushtoadmittheexistenceofthismoralsenseandtoexplainits

operation.Whatwassurprising(tomeatleast)wasthatClarke’sdefenders,

GilbertBurnetandBalguy,hadagreedthatwehaveamoralsense,butthatthey

thoughtthatthismoraland‘internal’sensewasreasonitself.Thetheological

utilitarianJohnGayargued(again,againstHutcheson)thatourpropermotivefor

benevolencewasthethoughtoftheconsequenceofthatactiontoourself.8Yet

Gayhadalsoagreedthatwehadamoralsenseoftherightandwronginactions.

Itsoperation,Gayclaimed,wasnotexplainedbyaspecialsense,orbyreason,

butbytheassociationofideas.NotonlyhadHutchesonwarnedhisreaders

abouttheperniciouseffectsoftheprocessofassociationuponmoralthought,

butLocke,whoGaytookhimselftobefollowing,hadstatedthiscriticismfirst

andinevenstrongerterms.Locke’scriticismsurroundedthetendencyofideas,

whichhadaninherentconnectivity,tobecomehabituallylinkedorassociated

withoneanother,toformjudgment-likeentitieswithoutthepropersupervision

ofreason.9Themoralsensethen,couldrefereithertoadistinctiveinternalsense

onthemodelofourexternalsenses,ortoreason,ortotheunsupervised

formationofconnectionsorassociationsbetweenideas.

Hutcheson’sownaccountofmoralsense,moreover,onshowinhistexton

metaphysics(initiallycomposedatthesametimeashisfourtreatises,butnot

publisheduntillater),claimedthatthemoralsense,orsenseof‘thefittingand

thegood’playedajudicialrole.Heclaimedthatit

passesjudgmentasfromthebenchonallthethingsmendo,onallourpleasuresofbodyormind,onouropinions,sentiments,actions,prayers,intentions,andfeelings,determiningineachcasewhatisfine,fittingandgood,andwhatisthemeasureineach.10

8JohnGay,“PreliminaryDissertationConcerningtheFundamentalPrinciplesofVirtueorMorality,”inWilliamKing,AnEssayontheOriginsofEvil,trans.EdmundLaw(London:Thurlbourn,1731).HenceforthDissertation.9Locke,ECHU,2:33:5,395.10FrancisHutcheson,Logic,Metaphysics,andtheNaturalSociabilityofMankind,ed.JamesMooreandMichaelSilverthorne(Indianapolis:LibertyFundpress,2006),119.HenceforthLogic,Metaphysics,andtheinaugurallectureasindividualtexts,andLMNSMforthepublication.

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Hutchesonseemedtosuggestthatourideasfrommoralsensewerenotjust

inherentlyevaluativebecauseoftheiraffectivequality(i.e.thatwesomehow

‘liked’benevolence),althoughthisclaimwascontroversialenough.Hutcheson

claimedherethatthemoralsenseissuedajudgment(‘asfromthebench’)upon

themoralvalueofanaction,anduponhowgooditwas(‘themeasureineach’).

Alloftheauthorsdiscussedhereweresigneduptothepost-Lockeanagreement

astotheillegitimacyofanappealtoinnateguidanceinmoralthought.It

appearedthen,thatintheearlierpartoftheeighteenthcentury,anideafrom

sensecouldbeinherentlyevaluativeandpassjudgmentinaverdicativeway.

Reasoncouldbedescribedasan‘internal’moralsense,andideascouldbe

associatedwithoneanother(withouttheinferentialoversightofjudgment)and,

potentially,provideuswithanaccurateviewofthemoralvalueofanaction.

Duringthisattempttoaccountfortheexperienceofmoralthought,theterms

‘sense’,‘judgment’and‘reason’appearedtohaveslippedtheirreferential

mooringsinmoralepistemology(atleastinsofarasIhadunderstoodthose

termstohavebeenusedinthelateseventeenthcenturyandearlyeighteenth

century).Whatismore,theirexplanationsoftheoperationofthissenseall

appealedtoLockeinonewayoranother.

AtthispointIhadtwoquestionsinmind–first,howhadClarke,Burnetand

Balguyaccountedformoralmotivation,andsecond,howcouldasenseoperate

likeasenseyetbeajudgment,orreasonbeasense,orasensebeanassociative

processwhichdeliveredinformation,atleastofpotentialvalue,inmoral

thought?TheintrospectivemethodthattheoriesofmindsuchasLocke’swere

builtuponprovidedaconnectionbetweenthetwo.

ThefoundationofLocke’swayofideaswasthepremisethatintrospectioncould

delivertruthabouttheoperationofmind(ifnotaboutitssubstance).Thiswas

theessenceofhis‘historical,plainmethod’.11Introspectionwasusedby

Hutcheson,BurnetandBalguy,andtoacertainextentGay,inordertoaccount

fortheimmediate,intuitive,affectiveexperienceofourmoralevaluationsandto11SeeLockeECHU,1:1:2,44.

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proffercandidatementalprocesses.Thisapproachreflectedthepsychologicalor

epistemologicalapproachthatlogicsofideas,suchasLocke’s,broughttobear

uponaccountsofknowledgeacquisition.12Withinepistemologicallogics,method

demandedthatweintrospectandobservetheexperienceofthought(theflowof

ideasthroughthemindandtheoperationsthatweperformeduponthem)in

ordertoexplainhowwearrivedattruth(orprobablebelief).

ThetheisticmetaphysicsthatClarke,BurnetandBalguyandHutchesonoffered

asguaranteefortheirmoralphilosophiesalsorelied,tosomeextent,uponour

introspectiveexperienceintoourmoralattributes.They,andGay,alltookthe

latitudinarianposition(againstorthodoxCalvinism)thatthoseremnantsofour

moralandintellectualabilitiesthathadsurvivedtheFallweresufficientforusto

leadlivesthatwereacceptabletoGod.TheyallassumedthatGodhadmade

virtuepossibleforuswithoutapersonal,supernaturalinfusionofgrace.For

Clarke,Burnet,Balguy,andHutchesonandGaytherealityofvirtuewassecured

byanappealtoGod’smoralattributes.AllacceptedthatGodhadcreatedthe

worldashedidasaresultofhismoralperfection,orhisgoodness.Furthermore,

theywereinagreementthattheonlywayforus,eventually,tobetrulyhappy

wastoatleastaimforvirtue.Inaddition,forClarkeandhisdefendersand

Hutcheson,despitetheunbridgeablegapbetweenGod’smoralperfectionand

ourownstate,thetruefoundationofmoralitywastobefoundinthatfaintecho

withineachofusofwhateveritwasthatwasmorallyperfectinGod.Weneeded

tolookatourowncapacitiesanddecidewhichofthemresembled,inhowever

meagreaway,theattributesofGod,andwhichwerethepartsofournaturethat

oughttobegovernedbythoseattributes.TheseattributeswereGod’s

communicablevirtues.God’scommunicableattributeswerethoseattributesof

Godthatwewerecapableofunderstandingbecausewehadbeencreatedwith

ananalogousformofthem.13

12Fortheidentificationofcognitivepsychologywithdescriptiveepistemology,seeAlvinI.Goldman,“TheRelationbetweenEpistemologyandPsychology,”Synthese64,no.1(1985):29-68.13ThesearecontrastedwithGod’sincommunicableattributes.ThedistinctionisdiscussedfurtherinChapter3.

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BeyondthistheyofferedquitedifferentaccountsoftheprinciplesbehindGod’s

creativeactivity.Clarke,BurnetandBalguymaintainedthatGod’smoral

perfectionlayinthe‘rectitude’ofhiswill.ThismeantthatGodalwaysactedin

thewaythathisreasondictated.Furthermore,Godcouldnotalterwhatwas

goodandwhatwasevilintheactofcreation.AsBalguyputit,God

wasunderanecessityofsuitingit[thecreation]tohisownperfectideasandtheexactmodelofhisownmind.14

HutchesonmaintainedthatGod’sbenevolentnaturewashismoralperfection

andthat,assuch,God’sactionsderivedfromthenecessityofhisownnature

(whichwasnoabridgmentofhisfreedom).15HutchesonandClarkealsoagreed

thatGod,beingperfectlyhappyinhisownmoralperfection,wantedto

communicatethenatureofthismoralperfectiontous,inordertomakeus

happy.ThisactofcommunicationalsomadeGodhappy.Yetthisdesirefor

happiness,forClarkeandHutcheson,wasnot,initself,God’smoralmotivation.

Gay,Iwillsuggest,didnotmakeuseofthenotionthatGod’smoralperfectionis

replicatedinananalogousforminourownnature.Gayclaimedthatitwas

‘evidentfromthenatureofGod’thatGodwasinfinitelyhappyandfurthermoreit

wasevident(fromhisgoodnessincreatingtheworld)thathisaimwastomake

everyoneelsehappy.Weoughttoaimatthehappinessofall,Gayargued,

becauseitwasclearlyGod’swillthatallshouldbehappy.ItwasGod’scommand

thathadbeencommunicatedtoushere,andnotananalogousformofhisnature

perse.16

Thepointhere,forthemoment,wasthatClarke,Burnet,BalguyandHutcheson,

allassumedthatwecoulddiscoverthenatureofmoralgoodness,partlythrough

introspection,becauseGod’sperfectionswererealised,orrealisable,insome

smallimperfectwayinourownnature.17Tobeclear,noneoftheseauthors

14JohnBalguy,DivineRectitude:or,aBriefInquiryConcerningtheMoralPerfectionsoftheDeity,ParticularlyinRespectofCreationandProvidence,(1733),5.HenceforthDivineRectitude.15Hutcheson,Metaphysics,173-174.16Gay,Dissertation,xix.17BalguyobjectedtotheargumentfromanalogywithourownnaturetothatofGodonlywhereitledustodevelopthewrongideasofGod’svirtuefromourownimperfectnature.DivineRectitude,5.

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arguedthatwecoulddiscoverallmoralknowledgebyintrospectionalone–

observationoftheworldaroundus,and/orreflectionuponthecausesofthe

existenceandnatureofthatworldwerealsoimportant.Theysuggestedthatwe

oughttouseintrospectionintothewaysinwhichwethinkaboutmoralitywith

respecttoourownnatureinorderthatwediscover,totheextentthatweare

abletodiscoversuchthings,whatexactlyitisthatGodthinksconstitutesmoral

goodness,andthengovernourbehaviouraccordingly.

So,forexample,Hutcheson’sgreatsuggestionwasthat,inthefirstinstance,

ratherthanspendourtimeattemptingtodeducethelawsofnatureweshould

payattentiontoourexperienceofourmoreimmediatemoralreactionsandto

whatweinstinctivelyapproveinourmotivationalimpulses.Inreply,Burnetand

Balguyappealedtointrospectiontoclaimthatitwasourexperienceofself-

evidentthoughtandreasoneddemonstrationthatledustounderstandthatour

conductoughttoconformtothedeliverancesofreason.Gaytooencouraged

reflectionuponwhatwedeemedvirtuous.ItwasGay,however,whoarguedthat

therewerelimitstowhatwecoulddiscoveraboutthefundamentalprinciples

behindourmoralthoughtandbehaviourbyappealingtoourconscious

awarenessofourownmotivesandmoralresponses.Gaysuggestedthatwe

neededtogobeyondthisinordertouncoverthefundamentalprinciplesof

virtue,ormorality.

InthenextsectionIwillarguethatthesearchforananswertobothofmyinitial

questionsconformstotheaimsofabroadermovementinthesecondary

literature.Thismovementinsiststhatthedivisionofthephilosophyoftheearly

modernperiodintothatofcontinentalrationalistsandBritishempiricists,or

withintheBritishsphereintointellectualistorsentimentalmoralists,isinneed

ofqualification.Iwillprovideamoreformalintroductiontothethemes

discussedhere,statetheaimsofthethesis,andexplainthecontributionthatI

thinkthethesismakestoscholarship.

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Thethesisanditsaims

Critiquesoftheargumentthattherewere‘fundamentaldifferencesofmethod

andpurpose’betweenthecontinentalrationalists(usuallymeaningDescartes,

Spinoza,Leibniz,ArnauldandMalebranche)andBritishempiricists

(traditionallyLocke,BerkeleyandHume)havelongbeenafeatureofthe

secondaryliterature.18Thetensionbetweenrationalistandempiricistelements

inLocke’sapproach(thenatureofhisideasofreflection,theclaimsaboutthe

demonstrabilityofmoralknowledgeandhisaccountofthefoundationof

morality)hasbeenarecognisedfeatureofhisworksincethepublicationofthe

ECHU.19

Amendmentstothereadingoflaterseventeenthandeighteenth-centuryBritish

moralphilosophyasthebinaryoppositionofintellectualisttosentimentalist

epistemologies,aspresentedbySelby-Bigge,havebeenalsogatheringpace.20

TheroleofreasoninShaftesbury’sapproachhasbeenwellattendedtobyGrean,

Gill,andDarwall.21Gill,HuttonandDarwallhaveallemphasisedthesignificance

oftherolethatsensoryelementsplayedinCudworth’sepistemology.22Yetthe

oppositiontoarationalist/empiricistdivisionandSelby-Bigge’sbinary

classificationhastakenanotherform.Thisistodownplaythesignificanceof

18JohnCottingham,TheRationalists(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1988),2.SeealsoLouisE.Loeb,FromDescartestoHume:ContinentalMetaphysicsandtheDevelopmentofModernPhilosophy(NewYork:CornellUniversityPress,1981),25-35.19Theliteratureisvastclearly,butforexampleseeDavidHartley,ObservationsonMan(BathandLondon:SamuelRichardson,1749)onLocke’sideasofreflectionascompromisinghisempiricism.SeeJohnColeman,JohnLocke’sMoralPhilosophy(Edinburgh:EdinburghUniversityPress,1983),onthecoherenceofLocke’smoralthought.SeeFrancisOakley,“Locke,NaturalLawandGod–Again,”HistoryofPoliticalThought18,no.4(1997):624-651,onthetensioninLocke’saccountofnaturallaw.ForonerecentintellectualistinterpretationseeAndrewIsraelson,“God,MixedModesandNaturalLaw:AnIntellectualistInterpretationofGod’sMoralPhilosophy,”BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy21,no.6(2013):1111-1132.20Cuneoalsoobjectstotherationalist/sentimentalistdivisionintheworkofMacIntyreandRawls.TerenceCuneo,“ReasonandthePassions,”inTheOxfordHandbookofBritishPhilosophyintheEighteenthCentury,ed.JamesA.Harris,(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013),226.21StanleyGrean,Shaftesbury’sPhilosophyofReligionandEthics:AStudyinEnthusiasm(Ohio;OhioUniversityPress,1967).MichaelB.Gill,TheBritishMoralistsonHumanNatureandtheBirthofSecularEthics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),77-132.StephenDarwall,TheBritishMoralistsandtheInternal‘Ought’,1640-1740,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress(1995),176-206.22MichaelB.Gill,“FromCambridgePlatonismtoScottishSentimentalism,”JournalofScottishPhilosophy8(2010):13-31.Darwall,InternalOught,109-148.SarahHutton,“FromCudworthtoHume:CambridgePlatonismandtheScottishEnlightenment,”CanadianJournalofPhilosophy21,no.6(2012):8-26.

16

epistemologyastheleadingprinciplebywhichphilosophiesmightbe

classified.23

KnudHaakonssenhasofferedasustainedandprogrammaticcritiqueofthe

emphasisplacedonepistemology,orepistemologynarrowlyconceived,in

historiesofphilosophiesoftheearlymodernperiod.Haakonssenobjectstothe

Kantian/Reidianvisionofpost-Cartesianepistemologyasparadigmatically

concernedwithknowledge,whereknowledgeisstrippedbacktoits

propositionalcharacterandregardedsolelyforitstruth-value.24Haakonssen

claimsthatthismisrepresentsthewiderphilosophicalconcernsofanumberof

lateseventeenthandeighteenth-centurytheorists.25AccordingtoHaakonssen

themaineffectoftheLockeangroundclearanceprojectwastorevealan

impressionablesubject,togetherwithitsvariousenvironmentalconditioning

factors,astheprimaryobjectofphilosophicalenquiry:26

ThecentralpartoftheLockeanrevolutionwastoask“Whatdoesknowledgedototheknower?”or“Whataretheconditionsunderwhichaknowingsubjectholdsknowledge?”Thatistosay,theprimaryobjectofattentionwasthesubjectassuch,andknowledgewasonlyoneoftheconditioningfactorsofthesubject.27[Myemphasis.]

OnecorollaryofHaakonssen’spositionisthattheaimsofthephilosophersunder

discussionmaybemisunderstoodifitisassumedthattheyweresolely

concernedtoprovidetheirreadershipwithcompellingreasonstoalwaysbe

virtuous.Rather,itisarguedthattherelationshipbetweenthoughtandactionin

themoralspherewasconsideredtobeamulti-factorialaffair.Moraltheorists

23Iamgoingtodiscussrecentapproaches,butofcourseWhewellofferedadifferentclassificationtoSelby-Bigge.WilliamWhewell,LecturesontheHistoryofMoralPhilosophyinEngland(London:Parker,1852).24KnudHaakonssen,“ProtestantNaturalLawTheory:AGeneralInterpretation,”inNewEssaysontheHistoryofAutonomy:ACollectionHonoringJ.B.Schneewind,ed.,NatalieBrender,andLarryKrasnoff,(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004):97.25SeeKnudHaakonssen,ed.,TheCambridgeHistoryofEighteenth-CenturyPhilosophy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),3-25.ForcommentatorswhoshareHaakonssen’sconcernssee,forexample,TimothyJ.Hochstrasser,NaturalLawTheoriesintheEarlyEnlightenment(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2000),AaronGarrett,“SeventeenthCenturyMoralPhilosophy:Self-Help,Self-Knowledge,andtheDevil’sMountain,”inTheOxfordHandbookoftheHistoryofEthics(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013),229-279andJamesA.Harris,“ReligioninHutcheson’sMoralPhilosophy,”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy46,no.2(2008):205-222.26Haakonssen,“ProtestantNaturalLawTheory,”97.27Ibid.,97.

17

wereconcernedtodomorethatprovideanaccountoftheactionsthatwere

requiredofus,andanexplanationofwhyweoughttofulfilthoserequirements.

Theyaimed,morebroadly,toexplainhowwecouldachievevirtue.Thefollowing

passagesfromBacon,MoreandLockeprovideanindicationofthis:

ThemainandprimitivedivisionofmoralknowledgeseemethtobeintotheExemplarorPlatformofGood,andtheRegimenofCultureoftheMind;theonedescribingthenatureofgood,theotherprescribingruleshowtosubdue,apply,andaccommodatethewillofmanthereunto.(FrancisBacon).28Ethicsaredividedintotwoparts,theknowledgeofhappiness,andtheacquisitionofit.(HenryMore.)29Therebetwopartsofethics,theoneistherulewhichmenaregenerallyintherightin,thoughperhapstheyhavenotdeducedthemastheyshouldfromtheirtrueprinciples.Theotheristhetruemotivestopracticethemandthewaystobringmentoobservethem,andthesearegenerallyeithernotwellknownornotrightlyapplied.(JohnLocke.)30

Clarke,BurnetandBalguywereleftoutofDarwall’sBritishhistoryofthe

‘internalought’.Darwallrelegatedthemtothesidelineonthegroundsthattheir

positionwasareiterationofaPlatonicposition,and,assuch,wasnotthesortof

internalismthathe[Darwall]wasinterestedin.Thispositionheldthatthe

motivationforvirtuefollowedasa‘necessaryconsequence’ofaknowing

encounterwiththegood,butwasnotpartofthatknowingencounter.31

Hutchesonwasalsoputtooneside,inasense,inDarwall’soverallscheme

(althoughhepresentsaverydetailed,carefulandrevealingaccountof

Hutcheson’spositiononobligation).ThiswasbecauseHutcheson,likeClarke

andhisdefenders,didnotfindmoralobligationtoconsistinarationalmotiveto

act.ForClarke,Iargue,motivationwasindeedindependentofobligation,butnot

perhapsinthewayinwhichDarwallunderstandsittohavebeen.Clarkehere,I

believe,maybeseentohavetakenLocke’sviewofthe‘twopartsofethics’.For

Clarke,the‘truemotives’toactaccordingtoone’smoralobligation,didnotarise

28FrancisBacon,TheWorksofFrancisBacon,14vols,ed.JamesSpedding,RobertL.EllisandDouglasD.Heath(London:LongmanandCo.,1857-74),iii,419.29HenryMoore,EnchiridionEthicum,TheEnglishTranslationof1690,trans.EdwardSouthwell(NewYork:TheFacsimileTextSociety,1930),3.30JohnLocke,“EthicaB,”inLocke:PoliticalEssays,ed.MarkGoldie(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress),319.31Darwall,InternalOught,10.

18

asa‘necessaryconsequence’oftherecognitionofanobligation(oratleastthey

hadnotdonesosincetheFall).DarwalliscorrectinseeingthatClarke,Balguy

andHutcheson(attimes)didnotprivilegethesortofnormativitythatmakes

motiveandmoralobligationcoincide.ForDarwallthismakesthemanomalous.

DarwalldidnotconsiderJohnGayinhishistory.Gay’sparticularversionof

voluntarismdidhavemotivationcontainedwithinobligation(althoughits

ultimatesourceisclearlyextrinsic).ForGay,obligationisastateinwhichthe

obligedpersonfindsherselfwhenshefindsanactiontobenecessarytoherown

happiness,sothatitisnotdirectlyamatterofcommand,orself-command(butis

ultimatelyamatterofdivinecommand).32ThisthesisfinisheswithGayfora

numberofreasons,butasGarretthasrecentlypointedout,Gayviewedthe

separationofmoralknowledge,obligationandmotivationasproblematic,and

hisaimwastoaddressthis.33

Therelationofjudgment,motivation,obligationandactionintheworkofallthe

philosophersunderconsiderationherewasfundamentallysecuredby

providenceandatheisticmetaphysics.Theguidingconcernofallthe

philosophersconsideredherewas,Isuggest,asfollows:theysoughttoexplain

thewaysinwhichGodhadcreatedussoastoallowforthepossibilityofour

beinggood.Clarke,Hutcheson,GilbertBurnet,JohnBalguyandJohnGayall

askedhowwasitpossibleforustobevirtuous?Theyaimed,tothisend,toshow

howthenaturalprinciplessuppliedbyprovidenceoperatedtoproduceour

moralexperience,andtoshowhowanunderstandingofthoseprinciplesmight

beusedtobestpracticaleffect.AsIsaid,theysharedtheassumptionthatour

naturalconditionisnotoneofCalvinistpost-lapsariandegeneracy.

Nevertheless,theyallunderstoodthatourmoralvulnerabilities,bothcognitive

andmotivational,neededtobeaddressedwithinamoralscheme.Inaddition,

theyall,barGay,pointedtoanunderstandingofrevealedreligionasaresource

32Irwin,Development,Vol.II,826.IrwinmentionsGayveryinfrequently,buthedoesdrawsuccinctattentiontothedifferencebetweenGay’svoluntarismandthevoluntarismofthosewhomadetheimmediateperceptionofanobligationamatteroftheperceptionoftheneedtofulfillthecommandfromanauthority.33AaronGarrett,“ALockeanRevolutioninMorals,”paperpresentedtotheJohnLockeConference,DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofPittsburgh,April11th2015.

19

thatwasintendedtohelpsupplythiswantofnaturalmoralability.34Tobesure,

thequestionofwhatconstitutesourmoralobligationwasonethattheyall

addressed,butthiswasdoneintheserviceofawiderexplanationofhowvirtue

ismadepossibleforus.

Therearethenthreelinesofenquirytakenupbythisthesis.Theyarebroadly

governedbytheconcerntofurtherunderminetheconventionthatBritishmoral

philosophyofthisperiodisbestconceivedasastrugglebetweenrationalistand

sentimentalistepistemologies.Idonotdenythatthereweredifferences

betweentheepistemologiesproposedbyHutcheson,BurnetandBalguyandGay,

andIspendtimelookingatthosedifferences.However,Isuggestthateachofthe

philosophersconsideredheresituatedtheirepistemologywithinawider

concerntoaccountforthepossibilityofvirtuebeingarealpracticalendeavour,

therealityofwhichwassecuredbyanappealtotheisticmetaphysics.This

concernledClarke,BurnetandBalguytolookbeyondarationalistepistemology

inanattempttoaccountforthepracticalpossibilityofvirtue.Isuggestthatitled

Hutchesontodevelopamoralepistemologythatreflectedarealisttheistic

metaphysics,oratleastonethatwentsomewaybeyondanappealto

providentiallyimplantedmoralabilities.ItledBurnetandBalguytoconsiderthe

experientialqualitiesofreason,andtoappealtothesensoryandaffective

elementsofreasonitself.ItledGaytoattempttosynthesisetheapproachesof

ClarkeandHutcheson,withhisownvoluntaristposition.Gay’sschemerelied

upontheiragreementthatGodaimedatthehappinessofall,andthatthisought

tobeouraimtoo.Hismultifactorialmodelofmoralthoughtandactionused

elementsofClarkeandHutcheson’sepistemologytoexplaindifferentaspectsof

ourintrospectivelyavailablemoralexperience.Gay’saim,however,wasto

demonstratethatthevariousfeaturesofourmoralexperiencewereallbest

accountedforbyamorefundamental,explanatoryprinciple.Thiswas‘reason

pointingoutprivatehappiness’.35

34AlthoughthewillofGodistheultimatesourceofourobligationandmotivationforaction,GaydoesnotreferdirectlytoScriptureinhisshortDissertation.35Gay,Dissertation,xiv.

20

Thethesisisnarrowlyfocusedonadebateabouttheoriginal,foundationaland

fundamentalprinciplesofvirtuethatoccurredbetween1725(thepublication

dateofHutcheson’sInquiries)and1732(thepublicationofGay’sDissertation).

Thefocusisjustified,Ibelieve,becauseacloserreadingofthissmallexchangeof

viewsbringstolightthewaysinwhichthevariousprotagonistssoughtto

accountfortheexperienceofmoralthought.Thetruth-aptnessofanymoral

judgments,orevaluations,wasassumedbyalltobeunderwrittenbydivine

guarantee.Thedisagreementswereabouttheinternalmechanicsoffacultative

logic,whichputtoonesideconsiderationsabouttheproperformofinferential

relationsinfavourofanexplanationofthewaysinwhichourmoralthoughtand

behaviourreflectedtheimpoverished,butanalogous,operationofthedivine

‘virtuesconcernedwiththeunderstanding’.36Inaddition,Iarguethatthe

governanceofthoseprinciplesorattributesofhumannaturewhichwerenot

foundinthedivinecase,wereofequalimportanceintheaccountsofthewaysin

whichGodhadmadeitpossibleforustobevirtuous.Theseargumentsneedto

begivenequalweightininterpretationsoftheworkofClarkeandhisfollowers.

Boththeseaspectsofthedebateareneglectedincurrentaccountsofthemoral

philosophyoftheperiod.

Thethesisthereforeaimsto(1)examinetherelationshipofrationalismto

obligationandmotivationintheworkofClarke,BurnetandBalguy,and(2)to

exploretherelativerolesofsenseandjudgmentinHutcheson,Burnet,Balguy

andGay.Mysecondaryaim(2b)istoexaminethesomewhatvexedquestionof

Hutcheson’srealism.ItakethismatterupbecauseIbelievethatbylooking

carefullyattherelativeplaceofsenseandjudgmentinHutcheson,something

newmightbeofferedtothedebate.Tothisend,Ialsotracetheinfluenceof

Locke’slogicofideasupontheaccountsofmoralcognitionofferedbyHutcheson,

Burnet,BalguyandGay.Iwillalso(3)investigatethetheisticmetaphysical

claimsmadebyallpartieswithrespecttotheargumentsaboutmoralrealism,

andHutcheson’srealisminparticular.

36Hutcheson,Metaphysics,168.

21

Thesethreethemesarecoveredtoagreaterorlesserdegreeineachofthe

chapters.ThefirstchapteronClarke(Chapter2)speakslargelytothefirstaim

(Clarke’sthoughtsontheisticmetaphysicsarecoveredinchapter3).Thetwo

chaptersonHutcheson(Chapters3and4)speaktothesecondandthirdaims.

ThechaptersonBurnetandBalguy(Chapter5)andGay(Chapter6)encompass

allthree.

Thefirstaim

Astothefirstoflineofenquiry,MichaelGillhasarguedthatrationalismor,‘the

claimthatmoralityoriginatesinreasonalone’,actuallycontainsthreeseparate

claims.Theseare:themetaphysicalclaimthatmoralityconsistsinreason(the

valuespresentintheuniverse),theepistemologicalclaimthatmoralknowledge

isacquiredsolelythroughreason,andthepracticalclaimthatreasonalonecan

moveustomoralaction.GillbelievesthatClarkeandBalguy(alongwith

Cudworth)madeallthreeclaimsandrarelydistinguishedbetweenthem.37I

believe,however,thatifthepracticalclaimistobeattributedtoClarkeand

Balguythenthisclaimoughttobeunpackedalittlefurther.

IwillarguethatClarkeandBalguyverydeliberatelydidnotmaketheclaimthat

therationalperceptionofthefitnessofanactionaloneissufficienttomoveusto

moralaction,althoughtheydidmaketheclaimthatitoughttobe.(Clarke’s

viewsonthemotivationalimpotenceofallperceptionsandtheimmediate

naturalcausesofallactionsarenotthemainfocusoftheargumenthere.)Iargue

thatforClarkeandBalguy,rectitudeofwillisGod’smoralperfectionalone-

divinegoodnessleadsGodtoalwaysconformallofhisactionstotheknowledge

ofwhatisright,orfit.Godhowever,createdusrationalandsensible,and,at

leastsincetheFall,wehavebeenrequiredtodiscover(ortobetaught)other

motivatingtruthsthatappealtothesensiblepartsofournature,inorderto

performmoralactions.Thesearetruthsaboutthecertaintyofourcontinued

37MichaelB.Gill,BritishMoralists,273.SeealsoMichaelGill,“MoralRationalismvs.MoralSentimentalism:IsMoralityMoreLikeMathorBeauty?”PhilosophyCompass2/1(2007):26.SeealsoFrederickC.Beiser,TheSovereigntyofReason:TheDefenseofRationalityintheEarlyEnglishEnlightenment(NewJersey:PrincetonUniversityPress,1996),267,whooutlinessimilartripartiteambitions.

22

existenceinafuturestate,where,asrecipientsofdivinejustice,wecanexpect

rewardorpunishment.

Thisargumentoffersapartialcorrectivetocertainviewsoftherelationship

betweenrationalismandmotivationinClarkethatarecurrentlyonofferinthe

secondaryliterature,whichappeartodenyortodownplaytheroleofreward

andpunishmentinmoralmotivation.Inaddition,therehasbeenverylittle

discussionofBalguyinthesecondaryliterature,especiallywithrespecttothis

issue.

Thesecondaim

Astothesecondaim,Iwillarguethatthereisasharedreliance,inallauthors,on

thescaffoldofLocke’sapproachtotheoryofmind.Iwillarguethatthe

psychologisminimicaltologicsofideassuchasLocke’s,andafocusonthe

introspectedexperienceofmoralevaluation,entailedthatthenatureofthe

separationbetweensenseandjudgmentinthedescriptivemoralepistemologies

ofrationalismandsentimentalismwascomplexandisworthyoffurther

exploration.Thevariousaccountsofsense,judgmentandreasonacrossthework

oftheauthorsconsideredhereisexaminedinthecontextofepistemological

logics.Thisissuehasnotbeenfullydiscussedinthesecondaryliterature.38

AtthisstageitisappropriatetoaskwhythefocushereisonLocke,andtothis

endIofferthefollowingrationale.SamuelClarke’sappealtotheself-evident

intuitionofthemoralvalueofactionsdidnotsitwithinanexplicitlyLockean

theoryofmind.Theworkoftherestofthephilosophersselectedherealltook

inspirationfromLocke’sgeneraldescriptiveaccountofcognition.Eachofthem

tooksomethingfromhimdirectlyinthedetailoftheiraccountsofthecognitive

aspectsofmoralthought.Thatis,theyborrowedsmallpartsofthemental

machinerybywhichLocke’sgeneralaccountofhumanunderstanding

proceeded.Thesewere:ideasofinternalsense(Hutcheson),theperceptual

38Gill,in“MathorBeauty?”discussesthephenomenologyofsentimentalismandrationalism,butnotinrelationtothelogicofideas.

23

natureofreasonandinternalsense(GilbertBurnetandBalguy),and

associationismandtheideaofmixedmodesorcompoundideas(Gay).

Nevertheless,asNortonandMoorehavebeenatpainstopointout(withrespect

toHutcheson),therewereseveralother‘waysofideas’thanLocke’sway.39

MalebrancheandthePort-Royallogiciansinparticular,wereinfluentialinterms

oftheoryofmindintheearlyeighteenthcenturyinBritain(notspeakof

influentialearliernon-ideaists).Eachofthefiguresconsideredherewas

influencedbyawidevarietyofthinkers,bothancientandmodern,inany

numberofways.Indeed,Lockemayhavebeenafigurethattheydisagreedwith

fundamentallyinmanyrespects.Therewerecertainlyother,moredirect

influences,uponparticularaspectsofthetheoryofmindthatHutchesonused.

Nonetheless,Locke’sdescriptiveaccountofmindprovidedthegeneral

frameworktowhichHutchesonandtheothergroupsreferred.Theyborrowed

terminology,adaptedconcepts,arguedover,agreedanddisagreedwithmany

aspectsofLocke’sapproach,whichofcourseitselfreflectedamultiplicityof

influences.Locke’swayofideas,hisgeneralaccountoftheoperationofour

minds,wastheparadigminwhichtheyworked-butthisdidnotentailthat

Locke’smoralphilosophy,hismetaphysics,orindeedanyotheraspectofhis

approachweretakenup.AssuchHutcheson,Burnet,Balguy,LawandGaycanbe

seenveryfrequently,toborrowaphrasefromStephenBuckle,tohaveused

‘Lockeanconceptstoservequiteun-Lockeanends’.40

Ialsoarguethat,inparticular,problemsinLocke’sterminologyandthe

treatmentofhis‘ideasofreflection’,orinternalsense,allowedfortheproduction

oftheconflictingaccountsoftheexistenceandoperationofamoralsense,with

whichthisthesisisconcerned.Locke’sideasofreflectionweretermedideas

fromaninternalsense.41Lockedidnotclearlydistinguishtheseideasfrom

consciousness,or,ourawarenessofthecontentofourminds.Neitherdidhe

39DavidFateNorton,“Hutcheson’sMoralRealism,”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy23(1985):397-418.Moore,Introduction,LMNSM,xi-xii.40StephenBuckle,NaturalLawandtheTheoryofProperty:GrotiustoHume(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),96.41Locke,ECHU,2:1:4,105.

24

distinguishbetweenourintuitiveknowledge(ourawareness)oftheexistence

andcontentofourownideas,andtheperceptionofthecertainagreementor

disagreementofideas(alsointuitiveknowledge),orourintuitiveinsightinto

(speculative)self-evidentprinciples.Moreoversometimes,thehavingofideasof

reflection(i.e.ideasofourmentaloperations)wasconfusedbysomeofhis

readerswithourpowerofreflection(orreason).42Iwillarguethatthis

confusioncausedsomeoftheapparentlybewilderinguseofterminologyto

accountforthenatureandoperationofamoralsense.Iamnotconcernedhere

withwhetherornotLocke’stheorywascoherentorconfused.Ijustaimtoshow

thatthereadingofitallowedforarangeofunderstandingsastothenatureofan

‘internalsense’intheearlyeighteenthcentury.Therehasnotbeenadetailed

discussionofLocke’sinfluenceinthisrespectacrosstheworkoftherangeof

authorsdiscussedhere.

IwillalsoofferafairlysubstantialtreatmentofHutcheson’sclaimthathismoral

sensedoesnotoperatebymeansofnativeideasorpropositions.Thisdiscussion

willcentrearoundLocke's(andHutcheson’s)commitmenttowhathasbeen

termedthe‘awarenessprinciple’,andLocke’sdiscussionintheECHUofimplicit

andexplicit,ordeclarativeprinciples.43Therehasbeennodiscussioninthe

secondaryliteratureofthewayinwhichHutchesonmayormaynothave

controvertedthisprinciple.44

ExaminationoftheimpactofLockeonHutchesonisnotunprecedented,of

course.ThedisputebetweenNortonandWinklerisperhapsthemostwell

42UdoThiel,“Hume’sNotionsofConsciousnessandReflectioninContext,”BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy2(1994):75-115,andTheEarlyModernSubject:Self-ConsciousnessandPersonalIdentityfromDescartestoHume(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2011),118-119.43DeRosanamesthisaspectofLocke’sapproachthe‘awarenessprinciple’andoffersarevealingdiscussionofitsroleLocke’srejectionofnativism.RafaellaDeRosa,“Locke'sEssay,BookI:theQuestion-BeggingStatusoftheAnti-NativistArguments,”inJohnLocke:CriticalAssessmentsofLeadingPhilosophers,SeriesII.VolumeII,Knowledge:ItsNatureandOrigins,ed.PeterAnstey(London:Routledge,2006),82-110.44DanielCareyprovidesagoodaccountofHutcheson’sapproachtonativismandtheissueofdiversityinDanielCarey,Locke,ShaftesburyandHutcheson:ContestingDiversityintheEnlightenmentandBeyond(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),150-119.HetouchesontherelevanceofprinciplesinrelationtoLockeandThomasBurnetandHutcheson,167,andhealsodiscussestherelationshipofsenseandjudgmentinHutcheson,165-166.TheseissuesarediscussedatsomelengthinChapter4.

25

known.Butthisdebatewasfocusedverytightlyonthecomparisonof

Hutcheson’sideasofmoralsenseinrelationtoLocke’sideasofprimaryand

secondaryqualities.45IbelievethattheanalysisIprovideofHutcheson’s

treatmentofhismoralsense,usingfeaturesofepistemologicallogicsofideasin

general,togetherwithotheraspectsofLocke’sapproach,deliverssomefresh

insightintoanolddebateaboutthenatureofHutcheson’srealism.InadditionI

discusstheontologyofHutcheson’sideasfrommoralsense,astheyare

discussedinhistextsonMetaphysicsandLogic.Ibelievethatthenatureof

Hutcheson’srealismisfarbetterunderstoodoncehistextsonMetaphysicsand

LogicarereadalongsidehisotherworkscomposedinDublininthe1720s.Asfar

asIamawaretherehasbeennosubstantialtreatmentofthearguments

presentedinboththesetextsinrelationtothisissue,althoughreferencehas

beenmadetothem.

Thethirdaim

Lastly,IsuggestthatthetheisticmetaphysicsthatsecuredvirtueforHutcheson

andhisrationalistinterlocutorsmaynothavebeenasdifferentfromeachother,

asHutcheson’scontemporariesorlatercommentatorshaveassumed.Iwill

examineHutcheson’sappealtothecommunicabilityofGod’sattributesandthe

substanceofHutcheson’sresponsetoClarkeonthisissue,andtheresponseof

Burnet,BalguyandGaytoHutchesonhere.Again,Idonotbelievethispartof

Hutcheson’smoraltheory,ortheresponsestoithavebeenconsideredin

sufficientdetail.

Imakenoapology,ifanyoneexpectsit,fortheabsenceofadiscussionabout

Humeinthisthesis.ThechoicetofocusonHutcheson’sworkofthe1720s,and

theearlierresponsetoit,wasmadeinorderthatImightavoidanyoverlapwith

Hume’sentranceintothedebate.Iwantedtoinvestigatethewaysinwhichthe

paradigmthathadbeensetbyearlierapproachestothephilosophyofmind

influencedthedebatebetweenthephilosopher’sselected.Thedegreetowhich

45DavidFateNorton,“Hutcheson’sMoralRealism,”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy23(1985):397-418.KennethP.Winkler,“Hutcheson’sAllegedMoralRealism,”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy,23(1985):179-94and“HutchesonandHumeontheColorofVirtue,”HumeStudies1(1996):3-22.

26

Humesubsequentlydid,ordidnot,occasionaparadigmshiftisnotmyconcern

here.Ishould,however,offeranapologyforleavingoutShaftesbury,whowas

veryobviouslyafigureofinterestand/orinfluencetotheauthorsconsidered

here.ShaftesburyisoneofthedeistswhowerethetargetofClarkeandBalguy’s

attackupontheabilityofnaturalreasontodeliversufficientmoralknowledge.

HisinfluenceonHutcheson’smethodandtheoryremainsatopicofgreat

interest.Myonlyjustificationsarefirst,insufficientspace,andsecond,that

Shaftesbury’sprimaryconcernwasnottoembedhismoraltheoryinan

especiallydetailedtheoryofmind,anditwasthedetailofmoraljudgmentthatI

wantedtoexaminehere,acrosstheworkofalltheselectedauthors.

Inthenextsectionsomeoftherelevantbackgroundmaterialontheseventeenth

centuryisprovided.Iwilllookfirstatthereasonsforthefocusuponmoral

experienceatthebeginningoftheeighteenthcentury.Iwillthenprovidea

reasonablydetailedaccountofLocke’sgeneraltheoryofmindanditsrelationto

otherlogicsofideas.

Backgroundmaterial

Earlyintheeighteenthcentury,theDutchphysicianBernardMandevillevivified

adenialoftherealityofvirtueinhisGrumblingHive,laterFableoftheBees.

Mandeville’sdisquietingpromotionofbothpsychologicalandethicalegoismwas

intendedasaparticularprovocationtosupportersofShaftesbury’sviewof

universalbenevolenceasaconstitutiveforceinbothdivineandhumannature.46

Oneoftheproblemsforthoseearlyeighteenth-centurymoralistswhowishedto

defendtherealityofvirtueagainsttheconventionalismofMandevilleorindeed

Hobbes,orLockeandPufendorf,wasthedepletedstoreofexplanatoryresources

withwhichtomeetascepticalchallenge.

InBritain,thisscarcityofconceptualassetswasadistinctlypost-Lockean

phenomenon.Itwasbroughtaboutbyashakenconfidenceintheabilityofour

reasoningabilitiestodemonstrate,orevenfollowademonstration,ofthe

46SeeJohnColman,“BernardMandevilleandtheRealityofVirtue,”Philosophy47(1972):125-139.

27

contentofdivinelegislationoreternalconceptionsofthegood.Lockehadnot

onlyfailedtomakegoodonthepromiseoftheECHUofarationaldeductionof

morallaw,hehadalsovoicedthefirmopinionintheReasonablenessof

Christianitythattheinadequacyofourunassistedreasonentailedthenecessity

ofRevelation,andtheregularteachingandreadingofScripture.Thetextwas

publishedanonymouslyin1695,butiftherewasdoubtastoauthorshipthiswas

clarifiedinacodiciltoLocke’swill.47

Moreover,thedifficultywithfollowinglonganddifficultdeductionsofourmoral

dutiesthatLockehadpointedtowasofcriticalimportance.Thiswasbecauseof

thenon-negotiablerequirement,forAnglicananddissentingmoralistsalike,that

belieforknowledgeariseoutofone'sownreasoningprocess.Itwouldnot

suffice,foraProtestantGod,thatwesimplyadoptprinciplesratherthantaking

activeresponsibilityforsupplyingthecontentsofindividualconscience.

Everybodyhadamoraldutytounderstandhisorhermoralduties.48

Furthermore,theargumentofbookthreeoftheECHUhadsuggestedthatnatural

languageoughttobeviewedwithsomeapprehension.Wordswereseenasa

sourceofunavoidableerrorinthesocialarenabecausethetermsthat

representedcomplexideaswerethoughttobecharacterisedbyaninherent

semanticinstability.Therulesfortheformalmanipulationoftermslaiddownby

logicianswereatleastcommonlyunderstood,ifnotalwaysagreedupon,within

thecommunityofthoseeducatedintoitsprinciples.Therewasnosuch

guaranteeofferedbyLocke,whounderstoodouruseofterms,whichwere

supposedtosignifyourcomplexmoralideas,tohavebeenoccasionedbya

voluntary,arguablyarbitrary,blendofourownideas.Thisthreatenedsuccessful

communicationbetweenspeakerandlistenerandwriterandreader.Sofor

example,thesuccessfultranslationofmoraltermsacrosslanguageslooked

doubtful.IndeedLocke’sconcern,andhewasfarfromaloneinthis,wasthatany

47JohnLocke,TheReasonablenessofChristianity,asDeliveredintheScriptures,inJohnLockeWritingsonReligion,ed.VictorNuovo(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2002),85-211.HenceforthReasonableness.48Forexample,seeBrianYoung,ReligionandEnlightenmentinEighteenth-CenturyEngland:TheologicalDebatefromLocketoBurke(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1998),25,onLockeandtheneedfor‘aninwardpersuasionofthemind’tosaveinmattersofreligion.

28

formofpublicdiscourseaboutmoral,theologicalorpoliticalmatterscouldserve

onlytocreatemutualmisunderstandingandmightevenfostercivilunrest,

unlessitcouldbestringentlymanagedviatheestablishmentofanagreed

understandingoftherelevantmixofideasbehindthewordsinuse.49

Perhapsmoresignificantly,throughouttheseventeenthcenturyuniversally

available‘certitudeofmind’hadbeensuppliedeitherbyinnateideas,orbyself-

evidentlogicaltruths,orbycommonnotions(thoseideasthatreceiveduniversal

assent).50Intheimmediatepost-Lockeanperiod,a‘naive’appealtoimplanted

ideasandprinciplesofbothspeculativeandpracticalkindswasalsoruledout.

Lockehad,withsomesuccess,alsodeemedthe‘dispositional’approachto

nativismargumentativelyvacuous.Herehehadpointedtotheabsenceofany

meaningfuldelineationbetweenthepower,orabilityofreasontograspan

externallyheldmoraltruth,andthedivineimplantationofthattruthinan

implicitform,whichthenrequiredtheverysamecognitivepowertorealiseit.51

Lockehadalsoinsistedthattherewerenoself-evidentmoralprinciples.We

mightalways,andreasonably,askwhyanycandidatemoralruleshouldbe

acceptedasarule.52

Intheearlypartoftheeighteenthcentury,doubtsaboutthesufficiencyand

universalityofourpowersofrationaldeduction,inthecontextofawidespread

adoptionofLocke’sbasiccomplaintsaboutinnatism,drovesomeearly

eighteenth-centurymoralphilosophersinEnglandandScotlandtoexamineour

experienceofmoraljudgment.AfterLocke,thediscussionofwhatmight

legitimatelybeconsideredinnatetousrequiredcarefulmanagement,butthe

49OnthisaspectofLockeandlanguageseeHannahDawson,Locke,LanguageandEarly-ModernPhilosophy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2007),129-154andJohnMarshall,JohnLocke:Resistance,ReligionandResponsibility,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1994),353-355.50PeterHarrison,‘Religion’andtheReligionsintheEnglishEnlightenment(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1990),29.51JohnW.Yolton,LockeandtheWayofIdeas(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1968).52Locke,ECHU1:3:1and4,66and68.

29

discussionaboutournaturalresourceswasverymuchsubjecttoreformulation,

ratherthanhavingbeenbroughttoaclose.53

ItwasShaftesburywhoturnedfromlanguagetoappealtoourmoralexperience,

intermsoftherealityofthepleasuresitaffordedus,inanefforttodefeat

scepticism.Alltheauthorsconsideredinthefollowingchaptersagreedthatour

experienceofmoralevaluationwasuniversal,howevermisguidedthese

evaluationsmayhavebeen.Whatevertheoriginalsource,orsourcesoftheterm,

allagreed,howevergrudgingly,thattheexperienceofmoraljudgmentwas

loosely(ifnotproperly)describedbytheterm‘moralsense’–intermsofnon-

voluntariness,immediacy,certaintyandanaffectivequalitythatfeelslike

approbationorcondemnation.Whateverfacultyofmindactuallysuppliedthis

experience,itwasagreedthatbasicmoraljudgmentdoesnotrequiretheability

toundertakeorfollowcomplexdeductionsfromthenatureofman,orthe

extensiveanalysisofmoralterms.TheargumentbetweenHutcheson,Burnet

andBalguyandGaywasoneaboutwhatlaybeneathourexperienceofanoften

immediateandnon-voluntarymoraljudgment.Whatwerethenaturalprinciples,

thatproducedourexperienceofthisresponse?

Theargumentofthefollowingchaptersisbaseduponanunderstandingof

Locke’swayofideas,andsimilarlogicsofideas,suchasthatofthePortRoyal

theorists,ArnualdandNicole.Inordertosupportthisargument,Iwillbriefly

discussfeaturesofsuchlogicsandthenoutlineLocke’sowntheory.Thepointof

thissectionistoprovideanaccountofhowthefocusonthefirstactof

perceptionorreceptionofsimpleideasbecamethefocusofattentionwithin

logicsofideasandhowtheboundarybetweenthisandthesecondactof

judgmentwasnotfixed.Thisissupposedtogosomewayinprovidingthe

contextforthevariousexplanationsofamoralsenseofconcerninthisthesis.

53SeeJamesA.Harris,“InnatenessinBritishPhilosophy(c.1750-1820),”EighteenthCenturyThought4(2008):203–227,onspeculativeprinciples.SeealsoGeorgeWatson,introductiontoRemarksonJohnLockebyThomasBurnetwithLocke’sReplies,ed.G.Watson(Doncaster:BrynmillPress,1989),18.SeeHansAarsleff,LocketoSaussure:EssaysontheStudyofLanguageandIntellectualHistory(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1982),159,ontheassumptionofuniformityofnaturaland‘original’principles.

30

Thestudyoflogic,fromthetwelfthcenturyupuntilthelatterhalfofthe

seventeenthcentury,wasconceivedofasascienceoflanguage.54Theconcernof

themedievallogicianwastoidentifyrulesofinferencethatcouldlegitimise,or

discredit,apropositionoraseriesofpropositions,expressedeitherinanatural

language,orasOckhamhadproposed,inamentalproposition.Later,humanist

complainantsvilifiedformallogicfor(amongotherthings)beingalientonatural

thoughtprocesses,structurallyincompatiblewithnaturalgrammatical

expressionandincapableofdeliveringnovelinformation.Despitearejectionof

theformal,inferentialnatureofthemedievalapproach,humanistlogicians

retainedthelinguisticconceptionoflogic.Humanistlogicwastheartof

argument,ratherthanthescholasticscienceofdispute,butitwasstillverymuch

alanguagegame.55

ThemethodofDescartesandLocke,Hobbes,Gassendiand,tosomeextent,the

Port–RoyalteamofArnauldandNicoledepartedfrombothmedievaland

humanistapproaches.56DescartesandLockemovedawayfromtheformal(rule-

governed)manipulationoftermsthatbothlegitimisedandconstrainedmedieval

formalism.Intheirplace,andinstarkcontrasttohumanistapproaches,they

introducednaturalisedaccountsofcognitionwherepsychology,theoriesof

mentalfacultiesandepistemologywerecalledupontoexplainandtojustify

whereandhowwemightfindtruth.Logicbecamefocusedonthelegitimacyof54Iamindebtedtothefollowingforthecontentofthispartofintroduction.GabrielNuchelmans,“LogicintheSeventeenthCentury:PreliminaryRemarksandtheConstituentsoftheProposition,”inTheCambridgeHistoryofSeventeenthCenturyPhilosophy,ed.DanielGarberandMichaelAyers(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998),103-117,and“PropositionandJudgment,”ibid.,118-131.GabrielNuchelmans,JudgmentandProposition:fromDescartestoKant(Amsterdam:NorthHolland,1983).ClaudePanaccio,“OckhamandLockeonMentalLanguage,”inTheMedievalHeritageinMetaphysicsandModalTheory1400-1700,ed.R.FreidmanandL.ONeilson(Netherlands:Klewer,2003):37-52.JamesG.Buickerood,“TheNaturalHistoryoftheUnderstanding:LockeandtheRiseofFacultativeLogicintheEighteenthCentury,”inThePhilosophyofLocke:NewPerspectives,ed.PeterAnstey(London:Routledge,2003),229-268.PaulSchuurman,Ideas,MentalFacultiesandMethod:TheLogicofIdeasofDescartesandLockeandItsReceptionintheDutchRepublic,1630-1750(Netherlands,Brill,2004).55FrederickS.Michael,“WhyLogicBecameEpistemology:Gassendi,PortRoyalandtheReformationinLogic,”inLogicandtheWorkingsoftheMind:TheLogicofIdeasandFacultyPsychologyinEarlyModernPhilosophy,ed.PatriciaA.Easton(Atascadero,CA:RidgeviewPublishing,1997),3.56Nuchelmans,Logic,seemsnottoviewLocke’sworkaslogic,‘Others,likeDescartesandLocke,leftittotheirfollowerstoapplythenewinsightstothefieldoflogic’,105.ButseetheconvincingargumentofBuickeroodFacultativeLogic,andSchuurman,LogicofIdeas,thatLocke’sECHUandTheConductoftheUnderstanding(plannedasachapteroftheECHU)wereviewedandtaughtas‘logics’wellintotheeighteenthcentury.

31

ourideas,ratherthanonthelegitimateuseofterms.Therewas,moreover,a

manifestlyremedialortherapeuticairaboutmanyofthesenewlogicsofideas,

astheysoughttodictatetheproperconductofourunderstandingandtoproffer

adviceupontheimprovementofourmentalfaculties.57Itwastoour

managementoftheflowofinformationthroughourunderstandingthat

DescartesandLocketurned.58

DespitewidespreaddisparagementoftheAristotelianlogicaltradition,these

seventeenth-centuryschemesfrequentlykepttoitsorganisationalconventions.

Knowledgewasheldtoshareastructurewithlanguage,sothatateachlevela

linguisticentity(aword,asentence,orapieceofdiscourse)waspairedwitha

psychologicaleventortheexerciseofaspecificmentaloperation(perceptionor

conception,judgmentanddiscourse).59Thepresentationofsubjectmatter

typicallyblendedtraditionalformalstructurewiththesortofpsychologismthat

was,andstillis,heldtohavesubvertedthepracticeoflogicalenquiryformuch

oftheearlymodernperiod.60Infact,logicsstructuredwithreferencetomental

actswerefoundfrequentlyinhumanistlogics.61Itisthecase,however,that

therewerenoaccompanyingtheoriesofconceptformationwithinanyhumanist

logic.62Itwasthetheorisedprogressionofthe‘concrete’perceptionthrougha

hierarchyofmentalactsoroperationstoitsterminationinameaningful

utterancethatcharacterised‘logicsofideas’.Theemphasishadshiftedfroma

primaryconcernwiththelinguisticentitywithinthepair,tofocusattentionon

57GaryHatfield,“TheWorkingsoftheIntellect:MindandPsychology,”inLogicandtheWorkingsoftheMind:TheLogicofIdeasandFacultyPsychologyinEarlyModernPhilosophy,ed.PatriciaA.Easton(Atascadero,CA:RidgeviewPublishing,1997),3058Hatfield,ibid.,30.DescartesandLockeinparticular,hadmuchtosayaboutthedutyandpracticeofthe‘cognitivevirtues’withintheconductoftheunderstanding.59JaapMaat,“LanguageandSemiotics,”inTheOxfordHandbookofPhilosophyinEarlyModernEurope’,ed.DesmondClarkandCatharineWilson(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2011),272-294.60Totakejustoneexample,forBochenski(quotedinMichael,“WhyLogic,”2)logicfromthemid1500’stothemid1900’sis‘poorincontent,devoidofalldeepproblems,permeatedwithawholelotofnon-logicalphilosophicalideas,psychologistintheworstsense.’61Michael,“WhyLogic,”9.62Ibid,.

32

itspurelypsychologicalcounterpart-thecognitiveoperationsofperception,

judgmentandreason.63

Theapplicationofthenewphilosophytologicaltheorywaspresentedinseveral

widelyusedtextbooksandmanuals.Arguablythemostsuccessfulanddurable

pedagogictoolofthiskindwas‘LogicortheArtofThinking’.Published

anonymouslyin1662,itstitleprovedcontroversial.64Logic,criticsclaimed,was

conventionallyandproperlytheartofreasoningwellanddidnotreflectthe

bruteactofthinkingperse.Allsubsequenteditionscarriedareplytothat

objection(the‘seconddiscourse’)inwhichitsauthorsArnauldandNicole

insistedthat

thepurposeoflogicistogiverulesforalltheactionsofthemind,andforsimpleideasaswellasforjudgmentsandinferencesthereispracticallynootherwordwhichcoversallthesedifferentacts.Certainly“thinking”includesallofthem,forsimpleideasarethoughts,judgmentsarethoughts,andinferencesarethoughts.65

Thescopeofconcernoflogichadbeenbroadenedtoincludethesimple

apprehension,orperceptionofideas.Thefocusupontheanalysisoftheorigin

andperceptionofourfirstideaswasfundamentaltothephilosophyofthePort-

Royaltheorists’predecessor,Descartes,andalsotoLocke.

BothDescartesandLocke,however,wentmuchfurtherthanArnauldandNicole,

andeschewedrelianceuponthepubliclyavailabledeductiveproofdeliveredby

thesyllogism.Truthwastobeaccessedviathepropergovernanceofourmental

facultiesastheymanipulatedfoundational‘simple’ideas.Proof,moreover,for

DescartesandLockewasascertainedbymeansofaninward‘feeling’ofcertainty

thatarosewithinanindividualwheneversheintrospectedandexaminedthe

contentofherownideas(ortheperceivedconnexionsbetweenthem.)Forboth

63Seealso,JillVanceBuroker,'ThePriorityofThoughttoLanguageinCartesianPhilosophy,”inLogicandtheWorkingsoftheMind:TheLogicofIdeasandFacultyPsychologyinEarlyModernPhilosophyed.PatriciaA.Easton(Atascadero,CA:RidgeviewPublishing,1996),99-102.64Theeditorofthe1996Englisheditionclaimsitas‘ThemostinfluentiallogicfromAristotleuntiltheendofthenineteenthcentury’,seeJillVanceBuroker,introductiontoLogicortheArtofThinkingbyAntoineArnauldandPierreNicole,trans.anded.JillVanceBuroker(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),xxiii.65AntoineArnauldandPierreNicole,LogicortheArtofThinking,trans.anded.JillVanceBuroker(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),14.

33

DescartesandLocke,certaintyaboutthetruthofone’sownthoughtswas

availableonapurelyintrapersonalbasis.

Self-evidentknowledge,andtheexperienceofcertaintywithwhichitcoexists,

wassaidtobeamatterofeithertheintuitionofaproposition,ortheperception

ofthenaturalconnection,ordisconnectionbetweenideas,whichisa

proposition.ForDescartes,theprocessofacquiringknowledgebeganwithan

episodeofrationalinsight.Clearanddistinctperceptionsweremade'manifest

bythenaturallight'.66ForLocke,knowledgeresultedfromthecertainperception

ofagreementordisagreementbetweenjusttwoideas(intuitiveknowledge),or

betweenpairsofideasthatwerelinked,chainlike,bysuccessiveintuitive

episodes(demonstrativeknowledge).Lockealsoinsistedonsensitiveknowledge

(ofthe'existenceofanythingwithoutus').

Theoperationoflogicunderthereignofideasthen,becameadescriptive,

naturalisedaccountoftheworkingsofthemind,wheretruth(whereitcouldbe

found)wasamatterofsuccessfulcognition.Inthelatenineteenthandtwentieth

centuriescriticsprotestedthatthislogicofideaswaspredicatedupona

naturalisticfallacy.Theircomplaintwasthatanaturalisticdescriptionofthe

workingsoftheminddidnot,andcouldnot,guaranteethevalidityofthetruths

producedbysuchamind.Ourcognitivefacultiesintheearlymodernperiod

though,wereGodgivenand,assuch,theywereunderwrittenbydivine

guaranteeasbeingcapable,correctlyused,ofdiscoveringtruth.Anindividual’s

momentsofintuitivecertaintygaveherpotentialaccesstothatpartofexternal

realitythatGodwishesustocomprehend.However,althoughcertaintywasa

matterofindividualphenomenologicalexperience,wecouldbemistakenand

correctourselvesbyreasoningfurther.67

So,thefocusontheoriginandperceptionofsimpleideaswasfundamentaltothe

wayofideas.Justasfundamentalwastheinsistenceuponourawarenessofthe

progressionofthese‘concrete’perceptions,throughahierarchyofmentalactsto66ReneDescartes,MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy:WithSelectionsfromtheObjectionsandReplies,trans.JohnCottingham.(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2017),28.67Hatfield,“Workings,”21-46.

34

aterminationinknowledgeorbelief.ForDescartes,thePort-RoyalGroup,Locke

andBerkeley,thecognitiveoperationsofperception,judgmentandreasonwere

performedbyaunified,consciousmind.68Thisentailedthatfortheseauthors,

thattheworkingsofthemindcouldbeviewedclearlythroughtheprocessof

introspection.Ateachstage,theprogressionofinformationfromthesense

receptiontorationaldiscoursewasavailabletoconsciousness.69Individualideas

mustenter(oroccurto)themindviaanactofapprehensionorperception,

unmodifiedbyanactofjudgmentorinference.Yetthefulfilmentofthesetwin

obligations,tofullconsciousawarenessofmentaloperationsandthepassageof

informationthrougharigidhierarchyofmentalacts,wasachallengeinthefield

ofperception.

Forexample,invisualperceptionthetaskwastoexplainthegapbetweenthe

impoverishmentofthevisualstimulusrepresentedontheretinarelativetothe

complexnatureofourvisualphenomenalexperience,whereasensoryideamay

notbelegitimatelymodifieduntilithasbeencomparedorassociatedwith

anotheridea,insideofconsciousawareness.Theproblemwashowtoaccount

forthephenomenalexperienceofthethree-dimensionalfield.Anexplanation

wasneededforourexperienceofthesize,shape,distanceandmotionofobjects,

givenwhatappearsontheretina,andthatintrospectionwouldleadustobelieve

thatwedonotreasonourselvesintoourvisualphenomenalexperience.

ThesolutionthatDescartesandLockecameupwithwastoproposethatour

phenomenalvisualexperienceistheresultofourmakingasuccessionof

unconscious,orratherunnoticed,inferences.Theyhypothesisedthatwemakea

seriesofjudgments,which,becausewemakethemsofrequently,become

habitualandthereforegounnoticed.Berkeleyrejectedinferenceasthecognitive68IamindebtedtoGaryHatfieldforthissummaryoftheaccountoftheprocessintheworkofDescartesandBerkeley.Locke’sstrugglewithunnoticedinferencesinthree-dimensionalvisualfieldwasfirstnoticedbyCondillacandisdiscussedbyStephenK.Land,ThePhilosophyofLanguageinBritain:MajorTheoriesfromHobbestoThomasReid(NewYork:AMSPress,1986),73.69SeeGaryHatfield,“TheSensoryCoreandtheMedievalFoundationsofEarlyModernPerceptualTheory,”inHatfieldPerceptionandCognition:EssaysinthePhilosophyofPsychology(Oxford:ClarendonPress2009),384.SeealsoHatfield,“PerceptionasUnconsciousInference,”inPerceptionandthePhysicalWorld:PsychologicalandPhilosophicalIssuesinPerception,ed.DieterHeyerandRainerMausfeld(NewYork:Wiley,2002),115-144.

35

processbywhichwejudgenecessaryconnectionsbetweenthecontentofideas

andinsteadproposedthatphenomenalexperiencearisesfromtherepeatedco-

occurrenceofcues,whicharenotthemselvescontent-sensitive.These

associationorsuggestions,however,stilltookplaceoutsideofconscious

awareness.70

TherelationshipbetweenperceptionandjudgmentinLockeisofinterestin

otherrespectstoo.Lockegroundedallspeculativereasoningontheperception

ofself-evidentpropositions.Thesearethosepropositions,mentalorverbal,

whichprovokeourimmediateassentprovidedthatweunderstandthetermsor

ideasthattheycontain.Lockearguedthatwhilsttruthwasproperlyamatterfor

propositionsandnotideas,wecouldformasmanyself-evidentpropositionsas

wehavedistinctideas.Forexample,'thatwhiteiswhiteandnotblack',isa

propositionthatweformwhenweattendtoourperceivingofthecolourwhite.71

InthiswaythenLockeseemedtoflouttheconventionthatanon-verbalidea

fromsensecouldnotalsobeajudgmentorproposition.Lockeclaimedthat

whenwemakeanypropositionswithinourownthoughts,aboutwhiteorblack,sweetorbitter,atriangleoracircle,wecanandoftendoframeinourmindstheideasthemselveswithoutreflectingonthenames.72

Locke’saccountoftheperceptualnatureofreasonalsogaverisetocertain

problemsofterminology,nottheleastofwhichwasthefactthattheideasthat

resultedfromthefirstactofperceptionorconceptionweresimpleandsensory

innature-despitesomeofthemderivingfromanexternalsenseandothers

fromtheoperationofthemindupontheideasreceivedfromexternalsense.In

1728,ZacharyMayneobjectedthatLockehadnotdistinguishedbetweentheacts

ofsenseperceptionandactsofunderstanding.Maynewantedourideasfrom

sensetobeunderstoodasimagesorcopiesofthosethingsthatoursenses

perceive.Ourunderstanding,orourintellect,heinsisted,gaverisetonotions.

Hutcheson’sdiscussionoftheontologyofhisideasfrommoralsensealsospoke

70Hatfield,“SensoryCore,”384.SeealsoRebeccaCopenhaver,“PerceptionandtheLanguageofNature,”inTheOxfordHandbookofBritishPhilosophyintheEighteenthCentury,ed.JamesA.Harris,(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013),107-127,forBerkeleyonthisprocess.71Locke,ECHU,4:7:3and4,591.72Locke,ECHU,4:5:4,575.

36

directlytothisissue,asweshallsee,butitwascontainedinhistextsonLogic

andMetaphysics.73BalguytoohadsomethingtosaytoLockeaboutthisissue.I

havealreadyoutlinedthewaysinwhichLocke’ssimpleideasofreflection

(whichgaveusideasofvariousmodesofmentalexperiencesuchasthinking,

doubting,willing)wereunder-specified,especiallywithrespecttotheir

differentiationfromourmoregeneralconsciousawarenessorsenseofmind.

ThiswillbeatopicofinterestinthechaptersonHutchesonandBurnetand

Balguy.

Thequestionofconsciousawarenesswasalsocentraltoclaimsmadeaboutthe

operationofpracticalprinciples.AparticularpartofLocke’sattackon

dispositionalnativismrelieduponhisrejectionoftheoperationofimplicit

principlesinthemind,becauseitcontravenedhisprinciplethatwebeaware,or

havebeenaware,ofeverythingthattakesplaceinthemind.Thisprincipleis

intendedtocoverboththecontentandoperation,oractionsofthemind.With

respecttopropositions,Lockesaid,‘Nopropositioncanbesaidtobeinthemind,

whichitneveryetknew,whichitwasneverconsciousof.’74Locke,therefore,

rejectedtheargumentofDescartesandLeibnizthatthesegeneralimplicit

principles(e.g.‘somethingcannotbothbeandnotbe’)couldbeusedto

understandaparticularproposition(e.g.‘whiteisnotblack’),onthegrounds

thatwedidnotusetheseprinciplestojudgeconsciouslyby.75

Ileavetheaccountoftheimplicationsofthismaterialfortheindividualchapters.

ToclosetheintroductionIpresentabriefsummaryofthecontentofthe

remainingchapters.

Chapter2:ThischapterexaminesthenatureofClarke’srationalismand

interrogateshisviewsontherelationshipofthatrationalismtoobligationand

motivation.IofferapartialcorrectivetocertainreadingsofClarkeonthisissue.

73TimothyStanton,“LockeandHisInfluence,”inTheOxfordHandbookofBritishPhilosophyintheEighteenthCentury,ed.JamesA.Harris,(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013),21-40.74Locke,ECHU,1:2:5,50.75Locke,ECHU,1:2:22,60.SeealsoDeRosa,LockeQuestionBegging,86.

37

Chapter3:ThisisfirstoftwochaptersonHutcheson,whoseoverridingaimisto

considerthenatureofhisrealism.InthefirstIexaminethepositionofClarke

andHutchesonwithrespecttoGod’scommunicableattributesandourcognitive

accesstoessences.IlookattheintendedpracticaleffectofHutcheson’sadoption

ofintrospectionasamethodologyandexaminetheintendedfunctionof

obligationforHutcheson.IthenconsiderthenatureofHutcheson’scommitment

tomoralrealism.IdiscusswhyHutcheson’scommitmenttoanimplanted,

naturalbenevolence,whichresteduponadivinedecisiontocommunicatethat

virtue,wasunlikelytohavebeenintendedbyHutchesonasaspeciesof

voluntarism.IarguethatHutcheson’stextsonMetaphysics,andLogicrevealthat

HutchesondidnotviewGod’sdecisiontocommunicatebenevolencetousas

reflectiveofanysortofcontingency.

Chapter4:ThischapterpresentsadetailedconsiderationofHutcheson’smoral

epistemology.IexplorethreewaysinwhichHutchesonmayhaveunderstoodhis

ideasfrommoralsenseascapableofdeliveringajudgmentastothemoralvalue

ofanaction.First,IarguethatthedirectionofHutcheson’sthoughtmayhave

reflectedtheweakenedboundarybetweensenseorperceptionandjudgment.

Second,IsuggestHutchesonbothre-examinedtheroleofreasoninthestages

prior,andsubsequentto,theemergenceofanideaofmoralsense,andIdiscuss

thewaysthatHutchesonshiftedtheepistemicburdenbackontoreason.Third,I

considertheontologyofHutcheson’sideasofmoralsense.Anoverallassessment

ofHutcheson’smoralrealismispresentedattheendofthechapter.

Chapter5:ThischapterexaminestheresponseofClarke’sdefendersBurnetand

BalguytotheappearanceofHutcheson’smoralsensetheory.Iexplorethe

experientialprioritythatBurnetandBalguyassignedtoreasonoversense,and

discusstheinfluenceofLocke’sperceptualaccountofreasonhere.Ithen

considerwhetherBurnetandBalguycanbesaidtohaveupheldClarke’sposition

withrespecttothemotivationofmoralactions.Finally,Idiscusstheir

understandingofthenatureofGod’smoralperfectionandtheirquarrelwith

HutchesonoverhiscommitmenttoGod’sbenevolentnatureasthefoundationof

moralgoodness.

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Chapter6:ThischapterlooksatthewaysinwhichGayrespondedtotheworkof

ClarkeandhisdefendersandHutcheson,withrespecttothethreethemesthat

thethesisisconcernedwith:therelationshipofrationalismtoobligationand

motivation,therelativerolesofsenseandjudgmentinmoralknowledge(and

thedemandthatmotive,ideas,principles,propositionsandjudgmentsbe

availabletoconsciousawareness),andthetheisticmetaphysicsusedtosupport

argumentsaboutrealism(withparticularemphasisonGod’scommunicative

attributes).

Chapter7:Conclusion.

39

Chapter2

SamuelClarkeandthe‘mightymotives’

ThechapteraimstoexaminethenatureofClarke’srationalismandtoinspecthis

viewsontherelationshipofthatrationalismtoobligationandmotivation.To

thisend,IwillintroduceClarke’sapproachandcomparehisaccountofreason

withthatofferedbytheCambridgePlatonists.Thisisfollowedbyadetailed

accountoftheargumentofthesecondofClarke’sBoyleLectureseries.Ithen

introduceandcountersomeoftheclaimsmadebyrecentcommentatorswith

respecttoClarke’saccountofmotivation.Ialsodrawattentiontosimilarities

betweentheargumentsmadebyClarkeandLockeintheReasonablenessof

Christianity.ThechapterfinisheswithanexplorationofClarke’sviewson

conscienceinrelationtoobligation.

Introduction

By1704,Clarke,Voltaire’s‘veritablethinkingmachine’,wassufficientlywell

establishedinEnglishintellectuallifetobemadeBoylelecturer.Boylehad

institutedthelecturesin1692tocallattentiontotheharmonybetweenthenew

naturalphilosophyandScripture,inordertodefendtheChristianreligion.

Hobbes’moralconventionalismand,moreespecially,variousdeistclaimsforthe

sufficiencyofnaturalreasonintheattainmentofmoralandreligiousknowledge

werethetargetsofseveraloftheearlylectures.76

Clarke’sfirstseriesoflectureswaspublishedasADemonstrationoftheBeing

andAttributesofGod.MoreParticularlyinAnswertoMrHobbs,SpinozaandTheir

Followers.77Clarke’saimwastorevealthepowerofnaturalreasontodiscover

boththenecessaryexistenceofGodand,perhapsmoreimportantlyforClarke,to

demonstratethenecessityofhispossessingvariousattributes.Clarkedeemed

thedemonstrationofcertaindivineattributestobecentraltotheunderstanding

ofaGodwhocontinuedtodisplayaninterestin,andexercisedpowerover76OntheBoyleLectures,seeJamesP.Ferguson,AnEighteenthCenturyHereticDr.SamuelClarke(Kineton:TheRoundwoodPress,1976),23-34.77SamuelClarke,ADemonstrationoftheBeingandAttributesofGodandOtherWritingsed.EzioVailati(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1998).HenceforthBeingandAttributes.

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humanaffairsandtheoperationofmatter.Clarkemadebothapriorianda

posterioriargumentsfortheexistenceofGod.Thedistinctionbetweenthetwo

referredtothedirectionofargumentrunningbetweencauseandeffectrather

thanitsrelationtoexperience.Hemadeaprioriargumentsforthenecessary

existenceofaself-existentGodpossessedoftheattributesofindependence,

immensity,immutability,omnipresenceandinfinitude,andaseriesofa

posterioriargumentsforthenecessityofGod’somniscience,thelibertyofhis

agencyandhismoralattributes.78

Clarkehimself,itseems,wasnotespeciallyfondoftheargumentapriori,or

‘metaphysicalreasoning’,whichmadehisreputation,buthebelievedittobe

indispensablefortheproofofthreeofGod’sattributes-hisimmensity,eternity

andunity.Clarke’spreferredweaponofchoiceinthepopularwaragainstdeism

was,accordingtoWilliamWhiston,themoreeasilycomprehendedargument

fromdesign.Clarkebelievedthattheeaseofcomprehensionofthisargument

offeredabettersafeguardagainstscepticismforthemajority.79Neverthelesshis

‘numberlessmathematics’wasinitiallyverywellreceivedandhismethodwas

promotedatCambridgeforabouttwentyyearsaccordingtohiscriticEdmund

Law,‘tillatlengthcertainflawsbeingdiscoveredintheDoctor'scelebrated

argumentapriori.’80OneoftheflawfinderswasLawhimself,whowaspartofa

wideranti-NewtoniangroupwithinCambridgethatincludedDanielWaterland

andPhillipsGretton.

Clarke’sreputationasanethicalrationaliststems,inpart,fromhisdefenceofthe

abilityofnaturalreasontodiscern,oratleasttorecognise,thetruthsofrational

argumentsfortheexistenceofGodandhisattributes.Itwasthecontentofhis

78SeeJamesP.Ferguson,ThePhilosophyofDr.SamuelClarkeanditsCritics(London:VantagePress,1974),foranoverviewofClarke’sapproach,includingthevariouscriticismsbyClarke’scommentatorsastothe‘apriority’ofhisargumentsinChapter2.SeealsoVailati,introductiontoBeingandAttributes,xiv-xviii,andTimothyYenterandEzioVailati,"SamuelClarke,"TheStanfordEncyclopaediaofPhilosophy(Spring2014Edition),EdwardN.Zalta(ed.),URL=http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/clarke/.79SeeVailati,introduction,xiv-xix.SeealsoSamuelClarke,“TheAnswertoaSeventhLetterConcerningtheArgumentAPriori”inBeingandAttributes,118-123.80CitedbyJohnStephensin“EdmundLawandhisCircleatCambridge,”inThePhilosophicalCanoninthe17thand18thCenturies,ed.G.A.J.RogersandSylvanaTomaselli,(Suffolk:UniversityofRochesterPress,1996),165.

41

secondseriesofBoylelectureshowever,deliveredthefollowingyear,whichdid

mosttopromoteanunderstandingofClarkeasarationalistinmoral

epistemologyandinpracticalmorality.Clarkewas,andstillis,deemedtohave

heldtheintellectualistpositionthatanaturalunderstandingofthegoodis

sufficienttomoveustovirtue.81Thesecondlectureseries,ADiscourseonthe

UnchangeableObligationsofNaturalReligion,andtheTruthandCertaintyofthe

ChristianRevelation,however,deliveredClarke’sdefence,infifteenpropositions,

ofthenecessityofChristianrevelationforasuccessfulmorallifeandthe

conformityofthecontentofChristianrevelationtonaturalreason.

AfterthepublicationofHutcheson’sfourtreatisesproclaimingtheexistenceofa

moralsense,Clarkebecamethestandardbearerforabrandofethical

rationalism.IsuggestthatClarke’sconcerntoemphasisetheineffectivenessof

unassistedreasoningoverninghumanconductbecamedetachedfromhiswider

positionpartlyasaresultoftheintensefocusinthelaterdebatebetween

Hutchesonandotheropponentsontheworkingsofnaturalmoralknowledge.

Clarke’sdefender,GilbertBurnet,foughtHutchesononHutcheson’stermsas

theybothsoughttoaccountfortheoperationofnaturalreasonaloneinthe

productionofmoralbehaviour.IwillarguethatanotherofClarke’sfollowers

JohnBalguyinfacttookClarke’sapproachinaccountingforthemotivationof

moralaction,butthattherehasbeenfarlessconsiderationofhisworkinthe

secondaryliterature.

Clarkewas,andoftenstillis,takentohaveputforwardtheclaimthatnatural

reasonaloneissufficienttomotivatemoralaction.Thatis,Clarkeisdeemedto

haveclaimedthatreasonissufficientnotonlytodiscoverallthemoraltruth

necessaryforourpurposes,butfurtherthatthisknowledgecreatesan

obligation,therationalperceptionofwhichcanthenmoveustomoral

behaviour.

IwillsuggestthatClarke’srationalismextendednofurtherthantheassertion

thatGod,throughmoral(i.e.freelyimposed)necessity,directshimselfinhis81Seeforexample,Darwall,InternalOught,10.

42

creativeendeavoursbyhisunderstandingofeternallaw,thatwehavesome

sharedaccess,throughnaturalreason,tothislaw,andthatthisknowledgeisour

formalobligation(ofwhichmorelater).82Clarke,itistrue,alsoarguedthatafew

ancientmoralistsmighthavebeenabletoreasonthemselvestotheknowledgeof

anomnipotentGodwhowilldistributejusticetousinafuturestate,andthatthis

knowledgemayhavebeenabletomovethemtomoralaction(onoccasion).

WhatClarkedidnotclaimhowever,wasthatthismotivationderivedfrom

formal,ormoralobligation.

IwillarguethatClarke’sbroadermoralpsychologyspokeentirelyagainstthe

interpretationofhisthoughtasthepositionthatrationalunderstandingofright

andwrong,orthefitnessorunfitnessofactionsalone,was(post-Fall)sufficient

tocarryanyonetovirtue.ItwillbearguedthatClarke’srationalism,atleastso

farasitwasarguedforintheBoyleLectures,satinthecontextofhisprimary

practicalconcern,whichdidnotliewiththedetailsofmoralcognition,butwas

rathertodemonstratethepracticalnecessityofrevealedtruthstothelivingofa

morallife.Virtuewasonlymadepracticallypossible,accordingtoClarke,when

weweresuppliedwiththeconfidencethatjustrewardandpunishmentin

eternitywouldbethedefiniteconsequenceofactionsinthisworld,andwhenwe

usedthethoughtsoftheseconsequencestoourselvestomotivateouractions.

TheseindeedwereClarke’s‘mightymotives’.

TobeginwithIwouldliketomakeafewremarksaboutClarke’sgeneralaccount

ofreason,itsrelationshiptodivineunderstanding,andourmotivationforvirtue.

BeiserviewsClarkeaspartofalaterseventeenth/earlyeighteenth-century

traditionofEnglishethicalrationalismbirthedinCambridgebytheCambridge

PlatonistsandgivingrisetotheworkofClarke,Wollaston,BalguyandGilbert

Burnet,amongstothers.83AsHarrisonpointsoutthough,therearesubstantial

differencesbetweentheaccountsofreasonofferedbyEnglishPlatonists,by

‘deists’andby‘Enlightenmentrationalistsingeneral’.Harrison’sconcernisthe

Platonistsanddeistsandhe(wisely)doesnotelaborateonthepositionof

82SeeClarke,“SermonXVIOntheJusticeofGod,”inBeingandAttributes,144.83Beiser,Sovereignty,266andseealsochapter7,266-232.

43

‘enlightenmentrationalistsingeneral’.84Here,inordertoexplodefurtherthe

characterisationofthephilosophyof‘Britishmoralists’asasetofbilateral

negotiationsheldbetweenrationalistsandsentimentalists,Iwilloutlinebriefly

someofthedifferencesbetweentheversionsofrationalismpresentedbythe

CambridgePlatonistsandbyClarke.

Itisundoubtedlythecasethatthereweresubstantialsimilaritiesinoutlook

betweenClarkeandtheCambridgePlatonists.Bothabhorredallformsof

voluntarismthatgroundedthedifferencebetweengoodandevilpurelyindivine

command.Themoralorder,oreternallaw,existedpriortodivinecreative

activityandpriortoanylawmadebyGod.Thedifferencebetweengoodandevil

existed,asClarkeputit,‘antecedenttowillandtoallarbitraryorpositive

appointmentwhatsoever’.Thisdifferencecouldnotbealtered,evenbythe

absolutepowerofGod’swill,whichcouldnotactinconsistentlywiththereason

ofthings.85Thecontentofanymoralobligationswasheldtobefoundinour

comprehensionoftheessentialdifferencebetweengoodandevil.Itwasfound

‘eternally,necessarily,andunchangeablyinthenatureandreasonofthings’.86

ClarkealsotooktheLatitudinarianpositionthatGod’snaturalandmoral

attributesareidenticalinkindwiththosefoundinhumanbeings,althoughthey

areinfiniteinthedivinecaseandradicallycurtailedinours.87However,while

ClarkewascommittedtotheideathatthereiscommonaccessforGodand

ourselvestotherationalorderofthings,hisunderstandingofhumanreasonwas

verydifferenttotheoneadvertisedbytheCambridgePlatonists.Therationalism

ofboththeCambridgePlatonistsandClarkewasmodulated,toasignificant

degree,bytheneedtodemonstratehowthepossibilityofconsistentmoral

behaviour,sufficienttopleaseGod,couldcomeabout-buttheirapproachto

practicalmoralitywasverydifferent.

84Harrison,Religions,31.85Clarke,BeingandAttributes,83.86Ibid.,83.SeealsoBeiser,Sovereignty,269.87Vailati,introduction,xv.SeealsoBeiser,Sovereignty,282.

44

TheCambridgePlatonistsworkedfromamodelofsharedaccesstothedivine

mindbasedonthe'deiformity'ofourcreatednature,whichcouldascendin

ordertopartakeof,orparticipatewith,thedivinenaturethroughthejoint

exerciseofthoughtandlove.Theyworkedfromanunderstandingofmoral

knowledgeasissuingfromanactiveparticipationwiththedivinemind.88

NaturalknowledgeofGodisknowledgeofhisgoodness,notofthemetaphysical

necessityofhisotherattributes.89Theyheldnotonlythatthesuccessful

communicationofthisknowledgeresultsinalifeofconsistentvirtue,butfurther

thatlivingvirtuouslybringsaboutthisknowledge.Religion,asHarrison’sthesis

claims,wasamoralmatterfortheCambridgePlatonistsandnotaquestionof

assenttopropositionsortheperformanceofceremonialrites.JohnSmith,to

takebutoneexample,wrotethat

thisindeedissuchadeification...inthehighestpowersofthesoulbyalivingandquickeningspiritoftruereligionthereunitingGodandsoultogetherontheunityofaffections,willandend.90

AccordingtotheCambridgePlatonistsourmoralabilities,bothepistemicand

motivational,derivedfromtheaffectivequalityofreasoninboththehumanand

divinecase.Whenfunctioningveridically,thatispractically,reasonisloveor

‘intellectuallove’.Theirepistemologywasgroundedin,andrealisedby,innate

sensoryandaffectiveelementsinthehumancase.Theirviewofhumanreason

itselfwasprofoundlypractical,basedonthefoundingnotionofaself-

determiningagencycomprisingintellect,willanddesire,whichcamesupplied

withavarietyofinnateprovisions.91Reasoninthehumancasewaseither

plantedwithinnatelygivensensory‘praecognitia’or‘instincts’(Cudworth),or

wascrownedbyaboniformfaculty(More),orwasseenastheorganof‘divine

sense’,pregnantwithspiritualtruths(Whichcote),allofwhichledour

understandingtobothappreciateandlovethegoodandmotivateits

performance.FortheCambridgePlatonists,theintimateproximityofloveand

88SeeJenniferA.Herdt,“AffectivePerfectionism:CommunitywithGodwithoutCommonMeasure”inNewEssaysontheHistoryofAutonomy:ACollectionHonoringJ.B.Schneewind,ed.NatalieBrenderandLarryKrasnoff(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2004),30-60.89ThisisHarrison’spoint,Religions,46.90C.A.Patrides,TheCambridgePlatonists(London:EdwardArnold,1969),176.91TodE.Jones,introductiontoTheCambridgePlatonists:ABriefIntroduction,ed.TodE.Jones(Maryland:UniversityPressofAmerica,2005),21.

45

thesourceofreasonwithinthedivinebeing,andechoedinourownnature,

facilitateddualroutesintoourparticipationwiththatbeing–wecouldlearn

throughlove,hencetheiridentificationofvirtuewithreason.Lovingobedience

toscripture,farfrombeingaservileadherencetothelawofasuperior,actually

facilitatedparticipationwithindivineunderstanding.Theysawobedienceto

scriptureasthebeginningofanepistemicroutetomoralandspiritual

understandingandastheroutetopresentandfuturehappiness.

Clarke’sGodcreatedtheworldaccordingtothe‘abstractnatureofthings’.His

benevolence,orgoodnessalongwithhisjusticeandequity,ledhiscreativewill

toact(freely)inamannerconsistentwithhisunderstandingofthe‘reasonof

things’.92Ingeneral,Clarke,aswewillsee,expressedafarmorepessimisticview

ofhumannatureandofourrealworldcognitiveabilitiesthandidtheCambridge

Platonists.Clarkedidnotadvertisehumanparticipationinthedivinemind.For

Clarke,whilewemayappreciateandbegratefulfordivinelove,thereisno

emotionalresonancebetweenourmindsandGod'sthatcandeepenourrational

understandingofourobligations.Wedonotreachanepistemicawarenessofthe

moralgoodofbeneficence,forexample,throughanyaffectivecomponentof

reasonitself.Clarkehadusproceedingfromtheself-evidentcomprehensionof

eternalrelationsthatexistbetweenthings,toanevaluationofthemoralworthof

actions.Clarkedidallowaroleforaffectinthecomprehensionofduty.Likethe

CambridgePlatonists,GrotiusandHutcheson,Clarkeinsistedontheexistenceof

naturalaffectionstowardsotherswhichdidnotderivefromtheutilityof

sociability.Clarkemaintainedthatreflectionuponournatural‘uncorrupted’

lovingaffectionstowardseachother(parentalaffectiontowardsouryoung,for

example)waskeytounderstandingourselvesas‘partandmemberofthatone

universalbodyorcommunity,whichismadeupofallMankind’andthusthatwe

were‘borntopromotethepublicgood’andobligatedtodoso.‘Tisevidentevery

manisboundbytheLawofhisnature’(myemphasis).93Ouraffections,once

reflectedupon,revealtousthatweareobligatedtohelpallothermembersofour

communityandthatbenevolenceisaneternal‘fitness’,ormoralprinciple.

92Clarke,BeingandAttributes,86-89.93Clarke,NaturalReligion,208.

46

Clarkealsoexcludedimplantedorinnatelygivenideas,propositionsor

principles,asasourceofunderstanding.Hismodelofhumanmoralreasoning

excludedentirelyanyinstinctualsensoryapprehensionstodriveuniversal

assenttomoralprinciples,whichwouldnaturallypushustowardsmoralaction.

Hisviewofreasonwasentirelytheoreticalorspeculative.Itsdeliverancesare

foundeduponrationalintuitionintotheeternalrelationsthatspecifythemoral

worthofactions.Thisunderstandingprovidesuswithaformalobligation,but

doesnotcontainanymotivationalcomponentbeyondtheunderstandingthatan

actionis‘fit’orcorrecttobe,ortohavebeen,performed.

BoththeCambridgePlatonistsandClarkeappealedtoScripture.Butthe

CambridgePlatonistsviewedpracticalobediencetothedictatesofScripture

bothasaroutetoepistemicdevelopmentandasanimmediateandon-going

hedonicreward(i.e.intheincreasedjoyandloveexperiencedwhenperforming

amoralaction).Clarke,ontheotherhand,assignedadirectmotivationalrolefor

therationalbeliefinthespecificrevealedtruthofafuturestateofdivinejustice.

Revealedtruth,accordingtoClarke,fulfilsour‘naturalhopesandexpectations’

andprovidesuswiththerequisiteemotionalballast–thatis,thethoughtsofour

futurehappiness–neededtokeepusvirtuousinaworldwherevirtuefrequently

goesunrewardedandtheviciousappeartoescapecensureandeventothrive.94

FortheCambridgePlatonistsScripturewasan‘after-revelation’inthatitpost-

datednaturalreason,anditscontentswerecomprehendedandassessedby

naturalreason.Butreason,fortheCambridgePlatonists,wascapableof

receivingspiritualtruthsaswellasdiscoveringnaturalones.95Clarkesharedthe

viewthatvirtue,notceremonialactionorbeliefinspecificChristiandoctrine,

wasthecriterionbywhichwewouldeventuallybejudged,andhetooupheldthe

fundamentalrationalityofthecontentofscripture.96Butasweshallsee,Clarke

didnotseethereachofnaturalreasonextendingtothegraspofallthespiritual

truthsnecessaryforleadingaconsistentlymorallife.Heunderstoodbeliefin94SeeClarke,NaturalReligion,317,forexample.95SeeHarrison,Religions,33,onthebreakthatthisrepresented.96SeeBeiser,Sovereignty,ontheLatitudinarianpositionongoodworks,284-289.

47

particularrevealeddoctrines(afuturestateandtheimmortalityofthesoul)to

bevitalinmotivatingustobevirtuous.Thevitalpracticalimportofthesetwo

truthstous,andthehistoricalfactofourfailuretograsptheirtruthusingour

naturalcognitiveabilities,ledtotheirRevelationasrecordedinScripture.Clarke

didnotseethecharmsofvirtuealoneassufficienttogetusthroughthedemands

ofthislife,behavingwell.

IwillnowturntothedetailofClarke’sargumentashepresenteditinhissecond

Boylelectureseries.

TheargumentofthesecondBoylelectures

Intermsofourpracticalabilitytobehavevirtuously,thischapterarguesthat

Clarkeinsistedthatknowledgeofrevealedtruths,whichcontainedtruthsabout

thehedonicconsequencesofdivinejusticeinafuturestate,couldnotnowbe

reachedbynaturalreasonalone,inawaythatcouldconsistentlyleadusto

virtue.97IarguefurtherthatClarkedidnotclaimthattherationalperceptionof

thefitnessofanactionandtheformalobligationthatsuchaperceptiongaverise

toweresufficient,post-Fall,tomoveustoaction.Thischapterquestions,

therefore,thosereadingsofClarke,suchasSchneewind’s,thathavehimassert

thatanaturallyacquiredknowledgeofourmoralobligationaloneiscapableof

motivatingustomoralbehaviours.98Clarke’sthoughtsonboththeconditions

underwhichweareabletounderstandourobligations,andtherelationshipof

thisobligationtobehaviourwillbeexplored.Clarkeispresentedhereas

someonewhosharedBacon,MoreandLocke’sunderstandingofthe‘twoparts’

ofethics,andwhosawavitalandnecessaryrolefortheregularandcareful

promulgationofrevealedtruthsinthedevelopmentofourpracticalmoral

abilities,notwithstandingournaturalcognitiveencounters‘withthegood’.99

97Clarkeallowedthattheremayhavebeenaveryfewexceptionalheathenswhohadreasonedtheirwaytothesetruths,butClarkeclaimedthatwithoutRevelationtheforceofthesereasonedtruthsintheirownmindswasinsufficienttoallowthemtoliveconsistentlyvirtuouslives.Thisisdiscussedlateroninthischapter.98Schneewind,Invention,318.99SeeDarwallInternalOught,10and13,wherehedelineatestwokindsofinternalism.Oneofthese,whichhesaysisnothisconcerninhisbook,isthatofClarke,BalguyandPrice.Thisissaidtobe‘asoldastheancients’andreferstoamotivefordoinggoodpresentingitselfinconsequencetoperceivingorknowingthegood.

48

ThechapterwillfocuslargelyuponClarke’smoralthoughtasitwaspresentedin

thesecondBoylelectureseries.Clarke’sclaimsfortheexistenceofGodandhis

naturalandmoralattributespresentedinthefirstlectureserieswerethe

platformfromwhichhelaunchedhisdefenceofChristianrevelation.Theyare

summarisedatthebeginningofNaturalReligion.

Clarke’ssecondlectureseriescontainedaprefaceinwhichherespondedto

criticismofhisBeingandAttributes(anddeclaredhisindependencefromLocke),

andfifteenpropositionsthatClarkebelievedwoulddemonstratethe

unchangeableobligationsofnaturalreligionandthetruthandcertaintyofthe

Christianrevelation.100Clarkeadmittedthatthesamestandardofdemonstration

andmathematicalcertaintythathethoughttheproofsofthebeingandattributes

ofGoddeliveredwerenotachievableforhispresentpurposes.Here,mattersof

factmustbeintroducedintheformof‘mixtproofsfromcircumstancesand

testimony’.Mattersoffactwerenotbytheirnaturecapableofapriori

demonstrationClarkethought,but‘wiseandhonestmenarealwayssatisfied’

withthetypeofmixedproofsthathewouldoffer.101

Clarke’scommentatorshaveshownapreferenceforengagingwiththesubstance

ofhisattempttodemonstrateournaturalunderstandingofourobligations.That

suchanobligationiscreatedwhenournaturalreasonrecognisesor

involuntarilyapprovesofanactionasfittobedonewasindeedthesubstanceof

Clarke’sfirstproposition.Theremainingfourteenpropositionshowever,were

dedicatedtothetaskofdemonstratingtheinadequacyofnaturalreasonto

discovermanyofthetruthsofnaturalreligionand,therefore,tounderstandour

obligation.Evenwhereanactionhasbeenrecognisedasfit,andthusobligatory,

theimpotenceofthatunderstandingtogovernsubsequentbehaviourwaslaid

barebyClarke.

100‘Ineithercitedanyonepassage,nor(thatIknowof)borrowedanyargumentfromhim’,Clarke,Preface,NaturalReligion,136.101Clarke,NaturalReligion,158.Clarke’smoraltheoryisalsodiscussedinBeingandAttributes,84,89-90,andinhisSermonXVI,inBeingandAttributes,144-45.

49

InthefirstpropositionClarkemaintainedthatanactofassentastotherightor

wrongnessofparticularactionsiscompelledindivineandhumanunderstanding

bythe‘verynatureandreasonofthings’.Godalwayschoosestoconformhis

undeterminedwilltothisunderstanding,ashisnatureisbothjustand

benevolent.(ClarkearguedthatGod’snaturalattributescouldnotbeseparated

fromhismoralattributes–todenyhismoralattributes,asheunderstood

Hobbestohavedone,wastodenyhisnaturalattributes.102)Clarke’s

metaphysicalcommitmenttoamoralorderexistinginthenatureofthingswas

cashedoutintheclaimthat,fromthedifferenceofthingswhichexist,eternallaw

specifiestherelationswhichholdbetweenthosethings(whichincludepersons).

Thenecessary‘fitness’or‘unfitness’ofactionsisdeterminedbytheirconformity

ornon-conformitytotheeternalrelationsthatholdbetweenthings.

Toconveytherudimentaryanalyticnatureofthejudgmentoftherelationsthat

holdbetweenthings,Clarkeusedexamplessuchasthefollowing:

ThatGodisinfinitelysuperiortomanisasclearasthatinfinityislargerthanapoint,oreternitylongerthanamoment.103

Clarkefrequentlydrewananalogywithgeometry.Werecognisetheessential

differencesbetweengeometricfiguresinthesamewayaswerecognisethat‘that

Godisinfinitelysuperiortoman’andthattherearedifferencesbetweenpeople

(‘thequalificationsofpersons’).Clarkearguedthatthespecificationofeternal

relationsderivesfromthesamerationalorderingprincipleatworkthroughout

existence.Justasthereisconsonanceanddissonancebetweendifferent

geometricalfigures,whichflowsfromtheiressences,andgivesusthecontentof

basicaxiomsthatwemustobserveassuccessfulgeometers,sowemustobserve

therulesofakindofmoralgeometrythatgovernsrelationsbetweenthe

differentessencesofGod,andourselves,andofotherpeopleifwearetoactas

successfulrationalcreatures.104

102Clarke,NaturalReligion,164.103ClarkeNaturalReligion,177.104SeeGill,“MathorBeauty,”ontheanalogywithmathematicsandbeautyinmoralthinking.

50

Theseeternaltruthsarenotinnate,theyexistinthe‘reasonofthings’,butour

assenttothemisinvoluntary,evenincaseswheremoreprotractedreasoning

processisneededtorevealortoreachthem.105Likemathematicalfirst

principlestheyareseenasnecessary,inthesenseofournotbeingableto

contradictthemastruths.106Fromourunderstandingofanactionasfitorunfit

tobeperformed(whetherornotitrespectstheeternalrelationsbetween

things)anunderstandingofourobligationtodetermineourwillstothis

understandingarises.Weoughtalwaystobehaveasweseefit,Clarkebelieved.

Godalwaysperformshisobligation,whichistosaythathealwaysconformshis

actionstohisunderstanding,butwe,foravarietyofreasons,donot.107Itis

importanttoemphasise,asClarkedid,thattheobligationcreatedforus,byour

understandingofrelationsbetweenbeingsorpersons,derivesinthefirst

instancefromthevery‘natureofthings’.Moralvaluesjustarefundamentally

presentintherelationsbetweenthings,priortoanydivinecommandforusto

actinconformitytothisunderstanding.108

Moralprinciplesare‘eternalfitnesses’becausetheydescribethecorrect

relationshipsbetweenthings.Clarkeidentifiedequity,piety,justice,sobriety,or

prudentself-love,andbenevolenceasthemoralprinciples.Clarke’sfirst

proposition,then,explainedournaturalunderstandingofournaturalobligation

toactaccordingtoeternalfitnessesandunfitnesses,specifiedbyeternallaw.It

describedouroriginal,naturalabilitytodiscoverthetruthabouttheexistenceof

Godandhisattributes,andtoreasonourobligationstohimandoneanother.

Throughoutthetext,itisimportanttopayattentiontothedifferenceincognitive

processthatClarkespecified,whichallowsuseithertodiscoveratruthfor

ourselves,ormoresimplytorecognisethetruthofapropositionthatis

explainedtous.109AnimportantpartofthelatertextsawClarkebaldlystatethe

105Clarke,NaturalReligion,192.106SlawomirRaube,“MoralityandReason.SamuelClarke’sRationalistEthics,”StudiesinLogic,RhetoricandGrammar15,no.28.(2009):138.107SeeClarke’sfirstpropositionNaturalReligion176–241.108OnClarke’smetaphysics,seeBeiser,Sovereignty,272-275.109SeealsoThomas“ReasonandRevelation,”125-128,onthedifferencebetweendiscoveryandteachinginClarkeandtheplaceofrevelationinClarke’sbroaderepistemology.

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difficultyofthereasoninginvolvedindiscoveringunassistedcertainknowledge

ofthewholetruththatcontainsourobligation:

Andhowcanmanbesureheshouldhavemadesogoodimprovementofhisreason,astohaveunderstooditperfectlyinallparts,withoutsuchhelp?...Butsupposehecould,andbystrengthofreasonhecoulddemonstratetohimselfthesethingswithallclearnessanddistinctness;yetcouldallmendoso?Assuredlyallmenarenotequallycapableofbeingphilosophersthoughallmenareequallyobligedtobereligious.110

Giventhat,howeverunequalourcognitiveabilitiesare,weareallequallyobliged

to‘bereligious’,whichmeansunderstandingthewholetruthofGod’sexistence

andthepropergovernanceofhumanbehaviour,Clarkewantedtoexplainhow

thelessgiftedamongstusmayunderstandourobligations.Thiswouldbe

achievedthroughthe‘particular’teachingofscripturethatmeetsaresidual

abilityinthe‘generalityofmen’tounderstandthetruthofwhatisbeingsaidto

them.111Itistheteachingofparticulardoctrines,understoodasissuingfroman

authoritativesourcethatwill

enforceandinculcateuponmen’smindswithsostronganimpression,astoinfluenceandgovernthegeneralpracticeoftheworld.112

Indeed,theremainderoftheworkwasdevotedtoestablishingthatournatural

knowledgeofourobligationisinsufficientlymotivatingtousinourpresent

condition,andfurther,thatmostofusarenotcapableofdiscoveringour

obligationsinthefirstplace.Clarkearguedthatitwasonlythetruthof

Christianity,acknowledgedasapracticalforce,whichmadeitpossibleforus

nowtobevirtuous.Hemaintainedthateverythingcontainedinrevelationis

consistentwithwhatweunderstandtobereasonable.Themotivesthatits

doctrinessupplyarereasonableandthewayinwhichit‘urges’thesemotivesis

reasonable.ClarkebelievedthatthisiswhatjustifiesChristianitytous.But,he

thought,wehavenotbeenable,atleastsincetheFall,toreasonourwayto

discoverallofthetruththatweneedtogovernourselvesinaccordancewith

whatreasondictates(supportedbytheevidenceofthefactofmiracles,signs,

110Clarke,NaturalReligion,314.111SeeFerguson,Heretic,30,onourabilitypreservedabilitytorecognisetruth. 112Clarke,NaturalReligion,154.

52

etc.).ItisworthsummarisingClarke’sremainingpropositions,withfairly

extensivequotations,inordertoseethedirectionandforceofhisargument.113

Clarkewenton:

ii)Thoughthis‘eternalmoralobligation’isuniversallybindingonrational

creaturesandwasderivedbyGodfromthemetaphysicalstructureofexistence

(‘theabstractreasonofthings),‘thatwhichmoststronglyconfirmsandin

practicemosteffectuallyandindispensablyenforcesthemuponus’isthatGodhas

madethesemoralobligationshiscommands.Assuch‘inobediencetohissupreme

authority’weshouldobservethatwhichourreasontellsusistherightthingto

do(myitalics).

iii)Thatcomplianceordisobediencetohiswillarenecessarilyrewardedor

punishedbyGod.

iv)ThatGod,inordertoestablishthe‘differencebetweenthefruitsoreffectsof

virtueandvice’,hadarrangedmatterssothatvirtuemakesthevirtuoushappy

andviceupsetsthevicious,butthroughtheoriginaleffectsoftheFallweare

nowruinedcreaturesandjusticeinthisworldisperverted.Through

somegreatandgeneralcorruptionanddepravation,(whencesoeverthatmayhavearisen;theparticularoriginalwhereofcouldhardlyhavebeenknownnowwithoutrevelation,)since,Isay,theconditionofmeninthispresentstateissuch,thatthenaturalorderofthingsintheworldisineventmanifestlyperverted,andvirtueandgoodnessarevisiblypreventedingreatmeasurefromobtainingtheirproperanddueeffectsinestablishingmen’shappinessproportionatetotheirbehaviourandpractice.

ThisissoclearlycontrarytoGod’sdesignandthenaturalorderofthingsthat

theremustbe(andthereis)afuturestatewherejusticeisreasserted.

v)Thoughnaturalreasonwas,intheory,capableofdiscoveringthemoral

obligationsofnaturalreligionandthecertaintyofafuturestateofrewardsand

punishment,wehaddestroyedournaturalabilitiestodiscoverthesetruths,and113ThesearesummarisedbyClarke,NaturalReligion,150-157,andseethesepagesforthefollowingquotations.

53

nowrequireinstructiontocomprehendandperformeventhemostbasicof

moralduties.

Suchisthecarelessness,inconsiderateness,andwantofattentionofthegreaterpartofmankind;somanytheprejudicesandfalsenotionstakenupbyevileducation;sostrongandviolenttheunreasonablelusts,appetitesanddesiresofsense;andsogreattheblindness,introducedbysuperstitiousopinions,viciouscustoms,anddebauchedpracticesthroughouttheworld;thatveryfewareable,inrealityandeffect,todiscoverthesethingsclearlyandplainlyforthemselves:butmenhavegreatneedofparticularteaching,andmuchinstruction;toconvincethemofthetruth,andcertainty,andimportanceofthesethings;togivethemaduesense,andclearandjustapprehensionsconcerningthem;andtobringthemeffectuallytothepracticeoftheplainestandmostnecessaryduties.

vi)Thatalthoughthroughouthistorytherehadbeenaveryfew‘wise,braveand

good’heathenswhohadattemptedbothtodiscovermoraltruthandlivebyit,

andwenttosomelengthstotrytocheckthe‘extremesuperstitionand

wickednessofthenationswhereintheylived’,noneofthemhadbeenableto

reformtheworldwith‘anyconsiderablygreatanduniversalsuccess’.The

heathenmoralists(andClarkehadgreatadmirationforafewofthem)were

altogetherignorantofsomedoctrines,anddoubtfulanduncertainaboutothers

‘necessarytobringaboutthatgreatend’.Whattheydidknow,theycouldnot

proveandexplainclearly.Wheretheycouldproveandexplainthingsclearly,

theydidnothavedidnothavesufficientauthorityto

enforceandinculcateuponmen’smindswithsostronganimpressionastoinfluenceandgovernthegeneralpracticeoftheworld.

vii)Divinerevelationwasneededtoredeemmankind.

viii)NootherreligionbutChristianityistolerabletoreason.IfChristianityisnot

truethenthereisnorevelationofthewillofGodtomankind

ix)TheChristianreligion‘consideredinitsprimitivesimplicity’andinScripture

suppliesallthe‘marksandproofs‘ofbeingadivinerevelationthatanyonecould

want.

54

x)ThepracticaldutiesrequiredbyChristianitycontainallthe‘wiseandtrue

precepts’ofallotherphilosophies(anddoesnotcontainanyoftheabsurdand

superstitiousones.)AssuchChristianityisthoroughlyconducivetoour

happinessandwellbeing.

xi)ThemotivesbywhichChristianity‘enforcesthepracticeoftheseduties’are

consistentwithGod’swisdomandman’snaturalexpectations.

xii)ThewaysinwhichChristianity‘enjoins’ourdutiesand‘urges’thesemotives

isreasonable.

xiii)ManytruthsofChristianityarenotdiscoverablewithoutrevelation(by

reasonalone)butarefoundtobe‘agreeable’toreasonandmoreover,‘everyone

ofthemhasanaturaltendencyandadirectandpowerfulinfluencetoreform

men’slivesandcorrecttheirmanners.’Thesetruthsareamore‘consistentand

rationalscheme’thanisfoundinheathenphilosophyorpromotedby‘modern

unbelievers’.

xiv)Revelationisrecognisedbyreasonastruth,butsigns,miracles,fulfilled

propheciesandthetestimonyofChrist’sfollowersisthemost‘credible,certain

andconvincing’evidenceoffactthatexists.

xv)ThosenotconvincedbyClarke’sargumentwouldnotbeconvincedbyany

otherargumentorevidence.

WhatarewetomakeofClarke’sapparentunderminingoftheclaimsfornatural

reasontoderiveourobligation,andforthatobligationtomoveustoaction?The

rationalismforwhichClarkeisnow,andwasintheyearsfollowingthe

publicationofthelectures,mostfamous,referstoournaturalabilitytodiscover

thesetruthsforourselves,holdtheminmindaswemakeamoraljudgment,and

inhisgroundingoftheirjustificatorypowerinthe‘reasonofthings’.MichaelGill

makestheparticularlyhelpfulpointthatrationalismor,‘theclaimthatmorality

originatesinreasonalone’actuallycontainsthreeclaimsthatcanbeclearly

55

delineated.Theseare:themetaphysicalclaimthatmoralityconsistsinreason

(thevaluespresentintheuniverse),theepistemologicalclaimthatmoral

knowledgeisacquiredsolelythroughreason,andthepracticalclaimthatreason

alonecanmoveustomoralaction.GillbelievesthatCudworth‘alongwithmost

oftheotherethicalrationalistsoftheseventeenthandeighteenthcenturies’

madeallthreeclaimsandrarelydistinguishedbetweenthem.114Wehaveseen

thattheepistemologicalclaimcanbejustifiablyclaimedinrelationtoCudworth

onlywithsomeaccommodationbeingmadeforinnatesensoryaffective

‘praecognitia’operatingwithinreason.Idon’tthinkBalguycanbesaidtomake

allthreeoftheseclaimsstraightforwardlyeither,butthiswillbediscussedina

laterchapter.Clarke,aswehaveseen,certainlyheldtothemetaphysicalclaim

thatmoralvalueconsistsofandexistsinthe‘abstractreasonofthings’.Clarke

alsomadetheepistemologicalclaim,althoughherehispsychologyofknowledge

acquisitionandbeliefformationincludedsuchconsiderationsasthedifference

betweenanabilitytodiscoveratruthforourselves,andtorecognisethattruth

onceithasbeentaughttousbysomeonewerecogniseashavingsufficient

authority.However,thepracticalclaimmayonlybesaidtohavebeenmadeby

Clarkewithtwoqualifications.First,asweshallsee,Clarkedoesnotclaimthata

rationalperceptionofthefitnessofanactionaloneissufficienttomotivatethe

performanceofthataction.Ifreasonisunderstoodastherationalperceptionof

thefitnessofactionsandthenaturallyreasonedtruthsofeternallifeanddivine

rewardandpunishment,thenClarkedoessaythatitispossiblethatforafew

giftedancientsnaturalreasonmayhavebeenabletomotivateaction–inan

indirectway,orawayinwhichClarkedidnotmakeclear-inthesefewcases,

andonoccasion.Clarke’sargumentagainsttheDeiststhough,isthatwearenot

able,inthemain,toreasonourselvestothesetruths,orusethemtomotivate

ourselvesconsistentlywherewehavereasonedourselvesnaturallytothem.

Second,evenanaturalappreciationthatGod’sauthorityentailedthathisjustice

wouldbeappliedinafuturestate,doesnotobligateus.Itmightmotivateus,if

wewereinfactabletodiscoveritforourselves,butitwouldnotobligateus

morally.

114Gill,BritishMoralists,273.SeealsoBeiserSovereignty,267,whooutlinessimilartripartiteambitionsforEnglishrationalists.

56

IwillnowmoveontolookattheaccountsofClarke’sthoughtsonmotivation

thatarefoundintherecentsecondaryliterature.

ThetreatmentofClarkeintherecentsecondaryliterature

IdonotbelievethatClarkedidmakethepracticalclaiminanundifferentiated

form,althoughhissomeofhiscontemporariesmayhaveunderstoodhimtohave

doneso,anditisthepracticalclaimthatClarkehasreceivedmuchattentionfor

inpresentdayphilosophicalcircles.Clarkeissupposedtohaveclaimedthat

speculativereasonissufficienttomotivateustoperformanactionwebelieveto

bemorally‘right’,viaourperceptionthatsomethingbeingmorallyrightis

obligatoryforus.KorsgaardhasClarke,BalguyandPricebelievingthat‘the

perceptionofanactionasright,orwhattheytooktobethesamething

obligatory,isamotivetodoit.’115Irwinsaysthat

Clarke,however,takesbareawarenesstomotivateus.Hebelievesthatthesimplegraspofamoralprinciplemotivatesawell-orderedwilltochoosetherightaction.Asoundunderstandingnecessarilygraspsthetruemoralprinciplesandasoundwillnecessarilyactsonthem.116[Myemphasis.]

Schneewindarguesthatwe‘areabletobemovedbythefitnessofthings’and

that

Clarkeistryingtothinkhiswaytotheviewthatitisourrationalagencythatmakesmoralprinciplesbindingonusandenablesustobemovedbythem.117

SchneewindalsoclaimsthatClarkeheldthattheobligationtoactinconformity

withourunderstandingofwhatisrightandwrong,orfitorunfit,‘neednot,at

leastinprinciple,bebackedbysanctions.’118

Thepracticalclaimisinterpretedbytheseauthorstoentailthatourrational

comprehensionofourobligationissufficientalonetomotivateus,atleastina

smallnumberofcases,inhoweverfewpeople.Itisimportanttoemphasisethat

115ChristineKorsgaard,“Kant'sAnalysisofObligation:TheArgumentsofFoundation1,”Monist72,no.3(1979)311-340.116Irwin,Development,Vol.II,387.117Schneewind,Invention,318-319.118Ibid.,318.

57

thisisnottheclaimthatwhatwehavediscoveredtobetruebyusingourreason

iscapableofmotivatingus.Clarkewasclearthataveryfewrespectableheathen

moralistswereabletodiscoverthetruthsabouttheexistenceofafuturestate,in

whichthecomplianceornon-compliancewithanall-powerfuldivinewill(acting

onanunderstandingofwhatisright)wouldbemetwiththeforceofhisjustice.

Thisthough,amountstoareasonedunderstandingofthehedonicconsequences

ofouractioninafuturestate.Thisknowledgemighthelpmotivateus,andClarke

saidthatitdid,butitisnotpartofourknowledgeofourobligation,whichis

causedbythereasonofthings,andClarkedidnotclaimthatitwas.Clarke

clearlymadetheargumentthatself-interestedconcernwiththepainsand

pleasuresofeternallifemotivatesustobehavevirtuously(andinfactheterms

rewardsandpunishments‘secondaryobligations’.)Fergusonnotesthe

implicationsofthechangebetweentheargumentofthefirstpropositionandthe

remainder,i.e.thatatfirstClarkesaidthatourawarenessofourobligation

motivatesusandthathethenswitchedtothepositionthatthoughtsofour

happinessmotivateus.119Idon’tbelievetherewasachange-thatis,Clarke

neverclaimedthat,inpractice,post-Fall,thecomprehensionofrational

obligationaloneisasufficientmotiveforaction(althoughitoughttobe).Ifthe

obligationsatwithinaframeworkofbeliefacquirednaturally,whichincluded

knowledgeofGodandafutureeternalstateinwhichjusticewouldbe

apportioned,thenthiswouldmotivateus.ThethoughtofGod’sjusticeinafuture

stateisamotiveforaction–naturalreligionunderstoodbyreasoninitsentirety

canobligateandmotivateustobevirtuous.Thenaturalunderstandingthatan

actisobligatorybecauseitis‘fit’inandofitself,however,willnot,byitself,now

moveustoperformitintheabsenceofanadditionalmotivationalimpetus.

Clarke’smoralprinciplesincludedequitypiety,justice,sobrietyorprudentself-

loveandbenevolence.Wemight,asSchneewindargues,seetheeternalfitnessof

obeyingandworshippingGod.120WemayseethatitisrationalandfitforGodto

governusanddistributejustice,andthattheexpectedrewardsandpunishments

arereasonable,butIsuggestthatClarkedoesnotarguethatitistheperception

119SeeFerguson,SamuelClarke,89.120Schneewind,Invention,317.

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oftheseparticularfitnesses,derivedfrommoralprincipleswhichmovesus–

ratherthatitisthethoughtoftheexperienceofpunishmentorreward,whichis

necessaryfortheactualperformanceoftheaction.Clarkeinfactstatedthe

following:

Thedreadofsuperiorpowerandauthorityandthesanctionsofrewardandpunishment;howeverabsolutelynecessarytothegovernmentoffrailandfalliblecreatures,andtrulythemosteffectualmeansofkeepingthemintheirduty;isyetreallyinitselfonlyasecondaryandadditionalobligationorinforcementofthefirst.121[Myemphasis.]

Ifitisan‘absolute’(presumablylogical)necessityforGodtouseourdreadof

powerandassociatedsanctionstogovernus,thenyes,thissecondaryobligation

maybesaidtoderivefromGod’scomprehensionofeternallaw,butitisnotonly,

orsimply,ourperceptionofthefitnessofsecondaryobligationsthatmovesus

surely?Itistheobligatoryforceofthethoughtoftheactualdreadorthe

anticipatedpainsandpleasuresofafuturestate.

SchneewindinsiststhatforClarke,‘sanctionshavenoroleinobligating’.122I

agreethatthisistrueofwhatClarketerms‘formal’obligation,butSchneewind,

aswesaw,alsosaysthatClarkearguedthatformalobligation‘neednot,atleast

inprinciple,bebackedbysanctions.’123SchneewinddoesnotquoteClarkehere

butprovidesasinglereferenceafterthisstatement(‘Works,I,p.614’).124

Inthisedition,onpage614wefindClarkeinsistingthatthewillsandactionsof

‘allrationalcreatures’oughttobeconstantlydeterminedbythe‘eternalruleof

rightandequity’andthat

thejusticeandconscienceofaman’sownmind,concerningthereasonsandfitnessofthethingthathisactionsshouldbeconformedtosuchorsucharuleorlaw;isthetruestandformallestobligation;evenmoreproperlysothananyopinionwhatsoeveroftheauthorityofthegiverofalaworanyregardhemayhavetoitssanctionsbyrewardandpunishment.

121Clarke,NaturalReligion,191.122Schneewind,Invention,315.123Ibid.,318.124TheWorksofSamuelClarke:SermonsonSeveralSubjects.(London:Knapton,1738;repr.,NewYork:Garland,1978)614.ThecorrespondingpagenumberintheeditionIhaveusedis191.

59

Clarkehere,Ibelieve,justarguedthatformalobligationismoreproperthan

secondaryobligation,butnotthatitispossible,eveninprinciple(post-Fall),to

actwithoutknowledgeofsecondaryobligation,orenforcement‘ofthefirst’.This

passageisfollowedbyClarke’sviewsontheself-condemnationofconscience

andthenimmediatelythequotationaboveconcerningsanctionsandsecondary

obligation.

AttheendofthepageClarkegoesontosaythatGod,whohasnosuperior,

alwaysobligeshimselftogoverntheworldaccordingtohisunderstandingofthe

reasonofthings(andisnotmadehappierorlesshappybydoingso).Clarke

goeson:

Andthemoreexcellentandperfect,(orthefreerformcorruptionanddepravation)anycreaturesarethemorecheerfullyandsteadilyaretheirwillsalwaysdeterminedbytheirsupremeobligation,inconformitytothenature,andinimitationoftheperfectwillofGod.[Myemphasis]

Clarke,aswehaveseen,madehisviewsonourcurrent(intellectualandmoral)

corruptionanddepravitycompletelyclear.Hetalkshereof‘creatures’rather

thanhumanbeingsperse(andatthebeginningofthissectionsays‘allrational

creatures’areobligedbytheeternalruleofrightandequityandthatthiscovers

‘Men’.)Giventheprevalenceoftheviewofthemoreperfectunderstandingand

naturesofangels,andthelessperfectunderstandingandnaturesofmenand

thenofanimals,Isuggestthatthemoreperfectcreaturesreferredtohereare

angelic.Clarke’sfollowerBalguyreferredtoangelicnaturesandtheirmoral

abilitiesinasimilarfashioninrelationtoourneedforreligion.Balguyargued

thatthose

purerbeings,whichareofanordersuperiortohumannature,neednotperhapsanyotherrulethantheinternaloneofreasonorvirtue;butourfrailandfaultyspecieswantsbothanotherlaw,andalegislator,tocurbtheirfolliesandvices,andkeeptheminsomemeasurewithintheboundsoftheirduty.125[Myemphasis.]

IthinkthatClarke’sstatementreferstoaslidingscaleofabilityinall‘creatures’

togoverntheirwillsbyformalobligationalone.IntheverynextsentenceClarke

125Balguy,SecondPart,43.

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revertstostatingthat‘men’oughttogoverntheirwillbythereasonofthingsas

‘indispensably”astheirassentisgovernedbyit.Myreadingofthispageisthat

weareunderaformalobligationtoactaccordingtoourownjudgmentofwhatis

right–butClarkedoesnotsaythatweareunderanobligationtoactfromthis

formalobligationalone,orthatwecando–wearejustunderanobligationnot

toactagainstit.

So,withrespecttothepracticalclaim,IagreethatClarkeheldthatpurely

rationalmotivationispossiblewherethatrationalmotivationincludesthe

rationalcomprehensionofeternalrewardsandpunishments(secondary

obligation).Clarkesaidthatweareformallyobligedtogovernourselves

accordingtothereasonofthings,butIdonotbelievethathearguedthat,evenin

principle,thathumanbeings(post-Fall)coulddothiswithoutanappreciationof

bothourformalandsecondaryobligations.

Clarkethen,didnothold,asIrwinclaims,that‘bare’speculativereasoncould

motivateus,unlessthatreasoncontainedanunderstandingofanhedonically

tintedpromiseorthreat.Clarkerepeatedlytoldusthatitcouldn’t.Hedid,

however,repeatedlytellusthatweareobligatedbyreasonandthatwecould

understandourformalobligationbyreason.Thisisjustoneexample:

Sofarthereforeasmenareconsciousofwhatisrightandwrong,sofartheyareunderanobligationtoactaccordingly–itoughttogovernmen’sactionsasitcannotbutnecessarilydeterminetheirassent.126

IrwinclaimsthatClarkebelievedthat

Asoundunderstandingnecessarilygraspsthetruemoralprinciplesandasoundwillnecessarilyactsonthem.127

ThisisperhapsfaircommentaslongasClarkeisunderstoodtohavemaintained

thatfirst,neitherourunderstandings,norourwillshavebeensoundsincethe

Fall,andsecondthat‘bareawareness’mustalsograspthetruthsaboutour

continuedexistenceinafuturestateanddreadthepunishmentorlookforward

totherewardthatwillbeoursinthatfuturestate.126Clarke,NaturalReligion,191.127Irwin,Development,Vol.II,387.

61

Theentirepointofthesecondlectureserieswastodeliverbadnewstothefour

differentkindsofpresentdaydeistscondemnedbyClarkeas‘vainpretendersto

reason.’128ClarkecountedasdeiststhosewhounderstoodGodtohavecreated

theworld,butthentohaveoptedoutofanyinvolvementwithit;thosewho

maintainedthatGodcontinuedtomaintainhiscreation,butdidnotrecognise

thebasisforthemoraljudgmentsmadebyhiscreatures;thosewhobelieved

thatGodispossessedofnaturalandmoralattributes,butwhodidnotbelievein

futurestateforimmortalsouls,andfinallythosewhoheldthatnaturalreasonis

capableofdiscoveringthereligioustruthincludingmoraltruths,andwhodenied

anecessaryroleforrevelationinthisprocess.129ThebadnewsthatClarkewas

keentoimpartwasthatonlyChristianity,asrevealedinScripture,isableto

providetheappropriatepsychologicalconditionsforustobegood.ForClarke,

thepracticalforcecontainedwithinRevelationisthemeansbywhichGodhas

madeitpossibleforustobegood.Revelationwasneededbecauseofthehistoric

factofourwilfulfailureinthe‘pasttrial’toputournaturalreasoningabilitiesto

theirproperpurposeinorderdiscoverallofthemoraltruthweneededinorder

tobehave.

AtthispointwecannoticethesimilaritybetweenClarke’sargumentandLocke’s

claiminthefinalchapteroftheReasonablenessthatnaturalorunassistedreason

isincapableofdiscoveringandkeepingustoourdutysufficiently(hencethe

needforChrist).LockearguedthatGodhadprovidedallofuswithanatural

reason(the‘candleoftheLord’)throughwhich(bythe‘lightofreason’)he

revealedtoushisexistence(‘throughtheworksofnature’),hispowerandhis

goodness,andthatashiscreatureswewereunderalawthatspecifiedbothour

dutiesandvariouswaystoreconciliationshouldwefailinthoseduties.130So

Lockeasked,giventhatthisknowledgewasatleastintheoryaccessible,‘What

needwasthereofaSaviour?WhatadvantagehavewebyJesusChrist’?

128Ibid.,150.129SeeFerguson,Heretic,28,forthissummary.130Locke,Reasonableness,190-191.ThereisalsoaninterestingdiscussiononLocke’spositionhereinrelationtoSpinozainAndreaSangiacomo“LockeandSpinozaontheEpistemicandMotivationalWeaknessesofReason:TheReasonablenessofChristianityandtheTheological-PoliticalTreatise,”IntellectualHistoryReview26,no.4(2016):477-495.

62

LockethenproceededtoworkhiswaythroughthehistoricalreasonsforChrist’s

appearance.Eitherblindedby‘senseandlust’,orby‘acarelessinadvertency’,we

hadfailedtouseournaturalreasontolookattheworksofnaturethatclearly

‘evidence’abenevolentdeity.Fearandsuspicionofasuperiorbeinghadledus

intotheclutchesoffalsepolytheisticpriests,wholedusfurtherintodarkness,

ignorance,viceandsuperstition,through‘wrongnotionsandinventedrites’.

Ournaturalreasonwasatthispointofnouse,sincereasonhadbeendrivenfrom

religionandwas‘judgedtohavenothingtodointhecase’.Fearandsuperstition

reignedwithinourmindsandreason,whichwouldhaveinformedusofthe

existenceof‘theoneinvisibletrueGod’,exceptthatthroughourownmisuse

reasonnowlackedsufficientauthoritywithinourownmindsto‘prevailupon

thevirtuous’.LackingatrueideaofGod,wealsolackedproperknowledgeofour

duty.131TheMosaicRevelationwascontainedwithinthatcommunityanddidnot

spread.Lockeassertedthat

naturalreligioninitsfullextent,wasnowhere,thatIknowof,takencareofbytheforceofnaturalreason....‘tistoohardataskforunassistedreason,toestablishmoralityinallitspartsuponitstruefoundations;withaclearandconvincinglight.132

Deducingourcertaindutiesrequired‘suchtrainsofreasonings’thatitmadethe

tasktoodifficultformost.RevelationbyChristwasthe‘surerandshorterway’

forGodtodiscloseourdutieswithsufficientauthoritytothatthe‘massof

mankind’,wholackingwill,ability,educationortime,couldthenbebroughtto

obedience.Thetaskofdiscoveringallthepartsofthemorallawthatpertainedto

usissodifficult,Lockeargued,thateventhelearnedChristianphilosophershad

failedtorealisethedebttheyowedtorevelation,whichprovidedtheseedsofa

rationalaccountofChristianity.Here,Lockemadethedistinctionbetweenthe

discoveryoftruthandrationalreceptiontotruthonceitispromulgated:

Nativeandoriginaltruth,isnotsoeasilywroughtoutofthemineaswewhohaveitdelivered,readydugandfashionedintoourhands,areapttoimagine.133

131Clarke,NaturalReligion,192-94.132Ibid.,195.133Ibid,.

63

Asfortheancientphilosophers-the‘wiseheathens’-Locke’sconclusionwas

that

‘tisplaininfact,thathumanreasonunassisted,failedmeninitsgreatandproperbusinessofmorality.Itisneverfromunquestionableprinciples,bycleardeductions,madeoutanentirebodyofthelawofnature.Andhethatwillcollectallthemoralrulesofthephilosophers,andcomparethemwiththosecontainedintheNewTestamentwillfindthemtocomeshortofthemoralitydeliveredbyoursaviour,andtaughtbyhisapostles.134

Even,Lockemaintained,ifweweretoallowthatthesephilosophershadmade

outalltherulesbywhichweweretolivelife(andhestressedtheyhadnot),then

thisrulebookwouldstillfailasaguidetopracticalmorality,asitwouldnothave

beenbackedbysufficientauthoritytoplaceusunderanobligation.Wecould

acceptorrejectitatwillbecauseourobligationstoconformtoitsdictateshad

notbeenmadeout.Thelawofnatureisnotacompletesystemofmorality

withoutademonstrationofitsobligatorynature,whichis,Lockeinsisted,the

powerofthelawmakertomakeordestroyourhappinessinafuturelifein

whichthe‘greatrewardsandpunishments,forthosewhowould,orwouldnot

obeyhim’wouldbecomemanifest.135Lockearguedthattherewardsforvirtuein

ourearthlyexistencewereinsufficientlytiedtoitsperformanceandwithout

certainknowledgeofafuturerealmwherethisstateofaffairswouldbe

remedied,themotivationformoralbehaviourwastooweak.136

Clarketoowaspellucidonthedegenerationofournaturalabilityinthe

‘generalityofmen’tocorrectlyidentifythatwhichisfitorunfittobedone.The

reasonsforthis(whichcompoundtheresultsofouroriginalFall)aregivenas

ourcarelessnessandlackofattention,falsenotionssuppliedbyanevil

education,andtheeffectofsensualdesiresandappetites,wheredebauched

practicedestroysourabilitytothinkproperlyortowanttothinkproperlyabout

moralduty.Weallnowrequireparticularinstructiontogiveusaccuratemoral

ideasandtoconvinceusoftheirtruth,certaintyandimportance.Thereisa

reciprocaleffectofignorantthoughtandviciouspracticeupononeanother,such

that134Ibid.,196.135Ibid.,199136Ibid.,203-204.

64

viciouscustomsandactions,reciprocallyincreasetheblindnessoftheirhearts,darkenthejudgmentsoftheirunderstandings,stupefyandseartheirconsciencessoastobecomepastfeeling,andbydegreesextinguishwhollythatlightofnatureintheirownminds,whichwasgiventothemoriginallytoenablethemtodiscernbetweengoodandevil.137

ClarkedisagreedwithLockethattheobligationformoralbehaviourderived

fromitsstatusasacommandfromanall-powerfullawmaker.ForClarke,formal

obligationderivedfromtheconformityofanactiontoavaluespecifiedineternal

lawbytherelationofobject,thingsorpersonstooneanother.ForLocke,inthis

text,obligationhadmotiveforcebecausethebeliefinacommandmadebyan

omnipotentlawmaker(evenwhereitisacommandmade,byabenevolent

lawmakerwithreferencetoaneternalandimmutablelawthatstateswhatis

goodorevil),wasaccompaniedby,orboundupwith,themotivatingbeliefof

likelihoodofassociatedrewardsandpunishmentsattachedtocomplianceor

non-compliance.ForClarke,obligationderivedfromvaluespresentnecessarily,

eternallyandimmutably,andnotbythecommandperseofalawgiverreferring

tothesevalues.Motivation,forClarke,wasextrinsictotheobligation,butitwas

indispensableforthefulfilmentofobligation.Thisiswhatanunderstandingof

theNewTestamentprovided.Clarkealsothought,likeLocke,thatunassisted

reasonfailedtodeliveracompletemorallawbecauseoftheweaknessofour

mindsandwill,andthelackofauthoritythatrationaldeliveranceonitsown

carriedwithinourfallennatures.Thismeantthatvirtuealonewasinsufficiently

attractivetoustomotivateperformance,buttheremedyofrevelationhere

spoketomotivationandnotobligationitself.

ItisalsoimportanttoemphasisethatClarkethoughtthatthe‘wiseandgood

laws’madeforusandcommandedbyGod,iffollowed,wouldleadtoour

happiness.They‘tendtothegoodofmankind’.138Clarkewasabsolutelyclear

though,thattheobligatoryforceofourmoralideasderivedfromwhatisfitor

unfittobedone,andnotfromthegoodthatvirtuemayaccrueus.Ibelievethat

Clarkearguedthatweneedtohaveafullandcompleteunderstandingofthat

partofGod’sordainedlawforus,whichhefreelychosetoconformtoeternal137Clarke,NaturalReligion,277.138Clarke,BeingandAttributes,90.

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law,andwhichincludesthelawofnature,inorderforittobepossibleforusto

effectivelyfulfilourmoralduties.Thisfullandcompleteunderstandingwas

revealedinScripturetous,becausewehadfailedtoderiveitfromournatural

comprehensionofthelawofnature.

Clarkedidnotgosofarastoclaimthatnobodyeverhadbeenabletounderstand

andfulfilanymoralobligationwithoutknowingandacceptingthewholeofthe

Christianrevelation,buthesaidthat‘thosefewof’theheathenphilosopherswho

mayhavedonesowereexactlythosewhohadreasonedtheirwaytoaconfident

beliefinafuturestate.Thatis,theyfulfilledtheirobligations,motivatedbythe

thoughtoffuturehedonicconsequences.Clarkedidnotdirectlystatethatthis

wastheirmotivationbuthestatedthatbeliefinafuturestatehadbeen

discoveredby‘thosefew’throughnaturalreasonaloneandthat(someof)the

ancientmoralistshad‘indeedaconsistentschemeofdeismasfarasitwent’.

Theywere‘verybraveandwisemen,ifanyofthemcouldkeepsteadyandfirmto

it’139(myemphasis).Clarkeclearlydoubtedheretheabilityofthesementobe

consistentlyvirtuous,andclaimedthatpartoftheirwisdomwastoseethe

necessityforrevelation.ThiswasanecessityalsoforeseenbyGod,andmet

partlybytherevelationofthecommandmentstoMoses,butmainlybythe

comingofChrist.

NowhereinthetextofthesecondlectureseriesdidClarkeclaimthatfulfilment

ofanobligationfromnaturalreligioncouldoccurwithoutthenatural

understandingthatthatobligationisalsothecommandmentofanall-powerful

Godwhowillexposeustohisjusticeatsomepoint.Hemadetheoppositeclaim,

thus:

Allthegreatthingsthatmoderndeistsaffecttosayofrightreasonastoitssufficiencyindiscoveringobligationsandmotivesofmorality;isonlyapretence.140

Virtuousaction,whereitresultedfromnaturalreligion,wasmadepossibleby

ourknowledgeoftheothertenetsofnaturalreligion.Itdidnotcomeaboutfrom

139Clarke,NaturalReligion,172.140Ibid.,314.

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thereasonedbelieforknowledgethatanactionisright.Itmighthavecome

aboutastheresultsofournaturalreasoningofotherreligioustruths,butthisis

nottheclaimthatthe‘bareawareness’ofthefitnessofanaction,whichis

understoodasanobligation,canmotivateus.Italsoentailsthatevenifthe

practicalclaimisinterpretedasincludingreligioustruths,thenthesetruths

includethecertaintyoffuturerewardandpunishmenttobemetedouttous.A

bareawarenessofcertaineternaldamnationwouldmotivateus.Itdoesnot

obligateus,butthentheperformanceofamoralactionortheforbearanceofa

degenerateonedoesnotarisefromtheobligation,butfromthefearorhope

engenderedbythethoughtofactingagainstorinaccordancewiththat

obligation.Clarke,throughoutthetext,sets‘obligationsandmotives’apart.

Indeedinproposition(xi)Clarkedescribedthewaysinwhichthemotives

suppliedbyChristianityareconsistentwithreason,andinproposition(xii)

ClarkesaysthatthewayinwhichChristianity‘urges’ourmotivetoperformour

dutiesisreasonableandreferstothesettingbeforemenoftheirdutiesbutalso

thegreatdangersinvolvedinneglectingthem.141

LookinghardforanyevidenceoftheclaimthatClarkebelievedthatobligationis

eversufficienttomotivateus,wemightlookatthefollowingquotationscitedin

thesecondaryliteratureinsupportofthepracticalclaim:

1)Thefitnessofmen’sgoverningalltheiractionsbytheruleofrightorequity:andalsothatthisassentisaformalobligationuponeveryman,actuallyandconstantlytoconformhimselftothatrule.142

Thisagainissimplytheunderstandingthatassentresultsinobligation.There

arefrequentexamplesofthisclaiminClarke’stext,someofwhichwehave

alreadyseen.

Thefollowingpassageisalsoofferedinsupportoftheideathatunderstanding

fitnessaloneasanobligationispracticallysufficienttomoveustothataction:

2)Andbythisunderstandingorknowledgeofthenaturalandnecessaryrelations,fitnessesandproportionsofthings,thewillslikewiseofallintelligentbeingsareconstantlydirected,andmustneedsbedetermined

141Ibid.,344.142Ibid.,199.

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toactaccordingly;exceptingthoseonly,whowillthingstobewhattheyarenotandcannotbe;thatisthose,whosewillsarecorruptedbyparticularinterestoraffection,orswayedbysomeunreasonableandprevailingpassion.143

Clarkeclaimedthatassent‘constantlydirects’,bywhichwemightunderstand

thatitcounsels,orpointstowardsorissuesanordertothewill.Clarkeargued

elsewhere,thatmoralnecessitydoesnotimplyphysicalorabsolutenecessity.

Ourunderstandingastowhatisfitcouldissueacommandbutourlibertyissuch

thatwemightrejectthisandselectanother(lessreasonable)reasonfor

acting.144Clarkedid,asSchneewindsays,argueinalatersermonthatwhenwe

actwealwaysactwith‘someview’inmind,butthisviewcouldalsobethatgiven

tousby‘thebrutalguidanceofmereappetiteandpassion’.

SchneewindarguesthatClarke’sviewofrationalagencyentailsthatweare

‘unabletoescapebeingmovedbyreasonsatleasttosomeextent’145(my

emphasis).Thetroubleisthatthe‘atleasttosomeextent’makestheclaim

trivial,inthemoralcase.Obviously,Imightwellhaveaviewofmyobligationto

repayadebtandaviewofmyfinancesbeingbetterservedbynotrepayingit.My

willmaybe‘directed’bybothviews.Schneewindadmitssoonafterinthemoral

casethat

indoingsoherunsafoulofaproblemthathebarelytoucheson.Wecan,regrettablyknowwhatweoughttodoandyetnotdoit.146

ThisispresumablywhySchneewindstartsthesentencewith‘Clarkeistryingto

thinkhiswaytotheviewthatitisourrationalagencythatmakesmoral

principlesbindingonusandenablesustobemovedbythem.’Thereis,though,

verylittleevidencethatthatiswhatClarkedidthink.Clarke,onthecontrary

arguedforthe‘necessityofrewardsandpunishment’inthe‘practiceof

virtue’.147Giventheimmediaterewardsthatviceseemstoofferandwhere

143Clarke,NaturalReligion,186.144SeeJamesA.Harris,OfLibertyandNecessity:TheFreeWillDebateinEighteenthCenturyBritishPhilosophy(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2005),46-53,forClarke’sviewofliberty,145Schneewind,Invention,318.146Schneewind,Invention,318-9.147Clarke,NaturalReligion,223.

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virtueisoftenthreatenedwithgreatcalamities,lossesandsometimeseven

deathitself,Clarkemaintainedthefollowing:

Thisaltersthequestionanddestroysthepracticeofthatwhichappearstobesoreasonableinthewholespeculation.148

Indeed,Clarkeclaimeditwas‘theerroroftheStoics’,toassumethatthe

rightnessofvirtuemadeit'entirelyself-sufficient'.

Forthoughvirtueisunquestionablyworthytobechosenforitsownsake,evenwithoutexpectationofreward;yetitdoesnotfollowthatitisthereforeentirelyselfsufficient,andabletosupportmenunderallkindsofsufferings,evendeathitself,foritssake;withoutanyprospectoffuturerecompense.HerethereforebegantheerroroftheStoics;whotaughtthatthebarepracticeofvirtue,wasitselfthechiefgood,andableofitselftomakeamanhappy,underallthecalamitiesintheworld.149

Clarkedidnot‘runafoulofaproblemhebarelytouchesupon’asSchneewind

suggests.Onthecontraryknowingwhatdotoandyetnotdoingitisatthe

forefrontofClarke’sattempttoprivilegeanunderstandingofrevealedtruthsas

theonlysourceofknowledgethatcanleadustoavirtuouslife.Schneewindfinds

Clarke’saccountoftheweaknessofthewill,based,asitisonourcorrupted

nature,‘hardlyphilosophicallysatisfying’.150Butthisisakintothecomplaintthat

seesHutcheson’smoraltheoryisnot‘recognisablyrealist’topresent-day

readers.151PlainlyneitherClarke,norHutcheson,wasattemptingtosatisfyor

interestphilosopherswhoexcludetheworkingsofdivineprovidence.Both

thinkerssoughttooffersolutionstotheproblemsofaChristianmorallifelived

intheroundandnottosatisfytheWhiggishdemandsoflaterhistoriesof

autonomyormoralcognitivism.

Schneewinddoesn’tusequotation(2)(Irwindoes)butperhapsheoughttohave,

becausethesecondphraseinthesentencethat‘thewillslikewiseofall

intelligentbeingsareconstantlydirected,andmustneedsbedeterminedtoact

accordingly’(myemphasis)ismoreproblematic.Thephraseisnotproblematicif

148Ibid.,223.149Ibid.150Schneewind,Invention,319.151PeterJ.E.Kail“Hutcheson'sMoralSense:Skepticism,Realism,andSecondaryQualities,”HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly18,no.1(2001):77.

69

‘mustneedsbe’isreadas‘should’or‘oughtto’bedeterminedtoactaccordingly,

butcould‘mustneedsbe’,bereadas‘are’determinedtoactaccordingly?

ThepassageistakenfromasectionofClarke’sargumentthatGodalways

determineshiswillaccordingtohisperfectunderstanding.Clarkecontinuedthat

itisalso‘veryunreasonableandblame-worthyinpractice’thatrational

creaturesgiftedwithfacultiesofreasonandwill,whichallowustoidentifygood

andevil(reason)andchoosegoodandrejectevil(will)actviciously.Buthethen

said,‘ifwesupposenofuturestateofrewardsitwillfollowthatGodhasendued

menwithsuchfaculties’,andhas

putthemunderanecessityofapprovingandchoosingvirtueinthejudgmentoftheirownminds;andyethasnotgiventhemthewherewithtosupportthemselvesinthesuitableandconstantpracticeofit.152

So,ifwereadthateitherourwills,orweastheintelligentbeings‘mustneedsbe

determinedtoactaccordingly’asmeaningthatwedoactaccordingly,orour

willsaredeterminedtoactaccordingly,byourknowledgeoffitnessand

unfitness,thenthismakesnonsenseofClarke’sunderstandingthatweneedthe

thoughtofcertainfuturerewardsorpunishmentstobringourselvestobe

virtuous.AresolutionmightbesuggestedbylookingatLeibniz’sresponseto

Clarke’spositiononthelibertyofthewill,butitshouldbenotedthatClarke’s

variousstatementsonlibertydonotseemtohavebeenreconciledinamanner

thatanyoneotherthanClarkehasfoundsatisfactory.153

Clarke’sposition(oroneofthem)wasthatitisimpossibleforthelastjudgment

oftheunderstandingtomoveanagenttoactsincejudgmentisapassive

occurrenceandcannotmoveustoact.Atonepoint,inalaterletter,Clarke

claimedthat

thereisnoconnectionbetweenapprobationandaction,betweenwhatispassiveandwhatisactive.Thespringofactionisnottheunderstanding,forabeingincapableofactionmightneverthelessbecapableofperception.154

152Clarke,NaturalReligion,225.153SeeHarris,Liberty,52-53.154Clarke,“Clarke’sAnswertoBulkeley’sFirstLetter”inBeingandAttributes,26.

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Clarkemaintainedthat,infact,the‘springofactionistheself-motivepower

whichis(inallanimals)spontaneity,and(inrationalones)wecallliberty.’

Anagentthenisalwaysmovedtoactonsomethingotherthanthelast

judgementoftheunderstanding.Harristhough,understandsClarke’snotionof

freedomtoentailafurtherliberty.Thatis,thelibertytochoosetoperforma

differentactionthantheonethatourlastjudgmenthasapproved(wherethis

libertyisstillafreedomtochooseandnotafreedomtoact).Leibniz,inan

exchangewithClarke,maybeseenashavingunderstoodClarkethisway,and

sawtheproblematicimplicationsofthisforthemotiveforceofreasons.Clarke’s

manoeuvringaroundthevarioussensesofnecessity,Leibnizargued,dissociated

‘themindfromthemotives’insuchawayasweareleftneedingasecond-order

motivetochoosetochoosethelastjudgmentoftheunderstanding.155Sothen

Clark’saccountoffreedomdoesnotsimplyclaimthatwearenotmovedto

actionbyanactoftheunderstanding,butfurtherthattheunderstandingdoes

notdeterminewhichactionitisthatweendupchoosing.

ItispossiblethatClarke’saccountoflibertyleftthespacebetweenthelast

judgmentoftheunderstandingthatanactionwasfitorunfitandtheelectionof

thataction,inorderthatthemotivessuppliedbyChristianitymighthavearole

inmoralconduct(notcoveredbythejudgmentthatanactionisfittingor

unfitting).Thepowertochoosedifferently,afterthelastjudgmentofthe

understandinghasbeenissued,iscapturedbythepassagewhereClarketalks

abouttheunfairnessofthesituationwherewithoutknowledgeofjustrewards

andpunishmentbeinghandedoutinafuturestate,wewouldbe

underanecessityofapprovingandchoosingvirtueinthejudgmentoftheirownminds;andyethasnotgiventhemthewherewithtosupportthemselvesinthesuitableandconstantpracticeofit.156

Clarkeinsistedthat,inpractice,weneedfurthermotivestohelpustochooseto

choosewhatourunderstandinghasputusundera‘necessityofapprovingand

choosing’.

155QuotedinHarris,OfLiberty,53.156Clarke,NaturalReligion,225.

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Thisalsohelpstounderstandwhyarationallyderivedobligationtoactisnot

everseenbyClarkeashavingthepowertomotivateus.Thecorrectreadingof

mustneedsbedeterminedtoactaccordinglyinquotation2isthatourwills

shouldoroughttobedirectedbyourunderstandingtoactaccordinglybythe

forceofmoralnecessitywhichdoesnotimplyalossoffreedomtoignorethe

dictatesofreason.

ThatClarkeunderstoodobligationandmotiveasindependententities,tobe

derivedindependentlyisalsoalludedtohere:

Allthegreatthingsthatmoderndeistsaffecttosayofrightreasonastoitssufficiencyindiscoveringobligationsandmotivesofmorality;isonlyapretence.157

Clarke,however,alsosaidthat

everyman,becauseofthenaturallibertyofhiswill,canandoughttogovernallhisactionsbysomecertainruleandgiveareasonforeverythinghedoes.158(Myemphasis.)

WhichcertainlysuggestsamorecompatibilistreadingofClarke’sviewof

freedom,butitisnotmyaimheretoofferafulltreatmentofClarkes’viewson

freedom.MypointisthatClarke’swiderargumentwasthatinourpresentfallen

stateweneedrevelationtohelpustrulybelievethattherewillbefuture

consequencestoouractions.Clarkeadmiredthoseveryfewancientheathens

whomanagedtoreasontheexistenceofafuturestate,buthewasscepticalof

theirabilitytobeconsistentlyvirtuous,especially,aswesawinhisrebuttalof

stoicclaimsoftheself-sufficiencyofvirtue,inthefaceofmisfortuneandtragedy.

Justbecausewecould,andshouldgovernouractionsaccordingtoarule,does

notimplythatwemustonlyuseknowledgeofthejudgmentoffitnessor

unfitnesstopracticallygovernouractions.

InowturntolookatClarke’saccountofconscienceinrelationtoobligation.

Clarke,conscienceandobligation

157Ibid.,314.158Ibid.,273.

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AtthispointwecanpressClarkestillharderonthequestionoftheforeseeable

hedonicconsequencesofbreakingorcomplyingwitharule.Aswehaveseen,

Clarkeinsistedthatthe

judgmentandconscienceofaman'sownmindconcerningthereasonablenessandfitnessofathing,thathisactionsshouldbeconformedtosuch,orsucharuleorlaw,isthetruestandformallestobligation.159

WehavealreadyseenthatobligationforClarkeconsistedinthereasonofthings.

Theknowledgeofrewardsandpunishmentsinthenextlifewerecharacterised

byClarkeas‘secondaryobligations’orthe‘mosteffectualmeansofinforcement’.

Clarke,however,sometimessaidthatourassenttothefitnessofanactionjustis

theobligationandatothertimesheindicatedthatobligationderivesfromthe

involuntaryassenttoafurtherprinciple;thisistheprincipleofthe

fitnessofmen’sgoverningalltheiractionsbytheruleofrightorequity:andalsothatthisassentisaformalobligationuponeveryman,actuallyandconstantlytoconformhimselftothatrule.160

Here,obligationderivesfromourinvoluntaryjudgmentthatitisrighttodowhat

webelieveisright,andnotsolelyfromthejudgmentthatsomethingisright.So,

forexample,whenKorsgaardsaysthatforClarke,BalguyandPrice‘They

believedthattheperceptionofanactionasright,orwhattheytooktobethe

samethingobligatory,isamotivetodoit’(myemphasis),thisisnotquite

accurate.Consciencewouldseemheretobeaformalobligation,butClarkedid

notelaborateonwhathemeantbyformalobligation(or‘formallest’).Raube

takeshimtomeanthatobligationisa‘logicalconsequence’oftheperceptionof

thefitnessofanaction,andthattheobligationtogovernone’sactionsaccording

totheperceptionofwhatonetakestoberightisthe‘primary’,orpresumably

foundational,obligationfromwhichobligationstospecificactionsderives.161

IfthisiswhatClarkehasinmind,itentailsthatitisnotthebasicperceptionofan

actasfittobeperformedthatmotivatesus,butratherthehedonicconsequences

ofperformingornotpeforminganactionweknowtoberight.

159Clarke,NaturalReligion,190-191.160Ibid.,199.161Raube,“MoralityandReason,”138-9.

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Forwhoeveractscontrarytothissenseandconscienceofhisownmindisnecessarilyselfcondemned;andthegreatestandstrongestofobligations,isthatwhichamancannotbreakthroughwithoutcondemninghimself.162

Indeed,Clarkemadeplainthehedonicconsequencesofthisself-judgment.

Thereisnoman,whoatanytimedoesgoodandbraveandgenerousthings,butthereasonofhisownmindapplaudshimforsodoing;andnomanatanytimedoesthingsbaseandvile,dishonourableandwicked,butatthesametimehecondemnshimselfinwhathedoes,theoneisnecessarilyaccompaniedwithgoodhope,andexpectationofreward;theotherwithcontinualtormentandfearofpunishment.163

Clarkethencanbesaidtohavearguedthatweareabletoactaccordingtoour

moraljudgmentandaccordingtoourobligationonlywherethereissome

additionalhedonicmotivation,fromconscienceorfromotherforeseeable

hedonicconsequences.Whenweactonthisadditionalmotivation,ourobligation

isfromthereasonofthings(themetaphysicalclaim)andthereasonofourown

minds(theepistemologicalclaim).Itcouldevenfulfilthepracticalclaim(that

reasonalonecanmotivate)ifbythisweunderstandthisreasoningtoinclude

reasoningofhedonicconsequenceofouraction.Butthenwehavenotacted

solelyfromthefitnessoftheactionbutfromtheadditionalreasonofthe

consequencetoourselves.

ItisimportanttonotethatClarke’stheoryofwhypartsofrevelationworkso

welluponusasmotivatingtoolsisthatwecomeequippedwith‘naturalhopes

andexpectations’.Despitehisrefusalofinnatism,Clarkebelievedthatweare

createdneedingtobereassuredthatthesenaturalhopesandexpectationsare

validandwillbemet.Havingfailedourtrialatmanagingourownbehaviour

guidedbynaturalreasonalone,revelationwasprovided.Agoodpieceoftextual

supportforthisinterpretationisderivedfromClarke’sobservationofthe

frequentdissociationbetweenourunderstandingofwhatisrequiredofus

(wherewealsohaveanappreciationoftheattractivenessofvirtue)andour

performanceoftheaction.

162Clarke,NaturalReligion,191.163Clarke,NaturalReligion,272.

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Menmaybepleasedwiththebeautyandexcellencyofvirtue,andhavesomefaintinclinationsandevenresolutionstopracticeit;andyetatthereturnoftheirtemptations,constantlyfallbackintotheiraccustomedvices;ifthegreatmotivesoftheirdutybenotveryfrequentlyandverystronglyinculcateduponthem,soastomakeaverydeepandlastingimpressionupontheirminds;andtheyhavenotsomegreaterandhigherassistanceaffordedthem,thanthebareconvictionoftheirownspeculativereason.164(myemphasis)

Theaimofthischapterwastobringouttheimplicationsofthewidercontextof

Clarke’ssecondBoylelecturesfortheunderstandingofhisethicalrationalism.I

willreturntothesubjectofrationalismandmotivationinchapter5whenIlook

atthepositionofClarkes’defenders,GilbertBurnetandBalguy.

InthenextchapterImoveontocomparethetheisticmetaphysicsofClarkeand

Hutchesonandexaminetheirrespectivepositionsonessences.Thiswillbethe

firstoftwochaptersonHutcheson,whoseoverridingaimistoconsiderthe

natureofhisrealism.

164Clarke,NaturalReligion,282.

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Chapter3

Hutcheson’smethodandGod’scommunicableattributes

Itisaneasythingformentoassertanythinginwords;butourownheartsmustdecidethematter.

HutchesonInquiry165

Theaimofthischapterandthenextistoofferanaccountofthenatureof

Hutcheson’srealism.Thepresentchapterfocusesuponthewayinwhich

Hutchesonsoughttosecuretherealityofvirtue–histheisticmetaphysics,and

thewayinwhichheintendedtoprovethatrealitytohisreaders–hismethod.I

willarguethatHutcheson’stheisticmetaphysicsmaynotbeasfarapartfroma

figurelikeClarkeasmighthavebeenimagined.Thechapterproceedsasfollows:

First,Ibrieflyoutlinesomeoftheapproachestotheinterpretationof

Hutcheson’sworkinthesecondaryliterature.Iwillthenintroducethe

comparisonofHutchesonwithClarkeonthematterofmethodandGod’s

communicableattributes.ImoveontodiscussHutcheson’sadoptionof

introspectionasamethod.Hutcheson’steleologyandhisviewsonthepurpose

ofmoralobligationarethendiscussed.Ifinishwithacomparisonofthemeta-

ethicsofClarkeandHutcheson.AdetailedinspectionofHutcheson’smoral(and

aesthetic)epistemologyisreservedforthefollowingchapter.

ApproachestoHutcheson

Hutcheson’sfirstmajorworksinmoralscience,hisfourtreatises,were

composedinthe1720sinDublin.HisLatintreatiseonmoralphilosophy,

possiblybasedonhisearlierDublinlecturesandgivenashisGlasgowprivate

lectures,thePhilosophiaeMoralisInstitutioCompendiariawaspublishedin1742,

revisedin1745andthentranslatedintoEnglishandpublishedasAShort

IntroductiontoMoralPhilosophyin1747.166HisSystemofMoralPhilosophy,

circulatedamongstfriendsfrom1737,andprobablygivenashispublicGlasgow

165Hutcheson,Inquiry,98.166SeeLuigiTurco,introductiontoFrancisHutcheson,PhilosophiaeMoralisInstitutioCompendiaria,withAShortIntroductiontoMoralPhilosophy,ed.LuigiTurco,(Indianapolis:LibertyFundPress,2007),ix-xi.

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lectures,waspublishedposthumouslyin1755.167HisDublincoursenoteson

metaphysicswerefirstpublishedwithouthispermission.Hutchesonpublished

hisownversionin1742asASynopsisofMetaphysicsComprehendingOntology

andPneumatology(revisedin1744).StudentnotesfromhisDublincourseson

logicwerecirculated,andeventuallypublishedafterhisdeathin1756,asA

CompendofLogic.168

Oneprominentdebateinthesecondaryliteratureconcernstherelationship

betweenHutcheson’sfourtreatisesandhislaterpublishedworks,theSystemand

theShortIntroduction.InthefourtreatisesHutchesonhadopposedany

legislativebasisformoraljudgmentandbehaviour.Hutchesondeniedboththat

moraljudgmentsaremadewithreferencetoaknownlaw(revealed,naturalor

civil)andthatthemotivationformoralactionarosefromtheforeseeable

consequencesofdeviationorcompliancewithalaw.Hutchesoninsistedupon

thenaturaloccurrenceofadistinctivelymoralmotivation(akindaffection

towardsothers),andanaturalsenseofthedifferencebetweenvirtueandvice,

whichrespondstothepresenceofbenevolentintentioninanactor’s

motivationalset(amoralsense).IntheInquiryandtheEssayHutcheson

describedboththemoralsenseandourprimaryimpetustowardssecuringgood

forothersasinstinctive.169Prudentialconcerns,accordingtoHutcheson,even

thosesurroundingdivinejusticeinafuturestate,donotdriveorgovernwhatwe

countasmoralbehaviour.Neitheristhemotivationtoperformanactionsimply

tosatisfyGod,whatanyonecountsasmoralinamotivation.

ThedebateinthesecondaryliteratureoverthecohesionofHutcheson’swork

centresuponthedegreeofconformityinthelaterpublishedworkstotraditional

aspectsofthecurriculum−thosethatdealtwithnaturalandcivillaw(especially

theSystem),andtheReformedscholasticdoctrinethattaughtthatmoral

motivationproperlyconsistedofaspecificintentiontoplease,orappease,God

167FrancisHutcheson,ASystemofMoralPhilosophy.CollectedWorks,Vols.v-vi,(Hildesheim:GeorgeOlmsVerlagsbuchhandlung,1755,1969).168Moore,introduction,LMNSM,xxii-xxiii.169Hutcheson,Inquiry,112,133.Essay,23-24.

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(especiallytheShortIntroduction).170JamesMooreoriginallyarguedfora‘two

system’readingofHutchesonwherebythelaterpublishedworksaretobe

understoodasteachingmaterialsthatwerenotprimarilyintendedtoadvance,

orpromulgatehisownphilosophy.171Moorehasmorerecentlyargued,inthe

introductionofhiseditionstotheLogicandMetaphysics,thatthesewereclearly

pedagogicandprobablycomposedinitiallyinDublin.Mooreclaimsthatbothof

theseworksandtheShortIntroductionandpartsoftheSystemcanbeseenas

partofa‘textbooktradition’wherebytheauthorofferedcommentaryona

varietyofopinionsonthetopicsunderconsideration,thechoiceoftopicand

structurehavingbeensetbyauthorsofprevioustexts.172Moorenowtakescare

toemphasisthepointsintheLogicandtheMetaphysicswhereHutcheson

introduceshisowntheoriesintothesediscussions.Thisisseenmostespecially

intheMetaphysics,aworkinwhichMooreseesHutchesonpresenting‘hisown

distinctivetheoryofconcomitantideas’inordertoofferaLockeanstylerebuttal

ofBerkeley’sdenialofexternalreality.173Moorealsolinksthisworkto

Hutcheson’sLogicandappearstofindsupportformoralconcomitantstheretoo.

Theseare,saysMoore,‘theprinciplepointofconnectionbetweenhislogicand

hiswritingsonaestheticsandmorals’.174

KnudHaakonssenandJamesHarrisbothopposeMoore’sinitial‘twosystem’

interpretation.HaakonssenoffersaparticularlytrenchantrebuttalofMoore’s

position.HereadsHutchesonasamoralrealistandacognitivist,wherevirtueis

anaturallyexistingqualityinmotivation,whichisjudged,correctlyor

incorrectly,assuchbyanaturalmoralsense,ournaturalabilitiesbothcognitive

andmotivationalbeingtheresultofdivinebenevolence.Inadditionthemoral

senseisabletoleadustoanunderstandingtheroleofdivinebenevolenceat

workinthenaturalworld,whichincludesourownnaturalmoralabilities.

Haakonssensuggeststhatnaturalreligionisthebridgebetweenmoralsenseand170SeeHaakonssen,NaturalLaw,65-67,andHarris,“Religion,”205-222.171JamesMoore,“TheTwoSystemofFrancisHutcheson:OntheOriginsoftheScottishEnlightenment,”inStudiesinthePhilosophyoftheScottishEnlightenment,ed.M.A.Stewart(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1990),37-60.SeealsoJamesMoore,“Hutcheson’sTheodicy:TheArgumentandContextofASystemofMoralPhilosophy,”inTheScottishEnlightenment:EssaysinReinterpretation,ed.PaulWood(Rochester:UniversityofRochesterPress,2000),239-266.172Moore,introduction,LMNSN,x.173Ibid.,xiv.174SeeMoore,footnotes3and4ofLogic,12-13.

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naturallawforHutcheson.175Harrisfinds,againstMoore,forcontinuityacross

textsinHutcheson’streatmentofreligiousbelief,seeingthemasofferinga

supportivemotivationalaidforprovidentiallyinstitutednaturalmoral

abilities.176CrowebothfollowsHarris,andgoesfurther,toarguethatHutcheson

wasinfactanearlychampionofapsychologicalapproachtoreligion,whichis

foundeduponman’smoralandaestheticabilities,andthatthisapproachis

evidentacrosstheentirespanofHutcheson’swork.177

Hutcheson’sthought,ofcourse,developedoverthespanofhiswritingcareer,

differencesinintendedaudiencesnotwithstanding.Othercommentatorshave

takenapurelychronologicalviewoftheshiftsinthinkingevidentinthetexts

andrevisions.Scott,Hutcheson’sfirstbiographer,andBishop,bothpresent‘four-

stage’modelsofHutcheson’swork,structuredchronologicallyovertheInquiry,

thenEssayandIllustrations,SystemandtheShortIntroduction.178Bothexamine

thechangesineachofthetextsinthewaythatHutchesonconceptualisedthe

moralsenseanditsrelationtomotivation.

ByfarthemostpopularapproachtoHutchesonthough,istoconfinetheanalysis

tothefourtreatises,andsometimestothechangesbetweenthefirsttwo

treatisesandthesecondtwo.Thistack,whereitisjustified,issometimestaken

onthegroundsthatHutcheson’sfourtreatisesweretheonesthathis

contemporariesrespondedto,orwhichhisreputationcametorestupon,orthat

theyrepresenta‘purer’statementofhismoralphilosophy.Toagreatextent

though,Hutchesonpresentshisreaderswithamovingtarget,ashisviews

developacrossthetextsandtheearlierworksarerevised,atleasttosome

175SeeKnudHaakonssen,”NaturalLawandMoralRealism:TheScottishSynthesis,”inStudiesinthePhilosophyoftheScottishEnlightenment,ed.M.A.Stewart(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1990),61-85.Haakonssen,Naturallaw,63-98.KnudHaakonssen,“MoralPhilosophyandNaturalLaw:FromtheCambridgePlatoniststotheScottishEnlightenment,”PoliticalScience40(1988):97-110.176Harris,“Religion,”205-222.177BenjaminD.Crowe,“HutchesononNaturalReligion,”BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy19,vol.4(2011):711-740.178TheydisagreeabouttheorderofcompositionbetweentheShortIntroductionandtheSystem.WilliamR.Scott,FrancisHutcheson;HisLifeTeachingandPositionintheHistoryofMoralPhilosophy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1900;repr.,ForgottenBooks,2012).JohnD.Bishop,“MoralMotivationandtheDevelopmentofFrancisHutcheson'sPhilosophy,”JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas57,No.2(1996):277-295,andTheMoralPhilosophyofFrancisHutcheson,(PhDDiss.,UniversityofEdinburgh,1979).

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extent,toreflecthissubsequentthought.Theimportantpointaboutthe

interpretationofHutchesoniswellcapturedbyGill,inhisBritishMoralists,

wherehedescribeshisownanalysisofHutchesonasa‘snapshot’.179Any

explanationwilllikelyholdgoodonlyforaperiodofHutcheson’sthoughtand,

movingbetweentexts,becauseoflaterrevisionsandcertaindatingdifficulties,is

somethingofahigh-wireact.

Inthischapterandthenext,Iwillconcentrateontheperioduptoandincluding

Hutcheson’sinaugurallectureatGlasgowin1730(OntheNaturalSociabilityof

Mankind),mainlybecausethesubsequentchaptersinthethesislookat

responsestothefourtreatises.Iwill,however,includeHutcheson’sLogicand

Metaphysicsandthetextoftheinaugurallecture.180Thesetextswereeithernot

circulated,ornotwidelycirculatedinHutcheson’slifetime,butIbelieve,as

Moorehasindicated,thattheyoffervaluableinformationforanassessmentof

Hutcheson’sthoughtintheperiodupto1730.Referencewillalsobemadeto

Hutcheson’scorrespondencewithGilbertBurnet,anintroductorylettertothe

‘Inquiry’publishedinthe‘LondonJournal’as‘ReflectionsinourCommonSystems

ofMorality’in1725,and’Hibernicus’sLetters’publishedinthe‘DublinJournal’of

1725.181Hutcheson’sMetaphysicsandtheLogichaveyettoreceivea

comprehensivetreatmentinthesecondaryliteratureandthisisnottheaim

here.182Nevertheless,inthischapterandthenext,partsofboththesetextswill

beanalysed.WithregardtoHutcheson’srealism,Iargueinthischapterthatfirst,

Hutcheson’stheisticmetaphysicsindicatethatmoralgoodwasamind

independentpropertyinsofarasmoralgoodnesswasapropertyofthedivine

nature,andwasunderstoodbyGodtobeaneternalandimmutablegood.

Second,Hutchesonclearlyarguedthatthispartofthedivinenaturehadbeen

communicatedtous,andthatwecouldrecogniseitasagoodviaournatural

179Gill,BritishMoralists,155.ThisisalsoDarwall’sapproachtoHutchesoninInternalOught.180I’llnoterevisionsmadetothefourtreatisesin1738and1742andtotheMetaphysicsin1744181“Correspondence”inIllustrations,195-247.FrancisHutcheson,FrancisHutcheson:TwoTextsonHumanNature,ed.ThomasMautner(Cambridge;CambridgeUniversityPress,1993).HenceforthTwoTexts.FrancisHutcheson,OperaMinora,Works,Volvii(Hildesheim:GeorgeOlmsVerlagsbuchhandlung,1971).182AlthoughseeEmilyMichael,“FrancisHutcheson’sLogicaeCompendiumandtheGlasgowSchoolofLogic,”inLogicandtheWorkingsoftheMind:TheLogicofIdeasandFacultyPsychologyinEarlyModernPhilosophy,ed.PatriciaA.Easton(Atascadero,CA:RidgeviewPublishing,1977),83-96.

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affectionsandsenseofmorality.

Inthenextsection,IwillintroduceacomparisonoftheapproachofClarkeand

HutchesononthematterofGod’scommunicableattributesandmethod.

ClarkeandHutcheson

HutchesonwasopposedtoClarke’s‘apriori’methodbecausehethoughtthat

rationaldemonstrationwasinadequateasatooltodefeatscepticisminthe

generalpopulation.This,however,wasnotjustbecauseofthedifficultyof

followingtheargument,butalsobecauseHutchesondidnotbelievethatGod’s

moralgoodnesscouldbeproventous(i.e.toallhumanbeings)tofollowfrom

hisotherattributes.MorefundamentallyHutchesondidnotbelievethatrational

insightintoeternallawwasthestartingpointformoralcognition.Heargued

thatouroriginalideaofvirtuederivednecessarilyfromasense.

TherewasnodisagreementbetweenClarkeandhisdefendersandHutcheson

overHutcheson’sassertionthatvirtue,definedasbenevolence,isrealinthe

followingtwoways.First,Hutchesonmaintainedthatbenevolenceexistsasa

qualityinourpresentmotivationalsetandwasnotcompletelyobliteratedbythe

eventssurroundingtheFall.Second,heinsistedthattheexperience,orfeelingof

benevolence,doesnotsuperveneuponamorefundamentalwishtoserveour

ownbestinterests.Clarkeandhischampionswereinagreementwiththereality

ofvirtueunderstoodinboththeseways.183

Whiletheepistemologicalchannelforourideasofvirtuewasanissuethat

Clarke’ssupportersclashedwithHutchesonover,theyrarelyengagedinany

depthwithoneanotherovermetaphysics.Indeed,Hutchesonkeptmostofhis

metaphysicswellawayfromhisfourtreatises.184BeiserarguesthatClarke

himselfandhissupporterswererhetoricallyunwillingtobeclearaboutthedebt

183ThisiswhatGilltermshis‘anti-egoist’reality.SeeGill,BritishMoralists,296,forexample.184SeeMoore,introductionLMNSM,xvii,footnote28.MooresuggeststhatHutcheson,afterShaftesbury,foundmetaphysicalreasoningtobeanunnecessarydistractionintheimpartingofhiswisdomtogentlemen,ratherthanscholars,theformerbeingtheintendedreadershipofhisfourtreatises.

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thattheirvisionofnatureowedtoscholasticessentialism.185ItisBeiser’sthesis

thatHutcheson(andHume)bothignoredthemetaphysicalmeaningofnature

thatunderpinned,butwasnotalwaysdeclaredby,figuressuchasClarke,Burnet

andBalguy.186HutchesonfurthermoreissupposedbyBeisertohavetaken

‘moralvaluesoutoftheuniverseandplacedthemwithintherealmofhuman

consciousnessalone’.187Iwillarguethatthisisnotanaccuratestatementof

Hutcheson’sposition,andneitheristhechargeofcontingencylevelledat

Hutcheson,indifferentforms,byhiscontemporariesandbyalineoflater

commentatorsrunningfromFrankena,toWinkler,toMichaelGill.188

TheteleologyofHutcheson’saccountofnatureisundeniableandispresentin

hisfourtreatises,butitreceivesitsfullestandcleareststatementinhisinaugural

lectureof1730andhisMetaphysics.HaakonssenandCuneopresentHutcheson’s

realismaslyingintheprovidentiallyinstitutedfactofourbenevolentaffections

asadistinctivelymoralmotivation.ThisisanecessitythatissuesfromGod’s

benevolenceatworkinhiscreativeactivity.189Ibelievethough,thatHutcheson

wentfurtherthanthis.IwillarguethatitisnotjustthatHutchesonbelievedthat

Godhadoptedtoabidebythespecificationsofeternallaw,whenhechoseto

createashedid,becauseofhisgoodness.BothHutchesonandClarkeagreethat

Godactedashedidtosecureour(eventual)happiness.IarguethatHutcheson’s

commitmenttorealismwasstrongereventhanthis.Itwaslocatedintheeternal

andimmutablemoralgoodofbenevolence,whichcouldnotbeoverturnedby

Godinhiscreativeactivity,asitsessenceliesinthisdivineattribute.(Although,

asdiscussedalittlelater,Godmightpotentiallyhaveretainedthepowerto

ignoreit.)Iwillargueinthenextchapter,moreover,thatourideasfrommoral

sensederivefromthiseternalandimmutablerealm,atleastasitexistedinthe

divinemind.(Whethertheseideasfrommoralsensearecomparablewithany185Beiser,Sovereignty,274.186Ibid.,272.187Ibid.,309.188WilliamFrankena,“Hutcheson’sMoralSenseTheory,”JournaloftheHistoryofIdeas16(1955):356-375.KennethP.Winkler“Hutcheson’sAllegedRealism”JournaloftheHistoryofPhilosophy,23(1985):170-194.KennethP.Winkler,“HumeandHutchesonandtheColorofVirtue,”HumeStudies22(1996),3-22andGill,BritishMoralists,“NotestoChapter13,”footnote2,295-301.189Haakonssen,“NaturalLawandMoralRealism,”63-65,Haakonssen,Naturallaw,63-85,TerenceCuneo,“ReasonandthePassions,”233-234.

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presentdayunderstandingofmoralrealism,orcognitivism,isnotmyconcern,

butthenatureoftheevaluationofferedbyHutcheson’smoralsense,andthe

natureoftheideasitproduces,willbethesubjectofthefollowingchapter.)

OneearlycriticalresponsetoClarke’sBoylelecturescamefromtheyoung

FrancisHutcheson.In1717HutchesonwrotetoClarketoprotestatthenatureof

Clarke'saprioriproofoftheexistenceandattributesofGodofferedinhisBoyle

lectures.NeitherHutcheson’soriginalletter,norasubstantiveaccountofits

contentssurvives,butHutchesonlatertoldhisfriendWilliamLeechmanthathe

hadexpressedreservationsaboutthefeasibilityofacertaindemonstrationof

suchmatters,thefailureofwhichwouldengenderyetmorescepticisminthe

readingpublic.190

Hutcheson’sconcernsaboutrationaldemonstrationoftheexistenceofGod(and

someofhisattributes)derivedfromtheconvictionthatthenatureofthe

creativeforceuponwhichanymoralsystemultimatelyrested,couldnotbe

demonstratedinthewaythathebelievedClarketohaveattemptedtodoso.The

Inquiry,Hutcheson’sfirstpublication,fromthefirsteditionof1725tothefourth

editionof1738,closedwiththeguaranteethatournaturalmoralabilitiesarethe

resultofprovidentialinstitutionbyabenevolentDeitywhoiskeentosecureour

happiness.Theseabilitiescouldhavebeendifferentabilities,‘thereisnothing

surpassingthenaturalpoweroftheDeity’,Hutchesonadmitted,butthe

goodnessofdivinenaturedictatedthatourhappinessishisaimandthatany

implantedabilitieswouldhavetoservicethisaim.191The‘greatagreementof

mankind’overdivinebenevolenceitself,however,Hutchesonnoted,didnot

derivefromtheideaofanecessaryandoriginal,self-existingbeing.Itwas

conceivedofasan‘abundantprobability’thatwas‘deduced’fromobserved

effectsinthenaturalworldbacktocause.

Ithasoftenbeentakenforgrantedinthesepapers.“Thatthedeityismorallygood;”tho’thereasoningisnotatallbuiltuponthissupposition.Ifweenquireintothereasonofthegreatagreementofmankindinthisopinion,weshallperhapsfindnodemonstrativeargumentapriori,from

190Scott,Hutcheson,15-16andBeiser,Sovereignty,308.191Hutcheson,Inquiry,197.

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theideaofanindependentbeing,toprovehisgoodness.Butthereisanabundantprobabilitydeducedfromthewholeframeofnature,whichseemsasfarasweknow,plainlycontrivedforthegoodofthewhole;andthecasualevilsseemthenecessaryconcomitantsofsomemechanismdesignedforvastlyprepollentgood.192

HutchesondidnotactuallyclaimherethatGod’sgoodnesscouldnotbe

demonstratedfromhisindependence,butratherthatthegeneralagreement

withtheideaofhisgoodnessderivesfromourobservationoftheworld.Hewas

makinganempiricalclaimaboutthegeneralsourceofouragreement.

ThatClarkedidnotactuallyclaimthatGod’smoralattributeswerenecessaryin

ametaphysicalsenseseemstohaveescapedHutcheson.Thesubstanceof

Clarke’sargumentwasthatGod’sgoodnesswasamoralnecessity(bywhichhe

meantitwasnotcompelledbytheforceofdivineunderstanding),butClarkedid

notarguethatGod’sgoodnesswasnecessaryinthesamewaythat,forexample,

hisindependenceorinfinitywere.193God’sindependence,inClarke’saccount,

referredtohisbeinguncaused.194

WithrespecttoGod’sgoodness,Clarkearguedthatlikehislibertyandhisother

moralperfections,thiswasacommunicableattribute.Thescholasticdistinction

betweenGod’scommunicableandincommunicableattributesreferredtothe

differencebetweenthoseattributesthatwesharedsomepartof,andsocould

understandbyenlargingtheminordertohavesomeviewoftheirperfectionin

God(hisgoodness,libertyandpower,forexample),andthosethatlayoutsideof

ourexperienceandmustbedemonstratedinadifferentway,ifatall(hisself-

existence,independence,omniscienceandomnipresence,forexample.)

ClarkemadethecontrastbetweentheincommunicabilityofGod’sself-existence

andabsoluteindependenceandthecommunicabilityofhisotherattributes

explicit:

Nopowersareimpossibletobecommunicatedbutonlythosewhichimplyself-existenceandabsoluteindependence.195

192Ibid.,197-198.193SeeVailati,introduction,forthedifferencebetweenClarke’ssensesofnecessary,xiv-xv.194JonathanBennett,Glossary“Independence,”www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/clarke1704.pdfglossary.195Clarke,BeingandAttributes,61.

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Clarkearguedfirst,thatGodwasinfinitelygoodbecausehewas‘necessarily

happyintheeternalenjoymentofhisowninfiniteperfections’,andsocouldnot

haveanyothermotiveforcreatingcreaturesotherthantocommunicatehisown

perfectionstothemand,secondly,thatGodwas‘necessaryall-sufficient’(he

didn’twantforanything,nordependonanythingelseforanything)andsowas

‘infinitelyremoved’fromany‘causeortemptationsofdoingevil’,andthathis

powerwasnotlimitedbyanothersuperiorwill.196God’sgoodnessdidnot

derivefromhisbeinguncaused,orindependentinthewaythatClarkeoutlined

theargumentforindependence.ForClarke,God’scausalindependencewasan

incommunicableattribute.Hisgoodnessandpower(hisself-sufficiency)had

beencommunicated.ThiswasClarke’sposition:

Inparticular,thesupremecausemustinthefirstplacebeinfinitelygood,thatis,hemusthaveanunalterabledispositiontodoandtocommunicategoodandhappinessbecause,beinghimselfnecessarilyhappyintheeternalenjoymentofhisowninfiniteperfections,hecannotpossiblyhaveanyothermotivestomakecreaturesatallbutonlythathemaycommunicatetothemhisownperfection...Thathemustbeinfinitelygoodappearslikewisefurtherfromhence,thatbeingnecessarilyall-sufficient,hemustconsequentlybeinfinitelyremovedfromallmaliceandenvyandfromallotherpossiblecausesortemptationsofdoingevil,which,itisevident,canonlybetheeffectsofwantandweakness,ofimperfectionordeprivations.197

InhistextonMetaphysics,composedinDublininthe1720s,Hutcheson

discussedGod’sattributesandreferredthedistinctionbetweenthosethatare

communicableandthosethatareincommunicable.God’sindependenceis

incommunicabletousinthesense,Hutchesonargued,thatwecannotinferthat

heisself-caused.God’sindependencerather,entailedonlythatheissubjectto

nootherwill.198ThiswasnotClarke’sunderstandingofindependence,butit

was,aswehavejustseen,oneofhisargumentsforGod’sgoodness.God’smoral

attributesandhisunfetteredpowerare,underHutcheson’sscheme,both

communicableattributes.InfactalittlelaterintheMetaphysics,Hutcheson

196Ibid.,84.197Ibid.,84.198Hutcheson,Metaphysics,163.

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producedexactlythesamearguments‘whichshowthatGodisgood’thatClarke

hadused.WeinferthatGodis‘whollygoodandbenevolent’because

itispraiseworthyinitselfandthesupremeexcellenceandperfectionofanintelligentnature,theverysenseofwhichbringsjoytosuchanature,butalsobecausenotemptationtoacontrarycoursecouldoccurtoasuperiornaturewhichneedsnothingforitsownsake.199[Myemphasis]

OnthequestionofthenatureofthenecessitythatcharacterisesGod’sgoodness

then,ClarkeandHutchesondidnotinfactdisagree.IwillarguethatbothClarke

andHutchesonarguedthatGod’screativeactivitywascausedbythegoodnessof

hisnatureinawaythatcouldnotbeconsideredanabridgmentofhisfreedom.

ForClarkeandHutcheson,thenecessaryfactthatGodcouldnotbeotherthan

happyabouthisownmoralperfectionderived,inthefirstinstance,fromthefact

thatGod’sgoodnesswasgood‘initself’.MoreoverClarke,likeHutchesonwasan

anti-essentialistwhenitcametothematterofGod’sbeing.200Idonotbelieve

thatHutchesonintendedthatGod,givenhisotherattributes,inpracticeretained

theabilitytoimposevaluesonhiscreationthatwereatoddswithhis

understanding.Ibelievethatthechargeofvoluntarismorcontingencythrownat

HutchesonbyGilbertBurnetandBalguy,orlatercommentatorswas,andis,ill-

judged.TheproblemhasbeenthatwereallyneedHutcheson’sMetaphysics(and

hisLogic)toseewhy.Iwillreturntothissubjectinthelastpartofthechapter.

Burnet,andBalguyespecially,didunderstandandobjecttoHutchesonfounding

God’sgoodnessinhisbenevolentnature,asopposedtotherectitudeofhiswill,

whichwasalsoClarke’sbroaderposition.ThiswillbediscussedinChapter5.

Theyall(Clarke,Hutcheson,BurnetandBalguy),however,believedthatGod’s

goodnesswascommunicatedtousinsuchawayaswecoulddiscoveran

analogous,imperfectresidueoftheparticularnatureofGod’sgoodnessin

ourselves.AccordingtoHutcheson,wedidthisbyintrospection,andnotby

rationaldemonstrationfromanuncausedbeing(howevermistakenHutcheson

mayhavebeenaboutClarke’sactualargumenthere).

199Ibid.,174.200Clarke,BeingandAttributes,29-31.

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Inthenextsection,IwillexaminethenatureofHutcheson’sintrospective

method.Hisuseofintrospectionreliedupontheassumptionthatwebeawareof

adifferenceinthequalityofmotivebehindactionsandthatwebeabletotrustin

therealityofamotivationtodogoodforothers,ratherthanresolvethisback

intoanoriginalimpetusofself-loveorself-interest.

Hutcheson’smethod

TheaccuracyofhisreadingofClarkenotwithstanding,Hutchesonwasconvinced

thatouretiolatedpowersofreasonmeantthatourconsensusoverthegoodness

ofGoddidnotderivefromthe‘demonstrativeargumentapriori’.Sincethe

consensusdidexistfromwhencediditderive?HutchesonjoinedShaftesburyin

theattempttoreinstatelegitimateenquiryintowhatcouldbeconsidered

‘natural’tous.Hutcheson’slongerargument–thepurposeofhisfirsttwo

Inquiries–wastoassertthatbylookingat‘thewholeframeofnature’wecould

observetheexistenceofasenseofbeautyandamoralsense.Thesehadbeen

providedbyprovidenceasthefoundationofourunderstandingoftheexistence

ofawiseandbenevolentGod(althoughwedidnotneedtorealisetheexistence

ofthatGodinorderforthemtooperateinthefirstplace).Ultimately,Hutcheson

arguedinhisfirsttreatiseonbeauty,ifwegovernedourmindswellenough,our

senseofbeautywouldinformusofthepresenceofanintelligentdesignerwhose

purposewasourhappiness.Itdidsobyguidingustowardstheobservationof

regularityinnatureandmathematics–theuniformityamidstallthevariety.201

Inthesecondtreatise,hearguedthatourabilitytodetectthepresenceofa

qualityinmotivationthatwasrecognisedasadistinctivelymoralgood(eitherin

Godorineachother)wasprovidedbyourmoralsense.Whatthisentailedwas

thatourbeingabletohavetheveryideaofmoralgoodassomethingthatwas

foundinourownmotivesorGod’smotives,dependedinthefirstinstanceonour

havingaspecialsenseofvirtue.Hutchesonarguedthatwejustcouldnothavean

ideaofgoodness(orevil)asamoralqualitywithoutthis.Anyattempttoargue(a

priorioraposteriori)tothegoodnessofGoddepended,inthefirstinstanceon201SeeCrowe,NaturalReligion,forathoroughandconvincingexaminationoftheimportanceofHutcheson’ssenseofbeautyinhisreligiousthought.SeeHaakonssen,NaturalLaw,fortheargument,alsomadelaterbyCrowe,thatreligiousbeliefisthecompletionofourmorality,72.

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ouroriginalideafromthissense-thatis,itdependeduponourknowingthat

thereissuchathingasmoralgood,orleastagoodthatisdistinctivelydifferent

fromnaturalgood.ThisisthesubstanceofHutcheson’sempiricismanditwillbe

examinedfurtherthroughoutthischapterandthenext.

JustasfundamentaltoHutcheson’sapproach,though,washisclaimthatour

benevolenceorkindaffections,asperceivedbyourmoralsense,arerealin

themselves.Hutchesonmeantthatkindaffectionsdonotderivefromamore

foundationalself-loveandneitherdotheyinstancetheworkingsofdelusional

prideuponacorrupted,fallennature.Inhisfourtreatises,Hutchesonlaunched

hisinquiriesproperintobothournaturalmoralcognitivepowersandour

naturalsociableinclinations.Todiscoverthesetruthsaboutourselves,

Hutchesoninsistedthatwedidnotrequireanyparticularknowledge(naturalor

revealed),oranintellectualabilitybeyondthecapacitytointrospectandreflect

uponwhatweobserveaboutourselves.

Todiscovertruthonthesesubjects,nothingmoreisnecessarythanalittleattentiontowhatpassesinourownhearts,andconsequentlyeverymanmaycometocertaintyinthesepoints,withoutmuchartorknowledgeofothermatters.202Wouldmenreflectuponwhattheyfeelinthemselves,allproofsinsuchmatterswouldbeneedless.203

Anappealtotheintrospectedexperienceofmoralmotivationandjudgement

wasHutcheson’schiefmethodinhisfourtreatises.Thisapproachrequired

observationofourownexperienceofsocialinteraction,intermsofourown

aimsandmotivationsandourresponsestotheactionsofothers,andour

reactionstohearingorreadingaboutthethoughtsandactionsofcharactersin

historyandabroad.Itwas,however,premisedupontheunderstandingthatour

benevolenceisrealandunderstoodbyusviaourexperiencebecauseitisa

communicableattributeofGod(althoughwedonotneedtounderstandthisto

recognisethedifferentqualitiesofmotives).JamesMoorethinksthat

Hutcheson’sadoptionofthedistinctionbetweenGod’scommunicableandnon-

202Hutcheson,Essay,4.203Ibid.,5.

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communicableattributesindicatedapolicyofappeasementtowardsthose

readerswhoexpectedtoseeaspectsofReformedscholasticismonthe

curriculum.Haakonssentoo,thinksthatalthoughHutcheson’suseofitisblunted

byanabsenceofothersupportingtheoriesonthenatureoftheTrinity,itstill

representedaconsiderableconcession.

Haakonssen’smissingTrinitariantheories,Isuspect,werethosefoundin

reformedaccountsoftheoperationoftheTrinity,suchasTurretin’s,whereby

thecommunicationofGod’sgoodnessisachievedbyparticipating,orsharing

directly,indivineloveitself,throughthegracegivingactivityoftheHolySpirit.

Ourbenevolence,forHutchesonhowever,isonlyanalogoustoGod’s.204

Nevertheless,IsuggestthatthedistinctionbetweenGod’scommunicableand

incommunicableattributeswascentraltoHutcheson’sargumentsaboutthe

waysinwhichwemayhavemoralknowledge.

Ourmoralattributesaresupposedtobeanalogousinkind,butnotscope,to

thoseoftheDeity.Bylookingatthe‘wholeframeofnature’,Hutchesonargued,

wemightobserveourownsociabilityandconcernforthegoodofothers.The

goodnessofourownnature,our‘universalbenevolenceandasocialtemper’,

will,ifputintopractice,giveusgreatpleasureonreflectionandultimatelylead

toourownhappiness-asGodhadintendedandShaftesburyhadadvertised.

Hutchesoninsistedhowever,thatevenifweenjoythispleasureandrealisethat

ourowninterestsarebestservedbyactingforthegoodofothers,actingfrom

primary‘kindaffections’isnotreducibletoactingfromself-interest.205Ifwepay

attentionto‘whatpassesinourownbreasts’wewillunderstandtherealityof

thedifferencebetweenthetwo.Oncethishasbeenunderstood,wemight

204SeeWilliamJ.Danaher,“JonathanEdwards,FrancisHutcheson,andtheProblemsandProspectsofCivilSociety,”inAWorldforAll?GlobalCivilSocietyinPoliticalTheoryandTrinitarianTheology,ed.WilliamF.Storrar,PeterJ.CasarellaandPaulL.Metzger(Michigan:WilliamB.EerdmansPublishingCompany,2011),181,onthedifferencebetweenHutcheson’suseofthedistinctionbetweencommunicableandincommunicablevirtues,andthemoretraditionalunderstandingofthisdivisionthatoccurredinthecontextofmetaphysicalTrinitarianargumentsinTurretin,forexample.205SeeBishop,MoralMotivation,onhow,inHutcheson,theappreciationoftherelativerolesofpleasurefromactingvirtuouslyandactingfromotherdirectedaffectionssharpenHutcheson’sconcernwithmoralmotivationfromtheInquirytotheEssay/Illustrations.SeealsoHenningJensen,MotivationandtheMoralSenseinFrancisHutcheson’sEthicalTheory,(TheHague:MartinusNijhoff,1971).

89

enlargeandperfectthisnotionofmoralgoodnesstocomprehendthegoodness

ofGod.

TheCambridgePlatonistshadframedtheclaimthattherewereprinciplesof

humannature,whichconstitutedourmoralabilities,butthatwerenotentirely

exhaustedbytheappealtoourultimateself-interestlyinginvirtue.Thatis,that

theexerciseofthoseabilitiesmightleadtoourbenefitinimportantways,but

thattheydidnotoriginateinourconcernforourownwell-being.Thisclaim

founditselfbeleagueredonseveralfrontsattheturnoftheeighteenthcentury.

Hobbeshadofcoursesteppedforwardtoproposethatthenaturalconditionof

manwasthatofabeing,desirousonlyofitsownsurvival,self-gratificationor

painrelief,anddrivenintosocietysolelyinpursuitoftheseends.Pufendorfhad

claimedthatsociabilityandsocialaffectionshadarealexistencewithinus,but

analysisrevealedthattheyweredrivenultimatelybyamorefundamental

principleofself-love.Locke’stabularasahadleftusofficiallywithoutinnate

ideasofeithermoralgoodoreviltoguideactionineitherdirection,buthealso

thoughtthatournaturalmotivationalapparatus,leftunguided,naturally

disposedustoviceratherthanoriginalneutrality.ForLocke,moralknowledge,

fortheindividualactor,wasknowledgeofthecontentofalawandthe

correspondenceofanactiontothatlaw.Moralmotivationwasamatterofself-

concernedcomplianceandwaseffectedthroughtheforeseeableconsequencesof

complianceornon-compliancewiththatlaw.Clarkedidallowthatwepossessed

un-derived,original,naturalaffectionstowardsothers,reflectionuponwhich

allowedus,intheory,toderivetheother-directeddutiesofnaturallaw.In

practicethough,aswesaw,Clarkearguedthatweweresocorruptedthatwe

neededcontinuousinstructioninafuturestateofrewardsandpunishmentto

motivateuseffectivelytodowhatwethoughtwasright.Moreover,orthodox

Reformedtheologianscontinuedtoinsistuponapost-lapsariancorruptionso

thoroughlywroughtuponournaturalstatethateventhewillingperformanceof

actionscommandedbyGodweredispleasingtohimunlesstheywereperformed

withtheassistanceofgrace.206

206SeeMautner,introduction,TwoTexts,11.

90

Intheearlyeighteenthcentury,thoseBritishmoralistswhowishedtoinsistthat

ourmoralthoughts,affectionsandactionswerereflectiveofsomethingother

thantheoperationofself-interest,foundthemselvesprovokedrepeatedlyby

BernardMandeville.Mandeville’sdisquietingpromotionofegoismwasintended

asaparticularprovocationtosupportersofShaftesbury’sviewofuniversal

benevolenceasaconstitutiveforceinhumannature.AccordingtoMandeville,

however,wewerebothdeceivedandself-deceivingwherewetrustedinour

experienceofnaturalaffectionstowardsothers.207Mandeville’stheorieswere

unsettlingbecausetheyfurtherunderminedourexperienceofmoralagency.

Hobbeshad,atleast,allowedussufficientself-understandingtoknowinglyherd

togetherformaterialbenefit,andPufendorfiansociability,althoughultimatelya

matterofself-love,washeldtobea‘real’enoughexperiencethatwewereableto

deduceourdutiesfromoneanotherbyreflectinguponit.

TheresponseofFrancisHutchesontoMandeville,toHobbes,andalsotothe

reformedtheologicalunderstandingofourcompromisedmoralabilities,rested

uponaturntointrospectivepsychologyintheefforttoanchortherealityof

virtue.208IsuggestthatHutcheson’sassumptionwasthatwecould,byturning

inwardandreasoninganalogously(ratherthanbythespecialactionofgrace),

knowthatbenevolencewasGod’smoralperfection.Inaddition,andthisismost

important,ournaturalmoralgoodnesscouldnot,withintheframeworkof

communicableattributes,beutterlydifferentinkindtoGod’s–sothatself-love

couldnotbethefoundationofourmoralabilitiesandbesomethingquiteother

inGod.

Accountsoftheoperationofspecies-wide,uniform,naturalprinciplesdeemed

foundationalformindandnaturecometotheforeinthisbidtoexplainandto

validatemoralexperience.209Naturalprinciplesofmindandnaturewereheld

tosettheconditionsforthepossibilityofvirtue,astheystructuredan

understandingoftherelationshipbetweenmoralthoughtandbehaviour.

207Colman,“BernardMandeville,”125-139.208SeeGill,BritishMoralists,forhisthesisontheimportanceofviewsonhumannatureinthelateseventeenthandeighteenthcentury.209HansAarsleff,FromLocketoSaussure,158-163.

91

Deductionsfromthe‘natureofman’tothespecificationofourdutieshadalong

historyinthenaturallawtraditionoftheearlymodernperiod.Clarke,aswesaw,

hadagreedwithPufendorfandCumberlandthat,inprinciple,wemaydeduce

ourdutiestoothersfromoursocialaffections.AfterClarke,though,thedebate

movedawayfromthederivationofdutiestofocusmoredirectlyonattemptsto

identifyanddescribethehierarchyofnaturalprinciplesatworkinthe

productionofaction.AsHutchesonexplainedin1730,

thoughmanyrecentwritershavetakenthepositionthatsociabilityisthesourceofnearlyallourduties,theydonotseemtohavesufficientlyaddressedthegeneralquestionofwhatthosethingsarewhicharetobecallednaturaltoman.210[Myemphasis.]

WhilstClarkeofferednodetailedmoralepistemologybeyondan

underdevelopedappealtointuitiveinsightintoself-evidentprinciples,

HutchesonfollowedClarke’stacticofexploringwhatseemsimmediateand

certaintousinmoraljudgment.Experienceofmoraljudgmentwaslegitimised

asafieldofinquirybecause,alongsidetheassumptionofuniformity,aprinciple

ofawarenesshadbecomecentraltothephilosophyofideas.Thisassertedthat

theworkingsofmind,itscontentsand‘theprinciplesofactions’were

transparentandavailabletous.211Incombinationthesetwoassumptions

validatedintrospectionasamethodfortheinvestigationofmoralthoughtand

behaviour.Asweshallseeinthenextchapter,thelegitimacyofanappealto

declarative(conscious,orexplicitlyheld)andnon-declarative(non-consciousor

implicitlyheld)principlesisacomplexpartofHutcheson’smoralsenseor

judgmentandonewithwhichhestruggles.IraisethisnowbecauseHutcheson

reliedontheappealtointrospectivelyavailablefeaturesofourmotivationand

affectionsinordertomakehismostfundamentalclaimsaboutwhatvirtue

consistsinandhowwemaybebroughttobehavevirtuously.212

Hutcheson’sworkupuntilthe1730swaspreoccupiedbytheneedtodefeat

orthodoxCalvinistclaimsabouttheruinationofournaturalabilitiesandegoist

210Hutcheson,inaugurallecture,194-195.211Thisclaimisdiscussedinmuchgreaterdetailinthenextchapter.212SeealsoGill,BritishMoralists,onHutcheson’sappealtobenevolenceasan‘observablephenomena’tocounterthe‘egoists’circuitouspsychologicalstories’,146-147.

92

accountsofvirtuethathaveusmovedsolelybyself-love.Explanations

surroundingthevariousnaturalprinciplesatworkintheexplanationof

sociabilitywerethefocusofHutcheson’sargumentsinhiswaronegoism.

Hutcheson’sresponsestoHobbes,MandevilleandPufendorfaresignificant

becauseHutchesonrebuffedtheirexplanationsofthe‘protean’workingofself-

loveonthegroundsthatthemoralactorisnotawareofselfishmotivationswhen

sheacts.Hutchesonwantedustobeabletotrusttheexperienceofwantingtodo

somethinggoodforsomeoneelsebecausethisfeelingisofepistemicrelevance

tousinpracticalmorality.Ifwereinterpretitassuperveningonamore

fundamentalmotivationofself–lovethenwewill,oratleastmight,overrideour

naturaljudgmentthatthesebenevolentaffectionsreallyarethemoralgoodand,

insodoing,destroyournaturalmoralabilities.

Whetheraprinciplemustbeconsciouslyavailabletousinorderforittoplayan

activeroleinourmotivationorcognitionisanimportantquestion,given

Hutcheson’suseofintrospectiontojustifyhisassertionsaboutourmotivation

andourmoralresponses.Italsounderpinnedhisclaimsaboutthepractical

importofmoralphilosophy.Hutcheson,likehiscontemporaries,sawoneofthe

greattasksofmoralphilosopherstobetoshowhowactingvirtuouslyistoour

ownbestadvantage‒butthiswasnottheendofhisclaimsaboutthepractical

dutiesofmoralphilosophers.213

Hutchesonthoughtthatinordertodevelopournaturalmoralpotentialitwas

necessary,inapracticalsense,totrustintherealityofourexperienceofour

moralresponsesandmotivation.Thedevelopmentandcontinuedoperationof

thesenaturalabilities,however,wasatriskfromcurrentmoralteachingitself.

Thiscomplaintwentfarwiderthanhisclaimthataprioridemonstrationwas

likelytoleadtoscepticism.Hutcheson’sconcernwithcorrectingourviewsof

humannaturewasprimarilypractical.Thisisapositionhekepttothroughout

hisworks,evenwheresubsidiarymotivationalfactorssuchasfuturestate

considerationsorlawsareentertained.LikeClarke,withhisinsistenceonthe

needforregularandcarefulinstructioninrelevantrevealedtruths,Hutcheson213OnthepracticalpurposeofmoralphilosophyforHutcheson,seeKateAbramson,“SympathyandtheProjectofHume’sSecondInquiry,”ArchivfurGeschictederPhilosophie83(2001):45-80.

93

recognisedtheneedforanaturallyexistingdispositiontovirtuetobecultivated.

BeinglefttoourownmoraldeviceswasnotanoptionforHutcheson,despitethe

naturaloriginofourpotentialmoralabilities.Hislaterpublishedworksarefar

moreconcernedwiththecultivationandpracticeofvirtuebyavarietyofmeans,

andthewayheunderstandsnaturalnesschanges.214Atthebeginningofhis

careerthough,Hutcheson’sconcernwaswiththedamagethatholdingincorrect

viewsaboutourownnatureislikelytodotoourmoralability.

HereIwouldliketodiscusssomeofthematerialthatHutchesonpresentedinhis

earliestpublications,aseriesoflettersalsopublishedin1725,theyearofthe

firsteditionoftheInquiry,ashisconcernaboutthepracticalimplicationsofthe

beliefsthatweholdaboutourmotivationanddivineintentionareillustrated

wellhereandtheyreflectimportantaspectsoftheargumentpresentedinthe

InquiryandtheEssay/Illustrations.

ThefirstisaletterpublishedinTheLondonJournalthatservedasapreambleto

the1725firsteditionofhisInquiry.SetoutinitisHutcheson'sbeliefinthe

practicalpowerofholdingtherightbeliefsandthecorruptingpowerofmistaken

beliefsaboutthenatureofournaturalmoralabilitiesandthenatureofGod.

Hutchesonaskedwhethertheimpotenceofrecentimprovementsinourwisdom

toeffectbehaviouralchangeweretheresultofnaturalcorruption,orhadwein

factbeenledastraybythese‘leadingprinciplesofscience’?

Arealltheeffortsofhumanewisdom,inanagewhichwethinkwonderfullyimproved,soentirelyineffectualinthataffair,whichisofthegreatestimportancetothehappinessofmankind?Shallwelayitonanaturalcorruptioninus,growingstronger,themoreoppositionitmeetswith?Ormaywenotrathersuspect,theremustbesomemistakesintheleadingprinciplesofscience;somewrongstepstakeninourinstructionwhichmakeitsoineffectualfortheenditprofessestopursue?215

Hutchesonthenrevealedhisownpragmatictheoryofmoralknowledge.Itis

pragmaticinthesensethatthetestofitstruthfulnessistobefoundinits

practicaleffectuponus.

214SeeThomasArnhert“FrancisHutchesonandtheHeathenMoralists,”TheJournalofScottishPhilosophy8,no.1(2010):51–62.215Hutcheson,TwoTexts,97.

94

AllvirtueisallowedtoconsistinaffectionsoflovetowardstheDeity,andourfellowcreatures,andinactionssuitabletothoseaffections.Hencewemayconclude,1st,“Thatwhateverschemeofprinciplesshallbemosteffectualtoexcitetheseaffections,thesamemustbethetruestfoundationofallvirtue:And2dly,WhateverrulesofconductshallleadusintoacourseofactionacceptabletotheDeity,andthemostbeneficialtomankind,theymustbethetruepreceptsofmorality”.216

Thetruthofanymoralsystemistobeassessedbythedegreetowhichitexcites

lovingaffectionstowardsGodandotherpeople,sincetheyarewhatvirtue

consistsin.Iftheschemeworkstoexcitetheseaffectionsthenitmustbetrue,

Hutchesoninsisted.Whatever'schemeofprinciples'itisthatbestinspires

affectionstowardsGodandoneanother,this‘mustbethetruestfoundationofall

virtue’.Thetestofthetruthofanysystemofmoralknowledgeisthedegreeto

whichitsprinciples,inculcatedinourminds,raisetheseparticularaffectionsin

us.

Inthisearlytext,Hutchesonlookedtothecultivationofpositivebeliefsabout

ournatureandthenatureoftheDeityasthefoundationofourpracticalmoral

abilities.Tobolsterhisargument,HutchesonthenpointedtoBayle’s

observationaboutthefailureofmentodowhattheyknowtoberight:

Thisisthereasonofwhataveryingeniouswriterjustlyobserves,viz.thatmens[sic]practicesareverylittleinfluencedbytheirprinciples.Theprincipleshemeans,arethosewhichmovementovirtuefromconsiderationsofinterest.217

Hutchesonpointedoutavarietyofmoralfailingsinunnamedindividual

thinkers,whoselamentableconductistheresultoftheirfailingtobemovedto

virtuebythe‘nicedistinctions’suppliedbytheirownprinciplesofself-love.His

observationherewasthatholdingfaultyviewsofwhatconstitutesamoral

principlecanresultinaninabilitytoraisekindaffectionstowardsGod,andother

people.Hutchesonthenaskedusto‘observehowourmoralistsinculcatethese

greatfoundationsofallvirtue,theloveofGodandofourneighbour’intheir

followers.Theirschemefailed,Hutchesonargued,becauseappealingtothe

216Ibid.,97.217Ibid.,98.

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principleofself-interest,intheformofthreatsorpromises,cannotmakeus

approveaviceorhatevirtuebecause

Somequalitiesofmindnecessarilyraiseloveineveryconsideringspectator,andtheircontrarieshatred;andwhenthesequalitiesdon’tappearweinvainattempttopurchaseeitherloveorhatred.218

Ournaturalkindaffectionsarethetruepracticalprinciplesbehindmorality,and

wefeellovetowardsthosewhodisplaythem.Ourlovingesteemorcomplacence,

whichisraisedonlybytheperceptionofbenevolenceinothers,isnotunderour

voluntarycontrol.219Anyeffectonthewillofpotentialrewardorpunishmentis

impotentintheraisingofthosekindaffections.

AsHarrishaspointedout,Hutchesonallowedthatthethoughtsofrewardand

punishmentinafuturestatecouldactassubsidiarymotivationalaids.220Butfor

Hutcheson,thepracticalsufficiencyofourprimary,natural,other-directed

affectionsisthreatenedwhenweignorethepromptingsofourownkind

affections,becausemoralistshavetaughtustheyarefalseormisguided.

Hutchesonlamentedthat‘Manyofourmoralists,afterMrHobbs’misrepresent

humannatureascorruptedandentirelyself-interestedandfailtodrawour

attentiontoorkinderinstincts,naturalsociableaffectionsandaloveofvirtuein

othersandofbeinghonouredforourownvirtue.Theycompoundthiserror

whentheyattempttogetustodogoodforothersbythreateningthepainsof

divinesanction.

HutchesonalsotookaimatPufendorfforsuggestingthattheutilityofabeliefin

Godestablishesitstruth.221Hemovedontocriticisethosewho,though

'ashamed'ofthistypeofargument,goontogiveus‘rationalargumentsforthe

existenceandpoweroftheDeity’andmisrepresentthedivinenatureas‘fondof

glory,jealousofhonour,suddeninresentmentofaffronts,andresolutein

218Ibid,,98.219SeeLuigiTurco,“SympathyandtheMoralSense,”BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy7,no.1(1999):79-101,oncomplacenceinHutcheson.220Harris,“Religion,”210.221Hutcheson,TwoTexts,98andseeMautner,inthesame,ontheunfairnessofthisremark,92-93.

96

punishingeverytransgressionofhislaws’.222Hutchesonbelievedthat

emphasisingthe'boundlessgoodness'ofGodwasafarmoreeffectivewayto

leadamindtotheloveofGod,whichinturnwillleadustohaveconfidencethat

ourownbenevolenceissuesfromhisnature.Asforourdutiestoourselves,

Hutchesonnotedthatwearegivenmanywaystocheckourpassions.Heargued

though,thatitdoesnothelpustogovernourpassions,ifweareledtobelieve

thathavingthemisasignofacorruptednature.Theproperwayforusto

restrainviceistoletusseethatweare'goodnatured,yetweakandfallible'and

torectifyotherfalsebeliefsthatleadustoanger,jealousy,fear,sorrow,

cowardliness,andambition.

Unlessjustrepresentationsbegivenoftheobjectsofourpassions,allexternalargumentswillbebutrowingagainstthestream;anendlesslabour,whilethepassionsthemselvesdonottakeamorereasonableturn,uponjusterapprehensionsoftheaffairsaboutwhichtheyareemployed.223

Aproperunderstandingofourownnature,verifiedandprovenbyintrospection

intoourownexperiencewasHutchesonthought,thebestwayforthemajorityof

usnotgiftedwithNewtonianpowersofratiocinationtocounterthescepticism

promotedbyHobbesandMandeville.Therealityofavirtueunderstoodtobe

naturaltouswasunderwrittenbythenotionofGod’scommunicableattributes.

Inotherlettersof1725,publishedintheDublinJournal,Hutchesonaddressed

thecampaigntohaveself-loverecognisedasthesoleprincipleuponwhichwe

arecapableofactingorrespondingtoanythingatall.Inseveraloftheseletters,

HutchesonrespondedtoHobbes’accountoflaughter,inwhichHobbesargued

thatlaughteraroseuniquelyfromasenseofsuperioritywithinus,whichwas

tickledintoactionbythepresentationofthereducedabilitiesorstatusofothers.

Hobbes’sself-enhancingsuperiorityprinciplewassupposedtoberesponsible

forusfindinganythingatallfunny.IwillnotgointothedetailsofHutcheson’s

responsetoHobbes,butoneofhisobjectionswasthatwearejustnotawareof

thissuperioritywhenwelaughatsomething.Howthen,Hutchesonasked,canit

provokearesponsefromus?HutchesonnotedthatHobbes,Pufendorfandthose222Hutcheson,TwoTexts,99.223Ibid.,104-105.

97

ofanEpicureanbentsuchasLucretius,suggestedthatourtruemotivesremain

hiddenfromus.

Wegotoourclosetsoftentospinoutsomefineconjecturesabouttheprinciplesofouractionswhichnomortalisconsciousofinhimselfduringtheaction;thusthesameauthorsabovementionedtellus,thatthedesirewhichwehavetoseetragicalrepresentationsis,becauseofthesecretpleasurewefindinthinkingourselvessecurefromsuchevils.224

Thisistheawarenessprinciplespelledout.Hutchesonthoughtthatweshouldbe

abletotrustournaturalaffectionstowardsothers.Theseimmediateaffections

werethebasisofouractionsandtheydidnotrequireposthocreinterpretation

bythelightofotherprinciplesthatwewerenotconsciousofexperiencing.225

Hutcheson,delightfullypreFreudian,askedhowamotivationorafeelingthat

wewereunawareofcouldmoveus?Whatweexperiencedwasimmediateand

primaryintermsofexplainingbehaviour,oratleastitcouldnotbecontradicted

byopposingnon-consciousprinciples.Hutchesonmakesthesameargumentin

boththeInquiryandtheEssay/Illustrationsabouttheappealtocontortedand

non-consciousaspectsofself-lovetoaccountbothforthestandardbywhichwe

approveactionsandthebasisfortheirmotivation,againstthosewhowould

‘rathertwistself-loveintoathousandshapes,thanallowanyotherprincipleof

approbationthaninterest.’226IntheIllustrationshecomplainsthat

menareconsciousofnosuchintentionsoracutereflectionsintheseactions.Ingeniousspeculativemen,intheirstrainingtosupportanhypothesis,maycontriveathousandsubtleselfishmotives,whichakindandgenerousheartneverdreamedof.227

Itshouldbementionedthough,thatHutchesonresortedtoexactlythesametype

ofargumentwhenheexplainedourapprovalofotherqualitiessuchascourage,

wherethereisnoimmediatebeneficiary.Insuchcases‘itisuponsomesecret

apprehensionofagoodintentionintheuseofit’.228

224Hutcheson,OperaMinor,110.225Ibid.,100.226Hutcheson,Inquiry,93.227Hutcheson,Illustrations,135.228Hutcheson,Inquiry,102.

98

ThisthenwasthebasisofHutcheson’suseofintrospectionintoourmoral

experience.Fiveyearsaftertheappearanceofhisfirstpublications,Hutcheson

wasappointedtothechairofmoralphilosophyatGlasgow.Inhisinaugural

lecturehewasreadytoforegroundtheparticularemphasisonthenaturalnessof

ourmoralabilities,bothcognitiveandbehavioural,withinthecontextofafull

blownprovidentialteleology.229

IwilloutlineHutcheson’steleologyinthenextsection,becauseitgivesusan

understandingofoneformofthesortofprovidentialguaranteethatHutcheson

putforwardtosecuretherealityofourmoralabilities.Isuggest,inthelast

sectionofthischapter,thatHutchesongoesalittlefurtherthanaprovidentially

institutednaturalisminhisrealism,andIofferaninterpretationofhisargument

intheMetaphysicstosupportthisclaim.InbetweenthesesectionsIalsodiscuss

Hutcheson’schangedviewsonthenatureofourmoralobligation.Isuggestthat

practicaleffectofmoralobligation,inthe(re)formulationitreceivedinthe

Essay/Illustrations,istoleadustoanappreciationoftheexistenceofGodandhis

communicableattributes.

Hutcheson’snaturalismandhisteleology

Hutcheson’sinaugurallecturewasintendedtocomprise‘arathermorecareful

considerationofhumannature’.230ThistimeLockewasnamed(andtoacertain

extentshamed):

Idonotknowhowithappened,butsincethefamousLockeandotherwritersdemonstratedtothesatisfactionofmany,amongthemmenbothillustriousandhonourable,thattherearenoideasofthingsinthehumanmindfromtheverybeginning,noconceptionofthings,nojudgements,whethertheoreticalorpractical(whichalonetheyaredeterminedtocallinnate),thesemenhavevirtuallyabandonedinvestigationintonaturalideas,apprehensions,judgements,andthenaturalsenseofanythingwhatever.231

Inthelecture,Hutchesonsaysthathewillrestricthimself,onthetopicofhuman

nature,todiscussing‘thosepartsofthehumanmindwhichmakeussociable’.232

229SeealsoHarris,“Religion,”ontheroleforprovidenceinHutchesonacrossalltexts,205-222.230Hutcheson,inaugurallecture,193.231Ibid.,212.232Ibid.,194.

99

Hutchesonacknowledgedthatmanyhavetakentheviewthatsociabilityisthe

sourceof‘nearlyallourduties’,buthearguedthattherehadnotbeenaproper

discussionofwhatitiswhichisnaturaltous,whatour‘socialityconsistsin’and

whichpartmakesusseekoutandbefitforsociallife,withorwithoutthe

presenceofcivilgovernment.233

Doesadesireforsociallife,andforgoodtoaccruetothe‘massofmankind’,

originateinourequallynatural‘want,weaknessandindigence’?Hutchesonsaid

thatPufendorfadoptedthisEpicureanpositioninordertoarguethatGod

implantedthisdesirebecauseweneedtopulltogetherinordertosurvive,and

thathealsocreatedusweakinorderthanwemightdiscoverourmoralselves.

Sociabilitymakesushappyandprovidesuswithbenefits,andweareledinto

companybyadesireforhappiness,notawarethatourbestinterestsareserved

bydoingso.Ratherthaninvokeanappealtointrospectionhere,sincePufendorf

agreedthatweexperiencesocialaffections,Hutchesonhadtomovethe

argumentontoconsidertheorderofournaturalprinciples.Godintendsboth

ourbenevolenceandour‘indigenceandweakness’,butdoestheself-preserving

motiveunderpinthedesiretoactforothers?Hutcheson’sanswerwastosee

Pufendorf(andCumberland’s)glosson‘natural’asamountingtoan

understandingofsociallifeas‘naturalinasecondarysenseandcertainlyas

necessary’.234Thisisfineasfarasitgoes,saysHutcheson,betterthanfineinfact

(‘correct’,‘perceptive’and‘profound’),butHutchesonwantedtoinsistthat

humannatureissociable’foritsownsake’,‘initself,immediatelyandprimarily

kind,unselfishandsociablewithoutregardtoitsadvantageorpleasure’.235We

alsodidnotneedfirsttoexchangeserviceswithsomeoneinordertoraisetheir

tenderfeelingstowardsus.236For,

suchisthestructureofthehumanmind,thatwhencertainimagesofthingscomebeforeit,certainaffectionsariseunderthesoleguidanceofnature,withoutanyartordeliberation,indeedwithoutanycommandofthewill...whenimagesofothermenandtheirfortunecometoour

233Ibid.,195.234Ibid.,203.235Ibid.,205.236Ibid.,210.

100

attention,theyexcitepublicandunselfishfeeling,eventhoughthereisnoprospectofprivateadvantage.237

Moreover,whateverthefaultsorflawsthatGodhasallowedtoournatures,

thereisaprioritytothem.Weareinclinedtoseekthegoodofallotherswhoare

‘harmless’,howeverremotetheyaretous.Malevolencecanonlyresultfrom‘a

conflictofinterests,rivalry,jealousy,orbysomethoughtsofpreviousinjuryor

cruelty.’This,Hutchesonbelieves,

seemstodemonstratethatbenevolenceisdirectlyandinitselfnatural,butmalevolenceisonlysecondarilyso,andoftenresultsfromignoranceandaccident.238

Inadditiontomalevolenceresultingfrommisunderstanding,Hutchesonallowed

thatthereareprinciplesor‘weaknesses’withinournaturethattendtovice,the

‘lowerfaculties’forexample,whicharetherearetherebydivineinstitution.The

moralsensehasbeenimplantedtoidentifyviceasbeingunnaturaltoournature.

This‘rulingprinciple’allowedustodistinguishthosepartsofournaturethat

Godhadimplanted,butintendedustoviewasnon-naturalandtogovernas

such.Through

thatmoralsensewhichwemayalsocallnaturalconscience,weseeclearlythatvicesarenotnaturaltoournature;weseethefacultieswhichoughttomoderateandgovernthelowerdesires.Thereforethoughthestrengthandpowerofthissenseorconsciencemaybesodiminishedthatitisoftenunabletogovernthelowerdesires,yetweseeclearlythatbyitsownnatureitisnaturallyfittorule.Clearlyitistherulingprinciple[hegemonikon],towhichallthingsweremadesubject,andrightlyso,intheintegralstateofournature.239

Inlookingatthenaturalpartsofour‘moralcharacter’Hutcheson’steleologywas

tothefore.Hearguedthatwemightdistinguishthenaturalfromtheartificialin

anythingconstructed-eyes,teeth,buildings,ships,humannature-bylookingat

thepurposeforwhichitwasdesigned.Whatisbydeliberatedesignandwhatis

byaccidentorexternalforcemaybeunderstoodbyitsintendedfunction,justas

eyesareforseeingandbuildingsareforshelteringin.Focusingonthefaultsis

unhelpful.First,wecan’tdiscovertheintendedpurposeofastructurebylooking

attheproblemswithit,andsecond,thoseelementsofournaturethatseem237Ibid.,205.238Ibid.,210.239Ibid.,199.

101

unhelpfultousmightbetherebydesignandareinsomewayhelpfulor

necessaryforthedesignertoachievehisvision.Wejustaren’tinapositionto

appreciatehisoverallscheme.Forexample:

TheweaknessofournatureseemtohavebeenwilledbythegoodandgreatGodintheexcellentwisdomofhiscounsel;yetallourinnatedesiresstriveagainstthatweaknessanddeclarethatsuchweaknessisnottheendofduties,muchlessthegoalwhichnaturehassetforouractions.240

Hutcheson’spanegyrictothenaturalrestsonhispresumptionthatweareable

toidentifythegoalorendenvisagedforusbyGod,viaanimplanteddesireof

whichweareintrospectivelyaware.

Foradesireimplantedbynatureisperhapstheonlyconceivablefacultyofanactivenaturethatwouldallowustodistinguishbetweennaturalstatesoractionsandtheircontraries;particularlyifunitedwiththatdesireisasense,equallyinnate,whichmakestheactionsorresultsagreeableandpleasant.241

Thisiswhy,Hutchesonargues,weare‘righttocallthatstatewhichismost

highlycultivatedthenaturalstateofthehumanrace’.Itwasalso,heinsists,our

originalpre-lapsarianstate,sinceevenreformedtheologiansdidnotdenythat

‘theoriginalfabricofournaturewas,bythedivineartandplan,designedfor

everyvirtue’.242

NorindeedcanthetruefabricofournatureasGoddisposeditberestoreduntilconscience,seatedonthisitsproperthrone,crushesthebodilydesiresbeneathitsfeet.243

Themoralsense,forHutchesonby1730,isdoingfarmoreforusthanjust

providinguswiththeoriginalideaofvirtue–itisnowtherulingprinciple,

whosedictatestellushowweoughttobegoverningourselves,whichofcourse

ishowGodintendsthatweoughttogovernourselves,whichisourfinalend.

Hutchesonandthereligiouspurposeof(moral)obligation

IwillnowlookatHutcheson’sthoughtsontherelationshipofthemoralsenseto

moralobligationasitstoodattheendofthe1720s,justpriortohisinaugural

240Ibid.,197.241Ibid.,197.242Ibid.,200.243Ibid.,199.

102

lecture.IntheEssayandIllustrationsHutchesonhad,undertheforceofsome

pressurefromGilbertBurnet,expandedtheroleofreasonincorrectingor

checkingthedeliverancesofthemoralsense.Hehadalsoadvertisedagreater

roleforreasoninourmovefromaninstinctiveaffectiontowardsthosewelove

andadmirebecauseofourproximitytothem(geneticorotherwise),toour

beingabletodisplaythesortofuniversalbenevolencerequiredbytheNew

Testament(andrequiredbyBurnetandBalguy).244

Furthermore,bythispointHutchesonhadalsoclarifiedhisviewsontheabsence

ofaroleforthemoralsenseinmoralmotivation.Darwallneatlysummarises

threereasonswhythemoralsense,forHutcheson,wasnotpracticallyableto

motivatetheverybehaviouritidentifiedasofmoralworth.245First,Hutcheson

heldthatasenseorperceptionorjudgmentcannotexciteustoaction,only

desireorpassioncanmoveusdirectlytoaction.Secondly,ourdesires(and

passions)arealldirectedtowardssecuringnaturalgoods,eitherforusorfor

others‒theydonotaimdirectlyatobtainingmoralgood.Lastly,sincewecan

onlyraisedesiresfornaturalgoods,themoralsensecannotmotivateustoa

moralaction.Moralactioniscountedmoralif,andonlyif,itismotivatedbya

desiretosecurenaturalgoodsforothers(benevolence).Actingfromadesireto

experiencethenaturalgoodofself-approvaldeliveredbyourmoralsensewould

notbeamotivationthatwecouldapproveusingthismoralsense.

AsDarwallhascarefullydocumented,Hutcheson’sformulationofmoral

obligationintheEssay/Illustrations(andinsomeoftherevisionstotheInquiry),

reflectedhisreformulationoftherelationshipbetweenthemoralsenseand

moralaction.Hutcheson,likeClarke,didnotunderstandmoralobligationasa

rationalmotivewhererationalmotiveisunderstoodasaself-interestedreason

toact.Instead,intheformulationofferedintheIllustrationsthenormativeforce

isappliedtoanapprovaloftheperformanceofanaction(ordisapprovalofits

nothavingbeenperformed).246

244SeeGill,BritishMoralists,156-167,foranaccountofthecorrespondencebetweenBurnetandHutcheson.245Darwall,InternalOught,321.246Darwall,InternalOught,233.

103

Whenwesayoneisobligedtoanaction,weeithermean,1.Thattheactionisnecessarytoobtainhappinesstotheagent,ortoavoidmisery:or,2.Thateveryspectator,orhehimselfuponreflection,mustapprovehisaction,anddisapprovehisomittingit,ifheconsidersfullyallitscircumstances.Theformermeaningofthewordobligationpresupposesselfishaffections,andthesensesofprivatehappiness:Thelattermeaningincludesthemoralsense.247

Hutchesonarguedthatwearemorallyobligedtoanactionwhereeveryonewho

hasconsidereditapprovesitsperformance(orwhereweourselvesapproveit

afterreflection).Itisclearthattheobligatorynatureofanactionmay,inpart,be

properlydeterminedbythereasonedopinionofothers,anopinionofwhichwe

mayormaynotbeaware,butwhichwouldneverthelessmakeitobligatory.

Hutcheson’snotionofamoralobligationseemstocomprisethejudgementofthe

action(andnotonlytheintention)inathoroughmanner‘fullyinallits

circumstances’andthis‘lattermeaning’only‘includes’themoralsense.

Hutchesonnowsuggestedthatanyaction,whichisobligatory,orapproved,is

madesobymorethanjusttheexperienceofthenon-volitionalpleasurableidea

ofapprovalinus.Itmustderivefromareasonedassessmentoftheactionin

context.TothisendintheIllustrationsHutchesongivesusmoreofhismoral

calculusasanaidtothefulfilmentofthistask.248ThisisnotbecauseHutcheson

thoughtthatthroughreasoningitselfwemaycomprehendeternalrelations,in

thewaythatClarkearguedwemight,butsothatwemightproperlyconsiderthe

motivesofothersandourselves,andassesstheamountofpublicgoodachieved

orpotentiallyachievablebytheaction.Italsomightincludeourunderstanding

ofthewidercontextofthatactionin‘allitscircumstances’.Hutchesonwanted

ournatural,instinctive,pre-religiousactionstobemorallypraiseworthy,asthe

actionofourmoralsenseindicatestousthatitis.ButHutchesonalsowanted

theirobligatoryqualitytoconsistinareasonedappreciationofthefullercontext,

asfaraswewereawareofit.Thefullercontext,theoneappreciatedbyall

properlythinkingpeople,ofcourseincludedGod.Hutcheson’sreformulationof

moralobligationintheIllustrationsis,Ibelieve,anindicationofhiswishto

247Hutcheson,Illustrations,146.248Ibid.,189.

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integrateamoralityunderstoodnaturallybyustobesomethinginthequalityof

persons,withinthewidersystemofnaturallaw.

Ifthemoralsense,atthispointatanyrate,isnotdirectlyabletoraiseamoral

motivationalimpulseinus,doesithaveanydirectlypracticaleffect?Itdoes,and

IarguethatHutchesonintendedthatitspracticaleffectistoleadustoan

appreciationoftheexistenceofGodandhiscommunicableattributes.Asense

mayraiseadesireforanaturalgood.Isuggestthatthepleasureofapproval

arisesupontheperceptionofbenevolence,andthepleasuresofmoralapproval

deliveredbythemoralsenseinclineustothesearchformorebenevolence,or

moreaboutbenevolence,inordertoexperiencethepleasureofapproval.It

raisesaselfishdesiretoexperiencethepleasureofdiscoveringbenevolence

(andofcourse,itmeansthatbenevolenceitselfisnaturallydesired).

Thereisnoproblem,thatIcansee,withapleasurableideaofmoralapproval,

beingitselfexperiencedasanaturalgoodandtherebyraisingaparticularself-

interesteddesiretoexperiencemoreofthispleasure,byincreasingtheamount

oftimewespendconsideringtheintentionsbehindactionsandthecharacterof

moralagents,aslongaswedonotmixthisupwithourmoralobligation.(So

longaswedonotmistakethenaturalgoodofferedbythepleasureofmoral

contemplationasamoralmotivationtobevirtuous.)

Itmightbeobjectedthatthepainofmoralcensurewouldactasanequal

motivationalcounterbalancetothissearchformoraltruth,thatdisapproval

mightstopusinquiring.Hutcheson,fromthefirsteditionoftheInquiryisexplicit

thatunlikepurelybenevolentintention,puredisinterestedmalicedoesnot

reallyexist.

Astomalice,humannatureseemsscarcecapableofmaliciousdisinterestedhatred,orasedatedelightinthemiseryofothers,whenweimaginethemnowaypernicioustous,oroppositetoourinterest.249

Weneverjustdesirethatotherssufferoraredisadvantaged.Theirsufferingmay

beanoutcomeofourownrapaciousself-love,butwhenweactviciouslyitis249Hutcheson,Inquiry,105.

105

becauseweintendtogainsomething,ordonotwishtolosesomething,andnot

simplybecausewewishtocausesomeoneelsemisery.Tothisnaturalimbalance

indistributionofbenevolentandmaliciousaffections,infavourofbenevolence,

Hutchesonaddsthatthemoralsense,

ifweformtrueopinionsofthetendenciesofactions,andoftheaffectionswhencetheyspring,...isthefountainofthemostintensepleasure.250

SinceHutchesonbelievesthatweareallcapableofnaturalbenevolence,that

puremalicerarely,ifever,isseen,andthattheperceptionofbenevolence

providesuswiththehighestpleasure,wecanseehimtipthescaletowards

moralevaluationprovidinguswithmorepleasurethanpainoverallandthus

inducingustosearchforit.

Hutchesoninsisted,withrespecttooursenseofbeauty,thatthesearchforthe

pleasure,orbeauty(guidedbytheprincipleof‘uniformityamidstvariety’)

wouldeventuallyrevealtousthewayinwhichthenaturalworldhasbeen

designed.Thiswouldleadustoinfertheexistence,ability,powerandthe

essentialbenevolenceoftheDeityinannexingpleasuretouniformityamidst

variety.

Nowfromthewholewemayconclude,“ThatsupposingtheDeitysokindastoconnectsensiblepleasureswithcertainactionsorcontemplationsbesidetherationaladvantageperceivable,thereisagreatmoralnecessityfromhisgoodnessthattheinternalsenseofmenshouldbeconstitutedasitisatpresentsoastomakeuniformityamidstvarietytheoccasionofpleasure”.251[Myemphasis.]

Inthesameway,ourmoralsensehasbeenimplantedwithinustorevealtous

bothourownnaturalbenevolence,andGod’sownlovingnature.Fornow,the

moralsenseoperatesinorderthatweattendtowhatwe(naturally)find

pleasinginanaction,anduseourreasontofullyassessnotonlythe

circumstancesofparticularmoraljudgmentsandthelikelyoutcomes,butthe

operationofprinciplesofourownnaturetoo.Viathepleasurederivedfromthe

operationofthemoralsensewearenaturallyobliged,ormotivatedtothink

abouttheintentionofagentsandtoseekouttheirmoralexcellence.Weare250Hutcheson,Essay,106.251Hutcheson,Inquiry,80.

106

motivatedtoreasonsufficientlyabouttheintentionofagentsandtoidentify

whatitisthatweapprovein.Inthisway,wemaycometounderstandthe

prioritythatGod(inwhoseexistenceoursenseofbeautyhasalsoledusto

believe)hasassignedtoourvariousnaturalfaculties,asweconsiderhowto

behave.Thisisoneofthewaysinwhichthemoralsensewasunderstoodby

Hutchesonin1730tofunctionasa‘hegemonikon’orrulingprinciple.Godhad

implantedthissense,alongwithoursenseofbeauty,intheformthattheytake,

because‘thereisagreatmoralnecessityfromhisgoodnessthattheinternal

senseofmenshouldbeconstitutedasitisatpresent’.252Inowturntoexamine

thenatureofthatmoralnecessity.

Hutcheson’srealism

Asdiscussedatthestartofthechapter,Hutcheson,likeClarke,sawGod’s

goodnessasnecessary,andasnecessaryinthesameway(evenifHutcheson,

perhaps,didnotseetheiragreementhere.)Moreover,HutchesonandClarke

bothagreedthatwedidnothaveknowledgeofessencesofsubstances,butthat

thisinsufficiencydidnotmeanthatwecouldnotknowthetrueattributesand

propertiesofanything,includingtheSupremeBeing.Neither,Clarkeargued,

couldweclaimtodoubthisexistencebecausewedidnotknowhisessence.253

Clarkeclaimed,moreover,thattherecouldbenothingessentialtothenatureof

Godthatcouldbecontradictorytoour‘clearideas’.Thoughwehavenoideasof

thesubstanceofGod(oranythingelse),

yetweareasinfalliblycertainthattherecannotpossiblybeeitherintheoneortheotheranycontradictorymodesorproperties,asifwehadtheclearestandmostdistinctideasofthem.254

HereisHutchesonagreeingwithClarkeonessences(whetherHutcheson

appreciatedthisagreement,ornot)

Hencetheremaybefullknowledgeofspiritsandbodiesalike;theinnernatureofbothareunknown[but]theproperties(affectiones)areknown.255

252Ibid.,80.253Clarke’sargumentisfoundat29-31,BeingandAttributes.254Ibid.,30.255Hutcheson,Metaphysics,117.

107

ThiswashowHutchesonsawtheoperationofourexternalandinternalsenses

proceedingintheMetaphysicswithrespecttoourunderstandingofGod’s

(communicable)virtues:

WhatwederivefromourexternalsensesissupplementedbyargumentsfromwhichwerightlyinferthatthereisaGod,andthatheisendowedwitheveryvirtue;noexternalsense,however,cangraspthevirtuesofGodthemselves.Allmentalvirtuesthereforeareunderstoodbyaninternalsenseorbyinternalconsciousnessoftheselfanditsproperties.Thisisthesourcefromwhichatleasttheelementsofallthenotionswhichrepresentthedivinevirtuesareengenderedinthemind.256[Myemphasis.]

Alittlelater,whenHutchesonmovedfromadiscussionofGod’sincommunicable

attributestohiscommunicableattributes,Hutchesonexplainedthat

wewillnowproceedtoexpounduponthevirtues,whichweknowfromthatinnerawarenessofourownvirtuesthatwementionedabove.257[Myemphasis]

IsuggestthatHutcheson’sadoptionofthedivisionbetweencommunicableand

incommunicablevirtuesmakesperfectsenseinthecontextofhisaccountofhow

wecometohaveanideaofvirtueinthefirstplace.Theinternalsensehereis

thatofconsciousnessofourselfandits(moral)properties.258AsIgoonto

explaininthenextchapter,Hutcheson’suseoftheterminnersensechanges

overtime,butthatinternalsense,orconsciousness,isalsothesourceofour

ideasofmoralgood.

Hutcheson’scommitmenttointrospectionisanargumentabouthowwemight

bestgoaboutdefeatingscepticismbecauseitisanargumentaboutthewaysin

whichwearecapableofgraspingorunderstandingGod’sgoodness.Itwasalso

animportantpartofHutcheson’s(andClarke’s)argumentaboutwhyourmoral

goodcouldnotderiveultimatelyfromself-interest.Forifthiswerethecasethen

surelyGod’smoralperfectionitselfwouldhavelaininself-interest?A

communicableattributeisonethatisfoundinaperfectforminGod,andan256Ibid.,162.257Ibid.,167.258Hutcheson’suseoftheterm‘internalsense’doesshiftinseveralways.Heuseditatfirsttodescribeoursenseofbeauty,andbyanalogyourmoralsenseandlatertorefertoourinternalsenseofconsciousness.Thisisdiscussedinthenextchapter.

108

analogousforminus.Weknowaboutsuchattributesbecausewehaveideasof

ourowndistinctivelymoralmotivation.Acommunicableattributecouldnot,

therefore,bebenevolenceinGodandself-interestinus.

ThenotionthatGod’sgoodness(howeveritwasunderstood)groundedthe

operationofourownmoralabilitiesisthesubstanceofthesortofnaturalist

providentialismthatHaakonssenandGillagreeupon.Thebiggerquestion

though,andthequestionwithwhichClarke’ssupporters,andClarkehimself

weremostpreoccupied,wasnotthequestionofthegoodnessofGod’smotivein

creatingtheworldaccordingtoeternallaw.Theirprimaryconcernwasthe

natureofthepowerascribedtoGod,bythechampionsofvoluntarism,tocreate

theworldashedid.TheessenceofthevoluntaristpositionwasthatGodhad

beenabletodenominatemoralgoodandevilatwill,potentiallyatleast,in

contradictiontotheirspecificationineternallaw.Extremevoluntarismwas

mutedinsomeauthorsviaanappealtothedistinctionbetweenGod’sabsolute

powerandhisordainedpower.259

ThesalientpointforthediscussionofHutchesonisthatGodcouldhavechosen

tocreatetheworldotherthanhedid(hisabsolutepower)butoncehehad

chosentocreateashedid(hisordainedpower),therewerenaturallawsinplace

whichreflectedthecontentofeternallaw.Hutchesonhimselfadvertedtothisin

theInquiry.

Ifitbehereenquired,“CouldnottheDeityhavegivenusadifferentorcontrarydeterminationofmind,viz.toapproveactionsuponanotherfoundationofbenevolence?”Itiscertain,thereisnothinginthissurpassingthenaturalpoweroftheDeity.260[Myemphasis.]

God’snaturalpower,thatisIsuggest,nothismoralpower,couldhavehadus

approvingsomethingotherthanbenevolence,justashecouldhavehadus

appreciatethebeautyofsomethingotherthanregularity.Thereassuringcaveat

thatHutchesonsuppliedherewasthatifGodreallyaimsatourhappinessthen

hecouldnot‘rationallyactotherwise’.Hutchesonwenton:

259OnthisdistinctionseeOakley,“Locke,NaturalLawandGod,”624-651.260Hutcheson,Inquiry,197.

109

ForiftheDeitybereallybenevolent,ordelightsinthehappinessofothers,hecouldnotrationallyactotherwise,orgiveusamoralsenseuponanotherfoundation,withoutcounteractinghisownbenevolentintentions.261[Myemphasis.]

Hutchesonwentontoexplainwhybenevolencemustbeinourowninterests,

butthepointhereisthatGodisfreetoactandretainedthenaturalpowertoact

ashechose,butthatinchoosingtomakeushappyhecouldnotact

inconsistentlywithhisownaimsand,therefore,hisownrationality.Aswewill

seeinChapter5,Clarke,BurnetandBalguyallinsistedthatGod’sgoodnesslayin

therectitudeofhiswill(hisalways,freely,conforminghiswilltohis

understandingofeternallaw).IsuggestthatwhatHutchesonargued,wasthat

God’sbenevolenceledhimtoexactlythesamerectitude.

HutchesonelaboratedonthenotionofGod’sfreedomintheMetaphysicsandhe

wentfurtherinthistext.

AllascribelibertytoGod,butdifferentkindsofit.However,hardlyanyonewouldsaythathecouldwillanythingcontrarytohisowninnatevirtuesorfailtowinanythingconsistentwiththem.Godisnotthereforethoughttobeindifferenttoallthosethingsthatdependonhim,orfavourabletobothsides;forthereisacertainnecessarywill.262

Godthen‘cannotwillanythingcontrarytohisownvirtues’.Alittlelater

Hutchesonstatedthat‘goodnessisthecauseofthedivineoperations’.263

HaakonssenhasassociatedHutcheson’sprovidentialismwithastrainofrealism

inprotestantnaturallawthatispremisedonthesortofcompromiseadvanced

byPufendorf.Thatis(verybriefly),PufendorfhadinsistedthatGodhadcreated

aworldandimposedmoralvaluesuponit,butthatthevaluesselected(because

Godwasgood)werenotarbitraryandhismoralrulesprovideduswithproper

guidance.Theobjectiontothiswastoaskwhetherweoughttoobeybecause

Godhadcommandedusorbecausethereissomethingelseinplayotherthanthe

needtocomplywithdivinecommandthroughself-interest?264TheCambridge

261Ibid.,197.262Hutcheson,Metaphysics,173-4.263Ibid.,180.264SeeHaakonssen,“NaturalLawandMoralRealism,”63-72.

110

PlatonistsandClarkeandhisfollowersalsowantedtoknowwhetherGod’s

absolutepowerextendedtohisbeingabletochangeoraltermoralvalueatwill.

Theyagreedthathehadnotdoneso,whenexercisinghisordainedpower,but

didthispossibilityliewithinhisabsolutepower?

OneoftheobjectionsthatHutchesonsoughttoanswerdirectlyinthe

IllustrationswasthequestionofwhyGodhadchosentocreateashedid(‘to

makeoneconstitutionratherthananother’.)HehadalreadystatedintheInquiry

thatourinternalsenseswereimplantedintheformthattheywere,byGod,

through‘moralnecessity’.TheargumentofClarke,BurnetandBalguywasthat

Godactedaccordingtohisownunderstandingofeternal,immutablerelations,

butthatGodhimselfdidnothavethepowertoaltereternallaw.Furthermore,

theimmutableandnecessarytruthfulnessofthatlaw,wasthereasonthatGod

hadcreatedashedid.

OneofHutcheson’smostprominentargumentsintheIllustrationswasthatwe

cannotbemovedorexcitedtoanactionbyreasonalone,butthatwerequirean

affectiveimpulse.Hutchesonclaimed,againstGilbertBurnet,thatunlessGodhad

thesortofbenevolentaffectionsthatwewerecreatedwith,thenhewouldnot

havebeenmotivatedtocreateinthefirstplace–hencehisessentialbenevolence

ishis‘moralnecessity’.

‘TisplainiftheDeityhadnothingessentialinhisnaturecorrespondingtooursweetestandmostkindaffections,wecanscarcesupposehecouldhaveanyreasonexcitinghimtoanythinghehasdone.265[Myemphasis.]

ForHutcheson,ourviewsabouthowGodmightoperatearenecessarilytaken

fromareflectionupontheworkingsofvariousprinciplesofourownnature(and

thenperfected).Wedonothaveanyothernaturalmeansofthinkingabout

divineattributes(‘wecanscarcesuppose’).Hutcheson’sargumentwasthatif

Goddidnotfeelbenevolentlytowardsusthenhewouldnothavehadareasonto

do‘anythinghehasdone’.God’sownexitingreasonwasbenevolence.In

Chapter5,wewilllookatBurnetandBalguy’sobjectiontothiskindofnecessity

–anecessityfromGod’sgoodnature,andtheirrequirementthatGod’saffection265Hutcheson,Illustrations,151.

111

towardsusbeassessedbyhisreasonandfoundreasonablebeforehewouldact

uponit.

TheonlyrealevidencethatHutchesonthoughtthatGodcouldhaveactedin

creationtomakeusapprovesomethingotherthanbenevolence(malice,for

example)isifGodhadusedhisnaturalpowerwithoutreferencetohisgoodness

orhisunderstanding.‘Itiscertain,thereisnothinginthissurpassingthenatural

poweroftheDeity’.266[Myemphasis.]Myreadingofthispassageandthoseother

passagesatwhichhesaysthatitispossiblethattheremightbebeings(non

humans)whodonotpossessamoralsense,orthathumansmighthavebeen

createdwithasenseofmalice,isthis–thatGodmightpossessthenaturalpower

tocreatewithoutreferencetohisownknowledgeofamoralorder,butfirst,heis

curtailedinhisnaturalpowerbyhismoralattributes,andsecond,thatwhilsthe

mayhavebeenabletoignorethisknowledge,itwouldmeanthathedidnotact

rationallyifhiswillwastocreatewithourhappinessasanend.Hereisthequote

again:

ForiftheDeitybereallybenevolent,ordelightsinthehappinessofothers,hecouldnotrationallyactotherwise,orgiveusamoralsenseuponanotherfoundation,withoutcounteractinghisownbenevolentintentions.267[Myemphasis.]

Ineffect,intheactofcreation,God’swishtocommunicatehisgoodnesstous(to

makeushappybecauseitmakeshimhappy‘inhisownperfection’)iscausally

priortohisunderstandingofwhatmoralgoodis,butitdidnotgivehimthe

powertooverturnhisunderstandingofwhatmoralgoodis.

Moreover,virtue,asHutchesonhadremarkedintheMetaphysics,was

‘praiseworthyinitselfandthesupremeexcellenceandperfectionofanintelligent

nature’[Myemphasis].268Inthistexthereferredtothedistinctionfoundinthe

reformedscholasticsbetweenknowledgeofsimpleintelligenceandknowledge

266Hutcheson,Inquiry,197.267Ibid.268Hutcheson,Metaphysics,174.

112

ofvision.269Hutchesonsaidthatthescholasticsappliedthistwofoldknowledge

toGod.

BytheformerGodisthoughttoviewallabstracttruthsaswellashisownnatureandnecessaryvirtues;theseareallthosethingswhichtheydonotwisheventhewillofGodtobethecauseof,sinceamongtheeternalideasthemselvesinthemindofGodarethenecessaryrelationsandimmutableconnectionswhichareexpressedintheseeternalandabstracttruths.Noonecouldconceivethatthesetruthscouldbeotherwise,orthatthenatureofthingscouldbechangedthatsuchproportionscouldbecomefalse.270[Myemphasis.]

InterpretingthisparagraphisachallengeasHutchesongivesownershipofthe

wish(thattheseeternaltruthsdonotresultfromthewillofGod)tothe

scholastics–‘theydonotwisheventhewillofGod’.ConceivablyHutcheson’s

ownviewmayhavebeenthatsuchabsolutetruths,bothabstractandthoseof

‘hisownnatureandnecessaryvirtues’weremade,independentlyofreason,by

anactofdivinewill.Thisislesslikely,Ibelieve,giventhelaststatement

emphasisedinthequotationabove.Hutchesonsaidhere‘noonecouldconceive’

thesituationwheretruthscouldbeotherwiseandthenatureofthingsbe

createdinsuchawayastomakethemfalse.Hutcheson,likeLockeandClarke,

alsoclaimedthatactinginaccordancewithunderstandingwasnoabridgmentto

liberty.271

Hutchesonwasnomoreavoluntaristwithrespecttothefoundationofmoral

goodnessthanClarkewas,butHutchesonbelievedthateverythingmorallygood

originatedinkindaffectionandthatGod’sunderstandingofthisbeganwithan

ideafromaninwardsense.272HutchesoninfactarguedthatGodhimselfwas

269SeeMoore,inHutchesonMetaphysics,footnote3,p170270Hutcheson,Metaphysics170.Ontheknowledgeofvisionreferstodivineforeknowledgeoftheabsolutetruthsoftheexistenceofthingsandhisintentionswithrespecttothem,seeMoore,footnote3,170.271Hutcheson,Metaphysics,97-99.272Cuneo,ontheevidencepresentedintwopassagesintheInquiry,at197-198,saysHutcheson’sremarksonGod’sessentialbenevolenceentailthat‘Hutchesonisnosubjectivist’andthat‘thesepassagesclearlyimplythat,inHutcheson’sviewtherearenecessarymoralfacts’,in“ReasonandthePassions,”234.Iquiteagree.CuneodoesnotdiscussHutcheson’swiderargumentsaboutthecommunicabilityofGod’sbenevolence,ortheargumentsfoundintheMetaphysics,andelsewhere.IattempttoshowthenatureofthenecessityinHutcheson’stheisticmetaphysics,whichgoesbeyondthefactofGod’sgoodnessgoverninghiscreativeactivity.

113

probablypossessedofamoralsense,orsomethinglikeitbywhichhecameto

approvebenevolence.RecallthatHutchesoninsistedthatvirtue

ispraiseworthyinitselfandthesupremeexcellenceandperfectionofanintelligentnature,theverysenseofwhichbringsjoytosuchanature,[God’snature]butalsobecausenotemptationtoacontrarycoursecouldoccurtoasuperiornaturewhichneedsnothingforitsownsake.273[Myemphasis.]

Healsoaskedthefollowingquestion:

WhymaynottheDeityhavesomethingofasuperiorkind,analogoustoourmoralsense,essentialtohim?274

Balguy,aswewillseeinChapter5,objectedtoGod’sunderstandingofvirtue

beingpremiseduponasense,butthisisnotwhatHutchesonwasaimingat.

Hutchesonsaidthatvirtueispraiseworthyinitselfandthatthesenseofit

broughthimjoy.HedidnotsaythatGodreceivedhisideasofmoralgoodviahis

sense,onlythattheybroughthimjoy.Godwishedtocommunicatehisgoodness

tousbecauseitmadehimhappy(asHutchesonandClarkehimselfhadargued).

Inourminds,Hutcheson,aswehaveseen,annexedpleasuretoourmoralideas

inorderthatwemightvaluevirtue.ButGod,havingperfectintelligence,andan

unfetteredwill,doesnotneedtobemotivatedinthisway.Hedoesnotneedthe

hedonicclueastowhatitiseitherpraiseworthyinitself,orultimatelygoodfor

us,andhiswillisperfectlycompliantwithhisunderstanding.VirtuemakesGod

happybecauseitispraiseworthyinitself.HutchesononlysupposedGod’smoral

sensetobeanalogoustoours,notidenticaltoit.

SuchisthenatureofGod’sdivineideasthattheyfall,forHutcheson,intothe

communicablecategoryofhis‘virtuesconnectedwiththeunderstanding’.God

doesnothavesensations,Hutchesonsaid,orimagesoranyinadequateideas.275

However,whenwelookmorecloselyatthenatureofideasfrommoralsensein

ourownminds,asHutchesonunderstoodthem,wemightseewhytheymight

273Hutcheson,Metaphysics,174.274Hutcheson,Illustrations,153.275Hutcheson,Metaphysics,169.

114

notreflectsensations,asLockeunderstoodthem,butsomethingaltogethermore

elevated.Infact,forHutcheson,theyamountto‘athirdkindofperception.’

Inthischapter,IhavediscussedwhyHutcheson’ssentimentalism,restingasit

didontheideasofGod’scommunicablevirtue,wasunlikelytohavebeen

understoodbyHutchesonasaspeciesofvoluntarism,andwentbeyondan

appealtoaprovidentiallyimplantednaturalism.Ihavediscussedthesimilarities

betweenClarkeandHutchesontothiseffect.Ihavealsotakencaretoemphasise

thewaysinwhichHutcheson,fromhisveryearliestletters,tohisinaugural

lectureof1730,sawournaturalmoralabilitiesasleadingustoanunderstanding

ofGod,thenatureofhismoralattributes(andours)andfinallyourplacewithin

thesystemandourfinalends.IhavealsooutlinedthewayinwhichHutcheson’s

introspectivemethodrestedupontheassumptionoftransparencyofour

thoughtsandmotivestous.Thesignificanceofthisassumptionwillbediscussed

ingreaterdetailinthenextchapter,asIturntothematterofthenatureofthe

operationofHutcheson’ssenseofbeautyandhismoralsense.

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Chapter4

Hutchesonandthe‘thirdkindofperception’

TheaimofthischapteristoconsiderHutcheson’smoralepistemologyinsome

detail.IexaminevariouswaysinwhichHutcheson,conceivably,understoodthe

actsofsenseperceptionandjudgmenttooperatetoproduceourexperienceof

moralevaluation.IthenconsidertheontologyofHutcheson’sideasfrommoral

sense,andfinishwithadiscussionofHutcheson’srealism.

Therehavebeendiscontentedmurmuringsinthesecondaryliteraturerecently

overtheprominencegiventocommentaryonHutcheson’smoralsensetheory,

withappealstoexamineitsimportancewithinthewholeschemeofhiswork.276

Harris,althoughclearthattheconcernwithmoralepistemologyisnot(just)a

retrospectivelyfashionedpreoccupation,arguesthatitwasnotHutcheson’s

mainconcern,orindeedhismaincontributiontohisfield.Hutcheson’smainaim,

forHarris,wastopersuadehisreadersofthenaturalnessofsociallifeandthe

naturalnessofthevirtuethatenablessociallife.277Ibelievethough,that

Hutcheson’sepistemologywascentraltothiscampaign.Naturalnessfor

Hutcheson,aswesawinthediscussionofthemoralsenseinhisinaugural

lecture,issomethingthatneedstobeachievedthroughareflexiveappreciation

oftheorderandpriorityofourvariousnaturalprinciples.

TodownplayHutcheson’smoralepistemologyisalso,Ithink,todiscountthe

doggednessofhisattempttoshowhowmoralthoughtmightbeimplemented

withinanaturalhumanmind.Fromthebeginning,Hutcheson’sattentivenessto

contemporaryepistemologyofferedsomethingnewtohisreadership.Thiswas276Harris,“Religion,”206.SeealsoAhnert,HeathenMoralists,53.277Harris,“Religion,”206.Thismaywellbetrue,but,whenHarrissaysthat‘intwoofHutcheson’smostclearlyprogrammaticstatementsofhisphilosophicalambitions’,the‘Reflections’letter(TwoTextsinthisthesis)andhisinaugurallecture,citedinthepreviouschapter,that‘themoralsenseisnotsomuchasmentioned’,heismistaken.The‘Reflections’letter,itistrue,doesnotmentionthemoralsense,althoughHutchesondidreferbrieflyto‘qualitiesofmind’thatequatetothemoralsense.Inhisinaugurallecturethough,aswehavejustseen,Hutcheson’sconcernwastodescribeinsomedetail,thewayinwhichtheactionofthemoralsenseallowsustocultivateournaturalvirtue.

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nothisappealtoamoralsenseperse.Itwasthelevelofdetailwithwhich

Hutcheson’smoralsensewasspecifiedasanaturalprincipleofmindwhichwas

novelforanearlyeighteenth-centuryaudience.Cudworth’streatiseoninnatist

epistemologywasnotpublisheduntil1731and,inanycase,didnotconcern

itselfprimarilywithmoralepistemology.HenryMore’s‘boniformfaculty’was

moreastatementofthecontentsofanotionalmoralsensethananattemptto

embedthatfacultyinanaturalmind.Similarly,Shaftesbury‘sstrikinganalogyof

moralitywithharmonyandaestheticsandhissearchingtheoryofcharacter

developmentwasnotconcernedwiththedetailsofacognitivepsychologyof

moraljudgmentperse.278Overthecourseofhislifetime,andoftenunder

pressurefromcriticalcommentary,itwasHutchesonwhosoughttoprovidea

naturalimplementationofmoralknowledgewithinacontemporarytheoryof

mind.

Hutchesonhadtotreadacarefullinebetweeninsistingontheoriginal

providentiallyimplanted(‘natural’)characterofhismoralsense,whilestill

attemptingtoavoidadirectappealtoinnateideationalorpropositional

content.279Hisapproachtothenotionofamoralsenseneedstobereadasavery

deliberatebalanceoftheepistemologicalpossibilitiesofferedbytheterm‘sense’.

HutchesonwascommittedtotheAristotelian/Lockeanideaofsenseasthe

original‘inlet’ofallourideas.Thiswasthestartingpointofhisattemptto

explaintheflowofinformationaboutvirtuethroughahumanmind.Hewas

though,equallykeentopremiseourmoralcognitiononasenseofvirtuethat

providesakindofinbornguidancethatcannotbeexplainedfurther,atleastuntil

wehavebeenledtoanappreciationoftheexistenceofGod.

OnedebateaboutthenatureofHutcheson’smoralperceptions,whichbegan

immediatelyafterthepublicationofthefirsteditionoftheInquiry,concerned

(andstillconcerns)thequestionofwhatHutcheson’sideasfrommoralsense

deliveredtous.Therehavebeenvariousapproachestoansweringthisquestion.

278AnthonyAshleyCooper,CharacteristicsofMen,Manners,Opinions,Times,ed.LawrenceKline(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1999).279ThisisalinethatHutchesondidnottreadsuccessfullyforhiscriticssuchasGaywhoaccusedhimofrevertingtotheuseofinnateideas.SeeGay,Dissertation,xiv.

117

Inthemorerecentsecondaryliterature,therewasanattemptbyNortonto

defendHutchesonasholdingarealist,cognitivistpositionbecauseHutcheson’s

moralperceptionsweresaidtobe‘concomitantideas’ofobjectivemoral

qualitiesofintentionsoractions,whereother‘concomitant’ideas,suchas

extension,figure,motionandrest,butespeciallythoseofdurationandnumber,

provideduswithideasofprimaryqualitiesofobjects.280Winkler,following

RichardPrice,counteredthattheseideaswerebetterreadasideasofsecondary

qualities,suchasourideasofcolour.Assuchtheydidnotdirectlyrepresent(to

us)anyqualityinherentinobjectsthemselves(i.e.inactors,theirintentionsor

actions).Rathertheyreflectedaprovidentiallyinstitutedrelationshipbetween

variousqualitiesinthoseobjectsandthehumanmind.Thisrelationship,

however,offerednoguaranteethattheperceptionofsuchsecondaryqualities

representedanythingexternaltoourownminds.281

ThisdebatewaspartofanattempttospeaktothequestionofHutcheson’smoral

realism.Thereare,however,otherquestionsthatarisefromconsidering

Hutcheson’sepistemologyinrelationtothismatter,whichissuefromthe

frameworkoftheepistemologicallogicsoftheseventeenthandeighteenth

century.IntheInquiryandtheEssay/IllustrationsHutchesonmadefrequent

implicitreferencetothejudgingcapacityofthemoralsenseinhisuseofthe

termsapprobationandcondemnation,theapprover,approvedandsoon.The

rhetoricaltensionbetweenHutcheson’scharacterisationofourmoralresponses

asasense–thatisadeliverysystemforthebasicideaofsomething‒andthe

abilityofthosesameideastoofferamoraljudgment,waspresentfromthefirst.

Hutcheson’sgreattaskwastoexplainnotonlyhowwereceivemoralideas,but

alsohowtheexperienceofmoralevaluationmightconstituteamoraljudgment.

Hutcheson’slaterpublishedworks,hisSystemandShortIntroduction,were

manifestlypreoccupiedwiththisquestion,butifthereisasuggestionthatthis

tensiondoesnotarisebeforeHutchesonmadeanovertattempttointegratehis

ideasfrommoralsensewithintheframeworkofnaturallaw,thenIdonot

believethistohavebeenthecase.ImaintainthatHutchesonwasthinkingabout

280SeeNorton,“Hutcheson’sMoralRealism,”forexample281SeeWinkler,“AllegedRealism”and“Color,”forexample.

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variouspossibilitiesintherelationbetweensenseandjudgmentthroughouthis

timeinDublininthe1720s,andthatthiscanbeseeninhisfourtreatisesand,

especially,inhisMetaphysicsandLogic.

Thequestioniswhetherornotasensecandeliverajudgment(leavingtoone

side,forthemoment,thematterofthenatureofthequalityintheobjectthatis

beingsensed,perceivedorjudged).ThisquestionispertinenttoHutcheson

because,aswesawinchapter1,therewereseveralwaysinwhichthefirmness

oftheboundarybetweensenseandjudgmenthadbeentestedinthe

epistemologicallogicsofideas.Itwillbeimportanttobearinmindherethat

knowledgeintheearlymodernerawascharacterisedaseitherrationalintuition

intothetruthofself-evidentprinciples,ortheindubitableperceptionofthe

relationshipbetweentwoideas.Knowledgewasdifferentinkindtobelief.282

Judgmentinknowledge(intuitiveknowledge),asopposedtoprobabilistic

judgmentinvolvedinbeliefformationwas,aswesawintheintroductory

chapter,markedlyperceptualincharacterforLocke.283Inaddition,Locke

namedtheideasproducedbythepowerofanexternalorinternalsenseasboth

perceptionsandideasfromsense.Hutchesontoo,usedbothsenseand

perceptiontodescribetheideasfromhismoralsense.Hutcheson’s

contemporaries,hisrationalistcriticsGilbertBurnetandBalguy,objectedto

Hutcheson’spremisingvirtueuponthetraditionalnon-epistemicfunctionofa

sense,preferringtoseetheactofjudgmentinknowledge,howeverperceptualor

intuitiveincharacter,astheproperbasisformoralknowledge.

InthischapterIwillexplorethreewaysinwhichHutchesonmayhave

understoodhisideasfrommoralsensetodeliverajudgmentastothemoral

valueofanaction.SupportforallthreeisfoundinHutcheson’sMetaphysicsand

Logic,readalongsidethefourtreatises.First,Iargue,thatthedirectionof

Hutcheson’sthoughtmayhavereflectedtheweakenedboundarybetweensense

orperceptionandjudgmentdiscussedinchapter1.Aswesawinthatchapter,

282SeeMariaRosaAntognazza,“TheBenefittoPhilosophyoftheStudyofitsHistory,”BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy23,no.1(2015):168.283Belief,forLocke,wasamatterofprobablejudgmentandtheweighingofevidence.SeeLocke,ECHU,4:15and16,652-668.

119

bythelateseventeenthcenturytherewereanumberofwaysinwhichhavingan

ideaofsensation(aperceptionfromeitheraninternaloranexternalsense)

mighthavebeensaideithertoinvolveajudgment,ortofunctionasajudgment,

andIwillrefertobacksomeoftheselaterinthischapter.

Second,IarguethatHutcheson’sresponsetohisrationalistcritics,whodecried

thesensory,andbytheirdefinitionthenon-epistemicnatureoftheideasfrom

moralsense,canbeseenintheEssay/Illustrations(andinlaterrevisionsto

both).284Here,Hutchesonbothre-examinedtheroleofreasoninthestages

priorandsubsequenttotheemergenceofanideaofmoralsense,andhe

continuedtoappealtotheepistemicfunctionofasense,whichisalsoa

judgment.IwillarguethatHutchesonshiftedthejudgingfunctionontoour

preparatoryconsciousreasoning,butthenyokedtheoperationofthemoral

sensetotheresultsofthatjudgment.Thisentailedthatourreasoningeither

causedustohaveamoralperception,orthatourmoralperceptionsemerged

fromthispreparatoryreasoning.Inthiscase,theboundarybetweensenseand

judgmentremainedintact.Iwillarguetheepistemicburdenfallsonto

preparatoryreasoning,butthatitdoessoinsuchawayastoinvalidate

Hutcheson’sanalogybetweenthemoralsenseandthesenseofbeauty,and

comesclosetoinvalidatinghisclaimthatwedonotneedareasonedcriterionof

moralgoodnesstojudgeby.Third,IconsidertheontologyofHutcheson’sideas

ofmoralsense.Iwillarguethatthese‘internalideas’,gotbytheoperationofa

‘reflexive’sense,wereheldbyHutchesontodelivertous‘intellectualideas’of

the‘truepropertiesofman’.IwillexplainthewayinwhichIthinkHutcheson

claimedthatthesewereideasof‘true’properties.Thechaptercloseswitha

discussionoftheimplicationsofthematerialpresentedinthischapterfor

Hutcheson’s‘allegedrealism’.

InthenextsectionIprovideanintroductiontoHutcheson’smoralepistemology.

284Gill,BritishMoralists,156-167,hasanaccountofthewaysinwhichHutchesonrespondedtohisrationalistcritics’commentsontheInquiryintheEssay/Illustrations.SeealsoPeach,introduction,Illustrations,3-100.Inthischapter,IlookattheimplicationsofHutcheson’spositionintheEssay/IllustrationsandrevisionstotheInquiryfortherequirementforconsciousawarenessintheformationofjudgments–thisdoesnotrelatetoBurnet’scomments,butdoesitformpartoftheargumentthatGayhaswithHutcheson,seeChapter6.

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Hutcheson’ssenseofbeautyandhismoralsense

ThefoundationofHutcheson’sapproachwaslaidoutintheInquiry.Init,

Hutchesonproposedtwinpowersofdisinterestedperceptionmadeavailable

throughaninnersense,onefortheappreciationofbeauty,theotherforvirtue.

Hutchesonbeganwithaninquiryintoaestheticstoestablishthatwehavea

natural,'internal'senseofbeauty.Thissenseisrealisedinaninnate‘power'to

receiveanideaofbeauty,however,

aninternalsensenomorepresupposesaninnateidea,orprincipleofknowledgethantheexternal.285

Therearetwotypesofbeautythatwerespondto.286Thefirstis‘originalor

absolutebeauty’thatrespondstoshapes,naturalobjects,orscenes,and

theorems.Thesecondis‘comparativeorrelativebeauty’thatrespondstothe

visualarts-paintings,sculptureandsoonthatdepictnaturalobjectsandwhich

arefoundbeautifultotheextentthattheyimitatewhatwefindbeautifulin

nature.Hutchesonopenedwithhisaccountofabsolutebeauty,whichisfollowed

byachapteronthebeautyoftheorems.Hespentfourteenpagesexplainingour

absolutesenseofbeautyandfouronthesenseofrelativebeauty.

Weexperiencethereceptionofthisideaofabsolutebeautyasacharacteristic

andspecificpleasure,asweencounter'objectsofcontemplation',fromnatural

bodiestotheorems,whichthissenseperceivesasinstancingsomeratioor

relationofuniformitytovariety,

whatwecallbeautifulinobjects,tospeakinthemathematicalstyle,seemstobeinacompoundratioofuniformityandvariety.287

Oursenseofbeautyarisesimmediatelyandnecessarilyonperceptionofthis

quality.Itisanon-volitionalact,whichHutchesonequatedwiththepowerto

receiveideasfromexternalsenses.Itisnotestablishedbyconvention.Wecan

285Hutcheson,Inquiry,67.286PeterKivy,TheSeventhSense:FrancisHutchesonandEighteenthCenturyBritishAesthetics(Oxford:ClarendonPress,2003),isthebestaccountofHutcheson’ssenseofbeauty.SeealsoPeterJ.E.Kail.“FunctionandNormativityinHutcheson’sAestheticEpistemology,”BritishJournalofAesthetics40(2000):441-451.287Hutcheson,Inquiry,29.

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neither'will'ourselvestofindanobjectbeautiful,nortoexperiencethe

pleasuresofbeauty.Suchexquisiteperceptions,moreover,arenotcausedbyour

knowledgeoftheformalaspectsofobjects.

Thissuperiorpowerofperceptionisjustlycalledasense,becauseofitsaffinitytotheothersensesinthis,thatthepleasuredoesnotarisefromanyknowledgeofprinciples,proportions,causes,oroftheusefulnessoftheobject;butstrikesusatfirstwiththeideaofbeauty:nordoesthemostaccurateknowledgeincreasethispleasureofbeauty.288

Ourideasofbeautydonotresultfromourknowledgeof,orconsciousreflection

upon,theprincipleofuniformityamidstvariety.Inthisway,wefindourselves

aestheticallydumbfounded.

Butinalltheseinstancesofbeautyletitbeobserved,thatthepleasureiscommunicatedtothosewhoneverreflectedonthisgeneralfoundation;andthatallhereisallegedisthis,“thatthepleasantsensationarisesonlyfromobjects,inwhichthereisuniformityamidstvariety:”Wemayhavethesensationwithoutknowingwhatistheoccasionofit;asaman’stastemaysuggestideasofsweets,acids,bitters,tho’hebeignorantoftheformsofthesmallbodies,ortheirmotionswhichexcitetheseperceptionsinhim.289

Ourexperienceofbeautyarisesaswereceiveideasfromexternalsensationof

thecomplexideasofbodies,orofshapesorofequations.Likelaughter,in

Hutcheson’saccount,oursenseofbeautyisfunctional.290Hutchesondevoted

mostofhisfirstInquiry(otherthanthesectionswhichexplainthenatureofan

internalsense)toexplainingthefunctionofthissenseofabsolutebeauty.Ithad

beengiftedtousinorderthatwemightbemotivatedtodiscoverthefew'simple

generalcauses'atworkintheuniverse.Wereacruelanddeceitfulcreatorto

haveimplantedacontraryloveoftheirregularobjectorparticulartruth,sucha

'contrarysense'wouldhaveleadusawayfromunderstandingthewaysinwhich

theuniverseworks.291Providentialpurposeingrantingusasenseofbeautythat

respondedtouniformityingeometricalshapes,naturalfeaturesofthephysical

288Ibid.,25.289Ibid.,35.290Hutcheson’sapproachtolaughteristeleological,ashelookstothemoralgooditmightdous.Headdressesthequestionoftheseveralfunctionsofridiculeandlaughter,forexamplewhenitarisesgoodnaturedlytoarrestourenthusiasticpassionsofthingsand,citingMalebranche,tolaughusoutof‘smallervices’.Hutcheson,“RemarksuponLaughterandRemarksupontheFableoftheBees,”OperaMinor,97-170.291Hutcheson,Inquiry,80.

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worldandmathematicaltheorems,wastoexciteustoaneffectivesearchfor

knowledge.Discoveringalltheuniformityamidstallthevarietyintheworldisa

sourceofpleasuretous,anditleadsustothediscoveryofgeneraltruths.We

maybeaestheticallydumbfounded,aswedonotnecessarilyappreciatethatthis

principleisthesourceofourpleasure.But,evenifwedoappreciatethisfact,this

knowledgedoesnotitselfcauseourideaofbeauty.292Itisthepleasurewederive

fromanencounterwithuniformityamidstvariety,Hutchesonargued,which

motivatesustoseekoutthatwhichisuniformandgenerallytrue.

Hutcheson'sclearintentionwasthatoursenseofbeautyandoursenseofmoral

beautyweretobeseenasoperatinginananalogical,ifnotidentical,manner.On

thequestionsofinnatismanddisinterest,forexample,Hutchesonnotedthe

following:

Wearenottoimagine,thatthismoralsense,morethantheothersenses,supposesanyinnateideas,knowledgeorpracticalproposition:wemeanbyitonlyadeterminationofourmindstoreceiveamiableordisagreeableideasofactions,whentheyoccurtoourobservation,antecedenttoanyopinionofadvantageorlosstoredoundtoourselvesfromthem;evenaswearepleasedwitharegularform,oranharmoniouscomposition,withouthavinganyknowledgeofmathematics.293

Oursenseofvirtueisexperiencedinusasanimmediate,non-volitional,

pleasurable,approvalofcertainkindsofintentions.Wefeelapprovalorhavean

ideaofmoralapprobationonlywhenweperceiveabenevolentintention.Where

intentionsaremixed,forexampleifwewanttoexperiencethepleasureofmoral

approvalandactfromkindaffectionstowardsothers,werespondtotherelative

proportionsoftheintentionsbehindactions.Weapproveofanactorwhenever

herintentiontoincreasethenaturalgoodothersreceive,exceedsthebenefitshe

intendstoaccrueforherself.294 Justasoursenseofbeautyrequiresthatweuse

reasontoacquiretheideasofthevisualscene,objectortheorembeforeus,we

alsousereasontounderstandtheactionandtheintentionbehindit.Fromthis292SeePeterKivy,“ThePerceptionofBeautyinHutcheson’sFirstInquiry:AResponsetoJamesShelley,”BritishJournalofAesthetics47,no.4(2007):416-431.SeeJamesShelley,“AestheticsandtheWorldatLarge,”BritishJournalofAesthetics47,no.2(2007):169-183,foracontraryviewoftheepistemicnatureofourideasofbeauty.293Hutcheson,Inquiry,100.294SeeDouglasR.Paletta,“FrancisHutcheson:WhyBeMoral?”JournalofScottishPhilosophy9(2011):149–159,onmixedmotivation.

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reasonedanalysisoftheintentionoftheactor,whichcouldsometimesbe

surmisedfromitsresults,theideasofthemoralsensetakerise.

Butinthese,andinallotherinstancesofthelike,theapprobationisfoundedonbenevolence,becauseofsomereal,orapparenttothepublicgood.Forwearenottoimaginethatthissenseshouldgiveuswithoutobservation,ideasofcomplexactions,ortheirnaturaltendencytogoodorevil:itonlydeterminesustoapprovebenevolencewheneveritappearsinanyactionandtohatethecontrary.Sooursenseofbeauty,doesnotwithoutreflection,instruction,orobservation,giveusideasoftheregularsolids,temples,cirquesandtheatres;butdeterminesustoapproveanddelightinuniformityamidstvariety,whereverweobserveit.295[Myemphasis.]

Allourmoralideasareacquiredfirstthroughthismoralsense,andnotinthe

firstplacebyreasoningaboutwhatthemoralgoodmightbe.Asmoral

spectators,wesimplyhavetheexperienceofapprovalordisapproval.

Hutcheson,inthe1729and1738revisionstotheInquiry,madeitclearthatthis

experiencewastheresultofbothanideaofsomethingandafeelingofpleasure

ordispleasure.

Theadmiredqualityisconceivedastheperfectionoftheagent,andassuchaoneisdistinctfromthepleasureeitherintheagentortheapprover,tho’‘tisasuresourceofpleasuretotheagent.Theperceptionoftheapprovertho’attendedwithpleasure,plainlyrepresentssomethingquitedistinctfromthispleasure;evenastheperception.Thismaypreventmanycavilsuponthissubject.296[Myemphasis.]

IntheMetaphysics,Isuggest,thisrepresentationofthe‘admired’qualityis

revealedtobean‘adequateidea’ofthe‘trueproperties’ofman.Thiswillbe

discussedlateroninthechapter.Inthenextsection,Iwillexaminesomeofthe

waysinwhichHutchesonmighthaveunderstoodhisideasfrommoralsense,or

moralperceptions,tofunctionasjudgments.

Theboundarybetweensenseandjudgment

So,tobeginwith,howmightHutchesonhaveconceivedofsensoryjudgment?

PeterKailproposesthatHutcheson,inhisfourtreatises,usedanunderstanding

ofthefunctionalroleofsensoryideasofnaturalpleasureandpainsfoundin

295Hutcheson,Inquiry,139.296Hutcheson,Inquiry,seeLeidhold,textualnotes,222.

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DescartesanddevelopedmorefullyinMalebranche.Accordingtothisreading,

sensoryideasthatgiveuspleasantandunpleasantexperiences,determineusin

abrutefashiontopursueoravoidtheobjectthatprovokedthem.Thefunctionof

asensoryideaistopredisposetheagenttopursuenaturalgoodsthatwere

beneficialtoherhealth.Byprovidentialdesign,pleasuresandpainshadbeen

associated,respectively,withthatwhichtendedtowardsoursurvivalandthat

whichwaslikelytojeopardiseit.Forexample,pleasanttastesinformusofwhat

isinfactgoodforourbody,andunpleasanttastestelluswhatshouldbeavoided.

Asthetastesarepleasantorunpleasanttoustheyelicita‘dispositionto

appropriatebehaviour’.Thismotivationalcharge,however,anditsassociated

behaviouralimpulse,asKailpointsout,shouldnotbeunderstoodasbeing

representedbyanybeliefentertainedbypracticalreason.Reactingtoapainful

stimulusshouldnot,Kailargues,beexplainedbyourbeliefsaboutwhatis

painful,andastandingdesiretoavoidpain.297Kailcitesareferencein

Hutcheson’sEssaytothisaccountoftheroleofbodilysensations.

Nowourreason,orknowledgeoftherelationsofexternalthingstoourbodies,issoinconsiderable,thatitisgenerallysomepleasantsensationwhichteachesuswhattendstotheirpreservation;andsomepainfulsensationwhichshowswhatispernicious.298

HegoesontoarguethatHutcheson’ssenseofbeautyandmoralsensewere

supposedtofunctioninthisway–asahedonicsignaltousofthepresenceof

goodorevilinourownintentions(orintheintentionsofothers)which

motivatesouractionswithoutourunderstandingwhathascausedthis–wejust

sensethegoodandpursueit.Wedon’tcarryoutaformaljudgmenthere,rather

thejudgingfunctionisjustbuiltintotheexperienceofpleasureorpain.

Kail’saccountisattractive,thesemioticfunctionofsensoryideas,including

pleasuresandpainswaswellattestedtointheearlymodernera,especiallywith

respecttoourlowerfaculties.Kail’sviewmightholdforthenotionofamoral

senseasHutchesonpresenteditinthefirsteditionofhisInquiry.Itwillnothold

entirely,oratleastitfallsdownincertainplaces,ifwelookatthedevelopment

297PeterJ.E.Kail,“Hutcheson'sMoralSense:Skepticism,RealismandSecondaryQualities,”HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly18(2001):62.298Hutcheson,Essay,45.

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ofHutcheson’sthoughtasitispresentedintheEssay/Illustrationsandthe

revisionsHutchesonmadetotheInquiry.Hutcheson’saccountofmoral

motivationwasdevelopedintheEssay/IllustrationsfromwhichKail’squotation

istaken.Init(asdiscussedintheprecedingchapter)Hutchesonarguedthatthe

moralsensecouldnotmotivateusdirectlytomoralaction(inthefour

treatises).299Thishadtobemotivateddirectlybyadesiretoachievegoodfor

othersandnotbytheprospectofgarneringpleasurableself-approbation.What

wouldmoveustoanactionwas,inanycase,eitheradesireorapassion,andnot

anideafromsensationorreasoninanyform.Desiresandaversions,evenmoral

ones,wereraisedbytheperceptionofnaturalpleasureandpains–inthecaseof

moralmotivation,adesiretoaccruenaturalgoodforothers.Passions,whichdid

involveideasofpleasureandpain,werea‘brutalimpulseofthewill’andassuch,

mightpreoccupyustotheextentthatweareunabletoformatrueopinionofthe

naturalgoodandevil,orpleasureandpain.Passionsdidnothavetoaimata

knowngood.IfHutchesonhadheldasimilarviewofthefunctionofbodily

sensationstothatofMalebrancheandDescartesthenourresultingbehavioural

dispositionswouldhavebeenpassionateinnature.Butourdesireswerenot

passionsorappetites,asHutchesonmadeclearintheEssay.300Desireswere

formedonthestrengthofabeliefabouttheextenttowhichagoodispresentin

anobject.Pureorcalmdesires,foruniversalbenevolenceorforourown

greatesthappiness,lackedanypassionateelementandwereformedfor

whateverwasrationallyapprehendedasgood.301Kail,inhisanalogous

treatmentofHutcheson’ssenseofbeauty,wantstopreservethenon-epistemic

natureofHutcheson’sideasofbeauty,sohistheorycannotmoveusclosertoan

understandingofHutcheson’smoralsenseasissuinginajudgment.

Bythetimeofhisinaugurallecturein1730,Hutchesonusedthetermsmoral

sense,naturaljudgments,conscience,andrulingprincipleinterchangeably.In

thislecture,andinhisaccountintheMetaphysicsofareflexivesenseof‘the

fittingandthegood’thatpassedjudgment‘asfromthebench’,Hutchesonaimed

299Darwall,InternalOught,takesmuchtroubletodemonstratethis,223-237(althoughnotinrelationtoKail’sthesis).300Hutcheson,Essay,67.301SeeDarwall,InternalOught,225.

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explicitlyatacombinationofthereportingfunctionsofsensoryideaswiththe

epistemicnatureofajudgment.HutchesonblamedLocke,aswesaw,forthe

reluctancetoinvestigate‘naturalideas,apprehensions,judgements,andthe

naturalsenseofanythingwhatever’.302Whereas‘theancients’,Hutchesonnoted,

withoutexceptionsaidthatallideas,apprehensions,andjudgmentswhichweformaboutthingsundertheguidanceofnatureatwhateverstagethismayoccur,orwhicharereceivedbyanyofthefacultiesofournaturemoreorlessnecessarilyanduniversally,areinnate.303

Hutcheson,by1730,haddecideddefinitivelytoelevatehisnativemoralsense

fromthemeansbywhichourmoralideasaregenerated,tothepositionof

ButlerianconscienceorStoic‘hegemonikon’.Thisentailedthatourmoralideas

nolongersimplyprovideduswithan‘instinctiveappreciation’ofcertainmoral

qualitiesinintentions,butnowappearedtobecapableofregulatingourchoice,

orpotentialchoice,ofpassionsordesiresuponwhichtoact.Whatever

Hutcheson’snaturaljudgmentswere,theyclearlydidnotfunctionsimplyasa

bruteprovocationtoaction.Hutchesonhadtobalancehiscommitmenttothe

sensoryoriginsofourmoralideaswiththejudicialpre-eminencehewishedto

assigntoitasthepropergovernorofthesoul.

Hutcheson,however,couldneverabandontheelementsofhisaccountofmoral

sensethathadgivenhimtheresourcestopronounceourmoralreactions

universally‘natural’,byappealtotheirimmediacyandnon-voluntarinessand

theirnecessity.Heneededtoretainthesefeaturesinordertoargueagainstthe

ideathewillisabletodeterminejudgment.‘Almosteveryoneagreesthatwedo

notjudgeathingisthiswayorthatwaybecausewesowantedtojudge’,he

insistedinhisMetaphysics.304Naturaljudgmentsneededtobenecessary,inthe

senseoftheirbeinginvoluntary,andnotmadeaccordingtoourownwill,and,as

such,couldnotbealtereddirectlybyreasoning.

DanielCareyarguesthatHutchesonneededtokeepmoraljudgmentcoincidental

withthe‘momentofperception’inordertoinsulateitfromMandevilliansocial

302Hutcheson,inaugurallecture,212.303Ibid.,212.304Hutcheson,Metaphysics,124.

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corruptionandtoclaimtemporalpriority(its‘instantness’)overClarke’smoral

reason.305ThepointaboutMandevilleiswelltaken.Thepointabouttemporal

prioritywillbediscussedinthenextchapter.Themainreason,Isuggest,that

Hutchesoncouldnotabandonthesensorycharacterofthemoralsensewas

becausehecontinuedtodenyinnateideasandpropositionsaroleinmoral

thoughtinthefourtreatises.Despitehisreferencestonaturalideasand

judgmentsintheinaugurallecture(andcomplaintsthatLockeans‘alone’

describedthemasinnate),Hutcheson,inallhisrevisionstotheInquiryandthe

Essay/Illustrations(orintheSystemandShortIntroduction),neveractually

revokedhisdenialthathismoralsenseoperatedaccordingtoinnateideas,

principlesorknowledge.ThismeantthatHutcheson,throughoutthe1720sand

beyond,hadtohavehadanunderstanding(oratleasthopedtohavean

understanding)ofhowajudgmentmightbenaturaltous,andyetstillnotfall

foulofthechargeofnativism.

Ialsodon’tthinkthatHutchesonneededaparticulartargethereinordertoblur

thedistinctionbetweensenseperceptionandjudgment,ortomakethem

coincident,althoughIagreecompletelywithCareythathesoughttoretain

characteristicsofboth.306IsuggestthatHutcheson’saccountofasensethat

judgedderivedfromthecontextofthebreakdownoftraditionalmentalact

theorywhichDescartes,Locke,thePort-Royalists,Aldrichandmanyothers

retained.Themarriageofamentalactstructurewiththelogicofideas,as

discussedinChapter1,wasputunderparticularstraininaccountsofperception.

Aswesaw,Locke’sperceptualtheoryofintuitiveanddeductiveknowledgehad

alreadyputthetraditionaldemarcationofperceptionorapperception,and

judgmentatrisk.Locke’sappealtotheself-evidentpropositionsthatwere

formedwheneverwemadeabasicsensorydistinction(thatwhiteisnotblack,

forexample)furtherbreachedthebanks.Theroleofunnoticedinferenceinbasic

305Carey,Locke,ShaftesburyandHutcheson,166.SeealsoDanielCarey,“FrancisHutcheson’sPhilosophyandtheScottishEnlightenment:Reception,Reputation,andLegacy,”inScottishPhilosophyintheEighteenthCentury,Volume1:Morals,Politics,Art,Religioned.AaronGarrettandJamesA.Harris(Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2015),36-76.306Thisisdiscussedfurtherattheendofthepresentchapter.

128

visualperceptionmeantthat,atleastinthecaseofthree-dimensionalvisual

perception,judgment,incertainepistemologicallogics,wasonitswayto

becomingaReidiansense.Berkeley’s’objectionstoCartesianaccountsof

judgmentindepthperceptionandhispsychologyofnaturalsignsinwhich

experienceworksonnaturallygivencueswerealsomentioned,although

Berkeleyinsistedthatthetraditionalboundarybetweensenseandjudgmentbe

retained.307Introspectivepsychology,whetherofmentaloperationsor

associativeconnections,though,isnorespecterofinferentialrelations,andthe

wayofideascouldnotsustainastrictdemarcationbetweensense,perception

andjudgmentbyappealtotheintrospectionofmentalevents.

Winklerarguesthatthereweretwostrainsofthoughtwithrespecttojudgment

intheeighteenthcentury.Thefirstwasamoveto'downgrade'judgmentto

sensation,promulgatedbyCondillacandHume,workingfromaperceptual

approachtoknowledgeandusingassociationorsuggestiontoaccountforbelief.

Thesecond,conversely,wastheapproachtakenbyReidandKantto'upgrade'

sensation.Thisentailedeithertheincorporationofjudgmentaspartofeveryact

ofsensation(Reid)ortheacknowledgementthatthecombinatorialfunctionof

judgmentoccurredpriorto,oralongsidethehavingofasensation(Kant).308

Accordingtothefirstunderstandinganactofjudgmentproceedslikeanactof

perception.Accordingtotheseconditissuesaverdictonajudgmentcandidate

broughtbeforeit.WinklerarguesthatHutcheson’sconceptionofjudgment(not

moraljudgment),aspresentedinhisLogic,wasclearly‘verdicative’.Itwas,

Winklermaintains,basedonHenryAldrich’slogicandassuch,wasbothamark

ofhisdistancefromLocke’sperceptualaccountofjudgmentinknowledge,andof

his(Hutcheson’s)commitmenttoatraditionalapproachtothedemarcationof

mentalacts.309ItistruethatinthestatementinHutcheson’sLogicjudgment

appearsasthesecondactinthetraditionalhierarchyofmentalacts,which

beginswithapprehension.

307SeeKennethWinkler,“Ideas,PerceptionandJudgment,”inTheCambridgeHistoryofEighteenth-CenturyPhilosophy,ed.KnudHaakonssen(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),262.308Winkler,“Ideasandperceptions,”262-264.309Ibid.,265-266.

129

Judgmentisanactofthemindbywhichitformsanopinionabouttwoideas.310

IdonotagreewithWinkler’ssuggestionthatHutcheson’snotionofjudgmentis

verdicativebecausehesoughttomaintaintheboundarybetweenthefirstand

secondmentalacts.IbelievethatHutchesonwaswellawareofthevariousways

inwhichtheboundarybetweenthetwomightbelessthandistinct,andthathe

understoodjudgmenttohavebeenincorporatedintosensation,atleastwith

respecttosomejudgments,moralorotherwise.Reid’slaterpetitiontonatural

languageinordertoclaimthatsensealwaysinvolvedjudgmentsimplyfollowed

suit.Careydoesnotrefertoearlymodernaccountsofperceptionbuthe

mentionsbrieflythatHutchesonhad‘effectivelyadopted[Reid’s]linewithout

expresslydeclaringit’.311IthinkitisjustaslikelythatReidadoptedHutcheson’s

line,withoutexpresslydeclaringit.

Hutcheson'sstatementonthecapacityofthedeliverancesofthemoralsense

(thesenseof'thefittingandthegood')todeliveraverdictwasalsofoundinhis

Metaphysics.

Ofallthesereflexivesensesthemostnotableisthesenseofthefittingandthegood,whichpassesjudgmentasfromthebenchonallthethingsmendo,onallourpleasuresofbodyormind,onouropinions,sentiments,actions,prayers,intentions,andfeelings,determiningineachcasewhatisfine,fittingandgood,andwhatisthemeasureineach.312

‘Reflexivesense’asatermforthemoralsensedidnotappearinthefour

treatises,althoughthemoralsensewasconsideredaninternalsenseonthe

modelofLocke’sinternalsenseofreflection.313(Thechangeinterminologywill

bediscussedlateroninthischapter.)Thisreflexivesensepassedjudgement,

here,'asfromthebench'anditclearlyassumedanunderstandingofthesense

thatinvolvedmorethanareportingfunction.Hutcheson’sthoughtsmaybe

madeclearerherebylookingathisformulationofthegeneralactofjudgmentin

theMetaphysicsinthesection‘OntheHumanMind’.

310Hutcheson,Logic,11.311Carey,“HutchesonandtheScottishEnlightenment,”57.312Hutcheson,Metaphysics,119313Hutcheson,Illustrations,16.

130

Judgment,whichiscalledthesecondoperationoftheunderstanding,canhardlybetotallydistinctfromperception.Foranabsolutejudgmentmaybesaidtobethecomplexperceptionofathingexistingatacertaintime,whichispromptedeitherdirectlybymeansofthesensesorbytheinterventionofreason,whenonediscernstheconnectionofthethingwhichisthesubjectofthejudgmentwiththethingswhichsenseshowstoexist.Abstractjudgmentsareperceptionsofrelationswhichexistbetweenthingsobserved;or,ifanyonethinksthatjudgmentsaredistinctactionsofthemind,whichneverthelessoriginateintheseperceptions,theactofjudgmentisrepresentedbyasimpleideawhichcannotbedefined.314[Myemphasis.]

HereweseethatHutchesonunderstoodthatjudgmentwasmuchcloserto

perception.Thetwoactswereblurredintheperceptionofcomplexideas

(‘absolute’judgments)andtheperceptionsofrelations(‘abstract’judgments).

Thealternative,asHutchesonpresentedithere,wasthatjudgmentswere

distinctmentalactsthat‘neverthelessoriginate’inperceptions.Hutchesonwas

wellawareoftheformaldifferencebetweenideaslinkedtogetherprovisionally

tobepresentedtojudgmentforaverdict,aswesawinhisLogic.Indeed,inthe

Illustrationsherefersdirectlytothe‘themacomplexum’,whichisaproposition

candidatepresentedtothejudgmentforadjudication.315Hedoesn’tseemtohave

beenreferringtothisprocessforthesetwoclassesofjudgment,evenifjudgment

wasconsideredasaseparateactofmind.Thesejudgments,Hutchesonsaid,

‘originate[d]intheseperceptions’.Mightanabsolutejudgmenthavebeena

moraljudgmentforHutcheson?DidHutchesonunderstandthatreasonwould

judgethepresenceofbenevolentintention(‘thesubjectofthejudgment’)and

showitsconnectiontoour(probablysimple)ideasofmoralworth(‘thethings

whichsenseshowstoexist’)?316

QuitepossiblyHutchesondidnotintendeitheroftheseparticularinstancesof

judgments,whichwerealsoperceptions,toapplytomoralthought,butthe

statementswhichappearintheLogicandtheMetaphysicsshowthathewas

314Hutcheson,Metaphysics,124.315Hutcheson,Illustrations,161.316HutchesonwaiteduntilthethirdandfourtheditionsoftheInquiry(1729,1738)tostatethathisideasfrommoralsensewere‘probablysimpleideas,whichcannotbefartherexplained’.SeeLeidhold,textualnotes,Inquiry,217.

131

morethanalerttotheblurringofthedistinctionbetweenperceptionand

judgmentasmentalacts.

AlittleearlierintheMetaphysicsinthesection‘OnBeing’Hutchesonhadlooked

atthedifferencebetweeninternalandexternalnecessity.Internalnecessityor

absolutenecessityfindsitsnecessityinthe‘verynatureofathing’and‘doesnot

dependonanywillatall’.Bothweredistinctfromexternal,orsubsequent

necessitythatnecessarilyfollowsuponsomethingelsethathasbeenposited.

Hutchesonexplainedthataperception

issaidtobenecessaryifitpresentsitselftous,whetherwewillorno;avoluntary[perception],ontheotherhand,isonewhichwecanchange,obstructorstop.Judgementisnecessary;thisiseitherbecausethenatureoftheobjectissuchthatitcannotbechangedforanyreasonsoastorenderthejudgementuntrue,orbecausetheconnectionorconflictbetweenthetermsinthestatedpositionissuchastoensurethatthepropositionwillalwaysbetrue.317

Hutchesontreatedperceptionsandjudgmentsseparatelyinthispassage,butdid

Hutcheson’scommentsonnecessaryjudgmentprovideamodelforthekindof

judgmentsthatarenecessarilydeterminedbythenatureofthingsorthe‘nature

oftheobject’?Aretheyhis‘natural’judgmentsthatare‘formedunderthe

guidanceofnature’referredtoinhisinaugurallecture?318Sothat,havingbeen

createdaswehave,wemustapprovebenevolencewhereweperceiveitbecause

thejudgmentthatbenevolenceisgoodorapprovableisnecessaryforus?Again

theevidenceisclearlylacking,butperhapsthetendencyofHutcheson’sthought

mightbeglimpsed.Bothanecessaryjudgmentandanabsoluteperception(if

theyapplyatalltoHutcheson’smoralepistemology)forcethemindto

judge/perceivethatbenevolenceisgood.

WhatIwanttoargueisthatHutchesonisworkingwithinaframeworkwherethe

statusoftheperceptionofideasofsenseandjudgmentsrelatingtothemas

distinctmentalactshasbrokendown.Thoughtscanshuttlebetweenactsof

317Hutcheson,Metaphysics,89.318Hutcheson,inaugurallecture,212.

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perceptionandactsofjudgmentintheoperationaldetailsofthedifferenttypes

ofperceptionandjudgmentthatgiverisetothesethoughts.

HutchesonalsorecognisedLocke’sclaimthathavingasensibleideacouldissue

inapropositionaljudgment.Aswesawintheintroductorychapter,Locke’sself-

evidentpropositionswereformedwhenweattendtoideasofsense.Hutcheson

toopointedoutthatuniversalassentdoesnotimplythatanaxiomisinnate,in

thesenseofitshavingbeenknownfrombirth,sincetheperceptionofanidea

fromsensationcanformanimmediateself-evidentproposition,andyetthese

ideasarenotcountedinnate(byLocke,oneimagines).

Forallwillassenttoanyproposition,includingasingularpropositionwhichconcernsanysensibleideapresentedtoit,whenthereisanobviousconnectionoroppositionbetweensubjectandpredicate;yettheseauthorssaythatsingularandsensibleideasarenotinnate.319

Furthermore,againasdiscussedinChapter1,unnoticedinferencesorjudgments

hadlongbeenunderstoodtobenecessaryforthree-dimensionalperception

giventhetwodimensionalnatureoftheretinalimage.Dowemakeanunnoticed

inferencewhenwesenseourmoralapproval?Whenwemakeanunnoticed

sensoryjudgment,wearenotawareofitbeingajudgment,forexample,our

visualexperiencejustisthree-dimensional.InthesamewaymightHutcheson

haveunderstoodthatwejustdoexperiencemoralapprovalordisapprovalonce

wehavereasonedaboutthedirectionofintentionofthemotivationofanactor?

Hutcheson’sinsistedthroughouttheInquiryandtheEssay/Illustrationsthatour

experienceofmoralapprovalorcondemnationaroseastheresultofa‘fix’dlaw

ofnature’.Assuch,Hutchesoncouldmaintain,ourmoralperceptionswere

isolatedfromtheinfluenceofwill–wecouldn’tchoosewhatweapprovedor

condemned.ThefirsttwoeditionsoftheInquiry,especially,emphasisedthe

affectiveaspectsofourreactionstoviceandvirtue.Isuggest,cautiously,thatitis

possiblethatHutchesonsawtheexperienceofmoralspectatorshipinasimilar

way.


133

TheaccountsofjudgmentinvisualperceptionofferedbyDescartesandLocke

arguedthatthesewerenon-conscious,habitual,judgments.Locke’saccountof

thisprocessisespeciallypertinenttothepresentinquiry.Locke,intheECHU,

accountedfortheoccurrenceofnon-consciousorunnoticedinferenceinthe

followingway,andextendeditsoperationtohearingandreading.

Thisisinmanycasesbyasettledhabit,inthingswhereofwehavefrequentexperience,isperformedsoconstantly,andsoquick,thatwetakethatfortheperceptionofsensationwhichisanideaformedbyourjudgment;sothatone,viz,thatofsensation,servesonlytoexcitetheother,andisscarcetakennoticeofitself;asamanwhoreadsorhearswithattentionandunderstanding,takeslittlenoticeofthecharacters,orsounds,butoftheideas,thatareexcitedinhimbythem.320[Myemphasis.]

Andshortlythereafter:

Andtherefore‘tisnotsostrange,thatourmindshouldoftenchangetheideaofitssensation,intothatofitsjudgment,andmakeoneserveonlytoexcitetheother,withoutourtakingnoticeofit.321[Myemphasis.]

Hutcheson’spositionisthatourideasfrommoralsense(andbeauty)arisefrom

theworkoftheminduponideasfromexternalsensation(theyarereflexivein

thissense).ForLocke,weinitiallyperformajudgmentuponanideafrom

sensation(inordertojudgethatadiscisasphere,orasoundisaword),butthis

soonbecomeshabitualsothatthepresentationofthoseideasfromsense’excite’

thejudgment(sphereorword)andwedonotnoticethatwejudge,wejust

‘sense’orexperienceasphereoraword.

OnthisreadingofHutcheson’saccount,wemay,presumably,firstthinkaboutan

actor’smotivationandbecomeawarethatwefeelpleasureinresponsetosome

ofthesethoughts.Atsomepoint,presumably,wejudgethatthispleasantfeeling

isourideaofmoralapproval(aswesaw,Hutchesonmadeitclearthatourmoral

ideascontainarepresentationalelement,whichisdistinctfromthepleasure).In

thisway,afterrepeatedjudgments,thejudgmentthatthispleasantfeelingisthe

experienceorsignofourmoralapprovalbecomeshabitualandunnoticed-thus

wesimply‘sense’ourmoralapproval.320Locke,ECHU,2:9:9,146321Ibid.,2:2:10,147

134

InthissectionIhaveexaminedanumberofwaysinwhichHutcheson

acknowledgedthatthedistinctionbetweentheactsofsenseandjudgmentwas

notabsolute,sothattheactofperceptionmightalsoinvolvesomeaspectsofan

actofjudgment.InthenextsectionIturntotheroleofreasoninHutcheson’s

account.Here,Ibelieve,Hutchesonlefttheboundarybetweensenseand

judgmentintact(officially)buthasmoralperceptionsemerging,orarising,from

ajudgment.Thisstrategy,Isuggest,wasconceivedinordertodealwithany

chargeofinnatism,butitcontradictedHutcheson’sowncommitmenttothe

awarenessprinciple.

Reason,awarenessandprinciples

ForLocke,whatevertheprinciplesorrulesbywhichourmindsareabletosense

orjudgeanything,andregardlessofwhetherweareabletodiscoverthemby

science,ourexplicitknowledgeoftheseprincipleswillnot,inthefirstinstance,

causeustobeabletosenseorjudge.322Locke,intheECHU,objectedtotheuseof

implicitprinciples,bywhichwenon-consciouslyjudge,aspartofhisrebuttalof

thedispositionalnativism.Lockewasopposedtotheideathatwemightusean

implicitlyheldspeculativegeneralprinciplethatwewerenotawareof(e.g.‘a

thingcannotbeandnotbe’)inordertojudgeaparticularproposition(e.g.‘that

greenisnotred’).Lockearguedhiscasehereonthegroundsthatwehad,as

Descarteshadagreed,fullawarenessofallthatpassedinourminds.323‘No

propositioncanbesaidtobeinthemind,whichitneveryetknew,whichitwas

neverconsciousof’,saidLocke.324Lockealso,ofcourse,deniedtheoperationof

implicitlyheldpracticalprinciplesinmoralreasoning.Lockeinsistedthatwe

judgedanactororactionwithconsciousreferencetooneofthreeknownlaws

(divine,civiloropinion).

322DeRosaprovidesanexcellentaccountofLocke’srebuttalofdispositionalnativismhere.Itisshewhocoinstherequirementforconsciousawarenessthe‘awarenessprinciple’in“Locke,question-begging,”82-110.323Locke,ECHU,1:2:22,60.SeedeRosa,ibid.,86.324SeeLocke,ECHU,1:2:5,50,forthisexcerptandthewiderstatementofLocke’sposition.

135

In1697and1699ananonymoussetofcritical‘remarks’upontheECHUwas

published.TheywerewrittenbyThomasBurnet,adiscipleofCudworthat

CambridgeandfriendtoHenryMore.325Burnetopposedtheaccountofmoral

epistemologyofferedbyLocke.Heviewedthe'longandobscuredeductions'

requiredforadeductiveunderstandingofnaturallawasbeingbeyondmostof

the(largelyilliterate)population.Burnetwaskeentorestorethekindofnatural,

non-inferentialguidanceinmoralmattersthatinnatismhadguaranteed.Tothis

end,Burnetarguedfortheexistenceofsomethingtermedamoralsense,which

heidentifiedwithanaturalconscience.Thisamountedtoapowerorabilityto

sensethedistinctionbetweenmoralgoodandevil.Burnetrefusedtoequatehis

naturalconsciencewithinnateideasorpropositions.Hepreferredtodescribeit

asoperatingaccordingtonaturalprinciples.326

LockerespondedoncetoBurnetpublically,butwealsohavehismarginal

commentaryonBurnet'sthirdsetofremarks.Tobeginwith,Lockewouldnot

havethechangeinterminology.

WhatthisauthorhastosayaboutnaturalprinciplesIknownot.ThatwhichIdenyisthatpracticalprinciplesorrulesareinnate.327

LockewouldnotallowBurnet'sequationofafaculty,orpower,orabilitywitha

principleunderstoodasmentalcontent.328Conscienceisthemakingofa

judgment.Itisamentalact,anoperation,justlikeexternalorinternalsensation,

itisnotadeclarative,thatis,explicitlyheld,principle.

Conscienceisnotthelawofnaturebutjudgingbythatwhichistakentobethelaw.329

Lockewouldalsonotallowequivalencebetweenthoseinstinctiveactsofself-

preservationandprocreationtobecountedasdutiespriortoourconscious

realisationthattheyareaduty.Wecanperformtheseduties,thatiswecan

325GeorgeWatson,introductiontoRemarksonJohnLockebyThomasBurnetwithLocke’sReplies,ed.GeorgeWatson(Doncaster:BrynmillPress,1989),9.HenceforthRemarks.Carey,LockeShaftesburyHutcheson,offersabrieftreatmentoftheexchangebetweenThomasBurnetandLockeinrelationtoHutcheson,166-167.326Burnet“Firstremarks,”Remarks,24.327Locke’smarginalcomment,Remarks,70.328Ibid.,64-65.329Ibid.,68

136

performtheactions,butconsciencecannotjudgethem(asthefulfilmentofa

duty)withoutunderstandingthattheyarepartofnaturallaw.

Yes,wemaydoitwithouttheformalityofalaw,butconsciencecannotacquitorcondemnusforwhatwedowithoutalawtellingusitisourdutytodoorforbear.330

Locke’sproblemwithThomasBurnet’smoralsenseis,ofcourse,thatitequates

consciencewithinnate(i.e.implicitlyheld)propositionsthatjudgeforus,since

wearenotawareoftheprinciplebywhichwearejudging.

Hutchesonarguedthatthatwedonotusetheconsciousappreciationofa

reasonedmoralprincipletojudgemoralactionby.Wehavealsoseen

Hutcheson’sdenialthathissenseofbeautyandmoralsenseareinnate

propositions.Hedidadmitthattheywere‘secret‘sensesandthattheir

operationwas‘occult’inexactlythesamewaythatourunderstandingoftheway

inwhichvoluntaryactionisinitiatedisuncleartous(althoughhelaterremoved

thisremark).331Sohowthen,aretheprinciplesthat‘uniformityamidstvarietyis

beautiful’and‘benevolenceisapprovableanditscontrarycondemnable’tobe

understoodasbeingheldwithinHutcheson’smodelofmind?Apparently,they

wereheldneitherexternallytobediscoveredbyreason(andthenusedtojudge

by)norweretheyheldinternally,asinnateprinciplesorpropositions.They

wereneitherdeclarativenornon-declarative.So,whatwasthenatureofthe

principlesbywhichHutcheson’sideasofbeautyandmoralitywereproduced?

Hutchesonwouldprobablyhavelikedhisreaderstostopatthethoughtthat

moralideasarosejustasourideasofexternalsense,orLockeansimpleideasof

reflection,did.ForLocke,ourideasaroseastheresultofanencounterwith

solids,orcolours,oruswillingordoubtingsomething.Lockedidnotclaimthat

sciencewouldbeforeverunabletoaccountfortheprinciplesunderlyingour

perception(althoughtheessenceofsubstancewaspermanentlyunknowable).

Butinanycase,thisscientificknowledgewouldnotcauseaperceptionor

judgment.TheproblemisthatHutchesondidspecifytheprinciplesbywhichour330Ibid.,71.331NotedbyCarey,“HutchesonandtheScottishEnlightenment,“49.HutchesondroppedthisafterthefirsteditionoftheInquiry.

137

mindsjudgeorreacttobeautyinanobjectortheorem,andmoralityinanaction.

Thequestioniswhetherornotourimplicitknowledgeoftheseprinciplescauses

ourmoralideas(inwhichcaseitapparentlyviolatesHutcheson’sown

commitmenttotheawarenessprinciple).

Oursenseofbeautyandmoralsense,forHutcheson,werepowers,orabilitiesor

facultiesthatallowedustoexperiencebeautyormoralapprovalor

condemnation,astherewereotherpowersthatproduceideas.Lockehadargued

thatthepowerbywhichweperceivedsomethingtobesolidorred,orgained

awarenessofourownmentaloperations,producedourideas.Thiswasfine,at

leastatfirstpass.Theproblemwas,thathavingspecifiedthepropositional

contentoftheprinciplesbywhichwegenerateideasofvirtueand

simultaneouslyjudgevirtueandbeauty,Hutchesonneededtoaccountforthe

operationoftheseprincipleswithreferencetoourminds.Ifwedidjudgeby

them,howweretheyimplemented?Hutcheson’sprincipleslookedverymuch

likeinnateimplicitpropositionswhichspecifiedthecriteriaofvirtueandbeauty,

andoperatedoutsideofconsciousawareness.

Hutchesonwasofficiallysigneduptothefulldisclosuremodelofmindthat

DescartesandLockehadinsistedupon.ItwasstatedthusintheMetaphysics:

Theotherpowerofperceptionisacertaininternalsense,orconsciousness,bymeansofwhicheverythingthattakesplaceinthemindisknown.Eachmanknowshisownsensations,judgments,reflections,volitions,desiresandintention;theycannotbeconcealedfromthemindinwhichtheyare.332

ThiswasastatementthatwouldhaveunderlinedHutcheson’sinsistencethatwe

mustbeawareofourmotivationaltendencies,andcouldnotthereforepositthe

non-consciousworkingsofself-loveasmotivations.

WecouldatthisstagereplayThomasBurnetandLocke’sexchangeinLocke’s

marginalnotes,(itwoulddoaswellasanyiterationofthearguments)with

HutchesonsteppinginforBurnet.


138

H:Themoralsenseisaninnatepower,likethepowerofexternalsensation.

L:Fine,it’sanabilitythen.Tosensethemoralgood?How?

H:Well,it’sanabilitythatworksaccordingtoaprinciple.

L:Ok,whichprinciple?

H:Theprinciplethatisthecriterionofvirtueorthecriterionofbeauty.

L:OK,soit’saninnatepropositionthen?

H:Noit’snotaninnateproposition-ithasnothingtodowithinnateideas

knowledgeorpracticalprinciples.Itisaninnatepower,likeyourinternalsense.

L:Well,itisillegitimatetocallaprincipleapower-is‘uniformityamidstvariety

isbeautiful’,or‘benevolenceisthethingthatisgoodinmotivation’apower?No.

Ifthisistheprinciplethatdetermineswhatbeautyorthemoralgoodare,then

wemusthavethoughtaboutthis,oratleastbeawareofit,ifwearegoingtouse

ittojudgeby.

H:No,wedon’tneedtousereason.It’stheprinciplebywhichwearenon-

consciouslyjudging.

L:What?Ithoughtwe’dbothagreedthatweneedtohaveaccesstotheideas,or

principles,inourminds,orwecan’tusethemtoknowanything.

H:Well,weareconsciousoftheideas,justnottheprinciplethatproducesthem.

L:Thatwouldbetheinnatepropositionalprinciplethen?

H:No,it’saninnatepowertoproduce‘naturalideas...naturalapprehensions,

judgements,andthenaturalsenseofanythingwhatever’.It’sanaturalprinciple.

L:Inevermentionedanythingaboutnaturalprinciples,whatarethey?

H:Theyaretheprinciplesbywhichweknowwhetheranactionismoralornot.

Butwedon’tneedtoknowaboutthemtoapproveordisapproveofanaction.

L:No-amoralactionmeansalawrequirestheaction.Wehavetoknowwhat

lawitiswejudgeorarejudgedby.ItsGod’slawideally,obviously.

H:What’sthelawofnaturethen?

L:Alaw,whichweknowtobealaw,sothatwhenitcomestomoralactionswe

canbejudgedbyit!!

H:Well,howdoweknowwhatthelawis,orthatitisalaw?

L:Wereadourbibles,orsomeofusreasonitout.

H:Idon’tneedto.Ihaveamoralsense

L:Francis,we’vebeenthroughthis...

139

Andsoon

DidHutchesonhaveanywayoutofthisthatmightsatisfyLocke,orevenhave

satisfiedGay,whochargedhimwithinnatism?Thatis,canHutchesonmakea

convincingcasethathismoralsense/naturaljudgments/rulingprincipleboth

doesnotoperateaccordingtoinnatelyheldpropositionalprinciples,thecontent

ofwhichweareunawareof,yetstilljudgeby,yetstilloffersanaccountofmoral

thought,whichisexperiencedasasenseanddeliversmoralideas,butalso

involvesorreflectsajudgment?

IsuggestthatHutchesonturnedtothepreparatoryroleofreasoningtomaintain

hiscommitmenttomoralprinciplesthatarenotinnatepropositionsbutare

‘natural’tous.Infact,IthinkHutchesonoffered,ormightbeseenashaving

offered,twopartialsolutionsofsorts.Thefirstinvolveddistinguishingbetween

theoperationsofthesenseofbeautyandthemoralsense,accordingtowhether

theyproceededwithreferencetodeclarativeornon-declarativeprinciples.The

secondinvolvedHutcheson’smoralalgebra.

Firstthen:Hutchesonwantedusinitiallytoseeourmoralsenseasanalogousto

oursenseofbeauty.Whenwemakeamoraljudgmentwearesupposedtobe,or

atleastsomeofusaresupposedtobe,morallydumbfounded.Thiswassupposed

because,ontheanalogyofexternalsensesandourinternalsenseofbeautyand

harmony,wedonotneedtoknowwhatcausesoursensoryoraesthetic

responsesinordertohavethem.Hutchesonbelievedthatmoralprincipleby

whichwejudgeisveryprobablybenevolence,butthatthiswassomethingthat

wouldneedtobeconfirmedbycontinuedinvestigation.Asmoralspectators,we

simplyhaveafeelingofapprovalordisapproval,whichHutchesonlatermade

clearwasanideaofsomethingotherthanourownpleasureordispleasure,

togetherwithafeelingofpleasureordispleasure.However,Hutchesoninthe

Illustrationswentontoclarifytheroleofreasonintheprocessofmoralthought.

Weusereason,heexplained,tojudgetheoutcomeoftheactionforsomeone

140

otherthantheactorandtherelativemixofbenevolenceandself-interestthat

motivatestheactorandtocorrectouropinionsofthesetwojudgments.

Justsoinourideasofactions.Thesethreethingsaretobedistinguished,1.Theideaoftheexternalmotion,knownfirstbysense,anditstendencytothehappinessormiseryofsomesensitivenature,ofteninferr’dbyargumentorreason.2.Apprehensionoropinionoftheaffectionsintheagent,concludedbyourreason...3.Ourreasondoesoftencorrectthereportofoursenses,aboutthenaturaltendencyoftheexternalaction,andcorrectsrashconclusionsabouttheaffectionsoftheagent.333

AsHaakonssennotes,areasonedbeliefisformedconcerningthedirectionofthe

intentionoftheagent.334Thisiscognitiveworkproper(reasoning),whichwedo

whenwethinkaboutactions.Wehavetoconsiderintentionsinordertohavean

ideaofmoralsense.ToanswerLocke,therulebywhichwejudgeanactionis

‘whomdoestheagentintendtobenefit?’Wedothisconsciously.So,inthisway,

Hutchesonclaimed,whenwethinkaboutactions,priortotheoperationofthe

moralsense,wehavealreadyansweredthequestion,actuallyboththe

questions,accordingtothecriterionofvirtue–Whowasintendedtobenefit?I

suggestthatHutchesonthoughtthatthiswasjusthowweanalysedactions,but

thatwedidsoconsciouslyusingreason.Hutchesonthoughtthatjustwasa

naturalfactabouthowwe,ashumans,thoughtaboutactions.

UnderHutcheson’sschemethough,thiswasnotthecasewithoursenseof

beauty.Herewewerebusywithcognitiveworkanalysingnaturalobjects,or

scenesintermsofthevisualarraytheypresent,orwewerebusythinkingabout

theorems,butwewerenotconsciouslyanalysingtheseintermsoftheir

uniformity/variety.Oursenseofbeautymayhaveledustopreferregularityor

universaltruths,andifwearetobecomeguidedbythiswemayhavelearntthat

universaltruthswereworthpursuing,butwedidnotneedtobeconsciously

thinkingaboutuniformityamidstvarietyinordertoraiseanideaofbeauty.We

neededtousereasontoknowaboutregularity,torealisewhetherashapewas

regularormisshapenandperhapstoknowthataprinciplethatexplainedmany

observationswasdifferentfromonethatexplainedoneobservation,butwedid

333Hutcheson,Illustrations,177334Haakonssen,NaturalLaw,73.

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notneedtosearchconsciouslyforregularityoruniformity.Thatwepreferredit,

andthatitwasaction-guidinginintellectualworkwasprobablytrue,Hutcheson

believed,butwedidnotneedtorealisethisinorderforittobeso.PeterKivyhas

arguedthatHutcheson’sideasofbeautyarenon-epistemiconthegroundsthat

wedonothaveknowledgeofthisprinciplewhenwesensebeauty,orthatevenif

wedoknowthis,thentheideaofbeautyisnotproducedas,orbecause,weknow

it.Thatis,Kivyclaims,knowingitdoesnotcauseourideaofbeauty.Tobesure

theperceptionoftheideaofuniformitycausesourideaofbeauty,butour

consciousrealisationthatthisistheprinciplebywhichwejudgedoesnot.335We

donotneedtobesearchingforbeautyinordertoperceiveit.

Isuggestthough,thatwiththepreparatoryroleofreasoninmoraljudgment,we

doknowthatweareexaminingagentintention,wearethinkingaboutthething

thatcausesourmoralideastoemerge,andwedoneedtobethinkingaboutitin

orderforanideaofmoralsensetoarise.Wedon’tneedtoknowthatanactor’s

motivationwillhaveamoralquality,butwedoneedtobethinkingaboutthat

motivationandwhomtheactorintendstobenefitbyheraction(herself,others,

orboth).Inthisway,ourreasoningaboutactionsmaybesaidtocauseourideas

frommoralsense,whereourreasoningaboutavisualarray,ortheoremsmay

notbesaidtocauseoursenseofbeauty.

IsuggestthatHutcheson’smoralsenseapprovesthequalitiesweknowingly

reasonaboutinintentions.Thatwerecognisethatwehavemoralabilitiesatall,

though,istheresultofourmoralsense.Withoutitwemightstilljudgeactions

accordingtotheruleofwhomtheagentintendstobenefit,butwithoutamoral

sensewewouldnotrealisewhichoftheseintentionswasamoralgood,oreven

thattherewassuchathingasmoralgood.Wewouldbemoralidiotsbecauseour

ideasofactionswouldnotcontainanythingthatlinkedthemtovirtuebecause

wewouldnothaveanyideasofvirtueorasensethatmoralityexisted.Themoral

senseoperatestosignaltousthatbenevolenceiswhatismorallygood.Thisis

notajudgmentthatarisesinparticularcases,itisablanketresponsetothe

335Kivy,“ResponsetoShelley,”182.KivyemphasizesthathisargumentholdsgoodonlyforHutcheson’sthoughtinthefirsteditionoftheInquiry.

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reasoneddetectionofbenevolence.Wearesavedfromtheeffortofdiscovering

whichintentionsaremorallygoodorevil,butwearenotsavedfromtheeffortof

reasoningthebenevolentorselfishintentionineachcasethatcomesbeforeus.

Inthissense,wejudgeproperlythepresenceofbenevolenceandwe

sense/judgethatitisamoralgood.Thejudgmentthatthemoralsenseoffersis

simply‘moral’or‘notmoral’.Therearedifficultieshere.Mostproblematicisthe

factthatwecan’treallyeverknowtheintentionsormotivesofanotherperson

andmustlooktooutcomes.AsHutchesonadmitted,itis‘theexternalmarksby

whichmenmustjudge’,becausewe‘donotseeintoeachothershearts.’336

Toacertainextent,however,Ithinkthatadvertingtotheroleofpreparatory

reasoningallowsHutchesontoescapethechargethatthemoralsenseisdriven

byinnatepropositionalcontent.Thisisbecauseweareunawarethatwejudge

bytheprinciplethatbenevolenceisamoralgood.Hutchesonhasshiftedthe

heavyliftingepistemicworkbackontoconsciousreasoning.Itjusthappensthat

wealready,naturally,thatisinnatelybutconsciouslyassessactionsbythinking

aboutwhobenefitsfromthemandwhattheintentionoftheactoris.The

recognitionthatbenevolentintentionisgoodinactionsandisanecessaryor

‘natural’judgment,orperception,isachievedbyasense,bya‘fix’dlawof

nature’.Inthiswaythinkingaboutthepresenceofbenevolenceinanactor’s

intentiondoesraisetheideaofmoralapproval–itdoescausethisidea.Thinking

orreasoningaboutanactor’sintentionincombinationwiththemoralsense

thereforeisHutcheson’swholemoralepistemologyintheIllustrations.

OneimplicationofthinkingaboutHutcheson’sideasofmoralsenseinthiswayis

that,contrarytowhatHaakonssenandGillsuggest,theseideasareaninfallible

judgmentthatbenevolenceisthemoralgood(a‘necessaryjudgment’,an

‘absoluteperception’).BothHaakonssenandGillsuggestthatHutcheson’s

theoryisacognitiveonebecauseourmoralsensehasatruth-valueandmaybe

wrong.337Thatis,theyargue,wemaybemistakeninourmoraljudgmentsand

usereasontocorrectthem.Isuggest,onmyreading,thattheonlythingthatwe336Hutcheson,Inquiry,130.337Althoughtheyhavedifferentopinionsastowhattheimplicationsofthisare.SeeHaakonssen,“NaturalLawandMoralRealism,”73-75.SeeGill,BritishMoralists,299.

143

maybemistakenaboutisthereasonedappreciationofthemotivationofthe

actorandtheamountofpublicgoodthatwaseitherintended,orwasactually

produced,bytheactor.Ideasfrommoralsensearisefromthisreasoningto

indicatemoralworthonlyuponthereasonedappreciationofbenevolence.Our

ideasfrommoralsensecannotbewrong,unlessourunderlyingreasoninghas

goneastrayinsomeway.Wemayhavelong-heldfaultyviewsorbeliefsabout

whatis,infact,benevolentorcontributestothepublicgoodacquiredthrough

pooreducation,or‘fantastik’associations,orjustfaultyreasoning.Soitmightbe

thatourmoralsenserespondstoafaultyjudgmentofwhatisbenevolent,butthe

moralsensealwaysandonlyrespondstowhatweconsidertobebenevolence,or

self-interest.338Thetruth-valueisattachedtoourreasoningaboutanactor’s

intention.Ourreasoningaboutthepresenceofbenevolencecanbefaulty,andit

isopentocorrectionbysubsequentreasoningbutwecannotdirectlystopthe

appearanceofanideaofmoralworthupontheperceptionofbenevolence.

Neithercanwecorrectourperceptionthatwhatwebelievetobebenevolenceis

morallyworthy.Theseideassignaltousthatbenevolenceismoralgood.Thisis

notopentomodificationbyreason.Wemayhavemistakenlyreasoned,or

assumed,orbelieved,thatwhichisactuallyaselfishmotivationisabenevolent

motivation,andwemaycorrectthis,butthisisreasoncorrectingreason.Itisnot

reasondirectlycorrectinganideafrommoralsense.

Theotherway,Isuggest(muchmoretentatively),inwhichHutchesonmayhave

conceptualisedthenaturaloperationofthesenseofbeautyandthemoralsense

wastoseethemascomputationallydriven.Hutchesonmaintainedthattheideas

ofdurationandnumber‘doormay,accompanyallperceptionsofthemind’.339

Thiswasnotcontroversialwithintheepistemologyofideas;itjustmeantthat

wereceivedideasofhowstrongorlastingoursensoryideaswere-howsweet,

orbeautiful,orpainful.IntheInquiryHutchesonprovidedseveralequationsthat

comprisedhis‘universalcanontocomputethemoralityofanyactions’,or‘how

338MichaelB.Gill,1995."NatureandAssociationintheMoralTheoryofFrancisHutcheson,"HistoryofPhilosophyQuarterly12(1995):281-301,and“FantastickAssociationsandAddictiveGeneralRules:aFundamentalDifferenceBetweenHutchesonandHume,”HumeStudies22(1996):23-48.339Hutcheson,Metaphysics,115.

144

wecomputethemoralityinoursenseofthem’.340Hutchesondescribedthe

compoundratiosbywhichweassessedthe‘moralimportanceofanyagent,or

thequantityofpublicgoodproducedbyhim’,anditsconversetoassessmoral

evil.Hederived,orproved,severalaspectsofhistheoriesbythem–forexample,

theneedtotakeintoaccounttheabilityoftheagenttoachievetheoutcomein

relationtotheirintentiontodogood.Theequationswereremovedfromthe4th

editionoftheInquirybutwererestatedinwordscoveringthesamethemes.

IntheIllustrations,however,Hutchesonusedformulaeagaintoexplain,‘howwe

computethegoodnessoftemper’andthe‘quantityoflovetowardanyperson’

(thedegreeofdesirewehavefortheirhappiness),whichwasraisedbyour

considerationofanysensitivebeing(whohasnotharmedus).Wewerenaturally

inclinednottodistributeourbenevolencegenerally,butratherwere

predisposed(throughtheweaknessofourunderstandingandlackofpowerto

obtaingoodsforall)tofavourparticularindividualswiththemost‘quantityof

love’.Theseindividualswerethosewhoweperceivedashavingthemost

‘goodnessoftemper’.Thisisina‘compoundproportionoftheapprehended

causesofloveinhim,andofthegoodnessoftemperintheobserver’.341

HutchesonalsousedtheseformulaetodeducethatnotlovingGodisperceivedto

befarmorecondemnablethannotlovingourfellowcreatures.342

BrooksandAaltocharacteriseHutcheson’sapproachhereashisattemptingto

presenthistheories‘inmathematicalterms’.343Indeedthisisaninstanceof

Hutchesonsteppingoutsideofhisusualrelianceonintrospectioninhismethod.

Hutchesonisunderstoodheretohavestatedtheaxiomaticprinciplesofhis

theoryasequations,andderivedconclusionsfromthemthatagreedwithother

aspectsofhistheory(abouthowweassessthedegreeofbenevolencein

intentionsinrelationtotheoutcomeofanobservableaction,forexample).344In

thiswayHutchesoncouldbeseentooffera‘mathematicalstatement’ofhis

340Hutcheson,Inquiry,128.341Hutcheson,Illustrations,189.342Ibid.,187.343G.P.BrooksandS.K.Aalto,“TheRiseandFallofMoralAlgebra:FrancisHutchesonandtheMathematizationofPsychology,”JournaloftheHistoryofBehaviouralScience17(1981):354.344BrooksandAalto,“MoralAlgebra,”348-9.

145

work.Theequationsalsostoodasadviceonhowoneoughttothinkorreason

aboutactorintentioninrelationtooutcomeandvariousotherrelevantfactors.It

needstobeemphasisedheavilyhere,contraBrooksandAalto,thattheoperation

ofthemoralsenseisnotbeingdescribedhere.Hutchesonwasformulatinghis

ideasontheoperationofreasoninassessingintentionandoutcome.

Ithink,however,thatpossiblyHutchesonalludedtosomethingalittledifferent

intheIllustrations.Itisnotjustthatvariousaspectsofourmoralthoughtand

behaviourcanbedescribedusingequations,oreventhatweoughttomakeuse

ofhisformulaetohelpusreasonaboutmoralmatters.IthinkHutchesonalso

impliedherethatourthoughtismathematisedtosomedegree.Weknowfrom

theMetaphysicsthatHutchesonarguedthattheideasofnumberandduration

accompaniedevery‘perceptionofthemind’,whethertheyderivefrominternal

orexternalsensation.Assuchallourthoughtwasnumerated.Intheremarksin

theIllustrationsespecially,Hutchesonseemstometohavebeendescribingnot

justhowweoughttothinkaboutjudging‘goodnessoftemper’and‘qualityof

love’,ifwewantedtojudgecorrectly,butratherhowlovewasraisedtowards

anotherpersonbyanon-consciouscalculationofthe‘compoundproportionof

theapprehendedcausesofloveinhim,andofthegoodnessoftemperinthe

observer’.345

Again,thismovestherationalelementofjudgmentinthecaseofmoralsaway

fromtheideasofmoralsense,whichagainhereseemtobesomesortof

emergentfunctionuponourpriorreasoning.IsthisHutchesonsuggestinga

computationallydrivenmodelofmindfromwhichmoralpropertiesemergein

theformofourideasofmoralsense?Isthishowhemighthavethoughtthata

power,asopposedtoaprincipleorinnatepropositionmightoperate?Again,this

isatentativesuggestion,butwhateverthestatusofourpreparatoryreasoning,

whetheritisanexaminationofagentmotivationbyadeclarativeprincipleor

onedrivenbyanimplicitcalculation,theresultisthatanideafrommoralsense

emerges,arises,orisproducedbythisreasoning.

345Hutcheson,Illustrations,187.

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InthissectionIofferedanaccountoftheroleofreasonproperinHutcheson’s

epistemology.Ihavesuggestedtwowaysinwhichourideasfrommoralsense

mightarisefromthatprocess.Ithinktheaccountofpreparatoryreason

producinganideaofmoralsense,inthewaythatIhaveoutlined,wasprobably

Hutcheson’ssettledviewattheendof1720sasherespondedtothecriticismsof

BurnetandBalguyandattemptedtoshieldhismoralsensefromthechargeof

innatism.

Hutcheson,Isuggest,wasconcernedprimarilytoaccountforourexperienceof

moralevaluation.Theconclusionthatcanbedrawnfromthissectionandthe

previousone,whichlookedatthepermeabilityoftheboundarybetweensense

andjudgment,isthathismoralepistemologywasbuiltupontheshiftingnotions

oftheoperationsofsenseandjudgmentthatwerecharacteristicof

epistemologicallogicsingeneral.Thewayofideasplacedgreatemphasisupon

thefirstactofperception,orthereceptionofsimpleideas.Theseideas,in

addition,withinnativisttheoriesofideassuchasthoseofDescartesorLeibniz,

wereallowedtoemergefromprinciplesorgeneralpropositions,thatwewere

notnecessarilyawareof.Hutchesondidnotneedustoknowthatbenevolence

wasthemoralgoodinordertohaveanideafrommoralsense.However,he

neededustoreason,naturally,aboutwhomtheagentintendedtobenefitbyher

actions,inorderfortheemergingmoralideastobeofepistemicvaluetous.As

such,hemightshieldhismoralsensefromaccusationsofnativism.

InthenextsectionIwillexaminetheontologyofHutcheson’smoralideas.Inthe

verylastsection,Iwilllookattheimplicationsofthismaterialforanassessment

ofHutcheson’srealism,withinthetermsofeighteenth-centuryepistemology.

Theontologyofideasfrommoralsense

Iwillarguethatwhatsecuredtherealityofourmoralperceptions,for

Hutcheson,is,ultimately,theirontology.Iamnotgoingtoaddressthequestion

ofwhethertheseideasareconcomitantideas,asNortonhassuggested,and

147

Moorecontinuestosuggest.346IthinkthatHutcheson’suseofthistermis

difficulttointerpret.Inthissection,Iwillexaminethenatureoftheideasfrom

moralsense.

Lockewasofficiallyagnosticonthequestionofthinkingmatter,ashedeniedus

anabilitytoknowtherealessencesofanysubstances.Hutchesonwasin

agreementthatwedonothaverealknowledgeofessencesofsubstancesboth

materialandspiritual‘theinnernatureoressencesofthingsarehiddenfromus.’

(Metaphysics)and‘allourideasofsubstancesareinadequate’(Logic).But

Hutchesonclaimed‘theremaybefullknowledgeofspiritsandbodiesalike;the

innernatureofbothareunknown,[but]theproperties(affectiones)are

known’.347

Hutcheson,intheLogic,distinguishedthreetypesofideas:ideasofsensation,

ideasofimaginationandideasofpureintellect.EmilyMichaelhasshownthat

‘intellectualideas’wereadistinctivefeatureofseveralScottishlogicsthat

appearedinthelecturesgivenbyJohnLoudon,whomMichaelbelievestohave

beenHutcheson’stutorinlogicatGlasgow.Atanyrate,theappearanceof

intellectualideasintheselogicswasintendedtoaddressthequestionofthe

immortalityandimmaterialityofmind.Intellectualideaswereheldtohavebeen

‘pure’andnon-corporealinthattheydidnotarisefrommaterialpartsofmind.

Theywerenotimagisticinnatureorprovokeddirectlybyamaterialexternal

sourcebutinsteadarosefromtheminditself.Moore,likeMichael,noteslikely

continentalinfluencesonpureintellectionsasatypeofideasfoundinthe

Scottishlogics.ArnauldandMalebranchebothdeniedthatthesourceofallour

ideaswassensationandimaginationworkingupontheseideas,andappealedto

pureintellectasanoperationdistinctfromimagination(Arnauld)orthatthe

sourceofallideaswaspureintellect(Malebranche).IntheSt.Andrewslogic,

whichMichaelbelievesLoudontohavebasedhislecturesupon,intellectual

ideasaresaidtoallowusto‘conceiveGod,angels,thehumanmind,virtue,truth

346Moore,Logic,footnote4,12-13.347Hutcheson,Metaphysics,117.

148

andsoforth’.348BytheiractionLoudonunderstoodustobeabletohave

knowledgeofbothuniversalsandspiritualentities,includingideasofaffirmation

andnegation,truthandvirtue.349

InhisLogic,Hutchesonexplainedthatideasaredividedinto‘sensations,

imaginationsandpureintellections’.Sensationscanbeexternalorinternal.Pure

intellectionsareideasfrominternalsense,whicharenot‘graspedbyanyofthe

bodilysenses’.Bythemwe

discernthingswhicharedifferentfrombodyaswellastheirmodes,butwealsoattainmoreaccurateideasofnumberandofshapeswhichhaveseveralpartsthanthosewhichthesenseprovide.350

Hutchesonthenelaboratedontherelationshipbetweenpureintellectionsand

theinternalsenseofconsciousness.Pureintellectionsareproducedbyour

internalsense,whichisalsoourpowerofreflection.

Thereisalsoaninternalsensewhichaboveallfurnishespureintellections;thisiscalledconsciousness(conscientia)orthepowerofreflection.Thissenseaffectsalltheactions,passions,andmodesofthemind:namely,judgment,discourse,certainty,doubt,joy,sorrow,desires,aversions,loveandhatred,virtues,vices.Themorepreciseandabstractideasofprimaryqualitiesarealsoattributedtopureintellections.Butintruthallideasarisefromreflectionorfrom[an]externalsense.351[Myemphasis.]

Justtobeclear,intheLogictherearethreepossiblecategoriesofideas

(sensations-externalorinternal,imaginations,andpureintellections),butthey

arenotmutuallyexclusive.Theycan’tbebecauseourideasofinternalsenseare

alsoourpureintellectionsandtheyproduceourideasofvirtuesandvices(and

abstractideasofprimaryqualities).

Theissueoftherelationshipbetweenourpowerofreflection,ourideasof

reflectionandourconsciousawarenessisonethathaslongtroubledLocke

348Michael,“GlasgowLogic,”89-90.349SeealsoMoore,introduction,Logic,xi.350Hutcheson,Logic,12.351Ibid.,12

149

scholars.352ThielhasarguedthatLockedoesnotequatethepowerofreflection

withconsciousawareness,butthatmanyofLocke’scontemporariesdidnot

recognisethis.Lockecertainlyreferredtotheoperationofaninternalsense,

where‘themindturnsinwarduponitself’.Hutchesonhimselfadvertedtothis.353

IamnotgoingtodiscussLocke’spositionhere,butIwanttolookathow

HutchesonpositionedhimselfinrelationtoLocke,onthequestionofourideasof

beautyandmoralsenseandinternalsensesandreflection.

IntheprefacetotheEssay,Hutchesonsetouthiscomplaintaboutthenarrowuse

ofthetermsensetorefertoexternalsenses.Hutchesoncomplainedthatwehad

‘multitudes’ofperceptionsthat‘hadnorelationtoexternalsensations’,

ifbyit[externalsensation]wemeanperceptions,occasionedbymotionorimpressionsmadeonourbodies,suchastheideasofnumber,duration,proportion,virtue,vice,pleasuresofhonour,ofcongratulations;thepainofremorse,shame,sympathy,andmanyothers.354

Hutchesonwishedthatthosewhowere

atpainstoproveabelovedmaxim,that“allideasarisefromsensationandreflection,”hadsoexplainedthemselves,thatnoneshouldtaketheirmeaningtobe,thatallourideasareeitherexternalsensationsorreflexactsuponexternalsensations;orifbyreflectiontheymeananinwardpowerofperception,asIfancytheydo,theyhadascarefullyexaminedintotheseveralkindsofinternalperceptions,astheyhavedoneintoexternalsensation;thatweseewhethertheformerbenotanaturalandnecessaryasthelatter.355

HutchesonveryobviouslyhadLockeinhissightshere.Hutcheson’sposition

hereisthatan‘inwardpowerofperception’producesseveraltypesof‘internal

perceptions’.This‘inwardpowerofperception’worksbyperforming‘reflexacts

uponexternalperceptions’.Alittlelateron,inafootnote,Hutchesonexplained

thatourmoralperceptionsofapprobationanddislike,likeourideasof

regularityanduniformityinfigures,forexample,wereproducedwhen

affections,tempers,sentimentsandactionswere‘reflecteduponinourselves’.

352UdoThiel,“Hume’sNotionsofConsciousnessandReflectioninContext,”BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy2(1994):75-115.SeealsoKevinScharp,“Locke’sTheoryofReflection,”BritishJournalfortheHistoryofPhilosophy16,no.1(2008):25-63.353Hutcheson,Metaphysics,115,seealsofootnote9,115.354Hutcheson,Essay,5.355Ibid.

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Oursenseofbeauty,Hutchesonmaintained,derivedfrom‘perceptionsofthe

internalsense’,ourmoralperceptionsarose‘inalikemanner’.356

IntheMetaphysicsHutchesonseemedtoseparateour‘internalsense,or

consciousness’fromourreflexiveorsubsequentsensations,ashehasthemin

consecutivesubsections.357Buthealso(inthissection)continuedtorefertoour

ideasofnumberandduration(‘ourmoreabstractideasofprimaryqualities’)as

beingperceivedby‘theinternalsenseorbyreflectionasitiscalled’ashehad

doneintheLogic.358

Hutcheson’sterminologyisconfusing,butIbelievethatHutcheson’sviewwas

thatreflection(asanact)isareflexoperationuponideasgotfromexternal

sensation,andthatwearemadeawareofthisoperationbyourinternalsense,

whichisthesourceofourideasof‘reflexorsubsequentsensations’.This

internalsense,or‘consciousness,orpowerofreflection’,givesusourideasof

whateverourreflexactsofreflectionhavedonetoideasfromexternalsense.As

such,ourideasfromour(internalandreflexive)moralsense(ofviceandvirtue)

areinthecategoryofpureintellections.Pureintellectionsareproducedbyan

internalsense,workinguponinformationfromexternalsense.Thisreading

bringstogetherHutcheson’svarioususesofinternalsense,reflection,

consciousness,aninwardpowerofperception,reflexactsandreflexiveor

subsequentsensations.

IfweturntotheMetaphysicswecanseewhereHutchesonwaskeentotakethis

divisionbetweenpureintellections(frominternalreflection)andideasof

externalsenseandimagination.

Hutcheson’schapterintheMetaphysicsentitled‘WhetheraSpiritIsaDifferent

ThingfromBody’makesitclearthatheintendshisideasofaninnersense,or

ideasofpureintellection,tobeideasofspirit.Hutchesonbeganbyagreeing

againwithLockeonthequestionofessenceswithinthiscontext,356Hutcheson,Essay,16.357Hutcheson,Metaphysics,117.358Ibid.,115.

151

itwillbewelltorememberthattheeyeofthemindisdull,andcannotpenetratetotheinnernaturesofthings,andthereforewearemerelyinferringlikelyconjecturesaboutthemfrompropertiesknownbysenseorexperience.359

Hutchesoncontinuedthough,

itisnotbyargumentsorreasoningbasedontheperceivednatureofthingsthatwearebroughttoadoptsomeofthemostvitaldoctrinesinphilosophy,butratherbyacertaininternalsense,byexperience,andbyakindofimpulseofnatureorinstinct.360

HutchesonagreedwithLocke,thatreasoningbaseduponthedeliverancesofour

externalsensescannotprovideuswithknowledgeofrealessences,buthe

maintainedinsteadthatourideasfrominternalsensecan,forexample,giveus

probablebeliefthatspiritisdifferentfrommatter.Hutchesonwentontoexplain

thatweall,‘undertheguidanceofnature’areconsciousthatourmindisdistinct

fromourbody,andthisconsciousness,

seemstoperceivethatthisbodyanditsparts,howevertheymaybeconnectedwithitself,areneverthelesssubjecttoitself,toberuledbyitscommand,andareusefultoitself;andperceivesitselfthereforetobedistinctfromthatbody.361[Italicsinoriginal]

Inthenextsectionheaded“Athreefolddistinctionbetweenperceivedproperties”,

wecanseemorestarklywhatelseHutcheson’sideasfrom‘pureintellection’are

capableofprovidinguswith(‘acertaininternalsense,experience,andakindof

impulseofnatureofinstinct.).362HereHutchesonexplainsthatthisargument

‘comesfromPlatoorSocrates’.Hutchesongoesontodescribethethreetypesof

propertiesandtheirperceptions.Itisworthquotingatlength:

Some[perceptions]undertheguidanceofnatureherselfreferwhollytoexternalthings,whichbelongtousonlyinthesensethattheyareperceivedandwhosechangesdonotaffectus.Thereisasecondkindofperception,namelythosewhichtouchusmorenearly,pervadinguswithasenseofpleasureorpain,andwhichbyawarningofnature,arealwaysattributedtothepartsofthecorporealsystemwecallourbody...Thesetwokindsofideasareinvolvedinsomewaywithcorporealpropertiesi.e.,motionextension,andspaceandcontributenothingtothetruedignityandexcellenceofmanorhisdepravityorbaseness,andonewould

359Hutcheson,Metaphysics,139.360Ibid.361Ibid.,140.362Ibid.,141.

152

notputalowerorhighervalueonhimselforanother[person]onthebasisoftheseideas.

Finally,thereisathirdkindofperception,foreigntoeverycorporealproperty,whichrepresentstheverypropertiesofmanorofthehumanmind,andinvolvesnoideasofspace,extension,ormotion,butdepictsthetruepropertiesofeachself,fromwhicharefashionedallitsdignity,goodnessandexcellenceontheonehand,andallitsevildepravityandbasenessontheother.Sucharethenotionsofunderstanding,cognition,knowledge,reasoning,love,benevolence,faithfulnessandvirtueandoftheircontrarieties;noneofthemhavinganythingincommonwithanykindofcorporealproperty.363[Myemphasis.]

HereHutchesonprovidesuswithananswertothequestionofwhattheontology

ofourmoralorintellectualideasis.Theyarequitedistinctfromanythingthatis

knowntousbyitseffectuponourbody,includingprimaryqualitiessuchas

space,extensionandmotion.

Thisisanon-corporealreality(spirit)thatincludesseveraldenominatorsof

cognitiveandmoralactivity(‘understanding,cognition,knowledge,reasoning,

love,benevolence,faithfulnessandvirtue’)andtheir‘contrarieties’,the

perceptionsofwhichprovideuswithideasofthe‘verypropertiesofmanorthe

humanmind’.Itisarealitythatencompassesallofourthinkingthatisnot

concernedortodowith,corporeality.Mostprimaryandsecondaryqualities

refertophysicalpropertiesandtheseperceptionsaredifferentiatedentirelyby

Hutchesonfromourreasonandmoralqualities.IntheLogicHutchesonincluded

onlythemoreabstractideasofprimaryqualitiesinhisideasofpureintellection.

WehaveseenthatHutchesoncategorisedourideasofviceandvirtueandour

‘morepreciseandabstractideasofprimaryqualities’togetherasintellectual

ideas,orideasofpureintellection.So,ourideasfrommoralsensearenotlike

ideasofprimaryqualitiesinthesamewaythatideasofextension,figure,motion

andrestare.These(theideasofextension,figure,motionandrest)areideasof

primaryqualitiesperceivedbyexternalsensesonlyandarenotideasofpure

intellect.Ideasfrommoralsenseandideasofnumberandduration,whichare

363Ibid.NBThereisnoindicationthatthiswasarevisionaddedinthe1744editioninMoore’snotes.

153

concomitantandapplytoideasofprimaryqualities,arebothideasofpure

intellection.Ourideasofvirtueandviceareideasofpureintellectaswell,but

theyarenot‘abstractideasofprimaryqualities’.Hutchesonidentifiedboth

ourideasofviceandvirtueandideasofnumberandduration(our'more

abstractideasofprimaryqualities')asbeingideasofpureintellect,whichcome

frominnersense,whichisconsciousness.

So,areourideasofviceandvirtueideasofanythingthatexistsoutsideourown

minds?Hutcheson'sideasofpureintellectarealsohisideasfroma‘thirdkindof

perception’.They‘representtheverypropertiesofmanorofthehumanmind’.

They‘depictthetruepropertiesofeachself,fromwhicharefashionedallits

dignity,goodnessandexcellence.’[Myemphasis.]Hutchesonhasmadehiscase

thatwearenotabletoreasonourwaytoanunderstandingofthevalueofthese

propertieswithouttheassistanceofasense,orthirdkindofperception.The

sameargumentappliestoourprivilegingofrationality.

TheideasfromHutcheson’s‘thirdkind’ofperceptiontellusaboutourown

mindsandreportitstrueproperties.Thesemaybetriggeredbyotherminds,

presumablyintemporalsequenceafterwehavegainedsomeknowledgeofour

ownminds(presumablyearlyonindevelopment).Weknowallmenhavethe

propertiesof'understanding,cognition,knowledge,reasoning,love,

benevolence’andsoon.Manisperceivedtobecapableofbeingan

understanding,cogitativeanimalandaloving,virtuous,faithfulanimal'andtheir

contrarieties'usingthisthirdkindofperception.Theseideasgiveusan

understandingofthepropertiesofourownnon-corporealnatures.Theseare

creatednaturesofcourse,anditisarrangedbya'fix'dlaw'thatwehaveideasof

this.Wehaveideasofallournon-corporealproperties.SinceHutchesonsaysof

corporealproperties‘noonewouldnotputalowerorhighervalueonhimselfor

another[person]onthebasisoftheseideas’,wemaytakeitthatwerankorder

ourvalueaspeopleonthebasisoftheseideas.Theyarejudgmentsof'ourvalue'

andthevalueofothers.Thisishowthemoralsensecanorderorprioritise

affectionsandintentions;wemakeavaluejudgmentbyappealtothesekindsof

ideas.

154

Wevaluevirtue(benevolence)inexactlythesamewaythatwemayunderstand

epistemicvirtue.Wesensethatitisbetterthatwereason,calmlyreflect,

cogitate,seekknowledge.Bothunderstandingandbenevolencearedivine

communicableattributesthatwepartakeofbecauseGodislovingandseeksour

happinessandsawthatthebestwaytoachievethisforusistocreateuswith

analogousversionsoftheseabilitiesandthenhaveusvaluethem.

Hutcheson’srealism

MichaelGillseesthedebateaboutrealismwithineighteenth-centuryBritish

moralphilosophyasbeingcharacterisedbytwosortsofapproach.Therewere

thosewhoallegedthattherewasarealdifferencebetweenthemotivesinthe

peopletheyjudgedvirtuousandthosetheyjudgedvicious(anti-egoistrealists)

andtherewerethosewhoheldthatmoralproperties‘existindependentlyofthe

humanmindandthatourmoraljudgmentsrepresentthoseproperties

accurately'(mind-independentrealists).364GillagreesthatHutchesonisananti-

egoistrealist,butbelievesthatHutchesonpromotedabrandofsubjectivism

underwhichitisonlyacontingentfactthatourmoraljudgmentscoincide,and

whereitispossiblethatwhatismoralforonepersonisnotmoralforanother.

Gill’sfullstatementisasfollows:

IholdthatHutchesonbelievesthatmoralpropertiesdependonhumanaffectionsandthatthesemoraljudgmentsdonotrepresentanythingintheexternalworld.SoaccordingtoHutchesonifnoonehadamoralsense,moralpropertieswouldnotexist;andifeveryonehadamoralsensethatapprovedof,say,malice,thenmalicewouldbeasmoralasbenevolenceisnow.365

Fromtheargumentpresentedinthisandthepreviouschapter,Ithinkthat

Hutcheson’stheisticmetaphysicsdenythat‘ifnoonehadamoralsense,moral

propertieswouldnotexist;andalsothatifeveryonehadamoralsensethat

approvedof,say,malice,thenmalicewouldbeasmoralasbenevolenceisnow’.

364Gill,BritishMoralists,296.365Ibid.,296.

155

Hutcheson’stheisticmetaphysicsindicatedthatwhateverourideasofvirtues

are,theyreflect,howeverpoorly,thesameideasofvirtuethatexistasdivine

ideas(ofhisownvirtues).Theonlywayinwhichwe,asaspecies,couldactually

approveofmalice,asopposedtoourmistakenlybelievingthatanactofmalice,

wasanactofbenevolence,isifGodunderstoodmalicetobevirtuous.Iamnot

suggestingthatHutchesonclaimedthat,asindividualswecouldnotbemistaken

inourjudgmentsaboutthepresenceofbenevolence.Iamsuggestingthat

Hutchesonmaintainedthatourperceptionorjudgmentofbenevolenceitselfas

beingamoralgoodisalwaysatruereflectionofwhatthemoralgoodis,because

benevolenceisGod’sgoodness,and,aswesawinthepreviouschapter,

benevolenceispraiseworthyinitself(howevermistakenwemaybeaboutthe

actualpresenceorabsenceofbenevolence).

Asexplained,HutchesonarguedthatGodismovedbythenecessityofhisown

naturetoseekourhappinessandtocreateinaccordancewithwhatwill,

eventuallyturnouttobringushappiness.OnHutcheson’sunderstanding,God

retainedthenaturalpowertodoashepleased,butnotthemoralliberty.AsI

arguedinthepreviouschapter,thereisnowayinwhichif,forexample,God

knowsthathisownvirtueexistsandthatitconsistsinhisbenevolence,thathe

couldcreateuswithamalice-approvingsenseandstillbeactingrationally.He

couldhavecreateduswithoutamoralsense,Isuppose,ifhedidnotwishto

communicatehismoralattributestous.

Hutchesonarguedthatweareonlyawareofmoralvaluebecauseofourthird

powerofperception.Itisquitetrue,andofcourse,itisHutcheson’smainclaim

thatwecanonlyknowanyofthisaposteriori,workingbackfromeffecttocause.

Butthisdoesnotentailthatwhatwevalueisnotmind-independent.Gill

presentssubstantialtextualevidenceofHutcheson’sargumentsforoursenseof

beautyreachingnofurtherthanourownminds.Ourresponsesbeingsensations

thatexistedwithinourownminds,wherethereis‘perhapsnoresemblanceto

theobjectswhichwefindbeautiful’[myemphasis],whereamindwithouta

senseofbeautycouldnotcallobjectsbeautiful,wherebeautyalwayshasa

relationtothe‘senseofsomemind’andsoon.Gillarguesthatweshouldsee

156

Hutchesonashavingclaimedthesamekindof‘origin’,forourmoralsense.

However,ourideasofbeautyarenotmentionedinthelistofideasproducedby

thethirdpowerofperception,whichmaymeanthatHutchesonjustdidnotsee

themashavingthesameontologyasourideasfrommoralsense.

Ithinkthough,thatweneedtolookattheproposedfunctionofoursenseof

absolutebeauty.AsIdiscussedpreviouslyitsintendedfunction(Hutcheson

believed)wastoinclineustosearchforgeneralanduniversaltruths,ratherthan

particulartruths.Now,itmayverywellbetruethatneitherGod,noranyother

beings,requireourparticularsenseofbeauty,orlovefortheuniformtosearch

forgeneraltruths.Itmayalsobetrue,asGillindicates,thatanimalsmayhavea

differentsenseofwhatisbeautiful.ThisthoughwouldbebecauseGoddidnot

finditnecessarytoinclinebeastsorangelstosearchforgeneraltruths(because

animalsrequiredknowledgeofparticulartruthsandangelshadintuitiveinsight

intothosetruths).Whatismind-independentisthevalueofgeneraltruths,

because,asHutchesonargued,generaltruthsdescribetheoperationofthe

universe.

Thesame,Ithink,istrueforHutcheson’smoralsense.Themind-independent

valueitconnectsuswithisGod’sgoodness.AsIarguedbefore,ourreasoning

abouttheintentionsofactorsandtheoutcomesoftheiractionsisfallibleand

mayvarybetweenpersons,sothatwemayhaveactuallyapprovedsomething

whichwasnotinfactamorallygoodaction,andwhichmightbecorrectedby

furtherreasoning.Thisisnottheoperationofourmoralsensethough–our

moralsensejustrespondstowhatwedetectasbenevolenceorself-interest(or

calculatetobethegreaterpartofarelativemixofthetwo).Whatisindependent

toourmindsisGod’sgoodness.Itistruethatitwasnotnaturallynecessaryfor

Godtocommunicatethistous–hecouldhaveleftitasanincommunicable

attribute.Hechosenottothough.Havingchosenfreelytocommunicatehis

goodnesstous,Hutchesonmaintained,Godwaslimitedinhischoicesastohow

hecommunicatedthistous,bythegoodnessofhisownnatureandbyhisown

understandingofwhatthatgoodnessconsistsin.Thatis,havinggivenusamoral

sense,hisconcernforourhappinessdictatedthatitshouldrespondtothe

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analogousformofhisgoodness,hehadimplantedinus.This,issuggest,isthe

natureofthemoralrealismthatwasofferedbyHutcheson’smoraltheory.

Inthenextchapter,ImoveontodiscusstheobjectionsofClarke’ssupporters,

GilbertBurnetandJohnBalguy,toHutcheson’smoralsenseandindeed

Hutcheson’stheisticmetaphysicsinordertocontinuetoexplorethewaysin

whichtheprinciplesresponsiblefortheexperienceofmoralthoughtwere

contested.

158

Chapter5

GilbertBurnetandJohnBalguy:‘Rationalandsensibleagents’

Inthischapter,IwillexaminetheresponseofClarke’sdefenders,Burnetand

BalguytotheappearanceofHutcheson’smoralsensetheoryandtoHutcheson’s

viewsonGod’scommunicableattributes(andtheirrelationshiptoourown

moralabilities).IwillalsoreturntothethemeofChapter2,whichdiscussed

Clarke’sviewsontherelationshipofmoralknowledgetomotivationandmoral

action.Here,IconsiderthedegreetowhichBurnetandBalguycanbesaidto

havetakentheview,attributedtoClarke,withrespecttothemotivationofmoral

actions.Iaskwhetherthey(asIargued,Clarkedidnot,)defendedtheideathata

rationalperceptionofthefitnessofanactionandourobligationtoperformit

wassufficienttomotivateamoralaction?

Thethreemainthemesofthethesisarealladdressedhere:Ibeginwiththe

approachtakenbyBurnetandBalguytomoralepistemologyandtheiraccounts

ofsense,judgmentandreason(theinfluenceofLockeisnotedanddiscussed).I

thenmoveontothequestionofmotivationandIfinishwithanaccountoftheir

viewsonthemoralattributesofGod.IneachsectionIwilldiscussBurnetfirst,

andthenBalguy.

Theexperienceofreason

BurnetandBalguyhadtakentoprintinordertoexplainandpromoteClarke’s

views,whereClarke’saccountofthefitnessorunfitnessofactionsseemed

unclear.PartofthisdefenceinvolvedanengagementwithHutchesonoverthe

experienceofmoraljudgmentandhowtointerpretthatexperience.Oneoftheir

difficultieswasthatClarkehadnotmuchconcernedhimselfwiththedetailsof

moralepistemology,beyondhiscontentionthatintuitionofself-evidenttruths

servedasthefoundationofourmoralknowledge.BurnetandBalguyadvanced

theirargumentswithreferencetotheirunderstandingofthegeneralperceptual

accountofreasonprovidedbyLocke.

159

Lockehaddeniedtheexistenceofself-evidentprinciplesinmoralreasoning.

Whenpresentedwithanycandidatemoralrule,Lockehadarguedwemight

alwaysaskwhythisshouldbearule?366BurnetandBalguy,asweshallsee,

rejectedthisclaim,buttheyusedLocke’saccountofreasonasthegeneral

frameworkfortheirepistemology.ThisofferedBurnetandBalguycertain

advantagesastheyattemptedtocounterHutcheson’saccountofamoral,

internalsense.InanefforttoaccommodateHutcheson’sappealtothe

phenomenologicalaspects,orexperienceofmoraljudgment,BurnetandBalguy

stretchedaperceptualaccountofreasontomakereasonitselfan‘internalsense’,

whichwasalsoourmoralsense.

Itisherethat,onceagain,thatwecanseetheinfluenceofapsychologicalor

epistemologicalapproachtologicuponaccountsofmoralreason.Method

demandedthatweintrospectandobservetheexperienceofthought(theflowof

ideasthroughthemindandtheoperationsthatweperformeduponthem)in

ordertoexplainhowwearrivedattruth(orprobablebelief).367Asdiscussedin

Chapter1,andthesecondofthechaptersonHutcheson(Chapter4),theterms

usedtodescribeoraccountfortheexperienceofthoughtwereliabletolackthe

sortofprecisereferentsthatindicatedacleardemarcationbetweensense,

judgmentandreason.Thiswasespeciallytruewherethatexperiencewasofour

immediate,intuitive,responses.Hutcheson,BurnetandBalguyallattemptedto

explainwhattheytooktobethebrutefactofourimmediateandaffectivemoral

judgments–assuch,theywereallintuitionists.368Theybattled,amongstother

things,overwhatmightbetermedthe‘experientialpriority’ofreasonover

sense.BythisImeanthatbothBurnetandBalguyclaimedthatreasoning,

howeverperceptualinnature,provideduswithcertainexperiencesthatwereof

epistemologicalvaluetous.Theybotharguedthatthesewereexperiencesthat

couldnotbehadbyanactofsensation.Hutcheson,conversely,claimedonlya

366Locke,ECHU,1:3:4,68.367Fortheidentificationofcognitivepsychologywithdescriptiveepistemology,seeGoldman,“EpistemologyandPsychology,”29-68.368SeeW.D.Hudson,EthicalIntuitionism(NewYork:StMartin'sPress,1967).

160

sensewascapableofdeliveringtherightsortofexperiencetomakeamoral

judgment.369

Givenspaceconstraints,Iamnotgoingtoaddresshowfar,orhowsuccessful,

BurnetorBalguywereindefendingClarke’stheory.Iamalsogoingtoleave

BurnetandBalguy’sownreadingsofHutchesonlargelyunchallenged.Thereare

alreadyaccountsoftheexchangebetweenBurnetandHutchesonandtheimpact

ofthatdiscussiononthedevelopmentofHutcheson’sthoughtinthe

Essay/Illustrations.370MyconcernhereistoexaminethewaysinwhichBurnet

andBalguyusedaspectsofLocke’sapproachtoreasontocounterHutcheson’s

arguments(astheysawthem),inordertoexplainhowreasoncouldbetermed

ourmoralsensewithanydegreeofcoherence.Isay‘astheysawthem’because

BurnetwroteinresponsetothepublicationofthefirsteditionofHutcheson’s

Inquiry,publishedin1725,whileBalguywroteinitiallyin1728and1729to

refutetheargumentspresentedinHutcheson’sInquiryandthefirsteditionofhis

Essay/Illustrations.Idon’tbelievethateithercouldhavehadaccessto

Hutcheson’snotesonMetaphysicsorLogic,orthetextofhisinaugurallecture.It

wasinthesetexts,aswesawoverthecourseofthetwopreviouschapters,that

Hutchesondevelopedandextendedhistheisticmetaphysics,andrevealedthe

ontologyofhisideasofmoralsense.Theaimofthosechapterswastoexamine

thedirectionofHutcheson’sthoughtintheperiodupto1730.Idonotdoubt

though,thathadBurnetandBalguyhadsightoftheseothertexts,theywould

stillhavefoundelementstoquarrelwith.

ThecruxofBurnetandBalguy’sobjectiontoHutcheson’smoralsensewastheir

understandingofthelimitationsofasensoryideaontheLockeanmodelofan

ideafromexternalsensedeliveringinformationaboutLockeansecondary369GillhasexaminedthephenomenologyofHutcheson’saccountofthebeautyofvirtueincontrastwiththeanalogydrawnbysomerationaliststotheexperienceofmathematics.Myaimisnotquitethesamehere.IexaminethewaysinwhichLocke’saccountofreasonandlogicsofideasingeneralappealedtotheexperiencesofimmediacyandcertaintytoindicatethepresenceofknowledgeortruthtous,alongwithotherexperientialfeaturesoftheactofreasoningwhichBurnetandBalguydeemedtobesignificant.ThereissomeoverlapwithGill’sapproachthough.SeeGill,“MathorBeauty”.370Gill,BritishMoralists,156-167,hasanaccountofthewaysinwhichHutchesonrespondedtohisrationalistcritics’commentsontheInquiryintheEssay/Illustrations.SeealsoPeach,introduction,3-100,fordiscussion.

161

qualitiessuchascolourortaste.Lockehadbeenveryclearaboutthenatureof

ideasofsecondaryqualities;therewasnonecessaryconnectionbetweenour

ideasofsecondaryqualitiesandtheprimaryqualitiesfromwhichtheyderived.

Theinformationtheyreportedtouswastheresultofan‘arbitrary

determination’byGod.371BurnetandBalguybothsawideasfromHutcheson’s

putativemoralsense,byextension,asexhibitingthesamesortofcontingency.

Theywereunhappywithhismoralsensebecauseitdidnotappeartodeliver

ideasofmoralgoodthatwereeternalorimmutable.372Suchideas,theythought,

couldonlyreportinformationaboutourownreactions,andcouldnotdelivera

moraljudgment.Moreimportantly,theseideasdidnotappeartoreflect,inany

directway,theideasofmoralgoodfoundinthedivinemind.

Theywere,however,happyenoughtouseLocke’ssuggestionthathisideasof

reflectionderivedfromaninnersense,toequatethepowerofreflection,which

theyreadasreason(theperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementbetween

ideas)withaninnersense,inordertoproducearivaltoHutcheson’smoral,and

inner,sense.

GilbertBurnetandthemoralsenseBurnetdidnotquestiontheexistenceofamoralsense,orthedivinesourceofits

institutionwithinus.373HetooktheviewthattheconclusionsofHutcheson’s

Inquiry,althoughgenerallycorrectand‘capableofdemonstrativetruth’,left

virtue‘unsupported’andinneedofa‘firmfoundation’.Fortunately,Burnet

continued,thisfoundationhadalreadybeensuppliedbytheprinciplesadvanced

byCumberland,ClarkeandWollaston.Theseprinciples,heargued,couldbe

reducedtoasingleproposition,‘thatvirtueormoralgoodness,isfoundedon

truth’.374

371Locke,ECHU,4:3:28,558-559.372Beiser,Sovereignty,stresseshowthreateningallEnglishrationalistsfoundanychallengetotheeternalandimmutablenatureofmoralideas,269.373Burnet,Correspondence,203.374Burnet,Correspondence,199-200.

162

Burnetarguedthatasensecouldonlydeliveranideaofgoodinthesecondary

senseofitbeing‘good’relativetous.HeidentifiedHutcheson’sideasfrommoral

sensewiththeperceptionofpleasure.Pleasure,Burnetmaintained,wasknown

tobedeceitfulaboutthetruenatureofanygood.Theideasofmoralgoodand

moralevilinthedivinemindhowever,mustbe‘immutablyfixed’andrefertoa

goodorevilinthe‘primary’,or‘absolute’sense.TheydonotrefertowhatGod

approvesof,ordislikes(iftheydidtheywouldbe‘uselessandsupernumerary

words’).So,whenwesaythatGodisgood,thiscannotbebecausewebelievethat

hesimplyapprovessomething,ifwehavenoideawhyitisthatheapprovesit.

God’sbareapproval,ordisapproval,ofanactioncannotindicatehismoral

perfectiontous,unlessweknowthatthebasisuponwhichthisapprovaland

disapprovalisfoundedisfixed,oreternal,andhasan‘immutablefoundationin

thenatureofthings’.Burnetwenton:

Itfollows,thatthingsarenotmorallygoodbecauseGodapprovesthem.Butheisimmutablygoodhimself,inthemoralsenseoftheword,becausehealwaysand,unchangeably,approveswhatisinitselfgood,anddisproveswhatisinitselfevil,andalwaysactsconformably.375

OurmoralideasderivefromGod’smoralideas.God’sideasderivefromthe

eternallawthatspecifiesmoraltruth.Ourideasoughtnotthen,Burnetthought,

toderivefromadifferent,specialsense.Inthisway,Burnetmaybeseentoinsist

onananalogousformofGod’scommunicativeattributeofunderstanding.376

InBurnet’sfirstletterwefindhimrebuttingthebasisfortheexperienceofmoral

judgmentwithapetitiontoLocke’saccountofreason.Burnet,likeBalguyand

Gay,offerednoresistancetoHutcheson’sdescriptionoftheexperienceofmoral

judgmentasbeingrapid,involuntaryandpleasantorunpleasantdependingon

thefinding.Locke,aswesawintheintroductorychapter,hadarguedthat

almostallofoursimpleideaswereaccompaniedbyideasofpleasureorpain.377

Burnetbelievedthatthisexplainedtheirapparentcoincidenceofideaand

pleasure–theexperienceofreasoning,ofdiscoveringwhatisreasonable,itself

givesuspleasure.375Ibid.,202.376JustasHutchesonhadsuggestedGodmayhavehadsomethinganalogoustoourmoralsense.Hutcheson,Illustrations,153.377Locke,ECHU,2:7:1-6,128-131.

163

Theconstitutionofallrationalagentsthatweknowofissuchindeedthatpleasureisinseparablyannexedtothepursuitofwhatisreasonable.Andpleasureoughtnevertobeconsideredsomethingindependentonreason,nomorethanreasonoughttobereckonedunproductiveofpleasure.Butstill,theideasofreasonarequitedifferentfromthoseofpleasureandmustalwaysinreasoningbeconsidereddistinctly;reasonasthegroundofinwardpleasureandthatpleasureastheencouragementtofollowreason.378[Myemphasis.]

BurnetmadefulluseofLocke’scharacterisationofintuitiveknowledgeasthe

immediateperceptionofagreementordisagreementbetweenideas.Burnet

calledreasonaninternalsenseand,inrelationtoactions,heargued,thisisour

moralsense.Butreason,asthe‘sense’oftherelationshipbetweenideas,Burnet

argued,wasquitedistinctfromany‘joy’thatthoseideasmaygiveus.

Reasonandpleasuremaybothofthembeproperlyenoughstyledinternalsenseand,withrelationtomoralactions,moralsense.Butstilltheymustbeconceivedasdifferentsenses;reasonasthesenseoftheagreementordisagreementofoursimpleideasorofthecombinationofthemresultingfromtheircomparison;pleasureasthesenseofthejoywhichanyideasaffordus.379[Myemphasis.]

Burnetwentontoexplainthatthepleasantorpainfulexperiencethat

accompaniestheresultsofanencounterwithtruthorfalsehood(althoughitmay

alsobeproperlystyledamoralsense)isnottherulebywhichweassesstruthor

falsehood.Pleasuregivesusanindicationoftruthhavingbeendiscoveredbyus

(webelieve)aboutamoralaction.Yettheexperienceofpleasure,evenmoral

pleasure,cannotfunctioneitherasanimplicitrule,oradeclarativeprincipleto

judgeby.

Theotherinternalormoralsenseofpleasureorpain,wherebyweconceivejoyindiscerningtruth,orpaininfeelingourselvesembarrassedwithfalsehood–or,inmoralactions,byreflectinguponourselves,orobservinginothers,moralgoodormoralevil–isnotitselftherulebywhichwejudge,orcanjudgeoftruthorfalsehood,ofmoralgoodorevil;butonlytheconsequenceoffindingwejudgeright,andaccordingtoreason.Andthislattersenseindeedconstitutesourideaofbeauty;bywhichword,Ithink,wemeannomorethanwhatpleasesus.380

378Burnet,Correspondence,204.379Ibid.,204-205.380Ibid.,205.

164

Burnethereaccountedforthe'otherinternalormoralsenseofpleasureand

pain'wefeelintheintellectualactivityofjudgmentandtruth-seekingintheway

thatDescarteshad,asanemotionintérieurarisingfromrationalactivityinthe

mind.381Burnetseemstohaveequatedthistoajoyindiscoveringtruthormoral

good(foundedupontruth),andapainupondiscoveringfalsehoodormoralevil

(foundeduponfalsehood).AsBurnetwellknew,apleasureindiscovering

generaltruths(uniformityamidstvariety)wasexactlythefunctionHutcheson

hadenvisagedforourinternalsenseof(absolute)beauty.Burnetclaimedthat

wefindbeauty,ormoreproperlypleasure,inwhatwehavefirstjudgedby

reason,toberight.Wemayhavehadtheexperienceofthepleasureofrational

perceptionatthesametimeaswediscernedtruth,heallowed.Wemaynot

experiencethisasacleartemporalpriority,butthereislogicalpriorityasthe

rationalperceptionoftruthorfalsehoodproducesthefeelingofpleasureor

displeasure.

Idonotsay,thereisalwaysadistanceoftimebetweenthetwosentiments,viz.ofthetruthorright,andbeauty.ButIspeakonlyoftheorderinwhichweshouldconsiderthem,andtheirdependencetheyhaveononeanother.382

Burnetequatedreasonwithaninternalsensehere.Lockehaddescribedour

ideasfromreflectionasderivingfromaninnersense,andidentifiedknowledge

astheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementoftheconnectionsbetween

ideas,knownthroughreason.Hence,Isuggest,Burnet’sidentificationofreason

asthemoral(inner)senseinordertoundermineHutcheson’sownpetitionto

internalsenses.Thiel,aswesawintheintroductorychapter,hasarguedthat

Locke’sideasofreflectiondidnotrefertotheactivity,orpowerofreflection

itself(i.e.reason),norweretheythesourceofourconsciousawarenessofour

ownminds,buthesuggeststhatthereisnoreasontosupposethatthisviewwas

widelyheldinthelateseventeenthorearlyeighteenthcentury.383Burnetseems

tohaveusedthesensory(conscious)awarenessoftheperceptionofthe

agreementordisagreementofideasaspartofajustificationforhisclaimthat381SeeSusanJames,PassionandAction:TheEmotionsinSeventeenth-CenturyPhilosophy(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1997),198.382Burnet,Correspondence,205.383SeeUdoThiel,“Hume’sNotionsofConsciousness,”102-105,foradiscussionofLocke’sposition.

165

reasonisaninternalsense.ReasonwasamoralsenseforBurnet,presumably

becauseitwasa‘sense’oftheagreementordisagreementofideasaboutmoral

actions.Burnetmadenodistinctionherebetweentheperceptualawarenessof

ourhavingperceivedaconnectionbetweensimpleideas,andhavingasimple

ideafromaninnersenseinformingusofthementaloperationofreasoning-but

thenLockehimselfwasnotclearaboutthis.

Moreover,Lockehadnotdistinguishedbetweentheintuitiveknowledgeofour

ownideas(ourawareness,orknowledge,ofourownideasandtheircontent)

andtheintuitiveknowledgethatwehaveofself-evidentpropositions.Thielhas

providedanaccountofthecorrespondenceofJohnWynnewithLockein1695,

whichspoketothisverymatter.384Wynnewantedtoknow,fromLocke,whether

ourconsciousawarenessofourownmindsoughttobeconsideredasadifferent

sortofknowledgetotheintuitionofself-evidenttruths(orthecertain,i.e.self-

evidentagreementofcertainideas)?Locke’sreplytoWynnedoesnotsurvive,

butThielsuggeststhatanotherofWynne’sletterstoLockegivesusanindication

ofwhatLockethoughthere.Lockeappearstohaverepliedthattheyoughtboth

tobeconsidered‘underthegeneralnameofintuition’because,although

different,theywereexperiencedwiththesameimmediacyandan‘equaldegree

ofcertainty’.385

Burnetalsogaveexactlythisexperientialprioritytoreason.Hearguedthatthe

experienceofdiscoveringtruthdeliveredtheexperienceofcertaintythatwe

neededinorderforustofeelsecure.IntheintroductorychapterIdiscussedthe

waysinwhichepistemologicallogics,orlogicsofideas,werefoundeduponthe

psychologyorphenomenologyofreasoning,andthewayinwhichthe

experienceofcertaintybecameparamountasproofwithinthem.

LockewrotetoStillingfleet,forexample,that‘withme,toknowandtobecertain,

isthesamething.’386IntheECHUheaffirmedthefollowing:

384Thiel,TheEarlyModernSubject,118-119.385Ibid,quotationsfromLocke’sletterarecitedat118.386LocketoStillingfleet,TheWorksofJohnLocke.Vol.iv.(London:ThomasTeggandothers,1823),145.

166

Onceweknowwearecertainitisso;andwemaybesecure,thattherearenolatentproofsundiscovered,whichmayoverturnourknowledge,orbringitindoubt.387

Lockedidnot,asexplainedintheintroductorychapter,makeself-evidencea

proofinpracticalreason.Certainty(ofself-evidence),however,wasthecruxof

Burnet’sargumenttoHutchesonoverwhattheexperienceofmoralreason

providesuswith.Burnetmaintainedthatwecouldnotusepleasureorthesense

ofmoralbeautyas‘ultimateprinciples’becausewecouldnotgaintheexperience

ofsatisfactionorcertaintytomovetoanydemonstrativeconclusionsfromthem.

Wemustjudgetheexperienceofmoralbeautybyreferringtoreason‘orour

internalsenseoftruthandfalsehood,moralgoodandevil,rightandwrong.’388[My

emphasis.]

Whenwegobacktoreasoninourinvestigation,i.e.whenweresolvepropositionsintoself-evidentorevidenttruths,thenwefindnofurtherdoubtinourmindsbutmeetwithaprinciplewhichwecannotbutacquiescein.Inonecasewestillleaveourprincipletobeproved.Intheotherwereachaprinciplewhichisself-evidentorcertainlydemonstrable....whenwerestourfootuponsuchtruthsasareevidentordemonstrate,weleavenothingunprovedbutarriveatasmuchcertaintyaswearecapableofandcangonofurther.389[Myemphasis.]

Burnetarguedthattheperceptionofaself-evidenttruthleftnoexperiential

roomfordoubt.390Inaddition,heclaimed,thisexperienceofcertaintywas

accompaniedbyanexperienceofintellectualjoy.So,forexample,Burnetargued

thatsinceweall‘immediatelyandwithoneglanceofthought’perceiveit

‘reasonableandfit’thatadvantageforeveryoneisbetterthanprivateadvantage

oradvantageforsome,sowefeelcertain,andseesubsequentlybeautyinany

actionthataimsatthis.391Wemightfeelasifwehaveexperiencedthejudgment

ofbenevolentactionasbeautiful,butwemusthavefeltcertainthatbenevolence

wasamoralgoodinthefirstplace.Intheexamplecited,Burnetclaimedthatwe

justneedtoaskourselves‘whydowefindbenevolencebeautiful?’Thenwewill

immediatelyseethatitisself-evidentlytruethat‘happinessforallisbest’and

387Locke,ECHU,4:15:3.,655.388Burnet,Correspondence,207.389Ibid.,223.390Ibid.,223.391Ibid.,204.

167

feelcertainofthis.Thenwehavegroundsforourjudgmentofbenevolencein

others,andmoreimportantlywewillknowthetruthof,andfeelcertainof,the

reasonsforactingbenevolently.392

BurnetalsoaddressedHutcheson’schargethatdeductivereasonitselfwastoo

slowanddoubtfultoaccountfortheimmediacyofourmoralresponse.Burnet

counteredthatwemay‘seethetruth’beforewehavereasonedallthesteps.

Sometimes,weperceivetruthorright,byakindofnaturalpenetrationandsagacityofthemind,beforewehavestayedtoweighdistinctlyeveryoneofthestepswhichleadtoit.Andthentakingtheconclusionforgranted,weesteemitbeautifulorpleasant.393

Thiswasespeciallytrueinmoralscience,heclaimed,whichwasfarlessabstruse

thanothersciences.

Few,indeedarecapableofsuchquickperceptionsinthosekindofsciences,wheretheconclusionareforcedtopassthroughmanysteps.Butalmostallmankindarecapableoftheminmoralscience,wheretheconclusionandpremiseliewithinanarrowercompass.394

Burnetdidmakeacleardistinctionbetweendeductivereasoningandthe

rationalperceptionofself-evidenttruths.Burnet,though,thoughtthatthere

wereplentyofexamplesofself-evidenttruthsthatjustcouldnotbequestioned

further.Forexample,thetruththat‘itisbetterthatthespeciesshouldbehappy

thanthatitshouldnot’(also,‘itisbestthatallshouldbehappy’),isbothself-

evidentand‘suchanunmoveabletruththatitwillbearalltheweightwecanlay

uponit’.395Furthermore,thistruthincombinationwiththedeductivetruththat

themoralsensetendstomakeushappierinthelongrun‘willaffordusasolid

bottomonwhichthewholestructureofmoralitymaysafelyrest’.396

Burnet,mindingLocke’soppositiontotheself-evidenceofpracticaltruths,

maintainedthatalltruthis‘strictlyspeaking’speculative.Truthsare‘seenand

perceivedbythemind’.Whentheyrelatetoactioninrationalagentstheyare

392Ibid.,236–237.393Ibid.,206.394Ibid.,206.395Ibid.,238.396Ibid.,238.

168

calledpracticaltruths,buttheyarereallyjusttherationalconclusionsdrawn

fromspeculativetruths,whicharenotinthemselvesrulesforaction(‘itisbest

thatallshouldbehappy’).Burnetarguedthatanominallypracticaltruthwasto

discover,fromthereasonofthings,ourobligationtoact,orinotherwords,

inwhatmannerpersonsareobligedtoacttowardssuchobjects,orwhatmeanstheyareobligedtoemployinordertoobtainthem.397

So,usingourpreviousexample,Burnetproposedthatweperceiveimmediately

that‘itisbestthatthatallshouldbehappy’.Our‘object’isthereforehappiness

foreveryone,andfromthiswemayconcludethatbenevolenceisthe‘properest

andfittestmeanstoprocurethehappinessofthespecies.’Therefore,weare

underanobligationtoactbenevolently.

IwillexamineBurnet’sviewsonobligationinalittlemoredetailwhenImoveon

tolookathispositiononmotivation.Atthispoint,IturntoBalguy’sresponseto

Hutcheson’smoralsense.Balguy,likeBurnet,addressedtheissueofthe

coincidenceofideasofpleasurewiththeresultsofreasonwhichtolduswhether

anactionisfitornot,tobeperformed.Healsotermedtheperceptionofthe

agreementsordisagreementsbetweenideasaninternalsense,butherehe

offeredanobjectiontotheterminologicalequivalenceofsenseandperception.

Balguytoo,dealtwithLocke’srefusaltoallowself-evidenceaplaceinpractical

reason.

Balguyandthemoralsense398BalguyturnedhisattentiontoHutcheson’smoralsenseinthefirstandsecond

partsofhisFoundationofMoralGoodness,SecondPart,(1729,1733).399Balguy

397Ibid.,218.398Forbiographicaldetailsandanoverviewofhisthought,seeHughDavidJones,JohnBalguy:AnEnglishMoralistoftheEighteenthCentury(Leipzig:VerlagVonQuelleandMeyer,1907).Balguyisnotmuchdiscussedinthesecondaryliterature,butseeIrwin,“Balguy:AdefenseofRationalism”and“BalguyandClarke:MoralityandNaturalTheology,”Development,Vol.II,439-463and465-472.SeealsoCarey,“HutchesonandtheScottishEnlightenment,”43-44,andDavidFateNortonandManfredKuehn,“TheFoundationofMorality,”inKnudHaakonssen,ed.TheCambridgeHistoryofEighteenth-CenturyPhilosophy(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2006),958-262.399JohnBalguy,TheFoundationofMoralGoodness:OraFurtherInquiryintotheOriginalofOurIdeaofVirtue.ByaClergyman,1728,revised1731,1733.HenceforthFirstPart;TheSecondPartofTheFoundationofMoralGoodness;IllustratingandEnforcingthePrinciplesandReasonings

169

championedClarke’spositionthateternallawwasthefoundationofmoral

goodnessand,assuch,wasthe‘original’ofourideasofvirtue.ForBalguy,

eternallawmustbetheoriginofourmoralideasbecauseitwastheoriginof

God’smoralideas.ItwouldbeinappropriateforthesourceandnatureofGod’s

ideas(arationalperceptionofeternallaw)andourideas(animplantedmoral

sense)tobedifferent.Eternallawdictatedwhatwasright–bothtoGodandto

us.

IntheFirstpart,Balguy’sconcernwastoshowthataperceptionoftherightness

ofanactionisnotdeliveredbyamoralsense.Balguyheldthatwecouldonly

approveanactionthatwhatwehadfirstreasonedwas‘fit’tobeperformed.This

wastruebothlogicallyandtemporally.Inadditionthereweretwowaysinwhich

virtuecouldbeconsidered,‘eitherunderthenotionofpulchrum,orhonestum’.

Pleasure,orbeauty,Balguythought,isnotseen,or‘visive’,butfelt,andonthese

experientialgrounds,

sensibilityseemstobeasdistinctfromunderstanding,astheunderstandingisfromthewill.Weshouldnotthereforeconfoundtheminourconceptions.400

Balguy,in1728,confessedtobeingunsureaboutwhetherweneededaspecial

sense,or‘somedistinctpower’,toperceivethebeautyofactions,sinceas

individualswedifferedgreatlyinouraffectiveresponsestomoralactions.401

Balguyagreedthatwepossessmore‘superior’sensesthatrespondedtomusic

andpaintingsandbuildings,however,theseonlyrelishedsuchobjectsorraised

pleasureinourminds.Theycouldnotcommunicatethetruthoftherelationsof

thosethings(likeharmony,formorstructure).Atanyrate,ourideasofvirtue

consideredas‘honestum’,were,Balguyinsisted,ideasoftheintrinsicrectitude

ofactions.Anysensedapprobation,intheformofpleasurablefeeling,followed

onfromtheperceptionofthatrectitude.402

ContainedintheFormer.BeinganAnswertoCertainRemarksCommunicatedbyaGentlemantotheAuthor,1729,1733.HenceforthSecondPart.400Balguy,FirstPart,24.401Ibid,23-24.Balguybeganasasupporterofoursenseofthebeautifulinaesthetics,butlatertookuptherationalistposition.SeeKivy,SeventhSense,127-133and138-140.402Balguy,FirstPart,23.

170

IntheSecondPart,Balguyofferedfurtherargumentforourfacultyofreason

beingtheonlyfacultyweneededtouseinordertoaccessmoraltruths.Balguy

didnotdisbartheidentificationofreasonwithamoraland,again,aninternal

sense.

Ifanyonehasamindtocallthatfacultybywhichweperceivemoralagreementsanddisagreementsaninternalsense,Iamveryunwillingtodisputeaboutwords.403[Myemphasis.]

Aslong,thatwas,aswealsoallowedthattheintelligenceweusedtoreach

physicalormathematicaltruthswasalsoaninternalsense.Balguythoughtthat

externalsenseswere‘verydistinctfromourunderstanding’,astheyonly

suppliedmaterialtoit(like‘anarchitect’andhis‘labourers’).

Balguythenclaimedthatdifferencebetweenthepowerofperception

responsibleforanytruth,includingmoraltruths(whichiscalled‘intelligence’)

andthatofthepowerofperceptionresponsibleforsensoryinformation(which

iscalled‘sense’),wastobefoundintheirobjects.Intelligenceperceives‘real

agreements’,whereasasenseperceivestheeffectexternalobjectshaveonour

ownparticularminds.Asensoryperception,moreover,actuallymodifiesour

mindsinsomeway.Anintellectualperception,however,doesnosuchthing.An

intellectualperception,

onlyshowswhatitsobjectsareinthemselves;wheretheyagreeordisagree,ordifferfromeachother.Bothsenseandintelligenceconsistinapowerofperception,andbothpowersarepassive.ButIknowofnootherresemblancebetweenthem.404[Myemphasis.]

Balguyobjectedtotheblurringoftheboundariesbetweensenseand

intelligence,becauseforBalguy,thisdistinctionwasfoundedupontheobjects

thattheyperceive.

Ifapowerofperceivingrealagreementsoughttobecalledasenseorsentiment;whatpartition,whatboundarieswillremainbetweensenseandintelligence?405

403Balguy,SecondPart,48.404Ibid.,52.405Ibid.

171

Balguyisacuteherethough,ontheimplicationsof‘apowerofperceivingreal

agreements’beingcalledasense.Iftheterm‘sense’waspressedintoservice,

then‘whatboundarieswillremainbetweensenseandintelligence?’heasked.It

isthisquestionthatspeakstothesemanticinstabilityofthetermssense,

judgmentandreason.Balguyinsistedhere,Ithink,thatifHutcheson’smoral

sensewassupposedtoprovideuswithepistemologicalaccesstorealknowledge,

thenthiswasanactivityoftheintellect,nomatterthatweexperiencedboth

senseandintelligenceasinvoluntaryandnoneffortfulmentaloperations.

ForBalguy,truthwaseitherofwords,ideas,orthings.Verbaltruthisthetruthof

propositionsrelatingtoeitherthetruthofideas(idealtruth)orthetruthof

things.Thetruthofthingspertainstotherelativenaturesofthingsandtheir

agreementordisagreement.Moraltruthisthetruthofthings,anditdictatesthe

waysinwhichdifferentthingsshouldbetreated.Balguyargued,forexample,

thattotreatmen,brutesandstonesinasimilarmannerisdisagreeabletothe

natureofthings.Itisdisagreeableinthesamewayasanattempttomakean

anglefromtwoparallellineswouldbedisagreeabletothetruthsofthingssuch

asanglesandparallellines.406Ourmoralideas,unlikeourmathematicalideas,

however,areonlyrepresentationsofrelativenatures,andsocannotbeascertain

ofourperceptionofthemaswemaybeofourideasofnumbers,whichhaveno

externalreferents.Inmostcases,though,wemayrelyontheseperceptions.The

objectsoftheseperceptionsare‘oftenself-evidenttruths,andalmostalways

resolvableintosuch’.407They‘seldomfailtoappeartousinaclearlight’.Balguy

herefollowedClarkeandHutcheson,andLocke,inmaintainingthatwedonot

haveaccesstotheessencesof‘things’,wehaveaccesstotheirmodesofexistence

only.408Ourideashereareonlycopiesofdivineideas.409

IntheSecondPartBalguycomplainedthatLockehadinsistedontheabsenceof

anyself-evidentpracticalpropositions,butthathehadstillproposedthata

certaindemonstrationofmoralitywaspossible.Balguywantedtoknowfrom

406Balguy,FirstPart,36.407Ibid.,38.408Ibid.,31.409Ibid.,37.

172

whatfoundationthatdemonstrationwouldproceed?GiventhatLockehad

suggestedthatmoralitymightbedemonstratedwithasmuchcertaintyas

mathematics,whatwouldbethefoundationalpremise,ifnotaself-evident

proposition?410Balguyhereappealedtotheobviousness(hethought)ofthe

truthsabouttherelations(nottheessences)ofagentstoactionsandobjects.

Therelationsofothermodesmaycertainlybeperceivedaswellasthoseofnumberandextension.411

Onceagainourowncertaintyprovedtobethecriterionfortruth(althoughwe

couldbemistakenandcorrectourviews).Hutchesonarguedthatourmoral

ideascontainedadistinctivepleasureofmoralapproval(oritscontrary),which

providedasortofevaluativecertaintyofitsown.Balguy,ontheotherhand,also

placedgreatemphasisonthespecialqualityofwhatreasoningasanactmeans

tous–its‘honour’or‘dignity’,orthe‘fitness’ofreasontoinfluenceus,together

withthespecialqualityoftheobjectsofrationalmoralthought.Theapparent

‘self-eligibility’,‘intrinsicexcellenceor‘self-amiableness’ofsuchactions,he

argued,resultedintheirnecessarilybeingapprovedasrightandfreely

chosen.412

BurnetandBalguy’srelianceuponouraccesstotheself-evidenceandthe‘self-

eligibility’ofmoralprinciplescarriedthemtoarguethatthecriterionoftruth

nowbecameourcertaintyofthetruth.BurnetandBalguysupposedthese

experientialfeatures(ofmoralreasoning)tobepartofthereasonwhywe

choosetoactinaccordancewiththem.Wearejustcarriedbythequalityofthe

experienceofourownreasoningprocesstoactinaccordancewithitsdiktats.In

thissense,theirbattlewithHutchesonisaboutthemeaningwegivetoour

introspectiveexperienceofmoralapprobation,andpartsoftheirargument

exploitedorreflectedtheterminologicalconfusionofLocke’saccountofreason,

reflection,intuitiveknowledge,consciousawarenessandsense.

410Balguy,SecondPart,43.411Balguy,FirstPart,44.412Balguy,SecondPart,74,forexample.

173

ThequestionforthenextpartofthechapteriswhetherornotBurnetorBalguy

arguedthatarationalperceptionofthefitnessofanaction,and(therefore)our

rationalobligationtoperformit,wassufficienttomotivateanaction.

Burnet,Balguyandthequestionofmotivation

BurnetandBalguy,Iargue,likeClarke,werebothrationalistsaboutmoral

knowledgeandmoralobligation,butwerenotaboutmotivation,oratleastwere

notstraightforwardlyso.IarguethatforBalguy,asmuchasforClarke,ourlack

ofperfectionentailedtheneedforustorecognisethetruthofthepromiseofthe

afterlifeandthedistributionofdivinejusticeinorderforustoleadamorallife.

Balguy,infact,calledactingtosecuredivinerewardour‘religiousobligation’.In

ordertomakevirtueapracticalreality,Balguyclaimedthatweneededto

recogniseandfulfilbothourreligiousandourmoralobligations.Irwintreats

Balguy’s(andClarke’s)religiouscommitmentsasanalmostseparatepartof

theirtheory.413IrwinseesbothClarkeandBalguy’sappealtotheconsequences

toselfofcomplianceornon-compliancewithdivinecommandassimplya

practicalsupportforvirtue.ButIrwinhere,Ibelieve,missescompletelythe

moralvaluethatBalguyallowsactsofself-interesttohave.

IrwinmakesthesameobservationaboutBalguythatwesawSchneewindmake

aboutClarke.Thisisthatthewillmay‘rebel’againstthenecessaryconclusionof

reason,whichClarke,forSchneewind,explainedbypointingtotheweaknessof

will.Irwin,talkingaboutBalguy,says,

likeClarke,he[Balguy]allowsthispossibility[thatthewillmaynotcomplywithrationalassent],buthehassomedifficultyexplainingit.Thoughheagreesthatthewillsometimesrebelsagainstrationalassent,hestillassumesthatrationalassentisnormallysufficientforaction,withoutanyfurtherapprovalbythewill.414[Myemphasis.]

IarguethatneitherClarkenorBalguythoughtrationalassenttothefitnessofan

actionwas‘normallysufficient’tomoveanagenttoamoralaction.Itoughtto

havebeen,theyagreed,butasaspecieswehadfailedthatparticulartest.God

413Ibid.,Theyappearinaseparatesectioninalaterchapterentitled“BalguyandClarke:MoralityandNaturalReligion,”465-475.414Ibid.,445.

174

hasseenfit,theyalsoagreed,tocreateuswithavarietyofapparentweaknesses

(God’sreasonforthisisultimatelytheresultofhiswisdomandhiswishforour

happiness).God’sperfectionliesintheperfectconformityofhiswilltohis

understanding.Sincewelackthisperfection,ourabilitytofulfilarationally

perceivedmoralobligationisincomplete.Theappealtodivinerewardand

punishmentnotwithstanding,Clarke,BalguyandBurnetalsoallreferredtothe

hedonicelementsofconsciencetomotivatebehaviouralcompliancewith

rationalassent.Inwhichcase,asIarguedinChapter2,theythenarguedthatthe

motivationwashedonic,anddidnotderivedirectlyfromtheperceptionofthe

fitnessofanaction.

Burnetandmotivation

Burnet,inhiscorrespondencewithHutcheson,didnotassignaprominentrole

tothepleasuresandpainsofeternityinhismoraltheory.Thequestion(forme)

iswhynot?IfIamcorrecttoemphasisethevitalpartthatbeliefinthepromises

oftheafterlifeplaysinClarke’stheory,and,sinceBurnetwrotetodefend

Clarke’sapproachasmuchasBalguydid,whyisthisargumentlargelymissingin

Burnet’sletterstoHutcheson?

Ananswermaybefound,Ibelieve,intheprefacethatBurnetwrotetothe

publicationofhisletterswithHutcheson.Here,Burnetreportedthatthe

foundationthatHutcheson’s‘beautifulstructure’sobadlylackedhadalready

beenprovidedbyCumberlandandClarke‘inthebeginningofhissecondBoyle

lectures’,andWollaston.415ThebeginningofthesecondBoylelectures(thefirst

proposition)waspreciselytheplaceinwhichClarkeoutlinedthewayinwhich

ourmoralknowledgeandobligationwasfoundedinreason.Therestofthat

lecture,however,wasdevotedtoanexplanationofwhythenaturalknowledgeof

theperceptionofthefitnessofanactionwasinsufficienttoactuallymoveusto

virtueandhowRevelationmadeupforthisdeficit.

415Burnet,Correspondence,199.

175

Burnet,inhiscorrespondencewithHutcheson,madeitclearthathisquestion

wasnot‘whatinexperienceisseentoleadmentoactbutwhatoughtto’.416[My

emphasis.]WhatoughttomotivateuswasthesubjectofClarke’sfirst

proposition.Burnet,asweshallsee,fullyallowedthatGodhadgiftedusallsorts

ofusefulnaturalpassions,affectionsandevenamoralsenseitselftohelp

motivateustoact(‘thepropermeanstoanimateandsupportasreason

dictates’).Nevertheless,Burnet,likeClarkeinthefirstproposition,arguedthat

affectionswerenotwhatmadeanactionmoral,andtheywerenotwhatoughtto

moveustovirtue.417

AtonepointinhisreplytoBurnet,HutchesonchastisedBurnetforbringingin

the‘endoftheDeityasareason[forus]ofpursuingpublicgood’.418Thiswas

becauseHutchesonwasseekingtoaccountforhowvirtuemightemergeinus,

irrespectiveofourknowledgeofGod,orthemetaphysicalgroundingofmoral

good.Burnet,Ithink,respondedtothetermsofHutcheson’sargument.He

agreedthatanaccountofournaturalmoralunderstandingshouldbegiven.For

Burnet,andforClarkeandBalguy,naturalreasoncouldindeedtelluswhat

oughttomotivateus.

I’llbeginbylookingatBurnet’sthoughtsonobligation.ForBurnetonly

discursivereasoning,andnottheimmediateperceptionofaself-evidenttruth,

laid

theproperandindeed,strictlyspeaking,theonlyobligationuponustoactinacertainmanner,sincewearealwaysself-condemnedwheneverwecontradictitsconclusionsanddirections.419

Burnetthoughtthatwecouldnotbeobligedbyadispositiontoactfromnatural

affection,orasenseofbeautyinanactionbecausetheseareonlyaffectionsand

416Burnet,Correspondence,232.417Ibid.,207.418HutchesontoBurnet,Correspondence,228.419Burnet,Correspondence,223,244.Aswesawinchapter4,therewasasimilaremphasisondiscursivereasoninthere-formulationthatHutchesongavetomoralobligationintheIllustrations–thatitincludedthemoralsenseinthecontextofafullyreasonedappreciationofthecontextandconsequencesofanaction.

176

relishandcarrynoobligatoryforcewiththem,untilwehavejudgedthem‘fit’by

deductionfromarationalprinciple.

Inshort,allsortofobligationtoanythingrequiresreasontogiveitforce,withoutwhichitisamerephantasmoftheimagination.420[Myemphasis.]

Burnetclaimedthatwecannoteven‘formanobligationwithoutintroducing

reasonatitsfoundation’.Wecanonlybeobligedtoanendthatisrational,

meaninganendwehavereasonedascorrectlyreflectingthenatureofthings

andtherelationsbetweenthem.Whatdoesobligationmean?

ObligationisawordofaLatinoriginalsignifyingtheactionofbindingwhich,thereforeinamoralsense...mustimportthebindingofanintelligentagentbysomelaw,whichcanbenootherthanthelawofreason.Forallothertiesarereducibletothisandthisisprimaryandreducibletonootherprinciple.421

Burnetmaintainedthatweareself-condemnedwhenweactagainstwhatwe

knowtobetrue,aswemightjudgeourselvesifweactedagainstatruthabout

anything.Icanactagainstdesiresandaffection,however,Burnetmaintained,

withouthavingto‘bringmyselfinguilty’.Moralgoodness,inourcase,asinthe

caseofGod,justwas,forBurnet,actinginaccordancewithwhatwetooktobea

trueproposition,orpropositions.Burnetsaidthatwhen

Ifindcertaintruepropositionsresultingconcerningthenatureofthings,thenmoralgoodness,Isayconsistsinactingagreeablytothosepropositions,moralbadnessactingdisagreeablytothem.422

ForBurnet,whatactuallymovesapersontoactisnotthequestion–thisis

generallynotmoralobligation,hefreelyadmitted,butonlyreasoncantellusifa

plannedactionistheright/correctone,whichthenputsusunderamoral

obligation.

Thequestionisnotwhatisseeninexperiencetoleadmentoact.Iconfesstheirpassionsandaffectionsgenerallydoleadthem.Anditistheirhappinessandthewisdomoftheircreatorthattheyhavesuchaffectionsandpassionsasnaturallytend,tilltheycorruptthem,toproduceinmanyinstancesthesameeffectswhichreasondictates.Butitisstillreasonwhichinformsusbeforehandthatsuchactionswouldberightaswellas

420Burnet,Correspondence,224.421Ibid.,235.422Ibid.,232.

177

afterwardstheywereright.Andofthisindeedtherecanbenodoubttoanyonewhohaseverfeltreasonworkinginhisbreast.423[Myemphasis.]

Burnetdidnotwishtodenythemotiveforceofbeautyandpleasurethatwe

perceiveinvirtue,orournaturalaffectionsforothers,sincetheywereputthere

bydivineinstitutioninorderthatwebemotivatedbythem.

Iknowtheyarethemostsuccessfulsolicitorstoeverythingthatisrightandreasonableifdulyattendedtoandnotmistakenormisused.Andweshouldbecomfortlessandforlorncreaturesifwehadnoaffectionsandinwardwarmthofsentimenttospurusontowhatdryreasonapprovesof.ButIwouldnothavemendependontheiraffectionsasrulessufficienttoconductthem,thoughtheyarethepropermeanstoanimatethemandsupportthemasreasondirects.Iwouldhavethemsearchstillhigherforthefoundationandgroundsoftheseverymotives.424

Burnetclearlyexpressedtheviewintheselettersthatthecomprehensionofour

obligationisreachedbyrightreason.Wemaycarryoutanactfromkind

affection,whichresultsinthebeneficiarygaininginnaturalgood,andBurnet

arguedthatthisis‘generally’whatleadsustoact.Buthewassilentonwhat

‘generally’means.ItisjustnotcleartowhatdegreeBurnetthoughtitwas

possibleforustoactpurelyfromaregardtothemoralvalueofanaction.Inany

case,theroleofconscienceworkingtomotivateustofulfilanobligationisnot

freefromhedonicinfluence.

Burnet’sminimalcommentsontheforceofself-condemnationofacting(weare

‘self-condemned’whereweactagainsttheresultsofourownreasoning,hence

weareobligedtofollowthem),likeClarke’s,aredifficulttointerpret.425Dowe

acttofulfilourobligationtoreasonbecausewebelievetheactiontoberight,or

doweacttosecurethepleasureofself-approvalandavoidthepainofguilt(of

actingaccording,ornot,tothatknowledge)?Whatroledotheseconsiderations

ofourown‘self-good’playinourconsistently,oratleastregularlybehaving

accordingtoourunderstandingofwhatitisrightorcorrect(oratleastregularly

enoughtosecureourownsalvation)?Moreover,diditmattertoGod,whywe

actedorwasthematterofouractualmotivationamatterofindifferencetohim,

423Ibid.,233.424Ibid.,207.425Ibid.,224.

178

aslongaswealsoaimedforvirtueaswell?WhatwasGod’sviewonmixed

motives?TheseconcernslayattheverycoreofBalguy’sapproachtothe

possibilityofvirtueashetookupthequestionofthemoralvalueofactsofself-

interest.

Balguyandmotivation

Balguyisimportantbecauseheattemptedtoaddress,moredirectlythanClarke

perhaps,thequestionofhowGodhadactedtomakevirtuepossibleforusgiven

thetendencyofthesensiblepartsofournaturetoleadusawayfromourrational

understandingofwhatisright.

IntheFirstandSecondPartsBalguyarguedthatourmoralobligationconsistsin

ourfreelychoosingtoactaccordingtoourrationalperceptionofthe‘fitness’of

anaction.Butdidhemakethe‘practicalclaim’thatthisissufficienttomoveusto

choosetoactvirtuously?IarguethatBalguydidnotmaketheclaimthat

knowledgeoffitnessandtheobligationderivedfromthisissufficienttomotivate

moralaction,forexactlythesamereasonthatIarguedthatClarkedidnot–

becausewepresentlyrequire,andhaverequiredsincetheFall,knowledgeofour

immortalityandafuturestatewheredivinejusticeismetedout,toinorder

behavevirtuously.

Balguy’sfirstLettertoaDeist,publishedin1726tookonShaftesbury’sclaims

overthesufficiencyoftheinherentmoralbeautyofanactiontomoveusto

virtue.426Balguyagreedthatthough‘hercharms’wereconsiderableandderived

fromanintrinsicworth,theseweren’tsufficienttomakeusbehavevirtuously.

BalguythoughtthatShaftesbury’sinsistenceonthedetrimentaleffectthatacting

forreasonsofself-interesthadonthemoralqualityofourmotivationwas

misplaced.This,Balguyargued,wasbecauseconsiderationsofrewardand

punishmentclearlyenhancedourabilitytobehavevirtuously.IntheSecondPart

Balguyarguedthat,aswehadbeencreatedbothrationalandsensible,Godhad

placedusundera‘doubleobligation’asrationalandsensible(sensitive)426JohnBalguy,ALettertoaDeistConcerningtheBeautyandExcellencyofMoralVirtue,andtheSupportandImprovementWhichitReceivesfromtheChristianReligion,1726.HenceforthFirstLetter.

179

agents.427Thesetwinobligationsweredesignedtoenhanceourabilityto

practicewhatweknewtoberight.Theimplicationofthiswasthatwewerenot

lessobligedintheactualperformanceofamoralactionbyaconsiderationof

divinerewardsandpunishments.Moreover,forBalguy(althoughhedidnot

statethis),theimplicationwasthatthe‘naturalsanctions’ofconscience(guilt

andcondemnation)couldalsonowbeseentobeperfectlyacceptableinthe

fulfilmentofourobligationsassensibleagents.Balguy,moreover,arguedthat

certaindutiestoself,suchasself-careandpersonaldevelopmentalsocame

underthelabelofmoralvirtues,althoughtheywerenotsocialvirtues.428So,we

havebothreligiousobligationsthatentailthatweneedtoconsiderthe,likely,

judgmentofouractionsinafuturestateandwehavedutiestoourmoral(self)

developmentthatentailthatweoughttoactonthehedonicforceofconscience.

BothClarkeandBalguybelievedthatournaturalreasoningabilities,inpractice,

hadbeenpartiallydestroyedbytheFall.Forthe‘greatestpartofmankind’,our

choicetopursuesensualpleasureandindulgeourpassionshadoverwhelmed

theabilityofnaturalreasontoperceivethetruthandtochoosetofulfilour

obligationtoactaccordingtoit.BothClarkeandBalguy,itistrue,most

frequentlymadetheclaimthattheinsufficiencyofreasonappliestothemajority

ofmankind,ratherthantheexplicitassertionthatnoonewasevermovedtoa

moralactionbyreasonofitshavingbeenunderstoodtobetherightthingtodo.

Clarke,aswesaw,deemeditpossiblethataveryfewexcellent‘ancients’might

havemanagedthisveryoccasionally,butthatsamenaturalreasonremainedan

inadequatesourceofmotivationforevensagestolivealifeofconsistentvirtue.

Balguyargued,likeClarke,thattheStoicclaimstothesufficiencyoftheintrinsic

qualitiesofvirtueweremisguided,giventhesensibleelementsofournatures,

whichhadbeenimplantedbyaGodwhocreatedusaccordingtowhatwasbest

forus,givenhistotalcomprehensionofeternallaw.Indeed,Balguysawhimself,

intheSecondPart,ashavingreconciledthetruthsinbothStoicandEpicurean

positions,andtohavedonesoinawaythatrespectedGod’sintentionincreating

427Balguy,SecondPart,14-15.428Ibid.,65.

180

usrationalandsensible.429ItwasBalguy’sparticularmissiontoexplainwhy,

giventhatwewerecreatedwiththedualqualitiesofrationalityandsensibility,it

wasperfectlyacceptabletoactforself-concernedreasonsconcernedwiththe

qualityofourimmortallivesinafuturestate.Herefusedtodisbarcertainduties

toself-interestfromthemoralsphere.Thesewerenotsocialvirtues(friendship,

gratitude,naturalaffection,generosity,publicspiritandcompassion),butthey

werenotentirelyoutsideofthemoralsphereasHutchesonhad,hethought,

claimed.Balguyfoundthathecouldnot

concludethatnoactionscanbemorallygood,whicharesolelydirectedtoprivateinterest.430

TheFirstLetterwaspennedanonymouslybyBalguy,afterreadingthe

Characteristics,tocomplainaboutthe‘lowanddisadvantageousaccounthehas

givenofthosereligiousmotiveswhichbothreasonandrevelationsetbefore

us.’431BalguyagreedwithShaftesburythatmoralitycould‘innoway’be

resolvedintoself-interest.‘Interestcanneverenterintothenatureand

constitutionofvirtue,yetwhymayitnotbeallowedtoaccompanyandstand

besideher?’Self-interest,thoughtBalguy,couldonlybeopposedtovirtueifit

destroyedbenevolence.Ifwedestroyedbenevolence,thenwedestroyedvirtue,

heallowed.432Balguyhereshowedthesamesortofpragmaticattitudetomoral

thoughtthatHutchesondidinhisletterintroducingtheInquiry.Hutcheson,as

discussedinChapter3,maintainedthatwhicheverbeliefsaboutourownnature

andthenatureofGodincreasedbenevolencewerecorrectbeliefs.Balguy

claimedthatreasonsofself-interestcouldonlybeopposedtowhatwethought

ofasvirtueiftheyactuallydecreasedtheamountofbenevolencethatresulted

fromtheirbeingheld.

Balguyinsistedthatvirtueandtherewardsofvirtue(whichaccruedtotheactor,

soamountedtoaselfishmotivationifweactedtoreapthem)shouldnotbe

consideredasantitheticaltooneanother,primarilybecausetheyhadbeen

joinedtogetherbyGod.Hethenoutlinedallthewaysinwhichknowledgeofa429Balguy,SecondPart,99-100.430Balguy,FirstPart,5.431Balguy,FirstLetter,5.432Ibid.,10.

181

futurestatewithrewardsandpunishmentsdevelopsandenhancesour

benevolence,andpreventsusfromsinning.These‘newmotives’donothinder

benevolence,heclaimed,sincea‘strictattentiontoself-good’addstoour

enjoymentofvirtue.Inaddition,thisknowledgepromisesus‘greatandendless

happiness’andapeacefulandtranquilmind,‘inproportiontothestrengthofour

hopes’.Experienceandobservationwouldtellusthatthisknowledgeincreases

ourgoodnessoftemper,‘endears’ustooneanotherandmovesustorespond

withgratitudetoourcreator,bothofwhichhaveapositivepracticaleffect.Truly,

tolivewithoutthesehopes‘wouldstrikeallvirtuedead’-‘dejectedand

disconsolate’,wewoulddonogoodforeitherforothersorforourselves.433

Inshort,toprescribeandpreachupvirtue,withoutafuturestate,appearstobenootherwisethanasasortofreligiousknight-errantry.Howevermenmaygazeorlistenforawhile,theywillneverbeinfluencedbyadoctrinethatiscarriedsohigh,astobeabovetheprinciplesofhumannature.434

Theotherdifficultywithasoleappealtotheintrinsicallyappealingqualitiesof

virtuewas‘howsmallaproportionofmankind’werecapableofdiscerning

them.Shaftesbury’sschemerequiredthecultivationoftastesunlikelytobe

stirredinthe‘bulkofmankind’,andevenanappealtoauniversalmoralsense,as

proposedbyHutcheson,neededtobe‘cherished’bythecare,attentionand

practiceofvirtueifitisnottobeextinguished.435Bothschemesappearedto

Balguytobeinsufficienttosupportandmaintainmoralityinmostofus,because

wecannotarriveatanaturalknowledgeoftheworthofvirtueby‘abstract

reasoningsandspeculations’.Intruth

toexpectindeedanywaythatthegreatestpartofmankindshouldhavejustideasofvirtueandunderstanditsworth;istoexpectthegreatestpartofmankindshouldbecomephilosophers.436

Evenifthistruthwereperceived,how,Balguyasked,coulditbeexpectedto

operateeffectivelyonus?‘Whatslightholdwouldsuchintellectualbeautiestake

ontheunderstandingofthevulgar;andhowfeeblywouldtheyoperateupon

433Ibid.,11-15.434Ibid.,15.435Ibid.,16-17.436Ibid.,13.

182

them?’437Whateveritisthatmotivatesustoanaction,bythenecessityofour

creatednatures,itneedstoworkstronglyonour‘grossminds’byaffectingour

senseandpassions.Whatbettermethodthen,thanrewardsandpunishmentsto

motivateustodoourduty?Directcompulsionwas‘inconsistentwithour

nature’,thereforeGodprovideduswiththesemoresuitablemotives.The

necessityofthesemotiveswillbecomeclearwhenwerecognise‘agreatpartof

mankindasdeeplyengagedinsinfulcourses’.Reformationcouldnotbeleft

eithertoour(‘their’)‘darkanddepraved’naturalreasonoranunsupported

moralsense.Theintrinsicgoodnessofvirtueisnotapparenttomostpeople.Try

representing‘toaviciousmanthebeautyofvirtueandyouspeaktohimina

languagehedoesnotunderstand.’438

Vicehadruinedournaturalunderstanding,anda‘strongattachmenttosin’is

producedbyinclinationandstrengthenedbypractice.Theonlytruthpowerful

enoughtopenetratethefogofdepravityisatruththatfirstappealstoself-

interest.Itisnotonlytothoseofusengagedinvicethatafuturestateofrewards

andpunishmentsactsasanencouragementtovirtue.Thesesamemotivesthat

workonsinalsoworktoconsolethoseofussufferingingrief,pain,adversityor

hardship.LikeClarke,BalguyfoundtheStoicappealtothesufficiencyofthe

intrinsicqualitiesofvirtuedeeplymisguided.Thesemotivesthen,supplyallthe

defectsofournaturewitheffectivemotivestoconductourselvesvirtuously.

Suchmotivesarenotasocialvirtue,butactinguponthemproducesvirtue,and

assuch,theyarenecessaryforvirtue.

Weplainlyseethatsheisnotself-sufficient;andhowcouldherdefectsbebettersupplied,thanbythoserewardswhichrevelationhasofferedmen?439

Theyare‘auxiliaries’tovirtuetobesure,buttheyarenolessnecessarytothe

practiseofvirtue.Inreality,ifwetookawayalltheactionsthathadbeen

conductedforthebenefitofothersbutinexpectationofinteresttoourselves,

‘theremainder,inalllikelihood’wouldnotbeveryconsiderable.Ourdutyand

interestmustcoincideformoralactionstobeperformed.437Ibid.,17.438Ibid.,18.439Ibid.,23-24.

183

‘Tisvanityandpresumptioninhimtoslightthoseadvantageswhicharenecessarytohiswell-being.Ontheotherhand‘tismeanandmercenarytopursuethoseadvantagesalone.TopreventbothGodhascloselyconnectedourdutyandinterestandinterwoventhemtogether.440

WantingtopleaseGod,forreasonsofself-interest,wasnothingtobeashamedof,

infactitrivalleddisinterestfortheclaimofnoblestmotive.

Adesiretopleasethesupremebeing,andobtainhisapprobation,issowiseandworthyanintention,sojustaprincipleofaction,soagreeabletothedictateofrightreason,andthegenuineinclinationsofhumannature,thatitmayseemtorivalthemostdisinterestedloveofvirtue,oratleasttoclaimaplaceverynearit.441

Whatthe‘exaltedmind’ofSocratesunderstoodwasthattoseparatevirtueand

interest,andpursueeitheralonewastoactnotonlyagainstourownnaturesbut

alsothe‘rulesoffoundwisdom’.Theknowledgethatatthecrucifixion,Christ

enduredhisposition‘forthejoythatwassetbeforehim’,wassurelyenough

authorityandassurancethatanyonecouldwantthat‘themixedprinciplebefore

mentionedisperfectlyright’.442

Sixyearslaterin1732,afterthepublicationofhisFirstandSecondparts,Balguy

addedapostscripttotheunalteredtextofthethirdeditionofhisLettertoaDeist

(henceforthPostscript).Inithewantedtoclarifythatwhateverhehadsaidabout

theusefulnessand‘insomecasesabsolutelynecessary’rewardsofferedby

religion,thetruthremainedthat‘themoredisinterestedlytheagentacts,the

morevirtuousheis’.Balguywishedtoretractanythingthathehadsaidwhich

wascontrarytothenotionthat,

thehighestprincipleofamoralagentisaloveofvirtueforvirtue’ssake;ashischiefmeritistopursueandpracticeituponitsownaccount.443

ThisindeedisGod’sperfection.Anditwouldbeourstooexceptthat,inour

presentcondition,itwasimpracticalforpartsofourdutytobemotivatedby

disinterestedloveofvirtuealone.

440Ibid.,24.441Ibid.,26.442Ibid.,27.443Postscript,1732,33.

184

Manisnotcapableofsoperfectandexaltedacourseofvirtue...atleastnotinhispresentcondition.Consideringtheindigenceandinfirmityofhisnature,somepartsofhisdutyarereallyimpracticableonthefootofdisinterest.444

Since,

asensibleagentcannomorebeindifferenttohappinessthanamoralagentcanbeindifferenttorectitude.Theymustthereforebereconciledandrenderedconsistent;whichinmanycasescannotpossiblybe,withoutsupportandinfluenceoffuturerewards.445

Giventhatitisinournaturetoseekhappiness,wemaygiveuptheprospectof

immediatehappinessinreturnforafullerhappinessinalaterstate,butforGod

torequireapersontogiveuphappinessaltogether(assumingnofuturestate)

wouldbetorequirehimto

renounce,orcounter-acttheprinciplesofhisownnature;whichunavoidablyengagehiminthequestofhappiness,atthesametimethattheyinclinehimtothepursuitofvirtue.446

Balguystatedthatvirtueormoralrectitudecould,andshould,beconsideredin

twoways.Eitheritcouldberegarded

initself,asaneternalruleofactionforintelligentbeings,necessarilyarisingfromthenatureofthings,itsowndignityandbeautymust,inordinarycases,recommendittouncorruptedminds.447

Orelseitcouldbethoughtofasreligion,or‘thewillandcommandofthe

supremelegislator’,andassuchmustbeenforcedbyrewardandpunishment.

Giventhedepravityofthe‘bulkofthespecies’,themajorityofusneedtobe

governedbyauthorityand‘managedbythespringsofhopesandfear’.If

thisbethetruestateofmankind,asmustbeacknowledged;whoeverattemptstotakeoffmen’sthoughtsandregardsfromthesanctionsofreligionandfixthementirelyonthenaturalcharmsofvirtuewillinallprobabilitydomuchmorehurtthangood.448

444Ibid.,34.445Ibid.,34.446Ibid.,35.447Ibid.,36.448Ibid.,37.

185

ItshouldalsobeemphasisedthatwhileintheFirstandSecondPartsBalguy

wroteprimarilytoexplainthefoundationsofmoralvirtue‘initself’,hemade

herethesameargumentaboutourdual,butdistinct,existencesas‘moralagents’

and‘religiousagents’.IntheSecondPart,BalguycomplainedthatLocke(and

others)hadconfusedthetwobyfoundingbothmoralvirtueandreligionupon

thewillofGod.Infact,religionandmoralgoodness

maybelookeduponascoincident,bothinrespectoftheirultimateground,andtheagreementoftheirprecepts,yetupontheseaccountsweoughtnottoconfoundtheseideas,whicharethemselvesdistinct.449

God,beingmorallyperfect,is‘incapableofreligion’.Inourcasealthoughthose

moralactionsperformedfortheirownsakeare‘thepurestandmostperfect’

thatwearecapableof,but,wenonethelessneedreligion.Weneeditinorderto

fulfilallourdutiestoGod,whichcallforsomeofthesameactions,butwhich

derivefromhisauthorityasourgovernor,whowantsustobehappyinour

immortalstate‒itistheactualperformanceofbenevolentactionthatis

importanttoGod.Thisispresumablybecausebyactingforthegoodofothers,

fromwhatevermotive,weincreasehappinessonearthforeverybody,whichis

hisaim.TheactualperformanceoftheactioniswhatBalguyseemstothinkis

paramountinmeetingthedemandsofourreligiousagency.Theperceptionof

theobligationtoactinaccordancewithwhatreasontellsusisrequired;itis

whatisparamountinmeetingthedemandsofourmoralagency.Intermsofour

abilitytofulfilourrolesasmoralagents,wehadbeengivenachancetouseour

naturalreason,butfailed.

Godwaspleasedthereforetoreinforcevirtuewithreligion,togivemennewlight,andnewlaws,andstrengthentheselawsbypowerfulsanctions.450

Ourdutytobehavevirtuouslyisinfactcomposedoftwoseparateduties,oneto

actforvirtue’ssake,andonetoactaccordingtoGod’swill.Balguydidnotagree

withHutcheson‘thatnoactionscanbemorallygood,whicharesolelydirectedat

privateinterest’.451Heappraisedthereaderofthefollowingsituation:

449Balguy,SecondPart,42.450Ibid.,44.451Balguy,FirstPart,5.

186

Whateverpre-eminencemaybeduetovirtue,onaccountofitsintrinsicexcellenceanddignity,yettheauthorityandmajestyofreligionseemmuchfitter,andmoreeffectualtorestrainlicentiousmen,andgovernadegenerateworld.Thosepurerbeings,whichareofanordersuperiortohumannature,neednotperhapsanyotherrulethantheinternaloneofreasonorvirtue;butourfrailandfaultyspecieswantsbothanotherlaw,andalegislator,tocurbtheirfolliesandvices,andkeeptheminsomemeasurewithintheboundsoftheirduty.452

Balguy’saimswerethreefold‒toexplaintheneedfortheRevelationofthe

Gospels,toencouragehisreadershiptovirtue,andtoinsistthatthefoundations

ofmoralitydidnotrestuponthearbitrarywillofGod,butratheruponaneternal

truth,whichGodhadchosentobeguidedby.We,beinglessthanperfect,needed

theobligationsofreligionaswellastheperceptionofourmoralobligationto

makeuspracticevirtue.

Balguyargued,intheFirstandSecondParts,againstHutcheson,thatwecould

notcountanactionfrominstinctualaffectionmoral,atsomelength.Thiswas

becausehethoughtthatactingfrominstinctdidnotfulfilourobligations,moral

(includingoursocialdutiesanddutiestoself)orreligious(toobeythewillof

God).Healsosaid,quiteclearly,thatweneedtousereasontodiscoverour

dutiesandperceiveourobligationsandthatvirtueconsistsina‘rational

determination’.453TheclosestthatBalguycomestotheundifferentiatedpractical

rationalclaimishere,whenBalguydealtwithHutcheson’sclaimthatreason

couldnotexciteustoaction.Balguyarguedthatarationalperceptionofvirtue

leadstoourapprobationofit(becauseitisarationalperception),

Whatisthereasonexcitingamantothechoiceofavirtuousaction?Ianswer,hisveryapprobationofitisitselfasufficientreason,whereveritisnotover-ruledbyanothermorepowerful.454[Myemphasis].

Thepointbeingthatwehaveotherrationalapprobations,whichincludethose

thatargueforourrationalself-interest,orhappiness.Balguyarguedthatwe

haveanon-reduciblerationalaffectionforthe‘rectitude’ofactions(their

‘honestum’,nottheir‘pulchram’).Thisisnotreducibletoanaffectionforself,or452Balguy,SecondPart,43.453Balguy,FirstPart,13,21.454Ibid.,BalguyhadrubbishedLeibniz’snotionofsufficientvirtue(whichLeibnizclaimedwasunderminedbyClarke’smoralnecessity).

187

others,andwemaybeexcitedbyit.‘Theendofrationalactionsandrational

agents’,Balguyinsisted‘consideredassuch,isreasonormoralgood’.455But,we

needtokeepinmindthatwearebothrationalandsensibleagentsandhave

obligationstoboththeseagencies.Thesensitivepartofournaturedemandsthat

wefulfilourobligationstothewillofGod,becauseobediencealsodetermines

ourhappiness.Indeed,

asGodhasframedournaturesinsuchasmannerasmakesitnecessarytoapproveandpursueboththeseends,wemayinfalliblyconclude,thathedoesnotintendtosufferthemfinallytointerfere.456

IdobelievethatClarkeandBalguyaredoneadisservicebyreaderswhose

interpretativestrategyleadsthemtoignorethepartsofClarkeandBalguy’s

argumentwhichdealtwiththeroleoffuturerewardandpunishmentThis

approachdoesindeedleavethemlookingasiftheystruggledtoaccountfor

motivation,asIrwinandSchneewindsuggest.Theydidn’tstruggletoaccountfor

motivation;theyjustdidsoinawaythatlatercommentatorshavenotalways

deemedvalid,orinteresting.

Inthefinalpartofthischapter,IwillexploreBurnetandBalguy’stheistic

metaphysicsandcomparetheirargumentswiththosepresentedbyHutcheson.

ThiscomparisonismadesomewhatdifficultbecauseIhavepresented

Hutcheson’sargumentsastheywerefoundacrosstextsthatBurnetandBalguy

didnothaveaccessto.Hutcheson,however,didindicatethedirectionofhis

thoughtonGod’smoralattributesinthefourtreatisesandBurnetwas,ofcourse,

awareofHutcheson’sdiscussionofthismatterinhisletterstoBurnet.Burnet

andBalguyrespondedtothesearguments.Theseargumentsareimportant

becausetheyrevealthefoundationofBurnetandBalguy’sobjectionto

Hutcheson’smoraltheory.BurnetandBalguyobjectedtoHutchesonfounding

moralgoodnessonthebenevolentnatureoftheDeity.BurnetinsistedthatGod

aimedatourhappinessbecauseeternallawstatedthathappinesswasbest.

God’smoralperfectionlayinhisalwaysconforminghiswilltohisunderstanding

ofwhatwasright(hisrectitude).Thisiswhereourmoralgoodnessliestoo,but

455Balguy,FirstPart,88.456Ibid.,50.

188

ourlessthanperfectnaturesledGodtoimplantkindaffectionstohelpusactfor

thehappinessofothers.Balguymadethesamearguments.

BurnetonGod’smoralperfection

WesawintheprevioustwochaptersthatHutchesonhadmaintainedthatGod’s

creativeactsweremadeinconformitytohisunderstandingofwhatwouldbe

bestforus,becauseofhisbenevolentnature.Godretainedtheabsolutepowerto

act(priortocreation)ashewilled,buthechosenottoactagainstthis

understandinginhisactsofcreation.Burnetequatedantecedentfitnesswiththe

situationthatobtainedpriorto,orindependentofGod’screation.457Hutcheson,

inconversationwithBurnet,didnotdiscussGod’snaturalpower(whichIhave

suggested,forHutcheson,equatedtohisabsolutepowertoact,notthechoices

hemadeinconformitywithhismoralnature).

Hutcheson,inreplytoBurnet,hadarguedthatGod’smoralperfectionlayin

‘somethinglike’ourkindaffections(asfarasweareabletocomprehendhis

moralnature).Burnetcounteredthatthevalueofuniversalhappinesswas

understoodbythedivineintelligence.Thisunderstandinginfactlegitimised

God’sbenevolentdesires.

Itisbestthatallshouldbehappy.ThisisthetruthaconformitytowhichmakesthedesireofpublicgoodreasonableintheDeity,andIaddinallrationalcreatureswhowouldimitatethewisdomandgoodnessoftheDeity.458

HutchesononlyreferredtothecommunicableperfectionsofGodinhis

Metaphysics,butBurnetsawtheimplicationsofHutcheson’sreferencetoGod’s

kindaffectionsasexcitinghimtoaction.BurnetsawthatHutchesonreferred

heretoGod’spleasureinhiskindaffectionsasexcitingGodtoaction,because

thiswouldgroundGod’scommunicativedecisiontoimplantanalogousaffections

andamoralsenseinus.ButGod’shappiness,forBurnet,wasnotamoralreason

forGodtoact.Godisesteemedtobeessentiallygoodbyusbecausehisactions

conformtohisunderstanding.

457Burnet,Correspondence,220.458Ibid.,233.

189

Iown,indeed,thatwecannotbutconceivesomethingintheDeityinsomemeasureanalogoustoourkindestaffectionsasthathetakesinfinitepleasureincommunicatinghisgoodtohiscreatures.Butthisconsiderationleadsusonlytoconcludehiminfinitelyhappyandnotgoodinamoralsense.Weesteemhimessentiallygoodbecauseheknowsalltruthandalwaysactsaccordingtoit.459

Moreover,BurnetarguedthatGod’shappinesswassocompleteasaresultofhis

perfectabilitytoconformhiswilltohisunderstandingthathedidnotrequire

theassistanceofaffectionsto‘augmenthisdispositiontodoright’.God

standsinneedofnosuchassistancefromaffectionstoredoublehishappinessand,therebytoaugmenthisdispositiontodoright,ashehasmadeustowantandhasthereforeaffordedus.Andashedoesnotstandinneedofsuchassistance,soneithercouldhepossiblyreceiveit,beingofaperfectlyindependentnaturewhomthereforenothingfromwithoutcaninfluenceoractupon.460

BurnetandHutcheson,Isuggest,boththoughtthatGodhaddecidedtocreatein

accordancewithhisunderstanding,buttheythoughtthatthisdecisionwasnot

motivatedbyhisbenevolence.ForHutcheson,Godsawthathisownmoral

perfectionwashisbenevolence.Godhadchosentocommunicatethistous,both

becauseitwastruethatbenevolencewasamoralperfectioninitself,and

becausehewasmadehappybyit,andwishedtosharethathappinesswithus.

WehavealreadyseenHutcheson’sremarksconcerningthenecessityofGod’s

naturenotreflectinganyabridgementofhisfreedom.Burnetalsothought‘the

necessityof[God’s]ownnature’promptedhisconforminghispowertohis

understanding.ItwasnotGod’sloveforus,however,orhiskindaffections,that

Burnetclaimedconstitutedthenecessarypartofhismoralnature.Godwas

perfectlyhappyinhisperfectknowledgeandhisunlimitedpowertoactin

accordancewiththisknowledge.Burnetappearstohavethought,contraryto

Hutcheson,thatGod’saffectionorloveforuswasnotcommunicatedbyhimto

usasamoralperfection,butratherourownkindaffectionswereimplantedto

helpuswithourlessthanperfectabilitytoconformourwillstoour

understanding.ForBurnet,God’sloveforusdidnotneedtocausehiscreative

action,becausethatwasnotwhatconstitutedhismoralperfection–thiswasthe

459Ibid.,239.460Ibid.,247.

190

rectitudeofhiswill.We,however,requiredtheassistanceofkindaffectionsasa

motivationalaid,buttheydidnotconstituteourmoralgoodnesseither.

IbelievethatBurnetmayhavefollowedClarkehereandthatthecomprehension

oftheirposition,andHutcheson’s,isenlargedbyaconsiderationofthenatureof

God’smoralperfection.IsuggestthatBurnet’sobjectionisthatHutcheson

foundsdivinemoralperfectioninanaffectiveaspectofhisnature,ratherthanit

beinginhisnaturetoalwaysconformhiswilltohisunderstanding.Burnet

however,ismoreconcernedwithwhatitisthatisnecessaryinthedivinenature

thatleadsGodtoalwaysobeyhisunderstanding,notwhethertherewas

somethingnecessaryinthedivinenaturethatachievedthisinthefirstplace.

BalguyandGod’smoralperfection

BalguyintheFirstPartofferedarangeofobjectionstoHutcheson’sclaimsthat

virtueconsistedinbenevolentaffections(inourselvesandinGod),andthatwe

wereinpossessionofamoralsensewhichenabledustoreceiveideasofmoral

goodness.

Balguy’sobjectionstomoralgoodnessconsistingininstinctoraffectionwere,as

mightbesupposed,groundedinanobjectiontoactionsofnaturalnecessity

beingcountedasmoral.NecessityforGod,Balguythought,couldmeanoneof

twothings,eitherhewasnecessarilydeterminedbythereasonofthings,orbya

necessarydispositionofhisnature(hisbenevolence,forexample).IfGodwas

determinedbythelatterthiswasnotamoralperfection.The‘blindinstinct’of

brutescouldnotbeafactoratworkinaperfectbeing.Godmusthavedecidedto

actbenevolentlyforthereasonthatitwasthebestthingtodo,notthroughan

impulseoflovetowardsus,oranunavoidableinclination,inorderforusto

considerhimperfect.461Balguythengavearangeofexamplesthatdemonstrated

howweplacealowermoralvalueonbehaviourissuingfromloveratherthan

duty.Instinctsandaffectionswerelegitimateauxiliariestoreason,instinctbeing

akindof‘infantvirtue’,whichwouldleadustoaplacewherereasoncould

assumecommand.Healso,frequentlyandwithavarietyofrhetoricalflourishes,461Balguy,FirstPart,4-10.

191

putforwardtheobjectionthatitwas‘ignoble’forvirtuetobefoundedonsense

andinstinct.462

BalguytookupHutcheson’scommentthattherewas‘nothingsurpassingthe

naturalpoweroftheDeity’directly.Balguyarguedthat

itwasnomoreinthepoweroftheDeitytomakerationalbeingsapproveofingratitude,perfidiousnessetc.,thanitisinhispowertomakethemconcludethatapartofanythingisequaltothewhole.463

Ihaveargued,inapreviouschapter,thatthiswasnotHutcheson’spointhere.I

arguedthatHutchesonopposednaturaltomoralpowerandthattheexerciseof

God’snaturalpower,withouthismoralpower,wouldhaveentailedthathealso

abandonedhisunderstandingofeternallawincreation.QuitewhyGod’snatural

powerwouldneverbeexercisedinthiswaywas,ofcourse,duetohismoral

perfection.Balguy,however,wouldnothavebeenawareofthefulldriftof

Hutcheson’sargumenthere.

InanothertractBalguyexpressedhisviewsinmoredetail.InhisDivineRectitude

of1733,Balguyinsistedthatthe‘narrownessofourminds’entailedthatwe

couldneverreallyknowthefullextentofGod’sperfections.Balguy,however,

thoughtthatwhatevertheseperfectionsmightbe,theycouldbesubsumed

undertheideaofhismoralrectitude.ThisamountedtoGod’s‘determining

himselfbymoralfitness,oractingperpetuallyaccordingtothetruth,natureand

reasonofthings’.464Balguyobjectedhere,again,tothenotionthatGod’smoral

perfectionliesinthe‘suppositionofsuchanaturalpropension’ashis

benevolence.Thiswas‘injurioustohishonour’andlessenedhismoral

excellence.Itwas‘intrinsicallyrightandfittocommunicatehappiness’,andthe

productionofhappiness,ornaturalgoodmustbepreferabletoitsnon-

production,butthiswasnotGod’sfinalend.465God’sownendwashis‘glory,

whichconsistsinhisownapprobationofhisworksandactions.’466Thiswasnot

462Ibid.,11-18.463Ibid.,25.464JohnBalguy,DivineRectitude:or,aBriefInquiryconcerningtheMoralPerfectionsoftheDeity,particularlyinrespectofCreationandProvidence,1733,4.HenceforthDivineRectitude.465Balguy,DivineRectitude,10-11.466Ibid.,12.

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becausehehadcreatedaworldthatwasconducivetoourhappiness,whichwas

onlyasubservientend,butbecausethe‘realandintrinsicworth’ofhiscreation

was‘amiableinthesightofthecreatorhimself’.467

ThischapterhasexploredthewaysinwhichLocke’sperceptualaccountof

reasongaverisetoBurnetandBalguy’sclaimsthatreasonwasourinner,and

moralsense,andhowthefocusonourexperienceofimmediate,affectivemoral

reactionsledtotheirclaimsabouttheexperientialpriorityofreasonoversense

perceptionintheintuitionofself-evidentmoralprinciples.ItwasBalguywho

objectedtotheresultingindistinctnessoftheboundarybetweensenseand

reason,orintellect.Inaddition,IarguedthatBalguyfollowedClarkeinhis

approachtomotivation,whichwasnot,infact,somethingeitherofthemcould

besaidtostrugglewith,oncetheirwholeapproachisconsidered.Lastly,I

consideredtheirobjectionstoHutcheson’saccountofbenevolenceasGod’s

moralperfection.

InthenextchapterImoveontoGay,whoprotestedabouttherelianceofmoral

theoryontheawarenessofourintrospectiveexperienceinmoralthoughtand

motive,thispicksuponthisthemediscussedinsomedetailinChapter4on

Hutcheson.Gay’schiefaim,Isuggestwastoexplainhowtherationaland

sensiblepartsofournaturemightbebroughttogetherinaunifiedaccountof

agencythatsawhumannature,obligationandmotiveboundtogethertoexplain

thepossibilityofvirtue.Inaddition,Gaypresentedatheoryofdivinemotivation

thatmovedawayfromtheideaofGod’scommunicablevirtues.

467Ibid.,13.

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Chapter6

JohnGay:‘RestingPlaces’

In1731EdmundLawappendedtheanonymousPreliminaryDissertation

ConcerningtheFundamentalPrincipleofVirtueorMoralitytohistranslationof

WilliamKing’swork,AnEssayontheOriginofEvil.468Thisworkwaswritten,asit

turnedout,byLaw’sCambridgeassociate,JohnGay.GaywasheraldedbyAlbee,

as‘oneofthemostoriginal,evenifnotoneoftheprofoundest,thinkersinthe

wholedevelopmentofEnglishethics’.IntheDissertation,Albeefoundthefirst

statementofthe‘utilitarianprincipleinitswhollyundifferentiatedform’.469

Gay’soriginality,withrespecttotheprecisenatureofhistheological

utilitarianism,isnotofdirectconcernhere.Myconcernistolookatthewaysin

whichGayrespondedtotheworkofClarkeandhisdefendersandtoHutcheson,

withrespecttothethreethemesthatthethesisisconcernedwith:the

relationshipofrationalismtoobligationandmotivation,therelativerolesof

senseandjudgmentinmoralknowledge(andthedemandthatmotive,ideas,

principles,propositionsandjudgmentsbeavailabletoconsciousawareness),

andthetheisticmetaphysicsusedtosupportargumentsaboutrealism(with

particularemphasisonGod’scommunicativeattributes).Inaddition,although

thisisnotmajorthemeinitself,ashasbeenthecaseintheprecedingchapters,

Locke’sinfluencewillbemadeapparent.Lockewasafarlessproblematicfigure

forGay,who,likeEdmundLaw,tookhimselftobefollowingLockeinhis

approachtomoralmatters.

Gayhasbeenselectedforinclusioninthethesisbecausehetookhimselftobe

offeringasynthesisingsolutiontothethreefolddiscordbetweenClarkeandhis

supporters,Hutcheson,andthosesuchasJohnClarkeofHull,Archibald

CampbellandLaw’sgroupatCambridge,whoproposedself-interestasthesole

468WilliamKing,AnEssayontheOriginofEvil,trans.EdmundLaw(London:Thurlbourn,1731).HenceforthOrigin.469ErnestAlbee,“Review:BritishMoralists;BeingSelectionsfromWritersPrincipallyoftheEighteenthCenturybyL.A.Selby-Bigge,”PhilosophicalReview8,no.1(1898):82-86.SeealsohisAHistoryofEnglishUtilitarianism,1901.

194

principleofmotivationinmoralaction.470Gayproposedamodelofrational

actionthatconsistedofafour-parttheoryofobligation,andheidentifiedeach

obligationwithaparticular‘inducement’,whichpromisedtoaffectour

happinessasindividuals.Heexplainedbothourexperienceof‘publicaffections’

asthemotivationforother-directedactions,andourexperienceofapprobation

ofbeneficentactions,orbenevolentcharactersassuperveningonmorea

fundamentalprincipleofprivatehappiness.Gayrejectedtheaccountsofmoral

obligationprovidedbyClarke,BurnetandBalguy,andHutcheson.Healso

overruledHutcheson’sappealtoevidencefromintrospection,astoour

motivationandmoralapprovalordisapproval,onthegroundsthatweneedto

gobeyondourimmediateawarenessinordertouncoverthe‘fundamental

principleofvirtueortruemorality’.Gay’sexplanationofmotivationand

approbationreliedontheoperationoftheprincipleoftheassociationofideas,

thespecificationofwhichGayattributedtoLocke.

ToseewhyGaybelievedhisaccountcapableofsynthesisingtheapproachesof

Clarke,BurnetandBalguyandHutcheson,attentionmustbepaidtoGay’s

understandingofwhatitwasthatGodhadcommunicatedtousviahisactof

creation.TounderstandGay’sposition,itwillbenecessarytodiscusstheworkof

EdmundLawandWilliamKing.471Thiswillbethefocusofthenextsectionof

thechapter.ThesubsequentsectionwilldealwithGay’saccountofmotivation.

ThefinalsectionwilllookatGay’sobjectiontointrospectionasamethodin

moralphilosophy,andthenatureoftheassociativeprocessthatheheld

470Gayisalsoincludedbecause,asGarrett,hasrecentlybeenatpainstopointout,Gay’sworkhas,todate,beenunderexploredinthesecondaryliterature.AlthoughIdonotdiscussitdirectlyhere,IhavehadsightofaPDFofGarret’srecentveryhelpful(tome)andinsightfultalkonGay-“ALockeanRevolutioninMorals.”PaperpresentedattheJohnLockeConference,DepartmentofPhilosophy,UniversityofPittsburgh,April11th,2015.GayisalsodiscussedbrieflyinChristianMaurer,“Self-InterestandSociability,”inTheOxfordHandbookofBritishPhilosophyintheEighteenthCentury,ed.JamesA.Harris,(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2013),304-105,andCarey,“HutchesonandtheScottishEnlightenment,”49-50,andIrwinDevelopment,VolII,825-827.GayhasreceivedsomeattentionintheliteratureonDavidHartley,asheisthefigurenamedbyDavidHartleyastheinspirationforHartley’sownassociativetheoryofmind.SeeRichardC.Allen,DavidHartleyonHumanNature(NewYork;StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,1999),chapter7,265-296.471GaymentionedHutchesonbyname,andhediscussedtheapproachofthosewhoappealedtofitnessandunfitness,anddistinguishedtheirapproachfromthatofWollaston.HedidnotrefertoClarke,BurnetorBalguybyname.

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responsibleforourapparentexperienceofbenevolentinstinctsandamoral

sense.

King,LawandGayanddivinecommunication

EdmundLawfirstpublishedhistranslationofWilliamKing’sDeOrigineMali,

togetherwithhisownsetoffootnotesin1731.King’sforemostconcernwas

theodicy.Law’sfootnotesweredesignedtoshepherdthereadertowardsLaw’s

ownviewsonarangeoftopics,whichincludedepistemology,andthenatureof

ourabstractideas.472Law,whotookhimselftobefollowingLocke,deniedthe

abstractnotionsofspaceandtimeanyrealexistenceoutsideofourownideas.473

Law’stargetherewasClarkeandhisdefenceofNewton.Lawwaspartofawider

groupatCambridgewhoallobjected,forsomewhatdifferentreasons,toClarke’s

attempttodemonstratewhattheysawas‘Newton’sGod’,andClarke’suseofthe

aprioriasameansofdemonstratingthefirstcauseandhisincommunicable

attributes.474

Whenitcametothe‘generalpowersandpropertiesofhumannature’,Lawhad

alsolookedtoLocke.475InLaw’sopinion,theviewsofLockeandClarkehere

wereincommensurate,notleastbecauseofClarke’sfounding

allourmoralknowledge,oncertaininnateinstincts,orabsolutefitnesses(howeverinconsistentthesetwotermsmayappear),theformer[Locke’sapproach]beingwhollycalculatedtoremovethem.476

Presumably,althoughhedoesnotexplainthisfurther,LawfoundClarke’sself-

evidentmoralprinciplesoperationallyequivalenttoanappealtoinnate

472Law’sconcernswerenotsimplybroaderthanKing’s-onoccasiontheyheldopposingviews,forexampleLawremovedthesectionwhereKingdefendedtheexistenceofinnateideas.SeeJohnStephens,“EdmundLaw,”166.473AyershasarguedforarealistreadingofLocke’sideasofspaceandtime,asYoungpointsout,Young,ReligionandEnlightenment,88.MoorehasarguedthatHutcheson,inhisMetaphysics,usedhisownrealistreadingofLocketocounterLaw’sthesiswithanargumentfortherealexistenceofspaceandtime.SeeMoore,introduction,LMNSM,xxiv.474Clarke’sparticulardemonstrationofthedivineattributesofimmensityandeternitywerecloselyassociatedwithNewton’sunderstandingoftheuniverseascontainingtherealentitiesofabsolutespaceandtime(Clarkedeemedspaceandtime‘coeval’withtheexistenceofGod).SeeYoung,ReligionandEnlightenment,83-119,andontheseparationbetweenthereceptionofLockeandNewtoninearlyeighteenth-centuryCambridge,withrespecttoClarke’swork.475EdmundLaw,“Preface,”inAnEssayontheOriginsofEvil,byWilliamKing,5thEdition,Revised(London:Faulder,1781),xvi.Lawnamed(only)Lockeas‘oneofmychiefguides’.476Ibid,xix

196

instincts.Locke,asLawknew,haddeniedtheexistenceofbothinnateandself-

evidentpropositionsaspracticalprincipleswheretheyweresupposedtoguide

usunknowingly,orunquestioningly,towardsmoralgood.477

Lawargued,againonthebasisofhisreadingofLocke,thatthenatureofour

abstractideasofspaceandtimewassuchthattheydidnotallowustoassertthe

realexistenceofGod’sincommunicablepropertiesofimmensityoreternity,as

(Lawbelieved)Clarkehadsuggestedtheydid.Whenitcametotherelationship

betweenGod’scommunicableattributesandhiscreativeactivity,bothKing,and

LawarguedagainsttheviewtakenbyBalguythatwasdiscussedintheprevious

chapter.Torecap:-BalguyinsistedthatGodhadcreatedtheworldforhisown

finalend,whichwasinfact,hisownglory.Thecreationwasnot(just)theresult

ofdivinebenevolence,asHutchesonhadargued.BalguymaintainedthatGod’s

glorycouldonlybesatisfiedbythecreationofsomethingintrinsicallygood,and

notjustsomethingthatwouldmakeushappy.Makinghimself,orindeedus,

happy,Balguydeclared,wasonlyoneofGod’ssubservientendsincreation.King

andLawsharedtheassumptionmadebyClarkeandHutcheson(discussedin

chapter3),andBurnetandBalguy,thatsinceGodwasperfectandhiscreative

powersunlimited,heneitherneeded,norwantedforanything.Kingargued

however,thatthismeantthatGoddidnotcreateforhisownadvantage,which

includedhisownglory.478KingadmittedthatScripturetellsusthat‘theworld

wasmadeforthegloryofGod’,butarguedthatthiswasfalselyconsideredas

analogoustoman’sowndesireforglorytoGod.479Thecorrectinterpretation,

Kingclaimed,isthatalthoughGod’scommunicableattributes,hispower,

goodnessandwisdom,‘shineforthasclearlyinhisworksasifhehadnoother

intentinmakingthembesidetheostentationoftheseattributes’,God’srealaim,

477Lockedeniedthatinnatespeculativeprinciplescouldoperatetoproduceaparticulartruthwithoutourbeingawareoftheircontent.Inadditionheclaimedthattherewere,infact,noself-evidentmoralprinciplesbecausewecouldalwaysaskwhytheyshouldbefollowedasrules.ThecomparisonthatLawdrewbetweenClarke’sself-evidentprinciplesandinnateprinciplesisawkward(asheacknowledgedhere)becauseClarke,likeBurnet,didnotdifferentiatebetweenspeculativeandpracticalprinciplesinthewaythatLockedid.ForClarkeandBurnet,anobligationtoperformanactionarosefromtheperceptionthatanactionwasfittobeperformedbecauseitaccordedwiththeeternalrelationsbetweenthedifferentnaturesofthings.478King,Origin,52-54.479SeeStephens,“EdmundLaw,”forasummationofKing’sviews,167.(Stephensdoesnotdiscuss,Clarke,BalguyorHutcheson.)

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orend,increationwastocommunicatehispowerandgoodnessinorderto

makeushappy.480Hehaddonethisbycreating‘aworldwiththegreatest

goodness’.WhatKingmeantby‘good’here,heexplained,wasanaturalgoodfor

us,thatcould,ifusedproperly,makeushappy.

Bygood,Ihereunderstand,thatwhichisconvenientandcommodious,thatwhichiscorrespondenttotheappetiteofeverycreature.481

LawalsotooktheviewthatGodhadcommunicatedhispowerandgoodnessto

us,bytheexerciseofhiswill,inmakingaworldinwhichwewerecapableof

beinghappy.482Godhadcreatedtheconditionsunderwhichwemayfreely

choosetomakeourselveshappy,ineitherthisworldorthenext,byobeyinghis

will.483NeitherHutchesonnorClarke,norBurnetorBalguy,wouldhave

disagreedwiththis.ButtheyarguedthatGodhadcommunicatedhisgoodness

(hisbenevolenceorhisrectitude)tous,bycreatinguswithananalogousformof

goodnessasapotentialofourownnature.ThisisnotwhatLaw,orhisassociate

JohnGay,claimed.

HutchesonhadinsistedthatGodcommunicateshisownmoralperfection,which

weunderstandtobebenevolenceorirreduciblekindaffections,bycreatingus

capableofsimilarkindaffectionsandofrecognisingthemasmoralgood(and

afterobservationandreflection,byextensionandenlargement,capableof

understandingthatbenevolenceisGod’smoralperfection).God’sgoodness,for

Hutcheson,isnotreducibletoGod’sdesiretocommunicatethatgoodnessin

orderthateitherhe,orhiscreatures,ismadehappy,althoughthisisaresultofit.

ItisimportanttoemphasiseagainthatforHutcheson,participatingorsharing

directlyindivineloveitself,throughtheactivityoftheHolySpirit,isnotthe

methodwherebythecommunicationofGod’sgoodnessisachieved(asithad

beeninreformedaccountsoftheoperationoftheTrinity).Ourbenevolence,for

480King,Origin,54481Ibid.,55.482Law,“TheTranslator’sPreface,”inAnEssayontheOriginofEvil,byWilliamKing(London:Thurlbourn,1731)ix.483Lawdevelopshisargumentonfreedomhereacrosstheeditions.SeeStephens,“EdmundLaw,”168.

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Hutcheson,isonlyanalogoustoGod’s.484ClarkeandBalguyarguedthatGod’s

moralperfectionliesintheunalterablerectitudeofhiswill,andthatthistoo

constitutesthebasisforourmoralability.Again,forClarkeandBalguy,the

natureofGod’smoralperfectioniscommunicatedtous–weoughttobeableto

understandthatourknowledgeofanactionas‘fit’meansthatitoughtalwaysto

beperformed,andweought,therefore,toalwaysperformit.ClarkeandBalguy

believedthatthatperfection,orsomeappropriatelyanalogousdegreeofit,had

beenpotentiallyachievablebyus,atleastpriortotheFall.However,asIargued,

theymaintainedthatithadbeenproventoGodthatwehadchosentoruinour

understandingand/ortheabilitytoconformourwilltothatunderstanding.We

thereforeneededrevelationtocomprehendarangeofothertruths(the

existenceofafuturestate,forexample),whichwouldhelpmotivateustobehave

inawaythatwouldultimatelybeacceptabletoGod(irrespectiveofthetrue

natureofmoralgoodness).

GayfollowedLaw(andKing)onthequestionofGod’smotivationandhisaimsin

creation.King,LawandGaysupposedthatGod’sgoodnessisknown(outsideof

revelation)throughobservationofnaturalgoodintheworld,andthepotential

forhappinessthatitoffersus.Lawofferedthefollowingobservation:

WhenIenquirehowIgotintothisworld,andcametobewhatIam,I’mtoldthatanabsolutelyperfectbeingproducedmeoutofnothing,andplacedmehereonpurposetocommunicatesomepartofhishappinesstome,andtomakeme,insomemeasure,likehimself.485

GayandLawbotharguedthatGod’shappiness,andhisgoodnessledhimto

communicatethathappinesstous.Theydidnotmakeanargumentfromthe

natureofthedivinewill(i.e.intermsofitsrectitude[Clarke],oritsnecessary

determinationbyhislovingnature[Hutcheson])thatsupposedthatthenature

ofhismoralperfectionwasfound,insomesmallanalogousway,inhuman

nature.Gayargued,itseemstome,thatwhatiscommunicatedtousincreation,

iswhatGodwillsustodo(i.e.thecontentofdivinecommand),andofcourse,the484SeeDanaher,AWorldForAll?181onthedifferencebetweenHutcheson’suseofthedistinctionbetweencommunicableandincommunicablevirtues,andthemoretraditionalunderstandingofthisdivisionthatoccurredinthecontextofmetaphysicalargumentstodowiththeTrinity.485Law,“TheTranslator’sPreface,”inOrigin,iv

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factthatitisthecommandofanall-powerfulbeing.Gaysaid,veryclearly,that

forusassensibleandrationalagents,whowerecreatedtorespondtopleasure

andpain,that‘happinessisthegeneralendofallactions’.486Hedidnotsaythat

happinessisthegeneralendofallGod’sactions,quitepossiblybecausehe

thoughtthatGod’sgeneralendsintheirentiretyhadnotbeendisclosedtous,

buthebelievedthatGod’saimsincreationweredirectedtowardsour

happiness.487

GaytookthenotionofGod’scommunicableattributesawayfromaconsideration

ofvirtueasafacetofournaturethatechoedthemoralperfectionofthedivine

nature(benevolence,ortheabilitytoconformwilltounderstandingofwhatwas

right,orfit,regardlessofwhetherourowninterestswereharmedbyactingthis

way),towardstheideaofusasbeneficiariesofGod’sownhappiness,whowere

createdneedingeachotherinordertoincreasethe‘sumofpleasures’available

tous,inorderthatwemightbehappy,andthatGodmightseehishappiness

reflectedbacktohimself.

Clarkeandhisdefenders,Hutcheson,LawandGay,allagreedthatGodwantedus

tobehappy,andthatbeingvirtuouswouldmakeushappy,ifnotinthislifethen

thenext.TherewasalsoanagreementthatGod’scommunicationofhisgoodness

tous,inwhateverformorformsittook,madehimhappy(althoughthiswasnot

anecessarypartofhismotivation).Theirdifferenceslayintheirunderstanding

ofwhatGod’smoralperfectionconsistedof,andhismethodofcommunication.

ForHutchesonthiscommunicationisachievedbyimplantinganalogous

benevolentinstincts.ForClarke,BurnetandBalguy,itisachievedbygrantingus

sufficientnatural,moralknowledgeandafreewillthatoughttobeusedto

producebehaviourconsistentwiththatknowledge(andwasoriginallycapable

ofbeingusedtothatend).BurnetandBalguyagreedthatwehadbeengranted

naturalaffectionsforothers,whichwerenotreducibletoself-interest,butthese

naturalaffectionshadbeengiftedtousasamotivationalaid,ratherthanbeing

constitutiveofmoralgoodnessitself(whichwasrectitude).ForGay,this

486Gay,Dissertation,xxv.487Ibid.,xix.

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communicationisachievedbycreatinguswithawillthatrespondstothe

reasonedappreciationofthatwhichwebelievewillleadtoourownprivate

happiness.

Gaydidnotdirectlydiscussthedifferenceinpositionbetweenhimself,Clarke,

BurnetandBalguy,andHutchesononthequestionofGod’scommunicable

attributes.Gaybelieved,apparently,thatthecompetingmoralschemesproposed

byHutchesonandClarkeandhisdefenderswerenotrivalaccountsatall.He

appearstohaveunderstood,notwithoutjustification,thattheirschemesall

relied,insomerealway,uponourfundamentalneedtomakeourselveshappyin

thisorafutureworld,andthatGodhadwilledourhappiness(whateverhis

motivefordoingso),andthatbybeingvirtuouswewouldmakebothGodand

ourselveshappy.

Gayclaimedthatthedifferencesbetweenhimselfandothermoralistsarose

becausethegeneralideaofvirtuehadnotbeenagreedupon,andbecausethey

hadusedthewrongrule,orcriterion,tojudgewhetherornotanactionagreed

withthisgeneralideaofvirtue.Gay’sexplanation,asweshallsee,reliedupona

general,complex,ideaofvirtuethatincludedthenotionsofobligationand

approbation,anduponarangeofproximalanddistalcriteriausedtodecide

whetheranactionisvirtuousornot.Gay’srefusaltoacceptHutcheson’sclaim

thatweneedtobeintrospectivelyawareofanytrueprincipleofmotivationin

orderforittoactasapracticalprinciplealsoplayedalargepartinhisaccountof

moralmotivationandapprobation.ThefollowingsectionwillexamineGay’s

attempttosynthesisevariousmoralsystemswithhisownapproach.Particular

attentionwillbepaidtoGay’streatmentofthequestionofourmotivationfor

virtue.

Gay,moralideas,motivationandobligation

EdmundLaw,DanielWaterland,ThomasRutherforthandThomasJohnsonall

opposedthecurtailmentofdivinepowerthattheythoughtClarke'scommitment

201

tothenecessaryandimmutabledictatesofeternallawrequired.488Gaywasa

representative,alongwithotherswhofollowedLawatCambridge,ofagroup

whosoughttoadvancethe‘interestedscheme’.Itssupportersassertedthatthe

pursuitofhappiness,ortheavoidanceofpain,provideduswiththeonlypossible

motivationforacting,andthatbenevolencewasadutyweperformedinorderto

advanceourownhappiness(whetherwewereawareofthismotivation,ornot).

Theyworkedfrom,oratleastshared,Locke’sbasicmodelofmotivationin

humanbehaviour.Lockehadallowedonlytwoinnatepracticalprinciplesinhis

accountofaction.

Nature,Iconfess,hasputintomanadesireofhappiness,andanaversiontomisery:theseindeedareinnatepracticalprinciples,which(aspracticalprinciplesought)docontinueconstantlytooperateandinfluenceallouractionswithoutceasing.489

Locke,infact,alsoallowedasmallcollectionofbehaviouraldispositionsor

specificcharactertraits,whichareformedinutero,butneitherthese,norany

innateprinciples,ofanykind,wereheldtoinclineustowardseithermoral

goodnessormoralevil.490

TheparticulartaskthatGaysethimselfintheDissertationwastoexplainhow

theschemesputforwardbyClarkeandhisdefendersandHutcheson,andothers

includingWollaston,andunnamedothers,couldinfactbesubsumedunderhis

ownapproach.491GaybeganhisDissertationwithsomethingthatsoundsvery

muchlikeareferenceto‘two-partsofethics’thatwesawproposedbyBacon,

HenryMore,andLockeintheintroductorychapter.Isuggestedthatthis

distinction-betweenourknowledgeofhowweoughttolivetopleaseGodand

secureoureventualhappiness(usuallyadequate)andtheappropriatemotiveor

meansrequiredtobringthisbehaviourabout(usuallyinadequate)-reflected

theoverridingconcernofphilosophersoftheperiodwhichwastoshowhowwe

couldachievevirtue.Thetwoparts,inLocke’sparticularformulation,werethe488SeeStephens,“EdmundLaw,”163-173.489Locke,ECHU,1:3:3,67.490Althoughwewerealsonaturallyinclinedtoformhabitsofthoughtandactionwhich,ifnotcarefullyregulated,wouldleadustovice.ThisisthelessonandtheorybehindLocke’sapproachtomoraleducation.SeeJohnLocke,SomeThoughtsConcerningEducation,ed.JohnW.andJeanS.Yolton(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1989).491SeeDissertationxi.Wollastonisnamedanddiscussedatxx.

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‘rule’(whichwasgenerallyagreedupon)andthe‘truemotivestopractice’

(whichweregenerallynot).Gaybeganthus:

Thoughallwritersofmoralityhaveinthemainagreedwhatparticularactionsarevirtuousandwhatotherwise,yettheyhave,oratleastseemtohavedifferedverymuch,bothconcerningthecriterionofvirtue,vizwhatitiswhichdenominatedanyactionsvirtuous,orsotospeakmoreproperly,whatitisbywhichwemusttryanyactionstoknowwhetheritbevirtuousorno,andalsoconcerningtheprincipleormotivebywhichmenareinducedtopursuevirtue.492

Gaybelievedthattheagreementbetweenvariousauthorsoverwhichactions

werevirtuous,inthecontextofapparentdifferencesintheirstatementsabout

whatvirtueitselfwas,couldbeaccountedforbytheiruseofa‘differentcriterion

(thoughtheydidnotknoworattendtoit)’fromtheprincipletheyprofessedto

useinordertoidentifyaparticularactionasvirtuous.493Morecharitably,Gay

thought,thissituationmighthavearisenfromsemanticconfusion.This

confusionwastheinevitableresultofthenatureofourmoralideas,whichGay

identifiedasLocke’s

mixedmodes,orcompoundideasarbitrarilyputtogether,havingatfirstnoarchetypesororiginalexisting,andafterwardsnootherthanwhichexistsinothermen’sminds.Nowsincemen,unlesstheyhavethesetheircompoundideas,whicharesignifiedbythesamename,madeuppreciselyofthesamesimpleones,mustnecessarilytalkadifferentlanguage,andsincethisdifferenceissodifficult,andinsomecasesimpossibletobeavoided,itfollowsthatgreaterallowanceandindulgenceoughttobegiventothesewritersthananyothers.494

AsIsuggestedinchapter1,itwaspartlyLocke’sclaimsabouttheconstructed,

compoundednatureofourmoralideasandthesemanticinstabilityofmoral

termsthatwasthenecessaryresultoftheirmake-up,whichledHutchesonto

looktothemodelofsenseperceptionasasourceofourcommon,non-

composite,primitivemoralideas.Gayhowever,embracedthenecessary

diversityofopinionthatLocke’smixedmoralmodeswereabletoaccountfor.He

thoughtthattheconstructednatureoftheseideasentailedthatopposingmoral

schemeswould,infact,beresolvableintohisversionoftheinterestedscheme,

onceagreementcouldbereachedoverthe‘confusednotionofvirtueingeneral.’492Gay,Dissertation,xi.493Ibid.,xi.494Ibid.,xii.

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However,Gaynoted,eventhefullspecificationofthesimpleideaswhichwent

towardsthefinalcompoundofamixedmodecouldnottellushowtodecide

whetheraparticularactionwasinfactaninstanceofaparticularvirtue.(If

temperancewasavirtue,forexample,howwouldweknowwhetheraparticular

actionwastemperateorintemperate?).Gay’spointwasthatthecompoundidea

ofvirtuecouldnotcontainitsownmeasure,orrule,orcriterion.This,aswesaw

inchapter4,wasLocke’scounterargumenttoThomasBurnet’smoralsense.

Lockeinsistedthatinmoralcasesweneedaruletojudgeby,wecouldnot

simplyhaveanideaofmoralgoodwhichboth(somehow)includesastatement

ofthemoralgoodandajudgementthatanactionisaninstanceofthatmoral

good,unlessthatideaisconsidered(illegitimately)asinnate,oritisproduced

(againillegitimately)bytheoperationofaninnateproposition,orprinciplethat

weareunawareof.

Hutcheson’smoralideasmayhavebeenthetargethereforGay(althoughGay

doesn’tstatethisdirectly).JustasaLockeansimpleideaofsweetcouldonly

reportsweetandnotbitter,orasimpleideaofwillingcouldonlytellusthatwe

willed(andnotdoubted),so,(andgiventhatHutchesonhimselfhaddrawnthe

parallelwithLockeansimpleideasofreflection),anideaofmoralapprobation

couldonlyidentifymoralapprobation.Asdiscussedinchapter4however,

somehowtheprinciplethat‘benevolenceismorallyapprovable’isalso

containedwithinthatidea,orproducesthatidea.Gayinsistedthatweneededan

externalcriterionorrulewhichdidnotcontaintheideaofvirtueitself,inorderto

judgewhetheranactionwasvirtuousornot.

Gaydefinedthegeneralideaofvirtueascomposedofelementsthat‘everyone,or

most,putintotheirideaofvirtue’–thatis,thatitimplied‘somerelationto

others’,andanobligationtochoosetheaction,andthattheactionswere

deservingofapprobation.

Virtueistheconformitytoaruleoflife,directingtheactionsofallrationalcreatureswithrespecttoeachother’shappiness,towhichconformity

204

everyoneinallcasesisobligedandeveryonethatdoessoconform,isoroughttobeapprovedof,esteemedandlovedforsodoing.495

Thecriterionofvirtuewaswhateverruleoflifeobligedustoobeyit.Itis

importanttonotethatforGay,thecriteriabywhichwejudgewhethera

particularbehaviourisvirtuousalsocontainsamotivationalelement–itisarule

oflifeandderivedultimatelyfromanauthority.Theimmediatecriterionof

virtuewasthewillofGod.MorespecificallyitwasthatpartofGod’swill

concernedwithouractionsrelatingtoothers.496

Sincethe‘happinessofmankindisthecriterionofthewillofGod’,Gay

continued,soitshouldbeours.Hearguedthatitisevidentfromobservationof

thegoodintheworld,andfromthehappinesswetakefromit,thatGodhas

willedourhappiness.Thatourhappinessdependsupononeanother’sbehaviour

isalsoobservable.Therefore,Gaymaintained,weunderstandthatitisclearly

God’swillthatweacttosecurehappinessforeachother,asfarasweareable.

NowitisevidentfromthenatureofGod,vizhisbeinginfinitelyhappyinhimselffromalleternity,andfromhisgoodnessmanifestedinhisworks,thathecouldhavenootherdesignincreatingmankindthantheirhappiness,andthereforehewillstheirhappiness,thereforethemeansoftheirhappiness,thereforemybehaviourasfarasitmaybeameansofthehappinessofmankindshouldbesuch.497

Gaythenarguedthatthecriterionforthehappinessofotherswasdiscoverableby

reasonconsideringthe‘relationsofthings(whichrelations,withrespecttoour

presentinquiry,somehavecalledtheirfitnessorunfitness)’.498WhatGaymeant

bythis,heexplained,wasthatsomethingswere‘apttoproducepleasure,others

pain,someareconvenientandothersinconvenient’.Whenwejudgethingsas

theyreallyare(i.e.correctly),thenthisreflectstheoperationof‘RightReason’

(whichmeansreasongettingitright,presumably).499This,veryobviously,was

notwhatClarkeorBurnetorBalguywouldhaveacceptedas‘RightReason’.

Theiraccounthadreasondiscoveringtheeternalrelationsbetweentheeternal

495Ibid.,xvii496Ibid.,xvii–xviii.497Ibid.,xix.498Ibid.,xix.499Ibid.,xx.

205

naturesofthingsthatweregovernedbyeternallaws,andnotsimplydiscovering

thosethingsthattendedtoproducepleasureorpaininus,orwereconvenientor

inconvenienttous.Moreover,althoughGaydidclaimthatwewerevirtuous

whenweconformedourwilltoanunderstandingofwhatwasmorallycorrect

(whichwastoactforoneanother’shappiness),unlikeClarke,BurnetandBalguy,

Gayclaimedthatthefulfilmentofamoralobligationtoactintheinterestsof

otherswasmotivated,orinducedinthefirstplace,byaconcerntoraiseesteem

orapprobation,butitwasalsomorefundamentallyamatterofself-interest,

because‘Godonlycaninallcasesmakeamanhappyormiserable’.500

Gayconsideredthatwehavevariousobligations,whichareall‘rulesoflife’,that

couldbedifferentiatedbythemannerinwhichthoseobligationswereinduced

inus.

Obligationisthenecessityofdoingoromittinganyactioninordertobehappy,i.e.wherethereissucharelationbetweenanagentandanyactionthattheagentcannotbehappywithoutdoingoromittingthataction,theagentissaidtobeobliged.Soobligationisevidentlyfoundedupontheprospectofhappiness.501

Gayclaimedthat,byperceivingthenaturalconsequencesofthingsaccordingto

thefixedlawofnature,weunderstandournaturalobligations.Weperceivethe

consequencesofouractions,intermsofsocietalresponse(‘thatarisingfrom

meritordemerit,asproducingtheesteemandfavourofourfellowcreatures,or

thecontrary‘)-theseareourobligations‘usuallytitledvirtuous’.502Ourcivil

obligationsderivefromperceivingtheauthorityofthemagistrate,andlastlyour

religiousobligationsarisefromtheperceivingtheauthorityofGod.Thefirst

threeofthesehowever,areproperly,subsumedunderthefourth,since‘afull

andcompleteobligationwhichwillextendtoallcases,canonlybethatarising

fromtheauthorityofGod’.503ThusGayarguedthattheimmediatecriterionof

virtuewasthewillofGod-notthewholewillofGod,butthatportionofitthat

issuedrulesdirectingourbehaviourwithrespecttootherpeople.Thecriterion

ofthewillofGodwasthehappinessofmankind.Thecriterionforthehappiness500Ibid.,xix.501Ibid.,xviii.502Ibid.,xviii.503Ibid.,xix.

206

ofmankind,forus,wasreason,orexperienceinformingusofwhatwaslikelyto

producepleasureorpainforothersorourselves.

Balguy,aswesawinthepreviouschapter,hadalsoarguedthatwewereunder

morethanoneobligation.Balguyhadsupposedthatthereweretwosourcesof

obligation–moralandreligious.Balguythough,keptthetwoobligations

separateintermsoftheauthorityfromwhichtheywerederived.Heinsistedthat

ourobligationstoourpresentandfuturehappinesswerereligiousdutiestobe

fulfilledinordertocomplywiththewillofGod.Ourmoralobligations,however,

werederivedentirelyfromourrationalappreciationofthefitnessorcorrectness

ofanaction,irrespectiveofthebenefitofthatactiontoourselves,orindeedto

others(insofarasweknew).Theactualmotivationfortheperformanceofa

moralaction,forBalguy,wouldproperlyhavebeenboththewillofGodand

eternallaw,butthereweretwoseparateobligingauthorities.Gaythoughtthat

Hutcheson,Clarke,Burnet,Balguyorindeedanyonewhodidnotbringthewillof

Goddirectlyintotheiraccountofobligation,includingmoralobligation,had

failedtoexplainhowwecouldbeobliged,orwouldactinawaythatwouldharm

ourowninterests.504Gayagreedthatspecificmoralactionscouldverywell

produceanimmediatediminutionofourownprivatehappiness(includingloss

oflife)andthatmoralactionswereundertakenwiththeunderstandingthatthis

wouldbetheresult.ThosesuchasClarke,BurnetandBalguy,

whodropthehappinessofmankind,andtalkofrelations,thefitnessandunfitnessofthings,arestillmoreremotefromthetruecriterionofvirtue.Forfitnesswithoutanyrelationtosomeendisscarceintelligible.505

ClarkeandBalguy,asdiscussedhereandinchapters2and5,consideredour

self-concernedmotivation(asopposedtoourmoralobligation)foractionas

rightfullydependentuponthewillofGod.Burnettoo,actually,hadarguedthat

fitwasa‘relativewordexpressingtherelationofmeanstoanend’andthatthe

endofamoralactionwasalsothewillofGod.Hehaddonesoinhisexchangeof

letterswithHutcheson(andhadbeentickedoffbyHutchesonforbringingthe

Deityintosuchmatters.)506Burnetexplainedthatthe‘perfectlywiseandgood’

504Ibid.,xxi.505Ibid.506HutchesontoBurnet,Correspondence,228

207

Godhadcreatedusaccordingtoeternallaw,andthatourhappiness‘mustbethe

chiefendforwhichthewiseandgoodauthor’hadbroughthisrationalcreatures

intobeing–inthissensetheendofother-directedactionswasthewillofGod.

However,Burnetwenton,thereasonwhyGodsoughttomakeushappywasthat

happinessitselfwasareasonableendasspecifiedbyeternallaw.Itwas,since

wehadsomeaccesstothatpartofeternallawthatgovernedourownconcerns,

thereforefitandreasonabletousthatweshouldacttomakeoneanotherhappy.

God,beingwiseandgoodhadprovidedwiththe‘naturalaffectionsleadingto

thisend’.Thesearebenevolentaffectionsthatarenotreducibletoself-interest,

becausetheydonotneedtobe.Theyjustneedtobeareasonablemeans(for

God)tohisreasonableend(ourhappiness).Tothequestion‘Whyoughtthe

publicgoodtobesoughtafter?’Burnetanswered‘becauseitisfittoaccomplish

thewiseendofthecreatortomakeallhiscreatureshappythatitshouldbeso.’

‘Whyisthatendtoberegarded?’Burnetreplied‘becauseitisawiseand

reasonableend.’‘Indeedthefitnessofmeanstoanendlaynoobligationbutthe

endisreasonable.’507So,forBurnet,thewillofGodwasindirectlytheendto

whichfitnessesaim.BurnetwouldnothaveacceptedGay’saccountunlessGay

hadalsomadeitclearthatGod’sgoodnesslayintherectitudeofhiswill(his

alwaysconforminghisactionstothatwhichisreasonableaccordingtoeternal

law).

ToconsidertheargumentsofClarkeandhisdefendersandHutchesononGay’s

terms,wecanseethat,thecriterionforthewillofGod,forClarke,Burnetand

Balguy,wasthereasonablenessofhisdesireandwillforourhappiness,andnot

simply‘thehappinessofmankind’.ForHutchesontoo,oncetheargumentsinthe

Metaphysicsarereadalongsidethefourtreatises,wecanseethatthecriterionfor

thewillofGodwouldhavebeenthathismotivewasbenevolent,whichwas

‘praiseworthyinitself’,andnotjustbecausethe(alwayssuccessful)resultsof

thatintentioncausethehappinessofmankind.508Itisimportanttonotethatitis

notentirelyclearhowGay(whoseDissertationistheonlyworkknowntobehis)

dealtwiththequestionofwhatgaveGodthemoralauthority,asopposedtothe

507Burnet,Correspondence,221.508Hutcheson,Metaphysics,175.

208

barepower,tocommandus.IpresumethathewouldhavearguedthatGod’s

goodness(knownthroughobservationoftheworld)securedthis,butasIhave

suggested,thisgoodnessisnotexplainedinthisshortwork,furtherthanthe

assertionofGod’spower,desireandabilitytomakeushappy.

Gay,introspectionandtheassociationofideas

JustasLawhaddeemedClarke’sabsolutefitnessestobeequivalenttoinnate

instincts,soGaychargedHutcheson’smoraltheorywitheitheradvancing‘the

doctrineofinnateideas’,orofferinganaccountofourmoralabilitiesthatwere

toomysterioustocomprehend(‘itrelishestoomuchofthatofoccult

qualities’).509GayagreedwithHutcheson,justasGilbertBurnetandBalguyhad

done,thatsomethingwemightcallamoralsenseexisted(‘apowerorafaculty’).

Butalthough

itisnecessaryinordertosolvetheprincipleactionsofhumanlifetosupposeamoralsense(orwhatissignifiedbythatname)andalsopublicaffections,butIdenythatthismoralsense,orthesepublicaffections,areinnateorimplantedinus.Theyareacquiredeitherfromourownobservationortheimitationofothers.510[Myemphasis.]

GaycomplainedthatHutcheson’sexplanationofboththereliablyobserved

tendencyofagentstoactagainsttheirownbestinterests,andtheequally

reliablyobservedinabilityofagentstosaywhytheyapprovedastheydidin

moralcases,stoppedshortofafullexplanation.HefoundHutcheson’sappealto

animplantedmoralsenseand‘natural’kindaffectionstobemistaken,because,

heargued,Hutchesonhadfailedtolookbeyondourintrospectivelyavailable

experience.Hutchesonhadassumedinnateorimplantedabilitiestoactinthe

interestsofothersandtoapprovesuchmotivationsandactions.Insodoing,Gay

claimed,Hutchesonhadmissedthetrue,original,principlebehindourelection

andapprobationofactions.

Thisingeniousauthoriscertainlyrightinhisobservationsupontheinsufficiencyofthecommonmethodsofaccountingforbothourelectionandapprobationofmoralactions,andrightlyinfersthenecessityofsupposingamoralsense(i.e.apowerorfacultywherebywemayperceiveanyactiontobeanobjectofapprobation,andtheagentoflove)

509Gay,Dissertation,xiv.CareyalsodiscussesGay’schargeofinnatismtoHutcheson,Locke,Shaftesbury,andHutcheson,49-50.510Gay,Dissertation,xxxiii.

209

andpublicaffections,toaccountfortheprincipleactionsofhumanlife.Butthenbycallingtheseinstincts,Ithinkhestopstoosoon,imagininghimselfatthefountain-head,whenhemighthavetracedthemmuchhigher,eventothetrueprincipleofallouractions,ourownhappiness.511

Aswehaveseen,Gayinsistedthattherealprinciplebehindchoiceofactionswas

infacttheagent’sprivatehappiness,basedontheinducementsofferedby

actionsconsideredobligatory.512Theoriginalprinciplebehindourapprobation

ofanaction,oractor,Gayinsisted,wasreasonpointingouttheprospectofthat

privatehappiness.513Thefundamentalprincipleofprivatehappinessinboth

casesneededtobeuncovered,orbetter,recoveredbyus,sinceitwasnot

apparenttousbyimmediateintrospectionintoourmotives,orjudgements.

The‘grandobjection’tohisscheme,Gayacknowledged,wasthat,whenweactin

theinterestsofothers,orwhenweapprovetheintentions,oractionsofanagent,

wearenotgenerallyawarethatweselectorapproveanactionbecauseitwill

tendtoourprivatehappiness.Infactwemayverywellnotbeabletosupplyany

reasonforelectionorapprobationotherthanthatitseemedthe‘right’courseof

actiontoundertakeormotivetoapprove.AsGayadmitted,theassumptionhere

wasthat

ifthegratefulorcompassionatemindneverthoughtofthatreason,itisnoreasontohim.514

Gaydidnotfindvirtue‘inconsistentwithactinguponprivatehappiness’,515

(althoughactingpurelyfromself-interestwas‘prudentbutnotvirtuous’.)516He

arguedthatwhenweactedvirtuouslyweought,ordeservedtoreceive,the

meritoresteemofothers.Theexpectedprocurementofthismerit,oresteem,

couldbeamotiveinitselffortheperformanceofanaction(presumablywhere

wedidnothaveanideaofthemoreimmediatecriterionoftheactionas

commandedbyGod),butthisdidnotmeanthatwedidnotalsoexperiencethe

sortsofaffectionstowardsothersthatHutcheson(andClarke,Burnetand

511Ibid.,xiv.512Ibid.,xxv.513Ibid.,xiv.514Ibid.,xxiv.515Ibid.,xxv.516Ibid.,xvii.

210

Balguy)claimedweexperienced.Gayunderstoodthatalthoughweexperienced

kindaffectionstowardsothers,andexperiencedthemotivationtomakethem

happy,suchestimablefeelingsactuallyoriginatedinamorefundamental

concernforprivatehappiness.517

Gayexplainedtheoccurrenceofpublicaffectionsinthefollowingway:Our

happinessonearthdependedupontheactionsofotherpeople(thevoluntary

actionsofrationalagents).Wethereforeapproveofothersactinginourinterests

becausethisislikelytoincreaseourhappiness-henceweapproveother-

directedactionsandthebenevolentagentsbehindthem.Then,Gayslippedin,

becausewealsodesirewhatweapprove,sowedesire‘thehappinessofany

agentwhohasdoneusgood’,takepleasureinthis,andanticipatethepleasure

thattheagent’shappinesswillbringthem.518Thiswasnotinconsistentwith

Hutcheson’sclaimthatourvirtueraisedkindaffectionsandesteemor

complacenceintherecipientsofourbeneficence,butHutchesonhadinsisted

thatactingtoprocureesteemortheexpectedreturnoffeelingsdetractedfrom

thevirtueofanaction.WhenGaysaidthatourobligation‘usuallytitledvirtuous’

arosefromtheexpectedprocurementof‘esteemandfavourfromourfellow

creatures’,hedidnotneedtoinsistthatweactedsolelyfromthismotive-we

couldalsogenuinelydesire,andexperiencethedesirefor,thehappinessof

others.Thebasisofourfeelingsofloveandconcernforothers,however,

originatedintheirabilitytoactinourinterests.IndeedGaymadeitclearthat

ourobligationtothatagentextendednofurtherthanherintentiontoactinour

interests.519Anargumentfromundisclosednatureoftheselfishoriginofour

moralmotivationiswhatHutchesonwouldhavefoundunacceptable.

Aswesawinchapter3,Hutchesoninsistedthatwehadtohaveintrospective

awarenessofourmotivationinorderforittomotivateusdirectly.Gaydescribed

theobjectionthus:

517Hutcheson’sobjectionstothisargumentwerediscussedinchapter3.518Gay,Dissertation,xxiv.519Ibid.,xxiv.

211

Thatreasonorendofeveryactionisalwaysknowntotheagent,fornothingcanmoveamanbutwhatisperceived.520

GayaccusedHutchesonoffaultyreasoninghere.Gaymaintainedthatarguingfor

theexistenceofinstinctivepublicaffections,(becausethatiswhatintrospection

revealstousasmotive),oranimplantedmoralsense,(becausewecan’tsaywhy

weapproveofbenevolenceorpublicaffections),istoargue‘adignorantiam’or

‘aremotione’.521Gaydidnotelaborateonhiscomment,buttherearevarious

versionsofthisfallacy(theargumentfromignorance).522Theyinvolvethe

complaintthatanabsenceofevidenceorproof(ofamorefundamentalprinciple

behindelectionandapprobationthatwearenotawareintrospectivelyof,for

example)isnotevidenceofabsence(thatafundamentalprincipledoesnotexist,

forexample).Aformofthefallacy,orarelatedfallacy,istheargumentfromself-

knowing,orintrospectiveawareness.Thisfallacy,familiartomany

psychologists,isdescribed(inWikipedia)asfollows

1. IfPweretruethenIwouldknowit;infactIdonotknowit;thereforePcannotbetrue.

2. IfPwerefalsethenIwouldknowit;infactIdonotknowit;thereforePcannotbefalse.523

ThisistherootofGay’scomplainttoHutcheson–justbecausewearenotaware

thatourtruemotiveisprivatehappiness(orthatourapprobationofvirtuewas

originallytheresultof‘reason,pointingoutprivatehappiness’524),itdoesnot

meanthatthisisnot,infact,ourtruemotive(foractionorapprobation).

GayagreedwithHutchesonthatweapproveofmotivesandactionsthataimat

thehappinessofothers.However,hearguedthatthiswasbecause

inthepursuitoftruthwedon’talwaystraceeverypropositionwhosetruthweareexamining,toafirstprincipleoraxiom,butacquiesce,assoonasweperceiveitdeduciblefromsomeknownorsomepresumedtruth.525

520Ibid.,xviii.521Ibid.,xiv.522Lockehashisown,idiosyncraticformulationofthis,ECHU,4:17:19,686.523Wikipedia,“ArgumentfromIgnorance,”accessed29thMarch2017.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_ignorance524Gay,Dissertation,xiv.525Ibid.,xxix

212

Ratherthan‘runeverythingtothefountain-head’,andbecauseofthe

narrownessofourminds,weemployaheuristicand

chooseoutcertaintruthsandmeansofhappiness,whichwelookuponasrestingplaces,whichwemaysafelyacquiescein,intheconductbothofourunderstandingandpractice,inrelationtotheone,regardingthemasaxioms,intheotherasends'.526

Thispracticeleadsustomistakeintermediarypropositionsforaxiomsand

intermediaryendsasinnateprinciplesorinstincts.

Itisimportanttounderstand,though,thatGaydidnotclaimthathis

fundamentalprincipleoperatedentirelyoutsideofourconsciousawareness.

Gay’sclaimwasthatwehad,atsomeoriginalpoint,beenawarethatwe

approvedtheactionsofagentsthatweredirectedtowardsourownhappiness.

TheexplanationthatGayprovidedisthatinthinkingaboutourmotiveormoral

judgments,wedonotalwaysinterrogatethemsufficientlytouncoverthemore

fundamentalprinciplebehindthem.Withrespecttomotive,Gayexplainedthat

wehabituallysettleforidentifyingour‘inferiorends’ratherthanseekout,or

recallour‘ultimateends’.527Forexample,theinferiorendofstudyisknowledge,

butweultimatelyseekknowledgebecauseittends,orwebelieveitwilltend,to

ourhappinessinsomeway.So,wemusthavehadsomeexperienceofknowledge

furtheringourprivatehappiness,orwemayreasonforourselvesthatitislikely

todoso.528ItisimportanttostressthatGaydidnotclaimthatwehavenever

understoodthatknowledgeeitherbrought,orwascapableofbringing,us

happiness.Hedoesnotsuggestunconsciousmotivationhere,ratherthehabitual

forgettingofanoriginalinsight,togetherwiththeoperationofaprocessknown

astheassociationofideas.

Thecaseisreallythis.Wefirstperceiveorimaginesomerealgood,i.e.fitnesstopromoteourhappinessinthosethingsweloveandapproveof.Hence(aswasaboveexplained)weannexpleasuretothosethings.Hencethosethingsandpleasurearesotiedtogetherandassociatedinourminds,thatonecannotpresentitselfbuttheotherwillalsooccur.Andthe

526Ibid.,xxx.527Ibid.,xxv.528Ibid.,xxv.

213

associationremains,evenafterthatwhichfirstgavethemtheconnectionisquiteforgot,orperhapsdoesnotexist.529

Gayexplainedthat,inthecaseofthemiser,forexample,herattachmentto

moneyisformedfirstbyherperceivingthegoodsorhappinessthatmoneyis

abletosupplyher.Pleasureisthusassociatedwithmoneyinhermind.Butover

timesheforgetsthatmoneybroughtherpleasureandshesimplyassociates

moneyitselfwithpleasure.Shethenseekstoamassmoney,withoutintendingto

useittosecureherthegoodsorservicesthatoriginallybroughtherhappiness,

becausethemoneyitselfnowbringsher‘thephantasticalpleasureofhaving

it’.530

Inthesameway,bytheprocessofassociationwecometoloveorapproveof

benevolenceitself,becausetheoriginalincreaseinourownhappinessthat

agentsactingbenevolentlyproducedisforgotten,andwenowjustassociate

pleasurewiththeperceptionofbenevolence,eitherasourownintentionoras

anintentioninothers.Ourinstinctivepublicaffections,andimplantedsenseof

moralapprobation,arereallyjusttheexperienceofassociatedpleasuresthat

wereoriginallyassociatedwiththereasonedperceptionofourownhappiness.

AttheveryendofhisDissertation,Gayclaimedthattheotherwayinwhichwe

mayacquiresuchassociatedpleasuresisbyeducation,orthroughtheimitation

orobservationofothersbecauseweperceivetheesteemthatothersaccordus

whenweimitatethem.531

IneighteenthcenturyBritishphilosophyfourdifferentattitudestowardsthe

principleofassociationofideasweretaken.Thesewere:toadmititasa

principleofmindbuttoconstrueitasacauseofcomprehensiveerrorinhuman

understanding(Locke),orasasourceofdeviancefrominnategoodmoralor

aestheticsense(Hutcheson)(althoughbothLockeandHutchesondoallowits

usefulnessinlanguageacquisitionandmemory,andLockesuggestswaysin

whichitmaybeputtogooduseinearlyyearseducation);toadmititasa

529Ibid.,xxx-xxxi.530Ibid.,xxxi.531Gay,Dissertation,xxxiii.

214

principleofmindandreportitsactivityasbothbeneficialanddetrimentaltothe

constructionofveridicalunderstanding(Berkeley,withHobbesasa

predecessor);toadmititasthesingleunifyingprincipleofmind(Hume,Hartley,

Priestley),ortodenyitasanoriginalprincipleofmind(Reid).532Whatever

Gay’slaterinfluencewas,Idonotbelievethereissufficientevidenceinthe

DissertationtoclaimthatGaytookassociationtobethesingleunifyingprinciple

ofmind.Idobelievehowever,thathethoughtthatGodhadimplantedthis

principleintoourunderstandinginordertoencourageustoacttoincrease

publichappiness.

LockeandHutchesonwerevehementlyopposedtotheoperationofassociations

inreasoning,andespeciallymoralreasoning.533Lockehadarguedthatthe

naturaltendencyofourideastobecomehabituallyorcustomarilyassociated

withoneanotherpreventedthepropersupervisionofjudgmentthatthe

understandingoughttoprovide.Thenatural(true)correspondenceand

connectionofourideaswouldneverbediscovered,becausethestrengthofthese

associationsmadebycustom,onceformed,weresodifficulttobreak.The

immediateandbindingwaythatourideasnaturallycombineorrecombinemake

thisprocesshighlyvulnerabletoirrationalorhabitualassociations.Onceformed

associationsaredifficulttodistinguishfromjudgmentinknowledge,orintuitive

knowledgeproper.534Thisisbecause,asdiscussedintheintroductorychapter,

forLockeintuitiveknowledgeisperceptualincharacter-wesimplyseeor

perceivetheconnectionbetweenideas.Inthejudgmentofprobablebelief

(whichiswhatourunderstandingismostconcernedwith),theunderstanding

oughttovoluntarilyexercisegovernance,butthestrengthofanassociative

connectioncanleadtoourmostdeeplyheldbeliefsgoingunscrutinisedby

judgment.Lockemadehisoppositiontoitspervasiveinfluenceuponthe

understandingpellucid.

Ishallbepardonedforcallingitbysoharshanameasmadness,whenitisconsidered,thatoppositiontoreasondeservesthatnameandreallyis

532SeeMartinKallich,TheAssociationofIdeasandCriticalTheoryinEighteenth-CenturyEngland(TheHague:Mouton,1970)foranintroductiontoassociation(butwhodoesnotofferthissummary).533SeeGill,“Association,”forHutcheson’sposition.534Locke,ECHU,4:33:4-5,395.

215

madness;andthereisscarceamansofreefromit...Idonotmeanwhenheisinpowerofunrulypassionbutinthesteadycalmcourseofhislife...ifthisbeataintwhichsouniversallyinfectsmankind,thegreatestcareshouldbetakentolayitopenunderitsduename,therebytoexitethegreatestcareinitspreventionandcure.535

Gay’sappealtotheassociationofideaswhereassociationsareformedthrough

educationorcustomallowsthattheoriginalinsightintoourownprivate

happinessonlydevolvesasfarastheperceptionthatbyactinginaparticular

waywewillgainesteemfromthoseweadmire.Inhisgeneralaccountofan

originalactofreasonpointingoutprivatehappiness,Gay,Isuggest,comescloser

toadvertingtoLocke’saccountofunnoticedinferenceinperception,discussed

intheintroductorychapterandchapter4.

Lockeinsistedthatideasthatareassociatedarenotpartofpropositional

thought–theyaremerelyassociated,sothatoneregularlyfollowstheotherinto

ourmentalpurview.Inthecaseofunnoticedinferenceinthree-dimensional

visualperception,Lockewrotethat

thisinmanycases,byasettledhabit,inthingswhereofwehavefrequentexperience,isperformedsoconstantly,andsoquick,thatwetakethatfortheperceptionofoursensation,whichisanideaformedbyourjudgment;sothatone,viz.thatofsensation,servesonlytoexcitetheother,andisscarcetakennoticeofitself.536

S.K.LandobjectstoLocke’saccountherebecausehebelievesthatLockehas

identifiedthementalactofjudgmentinawaythatleavesitvirtually

indistinguishablefromthatoftheassociationofideas.537Itmaybedifficultto

distinguishthetwohere,butLockeandGaypointedtoanoriginalactof

judgmentthathasbecomehabitual.InthecaseofLocke,inthedomainofvisual

perceptionandGay,inourapprobationofactions,anoriginalveridicaljudgment

ismadewhichislaterforgotten.Inthisway,Isuggest,Gaythoughtthatour

introspectiveexperienceofapprobationitselfwasmisleading,butonlyinsofaras

Godhadintendedthatitshouldoperatetoencourageus‘intheconductofour

understandingandpractice’toactforoneanother’shappiness.535Locke,ECHU,4:33.4,394.536Locke,ECHU,2:9:8,145.537Land,PhilosophyofLanguageinBritain,73.

216

Gay’smoraltheoryisincludedinthisthesisbecauseGayhimselfbelievedthatit

functionedasaterminusforsomeoftheargumentspresentedbytheother

authorsconsideredhere.Gay’sattempttosynthesisetheapproachesofClarke

andhisdefendersandHutcheson,withhisownvoluntaristposition,reliedupon

theirsharedcommitmenttothebasicprinciplethatGodaimedatthehappiness

ofall,andthattherefore,thisoughttobeouraimtoo.Thereisnotalkofthe

natureofGod’scommunicableattributes,orthelegitimacyofvariousnecessities

withwhichGodmighthavebeenledtoactincreation.Gay,Isuggest,soughtto

reducethetermsoftheargumentwithrespecttodivineactiontosomethingthat

allcouldagreeon–thatGod,becauseofhisgoodness,aimedateverybody’s

happiness,andthat,therefore,weoughttoaimateverybody’shappinesstoo.

Gay’sowncommitmenttotheultimateauthorityofGod’swillanditsmotive

effectonthefulfilmentofourobligations,wouldhavebeenrejectedbyClarke

andhisdefendersasthesourceofourmoralobligation,butnotasthelegitimate

sourceofourownmotivetoobeywhatweknewtobeadivinecommand.

Hutchesonsimilarlywouldnothavedisagreedthatthiscouldbeaninducement

forustoact.BystoppingatthenotionthatGodwilledourhappinessbecausehe

wasgood,andnotspeculatingfurtherthanthisintoGod’sattributes,orhis

motivesorreasonsincreation,Gay,Isuggest,indicatedthatwe,asmoralagents,

neednotgofurtherthanthis‘fundamentalprinciple’behindGod’screative

activity,inordertoseehowandwhyGodhadmadevirtuepossibleforus.

Moreover,Gaysoughttoexplainhowthedifferentprinciplepartsofournature

(thesensibleandtherational)mightbebroughttogetherinaunifiedaccountof

agencythatsawhumannature,itsmotivationalapparatusandobligationbound

togethertoexplainthepossibilityofvirtue.

Gay’smultifactorialmodelofmoralthoughtandactionusedelementsofClarke

andHutcheson’sepistemologytoexplaindifferentaspectsofourintrospectively

availablemoralexperience.IfGay’sDissertationwasconceivedasaconsensus

formingexercise,thenitwouldhavefailedhere.NeitherClarke,Burnet,Balguy,

norHutchesonwouldhavebeenremotelysatisfiedwithGay’stheory.Clarkeand

217

hisdefenderswouldhaverejectedGay’sreductiveaccountofreasonasamethod

ofanticipatingandcalculatingpleasureandpain.Hutchesonwouldneverhave

agreedthatourpublicaffectionscouldbereducedultimatelytoaconcernfor

self-interest.AlthoughHutchesonveryclearlythoughtthatactingforthesakeof

thehappinessofotherswasultimatelyinourbestinterests,theideathatwe

approvedofbenevolencebecauseittendedtowardsourownbestinterestswas

somethingthatherailedagainstfromthebeginningofhiscareer.ButGaywas

concernedwithoutcome–thegoodproduced,andHutchesonhimselfhad

admittedthatwecannotbesureofthemotivesofothers,andthatitwaseasier

toworkbackwardsfromtheoutcomeofanactiontodiscoverthemotiveofits

agent.538

IsuggestthatinallthesewaysGay’stheologicalutilitarianismwasdesignedto

provideuswiththemoststraightforwardanswertothequestionofhowGodhad

madeitpossibleforustobevirtuous.Moraltheorydidnotneedtoconcernitself

withtheisticmetaphysics,beyondtheideaofanall-powerfulcreatorwhoaimed

atourhappiness.MoreoverforGay,althoughourultimateobligationandmotive

foramoralactionwasGod’sauthority,wedidnotnecessarilyneedtorealisethis

inordertoactvirtuously,wejustneedtohavereasoned,atsomepoint,thatit

wasinourbestinterestsforotherstoactbenevolentlytowardsus,inorderfor

ustoapprovebenevolence,esteemourbenefactorandthentoseektoaccrue

similaresteemforourselvesbyactingbenevolently.Thisperhapswouldnotlead

ustoheroicactsofself-sacrifice,buttheassociativenatureofourideaswould

ensurethedivinelyintendedconsequencesofageneralincreaseinhuman

happiness.

538Hutcheson,Inquiry,130.

218

Chapter7

Conclusion

Thebroadintentionofthisthesiswastoinvestigatethewaysinwhich(some)

earlyeighteenth-centuryBritishmoralphilosopherssoughttoaccountforthe

possibilityofvirtue.Insodoingmyintentionwastofurtherunderminethe

conventionthatBritishmoralphilosophyofthisperiodisbestconceivedasa

strugglebetweenrationalistandsentimentalistepistemologies.Overthecourse

oftheprecedingchaptersIaimedtoestablishthattheappropriateinterpretive

contextfortheaccountsofmoralepistemologyofferedbyClarke,Burnet,Balguy,

HutchesonandGaywastheirwider,practicalconcerntodemonstratetotheir

readershipthevariouswaysinwhichGodhadmadeitpossibleforustobe

virtuous.Iarguedthateachofthephilosopherssituatedtheirepistemology

withinthewiderframeworkofanattempttoprovetherealityofvirtueinthe

senseofvirtuebeinganachievablepracticalendeavour.Theultimaterealityof

virtue,orofmoralgood,wassecured,ineachcase,byanappealtotheistic

metaphysics,whereGod’sgoodnesswaseitherthebarefactofhisaimingatour

happiness(Gay),oranecessarypartofhisnature(Hutcheson),ortherectitude

ofhiswill(Clarke,BurnetandBalguy).Ibelievethatadetailedaccountofthe

waysinwhichtheseauthorsusedthetheoryofGod’scommunicableattributesis

missingfromthesecondaryliterature,asitstands.

IpresentedreinterpretationsoftheworkofClarkeandHutcheson,whosemoral

philosophy,Isuggested,aimedtoprovidesolutionstotheproblemsofa

Christianmorallifelivedintheround,ratherthantosatisfytheWhiggish

demandsoflaterhistoriesofautonomyoraccountsofmoralcognitivism.I

arguedthatClarke,BurnetandBalguydidnotproposearationalistaccountof

epistemologyinordertoexplainhowwemightbebroughttolivesofvirtue.

Rather,theirintentionwastoexplainhowweoughttohavebeenabletobring

ourselvestobehavewellusingnaturalreason,butthat,infact,wehad

demonstrated(toGod)thatwerequiredcertainreligioustruthsaboutthelong-

termconsequencesofouractionstoberevealedtous.Iofferedapartial

219

correctivetotheviewsexpressedbycommentatorswhoseownconcernsseem

tohaveledthemtodeny,ortoside-line,thosepartsofClarkeandBalguy’s

argumentthatclearlystatedthepracticalnecessityofourholdingviewsonthe

realityoffuturerewardandpunishmentintheafterlife.Thereadingsof

SchneewindandIrwinwhichfocusonClarkeandBalguy’sepistemology,do

indeedleaveClarke,BurnetandBalguylookingasiftheystruggledtoaccountfor

themotivationofmoralactions.Ihavearguedthattheydidnotstruggleto

explainmotivation;theysimplydidsoinawaythatlatercommentatorshavenot

alwaysdeemedvalidorinteresting.

IalsopresentedanaccountofHutcheson’smoralrealism.Thiswassomethingof

areframingexercise,asitrelieduponaninterpretationofseveralpartsofthe

materialfoundinHutcheson’stextsonMetaphysicsandLogic,whicheitherhad

notbeenexaminedbefore,orhadnotbeenintegratedwiththeargumentsfound

inthefourtreatises.IarguedthatHutcheson’ssentimentalism,restingasitdid

ontheideasofGod’scommunicablevirtue,wasunlikelytohavebeen

understoodbyHutchesonasaspeciesofvoluntarismand,infact,thatHutcheson

wentsomewaybeyondanappealtoaprovidentiallyimplantednaturalism.I

discussedthewayinwhichthetheoryofGod’scommunicableattributes

legitimisedHutcheson’suseofintrospectionintoourownmotives,andtheways

inwhichhebelievedthatourownbeliefsaboutourownnatureandthatofGod

wereofpracticalimportance.

IalsooutlinedthewayinwhichHutcheson’sintrospectivemethodrestedupon

theassumptionofthetransparencyofourthoughtsandmotivestous.The

significanceofthisassumption(inheritedfromearlierlogicsofideas)for

Hutcheson’smoralepistemologywasdiscussedatsomelength.Anothermajor

partofthesiswasconcernedwithdemonstratingthewaysinwhichthemoral

epistemologypresentedbyHutcheson,BurnetandBalguyandGayreflectedthe

influenceofearlierlogicsofideas,andespeciallyLocke’swayofideas.Locke’s

influenceonHutcheson’sepistemologyisfarfrombeinganunderexploredtopic

inthesecondaryliterature.However,myconcernherewastorevealthewaysin

whichthefirstactofperceptionorreceptionofsimpleideasbecamethefocusof

220

attentionwithinepistemologicallogicsingeneral,andthattheboundary

betweenthisandthesecondactofjudgmentwasnotseenasbeingfixedwithin

theselogics.Thisapproachoffersanothercontextwithinwhichtounderstand

thegrudgingconsensusthataroseintheearlierpartoftheeighteenthcentury

concerningtheexistenceofsomethingcalledamoralsense.Therewas

widespreadagreementthatourmoralthoughtneededtobeaccountedforina

waythatavoidedappealingtoanythingthatlookedasifitmightbeaninnate

idea,principleormaxim,andyetwouldstilldescribeaprincipleofmindthat

operatedineveryonetoprovidesomesortofpotential,primitive,commonly

availableguidanceinmoraljudgment-making.Ispentsometimedetailingthe

waysinwhichHutcheson,Burnet,BalguyandGayborrowedfrom,orexploited,

particularaspectsofLocke’sgeneralperceptualaccountofreasoninorderto

accountforourexperienceofmoralevaluationasaninvoluntary,immediate,

affectiveexperience.Iexplainedhowthebattletoexplainthebrutefactofour

immediatemoralreactionsbecameabattleovertheexperientialpriorityof

senseversusreason.IalsoexplainedthewayinwhichGaysoughttointegrate

theseaspectsofourexperienceofmoralthoughtintohisownassociative

accountofmoraljudgment.

IpresentedafreshperspectiveonHutcheson’smoralepistemologyinthe

followingthreeways:First,bylookingatthepermeabilityoftheboundary

betweensenseandjudgmentuponwhichhismoralepistemologywasbuilt.

Second,bylookingatthewaysinwhichHutcheson,subsequenttothefirst

editionoftheInquiry,shiftedtheepistemologicalburdenontothepreparatory

reasoningthatoccurredpriortotheemergenceofourideasofmoralsense,in

orderforthoseemergingmoralideastobeofepistemicvaluetous,andsothat

hemightshieldhismoralsensefromaccusationsofnativism.Third,andperhaps

mostimportantlyofall,byinspectingtheontologyofhisideasfrommoralsense

asthiswaspresentedintheMetaphysicsandtheLogic.

IexploredtheworkofBurnet,andBalguyandGay,inmoredetailthanisfound

theexistingsecondaryliterature,becausetheirworkwascentraltothedetailof

thedebateabouttheoriginal,foundationalandfundamentalprinciplesofvirtue

221

thatoccurredbetween1725(thepublicationdateofHutcheson’sInquiries)and

1732(thepublicationofGay’sDissertation).Thismaterialprovidesthecontext

forthevariousexplanationsofamoralsensediscussedinthisthesis.

Furthermore,acloserreadingoftheirworkrevealsthattheobjectionsthat

BurnetandBalguyhadaboutHutcheson’spositioninthefourtreatiseswereas

muchconcernedwithHutcheson’sviewsontheprinciplesthatmotivatedor

causedGodtocreateinthewaythathedid,astheywereonthenecessityofour

ownmoralepistemologybeingfoundeduponourintuitiveinsightintoself-

evidentpropositions.Gay’sworkisimportantforanumberofreasons,buthere

Ihaveoutlinedhisattempttosynthesisethepositionsofrivalmoralschemes.

Hischiefaim,Isuggest,wastoexplainhowtherationalandsensiblepartsofour

naturemightbebroughttogetherinaunifiedaccountofagencyandobligation

thatsawhumannature,itsmotivationalandcognitiveapparatus,andGod’s

ultimateauthority,boundtogethertoexplainthepossibilityofvirtue.

Thethesishadthreeaims:1)toexaminetherelationshipofrationalismto

obligationandmotivationintheworkofClarke,BurnetandBalguy,and2)to

exploretherelativerolesofsenseandjudgmentinHutcheson,Burnet,Balguy

andGayandto(re)examinethenatureofHutcheson’smoralrealism,and3)to

investigatethetheisticmetaphysicalclaimsmadebyallpartieswithrespectto

theargumentsaboutmoralrealism.IbelievethatIhavefulfilledtheseaimsand

thatinsodoingIhavemadeanoriginalcontributiontoscholarship.

222

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