early states synopsis

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Cross-Cultural Research

DOI: 10.1177/1069397102238924 2003; 37; 105 Cross-Cultural Research

Dmitri M. Bondarenko and Andrey V. Korotayev "Early State" in Cross-Cultural Perspective: A Statistical Reanalysis of Henri J. M. Claessens Database

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10.1177/1069397102238924 ARTICLECross-Cultural Research / February 2003Bondarenko, Korotayev / CLAESSENS DATABASE

Early State inCross-Cultural Perspective:A Statistical Reanalysis ofHenri J. M. Claessens Database

Dmitri M. BondarenkoRussian Academy of Sciences

Andrey V. KorotayevRussian State University for the Humanities

The authors reanalyze Claessens data set on the Early States.

Though Claessens Early State typology is largely justified, we sug-

gest some corrections and amendments to his typologization and

his model of Early State evolution. We show that the development of

personal ownership of land correlates rather weakly with the politi-

cal development of the Early State, and that political development

might be accompanied by the strengthening of communal owner-

ship. We also examine the correlation between Early State political

development and ruler sacralization. Though this correlation is in-

significant for the whole sample, its insignificance is accounted for

by two distinct evolutionary patterns. The pattern observed in the

axial age zone is characterized by a strong negative correlation be-

tween political development and ruler sacralization, while the pat-

tern observed throughout the rest of the world is characterized by a

strong positive correlation between the two variables. The authors

discuss possible causes of this difference.

105

Cross-Cultural Research, Vol. 37 No. 1, February 2003 105-132

DOI: 10.1177/1069397102238924

2003 Sage Publications



Keywords: Early State; land ownership; ruler sacralization

To many colleagues, the name of Hans Claessen has become almost

synonymous with the Early State. Over the past decades, he suc-

ceeded in making this topic into a major theme in anthropological

and evolutionist discourse. Indeed, due to his inspiration, the topic

attained truly global dimensions: a long series of seminars and con-

ferences in all sorts of contexts, bringing together people from all

parts of the globe; and an equally impressive stream of books, arti-

cles and collections.

P. Geschiere, 1995, p. 7

The Early State (Claessen & Skalnk, 1978) is perhaps the most

influential volume on the evolution of archaic states. The book was

conceived in 1973, when Henri J. M. Claessen and Peter Skalnk

met at a conference. By 1978, the project had been joined by more

than 20 scholars from different countries, and The Early State vol-

ume appeared. Since then, about 10 volumes of the series have

been published, almost all edited by Claessen in cooperation with

different colleagues (on the history of The Early State project, see

Kradin, 1998; Kochakova, 1996, 1999; Oosten & van de Velde,

1994). The Early State concept originated within the framework of

neostructuralism. Its founding fathers, Claessen and Skalnk,

were attempting to overcome the atemporality of classical

structuralism by combining structuralism with elements of

neoevolutionism. This intent, of course, departs from the essen-

tially structuralist orientation still evident in the first volume of

The Early State series (1978, pp. 533-596). As a historiographer of

the concept and one of its most active supporters, Kochakova

(1999) observed that the first volume of the series represented a

static comparison of The Early States whereas the next three were

devoted to their dynamic consideration (p. 6).

In its evolutionary dimension, however, The Early State concept

has unilinearity and directionality (see Bondarenko, 1998, pp. 18-

106 Cross-Cultural Research / February 2003

Authors Note: We are most grateful to Henri Johannes Maria Claessen for

his friendship and support of our studies. This article could not have been

written without the materials he has been supplying us with for many

years. The study was supported by grants from the Russian Foundation for

the Humanities (RGNF no. 01-03-00332a) and from the Russian Founda-

tion for Basic Research (RFBR/RFFI no. 01-06-80142).



22; Carneiro, 1987, p. 757; Kradin, 1998, pp. 10-12). Consider the

prevalent typology of The Early States. The inchoate, typical, and

transitional Early States are distinguished by differing levels of

development (Claessen & Skalnk, 1978, pp. 22, 589, 641). The

multilinearity and nondirectionality within the concept are

replaced by the possibility of movement along the staircase of

social evolution (Claessen & Skalnk, 1981). Yet despite The Early

State proponents sympathetic view of Marxism and, more gener-

ally, the leftist nature of this anthropological trend (see

Bondarenko,1998;Kubbel, 1988,pp.15-16;Webb,1984), its adher-

ents still represent The Mature State1 as an exception to the gen-

eral rule. The general rule is represented by The Early State

(Claessen & Oosten,1996,p.9;Claessen & van de Velde,1987,p.20).

In this article, we concentrate on the first volume of The Early

State project (Claessen & Skalnk, 1978) for the following reasons.

The whole project is definitely and consistently cross-cultural.

However, the research is mainly qualitative rather than quantita-

tive, though the editors of The Early State managed to obtain data

on more than 200 variables for quite a representative worldwide

sample of Early States. They also achieved a high level of data for-

malization, allowing Claessen to conduct some preliminary statis-

tical analyses. We believe that further statistical analysis of

Claessens data set is possible. This article is only the beginning of

that analysis.2

We decided to start with a reanalysis of Claessens developmen-

tal typology of Early States. He divided them into the following

three groups: inchoate, typical, and transitional according to

their closeness to the Mature State and remoteness from the

prestate forms of sociopolitical organization. His division of the

Early States was based on the following 10 criteria:

1. The presence of markets and professional traders.

2. The succession of general state functionaries through appointment

rather than in a hereditary way.

3. Special state functionaries through appointment rather than in a

hereditary way.

4. State functionaries through appointment rather than in a heredi-

tary way.

5. The presence of salaried functionaries.

6. Codified law.

7. Formal judges.

8. Codified punishment.

Bondarenko, Korotayev / CLAESSENS DATABASE 107



9. Personal property of land among aristocracy.

10. Personal property of land among commoners.

The inchoate Early State has none of these characteristics (at least

explicitly); the transitional Early State has all of them. The typical

Early State is somewhere in between.

The respective data set Claessen used for his typologization

(recoded by us for a further statistic reanalysis) is presented in the

appendix. Claessen classified 21 states of his sample as shown in

Table 1.

We decided to start by checking the validity of this classification

using principal components factor analysis (and the study of the

correlation matrix for Claessens typologization variables). The

results are shown in Tables 2 and 3.

The statistical analysis suggests that most of the Early State

development indicators are indeed positively, significantly, and

rather strongly correlated with one another. The factor loadings of

all the variables for Factor 1 (with eigenvalue as high as 5.6,

accounting for 56.1% of variance) are positive and generally rather

high. Hence, it seems reasonable to consider factor scores for Fac-

tor 1 as a sort of Early State Development Indexa measure of

each states closeness to the Mature State. Let us consider how the

early states are arranged along this axis (see Figure 1).

Thus, in general, Claessens typologization of early states is sup-

ported by our factor analysis. All the inchoate early states have

lower Factor 1 scores than both typical and transitional ones,

whereas most transitional early states have higher scores than the

typical ones.

But there are still a few problems here. The most evident prob-

lem is constituted by three casesYoruba, Inca, and China. The

Inca score is so close to Chinas that they should belong to one sub-

type of the early state. In addition, the Yoruba state has a higher

score than China, which suggests that either China should be

regarded as a typical rather than a transitional early state, or

Yoruba should be regarded as a transitional rather than typical

early state.

Note also that Norway, Volta, and Zande are much closer to the

typical Early States than to their fellow inchoate statesHawaii,

Tahiti, and Ankole. The impression is that these societies were

characterized by a different type of sociopolitical organization than

the rest of the sample societies. Thus, the conventional classifica-

tion of Hawaii, Tahiti, and Ankole as complex chiefdoms (e.g.,




TABLE 1

Claessens Classification of Early States

Inchoate States Typical States Transitional States

Ankole (17th-19th centuries) Angkor (9th-13th centuries) Aztecs (15th-16th centuries)

Hawaii (18th-early 19th centuries) Axum (1st-6th centuries) China (late 2nd-early 1st millennium B.C.)

Norway (10th-11th centuries) Egypt (first half of 1st millennium B.C.) France (10th-11th centuries)

Tahiti (18th century) Iberia (6th century B.C.-1st A.D.) Jimma (19th-20th centuries [until 1932])

Volta (15th-19th centuries) Incas (15th-16th centuries) Kuba (19th century)

Zande (18th-19th centuries) Kachari (17th-18th centuries) Maurya (4th-2nd centuries B.C.)

Mongolia (13th-14th centuries)

Scythia (6th-3rd centuries B.C.)

Yoruba (19th century)

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TABLE 2

Correlation Matrix for Claessens Early States Development Indicators

Mode of Mode of Personal Personal

Succession Succession Property Property

of General of Special Salaried Codified Formal Codified of Land of of Land of

Markets Trade Functionaries Functionaries Functionaries Law Judges Punishment Aristocracy Commoners

Markets .781 .609 .666 .728 .621 .518 .794 .261 .273

(.000) (.006) (.005) (.002) (.003) (.012) (.000) (.148) (.137)

Trade .781 .550 .500 .577 .458 .481 .730 .218 .284

(.000) (.009) (.029) (.015) (.021) (.014) (.002) (.185) (.119)

Mode of succession of .609 .550 .653 .731 .398 .563 .742 .412 .599

general functionaries (.006) (.009) (.004) (.002) (.051) (.008) (.002) (.056) (.007)

Mode of succession of .666 .500 .653 .767 .338 .558 .693 .354 .336

special functionaries (.005) (.029) (.004) (.002) (.109) (.015) (.006) (.107) (.131)

Salaried functionaries .728 .577 .731 .767 .714 .866 .837 .415 .415

(.002) (.015) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.000) (.000) (.079) (.079)

Codified law .621 .458 .398 .338 .714 .792 .720 .553 .433

(.003) (.021) (.051) (.109) (.002) (.000) (.003) (.009) (.036)

Formal judges .518 .481 .563 .558 .866 .792 .730 .263 .150

(.012) (.014) (.008) (.015) (.000) (.000) (.002) (.139) (.271)

Codified punishment .794 .730 .742 .693 .837 .720 .730 .141 .283

(.000) (.002) (.002) (.006) (.000) (.003) (.002) (.323) (.175)

Personal property of .261 .218 .412 .354 .415 .553 .263 .141 .645

land of aristocracy (.148) (.185) (.056) (.107) (.079) (.009) (.139) (.323) (.002)

Personal property of .273 .284 .599 .336 .415 .433 .150 .283 .645

land of commoners (.137) (.119) (.007) (.131) (.079) (.036) (.271) (.175) (.002)

NOTE:Numbers in bold indicate correlation is significant at the < .01 level (one-tailed).Numbers in italics indicate correlation is significant at the < .05 and > .01

level (one-tailed).Numbers not in bold or in italics indicate correlation is not significant at the < .05 level (one-tailed).Numbers in parentheses are p values.

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Earle, 1978, 1997, pp. 33-46, pp. 200-203, 2000) is perhaps more

reasonable than Claessens grouping them together with Early

States. These are minor problems, however. The main problem is

as follows.

The academic community understands the state in two distinct

ways. On one hand, the state is often understood as a certain type

of society (e.g., Fried, 1967, who considered the state as the most

recent type of society preceded by stratified, ranked, and egalitar-

ian societies; see also, e.g., Carneiro, 2000, p. 186; Haas, 1982;

Pugachjov & Solovjov, 2000, pp. 251-252), but it is just as often

understood as a type of political organization. As a political organi-

zation, the state is merely a subsystem within the social system: It

is not identical with the society as a whole (Belkov, 1993, pp. 32-38,

1995, pp. 171-175; Claessen, 1996, p. 1255; Godiner, 1991, p. 51;

Grinin, 1997, p. 20; Jakobson, 1997, p. 6; Pugachjov & Solovjov,

2000, pp. 251-252).

Now, as a general rule, scholars can use whatever definitions

they choose, provided that these definitions remain consistent

throughout a single piece of research. The writers of The Early

State did not follow this rule (Claessen & Skalnk, 1978). On one

hand, Claessen and Skalnk (1978) proposed the following defini-

tion of the Early State:


TABLE 3

Factor Analysis of Claessens

Early States Development Data Set

Factor Loadingsa

Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3

Salaried functionaries .86 .10

Professional traders .84 .23 .17

Codified punishment .84 .32

Markets .82 .27 .15

Mode of succession of general functionaries .78 .14 .33

Codified law .76 .17 .56

Formal judges .76 .17 .50

Mode of succession of special functionaries .73 .12 .31

Personal property of land of aristocracy .50 .74 .11

Personal property of land of commoners .50 .74 .24

Eigenvalue 5.6 1.4 .9

% of variance explained 56.1 14.3 9.1

a. Cutoff point = .1.



The Early State is a centralized socio-political organization for the

regulation of social relations in a complex, stratified society divided

into at least two basic strata, or emergent social classesviz. the

rulers and the ruledwhose relations are characterized by political

dominance of the former and tributary obligations of the latter, legit-

imized by a common ideology of which reciprocity is the basic princi-

ple. (p. 640)

Thus, Claessen claimed that he understood the state not as a

certain type of society but as a centralized socio-political organi-

zation for the regulation of social relations in a complex, stratified

society. However, in his list of the diagnostic characteristics of, say,

the transitional Early State, he includes the presence of markets,

professional traders, and personal land ownership by both aristoc-

racy and commoners (Claessen & Skalnk, 1978). These are char-

acteristics of a society regulated by a centralized sociopolitical


1.5 Aztecs (1.45); Jimma (1.45) Transitional

Maurya (1.22) Early

1.0 France (1.04); Kuba (1.05) States

Yoruba (.78) ??????????

.5 Inca (.52); China (.57) ??????????

Angkor (.15)

.0 Kachari (.02); Iberia (.03) Typical

Egypt (.07) Early

Axum (.21) States

Scythia (.36); Mongolia (.32)

.5 Norway (.55)

Volta (.70)

Zande (.82) Inchoate

1.0 Early

1.5 States

Hawaii (1.59)

Ankole (1.71)

Tahiti (1.93)

2.0

Figure 1: Ranking of Early States along the Axis of Early State Develop-

ment Index (factor scores for Factor 1)



organization. Hence, one wonders what exactly is being

typologized. If we are discussing the political organization of soci-

ety, why should we consider characteristics of society as a whole?

And if we are discussing the whole social system, why should we

consider six characteristics of political organization and just four

characteristics of other societal subsystems?

Claessens typologization paints a unilineal picture of early

states, proposing that they can be arranged along one line even if

we consider not only the indexes of political development but also

other characteristics of social and economic development.

As mentioned above, most variables used by Claessen for his

Early State typologization are characterized by strong and signifi-

cant correlations between one another. But not all of them are so

correlated. Note that neither characteristic of personal property

development shows any significant correlation with the political

development variables.

Let us now consider more attentively Claessens hypothesis that

political development in the direction of the Mature State is

strongly correlated with the transition from communal to private/

personal land ownership (Claessen & Skalnk, 1978). First, we

must single out the dimension of purely political development. To

do this, we will include in the analysis only the characteristics of

political development: succession of general and special state func-

tionaries through appointment versus a hereditary way, presence

of salaried functionaries, codified law, formal judges, and codified

punishment.Factor 1 scores for principal components factor analy-

sis can in this case be considered as an index of political develop-

ment (in the direction of Mature State).

The results are shown in Table 3.

Note that the factor analysis already suggests an interesting

alternative to the political development of the Early State, which

can be seen in the scattergram in Figure 2.

The political development of the Early State could be accompa-

nied by the elaboration of the system of appointed (and not heredi-

tary) functionaries in the absence of codified law and formal judges

(which in our sample is most clearly represented by Egypt, Iberia,

and Yoruba). But it can also be accompanied by the legal formaliza-

tion without a full transition to the functionaries succession by

appointment (which in our sample is most clearly represented by

Inca and Angkor).

Now let us see how the political development of the Early State

correlates with the development of personal ownership of land.




Claessen contrasted personal ownership with collective/commu-

nal ownership (Claessen & Skalnk, 1978, pp. 591, 645-646).

Hence, we decided to make a factor analysis of six variables of the


TABLE 4

Factor Analysis of Claessens Early

States Political Development Data Set

Political Development

Index (Equals

Factor 1 scores

for principal

Early State component analysis) Factor 2 Scores

Aztecs 1.42 0.08

Jimma 1.42 0.08

France 1.13 0.53

Kuba 1.13 0.53

Maurya 1.10 0.87

Yoruba 1.00 1.50

Inca 0.81 1.48

China 0.13 0.64

Angkor 0.10 1.68

Iberia 0.06 1.52

Egypt 0.12 1.61

Norway 0.33 0.94

Axum 0.44 0.66

Zande 0.54 0.73

Mongolia 0.61 0.90

Scythia 0.64 0.30

Volta 1.12 0.32

Hawaii 1.32 0.04

Ankole 1.73 1.24

Tahiti 1.73 1.24

Factor Loadings

Variable Factor 1 Factor 2

Formal judges .84 .376

Codified law .75 .584

Codified punishment .86

Salaried functionaries .89

Mode of succession of general functionaries .77 .345

Mode of succession of special functionaries .75 .472

Eigenvalue 3.95 .84

% of variance explained 65.9 14.0

NOTE: The cutoff point for factors is .3. The score for Kachari is entirely unrepresentative due to

the absence of data on four out of six variables.



data collected by Claessen and colleagues on these subjects. In

addition to personal ownership of land by aristocracy and personal

ownership of land by commoners, we also analyzed the following

variables: ownership of land by aristocrats through community

membership, personal land ownership by sovereign, land owner-

ship by sovereign through community membership, and land own-

ership by commoners through community membership. We

expected that Factor 1 of the principal component analysis would

have positive loadings for personal property variables and nega-

tive ones for communal property variables and, hence, it would be

possible to use Factor 1 scores as an index of the development of

personal ownership of land/decline of communal ownership. This

expectation was confirmed (see Table 5).

Now let us see how the Personal Ownership of Land Index corre-

lates with the Political Development Index (see Figure 3).

The development of the political system of the Early State corre-

lates rather weakly with the development of personal ownership of

land. As Figure 3 graphically demonstrates, an Early State could


Legal Formalization vs. Appointed Functionaries (factor 2 score)

2,01,51,0,50,0-,5-1,0-1,5-2,0

Po

litic

al D

eve

lop

men

t In

dex

(fa

cto

r 1

sco

re)

2,0

1,5

1,0

,5

0,0

-,5

-1,0

-1,5

-2,0

TahitiAnkole

Hawaii

Volta

Scythia MongoliaZande

AxumNorway

EgyptIberiaAngkor China

Inca

YorubaMaurya Kuba

France

JimmaAztecs

Figure 2: Early States Political Development Index Legal Formalization

Versus Appointed Functionaries (scattergram)



reach a high level of political development without reaching a high

level of personal ownership (and/or preserving strong communal

ownership forms)Angkor, Inca, and Yoruba. On the other hand, a

relatively high level of personal ownership (and/or disappearance

of strong communal ownership forms) may not be accompanied by

an equally high level of development in the direction of the Mature

State. This is not surprising. Consider, for example, western

Europe at the beginning of the 2nd millennium A.D., when a fast

political development (which finally led to the formation of Mature

States in this region and was accompanied by equally fast and rad-

ical developments in all othertechnological, economical, cul-

turalspheres of social life) occurred together with the develop-

ment and strengthening of the communal ownership of land (e.g.,

Alaev, 1999, pp. 100-101, 2000, p. 171; Bessmertnyj, 1969, pp. 163-

166; Genicot, 1990).

Finally, we decided to consider how the political development of

the Early States correlates with their so-called ideological develop-

ment. The data on these variables (published in The Early State)

were available (without too many missing cases) for parameters

connected with the position of the ruler. Their principal component

factor analysis produced the results shown in Table 6.

We decided to concentrate on Factor 1, which we interpreted as a

Rulers Sacralization Index. Note that the negative loading for the

variable Tours by Sovereign (Gafol) (Gafol is defined as inspections

during which the ruler with his retinue traveled around his posses-

sions, collecting assessments, executing judgement, etc.) fits this

interpretation very wella totally sacralized ruler would hardly

run the defilement risk inherent in any extensive visits to the pro-

fane zones of his realm.Such a negative correlation looks quite nat-

ural because the main means of sacralizing the ruler is imposing

taboos on him. All those taboos are aimed at limiting the rulers

opportunities to communicate freely with his subjects (the taboo

that directly prohibits him to appear in their presence except in

very rare ritual occasions is also frequent) (e.g., Bondarenko, 1995,

pp. 203-231; Claessen, 1986, pp. 116-119, pp. 124-125, 1987, pp. 206-

207, pp. 219-220, 234, 2000, pp. 178-186, p. 194; Claessen & Oosten,

1996; Claessen & Skalnk, 1978, pp. 511-530, pp. 533-596, 1981, pp.

1-13, pp. 59-86, pp. 239-250; Frazer, 1922; Freud, 1923; Heusch,

1987; Ldtke, 1991; Tokarev, 1990, pp. 320-330).

Now let us see how the Rulers Sacralization Index correlates

with the Political Development Index (see Figure 4).




Of course, the initial impression is that the two variables do not

correlate at all. However, a closer inspection of the scattergram

reveals that this impression is quite misleading.The lack of signifi-

cant correlation is in fact a result of the so-called Galton effect.


TABLE 5

Factor Analysis of Claessens Land Ownership Variables

Political Development

Index (Equals

Factor 1 scores

for principal

Early State component analysis) Factor 2 Scores

Aztecs 0.26 0.80

Jimma 2.03 1.47

France 0.82 1.48

Kuba 0.92 2.91

Maurya 1.37 0.47

Yoruba 0.91 0.34

Inca 0.91 0.34

Kachari 0.91 0.34

China 0.88 0.43

Angkor 1.25 0.05

Iberia 0.80 1.32

Egypt 0.02 0.15

Norway 1.25 0.05

Axum 0.31 0.12

Zande 0.45 1.23

Mongolia 0.91 0.34

Scythia 1.25 0.05

Volta 1.06 0.91

Hawaii 0.11 0.64

Ankole 0.23 1.08

Tahiti 1.25 0.05

Factor Loadings


Communal ownership of land by aristocrats .85 .20

Personal ownership of land by commoners .79 .21

Personal ownership of land by aristocracy .72 .44

Communal ownership of land by commoners .70 .58

Private ownership of land by sovereign .53 .70

Communal ownership of land by sovereign .40 .14

Eigenvalue 2.8 1.13




Those dealing with the Galton problem normally worry about cor-

relations being inflated as a result of diffusion effects. However, as

Carol Ember and Melvin Ember argued, the Galton problem could

well produce the opposite effects: duplication may weaken results,

because a set of historically related cases may be exceptional to a

cross-cultural generalization rather than consistent with it

(Ember, 1971; Ember & Ember, 1998, p. 679). We seem to confront

precisely such a case here. In the 1980s, many suggested that we

treat the Galton problem as a network autocorrelation problem

(e.g., Burton & White, 1987, p. 147, 1991; Dow, Burton, & White,

1981, 1982; Dow, Burton, White, & Reitz, 1984; White, Burton, &

Dow, 1981). This suggestion implies that Galton effects may result

from the influence of historical networks. We could not help but

notice that all the cultures in the upper left quarter of the scatter-

gram belonged to one large historical network that emerged in a

more or less full-fledged form during the Axial Age (e.g.,

Eisenstadt, 1982, 1986; Gellner, 1988; Jaspers, 1953) but whose

origins seem to go back to a much earlier time (Chase-Dunn & Hall,


Private Ownership of Land Index

2,52,01,51,0,50,0-,5-1,0-1,5

Polit

ical D

evelo

pm

ent In

dex

2,0

1,5

1,0

,5

0,0

-,5

-1,0

-1,5

-2,0

TahitiAnkole

Hawaii

Volta

ScythiaMongoliaZande

AxumNorw ay

Egypt IberiaAngkor China

Inca

YorubaMauryaKuba

France

JimmaAztecs

Figure 3: Early States Political Development Index Personal Owner-

ship of Land Index (scattergram)

NOTE: = .4, p = .035 (one-tailed).



1997). In the figure below, this historical network will be called

Axial. The Axial zone roughly corresponds to the Middle Old

World region singled out by Burton, Moore, Whiting, and Romney

(1996) on the basis of a correspondence analysis of Murdocks

Ethnographic Atlas database (1967).


TABLE 6

Factor Analysis of Claessens Ruler Sacralization Variables

Early State Factor 1 Scores Factor 2 Scores

Aztecs 1.68 0.91

Jimma 1.05 2.46

France 1.41 0.39

Kuba 1.83 0.25

Maurya 1.11 0.32

Yoruba 1.94 1.28

Inca 0.27 0.34

Kachari 0.37 0.33

China 0.60 0.27

Angkor 0.87 0.05

Iberia 1.13 0.32

Egypt 1.16 0.16

Norway 1.39 0.29

Axum 0.47 0.18

Zande 0.70 0.20

Mongolia 0.17 0.25

Scythia 0.27 0.34

Volta 0.75 0.25

Hawaii 0.24 2.45

Ankole 0.21 0.09

Tahiti 0.64 2.52

Factor Loadings


The sovereign or close kinsman is high priest .882

Ruler is high priest .804 .337

Human sacrifices at rulers funerals .701 .431

Acquisition of sacral status .172 .926

Tours by sovereign .524 .566

Ritual anarchy on rulers death .139 .434

Eigenvalue 2.24 1.67


NOTE: The cutoff point for factors is .1.



Let us see how the correlation between the Political Develop-

ment Index and the Ruler Sacralization Index looks for the Axial

Historical Network Zone (see Figure 5).

For this zone, the correlation is negative and significant.Now let

us see how this correlation looks for the rest of the world (see Fig-

ure 6).

For the rest of the world, the correlation is positive and margin-

ally significant. The immediate impression is that the Early States

of the Axial Historical Network and the rest of the world followed

rather different patterns of sociopolitical development. The pres-

ence in the overall sample of a roughly similar number of cases

from both subsamples destroyed the correlation, producing a sta-

tistically insignificant result.

What could account for this difference? We believe that what

really needs an explanation is the peculiarity of the sociopolitical

development of the Axial Historical Network societies. It is not sur-

prising that in the rest of the world, the growth of the political

power of the state and its ruler was accompanied by the growth of


Ruler Sacralization Index

2,52,01,51,0,50,0-,5-1,0-1,5-2,0

Po

litic

al D

eve

lop

men

t In

de

x

2,0

1,5

1,0

,5

0,0

-,5

-1,0

-1,5

-2,0

TahitiAnkole

Hawaii

Volta

ScythiaMongoliaZande

AxumNorway

EgyptIberia

AngkorChina

Inca

YorubaMaurya Kuba

France

JimmaAztecs

Figure 4: Early States Political Development Index Ruler Sacralization

Index (scattergram with regression line)

NOTE: = .01, p = .48 (one-tailed).



ruler sacralization. But what could account for the opposite pat-

tern found within the Axial Historical Network?

It was not by chance that we called this network Axial: the Axial

Age revolutions are quite relevant here. Eisenstadt (1982), for

example, considered as one of the most important features of the

Axial Age revolutions the development of highly autonomous reli-

gious-intellectual elites (clerics) claiming independent sacral-

religious authority. This authority was institutionalized within all

the world (universal) religionsBuddhism, Christianity, Islam.

In the premodern world (by, say, the 17th century A.D.), the Axial

Historical Network zone was roughly identical with the Universal

Religions zone.

As we stated above, the roots of the Axial Historical Network

seem to go much deeper than the Axial Age itself. The peculiar

social evolution pattern occurring within the Axial Zone appears to



1,51,0,50,0-,5-1,0-1,5-2,0

Po

litic

al

De

ve

lop

me

nt

Ind

ex

2,0

1,5

1,0

,5

0,0

-,5

-1,0

ScythiaMongolia

AxumNorway

Egypt

Iberia

AngkorChina

MauryaFrance

Jimma


Index (scattergram, for the Axial Historical Network only)

NOTE: = .57, p = .03.



be rooted in the zones pre-Axial cultural heritage. Note that three

(Greece, Iran, India) out of the five (Palestine and China are the

others) main Axial revolution centers are associated with the Indo-

Europeans. On the other hand, the basic principles of the social

organization of the proto-Indo-Europeans, as they have been

reconstructed by a wide range of sources (textual [e.g., Rigveda],

linguistic, archaeological, ethnographic, and so forth [Dumzil,

1958; Kullanda, 1995; Wikander, 1938]), must have served as a

sound basis for the Axial sociopolitical development pattern. The

sociopolitical organization of pastoral proto-Indo-Europeans

appears to have been characterized by a developed age-class sys-

tem.Within it, the sacral religious functions were performed by the

age-class of elders. Productive functions (animal husbandry and

agriculture) were performed by the age-class of mature married



2,52,01,51,0,50,0-,5-1,0

Po

liti

ca

l D

eve

lop

me

nt

Ind

ex

2,0

1,5

1,0

,5

0,0

-,5

-1,0

-1,5

-2,0

TahitiAnkole

Hawaii

Volta

Zande

Inca

YorubaKuba

Aztecs


Index (scattergram, for the rest of the world)

NOTE: = .55, p = .66.



men, whereas the military functions (on the basis of which the

political leadership functions were also developed) belonged to the

age-class of initiated youngsters.

With the formation of stratified societies among the Indo-Euro-

peans, the age-class stratification tended to transform into a social

stratification system. Within this process, the age-class of initiated

youngsters transformed into an estate/varna of warriors/political

leaders (Indian kshatryas or, say, the noble estate of medieval west-

ern Europe). The age-class of elders transformed into an estate/

varna of priestsIndian brahmans or the priestly estate of medi-

eval western Europe. The age-class of mature married men trans-

formed into an estate/varna of peasantsIndian vayshyas or the

European third estate. Within this pattern, so-called political and

sacral/religious authorities were rather sharply divided (Claessen

& Oosten,1996,pp.272-274,438).This division, of course,provided

good backgrounds for both the Axial Age transformations and the

Axial Historical Network sociopolitical development pattern.

At first glance, a tight cluster in the upper left of Figure 5, con-

sisting of such apparently diverse cultures as early medieval

France, ancient (Mauryan) India, and the Jimma Abba Jafar state

of the 19th and 20th centuries A.D. in southwest Ethiopia, looks like

a perfect illustration of the postmodernist conviction that stan-

dard statistical procedures can produce extremely wild results and

thus cannot serve as a sound basis for any generalizations. How-

ever, there are better grounds for viewing this cluster as evidence

of the reliability of standard statistical procedures.

All the three states were, first of all, strongly influenced by the

Axial Age world religionsChristianity in the case of France, Bud-

dhism in the case of Mauryan India (at least at the age of Asoka),

and Islam in the case of Jimma.3 France and Mauryan India are

further united by their common Indo-European heritage, with its

original three-function system implying the separation of the

sacral-religious function and the political-military one. The

Jimma, surprisingly, share something in common with them in

this respect: the pastoral backgrounds of the Galla were also char-

acterized by a developed age-class system within which the politi-

cal-military and sacral-religious functions were performed by dif-

ferent age-classes and, hence, rather sharply separated.4

But the pre-Axial influences on the Axial Age sociopolitical

development are not merely Indo-European. As Berezkin (1994,

1995a, 1995b, 1997, 2000) noticed, the sociopolitical evolution




pattern of the most ancient agricultural centers in western Asia

(associated, most likely, with the Aufrasians/Semito-Hamites

[e.g., Militarjov & Shnirelman, 1984]) seems to have been charac-

terized by the growth of cultural complexity through functional

differentiation rather than social stratification. From the very

beginning, this pattern appears to have differed significantly from

the one observed in the pre-Columbian Americas, tropical Africa,

or Oceania. Although, according to Berezkin, development in the

Near East was interrupted between the 4th (Mesopotamia) and

late 3rd (south Turkmenistan) millennia B.C.,5 its cultural-political

heritage might have contributed to the development of the civil-

temple communities in eastern Mediterrania. Those communities

also seem to have formed a sound basis for the Axial Age transfor-

mations (Diakonoff, Neronova, & Sventsitskaja, 1989).

METHODOLOGICAL CONCLUSION

Our research, we believe, shows that there is no impenetrable

gap between so-called orthodox quantitative, worldwide, cross-cul-

tural research, and qualitative comparative studies. The Early

State project constituted an important step toward bridging the

gap between the two types of cross-cultural research. Claessens

data set is extremely valuable, and we think further statistical

analysis of it will bring new and interesting results.

The Early State remains, in many respects,an incomparable vol-

ume. It looks like a miniature copy of the HRAF. It contains loads of

fully formalized data, but you can also find details about the values

of virtually any variable in question (using the subject index,

which serves in this case as an analogue of the Outline of Cultural

Materials [e.g., Murdock et al., 1987]). The recipe for such an

impressive result was very simple. Claessen and Skalnk distrib-

uted among The Early State contributors a well-designed question-

naire and insisted on the contributors answering all the questions

clearly and completely. Another important precondition for The

Early State success was, naturally, a very well-designed, truly

worldwide cross-cultural sample.

It is unfortunate that, to our knowledge, The Early State algo-

rithm has not been repeated. There is a pressing need for new

worldwide, cross-cultural projects based on similar algorithms.




APPENDIX

Data Set Used by Claessen for Typologization of Early States (recoded for a statistic reanalysis)

Mode of Mode of Personal Personal

Succession Succession Property Property

Professional of General of Special Codified Formal Codified of Land by of Land by

Description Markets Traders Functionaries Functionaries Salaries Law Judges Punishment Aristocracy Commoners

Angkor 3present 3present 2intermediate 2intermediate 0absent 1present 1present , 0absent 0absent

Ankole 2limited 1absent 1hereditary 1hereditary 0absent 0absent 0absent 0absent 0absent 0absent

Axum 3present 3present 2intermediate 2intermediate , 0absent 0absent , 0absent 0absent

Aztecs 3present 3present 3appointment 3appointment 1present 1present 1present 1present 1present 1present

China 3present 3present 2intermediate 2intermediate , 1present 0absent 1present 1present 1present

Egypt , , 2intermediate 3appointment , 0absent 0absent , , ,

France 3present 3present 2intermediate 3appointment 1present 1present 1present 1present 0absent 1present

Hawaii 1absent 1absent 1hereditary , 0absent 0absent 0absent 0absent , 0absent

Iberia , , 3appointment , , 0absent 0absent , 0absent 1present

Inca 3present , 2intermediate 2intermediate 1present 1present 1present 1present 0absent 0absent

Jimma 3present 3present 3appointment 3appointment 1present 1present 1present 1present 1present 1present

Kachari 2limited , , , , , 1present 1present 0absent 0absent

Kuba 3present 3present 2intermediate 3appointment 1present 1present 1present 1present 1present 0absent

Maurya 3present 3present 3appointment 2intermediate 1present 1present 1present 1present 1present 1present

Mongolia 3present 3present , , 0absent 0absent 0absent , 0absent 0absent

Norway 2limited 2limited , , , 0absent 0absent , 0absent 0absent

Scythia 3present 3present 1hereditary , , 0absent 0absent , 0absent 0absent

Tahiti 1absent 1absent 1hereditary 1hereditary 0absent 0absent 0absent 0absent 0absent 0absent

Volta 2limited 2limited 2intermediate 2intermediate 0absent 0absent 0absent 0absent 1present 1present

Yoruba 3present 3present 3appointment 3appointment 1present 0absent 1present 1present 0absent 0absent

Zande 2limited 1absent 2intermediate 2intermediate 0absent 0absent 0absent 1present 0absent ,

SOURCE: This appendix used as a basis Claessen and Skalnk (1978, p. 592, table XX ).

125

2003 SA

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Notes

1. There is no explicit definition of the Mature State in The Early State

(Claessen & Skalnk, 1978). However, the differences between the Early

State and the Mature State are explained in Early State Dynamics

(Claessen & van de Velde, 1987):

The restriction of the definition (of the Early StateD.B., A.K.) to tributary

relations instead of taxation (i.e., haphazard instead of regular contributions

to supply the needs of the government), and to a class division that is only in-

cipient makes it possible to draw a line between the Early State and more

mature types of state (cf. Claessen, 1984; Shifferd, 1987). The level of the Ma-

ture State is reached when a different type of legitimacy and a managerial,

bureaucratic type of organization replace the earlier forms (cf. Bargatzky,

1987); Shifferd (1987) adds to these factors the development of a legal system

that transcends specific office holders, even the ruler, as well as the forma-

tion of a permanent police force. These latter points are similar to Vitkins re-

quirements of an extensive and qualitative broadening of the sphere of con-

trol, the emergence of a bureaucratic apparatus and the development of a

money economy that freed the sovereign from the necessity of allotting them

(the office holders) land, together with corresponding economic rights of

dominance (Vitkin, 1981, p. 450; cf. Smith, 1985, who distinguishes between

Dominion and Bureaucracy). (pp. 4-5)

2. Of course, the data represented in the volume were gathered in the

1970s. Claessen himself recognized that in places corrections, or addi-

tions might have been possible in the light of the knowledge we have now

(personal communication, September 13, 2000). On the other hand,

Claessen still believes (in our opinions, with complete justification) that

the data are based on a series of case studies that are for the greater part

still valuable (personal communication, September 13, 2000).

3. Of course, both Christianity and Islam formed well after the Axial

Age.However,both of them originated within the Abrahamic religious tra-

dition that acquired its distinctly Axial Age shape during the Axial Age

(including rather sharp separation of sacral religious and mundane politi-

cal authorities [Diakonoff, Neronova, & Sventsitskaja, 1989]), which

makes it possible to treat both these religions as the Axial ones (Jaspers,

1953).

4. Note that the role of the Galla prestate backgrounds in the astonish-

ingly fast development of the Jimma in the direction of a Mature State was

already quite clearly spelled out by Lewis, who contributed his description

of Jimma Abba Jafar to The Early State project (Claessen & Skalnk, 1978,

pp. 321-338).

5. However, the polities developing squarely within this pattern appear

to have continued to exist in some parts of south Arabia up to the end of the

1st millennium B.C. (Frantsouzoff, 1995, 1997, 2000).




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Dmitri M. Bondarenko is a senior research fellow and head of the Sector of

Cultural Anthropology at the Center for Civilizational and Regional

Studies, and senior research fellow of the Institute for African Studies, both

of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a professor at the Center of Social

Anthropology at the Russian State University for the Humanities in Mos-

cow. He received a Ph.D. and a Doctor of Science degree from Institute for

African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is the author of

more than 120 publications, including three monographs (Benin on the

Eve of the First Contacts with Europeans:Person.Society.Authority, 1995,

Civilizations Theory and the Dynamics of Historical Process in

Precolonial Tropical Africa, 1997, and Pre-Imperial Benin: Formation and

Evolution of the Socio-Political Institutions System, 2001) and 16 edited

volumes.He is a member of the Society for Cross-Cultural Research, the Eu-

ropean Association of Social Anthropologists, and World Archaeological

Congress. His spheres of interest include the formation and evolution of

complex societies, the civilizations theory, and cultural anthropology of

tropical Africa.




Andrey V. Korotayev is a professor in and head of the program in Anthro-

pology of the East at the School of History, Political Science and Law at the

Russian State University for the Humanities, and in the sociology faculty

at the State University Higher School of Economics in Moscow. He is a se-

nior research fellow of the Oriental Institute and of the Center for

Civilizational and Regional Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences. He re-

ceived a Ph.D. from Manchester University and a doctor of science degree

from the Oriental Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He has

done field research in Yemen and Libya. He is the author of more than 130

publications, including four monographs (Ancient Yemen, 1995; Factors of

Social Evolution, 1997; Sabaean Studies: Some General Trends and Fac-

tors of Evolution of the Sabaean Civilization, 1997; and Chiefdoms and

Tribes of the Land of Hashid and Bakil, 1998). His research focuses on so-

cial evolution, cross-cultural research, and Arabian anthropology.




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