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EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS IN MINORITY CONFLICTSA FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING REGIONAL RESPONSES

7TH ASIA-EUROPE ROUNDTABLE WORKSHOPSingapore 20-21 May 2010

EDITED BYStefanie EliesSol IglesiasYeo Lay Hwee

On 20-21 May 2010, experts from the fi eld of early warning systems and minority confl ict issues, met at the Asia-Europe Foundation for a workshop which was held under the auspices of the Asia-Europe Roundtable (AER) series. Following up upon recommendations from previous AER meetings to monitor warning signals for minority confl icts, this workshop was on the topic of ‘Early Warning Systems in Minority Confl icts’.

Based on the background paper and the discussions from the 7th Asia Europe Roundtable workshop, Early Warning Systems in Minority Confl ict: A Framework for Developing Regional Responses’ studies the manner by which minority confl icts are prevented and contained through early warning systems; by analysing the gaps within the current mechanisms, it presents a framework by which regional early warning structures and responses can be better integrated and enhanced.

More specifi cally, this publication will:

• Map the international legal framework for minority confl ict prevention and make an inventory of various existing mechanisms for confl ict prevention;

• Illustrate how regional actors have acted to prevent minority confl ict and what preventive efforts have been organised at regional level;

• Present various approaches to minority confl ict prevention in the context of early warning systems;

• Identify potential and criteria for creating regional multi-level structures for minority confl ict prevention, methods to build capacity, trust and coordination between the stakeholders.

Supported by:

[ISBN: 978-981-08-8059-0]

This project is fi nanced by the European Commission

Published byAsia-Europe Foundation31 Heng Mui Keng TerraceSingapore 119595

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for Regional Cooperation in Asia7500A Beach Road #12-320/321/322The PlazaSingapore 199591

Singapore Institute for International Affairs2 Nassim RoadSingapore 25837

“Early Warning Systems in Minority Conflicts – A framework for developing regional responses” ISBN : 978-981-08-8059-0

Copyright@ 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the publisher.

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Commission. The views expressed in this publication are strictly those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia-Europe Foundation, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, or the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, the European Commission or the Europe-Asia Policy Forum.

About the Asia-Europe Roundtable

The Asia-Europe Roundtable is a series that aims to examine the nature of Asia and Europe, focusing on international relations issues, with a view to understanding both better and to identify and share best practices on solutions to common or contrasting problems. Since 2000 the following activities have been organised:

1st AER “Regions in Transition”August 2000 | Singapore

2nd AER “Trans-National Problem-Solving in a Global Era: Towards Multi-Level Governance?”September 2001 | Oxford, United KingdomCo-hosted by the Centre for Globalisation and Regionalisation Studies, Warwick University, and Corpus Christi College, Oxford University

3rd AER “Peace and Reconciliation: Success Stories and Lessons from Asia and Europe”October 2003 | Hanoi, VietnamHosted by the Institute for International Relations (IIR) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam

4th AER “Conflict Prevention: Actors, Institutions and Mechanisms”April 2005 | Berlin, Germany

5th AER “Sustaining the Peace through Post-Conflict Reconstruction”May 2007 | Singapore

6th AER “Minority Conflicts – Towards an ASEM Framework for Conflict Management”June 2009 I Derry, Northern Ireland & Letterkenny, Ireland

7th AER Workshop “Early Warning Systems in Minority Conflicts”May 2010 I Singapore

The series is organised by the Asia-Europe Foundation, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, and the Singapore Institute of International Affairs.

The inaugural AER was launched in Singapore in 2000, to present a broad overview of the transitions in the two regions. The 2nd AER was held in Oxford, UK, in 2001, and focused on the issue of global and regional governance and transnational problem-solving. The roundtable shifted from broader regional issues to a more specific focus on peace and security. The 3rd AER in Hanoi (2003) and the 4th AER in Berlin (2005) deepened bi-regional dialogue and promoted networking in the areas of conflict prevention as well as peace and reconciliation. The 5th AER focused on “Sustaining Peace through Post-Conflict Reconstruction” and the 6th AER looked at different types of minority conflicts and the potential to design possible political solutions & a framework for sustainable peace. The 7th AER Workshop focussed on Early Warning Systems in Minority Conflicts.

A Framework for Developing Regional Responses

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CONTENTSForeword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Executive Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91. Definition of Basic Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

1.1 DefinitionofConcepts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91.2 MinorityConflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.3 ConflictPrevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101.4 EarlyWarningSystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

2. International Legal Framework for Minority Conflict Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112.1 HistoricalOverview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112.2 UnitedNationsSystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112.3 DevelopmentoftheConceptofResponsibilitytoProtect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

3. Minority Conflict Prevention in Europe and Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143.1 BenefitsofRegionalFrameworks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143.2 Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143.3. Asia.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3.3.1 SoutheastAsiaandASEAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173.3.2 SouthAsiaandSAARC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3.4 OtherRegionalInstitutionsandMechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214. Minority Conflict Prevention in the Context of Early Warning Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

4.1 EarlyWarningSystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234.2 GapbetweenEarlyKnowledgeandWarning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

4.2.1 PoliticalCostsofRecognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244.2.2 NarrowDefinitionsof‘Threat’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254.2.3 IndicatorsofConflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254.2.4 LackofaSystematicApproach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

4.3 GapbetweenEarlyWarningandEarlyResponse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274.3.1 ComplexityofEWSinMinorityConflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274.3.2 StructuralChallenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284.3.3 ‘Spoilers’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284.3.4 Representation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284.3.5 EarlyWarningFatigue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

5. Creating Regional Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285.1 CreatingTrustandCooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285.2 MultiStakeholdersandMulti-levelApproach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295.3 CapacityandScenarioBuildingforEarlyWarning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305.4 ApplyingExistentEarlyWarningMechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315.5 CollaborationandCoordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 325.6 EntryPointsforNetworkedRegionalEarlyWarningStructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

6. Next Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Annexe1–Bibliography. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Annexe2–ListofWorkshopParticipants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37Annexe3–ConflictIndicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38Annexe4-AbouttheOrganisers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40


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FOREWORD

The7thAsia-EuropeRoundtableworkshop“EarlyWarningSystemsinMinorityConflicts”washeldon20–21May2010attheAsia-EuropeFoundationinSingapore.ItwasapartoftheAsia-EuropeRoundtableseriesonconflictmanagement,bringing togetherparticipants from theAsia-EuropeMeeting(ASEM)membercountries1.

TheAsia-EuropeRoundtable(AER)whichisajointinitiativebytheAsia-EuropeFoundation(ASEF),theFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung(FES)OfficeforRegionalCooperationinAsiaandtheSingaporeInstituteofInternationalAffairs(SIIA),isaforathatexaminesAsia-Europeexperiencesandcooperationintacklingcommonchallengessuchasregion-buildingandconflictmanagement.

The inaugural AER was launched in Singapore in 2000, to present a broad overview of thetransitionsinthetworegions.The2ndAERwasheldinOxford,UK,in2001,andfocusedontheissueofglobalandregionalgovernanceandtransnationalproblem-solving.In2003,theroundtableshiftedtowardsamorespecificfocusonconflictmanagement.The3rdAERinHanoi(2003)andthe4thAERinBerlin(2005)deepenedbi-regionaldialogueandpromotednetworkingintheareasof conflict preventionaswell aspeaceand reconciliation. The5thAER focusedon “SustainingPeacethroughPost-ConflictReconstruction”.The6thAER,heldinLetterkennyandDerry(2009)examinedminorityconflictswithaparticularfocuson“frozenconflicts”andrecommendedasetofpolicydirectivesonminorityconflictmanagement—chiefamongthemwasthecallforAsiaandEuropetocooperateonanearlywarningsystemtomonitortheoutbreakofminorityconflict.

Followinguponthisrecommendation,the 7thAERwasfocusedtowardsdevelopingaframeworkfor preventingminority conflict at the regional level. This publicationEarly Warning Systems in Minority Conflict: A Framework for Developing Regional Responseswhichwaspreparedinitiallyasabackgroundpaperfortheworkshop,isadirectoutcomeofthe7thAERworkshop.

Thispublicationpresentsanoverviewoftheexistinginternationalandregionalresponsestowardsminorityconflictprevention.Itprovidesananalysisofearlywarningmechanismsforminorityconflictsaswellastheroleofregionalactorsintheearlywarningandpreventionofminorityconflict.Finally,it offers proposals by which regional structures can be strengthened and on how coordinationbetweeninstitutionalandnon-institutionalactorscanbeimproved,bothintra-andinter-regionally.

1 ASEM(theAsia-EuropeMeeting)isaninformalprocessofdialogueandcooperation.ItbringstogetherAustralia,Austria,Belgium,Brunei, Bulgaria, Cambodia, China, Cyprus, CzechRepublic,Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,India,Indonesia,Ireland,Italy,Japan,Laos,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malaysia,Malta,Mongolia,Myanmar,TheNetherlands,NewZealand,Pakistan,ThePhilippines,Poland,Portugal,Romania,Russia,Singapore,Slovakia,Slovenia,SouthKorea,Spain,Sweden,Thailand,UnitedKingdom,Vietnam,theASEANSecretariatandtheEuropeanCommission.


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TheorganiserswouldliketothankMs.RatnaMathai-Luke(ProjectOfficer,Asia-EuropeFoundation),Dr.NoelMorada(ExecutiveDirector,Asia-PacificCentrefortheResponsibilitytoProtect)andDr.VesselinPopovski(SeniorAcademicOfficer,UnitedNationsUniversity)fortheircontributionintothepreparationsofthispublication.

Wewouldalsoliketothanktheparticipantsofthe7thAERworkshop,whocontributedinvaluablywiththeirsuggestionsandfeedbackontheworkshopreport,ultimatelyenrichingthisframework.

This event was made possible by the close cooperation between the Asia-Europe Foundation,theFriedrich-Ebert-StiftungOfficeforRegionalCooperationinAsiaandtheSingaporeInstituteofInternationalAffairs.

Theco-organisersalsoacknowledgeandappreciatethecooperationofthevariousFESofficesinAsiaandEurope.

Ms. Sol IglesiasDirector for Intellectual ExchangeAsia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)

Dr. Stefanie EliesDirectorFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES)Offi ce for Regional Cooperation in Asia

Dr. Yeo Lay HweeDirectorEuropean Union Centre, Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA)


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ACRONYMS

AER Asia-EuropeRoundtable

AICHR ASEANIntergovernmentalCommissiononHumanRights

AMM AcehMonitoringMission

APSC ASEANPolitical-SecurityCommunity

ARF ASEANRegionalForum

ARMM AutonomousRegionofMuslimMindanao

ASEAN AssociationofSoutheastAsianNations

ASEF Asia-EuropeFoundation

CoE CouncilofEurope

CSCE ConferenceonSecurityandCo-operationinEurope

CSO CivilSocietyOrganisation

DPA DepartmentofPoliticalAffairs

DPKO UNDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations

EAS EastAsiaSummit

ECOWARN ECOWASWarningandResponseNetwork

ECOWAS EconomicCommunityOfWestAfricanStates

EEP EminentExpertPersons

ESCAP EconomicandSocialCommissionforAsiaandthePacific

ESDP EuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy

EU EuropeanUnion

EWER EarlyWarningandEarlyResponse

EWS EarlyWarningSystem

FCNM FrameworkConventionfortheProtectionofNationalMinorities

FES Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

GPPAC GlobalPartnershipforthePreventionofArmedConflict

HCNM HighCommissioneronNationalMinorities

HRC HumanRightsCouncil

ICAPP InternationalConferenceofAsianPoliticalParties

ICES InternationalCentreforEthnicStudies

ICG InternationalCrisisGroup

ICRC InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross

IDRC InternationalDevelopmentResearchCentre


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IMT InternationalMonitoringTeam

MILF MoroIslamicLiberationFront

MNLF MoroNationalLiberationFront

NGO Non-governmentalOrganisation

NTSAsia Non-TraditionalStudiesinAsia

OCHA OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs

OHCHR OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights

OIC OrganizationoftheIslamicConference

OSCE OrganizationforSecurityandCo-operationinEurope

PRIO PeaceResearchInstituteOslo

RAMSI RegionalAssistanceMissiontotheSolomonIslands

R2P ResponsibilitytoProtect

SAARC SouthAsianAssociationforRegionalCooperation

SAPA SolidarityforAsianPeople’sAdvocacy

SAPG SpecialAdvisortotheSecretary-GeneralonthePreventionofGenocide

SEAPA SoutheastAsianPressAlliance

SIIA SingaporeInstituteofInternationalAffairs

TPF TitianPerdamaianFramework

UDHR UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights

UNDP UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme

WANEP WestAfricaNetworkofPeacebuilding


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Ethnicityandminorityidentityplayimportantrolesinconflict—bothincausationandperception.AcrossAsiaandEurope,minority issues remainat theheartofmost intrastateconflictsand inspiteofthelargestridesmadeindevelopingEarlyWarningSystems(EWS)forarmedconflict,manybelievethattheexistingframeworksandmechanismslacktheprovisionstospecificallypreventtheoutbreakofethno-politicalconflicts.

On20–21May2010,expertsfromthefieldofearlywarningsystemsandminorityconflictissues,metattheAsia-EuropeFoundationforaworkshopwhichwasheldundertheauspicesoftheAsia-EuropeRoundtable(AER)series.FollowingupuponrecommendationsfrompreviousAERmeetingstomonitorwarningsignalsforminorityconflicts,thisworkshopwasonthetopicof‘EarlyWarningSystemsinMinorityConflicts’.

Drawnfromthebackgroundpaperandthediscussions fromtheAERworkshop, this frameworkdocumentstudiesthemannerbywhichminorityconflictsarepreventedandcontainedthroughearlywarningsystems;byanalysingthegapswithinthecurrentmechanisms,itpresentsaframeworkbywhichregionalearlywarningstructuresandresponsescanbebetterintegratedandenhanced.

This paper alsomaps thedefinitionsand international legal frameworks forminority protectionandconflictprevention.Itillustratestheworkofregionalactorsinpreventingminorityconflictandthedifferentpreventiveefforts thathavebeenorganisedat the regional level.Thisenables thecontextualisationoftheimportanceandrequirementforaframeworktodevelopregionalresponses.

ThelegalframeworkfortheprotectionofminorityrightscanbefoundinseveralinternationalhumanrightstreatiessuchastheUniversalDeclarationofHumanRights;theInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights;theInternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights;andtheUNDeclarationonRightsofPersonsBelongingtoNationalorEthnic,ReligiousandLinguisticMinorities.

The legal framework for conflict prevention can be found in the Charter of the United Nations(UN)whichreststheresponsibilityofconflictpreventionwithnationalgovernments,withtheUNand internationalcommunity (includingcivilsociety)playinganactive,supportiverole inconflictprevention.

Increasingly, the linksbetweenminority rightsandconflictpreventionhavebeenacknowledgedand voiced in key reports of the UN Secretary-General, and seminal statements such as the2001‘ResponsibilitytoProtect’(reportoftheInternationalCommissiononInterventionandStateSovereignty).Theideaof‘ResponsibilitytoProtect’whichisgainingcurrencyininternationalcircles,linksstatesovereigntywiththeresponsibilitytoprotectpeopleatriskofatrocities.Intheeventofstatefailure,theconceptestablishestheresponsibilityoftheinternationalcommunitytopreventaswellastorespondtomassatrocities.

Regional frameworks however, are important in their ability to address conflict. Unlike globalstructuresand frameworks, they cancreatea cooperativeatmospherewheregovernmentscanengage incross-bordergovernanceandassisteachother in resolvingdisputes, including thoseconcerningminorities.Ifthefocusisoninteractionandnotmeremembershipinaregionalgrouping,thenasthetiesbetweenstatesandnon-stateactorsbecomedeeper,theexpectationisthatminorityconflictsdecrease.InHungary,Slovakia,Romania,aswellastheBalticstates,accessiontotheEUhasbroughtstrongerincentivesforcooperation,andgreaterpotentialforeconomicdevelopmentandinfrastructureimprovementsforminoritieslivinginborderregions.


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Similarly, the Council of Europe (CoE) has set standards for minority rights protections; thesedirectivesarelegallybindingalthoughmemberstatescanusedifferentapproachestoimplementthesestandards,aslongastheyadheretothevaluessetdown.

Incomparison to theCoE, theAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations (ASEAN)has traditionallyfollowedapolicyofquietdiplomacyandconsensus tomaintainstability in the region.Althoughfollowingapolicyofnon-interferenceintheintra-stateaffairsofmemberstates,inrecenttimestheChairofASEANhassetpolicyinitiativeswhichhighlightnon-traditionalsecurityissues—asseenwith thepromotionof theASEANSecurityCommunityandtheASEANSocio-CulturalCommunitywhichcanserveasimportantentrypointsandopportunitiesforminorityprotectiononwhichonecanbuildupanddevelopearlywarningsystem.

Forearlywarningtobesuccessfulasystematicapproachisrequired.Thepowerofthesemechanismsishowever,dependentonthecooperationanddialoguebetweencivilsocietyandofficialbodies.AnalysisshowsthatmostEWSarelooselyframedandwarningisseparatedfromearlyresponse,sothattheactorswhoaregiventheinformationaredifferentfromthosewhohavethemandatetocoordinatearesponse.Thetransformationfromanalysistopolicycanbesupportedbytheactivitiesofcivilsocietygroups,lobbyistsandotheractors.However,tobridgethesegaps,trusthastobebuiltbetweenallactorsinvolvedsothatamulti-levelresponsecanbeevolvedwherebyactivitiesarejointlycoordinated.

Indeed,formalisedinter-governmentalstructuresshouldnotbeseenastheonlypossiblesolution;other non-governmental approaches to EWS should also be studied. This is important in thecontext ofminority conflicts, especially in Asiawhere in the absence of a regional institutionalEWSframework,theworkofnon-stateactorstakesonconsiderablerelevance.TrackIIandTrackIIIactorscanbedirectlyinvolved—andthoughthereisastruggletofindexamplesofmulti-levelsolution,thereexistseveralsituationsinAsia(Indonesia)andEurope(Macedonia)wherethereislow-intensity tension thatdoesnotescalate;astrongeconomic imperative to takequickaction;wherethepresenceofstrongcharismaticleadersandthesatisfactionofbasicrightsmayactasameansofarrestingthedevelopmentofminorityconflict.

Successfulresponsestrategiesdependonsensibledivisionsof labouramongthoseactorswhoarebestplacedtofulfilveryspecificsecurityprovisiontasksandthegreaterthepoolfromwhichtoselectthebestplacedactors,thegreaterthechancesareforsuccess.Aregionalapproachwillautomaticallyincreasethatpool.Moreover,regionalapproachesmeanthatjointstrategiescanbeputintoplacetodeveloppracticalresponsestoavertcomplexthreatscenarios.

AregionalframeworkforanEWSforminorityconflictwillrequirebuildingcapacitiesatalllevels—local,national,bilateral,regionalandinternational.Whiletheirconstituenciesmaydiffer,thereisaneedfordifferentactorsateachleveltobeabletomonitorminorityconflictsituationsastheydevelop.Inaddition,thereisaneedtobuildaknowledgecommunityattheregionallevelthatwouldincludetheinvolvementofdecisionmakersandeminentpersons,think-tankacademicnetworksandjournalists’networks.


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WhilethelinkingofEWStoexistinghumanrightsandhumansecurityframeworksmaygaingreatersupportfortheideaforaregionalframework,someoftheimmediatenextstepsthathavebeenproposedinclude:

1. EncouragedirectmeetingsonEarlyWarningcomponentinAsiaandEurope,e.g.withOSCEHCNM;

2. Promote the framework to ASEAN’s Eminent Expert Persons (EEP) group and promoteexchangesbetweentheHCNMandtheEEP.Similarly,encouragelinkagesbetweenARFandOSCE;and

3. ThedialogueforaregionalframeworkcouldstartwithatrackIIapproachfirst(becauseofsensitiveissues);thiswouldallowevengovernmentofficialstoparticipatealbeitinaprivatecapacity

Ultimately,itisimportanttonotethatjointeffortsinfacingandavertingcommonthreats,crisesandinsecuritiesalsocontributetoregionalconfidence-building.Aregionthat jointlyandsuccessfullyovercomestraditionalaswellasnon-traditionalcriseswillinevitablyemergeasastrongercommunity.

RatnaMathai-LukeAsia-EuropeFoundation


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INTROduCTION

Thepasttwodecadeshaveillustratedhowimportantethnicityandminorityidentitieshavebecomeingrouppolitics—howtheyinfluenceconflict,bothincausationandperception.

In both Asia and Europe,minority issues remain at the heart ofmost intrastate and non-stateconflicts and in spite of the large stridesmade in developingEarlyWarningSystems (EWS) forarmedconflict,manybelieve that theexisting frameworksandmechanisms lack theprovisionsto specifically prevent the outbreakofminority conflicts. Indeed, oneof the keymessagesandrecommendations from the 6th Asia-Europe Roundtable (AER) on minority conflict was that“membersintheASEMframeworkshouldsetupatrackIIforumtodetectearlywarningsignalsandmonitorconflictareas”.2

Pickinguponthisrecommendation,the7thAERelaborateduponapotentialregionalframeworktoassemblepreventivetoolsandEarlyWarningSystems(EWS)toaddresssuchconflicts.Thispaperwillstudy themannerbywhichminorityconflictsarepreventedandcontainedthroughEWS;byanalysingthegapsinthecurrentmechanisms,itwillpresentaframeworkbywhichregionalearlywarningstructuresandresponsescanbebetterintegratedandenhanced.

Thispaperbeginsbymappingoutthedefinitionsandinternationallegalframeworksforminorityprotectionandconflictprevention.Italsoillustratestheworkofregionalactorsinpreventingminorityconflictand thedifferentpreventiveefforts thathavebeenorganisedat the regional level.Thisenablesustocontextualisetheimportanceandrequirementforaframeworktodevelopregionalresponses.

1. Definition of Basic Concepts3

1.1DefinitionofConcepts

Duetothelackofinternationalconsensusoragreement,thereisnouniversaldefinitionof‘minority’.IntheUnitedNationssystem,thetermreferstonational,ethnic,religiousandlinguisticgroups4. A commonlyaccepteddefinitionistheoneprovidedbyUNSpecialRapporteur,FrancescoCapotorti,according towhomaminority is “Agroupnumerically inferior to the restof thepopulationofastate,inanon-dominantposition,whosemembers—beingnationalsofthestate—possessethnic,religiousorlinguisticcharacteristicsdifferingfromthoseoftherestofthepopulationandshow,ifonlyimplicitly,asenseofsolidarity,directedtowardspreservingtheirculture,traditions,religionorlanguage”5.

Forthepurposesofthispaper,thecharacterisationprovidedbyFrancescoCapotortiisusedastheworkingdefinitionfortheconceptofminority.

2 6thAsia-EuropeRoundtableSpecialReport,MinorityConflicts–TowardsanASEMFrameworkforConflictManagement,2009,p11

3Thesedefinitionsarenotrestrictive—theirintentionistoframethecontextforthispaper.

4DeclarationontheRightsofPersonsBelongingtoNationalorEthnic,ReligiousandLinguisticMinorities,AdoptedbyGeneralAssemblyResolution47/135,18December1992.

5FrancescoCapotorti,proposeddefinitionof‘minorities’inthecontextofArticle27oftheInternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights:StudyontheRightsofPersonsBelongingtoEthnic,ReligiousandLinguisticMinorities,E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1,1979.


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1.2MinorityConflict

Whileitistruethatnotallminorityconflictsareethnicconflicts,inamajorityofminorityconflicts,ethnicity does play an important role. As Clancy andNagle observe6, depending on the natureoftheminoritygroup,conflictcanarisefromdemandsfor(greater)autonomy,seccessionor(re)unificationwiththekinstate.

When identifyinganyconflictasa ‘minorityconflict’, it is important tonote thatwhilestructuraldeprivationsanddiscriminationsareoftentherootcausesformanyconflicts,minorityorethnicidentitiesandtensionsareoftenmanipulatedbypoliticalactorstorallyandmobilisesupporterswithinthegroup7.

1.3ConflictPrevention

OneofthemostenduringdefinitionsofconflictpreventionhasbeenarticulatedbyMichaelLund,whodefinedconflictpreventionasthose‘actions,policies,proceduresorinstitutionsundertakeninparticularlyvulnerableplacesandtimesinordertoavoidthethreatoruseofarmedforceandrelatedformsofcoercionbystatesorgroups,asthewaytosettlethepoliticaldisputesthatcanarisefromthedestabilisingeffectsofeconomic,social,politicalandinternationalchange’8.

Forconflictpreventiontobeefficient9,quietdiplomacycanbeanecessaryaction—topreparethesolutionsinadvancewithoutallowingradicalvoicesfrombothsidestoprevail.Butthesesolutionsneed to be elaborated in bottom-up parallel developments too. Communitiesmay successfullyengageinsearchofconflictpreventiontoolsand,inadditiontoofficialgovernmentalefforts,civilsocietycanbeinstrumental.Theaimofconflictpreventionmustbe“tocreateasynergywiththosecivilsocietygroupsthatarebridge-builders,truth-finders,watchdogs,humanrightsdefenders,andagentsofsocialprotectionandeconomicrevitalization.”10

1.4EarlyWarningSystems

Early warning generally refers to the ‘systematic collection and analysis of information comingfromareasof crises for thepurposeof: a) anticipating theescalationof violent conflict; b) thedevelopmentofstrategicresponsestothesecrises;andc)thepresentationofoptionstocriticalactorsforthepurposesofdecision-making’11.

Earlywarningisanimportantcomponentofconflictpreventionwithitsfocusonbothpreparednessandprediction.AsBlénesinotes,‘Oneofthecrucialtasksinearlywarningisascertainingwhere andwhen themost harmful conflicts are likely to occur so that themost appropriate levels ofresponsemaybecommittedtothem’12.

6MaryAliceC.ClancyandJohnNagle,MinorityConflicts–TowardsanASEMFrameworkforConflictManagement,Paperpresentedtothe6thAsia-EuropeRoundtable,10-12June2009

7BruceGilley,AgainsttheConceptofEthnicConflict,ThirdWorldQuarterly,Vol.25,No.6,pp.1155–1166,20048M.Lund,PreventingandMitigatingViolentConflicts:ARevisedGuideforPractitioners,1997asquotedinA.Schmid,ThesaurusandGlossaryofEarlyWarningandConflictPreventionTerms(abridgedversion),PIOOM,SynthesisFoundation,1998,p12

9A detailed discussion on conflict prevention can be found in the special report of the 4th Asia-Europe Roundtableon ‘ConflictPrevention:Actors, InstitutionsandMechanisms.SharingExperiencesbetweenAsiaandEurope’,2005,availableatwww.asef.org

10UNSecretaryGeneralKofiAnnan’sopeningremarksattheSecurityCouncildebate,”Theroleofcivilsocietyinpost-conflictpeacebuilding”,NewYork,22June2004

11FEWERMissionStatement,ForumonEarlyWarningandEarlyResponse,1997asquotedinA.Schmid,ThesaurusandGlossaryofEarlyWarningandConflictPreventionTerms(abridgedversion),PIOOM,SynthesisFoundation,1998,p13

12ÉvaBlénesi,EthnicEarlyWarningSystemsandConflictPrevention,GlobalSecurityFellowsInitiative,OccasionalPaperNo.11,UniversityofCambridge,1998


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2. International Legal Framework for Minority Conflict Prevention

2.1.HistoricaloverviewRightsofpeoplebelongingtominoritieshavebeenamatterofconcernfor longtime—withanincreasedfocustowardstheprotectionoftheirrightsinthe20thcentury.AftertheFirstWorldWar,thenewlyindependentstateshadtoacknowledgetheminorityclausesofthepeacetreatiesandmakethempartoftheirdomesticlaws.Thesetreatiescontainedareconciliatoryprocedurebetweenminorities and affected states. This systemwas an important step in the evolution ofminorityprotection—itallowedthesubjectofviolations(collectively,ifnotyetasindividuals)tobebroughttoan international forum.For thefirst timethe internationalcommunity recognisedthatpeopleliving outsideusual domestic jurisdictionmayneedadditional guaranteesof their fundamentalrightsfromanexternalbody,iftheprotectionwithinindividualstatesfails.WiththedeclineoftheLeague inthe1930stheminoritytreatiesincreasinglybecameunenforceableandtheUNSecurityCounciloftenfailedtoactuponcomplaintsfromminorities.Statepoliciesforculturalassimilationwereignoredandevenseenascontributingtointernalstability.ThecrisisofthesystemdeepenedwhentheissueofGermanminoritiesinPolandandCzechoslovakiawasabusedasapretextforaggression.13

2.2.UnitedNationsSystemAfter1945theinternationalprotectionofhumanrights,includingtherightsofminorities,becameuniversalandenshrinedasoneofthepurposesoftheUnitedNations,asdefinedintheCharteroftheUnitedNations(Art.1/3).ThedraftersoftheCharterintentionallydiscardedspecialprovisionsonminoritiesinfavourofageneralhumanrightsregimebasedontheprinciplesofequalityandnon-discrimination.Minorityissueswereleftforstatestodealwithinternally,bilaterallyorregionally.

Some of the relevant International human rights laws and conventions that include implicit orexplicitrelevancetominoritiesare:

1948:UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights(UDHR)

1965:InternationalConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofRacialDiscrimination

1966:InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights(Article27ofwhichconcernstherightsofpersonsbelongingtoethnic,religiousorlinguisticminorities)

1966:InternationalCovenantonEconomic,SocialandCulturalRights

1981:DeclarationontheEliminationofAllFormsofIntoleranceandofDiscriminationBasedonReligionorBelief

1992:UNDeclarationonRightsofPersonsBelongingtoNationalorEthnic,ReligiousandLinguisticMinorities

2007:UNDeclarationontheRightsofIndigenousPeoples

13In principle, the League’sminority treaties are not ‘dead’—when the International Court of Justice analysed thestatusofPalestine(para69,70,129,AdvisoryOpiniononLegalConsequencesofConstructionofaWallinOccupiedPalestinianTerritory)inadditiontothegeneralguaranteesoffreedomofmovement,itstressedspecificguaranteesofaccesstoHolyPlaces,quotingthatminorityandreligiousrightshadbeenplacedunderinternationalguaranteebyArt.62ofthe1878TreatyofBerlin,andpreservedinaccordancewiththesafeguardingprovisionsofArt.13oftheLeagueofNationsMandate.


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AnothermechanismistheSub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (before1999knownas theSub-CommissiononPreventionofDiscriminationandProtectionofMinorities)—asubsidiarybodyoftheUNCommissiononHumanRights,whichwasreplacedbytheHumanRightsCouncil(HRC)in2006.TheSub-Commissionwasfirstformedin1947withthemandate to undertake studies andmake recommendations to theCommission concerning thepreventionofdiscriminationofanykindrelatingtohumanrightsandfundamentalfreedomsandtheprotectionofracial,national,religiousandlinguisticminorities.In2006theHRCresolvedtoextendtheSub-Commission’smandateonanexceptionalone-yearbasis.TheSub-CommissionmetforthefinaltimeinAugust2006;amongtherecommendationsadoptedwasoneforthecreationofaHumanRightsConsultativeCommitteeasastandingbodytoassisttheHRC.

A Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide(SAPG)wasappointedin July2004.ThePeacebuildingCommission, recommendedby theHigh-LevelPanel,hasbeenoperatingsince2005.TheSecretary-Generalisexpandinghis‘goodoffices’forconflictmediation,andtheDepartmentofPoliticalAffairs(DPA)hasestablishedaMediationSupportUnit.

In the Charter of the United Nations, the international legal framework for conflict preventionrestsuponChapterVI.Article33(1)callsuponstates,inthefirstinstance,toseeksettlementofdisputesbypeacefulmeans.Article36(1)allowstheSecurityCouncilto“recommendappropriateproceduresormethodsofadjustment”.Article36(3)holdsthat“legaldisputesshouldasageneralrulebereferredbythepartiestotheInternationalCourtofJusticeinaccordancewiththeprovisionsof theStatuteof theCourt”. TheSecurity Council Resolution 1366 on the roleof theCouncilinpreventionofarmedconflictsstresses that theessential responsibility for conflictpreventionrestswithnationalGovernments, and that theUnitedNationsand the international communitycanplayanimportantroleinsupportofnationaleffortsforconflictpreventionandcanassistinbuildingnationalcapacityinthisfield;furthermore,itrecognisestheimportantsupportingroleofcivilsociety14.

ApartfromtheUN,theWorldBank,theEuropeanCommission,andotherbilateralaidagenciesalsomonitorminoritysituationsincountriesinturmoilandassessrisksofviolencebreakingout.TheWorldBankandUNDPforexample,haveinitiatedajoint“watchingbrief”projecttomonitorsocialandeconomicconditionsinspecificcountries.TheUNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs (OCHA)hasadedicated ‘EarlyWarningUnit’ thatcombinesfieldmissionsandanalyticalworktotracktrendsthatmightleadtohumanitariancrisesorfailures.Italsodisseminatesregularupgradeandone-page reportshighlightingparticularsituations toothersentitieswithin theUNsystem.TheUNDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations(DPKO)alsodevelopedrecentlystrategiestoassesspotentialconflictescalationandpreventiveearlywarning.Moreactivelythanbefore,itsmissionsnowengageintheprotectionofciviliansinarmedconflicts.

Inadditiontothesystem-widechangesandeffortsbytheUN,otherinternationalentitiessuchasgovernments,multilateralorganisationsandNGOsarealsoinvolvedinconflictpreventionefforts—Sweden,NorwayandCanadahaveledmanyoftheinternationaldebatesandinitiativesrelatingtothepromotionofconflictprevention,andtheneedtopromotehumansecurityasakeytopreventingwar.15

14UnitedNationsSecurityCouncilResolution1366(2001),S/RES/1366(2001)

15JohnDegnbol-MartinussenandPoulEngerg-Pedersen,“Aid:UnderstandingInternationalDevelopmentCooperation”,London:ZedBooks,2003.


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2.3DevelopmentoftheConceptofResponsibilitytoProtect

MorerecentlytheconceptofResponsibilitytoProtect(R2P)hasbeenendorsedinthe2005WorldSummitOutcomeDocument(para138–140).R2Pplacestheprimaryresponsibilityforprotectionofcitizensonthestatesdirectly—linkingstatesovereigntywithresponsibilitytoprotectpeopleatriskofatrocities.Ifstatesfailtoprotecttheircitizens,theresponsibilitytoprotectthenfallsuponthe international community to intervene.R2P is significant not only for reconciling sovereigntywithhumansecurity,butalsoforholdingtheinternationalcommunityaccountableforstatefailure.Itestablishestheresponsibilityof the internationalcommunity topreventaswellas to respondtomassatrocities16. The2009UNSecretary-GeneralReport“ImplementingtheResponsibilitytoProtect”(2009R2PReport) placesagreateremphasisonpreventionratherthanintervention,andexhortstheinternationalcommunitytoprovideassistancetostatesinbuildingcapacitytoexercisethisresponsibility,includingestablishinganearlywarningcapability17.

Internationally there is growing support for R2P and in this regard regional organisations haveacquiredsignificantrelevanceinconflictprevention—especiallyinEuropeandAfrica.InAsia,therecontinuestobeastrongrespectforstatesovereigntyandapolicyofnon-interventionwithregardtoearlywarning.However,thisattitudeisnowbeginningtoshift,ascanbeevidencedintheremarksoftheSingaporeanPermanentRepresentativetotheUNwho,inhis2005pre-summitstatement,said“…itishightimethatmassivekillingsandcrimesagainsthumanitybethingsofthepast.Yet,thesethingscontinuetohappen,andtheycontinuetobeprotectedbywallsofanantiquatednotionofabsolutesovereignty.”18

Thereareplanstoimplementinstages,aconflictpreventioncomponenttotheASEANRegionalForum(ARF).ProponentsoftheR2Pframeworkplacegreateremphasisonpreventivemeasuresoverinterventionistmeasuresasawayofpushingforwardaregionalconflictpreventionframework.Civilsocietyhasanimportantroletoplayinpushingforstrongerregionalframeworksforconflictpreventionwheninter-governmentalandregionalorganisationsappearreluctanttoinitiateminorityconflict preventionmeasures. For example, the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy’s (SAPA)submission to theEminentPersonsGroupon theASEANCharter included the followingclause:“TheASEANChartershoulddefineclearlythattheresponsibilitiesofthestatetoprotect,promoteandfulfilitsobligationsinrespectingtherightsofitscitizenssupersedetheobligationsitimposesonitscitizens.”19

16NicoleDellerandSapnaChhatpar,“GuidelinesfortheInternationalCommunitytoPreventandReacttoGenocideandMassAtrocities”,presentedattheWorldFederalistMovement-InstituteforGlobalPolicy,November2006.

17Thereareconcernsthatthe2009R2PReportisconservativeandfocusesongeneralarmedconflictmediationandpreventionoverthepreventionofatrocities.Armedconflictsmayleadtoatrocities,butatrocitiesmayhappenoutsidearmedconflicttoo—theCambodiagenocideisagoodexample.Formoredetaileddiscussions,pleaserefertoKnightandPopovski,“PuttingPeopleAheadofProtocol”,theEdmontonJournal,4June2008.

18VanuGopalaMenon,PermanentRepresentativeofSingaporeto theUnitedNations”,87thPlenaryMeetingontheReportoftheSec-Gen“InLargerFreedom:TowardDevelopment,SecurityandHumanRightsforAll,”7April2005.

19SolidarityforAsianPeople’sAdvocacy(SAPA),“SubmissiontotheEminentPersonsGroupontheASEANCharter,”Ubud,Bali,17April2006.


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3. Minority Conflict Prevention in Europe and Asia

3.1BenefitsofRegionalFrameworks

Theregionalframeworksforminorityprotectionemergedasaresponsetotherisksofunilateralapproachesbykin-statesandalsothedeficienciesoftheglobalUNSystem.

Ifkin-states takeunilateralaction toprotectminoritiesabroad,serious tensionscanbecreatedorexacerbatedwith thehoststate.Forexample, the“ActonHungariansLiving inNeighbouringCountries”(knownasthe“StatusLaw”)adoptedbyHungaryunilaterallygrantedspecialrightsforthesignificantethnicHungarianminoritypopulationsinneighbouringRomania,Serbia,Slovakia,SloveniaandUkrainetoworkwithinHungary,referringtothemaspartofthe“unifiedHungariannation”.Toreceivethesespecialrights,individualssimplyhadtovoluntarilydeclarethemselvesasbeingofHungariannationality.TheStatusLawwasstronglycriticisedbysomeneighbouringstatesasinterferenceintheirdomesticaffairsandaviolationoftheirsovereignty.Withtensionsrising,regionalorganisations includingtheCouncilofEurope(CoE), theOSCE’sHighCommissioneronNationalMinorities(HCNM)andtheEuropeanUnion(EU),pressuredthestatesinvolvedtoenterintobilateralnegotiationswhicheventuallydefusedthesituation. Thiscaseillustratesthedilemmaofkin-stateinvolvementinminorityprotectionabroad:althoughkin-statescanprovidemuch-neededassistanceandfillcapacitygapsinpreventingandresolvingminority tensions, their interference in the domestic affairs of other states can also present adestabilisingthreattoregionalsecurity.Stillkin-statesareanimportantfactor,butthebestwayfor themtoensureprotectionofminorities isnot toactunilaterallybutmultilaterally— throughthe regional frameworks. If bilateral approaches might be problematic, because of historicallyinheritedtensions,kinstatescanutilisemechanismsofexistingregionalorganisationstoassisttheprotectionofminorities.

Regional frameworks forminority protectionhaveemergedpartly as a response to the risks ofunilateralapproachesbykin-statesandalsopartlythedeficienciesoftheglobalUNsystem.Whiletheeffectsofminorityconflictsarelocatedfirstatthelocallevel,theirimpactwillalsobedeeplyfeltat the regional level.Neighboringstatessharecommonconcerns,suchas regionalpoliticalandsocio-economicstability;regionalframeworksaidinthelocalimplementationofearlywarningsystemsintoastate’sdomesticpoliticalandsocialstructures.Forexample,theASEANDeclarationAgainstTraffickinginPersonsParticularlyWomenandChildrenwasquicklypickedupbymemberstatesintheirowneffortstocurbhumantrafficking.LessonscanalsobelearntfromtheEuropeanexperience where standards-setting for minority rights was a major part of the human rightsapproachbehindthecreationoftheCouncilofEurope.AlthoughdirectivesfromtheCoEarelegallybinding,memberstatescanusedifferentapproachestoimplementthesestandards,aslongastheyadheretothevaluessetdown.

3.2Europe

In1950theEuropean Convention on Human Rights wasadoptedwithallCoEmembersbeingpartytotheConvention. Individualsbelongingtominoritygroups,asallothercitizens,enjoythefullamountof rightsand fundamental freedoms, listed in theConvention, including theright toindividualpetitionagainstastateforviolationsoftheConvention.


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In1994theFramework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities(FCNM)wasadoptedby22memberstatesoftheCoE20.Itcameintoforcein1998andremainsoneofthefirsttreatiestocomprehensivelyaddresstheprotectionofminorityrights.TheFrameworkConvention’sbroadaimsaretoensurethatthesignatorystatesrespecttherightsofnationalminoritiesandundertaketocombatdiscrimination,promoteequality,preserveanddevelopthecultureandidentityofnationalminorities,guaranteecertainfreedomsinrelationtoaccesstothemedia,minoritylanguagesandeducationandencourage theparticipation inpublic life21. Asof2010,40memberstateshavesignedandratifiedtheConvention.

TheFCNMhasfacedcertaincriticisms.Firstofall,notallmemberstatesoftheCoEhavesignedandratifiedtheConvention22.Secondly,althoughlegallybindingonparties,thereisnoprovisionforenforcement–theConventioncannotbereviewedineitherdomesticorinternationalcourtssuchastheEuropeanCourtforHumanRights;itsprovisionsaremonitoredbytheCommitteeofMinistersoftheCouncilofEuropethroughanAdvisoryCommittee.Furthermore,theprovisions,whicharedirectedtowardsStatestoimproveminorityprotection,areflexible,creatingthepossibilityforstatestointerprettheFCNMinamannermostfavourableforthem23.

However,itisbecausetheprovisionsaredirectedtowardsstateaction,asenseofaccountabilityiscreated–Statesare legallyobliged to takeconcretesteps to implement theprinciplesof theConvention. In fact, Articles 24 to 32 are focused on the monitoring of the Convention. ThismonitoringprocessallowsNGOsandcivilsocietygroupstoprovideinputsintothemonitoringandimplementationoftheFCNMinmembercountries24.

Apartfromlegalmechanisms,therehavealsobeenpoliticalagreementsandmechanisms,whichalthoughnotlegallybinding,areimportantforsettingstandards:

1973:ConferenceonSecurityandCo-operationinEurope(CSCE)and1975HelsinkiFinalAct

1990:CopenhagenDocumentontheHumanDimensionoftheCSCE

1990:CharterofParisforaNewEurope

In1995CSCEwasrenamedOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

In1992withtherecognitionthatethnicconflictisoneofthemainsourcesoflarge-scaleviolenceandwith themain task topreventsuchviolence, thepostof theOSCEHigh Commissioner on National Minorities(HCNM)wasestablished.Itsmandate,accordingly,istoidentifyandseekearlyresolution of ethnic tensions thatmight endanger peace, stability or friendly relations betweenOSCEparticipatingStates.

20TheCouncil firstdiscussedspecificprotection fornationalminorities in1949,but itwasnotuntil1990when theCouncilmadeafirmcommitmenttoprotectminoritygroupsandlistedprinciplesinRecommendation1134.

21Thefulltextcanbeaccessedatwww.coe.int

22Andorra,France,MonacoandTurkeyarenotsignatories to theConvention.Belgium,GreeceandLuxembourgandIcelandhavesignedbutareyettoratify.

23AnindepthreviewofthelegalobligationsoftheFCNMcanbefoundinMarcWeller(ed).TheRightsofMinoritiesinEurope.AcommentaryontheFrameworkConventionfortheProtectionofNationalMinorities,OxfordUniversityPress,2005

24MagdalenaSyposz, FrameworkConvention for theProtection ofNationalMinorities–Opportunities forNGOs andMinorities,MinorityRightsGroupInternational,2006


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Morespecifically,theHCNMisdescribedas“aninstrumentofconflictpreventionattheearliestpossible stage” and is to provide “‘early warning’ and, when appropriate, ‘early action’ at theearliestpossiblestageinregardtotensionsinvolvingnationalminorityissueswhichhavenotyetdevelopedbeyondanearlywarningstage,but, inthe judgmentoftheHighCommissioner,havethepotentialtodevelopintoaconflictwithintheOSCEarea,affectingpeace,stabilityorrelationsbetweenparticipatingStates,requiringtheattentionofandactionbytheCouncilortheCSO”25.

TheHCNMdoesnotinvestigateindividualcasesnorisitanombudsman’soffice.Theofficefocusesontheprotectionofminorityrights,butitdoessointheinterestoftheOSCEmemberstates–theHCNMcontributestowardssocialcohesionwithinstatesandminorityprotectionwithintheOSCEarea26.

Since the1990s, theHCNMhasbeenparticularlyactive in the formerSovietUnion—buildingconfidenceandtrustbetweenthegovernmentsinthenewlyindependentstatesoftheex-SovietUnionand theirRussianminorities. InHungary,Slovakia,Romania,aswellas theBalticstates,accession to the EU has brought stronger incentives for cooperation, and greater potential foreconomicdevelopmentandinfrastructureimprovementsforminoritieslivinginborderregions.

TheofficeoftheHCNMisassuredoftwoimportantfeatures27:• AhighdegreeofindependenceisgrantedtotheHighCommissioner;althoughtheHCNMreports

tothePermanentCouncil,he/shedoesnotrequiretheapprovaloftheCouncilbutisallowedtotakeinitiativetogetinvolvedasanimpartialactorinanyparticularsituation.Withregardtoearlywarning,theHCNMactsasa‘tripwire’towarntheOSCEofconflictescalationbeyonditscontrol–in1999,theHCNMraisedanalarmoverthepotentialfalloutoftheinfluxofKosovoAlbanianrefugeesintoMacedoniaoninter-ethnicrelations.

• TheHCNMworksthroughapolicyofquietdiplomacyandconfidentiality.ThisallowstheHighCommissionertoworkdiscreetlyanddirectlywiththeconflictinggroups;moreimportantly,byworkinginconfidence,theofficeisabletoensureitsneutrality.

While early warning is an important activity of the immediate conflict prevention activities thattheHCNMundertakes, it also undertakes long term prevention activities; it conducts activitiesin language training, media broadcasting inminority languages, cultural sensitivity training forcivilservants,policepersonnelandjournalists.TheHCNMapproachisbasedbothonpromotingintegrationandencouragingrespectfordiversityandofteninvitesexpertstohelpdevelopguidelinesandrecommendations28.

25HelsinkiDecisions,paragraphII.3

26CouncilofEurope,InstitutionsforthemanagementofethnopoliticalconflictincentralandeasternEurope,CouncilofEuropePublishing,2008

27DetailedinformationabouttheHCNM’smandatecanbefoundontheOCSEwebsitewhichcanbeaccessedathttp://www.osce.org/hcnm/43201

28MoreinformationabouttheHCNM’sactivitiescanbefoundatwww.osce.org/hcnm


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3.3Asia

3.3.1SoutheastAsiaandASEAN

TheAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN)wasformedin1967.IncomparisontotheCouncil of Europe, ASEAN is based on informal cooperationwithout binding legal obligations29. Althoughlimitedtomanaginginter-statetensionsoverterritorialclaims,ithasaconflictpreventionrole—forexample, intheearly1990srecognisingthattheterritorialand jurisdictionaldisputesin the South China Seamay directly affect peace and stability in the region, ASEAN issued its1992ManilaDeclaration,whichpromotedapolicyofcooperationandcollaborationtomitigatetheconflict.ASEANalsoplayedasignificantroleinthesettlementoftheCambodianconflictthroughtheParisAgreement,sponsoredtrack-twodiplomacyeffortsontheSpratlyIslandsdisputein1991.ASEANcontinuestohostdialoguesregardingnuclearnon-proliferationinNortheastAsiaandSouthAsia.30

In 1994 ASEAN established theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to foster constructive dialogueandconsultationonpoliticalandsecurityissuesofcommoninterestandconcern,andtopromoteconfidencebuildingandpreventivediplomacyintheAsia-Pacificregion.Toachievethisobjective,the ARF has adopted an evolutionary three-stage process: stage one focuses on promotion ofconfidence building measures; stage two promotes the development of preventive diplomacymechanisms;andstagethreeelaboratesonconflictresolutionmechanisms31.TheARFframeworkisbasedontheASEAN’snormsandpractices,wheredecision-makingisbasedonconsensusandthattheARFshouldmoveatapacethatisneither“…toofastforthosewhowanttogoslowandnottooslowforthosewhowanttogofast”.32

Political Settlement of Conflict InthePhilippines,thepeacenegotiationswiththeMNLF(MoroNationalLiberationFront)andlatertheMILF(MoroIslamicLiberationFront)openedavenuesforgovernmentandtherebelgroupstodiscusslegitimategrievancesofMuslimpeople.ThecreationoftheAutonomousRegionofMuslimMindanao(ARMM)followingthepeaceagreementsignedbetweenthegovernmentandtheMNLFin the late1990sdemonstrates thatassimilationand integrationwereno longer theoverridingobjective—thegovernmentpoured ina lotofresourcesanddevelopmentassistance, includingmultilateralaid, toARMM. With theexceptionof theadministrationof formerpresidentJosephEstrada(1998–2001)whichpursuedatotalwarpolicyagainsttheMILFandsplintergroups,thegovernmentofthePhilippineshaspursuedanegotiatedpoliticalapproachinendingtheMuslimrebellioninMindanao,withtheparticipationofvariousnon-stateactorsdowntothelocallevels.

The negotiated political settlement however is not without ‘spoilers’ — there are still militaryoperationsorencountersbetweengovernmenttroopsandMILFrebels,breakdownsinceasefireagreementsandlackofcoordinationwithinMILFrebelfactionsindealingwithgovernmentforces.Therearecertainterroristgroups(e.g.,AbuSayyafandsplintergroups)operatinginMILF-controlledterritories.ItmustalsobenotedthatwithintheMILF,thecentralleadershipdoesnotfullycontrol

29RodolfoC.Severino,SoutheastAsiainSearchofanASEANReader.Singapore:ISEAS,2006.

30FormoreinformationseeAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations,www.aseansec.org

31Fordetailedinformationonthethree-stageprocess,pleasereferto“TheASEANRegionalForum:AConceptPaper”,1995.

32TheASEANRegionalForum:AConceptPaper,ibid.


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thedifferent factions in the group. The creationof an InternationalMonitoring Team (IMT)wassupported by the government of the Philippines in order to ensure that both sides honour theceasefireagreement. This isanother indication that the state isnotpurelyadoptingamilitaryapproachindealingwiththerebelgroups.ApartfromtheIMT,therearealsoNGOstobecreditedforcreatingpeacezoneswherebothgovernmentandrebelforcesareexpectedtohonourandavoidhavingmilitaryencountersinordertoprotectciviliansinthearea.

The Involvement of Regional Actors

Regionalactorshavealsoplayedanimportantroleinthefacilitationof‘GoodOffices’inMindanao.

The involvementof theOrganizationof the IslamicConference (OIC)beganat theheightof theconflictbetweentheMNLFandthePhilippinegovernment,afterconcernwasraisedbyMalaysiaon the impact of the conflict on theMuslim communities in Mindanao. Three OIC fact-findingmissionsweredispatchedbetween1972and1974,whoseparticipantsincludednolessthantheforeignministersofLibya,Senegal,SomaliaandSaudiArabia.Eventually,theOICplayedtheroleofamediatorbetweenthePhilippinegovernmentandtheMNLF,culminatinginthesigningoftheTripoliAgreementof1976,whichoutlinedthegeneralprovisionsforautonomyinthreeprovincesinsouthernPhilippines.

LibyaactedasheadofOIC(1972–1993)intheQuadripartiteMinisterialCommitteeandasmainsponsoroftheTripoliAgreement,whichbecamethemainreferenceforfurthernegotiationsbetweenthetwoparties.LibyawasalsothemainsupporteroftheMNLFwithinOIC33.WhileformerpresidentMarcosinitiallyrespondedtotheconflictbylaunchingfull-scalemilitaryoperations,theintensityoffighting,whichshowednosignsofdecreasing,ledhimtorespondtoproposalsforpeacetalks.TheOICalsourgeditsmembersinSoutheastAsia,IndonesiaandMalaysia,to“exerttheirgoodofficestohelpfindsolutionwithintheframeworkofASEAN”.AsummitbetweenpresidentsMarcosandSuhartoofIndonesia,anotherASEANmember,alsotackledtheprobleminMindanao.

InAugust2008,peacenegotiationsbetween thegovernmentand theMILFwereboggeddownfollowing thederailmentof thesigningof theMemorandumofAgreementonAncestralDomain(MOA-AD).Theagreementwassupposedtohavebeenthefinal,keysubstantivestageofthepeaceprocess on arrangements for recognition of the Bangsamoro homeland through an expandedformofautonomy.However, theagreementwasopposedbyanumberofChristianandMuslimpoliticians at the local and national levels. A Supreme Court ruling (by a narrow 8–7 vote) onthedraftagreementas “unconstitutional”has rendered thecontinuationof futurenegotiationsuncertainandhasledtothefiercestfightinginMindanaosince2003,whichbeganwhenamajorMILFunit launchedattacksonseveralChristiantownsintheLanaodelNorteprovince.Fightingaffectednineprovinces,resultinginsome610,000personsdisplacedfromtheirhomesand104deadinAugust2008.34

33SolimanSantosJr,TheMoroIslamicChallenge:ConstitutionalThinkingoftheMindanaoPeaceProcess.UniversityofthePhilippinesPress:QuezonCity,2001.

34AmnestyInternational,ShatteredPeaceinMindanao:TheHumanCostofConflictinthePhilippines,2008.


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Priortoitsdirectroleasfacilitator,Indonesia,alongwithfellowASEANmemberMalaysiapushedforapeacetalkframeworkofnationalsovereigntyandterritorialintegrityforthePhilippines.HeretheASEANfactorplayedaroleinsupportingthePhilippinepositioninnegotiatingwiththeMNLF.Bothcountrieswere“anxioustopreventinterference”inSoutheastAsia,andASEANwasof“highervalue”toIndonesiaandMalaysia,thanOICor“Islamicsolidarity”.Indonesiaalsoreportedlyavoidedusing the term “Bangsamoro people” because, quoting Indonesian AmbassadorWiryono— thechiefrepresentativeofIndonesiaduringtheGRPMNLFpeacetalks,“Wedon’twanttobeseenasadoptingtheright tosecede.”35 Indonesia itselfalsofacedmultipleseparatist threats, includingTimorLestewhichobtaineditsindependencein1999.

TheAceh struggleforindependencehasprobablybeenoneofthelongestandbloodiestseparatistinsurgenciesinAsia.TheAcehconflictisoftendescribedasa‘classicsecessionistconflict’inwhichgrievancesaboutstructuralimpoverishmentandgasextractioncametomergewithapre-existingstruggleagainstthegovernmentforautonomy36.Thethreedecadesofarmedconflictfinallyendedinceasefirein2005withbothsides–theGovernmentofIndonesiaandtheFreeAcehMovement(GAM)–signingaMemorandumofUnderstanding(MoU)on15August2005inHelsinki,Finland.

Amonthaftersigningthepeaceagreement,theAcehMonitoringMission(AMM)wasdeployedtoassisttheGovernmentofIndonesiaandtheGAMintheimplementationoftheMoU.TheAMMwasanEU-ledmission,conducted togetherwithfiveASEANcountries (Brunei,Malaysia,Philippines,SingaporeandThailand),andwithcontributionsfromNorwayandSwitzerland.OntheEuropeanside,theAMMwasthefirstsuchinitiativeundertheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP).).

TheAMMactivelyassistedwith thedecommissioninganddestructionofweapons,ammunitionandexplosivessurrendered.Itmonitoredthere-location/withdrawalof“non-organic”militaryandpoliceforces,andtheDecommissioning,DemobilisationandReintegration(DDR)offormerGAMcombatants.TheAMMobservedthehumanrightssituationandprovidedassistanceinthecontextofitstasks;itdidnottakeonafacilitationornegotiationrole.WithinthecontinuingpeaceprocessinAceh,anumberofimportantpoliticaleventssuchasthelegislativeelectionsandtherun-uptothepresidentialelectiontookplaceinrecentyears.Andthroughouttheseevents,thecivilsocietycontinuestoplayamajorroleinmakingsurethatthevoicesofthepeopleareheard37.

The AMM represented an invaluable opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its capacity torapidly launch a complex ESDPmission over long distances and to combine decommissioning,demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants and post-tsunami reconstruction, in anefforttoachievesustainablesecurityanddevelopmentoftheregion.

WiththegreatnumberandvarietyofculturalgroupsexistinginAsia,thescopeofpotentialconflictis large; however, intercultural relationsbyand large remainpeaceful andare rarely the causefor conflictat the regional level.CroissantandTrinnpoint to thenon-violent strategiesusedbySingaporeandMalaysiaandnotethat‘thefactthatcultureattheinter-statelevelinSoutheastAsiahardlyhasanyrelevanceforconflicts,butrather,withinASEAN,formsofajointidentitycreationarerecognisable(Shuck2008),clarify[ies]thatculturaldiversityandconflictswithinstatesandstateregionsinAsianeednotnecessarilyassumeviolentforms’38.

356thAsia-EuropeRoundtable,MinorityConflicts–TowardsanASEMFrameworkforConflictManagement:CaseStudiesofEthnicMinorityConflictsinSouthernPhilippinesandSouthernThailand,2009

36A.WennmannandJ.Krause,ManagingtheEconomicDimensionsofPeaceProcesses:ResourceWealth,Autonomy,andPeaceinAceh,TheCentreonConflict,DevelopmentandPeacebuildingCCDPWorkingPaper3

37ForfurtherreadingontheAMM,pleasesee‘SupportingthePeaceProcess:theAcehMonitoringMission(AMM)

38AurelCroissantandChristophTrinn,Culture,IdentityandConflictinAsiaandSoutheastAsia,ASIEN110,January2009,pp13-43,p41


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ASEAN’sroleinaddressinglocalminorityconflictshasthepotentialtobeenhancedfurther.Beforethis can happen, the organisationmust complement its present politicalmode of cooperationprimarily through state elites, by strengthening regional human rights norms, institutions, anddisputesettlementmechanismstoprotectandfulfilminorityrights—includingmigrantcommunities,indigenouspeoples,andethnicnationalities.ThesegoalsareclearlyenshrinedintheASEANCharterthatwasratifiedin2008andintheASEANConcordIIthatwassignedin2003,whichendorsedthecreationofanASEANCommunityby2015basedon“…politicalandsecuritycooperation,economiccooperation,andsocio-culturalcooperationthatarecloselyintertwinedandmutuallyreinforcingforthepurposeofensuringdurablepeace,stabilityandsharedprosperityintheregion”.39Atthe14th ASEANSummit in2009, theASEANPolitical-SecurityCommunity (APSC)BlueprintwasadoptedwhichprovidestheroadmapforestablishingofanASEANPolitical-SecurityCommunity.Inadditiontodetailingactionsaimedatthepromotionofpeaceandstabilityintheregion,italsolaysemphasisonpreventivediplomacyandconfidencebuildingmeasuresasimportantinstrumentsforconflictprevention.40

3.3.2SouthAsiaandSAARC

Whenitcomestoregion-building,SouthAsiaandSoutheastAsiahavehadverydifferentexperiences.HistoricalrelationsbetweentheSouthAsiancountrieshavenotalwaysbeenverycordialwiththecurrent tensions in the region only serving to further aggravate the situation. The South AsianAssociation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC ) was formed in 1985 by the seven countries ofthe region: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Afghanistanwas admitted as the eighthmember in 2007) with an objective to ‘contribute tomutual trust,understandingandappreciationofoneanother’sproblems’41.

Although SAARC countries do coordinate with each other on security issues, its joint activitiesremainfocusedonterrorism,narcoticsandorganisedcrime.AscomparedtoASEANwhosegeneralobjectivewastomaintainpeaceintheregion,SAARCatthetimeof itscreationwasspecificallychargedtonotinterfereinanybilateraldisputes.

AnanyaMukherjeeReedprovidesacritiquetotheinstitutionalapproachtointernationalcooperationwhichseesthebuildingofinstitutionsasaneffectivemeansofimprovingrelationsbetweennations.Reedobserves thatSAARC’s inadequateattemptsat regionalisation ‘arisespreciselyoutof theefforttousetheinstitutiontofocusattentionawayfromseriousdisagreementswithinthemembercountries,andestablishsomearrangementdespitethesedisagreements’42.

ASEAN’s success canbeattributed in largepart to theawareness thatpeacewas required forregionalprogress.HedleyBullcomparesASEANtoasocietyofstatesinwhichmembersadheretocertainnormsandpracticestobuildregionalsecurity;SAARCremainsasystemofstates,unabletoactoncommonregionalinterests43.

39DeclarationofASEANConcordII(BaliConcordII),2003

40Thefullreportcanbeaccessedathttp://www.aseansec.org/22337.pdf

41Thefullchartercanbefoundatwww.saarc-sec.org

42AnanyaMukherjeeReed,Regionalization inSouthAsia: TheoryandPraxis,PacificAffairs,Vol.70,No.2 (Summer,1997),UniversityofBritishColumbia,pp.235-251,p238

43HedleyBull,TheAnarchicalSociety:AStudyofOrderinWorldPolitics,Macmillan,1997asquotedby.KripaSridharan,Regional Organisations and Conflict Management: Comparing ASEAN and SAARC, Crisis States Research Centre,WorkingPaper33,2008


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The fact that a number of ASEAN peace treaties were technically formed outside the ASEANframeworkindicatesthatnotallnormshavetobeinstitutedinlegalcharters.Regularconsultationand dialogue between ASEAN countries has led to the development of the Association into aneffectiveregionalsecurityforum.AsBullstates‘itisnotuncommonforarule toemergefirstasanoperationalrule,thentobecomeestablishedpractice,thentoattainthestatusofamoralprincipleandfinallytobeincorporatedinalegalconvention’44.

WhilesomeSAARCcountriesarealreadyinvolvedinbilateralcooperationwithASEAN(IndiaandPakistanarebothmembersoftheASEANRegionalForum),thereneedstobegreaterandmoreinteractionbetweentheSAARCandASEANcommunities.

In Asia the building of both regional and domestic constituencies in supporting the protectionofminority groups has continued, notwithstanding the limitations of regional frameworks. It isimportant tohighlight theroleof ‘champions’andvariousstakeholders inprotectingcivilians inconflictareas,especiallyvulnerablegroups.Meanwhile,theChairofASEANalsohasthepotentialtosetpolicyinitiativeswhichasdemonstratedbyexperiencecanbemorepeople-centered,humansecurityoriented,andgiveimportancetonon-traditionalsecurityissues.WhenIndonesiawasChairin2003,itpromotedtheideaofASEANSecurityCommunitywithemphasisonpromotingdemocraticvaluesandprotectionofhumanrights.WhenthePhilippineswasChairofASEANin2006–2007,itpromotedtheASEANSocio-CulturalCommunity,aswellastheadoptionoftheASEANConventionontheProtectionofMigrantWorkersintheregion.Theseareimportantentrypointsandopportunitiesforminorityprotectiononwhichonecanbuildupanddevelopearlywarningsystem.

3.4.OtherRegionalInstitutionsandMechanisms

Whilearegionalframeworkmaybeuseful,formalisedstructurescannotbeseenastheonlypossiblesolution.InIndonesia,theexistenceofalargevarietyofethnicgroupscallforaneedforaspecialframework.Mechanismsneednotbe institutionalisedasad-hoccreationscateringto individualcommunityneedscouldalsobeeffective.

InSoutheast Asia, thereareanumberof bodiesandmechanisms that can, if utilisedwell, beinstrumental in developing an early warning framework and contribute to reduction ofminorityconflicts.Theseinclude:

- TheASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) frameworkwhich provides for preventive diplomacy,especially through theARFChairmechanism; theEminentExpertPersons (EEP)Group;and the (non-governmental)Council forSecurityCooperation in theAsiaPacific (CSCAP)process.

- TheASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR)whichinitsTermsofReferencehasthecapacityforconsultationwithcivilsocietygroups;workwithrelevantnational and regional human rights institutions, including the recently created ASEANCommissiononthePromotionandProtectionoftheRightsofWomenandChildren.

- International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP) existed for 10 years andconvened six Annual Conferences and accumulated a good record and reputation forbringingtogethermembersofParliamentfrombothrulingandopposition(minority)partiesalloverAsia.

44ibid


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- NationalBodies–e.g.,theadministrativecourtsinThailandhavemadepreviousrulingsonstatelessness

- The use of special envoys in the region. For example, individual states have activelyparticipatedininternationalpeacekeeping–Indonesia,JapanandChina

- International civil society groups/networkswhichincludeorganisationssuchasForumAsia,theGlobalPartnershipforthePreventionofArmedConflict(GPPAC),theInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),InternationalCrisisGroup(ICG),Oxfam,InternationalDevelopment Research Centre (IDRC), International Alert, SEA Women’s Caucus; othergroups and networks; as well as religious groups. Civil society organisations have thepotentialtomakethemostimpactascanbeseeninCambodiaandthenMindanao,wherecivilsocietywaspivotalinpushingforinternationalmonitoringfortheconflictsituation.

- Regional or national civil society groupssuchastheInitiativeforInternationalDialogue(Philippines), InstitutTitianPerdamaian (Indonesia),ShalomFoundation (Myanmar);andthecivilsocietyWorkingGroupforanASEANHumanRightsMechanism.

- Regional Groups on Responsibility to Protect, such as the Asia Pacific Centre for theResponsibility to Protect, Friends of R2P, and regional and national networks of R2Padvocates.

- Regional Peace-building Missions, such as the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), thoseinvolvedintheMindanaopeaceprocess.

- UN Regional offices–EconomicandSocialCommissionforAsiaandthePacific(ESCAP),OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights(OHCHR),OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA).

WithinSouthAsia,someoftheearlywarningmechanismsthatcanbeoperationalisedinclude:

- TheSAARCdatabaseonmonitoringviolence

- InSriLanka, the InternationalCentre forEthnicStudies (ICES)and thePeaceResearchInstituteOslo(PRIO)havedonesubstantialworkinthisarea

- Othernationalmechanismswhichmonitorlocalgroupsorlocalisedethnicissues

- Cross-borderinitiativessuchasinthePunjab

Thesituation inNortheastAsia isverydifferent fromSoutheastAsia–USdominance;potentialcompetitionbetweenChinaandtheUS;andthefactthattheKoreanpeninsulaisstilltechnicallyatwar.However,itisusefultonotethattheleadersofChina,JapanandSouthKoreahavebeguntomeetregularlysincetheirfirsttrilateralsummitinDazafuin2008.Inaddition,theirparticipationintheASEAN+3frameworkandtheEastAsiaSummit(EAS)couldallpotentiallycontributetotheirparticipationandinterestinanearlywarningsystemtopreventconflicts.

Thepoweroftheavailablemechanismsishowever,dependentonthecooperationanddialoguebetweencivilsocietyandofficialbodies.Stateandnon-stateactorsneedtoworkinpartnershiptopromoteandbuildanearlywarningsystemasanintegralpartofconflictprevention.


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4. Minority Conflict Prevention in the Context of Early Warning Systems

4.1EarlyWarningSystems

This sectionwill situateminority issueswithin the knowledge and experience of EarlyWarningSystems(EWS),whichrepresentamajorelementofthetheoryandpracticeofconflictprevention.

Important to any understanding of EWS for conflict prevention is to learn not only from theexperienceofinter-governmentalbodies,suchasOSCE,ASEANandSAARC,butalsotostudyothernon-governmental, non- regional approaches to EWS. This holds true in the context ofminorityconflicts,especiallyinAsiawheregiventhelackofaregionalinstitutionalEWSframework,theworkofnon-profitandacademicinstitutionsinthisfieldtakesonconsiderablerelevance.ListedbelowaresomeoftheEWSavailableforconflictprevention,noneofthemislimitedinscopetoaregion,butprovideinformationonaglobalscale—whichallowspolicymakerstoadaptinformationtotheirneeds.

• TheMinorities at Risk (MAR) ProjectisoneoffewEWSthathavethemonitoringandanalysisofethnicandminorityconflictsasacentralfocus.Usingqualitativeassessmentsandquantitativedata,MARwhich is a university-based research project, providesmapswhich display thosegroups in their database that are engaged in themost mobilisation (includes protests andrebellions)and those thatare subject to thehighest formsofpersecution (includespoliticaldiscriminationandrepression).

• AnotherminorityconflicttrackingtoolistheGlobal News MonitorwhichismanagedbyPreventGenocideInternationalwhichisaglobaleducationandactionnetwork.TheGlobalNewsMonitorfollowscurrentnewsandinformationongenocideandthosetopicsrelatedtoethnic,national,racialandreligiousviolence.

• CrisisWatch,which iscompiledby the InternationalCrisisGroup, isamonthlybulletinwhichprovidesupdatesonthedevelopmentsofcurrentorpotentialconflict.Informationisdrawnfrommultiplesources,includingICG’sowninternalstaffresources,providingsummariesofreportsandbriefingpapersthathavebeenpublishedbytheorganisation.

• The International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, which is also university-based, has beenengagedsince1975 inan investigationof434crises thatplagued the international systemfromtheendofWorldWarIto2001,andhasinvolvedtheparticipationof956individualstatesascrisisactors.Usingbothqualitativeandquantitativemethods,theprojecthasfourspecificobjectives:1)toaccumulateknowledgeaboutprotractedconflictsandcrisis;2)generateandtesthypothesesabouttheeffectsofcrisis-inducedstressoncopingandchoicebydecisionmakers;3)discoveringpatternsincrisis-onset,crisismanagement,superpoweractivity,involvementbyinternationalorganisations,andoutcome;and4)applyinglessonslearnttotheeffectivecrisismanagementoffutureconflict.Theprojectiscurrentlyinitsfifthstage.

• Swisspeace’searlywarningprogramcalledFAST International,whichwasoperationalbetween1998–2008, provided a systematic collection of early warning information through a webinterfacethatalloweduserstoaccessandworkwiththeentireFASTdatabase.Drawinguponinternational and regional expertise, FAST’s regional coverage extended to Asia, Africa andEurope.


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• The IASC Humanitarian Early Warning Service (HEWSweb) is an inter-agency partnershipprojectaimedatestablishingacommonplatformforprovidingearlywarninginformationfrommultiplespecialisedinstitutionsonbothhumanitariancrisisandnaturalhazards.EndorsedbytheIASCSub-WorkingGrouponPreparednessandContingencyPlanning—whichisco-chairedbytheWorldFoodProgramme(WFP)andUNICEF—in2004,theservicewasdevelopedandcoordinatedbyWFP.Partnershipswith external, non-UNspecialised institutionsand sourceshavebeenorarebeingestablished.

• TheBEFORE ProjectisjointlyadministeredbytheAllianceforPeacebuildingandSwisspeace.Builtuponandfocusedonpartnerships,theyconnectlocalstakeholdersandinternationalortransnational organisations with the purpose of looking at potential wars from every angle.Asabridgebetweennorthernand southernactors,BEFORE reachesout topeoplewith theopportunityforpeacefultransformationintheircommunities.

4.2GapbetweenEarlyKnowledgeandEarlyWarning

EWSreportrawdatawhichneedstobeanalysedsoastoprovideconcretepolicyrecommendationsthat canbeput intoactionbypolicymakers tomitigate theeffectsof conflict.AsdescribedbyFAST,theirworkwasaimedat“enhancingtheabilityofdecisionmakersandtheirstaffinstateandnon-stateinstitutionstoidentifycriticaldevelopmentsinatimelymannersothatcoherentpoliticalstrategiescouldbe“formulatedtoeitherpreventorlimitdestructiveeffectsofviolentconflicts,ortoidentifywindowsofopportunityforpeacebuilding”45.

However,evenwhenclearinformationisavailable,warningsignalsmaybedelayedandthereforethelinkbetweenearlyknowledgeandearlywarning,andbetweenearlywarningandearlyactionremainweak.

Thequestionsare:

1. Howinclusiveistheconflictpreventionprocessinallthreeelements—earlyknowledge,earlywarning,andearlyaction?

2. Howcanallactorsbeinvolved?Whowouldbetherightplayersandhowtoidentifythem?

3. Howcanwenarrowthegapbetweenearlyknowledge,warningandaction?

4.2.1PoliticalCostsofRecognition

Thelackofpoliticalwillhasoftenbeenidentifiedasthekeyfactorpreventingbothinter-governmentalandregionalorganisationsfromactingdecisivelyintheearlydaysofconflict.IncontrasttoNGOs,governmentalorganisationshaveahigherthresholdtowaitbeforeactinguponsignals.Therearepoliticalcostsinvolvedwithrecognisingandappraisingearlywarningsignals.Politicaldifferenceswithin organisations; lack of capacity for effective intervention and principles such as non-interventionandsovereigntyaresomeofthebarriersthatprevail.Evenapowerful internationalsecuritymechanismsuchas theUNSecurityCouncil is still not capable to identify threatsandrespondtoearlywarningsignals.Anotherfactorthatcontributestothedelaybetweeninformationandwarningisthefactthatinformationisoftenlevelledtoseniorpolicymakers,lessattentionispaidtoactorsatthelocallevel—whooftenhaveabetterunderstandingofthelocaldynamicsofminorityconflicts,thetriggersandthemitigatingfactors.

45Swisspeace’s Fast International, programme description at http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/en/peace-conflict-research/early-warning/index.html;lastaccessedinJanuary2011.


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4.2.2NarrowDefinitionsof‘Threat’

ArecentpaperbyAlbrechtSchnabelidentifiesafundamentaldeficiencyandexplainsthatcurrentpolitical EWSare geared towards one specific threat,while neglecting other existential risks tohumansecuritylinkedtoeconomic,political,socialorenvironmentaldevelopments;andthatthemainreasonforthisnegligenceisthetraditionaldefinitionofsecurity—originally,earlywarningwasamilitaryconceptthat,overtime,wasadjustedforcivilianpurposes46.VarioustypesofEWSemergedtoassistnationalandinternationalactorsintheearlyanticipationofandtimelypreparationfornaturaldisasters, theoutbreakof famine,politicaldestabilisation,andforcedmigration.Therationalebehindthesepoliticalearlywarningframeworks,however,wasstillreactiveratherthanproactive.Earlyknowledge,warningandresponsemeasuresweretakenonlyafterahumanitarianemergencyhadoccurredandnotbeforehand.Crisisde-escalationwasthekeyissue,notcarefulandearlypreparedness.

ContrarytotheearlygenerationsofpoliticalEWS,present-dayEWSaddressnotonlythesymptomsbutalsotheunderlyingcausesofviolentconflict.Astheterm‘earlywarning’indicates,monitoringandanalysisofapotentiallyconflictivesituationshouldbeinitiatedattheearliestpossiblestageinordertopreventratherthanalleviatehumansuffering.Thefactremains,however,thatthisandsimilardefinitionsusedwithintheearlywarningcommunitystillfocusononesinglefacetofthethreatspectrum,thatisviolentconflict—theyneithertakeotherexistentialthreatstosocietyintoaccount,nordotheyclearlydelineatewhattypeofinformationneedstobecollectedandanalysed.Thiscanbeinpartattributedtothefactthathumansecurityasadependentvariableisnotaseasilydefinedandoperationalisedthansuchnarrowlydefinedthreatsas‘famine’,‘forcedmigration’,or‘violentconflict’.Mostoftheverysameactorswhofinditdifficulttoinvestinpreventiveactivitiesalsorealiseandadmitthatpreventionisthebestassuranceagainstthesufferingandinstabilityassociatedwithstructuralanddirectviolenceandthecostsofrepairingthesubsequentdamage47. The fundamental mind-shift towards human security-focused early warning must first happenbeforefurthertechnicalchallengescanberesolved.Afterwards,monitoringandanalysisalongsidesuitablepreparationforcomplexthreatscenariosneedtotakeplaceonanationalbasis,feedingintocollaborationonaregionalbasis.

4.2.3IndicatorsofConflict

The4thAERReportlistedearlywarningindicatorsthatmustbeproperlyidentifiedandinterpreted,especiallythosethatcouldeventuallyleadtoviolence.Itappealedforadistinctionbetweenlatentinstability versus signals of impending violent conflict. Essentially structural problems within agivencountrysuchasendemicpovertyandeconomicinequality,ethnicandlong-standingreligiousdifferencesmaynever lead toviolentconflictwithout thepresenceof triggeringmechanisms. ItcategorisedtheseearlyindictorsasTerritorial,Ethno-religious,Governance,Economic,PoliticalandExternal.

46AlbrechtSchnabel,“PrioritiesforComprehensiveCapacityBuildingforRegionalArrangementstoAddressEmergingNon-TraditionalSecurityChallengesandThreats”attheInternationalSeminar“CommonStrategyfortheAsiaPacificRegion:regionalArrangementfortheEmergingChallenges”,Bangkok,Thailand,30March–2April2010.

47A.SchnabelandH.Krummenacher,‘TowardsaHumanSecurity-BasedEarlyWarningandResponseSystem’inH.G.Brauch(ed.)FacingGlobalEnvironmentalChange–Environmental,Human,Energy,Food,HealthandWaterSecurityConcepts,Berlin-Heidelberg-NewYork:Springer,2009,pp1253-1264


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Acarefulanalysiswouldberequiredsoastoensurethattherightsignsaredetectedattherighttime.Whilesomecanbereadilyappliedsuchassuddendemographicchanges;migrationpatterns(increaseinrefugees,internallydisplacedpersons);socialandeconomicdeprivationanddisparity;destructionofcultural/religioussites;stereotyping;hatespeeches,etc.;otherindicatorsusedformore‘generalised’formsofearlyconflictwarningsuchasincreaseinpublicdemonstrations;rise/shiftinunemploymentrateswouldhavetobemorecircumspectintheirapplication48.

4.2.4LackofaSystematicApproach

Forearlywarning tobesuccessful— inanycontextandwithregardtoany threat—oneshouldideally takesuchasystematicapproach.Thus,partners inearlywarningand responseneed toworkcloselytogether.EWSneedtobeunbiasedandevenwhenappearingtobecriticalofofficialactions,theyneedtoensurethatallactorsinvolvedintheprocessseektoactivelycooperatewithoneanother.SchnabelandKrummenacherhighlighthowafocusonredressingtherootcausesforhumaninsecurity–whichisalesspoliticallysensitiveissue–canhaveapositiveimpactonidentifyingandaddressingearlytherootcausesforconflict49.

Threatanalysis,warningandpreventionsystemsandtoolsexistatnational level.Alsothereareseveralfunctionalregionalearlywarningandpreventionprogrammesandactivities.Forinstance,theEuropeanCommissionandtheOSCEpursueearlywarningandpreventiveactivities,andsodoanumberofAfricansub-regionalorganisations,suchasECOWAS,IGAD,ECCASandSADC.Asthe sharing of confidential intelligence is difficult even among close and friendly organisations,suchregionaleffortstendtodependonopen-sourceanalysis(i.e.theanalysisofpubliclyavailableinformationresources,suchasmediareports).Once regional neighbours agree on the nature of regionally relevant threats and requirements for the most suitable responses, joint strategies can be put into place to develop practical responses to avert complex threat scenarios.

Mostimportantforasystematicapproachistheneedfornotonlycollatinginformationonimpendingconflictbut toanalyse the informationanddetectearlywarningsignals.The rightsignshave tobedetectedattherighttimeinordertoanticipateandpreparefortheoutbreakofconflict.Thisalso impliesanalystsandpolicymakersneed toworkclosely toensure thatproper response isundertakenby the appropriate authority in a timely fashion. In Schnabel andKrummenacher’swords50:

Itwillnotbeenoughsimplytogenerateinformationandhandittothosewhomightbeinthesituationtoringthealarmbell.Iftherecipientsofearlyinformationarenotwellplaced,capableorwillingtomakeearlywarninganalysis,itwouldbenothingbutanexercisewithoutanyeffectontheimprovementofpotentiallyvolatilesituations.Thosewhoareengagedinearly warningwork, particularly if operating on a system that focuses on context-specificthreats and their amelioration, must assure that the recipients of their analyses – theexpectedresponseactors-arecloselyinvolvedintheearlywarningprocessandthattheysupporttheworkdonebyearlywarningsystem.

48Thediscussionsarebasedonusing the indicatorsmatrix of the4thAERand the indicators listed in the ‘BeyondIntractability’document.

49A.SchnabelandH.Krummenacher,‘TowardsaHumanSecurity-BasedEarlyWarningandResponseSystem’inH.G.Brauch(ed.)FacingGlobalEnvironmentalChange–Environmental,Human,Energy,Food,HealthandWaterSecurityConcepts,Berlin-Heidelberg-NewYork:Springer,2009,pp1253-1264

50Ibid,p1259


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4.3GapbetweenEarlyWarningandEarlyResponse

The responsibility toact is vested in thehandsofpolicymakers,while information,knowledge,indicators’ analysis and early warning lies in the hands of policy analysts. The transformationof information fromanalysis topolicy canbesupportedby theactivitiesof civil society groups,lobbyistsandotheractors.Infact,thereisanaddedvalueofthosebodiesandorganisationsthatwearmultiplehats—providingbothanalysisandadvocacyrelatedtoearlywarning.

Evenwhenearlywarningisdoneproperly,thereremainsanevenmoresignificantgap—betweenwarningandresponse.Pastexampleshaveshown,withdevastatingconsequences,bothafailuretowarn(asinthecaseofKosovo)andafailuretoact(asinthecaseofRwanda).ReducingthedelaybetweenwarningandresponsebecomescrucialtothesuccessofEWSinitsabilitytopreventconflictfromescalatingintoafull-blowncrisis.

A gap between early warning and response characterised previous EWS. The first and secondgenerationofEWSreliedexclusivelyonquantitativeorqualitativedataandthenlater,acombinationofthetwo.Thesewereunabletoprovetheiraddedvalue—theycouldnotdemonstratetheirimpact(as in thecaseofFAST International51).Thepresent thirdgenerationofEWSnowreliesonandpromoteslocalinitiativesinearlywarningandearlyresponse.Forexample,duetolocaleffortsinAmbon,Indonesia,thefirstearlywarningsofconflictgotothelocalcommunityleaders(inthecaseofAmbon,theRajahs)whousetheinformationtoforestallandpreventviolenceinthecommunitythroughmediation.

Thegapbetweenearlywarningandresponseemergesfromseveralchallenges:

4.3.1ComplexityofEWSinMinorityConflicts

The essential purpose of EWS is tomonitor tension escalation, identify threats and, givewarningsignalstopreventconflict.Inthecaseofminorityconflicts,EWSbecomemorecomplex.Thesocial,historical,politicalandeconomiccircumstancesandconcernsofdifferentgroupshavetobetakenintoconsiderationwhichmakesitdifficulttoputearlywarningmechanismsinplace.Also,thereisareluctancetodiscusstheissueofintra-stateconflictsonabroaderlevel.Theprincipleofnon-interventioncropsup,and itusuallytakesaviolentsituationtoelicitaresponse.Internationalpressurebyitselfmaybeaweakinstrument.

4.3.2StructuralChallenges

MostEWSarelooselyframedandtherearelapsesbothinexternalandinternalinfrastructure.Veryoften,warningisseparatedfromearlyresponse,sothattheactorswhoaregiventheinformation are different from thosewho have themandate to coordinate a response. Apositiveexample, inwhich theexceptionproves tobemoreeffective, is theOSCE’sofficeoftheHighCommissionerofNationalMinoritieswhosepowersallowgreaterautonomy.InMacedonia,whenconflictbrokeout,theHighCommissionercouldrelaytheearlywarningtotherelevantnationalandcentralauthorities,withouthavingtowaitforauthorisationfromtheOSCEChairperson’soffice.

51FASTwasoperationalfrom1998–2008,covered25countriesorregionsinAfrica,AsiaandEurope.


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4.3.3‘Spoilers’

Early warning is often compromised by actors with different interests— ‘spoilers’. Actorsmayhave theirownagendaandbedirectly involved in theconflict.This isespecially trueof community leaderswhomay act as ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’, pushing their own politicalagendawithoutnecessarilyrepresentingtheinterestsoftheminoritygroup. 4.3.4Representation

Whospeakslegitimatelyonbehalfofminorities?Therecouldbeanexternalandaninternalassessment. The external assessment would analyse whether the existing legislation isdiscriminatoryinanymanner.ItmaylookatthecountryreportstotheUNmonitoringbodiesofmonitoringCivilSocietyOrganisations(CSOs)—suchasAmnestyInternational,MinorityRightsGroup,HumanRightsWatch,AsiaWatchanddiscoverunresolvedcasesofhumanrightsviolationsinthecountry.Aninternalassessmentwouldbetolookatthedocumentsandwebsitesofminorityrepresentatives,localcommunityreportsandtestimoniesassourcesofinformation.

4.3.5EarlyWarningFatigue

MostEWSskimonlythesurfaceofthecausesofconflict,withoutanyrealconsiderationofinterestmappingoranalysisof the rootcausesand tensions. Ifminority tensionsarenotsufficientlyanalysedandearlywarningsaremisreportedthesemaycreatefalsealarmsandcauseearlywarningfatigue.

5. Creating Regional Structures

UnderstandingthechallengesofEWSandpreventionofdiscriminationofminoritieswouldnarrowthe gaps between warning and response.What regional structures can be created to addressminorityprotection?WhatroleisthereforCSOs,internationalactors,governmentsandhowcanthey can build capacities, trust, cooperation and create regional arrangements to coordinateeffectiveearlywarningandresponse?

5.1CreatingTrustandCooperation

Thereisoftenalackofcooperationbetweenthosewhoidentifyandinterpretthewarningsignalsandthosewhoactuponthem.Certainnetworksmaybeclosedprocessessothattheremaybelittleengagementwithorganisationsoutsidethenetworks.Otherorganisationsinvolvedinpeacebuildingandminorityconflictpreventionactivitiesmayfind itdifficult to learnandemulatefromthesenetworks.

Governmentalactorsaresometimelatetorecognisesignsof intoleranceagainstminoritiesandoften lackthepoliticalwill toactandstopextremistactionsagainstminorities.Theremaybeadifference of opinion on priorities and timing of minority conflict prevention. Instead of takingon shared responsibilities, a blame game can escalate between governments and civil societyorganisations,fuelledbymistrustandlackofdialogue.

Theremayalsobedisagreementsonmethodologyandanalysiswhichcanconfusetheagendasofthestakeholdersinvolved.Someofficialstateactorsundervaluetheimportanceofanalyticalworkandactfrompositionsofpower,ratherthanexpertise.Onanotherhand,theCSOsandresearchthink-tanksmay fail to recognise thepoliticalnatureofEWSandsee themaspurelyacademicexercise.SomeEWSareoperatedbyunder-fundedacademicinstitutions,withoutresearchinthefieldandtheycanbedetachedfromtherealitiesinspecificminorityconflictssituations.


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Muchofthedelaybetweenwarningandactioncanbereducedbybridgingthegapinattitudes.Trust has to be built between analysts, policy makers and advocates through ongoing relationship-building, use of forums, expansion of networks, and even institutionalisation of regional structures.

Buildingtrust isa longprocess,whereaslosingtrustcanhappenquickly, inparticularwhentheearlywarningrepresentsafalsealarm.CSOs,andalsootherearlywarningactors,shouldbecarefulnottoexperiencetheso-called‘cryingwolves’situations,wheretheexaggerationofalarmsorthesendingofsignalswithoutsubstantiatedevidencemakethemlosetrustwithgovernmentsorwithhumanitarianactorsthatwould,otherwise,bewillingtoengageinreducingminoritytensions.Falsealarmsinsituationswhennothingdramatichappened,couldbeasdetrimentaltotheestablishmentoftrustandcooperation,asisthelackofalarm,whenseriousdeteriorationofminorityconditionsoccur.

Thedetachmentandgapbetweenearlywarningand response/action therefore isnotalwaysasimpleone-wayproblem.Thediscrepancycouldoftenoccurwhen thewarning isgiven,but theactionisdelayed.Alternatively,itcouldalsobeinthecasewhentheEWSgivesafalsealarm,butactionisneverthelessstronglyadvocatedanddemanded,andconsequentlyfoundasunnecessarywasteoftimeandefforts;thiswillreducethetrustandeffectivenessoftheresponsenexttimewhenthesameEWSappealsforaction.Whilethis isoftennotthecase,andmoredangersareunder-estimatedratherthanover-estimated,itwouldbefairnotalwaystoplacedirectlytheblameontherespondents—theearlywarningmaybesentinwrong‘cryingwolves’scenariotoo.

5.2MultiStakeholdersandMulti-levelApproach

It isimportantforCSOstodeveloprelationshipswithallthestakeholdersinvolved—inboththepublic andprivate sectors— toenhance their influenceon theminorityprotectionpolicies.Notall early responses can be achieved through official governmental channels. Indeed, the thirdgenerationEWSallowsamulti-levelsolutionsothattheenhancingofminoritysafetyandsecurityisno longeronlyastate’s responsibility. Track IIandTrack IIIactorscanbedirectly involved inminorityprotectionalongsidethestates.InseveralsituationsinAsia(e.g.Indonesia)andEurope(e.g.Macedonia)thereisaconstantlow-intensitytensionthatdoesnotescalateintoconflict.Theexplanationisfirstofallthatastrongeconomicimperativeexiststotakequickaction,astheprivatesectorisinvolved.Andsecond,thatthepresenceofstrongcharismaticleadersandthesatisfactionofbasicrightsmayactasameansofarrestingtheescalationofminorityconflicts.Suchpracticesneedfurtheranalysisandencouragement,suchasthroughgrantingfundsforresearchinstitutestodevelopprojectsontheroleofthevariousactors.

Indeed,theroleofcharismaticleaders,orregionalchampionswouldsupportthetaskofestablishingofaregionalframeworkthatcanfeedtheimplementationofmeasurestoreduceminoritytensions.Itwouldhelptohaveannualmeetingsofhighlyrecognisedeminentpersonsthatcanspeakagainstminoritydiscriminationandxenophobicappearances.SuchforuminAsiacouldbe,forexample,theInternationalConferenceoftheAsianPoliticalParties(ICAPP)—auniqueorganisationthatbringstogetherboththemembersoftherulingpartiesandtheopposition(minority)parties.

Theprivatesectorandthepublicsectorcanbepartnersinminorityprotection—alotofbusinessesoperateinareaswherevariousminoritieslive,andiftheyengageconstructively,applyingduecareforthecommunitiesandwithdueCorporateSocialResponsibility(CSR),theycanbestrongpartnersfor governmental and non-governmental organisations in a truly cooperative multi-stakeholderprocess.


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Successful response measures and strategies depend on sensible divisions of labour among those actors who are best placed to alleviate threats and provide security for the minorities. Complex threat scenarios and equally complex, multi-dimensional and sequenced response strategies must be built on thoughtful and sensible task-sharing. Not every actor is equally suitable to provide a particular response strategy. Each measure to prevent, reduce or alleviate threats should ideally be taken by those actors that possess comparative advantages vis-à-vis others: Non-governmental and governmental actors, development agencies and security sector institutions, internal and external agencies — all have specific competencies that put them in the unique position to fulfil very specific security tasks. The greater the pool from which to select the most suited and best placed actors, the greater the chances for overall success, effectiveness and efficiency. A regional approach will automatically increase such multi-stakeholder pools.

Following a thorough actor assessment, a ‘comparative advantage-assessment’ will identify the actors or group of actors, possibly from different parts of the region, who have the best chance of addressing a particular threat scenario. Moreover, as is already done by many regional arrangements including ASEAN, the members of the organisations invest in developing specially trained and equipped stand-by capacities to be deployed or otherwise utilised in managing potential or actual crisis situations. In addition to building the capacities, such regional approaches require the readiness and willingness of all involved parties to participate in the cooperation and coordination of joint activities, which puts to test the endurance of regional neighbours’ friendship and confidence in each other’s abilities. Yet, joint efforts in facing and averting common threats, crises and insecurities also contribute to regional confidence building. A region that jointly and successfully overcomes traditional as well as non-traditional crises will inevitably emerge as a stronger community.

5.3 Capacity and Scenario Building for Early Warning Advocating a successful regional framework of an EWS for minority conflicts requires building capacities at all levels — local, national, bilateral, regional, international. While their constituencies may differ, there is a need for different actors at each level to be able to monitor minority conflict situations as they develop.

Early warning could be very labour intensive and complex in a multi-level context, and the lack of enhanced training can jeopardise efforts. Therefore systematic capacity building aimed at strengthening various actors, becomes crucial, so that they are fully oriented and prepared for early warning and early action. Capacity building can be expensive and the lack of available funding can limit the potential for many actors to be actively involved in the early warning and early response process. Very often, there is a competition for resources between the actors involved. Therefore there is a need for a long-term strategy to develop coordination and synergies between the various stakeholders for the common benefit of all.

In addition to capacity building, scenario building exercises could help towards developing the trends and indicators for an early warning regional framework. A good model that scenario building could be based on is the Mont Fleur scenario-building process, which was first undertaken in South Africa during 1991–92 to encourage people from both private and public sector organisations to think creatively about their country’s future. Indicators of this model are mapped by analysing past experience; present development trends; and possible future developments. In the original model, participants narrowed down from 40 scenarios in the first year to four models in the fourth year. The government used these scenarios to guide itself during the development of different trends to act in a way that reduced tension and arrive to the best-case scenario.


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5.4ApplyingExistentEarlyWarningMechanisms

To focusonpreventingminority conflictasonesub-setof thegeneral conflictprevention,moreattentionshouldbegiventoutiliseexistentEWSthathaverelevancetominoritytensions.Particularattentionshouldbeaddresstofrequentoccurrenceofxenophobichatredspeech, incitementofethnicandreligiousintolerance,actsofextremismanddiscriminationagainstparticularethnicorreligiousgroups,demonstrationsofsuperiorityoverotherness,etc.

InEurope,earlywarningandearlyresponseshavealreadybeenmajortasksoftheHighCommissioneronNationalMinorities(HCNM)inregardtotensions,involvingnationalminorityissues.However,thesehavenotyetdevelopedbeyondwarningofsituationsthathavethepotentialtoescalateintoaconflictwithintheOSCEarea.TheHCNM’seffortstotrytocontainandreducetensionsandtoalertOSCEparticipatingstateswheneversuchtensionsthreatentoexplodeneedstobeanalysedtakingintoconsiderationothermodelsandmechanismsthatcouldbeapplicable.

InAsia,whenitcomestodevelopingframeworksatregionallevel,therehasbeenonlyarelativesuccess in terms of demonstrating best practices.One such example is the Titian PerdamaianframeworkasitwasappliedbytheInstitutTitianPerdamaianinAmbon,Indonesia—itsapplicabilityas one of the possible networkedmechanisms that can be used to approach EWS for ethnicconflictatdifferentlevelsofanalysis(e.g.sub-national,national,regional).TheTitianPerdamaianFramework52 TPF (Indonesia) serves as a good example of a networked structure that can bedeveloped:

TheTPFcanbeunderstooddiagrammaticallyasfollows:

TheTPFfavoursgradualcrisismanagementusingdialogueoverrapidreactioninterventionandcanbeusedasabottom-upmodelofminoritytensionsreduction.Itworksonthepremisethatallactorsinvolvedinconflictescalationcanbeinvolvedequallyinconflictreduction.Itseekstoconvertthesecuritisingactorswhoareconflictagitatorstodesecuritisingactorsaspeacebuilders.

Theframeworkfavourscrisismanagementoverrapidreactionandusesbothdialogueandeducationinitspeacebuildingefforts.Atlocallevel,itutilisesamultiple-effectapproachandaddressesthestructuralfactorsofconflict.Whereeconomicdiscriminationistherootcause,itrecommendsthecreationof creditand tradeunionsby thevulnerablegroupasasustainablemeans for raisingfundsforitself.Withregardtotheinvolvementofmultiplestakeholders,attheveryoutsetoftheaction,itrecommendsaforumofstakeholderswhereitisdeterminedwhowillbeinvolvedatwhatstageinwhatrole.Inthismanner,theframeworkutilisesacapacity-buildingprocessasopposedtodirectinterventionofactorsinconflictprevention.

ConflictEscalation

ConflictDe-escalation

FunctionalActors

SecuritisingActors

VulnerableGroups

ConflictBuilding

PeaceBuilding

StructuralFactors(Economic,Socialcauses)

Accelerators(Hatespeeches)

TriggeringFactors(anyincidentthatcaninciteviolence

52Assharedatthe7thAERworkshopbyMr.MohammadMiqdadfromtheInstitutTitianPerdamaian


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ParticipantsappliedthisframeworktoaEuropeancasestudy—Bosnia-Herzegovina—andagreedthatinmanyinstances,theframeworkprocessescouldbesuccessfullyapplied.However,certainissueswereraisedthatneedtoberesolvedbeforeapplyingsucharegionalframeworkinAsia.

• Theroleofmediator—inEurope,regionalmediationeffortsbybodiessuchastheHCNM

areacceptedandwelcomed.InAsia,thereisarelianceonexternalmediatorswhomayattimes,duetotheirperceivedneutrality,bemoreacceptable.

• The influenceof regionalorganisations— theEU followsa ‘carrotandstick’approach,usingbothengagementandsanctionsasameanstoensurememberstatescomplywithregionalguidelines.InAsia,sanctionsareveryrarelyusedorimplemented.‘Spoilers’ofconflictpreventionareoftenaccommodatedaspartofpeacebuildingactivities.

•• The use of structural funds — in Europe, structural funds can be used as a conflict

prevention tool to address structural causesof conflict. ASEANdoeshavea structuralfund,butitislimitedinitsuseforonlydevelopmentpurposes.

• Whiletherehastobeadivisionoflabourbetweendifferentstakeholders;andadistinctionbetweenpeacebuildingactivitiesandconflictpreventionactivities, theseactivitiesarepartofoverallconflictmanagement—theycannotbeorganisedsequentiallybutshouldplaycomplementaryrolestoeachother.

5.5CollaborationandCoordination

Thepracticeindicatesthatmulti-stakeholdersolutionsarenotoftensuccessfulincoordination—therearedifficultiesincoordinatingwarningsandresponses,theremaybeaconfuseddivisionoflabourandthewholeprocessmightnotbenecessarilylinear.

Thereforeaveryimportantelementwillbeacontinuouscollaborationandcoordinationwithvariousregionalprojectsandinitiatives.Forexample,usefulsynergiescanbeestablishedwithintheworkoftheASEAN Political Security Community(APSC).TheAPSCBlueprint(June2009)statesasoneof itsplannedactions thedevelopmentofEWSbasedonexistingmechanismswithinASEANtopreventoccurrenceandescalationofconflicts.

Somecoordinationmechanismsthatcanbeutilisedorcreatedinclude:

• Jointinter-governmentalcommissions/forums

• Reconciliationforums(especiallyinthoseconflict-sensitivecommunitieswherethereisahistoryofinter-communalgrievance)

• Publicawarenessforums

• Projectstopreparecommonhistorytextbooksforallschools,includingminorityschools

• Freedomtouseminoritylanguageseverywhere


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Whenitcomestopreventionofatrocitycrimes,somespecificissuestolookatmorecarefullywouldforexamplebe:(1)lackofcontroloverirregularforces,militia,(2)smallarmssmuggling,(3)militarytrainingandwhether it isaimedat reducingwarcrimes, (4) incitementofhatredandracism. Iflookingatwhathasgeneratedtheatrocities inRwanda,FormerYugoslaviaandDarfur,onecanthinkofsuchandotherconcreteareasofmonitoringandreporting.Insteadofpointingtoconcreteareas, the 2009 R2P Report talks generally about conflict resolution,mediation, developmentassistance,itincorporatestoomanyadditionalandalreadydevelopedspheres,ratherthancreateitsowncoherentscopeofattention.Dueattentionshouldalsobepaidtothepreventionofatrocitiesoutsidewartime.Itwouldbegoodtodesignspecificmachineryforearlywarningregardingatrocityprevention,notjustduplicatingthemachineryofgeneralconflictprevention.

5.6EntryPointsforCreatingRegionalEarlyWarningStructures

Faced with these challenges, possible entry points for early warning mechanisms to preventminority conflicts can start at domestic level — capacity building for civil society organisations,developinginformationmaterialsandcreatingaccesstothem.Afurtherandmorestrategictaskwouldbetobuildaknowledgecommunityataregionallevelthatwouldincludetheinvolvementof decisionmakers and eminent persons, think-tanks, academic networks (e.g. NTS Asia) andmedianetworkssuchastheSoutheastAsianPressAlliance(SEAPA).Furthermore,bylinkingEWStoexistinghumanrightsandhumansecurityframeworks,theideaforaregionalframeworkmaygaingreateracceptance.TheHumanRightsCouncilUniversalPeriodicReviewisapossibleentrypointforpromotingtheideaofparticipatoryregionalismbywhichtherecanbeagreater‘opening’ofmindsetstowardsaregionalEWS.YettherewillstillbeaneedtoincludeCSOsinthatprocess,iftheEWSareindeedtobeefficient.

Engaginginstitutionsinvolvedin—butnotlimitedto—peacebuildingandconflictpreventioncancontribute to a regional structural network in numerousways. Their value addition could be ininformation collection and analysis,mediation and advocacy efforts, preventive diplomacy andpublicoutreach,amongstothers.

Withregardtotheactualestablishmentofaregionalnetwork,someofthefollowingavenuescouldbeexploredfurther:

1) Workwithin pre-existing forums and identified networks— ASEM Inter-ParliamentarianAssociation;BaliDemocracyForum;Shangri-LaDialogue

2) Implementtheframeworkwherevertheremightbethepossibilityofan‘opendoor’—AcehPeaceProcess;promotingtheframeworktothe2011ASEANChairmanship

3) Advocatethestructuralnetworkthroughamediatraining/awarenessprogramme


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6. Next Steps

Tosupporttheestablishmentandimplementationofaregionalframeworkforminorityprotection,thefollowingrecommendationscanbecomepracticalnextsteps:

• EncouragedirectmeetingsonEarlyWarningcomponentinAsiaandEurope,e.g.withHCNM(OSCE)

• Promote the framework to ASEAN’s Eminent Expert Persons (EEP) group and promoteexchangesbetween theHCNMand theEEP.Similarly,encourage linkagesbetweenARFandOSCE

• Startdialoguefora regional frameworkwitha track IIapproachfirst, (avoidingsensitiveissuesandallowinggovernmentofficialstoparticipateinaprivatecapacity)

SomeofthespecificpolicyrecommendationsthatcanbetakenupbyregionalinstitutionsinAsia(suchasASEAN)canbethefollowing:

• CompileASEAN’sexperiencesandbestpracticesinearlywarningandresponsetominorityconflictsina‘library’thatcouldbeofusetobothresearchersandpolicymakersandthatwillinspireextensionofthebestpractices

• Analyse the best practices and the lessons learned from them and undertake furtherresearchwiththeviewtoenhanceandpromoteEWS

• Establish and strengthen cooperation among regional CSOs, using them as source ofknowledge,assourceforwarningsignals,andaslocalactorsinconflictprevention;

• Organise practitioners’ workshops and ask them to summarise their expertise andexperiences in manuals and engage directly in training of volunteers for EWS. IdentifyadditionalEWSexpertsandengagetheminexchangeofexperiencesasresourcepersonstoassistgovernmentsandNGOsandengagethemforcapacitybuilding

• Share knowledge among academic institutions, think-tanks, utilise bilateral relations inpracticaltrainingandcapacitydevelopmentwith institutionsfromotherregions,utilisingthestrongtraditionofEU-ASEANengagementindiversefields

• EngagewithUNagenciesandotherinternationalinter-governmentalorganisationsworkingonconflictprevention;

• PromotemoregendermainstreaminginconflictpreventionandthinkofgenderspecificitywhenitcomestoEWS—averyimportantandyetunder-valuedasset

• Developcapacityandexpertiseonparticularlyvulnerableminoritygroupsandtensionsinspecific country situations.Search for engagementwith development andhumanitarianagencies,UNHCR,UNICEFandotheragenciesthatfocusonvulnerablegroupsandseektheirassistancetospotrisingtensions


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Annexe 1 - Bibliography

AmnestyInternationalShattered Peace in Mindanao: The Human Cost of Conflict in the Philippines,2008

Annan,K.,The Role of Civil Society in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding,OpeningRemarksattheSecurityCouncildebateNewYork,22June2004

ASEAN,Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), 2003,accessedathttp://www.aseansec.org/19096.htm

ASEAN, The ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint, 14th ASEAN Summit, 2009,accessedathttp://www.aseansec.org/22337.pdf

ASEANRegionalForum,The ASEAN Regional Forum: A Concept Paper,1995,accessedathttp://www.aseansec.org/3693.htm

Asia-EuropeFoundation,FriedrichEbertStiftungandtheSingaporeInstituteofInternationalAffairs,Conflict Prevention: Actors, Institutions and Mechanisms. Sharing Experiences between Asia and Europe,4thAsia-EuropeRoundtableSpecialReport,2005 Asia-EuropeFoundation,FriedrichEbertStiftungandtheSingaporeInstituteofInternationalAffairs,Minority Conflicts – Towards an ASEM Framework for Conflict Management,6thAsia-EuropeRoundtableSpecialReport,2009

Asia-EuropeFoundation,FriedrichEbertStiftungandtheSingaporeInstituteofInternationalAffairs,Minority Conflicts – Towards an ASEM Framework for Conflict Management: Case Studies of Ethnic Minority Conflicts in Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand,6thAsia-EuropeRoundtable,2009

Blénesi,É.,Ethnic Early Warning Systems and Conflict Prevention,GlobalSecurityFellowsInitiative,OccasionalPaperNo.11,UniversityofCambridge,1998

Bull,H.,The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, Macmillan,1997asquotedby.KripaSridharan,Regional Organisations and Conflict Management: Comparing ASEAN and SAARC,CrisisStatesResearchCentre,WorkingPaper33,2008

Capotorti,F.,Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1,1979

ClancyM.,andNagleJ.,Minority Conflicts – Towards an ASEM Framework for Conflict Management,Paperpresentedtothe6thAsia-EuropeRoundtable,10-12June2009,accessedathttp://www.asef.org/index.php?option=com_project&task=view&id=520

CouncilofEurope,Institutions for the Management of Ethnopolitical Conflict in Central and Eastern Europe,CouncilofEuropePublishing,2008

Degnbol-Martinussen J. andEngerg-PedersenP.,Aid: Understanding International Development Cooperation,London:ZedBooks,2003

DellerN.andChhatparS.,Guidelines for the International Community to Prevent and React to Genocide and Mass Atrocities, presentedat theWorldFederalistMovement-Institute forGlobalPolicy,November2006


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Lund,M.,Preventing and Mitigating Violent Conflicts: A Revised Guide for Practitioners,1997inA.SchmidThesaurusandGlossaryofEarlyWarningandConflictPreventionTerms(abridgedversion),PIOOM,SynthesisFoundation,1998,accessedathttp://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/LGEL-5ERDQ8/$file/fewer-glossary-may98.pdf?openelement

GilleyB.,Against the Concept of Ethnic Conflict,ThirdWorldQuarterly,Vol.25,No.6,pp.1155–1166,2004

KnightA.andPopovskiV.,Putting People Ahead of Protocol,theEdmonton Journal,4June2008

Menon, V.G., In Larger Freedom: Toward Development, Security and Human Rights for All, 87th PlenaryMeetingontheReportoftheSec-Gen,7April2005

Reed,A.M.,Regionalization in South Asia: Theory and Praxis, Pacific Affairs,Vol.70,No.2(Summer,1997),UniversityofBritishColumbia,pp.235-251

SantosJr,S.,The Moro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Thinking of the Mindanao Peace Process. UniversityofthePhilippinesPress:QuezonCity,2001

Schnabel,A.,Priorities for Comprehensive Capacity Building for Regional Arrangements to Address Emerging Non-Traditional Security Challenges and Threats,PaperpresentedattheInternationalSeminar “CommonStrategy for theAsiaPacificRegion: regional Arrangement for theEmergingChallenges”,Bangkok,Thailand,30March–2April2010

Schnabel,A.andKrummenacher,H.,Towards a Human Security-Based Early Warning and Response SysteminH.G.Brauch(ed.)Facing Global Environmental Change – Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts,Berlin-Heidelberg-NewYork:Springer,2009,pp1253-1264

Severino,R.C,Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Reader, Singapore:ISEAS,2006

SolidarityforAsianPeople’sAdvocacy(SAPA),Submission to the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter,Ubud,Bali,17April2006

Syposz,M.,Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities – Opportunities for NGOs and Minorities,MinorityRightsGroupInternational,2006

United Nations Security Council, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1366 (2001), S/RES/1366(2001)

Weller,M.(ed).,The Rights of Minorities in Europe. A commentary on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,OxfordUniversityPress,2005

Wennmann,A.andKrause,J.,Managing the Economic Dimensions of Peace Processes: Resource Wealth, Autonomy, and Peace in Aceh, TheCentreonConflict,DevelopmentandPeacebuildingCCDPWorkingPaper3


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Annexe 2 – List of Workshop Participants

Ewa A. Chylinski DeputyDirector,EuropeanCentreofMinorityIssues

Frank Boerhave ProgrammeManager,EarlyWarningResponse,EuropeanCentreofConflictPrevention

Jim Della-Giacoma SouthEastAsiaProjectDirector,InternationalCrisisGroup

Krzysztof Drzewicki SeniorLegalAdvisor,OSCEHighCommissioneronNationalMinorities

Mohammad Miqdad ExecutiveDirector,InstitutTitianPerdamian

Noel M. Morada Director,AsiaPacificCentrefortheResponsibilitytoProtect

Priyanka Bhalla AssociateResearchFellow,CentreforNon-TraditionalSecurityStudies,S.Rajaretnamschoolofinternationalstudies

Vesselin Popovski Senior Academic Programme Officer, UN University, Institute forSustainabilityandPeace

Zsuzsanna Kacso Director,InternationalPeaceandDevelopmentTrainingCenter,PeaceActionTrainingandResearchInstituteRomania


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Annexe 3 – Conflict Indicators

Usingthematrix fromthe4thAERandsomeof thefactors listed inaknowledgebaseessayon‘EarlyWarning’writtenbyEricBrahm(2005)fortheBeyondIntractabilityorganisation(http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/early_warning/),thefollowingindicatorswerediscussed:

dimensions of Signals

Warning Signals

Common Indicators Listed details to Consider

Territorial §Sign of latent instability: historicterritorialdivisionofethnicgroups

§Heightened refugee movementsacrossborders

§Sudden demographic changes andpopulation displacement (BeyondIntractabilityessay)

Territorialmovementofgroupsshouldalso include displacement andemigrationresettlementsofdifferentgroupsfromnaturaldisasters.

Ethno-religious

§Perceived pervasiveness of culturalsymbolsofdominantgroupinpublicspace:e.g.educationsystem,useoflanguage

§Destruction or desecration ofreligious sites (Beyond Intractabilityessay)

The destruction of the symbols andsitesassociatedwithaminoritygroupneed not always be religious, butalso cultural sites which have somesignificance to the group’s history/identity.

Social §A rise of ‘societal’ intolerance andprejudice (Beyond Intractabilityessay)

Societal intolerance and prejudicewouldincludesignsof:

HatespeechNegative media coverage (use of‘enemyimages’)ProjectionofstereotypesApartheid/segregationpracticesAsuddenbreakdownofcommunityrelations

Governance §Escalationofincidentsofpoliceand/ormilitaryrepression

§Deteriorationofruleoflaw,particularlyperpetratedbythejudiciaryandpolice/military

§Discriminationorlegislationfavoringonegroupoveranother(BeyondIntractabilityessay)

§Government“clamp-downs”(BeyondIntractabilityessay)

Legal provisions for the protectionor promotions ofminority rightsmaynotalwaysbesufficient.Thelackof/or insufficient legislation should betakenintoconsideration.

Asymmetry in governance patternsshould also be viewed – thedemographic details of the policeforce(thedominationofoneparticulargroup–ortheabsenceofone);ifthearmyissituatedinanyparticulararea.


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dimensions of Signals

Warning Signals

Common Indicators Listed details to Consider

Economy §Signoflatentinstability:long-standingdisparityineconomicbenefits

§Abruptdistinctiveandobviouseconomicdisparitybetweendominantgroupanddominatedgroup

§Risingunemploymentrates(BeyondIntractabilityessay)

§Economicshocksorfinancialcrises(BeyondIntractabilityessay)

Whileeconomicreasonsareoftenpartof the structural causes for minorityconflict, theyaredifficult tomeasure– social and economic deprivationsand disparities may be more visiblethanothers.

Unemployment rates are difficult tomeasure for the informal sector. ILOfiguresmayprovide reliabledatabutit remains difficult to determine theratesbyethnicity.

Political §Eventsraiseexpectationsforpositivechangebuteventuallackofexpectedoutcomesparksdeepfrustration

§Governmentfurthercentralisesaccesstopower

§Riseinnationalistsentimentofdominantgroupinitsaction/inactionandrhetoric,particularlyitsportrayalinthemedia

§Destabilisingreferendaorelections(BeyondIntractabilityessay)

§Anincreaseinnumbersofdemonstrationsorrallies(BeyondIntractabilityessay)

An increase in the number ofdemonstrations could quite possiblyindicate a change in position of theminority group - they could havebecomemoreconfidentofvocalisingtheirdemands.Another alternative could be thatthereisanincreaseinthecausesofagitation(eg–cuttingofwatersuppliesinaparticularareadominatedbyanethnicgroup)

Irredentist/Separatist movementsshouldalsobemonitored–thegrowthof,orincreaseinthemovement.

External §Increasedtensionwithborderingcountries

§Foreignintervention(BeyondIntractabilityessay)

Foreign intervention is an importantconsiderationwhenethnicactivismisinvolved.

Conflict cannot be measured solelythrough increased tensions withneighbouring countries but alsotensionsbetweeninternalterritories.


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Annexe 4 – About the Organisers TheAsia-Europe Foundation (ASEF)promotesgreatermutualunderstandingbetweenAsiaandEuropethroughintellectual,culturalandpeople-to-peopleexchanges.ThroughASEF,civilsocietyconcernsareincludedasavitalcomponentofdeliberationsoftheAsia-EuropeMeeting(ASEM)*.ASEFwasestablishedinFebruary1997bytheparticipatinggovernments of ASEM and has since implemented over 500 projects, engaging over15,000directparticipantsaswellasreachingouttoamuchwideraudienceinAsiaand

Europe.www.asef.org.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) was founded in 1925 as a political legacy ofGermany´sfirstdemocraticallyelectedpresident,FriedrichEbert.Sincethebeginningofthefoundation’sworkinSouth,SoutheastandEastAsiathefocushasbeenthepromotionofdemocracyandthestrengtheningofthesocialdimensionofeconomic

development.Inthepastfewyears,theinternationaldialoguewithinAsiaaswellasbetweenAsiaandEurope,andtheissueofcrisispreventionhavegainedimportantstakesintheworkofthefoundation.Initsworkthefoundationco-operateswithanumberofgovernmentalinstitutions,tradeunions,politicalparties,socialmovements,NGOs,mediaandscientificinstitutions,aswellasinternationalorganizations.

The role of the Office for Regional Cooperation in Asia based in Singapore is to support the socialdimension of Southeast and East Asian co-operation and integration, the Asia-Europe dialogue andpartnershipactivitiesintheASEANmemberstatesCambodiaandLaoswheretherearenoFESoffices.The office’s activities include dialogue programmes, international and regional conferences (e.g. oneconomicandsocialpolicy,regionalintegrationandcomprehensivesecurity),Asia-Europeexchanges,research,aswellasprogrammeswithtradeunions.Formoreinformation,pleasevisitwww.fes-asia.org

The Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) is an independentorganizationdedicatedto theresearch,analysisanddiscussionof regionalandinternationalissues.WeaimtomakeSingaporeamorecosmopolitanandglobalsocietythroughresearch,policyworkandpubliceducationoninternationalaffairs.

Foundedin1961andregisteredasamembership-basedsociety,weareSingapore’soldestthinktank.

As a foundingmember of the ASEAN-Institutes for Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS)network,weworkwithourpartner think-tanks toorganizeregionaland internationalworkshopsandconferences toseeknew thoughtsand ideas.Accompaniedby researchandanalysis,weshareourpolitical,economicandsecurityinsightswithpoliticians,policy-makers,businessleaders,andopinion-leaders.www.siiaonline.org

The Europe-Asia Policy Forum (EUforAsia) is designed to target relevantstakeholders in Asia-Europe affairs and policy-making with information oncontemporaryissuesregardingEU-Asia.ThebriefingseriesispartoftheEU-AsiaPolicyForumthataimstoenhanceEU-Asiacooperationandawarenessonissues

ofmutual interestsuchassustainabledevelopment, regional integration,governanceandotherhottopics.MainpartnersaretheInternationalInstituteofAsianStudies(IIAS),theAsiaEuropeFoundation(ASEF) and the Singapore Institute for International Affairs (SIIA), in cooperationwith the EuropeanPolicyCenter(EPC).

TheprojectisfinancedbytheEuropeanCommission

*ASEMnowbrings together46memberstates (Australia,Austria,Belgium,BruneiDarussalam,Bulgaria,Cambodia,China,Cyprus,CzechRepublic,Denmark,Estonia,Finland,France,Germany,Greece,Hungary,Indonesia,India,Ireland,Italy,Japan,Korea,Laos,Latvia,Lithuania,Luxembourg,Malaysia,Malta,Mongolia,Myanmar,theNetherlands,NewZealand,Pakistan,thePhilippines,Poland,Portugal,Romania,Russia,Singapore,Slovakia,Slovenia,Spain,Sweden,Thailand,UnitedKingdom,Vietnam)plustheEuropeanCommissionandtheASEANSecretariat.www.aseminfoboard.org

Published byAsia-Europe Foundation31 Heng Mui Keng TerraceSingapore 119595

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Office for Regional Cooperation in Asia7500A Beach Road #12-320/321/322The PlazaSingapore 199591

Singapore Institute for International Affairs2 Nassim RoadSingapore 25837

“Early Warning Systems in Minority Conflicts – A framework for developing regional responses” ISBN : 978-981-08-8059-0

Copyright@ 2011 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the publisher.

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Commission. The views expressed in this publication are strictly those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect those of the Asia-Europe Foundation, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, or the Singapore Institute of International Affairs, the European Commission or the Europe-Asia Policy Forum.

About the Asia-Europe Roundtable

The Asia-Europe Roundtable is a series that aims to examine the nature of Asia and Europe, focusing on international relations issues, with a view to understanding both better and to identify and share best practices on solutions to common or contrasting problems. Since 2000 the following activities have been organised:

1st AER “Regions in Transition”August 2000 | Singapore

2nd AER “Trans-National Problem-Solving in a Global Era: Towards Multi-Level Governance?”September 2001 | Oxford, United KingdomCo-hosted by the Centre for Globalisation and Regionalisation Studies, Warwick University, and Corpus Christi College, Oxford University

3rd AER “Peace and Reconciliation: Success Stories and Lessons from Asia and Europe”October 2003 | Hanoi, VietnamHosted by the Institute for International Relations (IIR) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vietnam

4th AER “Conflict Prevention: Actors, Institutions and Mechanisms”April 2005 | Berlin, Germany

5th AER “Sustaining the Peace through Post-Conflict Reconstruction”May 2007 | Singapore

6th AER “Minority Conflicts – Towards an ASEM Framework for Conflict Management”June 2009 I Derry, Northern Ireland & Letterkenny, Ireland

7th AER Workshop “Early Warning Systems in Minority Conflicts”May 2010 I Singapore

The series is organised by the Asia-Europe Foundation, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, and the Singapore Institute of International Affairs.

The inaugural AER was launched in Singapore in 2000, to present a broad overview of the transitions in the two regions. The 2nd AER was held in Oxford, UK, in 2001, and focused on the issue of global and regional governance and transnational problem-solving. The roundtable shifted from broader regional issues to a more specific focus on peace and security. The 3rd AER in Hanoi (2003) and the 4th AER in Berlin (2005) deepened bi-regional dialogue and promoted networking in the areas of conflict prevention as well as peace and reconciliation. The 5th AER focused on “Sustaining Peace through Post-Conflict Reconstruction” and the 6th AER looked at different types of minority conflicts and the potential to design possible political solutions & a framework for sustainable peace. The 7th AER Workshop focussed on Early Warning Systems in Minority Conflicts.

EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS IN MINORITY CONFLICTSA FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING REGIONAL RESPONSES

7TH ASIA-EUROPE ROUNDTABLE WORKSHOPSingapore 20-21 May 2010

EDITED BYStefanie EliesSol IglesiasYeo Lay Hwee

On 20-21 May 2010, experts from the fi eld of early warning systems and minority confl ict issues, met at the Asia-Europe Foundation for a workshop which was held under the auspices of the Asia-Europe Roundtable (AER) series. Following up upon recommendations from previous AER meetings to monitor warning signals for minority confl icts, this workshop was on the topic of ‘Early Warning Systems in Minority Confl icts’.

Based on the background paper and the discussions from the 7th Asia Europe Roundtable workshop, Early Warning Systems in Minority Confl ict: A Framework for Developing Regional Responses’ studies the manner by which minority confl icts are prevented and contained through early warning systems; by analysing the gaps within the current mechanisms, it presents a framework by which regional early warning structures and responses can be better integrated and enhanced.

More specifi cally, this publication will:

• Map the international legal framework for minority confl ict prevention and make an inventory of various existing mechanisms for confl ict prevention;

• Illustrate how regional actors have acted to prevent minority confl ict and what preventive efforts have been organised at regional level;

• Present various approaches to minority confl ict prevention in the context of early warning systems;

• Identify potential and criteria for creating regional multi-level structures for minority confl ict prevention, methods to build capacity, trust and coordination between the stakeholders.

Supported by:

[ISBN: 978-981-08-8059-0]

This project is fi nanced by the European Commission

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