Week 1 Seminar

Introduction and significance of Japan’s international relations: politics, economics and security

Dr. Aimee Richmonda.richmond@sheffield.ac.uk

This week’s seminar questions:

Q1. Why is Japan still an important actor in the study of international relations? - why does Japan matter?

Q2. How can we use the questions what, why and how to study Japan’s international relations?

Q3. How useful is it to approach Japan’s international relations in terms of the three dimensions of politics, economics and security in the key sites of international activity, the United States, East Asia?

Q4. Why have the metaphors and perceptions of Japan’s role in the world changed? Do you recognise any of these characterisations of Japan’s international activity? Why do Japan’s international relations appear paradoxical, ‘normal’, ‘aberrant’ or ‘abnormal’?

Q1. Why is Japan still an important actor in the study of international relations? - why does Japan matter?

Icebreaker:

- Why did you choose to study Japan?- Why did you choose this module?- Give one reason why you think Japan is an

important actor in international relations / Why Japan matters

Q2. How can we use the questions what, why and how to study Japan’s international relations?

• What – to establish what has been and is Japan’s pattern of behaviour and role in the international system

• Why – explaining why Japan opts to behave in the way it does

• How – the means, methods and effectiveness of how Japan pursues its international role

Group activityTry to come up with three questions that could be used to investigate one area of Japan’s international relations

Q3. How useful is it to approach Japan’s international relations in terms of the three dimensions of politics, economics and security in the key sites of international activity, the United States, East Asia?

1. Overviews:- Economics- Politics- Security- United States- East Asia

2. Discuss Q3 in Groups

Economics• Before the war Japan had twin military and

economic objectives: “rich country strong army” (fukoku kyohei)

• Economic ambition remains• PM Ikeda Hayato’s income doubling plan in 1960s• Economism became the ‘norm’ • Since 1945 the principle image of Japan’s

international relations has been linked firmly to the pursuit of economic interests

• This has meant that politics and security are less prominent

Economics• 3rd largest economy in terms of GDP• 4th largest economy in terms of exports• Invests a lot in FDI and ODA• in contrast, the size of Japans national debt is growing (gross public

debt was 200% of GDP at end of 2010)• This now makes the Japanese government the biggest borrower

among the major industrialized powers, although most of this is borrowing from domestic sources.

• Japanese goods known for quality and innovation• These goods are in many ways the ‘face’ of Japan’s overseas

economic activities and the physical manifestation of its global power and reach (Emmott 1991)

• Japan has gradually enhanced its presence in global economic institutions

• From 2008 Japan has been the 2nd largest contributor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank

Politics• Japan’s economic weight has inevitably brought it a degree of

political power in global institutions. (only East Asian country in G8, member of G20, Second largest contributor to the UN’s budget)

• Japan generally appears to lack the political appetite and capacity to assert a clearly identifiable leadership role on the world’s political stage

• Japan has often been seen to lack a readily identifiable or forceful political and international ideology.

• Japan is seen as having a ‘legitimacy deficit’ (Rapkin 1990:195)- inability to pursue a fully independent foreign policy and to

demonstrate a decisive political leadership- Wartime memories have left Japanese policy-makers wary of

making attempts to reassert global or regional leadership• This ‘legitimacy deficit’ has been compounded by Japan’s apparent

lack of any universalistic values that can be exported to other countries.

Politics• The exact extent of Japan’s global political power is hard to aggregate

and to compare on the same basis as the other major industrialized powers

• This is because the Japanese Government concentrates on consensus building and financial support in global institutions, along with a greater attempt to raise its profile internationally

• This makes it seem like Japan is poised for a more assertive political leadership role in the world, although how independent a role Japan plays remains to be seen

• Through the global diffusion of Japan’s economic products, it has begun to acquire ‘soft’ political power (Nye 1990; Drift 1998)

• This soft power is accompanied by a degree of acceptance of Japanese culture and knowledge frameworks

• This influences the norms and value judgements of the recipients, which in turn can influence their economic, political and security decisions and policies in relation to Japan and the wider world (Strange 1988: 120)

Security• Maintains the 5th largest defence budget in the world• Article 9 of the Japanese constitution still serves to constrain the

state’s use of military • Japan makes a contribution to global security based upon the

extension of economic power and cooperation• The Japanese state and its people, then, harbour a view of security

which is much broader than the military approach of most of the other major industrialized powers

• The concept of ‘human security’ remains an important aspect of Japanese foreign policy (Hughes 2004a: 121-2)

• Alliance with US (US-Japan security treaty)• Japan is becoming an increasingly active partner• This more proactive role is emerging in the context of a

remilitarizing Japan (Hughes 2009a)• Hence the attempts to develop a ’human security’ dimension, is

being complemented by an increased military role.

United States• During occupation US promoted Japan’s economic growth• Bilateral trade and investment relations• Japanese TNCs are now part of the US landscape• There are also negatives reaction – e.g. to Matsushita’s

purchase of the Rockefeller Centre• Politically – The US’s relationship to Japan is in line with

victor and vanquished• US-Japan security treaty (right to construct military bases)• Entanglement• Japan’s political independence is constrained in some

instances, and in others foreign pressure has forced Japan to expand its political contribution to global and regional orders

East Asia • Japan is the largest provider of ODA• Provision of economic aid designed to build political and security

stability• FDI• Complex web of manufacturing production systems and trade links• Extended production networks through the activites of Japanese TNCs• The legacies of WW2 and the Cold War have left Japan still largely

distrusted• Continued fears of Japanese militarism mean that Japan contributes

instead through US-Japan alliance• Territorial and resource disputes (Senkaku and Takeshima)• However, Japan has constructed a set of special political relationships

with the ASEAN states• Japan has returned to a central, and possibly dominant position within

the East Asia region as a political, economic and security player and organiser during the first decade of the 21st century

Q3. How useful is it to approach Japan’s international relations in terms of the three dimensions of politics, economics and security in the key sites of international activity, the United States, East Asia?

In groups, discuss:

Q4: Why have the metaphors and perceptions of Japan’s role in the world changed? Do you recognise any of these characterisations of Japan’s international activity? Why do Japan’s international relations appear paradoxical, ‘normal’, ‘aberrant’ or ‘abnormal’?

Keep these questions in mind as we go through the following sections:• Metaphors of change• Metaphors of challenge• Metaphors of contradiction• Metaphors of capriciousness• Expectation vs reality

• Discussion of Q4 (time reliant)

Metaphors of change• 1960s-90s ‘Rising sun’ – implied Japans ascent to great status• 1962 The Economist ask readers to ‘consider japan’ and its

startling economic advances• 1971 ‘Superstate’ (Kahn, 1971)• 1976 East Asia’s new economic ‘giant; (Patrick and Rosovsky

1976)• 1979 Harvard academic Ezra Vogel warns the American people

that Japan was likely to overtake the US to become the world’s ‘No 1’ (Vogel, 1979)

• 1982 Economic ascendance declared a ‘miracle’ (Johnson 1986)• 1986 Pax Nipponica could replace Pax Americana (Vogel 1986)• 1990s Routinely talked about as a ‘superpower’ (Horley and

Buckley, 1990; Garby and Brown bullock 1994)

Metaphors of challengeJapan was portrayed as an economic juggernaut. At best, driverless and careering out of control. At worst, a peril and parasitic threat to the international order:• rise of the ‘Japan problem’ (Van Wolferen 1986/7)• ‘free riding’ on the US? (Prestwitz, 1988)• No aim in the international sphere save the shortsighted and reckless pursuit of

market share and the systematic crushing of economic rivals (Van Wolferen 1990).

• Climbed to prominence on the back of other major industrialized powers

Since the economic slowdown and onset of the Heisei recession, a new series of metaphors associated with Japan’s decline have emerged:• Japanese sun ‘also sets’ and is ‘divided ’(Emmott 1989; Callon 1997)• Japan is ‘anything but number one’ (Woronoff 1991)• Economic miracle is over (Katz 1998)• ‘head[ing] for the edge’ (Paul Krugman, economist, financial times Jan 1999)• Would Japan ever awake from its slumber? • No longer seems to pose a threat to Western industries

Metaphors of contradiction• Political pygmy (disproportionately large in terms of economic

power, but small in terms of its political power in the world)• Japan as a ‘free rider’• From potential superpower to international weakling• From economic juggernaut to economic write-off• From military cipher to uniformed helper

Metaphors of capriciousness*• Often changing PMs• Consequently proved unable to pursue a consistent foreign policy line• Wavering between highly ambitious values-orientated diplomacy

informed by strong, near neo-conservative sentiment, and reverting to cautious and pragmatic diplomacy

• Clashing with the US?

Japan’s international behaviour exhibits a number of characteristics which contrast sharply with those of the other major industrialized powers. As a result, attempts to conveniently categorize Japan in line with traditional interpretations of international relations remain frustrated.

* Capricious = given to sudden and unaccountable changes of mood or behavior

Expectation vs Reality

Scenario: Realist school of IR theory would posit that a rise to economic superpower status can be expected to be accompanied by the acquisition of comparable military power, including even nuclear weapons

Expectation: Japan would remilitarise, perhaps adopt a pro-nuclear stance or acquire nuclear weapons

Reality: Japan puts up strong resistance to the expansion of its military role

Expectation vs Reality

Scenario: Major industrialized powers typically follow the model of having a proactive stance

Expectation: Japan’s leaders would readily pursue a set of dynamic international relations

Reality: Japan tends to react to, rather than shape, international events

Expectation vs Reality

Scenario: Japan holds G8/G20 membership and strives to attain a permanent seat on the UNSC

Expectation: Japan would make a concerted effort to raise a voice equal to those of other major industrialized powers

Reality: Japan doesn’t tend to raise much of a voice and is often a silent participant

• Q4: Why have the metaphors and perceptions of Japan’s role in the world changed? Do you recognise any of these characterisations of Japan’s international activity? Why do Japan’s international relations appear paradoxical, ‘normal’, ‘aberrant’ or ‘abnormal’?