AMOR v. FLORENTINO

FACTS:Maria Florentino owned a house and a camarin (warehouse). By a will, she transferred the house to Jose Florentino and the warehouse to Maria Florentino. Maria sold the warehouse to Amor. Amor then demolished the old warehouse in order to build a new 2-storey structure. The problem is it will shut off the light and air that come in through the window of the adjacent house owned by Jose. Hence the latter files for prohibition claiming there is a negative easement prohibiting Amor from constructing any structure at any height that would block the window. Amor counters that there is no easement. Moreover, since the death of testator was before the Civil Code took effect, the rules on easement do not apply.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not there is an easement prohibiting Amor from doing said construction.2. Whether or not the Civil Code may be applied

RULING:1. Yes. Easement are established by law or by will of the owners or by title. Under Art. 624, there is title by the doctrine of apparent sign. When the estate is subsequently owned by two different persons and the “service” (it cannot be an easement before the transfer) is not revoked in the title nor removed, an easement is established.The Cortez case cannot be invoked by Amor because it involved acquisition by prescription. Art. 624 is acquisition by title.

2. Amor failed to prove that the death of the testator occurred before the effectivity of the Old Civil Code. The facts show that it happened after the effectivity of the said code so the law on easement is already applicable. In any case, even if we assume Amor’s supposition, the law on easement was already integrated into the Spanish Law and in fact, had been established by Jurisprudence.Therefore, Amor is prohibitied from constructing the warehouse above the level of the window.

DISSENTING OPINION OF OZAETA.1) The Majority opinio committed a travesty on justice when it ignored the evidence produced by Amor that the testator’s death occurred before the effectivity of the Code.

2) Hence, the law on easement will not apply.

Moreover, the Spanish Law and the Partidas provided for only three ways of acquiring easements: 1) contract 2) testament 3) prescription. There was no provision similar to the doctrine of apparent sign.

3) There is no doctrine established by the Spanish Tribunal regarding the doctrine.

4) In this modern age of flourescent lights and air conditioning devices, the easement of light and view would be obsolete and deterrent to economic progress especially when in the cities, buildings are side to side with each other.

RONQUILLO vs. ROCO- Easement of Right of Way

Easements of right of way may not be acquired by prescription because it is not a continuous easement.

FACTS:Petitioners’ parcel of land was connected to the Naga Market Place and Igualdad St. by an easement of a right of way through the land of the Respondents, which they have been using for more than 20 years. On May 1953, however, respondents built a chapel right in the middle of the road, blocking their usual path to the marketplace. One year after, by means of force, intimidation, and threats, the owners (respondents) of the land where the easement was situated, planted wooden posts and fenced with barbed wires the road, closing their right of way from their house to Igualdad St. and Naga public market.

ISSUE:Whether or not the easement of a right of way may be acquired by prescription?

HELD: No.

Art. 620 of the CC provides that only continuous and apparent easements may be acquired by prescription. The easement of a right of way cannot be considered continuous because its use is at intervals and is dependent on the acts of man.

Minority Opinion (including the ponente):Easements of right of way may already be acquired by prescription, at least since the introduction into this jurisdiction of the special law on prescription through the Old Code of Civil Procedure, Act No. 190. Said law, particularly, Section 41 thereof, makes no distinction as to the real rights which are subject to prescription, and there would appear to be no valid reason, at least to the

writer of this opinion, why the continued use of a path or a road or right of way by the party, specially by the public, for ten years or more, not by mere tolerance of the owner of the land, but through adverse use of it, cannot give said party a vested right to such right of way through prescription.

“The uninterrupted and continuous enjoyment of a right of way necessary to constitute adverse possession does not require the use thereof every day for the statutory period, but simply the exercise of the right more or less frequently according to the nature of the use.” (17 Am. Jur. 972)"It is submitted that under Act No. 190, even discontinuous servitudes can be acquired by prescription, provided it can be shown that the servitude was actual, open, public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants'."

NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO. VS HIDALGOOctober 31,

FACTS:Plaintiff is the owner of a sugar central (known as “mill site”) and also its adjoining plantation Hacienda “Begona”. He constructed a road adjoining the “mill site” and the provincial highway. Plaintiff allows vehicles to pass upon paying toll charge of P0.15 for each one; pedestrians are allowed free passage.

Defendant owns the adjoining “Hacienda Sangay” wherein he has a billiard hall and a tuba saloon (as in drinking place). The road of the plaintiff is the only means of access to get to Hacienda Sangay.

At one point, plaintiff stopped defendant from using the said road. Hence, instead of taking the road to get to his Hacienda Sangay, defendant passed through Hacienda Begona in a passageway used by the carabaos.

Plaintiff applied for injunction to restrain the defendant from entering/passing through his properties (road & Hacienda).

ISSUE: WON injunction should be granted.

HELD: NO.

RATIO:For injunction to be granted, it must be established that the right sought to be protected exists, but also that the

acts against which the injunction to be directed are violative of said right.In the case at bar, plaintiff failed to establish his right and that the defendant has committed/attempts to commit acts that endanger such right. The complaint does not state how and why the mere passage of defendant over plaintiff’s estate conveying “tuba” to his Hacienda has caused damage to plaintiff’s property rights. The real damage that the plaintiff seeks to avoid is the fact that tuba is disposed of at defendant’s hacienda in which the plaintiff’s laborers have access (apparently, the plaintiff hates that his laborers are getting drunk in the tuba saloon of the defendant). This however, is a nothing more than an exercise of legitimate business on the part of the defendant. What the law does not authorize to be done directly, cannot be done indirectly (if plaintiff cannot enjoin defendant from selling tuba, neither can it obtain injunction to prevent him from passing over its property to transport tuba). (TOPICAL: on mode of acquiring easements): The road was constructed by the plaintiff on hisown land and it made this road accessible to the public, regardless of class/group of persons/entities. This is a voluntary easement constituted in favor of the community. Indeed, the plaintiff may close the road at its pleasure as no period has been fixed when the easement was constituted, but while the road is still open, he may not capriciously exclude defendant from its use. Having the road devoted to the public in general, the road is charged with public interest and while so devoted, the plaintiff may not establish discriminatory.

MUNICIPALITY OF DUMANGAS V. BISHOP OF JARO

The municipality applied for registration of parcels of land claiming that there were owners since time immemorial. Bishop opposed saying that the church had been in possession also since time immemorial.

Since the construction of the church, there had been a side door in the wall through which the worshippers attending mass enter and leave ,passing and entering the land in question. As this use of the land has been continuous, it is evident that the church has acquired a right to such use by prescription, in view of the time that has elapsed since the church was built and dedicated to religious worship, during which period the Municipality has not prohibited the passage over the land by persons who attend services held by the church.

VALDERRAMA V. THE NORTH NEGROS SUGAR CO., INC.

What is prohibited by Art. 543 is that in extending the line or repairing or using the same, a larger area of land is occupied or excavations or materials deposited are outside the area occupied not by causing wagons to pass just because of a change of ownership of the objects being transported.

FACTS:Several hacienda owners in Manapla, Occidental Negros, entered into a milling contract with Miguel Osorio wherein the latter would build a sugar central of a minimum capacity of 300 tons for the milling and grinding of all the sugar cane to be grown by the hacienda owners who in turn would furnish the central with all the cane they might produce in their estates for 30 years from the execution of the contract. Later on, Osorio’s rights and interests were acquired by the North Negros Sugar Co., Inc.2 years after, the current petitioners, Catalino Valderrama, Emilio Rodriguez, Santos Urra et. al, made other milling contracts identical to the first one with the North Negros Sugar, Co., Inc. The hacienda owners, however, could not furnish the central sufficient cane for milling as required by its capacity, so the North Negros made other milling contracts with the various hacienda owners of Cadiz, Occidental Negros. This prompted Valderrama et. al to each file a complaint against North Negros.

The CFI entered 1 single judgment for all of them, ruling in Valderrama et. al’s favor finding that North Negros had no right to pass through the lands of the hacienda owners for the transportation of sugar cane not grown from their lands. Thus the appeal to the SC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the easement of way established was restricted to transporting only sugar cane from the hacienda owners’ lands

HELD: NO(the SC also made 1 judgment for all the 3 cases)The contract entered into by each of the hacienda owners contained a clause that granted the North Negros an easement of way 7 meters wide for the period of 50 years upon their properties for the construction of a railroad. The owners allege ambiguity since it could permit the transportation of sugar cane which they did not produce which is contrary to their intent but the SC held that it is clear that the easement

was established for the benefit of all producers and of the corporation as it is the intent of the milling contract.

Since the easement is a voluntary, apparent, continuous easement of way in favor of the corporation, it is contrary to the nature of the contract that it is only limited to canes produced by the servient estates since it is a well settled rule that things serve their owner by reason of ownership and not by reason of easement. The owners also cannot limit its use for there is nothing in the contract prohibiting the central from obtaining other sources.

Transporting cane from Cadiz also does not make it more burdensome since what is prohibited in Art. 543 of the CC is that in extending the road or in repairing it, it should occupy a greater area or deposit excavations outside the granted 7 meters. This does not happen in this case when the North Negros transports sugar cane from Cadiz, crossing the servient estates, since it continues to occupy the same area and the encumbrance is still the same regardless of the number of times it passes through the estates.

Also the period of the easement is longer than the period of the milling contracts, so even if the owners no longer desire to furnish the central canes for milling, the North Negros still has the right to the easement for the remaining period so the contention that it should be limited to the canes produced by the owners has no basis.

QUIMEN V. CALEAST DAMAGE > SHORTEST DISTANCEWhen the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

FACTS:Anastacia Quimen, together with her 3 brothers and sister, inherited a piece of property in Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among themselves. The shares of Anastacia and 3 other siblings were next to the municipal road. Anastacia’s was at the extreme left of the road while the lots on the right were sold by her brothers to Catalina Santos. A portion of the lots behind Anastacia’s were sold by her (as her brother’s adminstratix) brother to Yolanda.

Yolanda was hesitant to buy the back property at first because it d no access to the public road. Anastacia prevailed upon her by assuring her that she would give her a right of way on her adjoining property (which was in front) for p200 per square meter.

Yolonda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of anastacia’s property. But when yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.

After a few years, Yolanda purchased another lot from the Quimens (a brother), located directly behind the property of her parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending about 19m from the lot of Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of one brother, and Anastacia’s perimeter fence.

In 1987, Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia’s property. The proposed right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacia’s property facing the public highway, starting from the back of the sari-sari store and extending inward by 1m to her property and turning left for about 5m to avoid the store in order to reach the municipal road. The way was unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that the right of way through the brother’s property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through Anastacia’s property would no longer make the path straight. They held that it was more practical to extend the existing pathway to the public road by removing that portion of the store blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the public road and the least prejudicial to the parties concerned than passing through Anastacia’s property.

CA reversed and held that Yolanda was entitled to a right of way on Anastacia’s property. The court, however, did not award damages to her and held that Anastacia was not in bad faith when she resisted the claim.

Anastacia went to the SC alleging that her lot should be considered as a servient estate despite the fact that it does not abut or adjoin the property of private

respondent. She denies ever promising Yolonda a right of way.

Anastacia also argues that when Yolanda purchased the second lot, the easement of right of way she provided was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the servient estates in one person so that there was no longer any compelling reason to provide private respondent with a right of way as there are other surrounding lots suitable for the purpose.

She also strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the public road because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering that an avocado has an average life span of seventy (70) years, she expects a substantial earning from it.

ISSUE:1) Whether or not there was a valid grant of an easement2) Whether or not the right of way proposed by Yolonda is the least onerous/least prejudicial to the parties

HELD: YES to both1) A right of way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law to a person or class of persons to pass over another’s property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for the beneficial use of his property.

The conditions for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are:(a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway;(b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity;(c) the isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and,(d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate.

These elements were clearly present. The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons including

that of petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate. These facts are confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that “[t]he said properties of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and there appears an imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public highway.

2) Article 650 of the NCC explicitly states that “the easement of right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.”

The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. When the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.

TC’s findings:> Yolanda’s property was situated at the back of her father’s property and held that there existed an available space of about 19m long which could conveniently serve as a right of way between the boundary line and the house of Yolanda’ s father> The vacant space ended at the left back of the store which was made of strong materials> Which explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway.

CA’s finding:> The proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is 1m wide and 5m long at the extreme right of Anastacia’s property will cause the least prejudice and/or damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda’ s father which would mean destroying the sari-sari store made of strong materials.

Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records, or are so glaringly erroneous, the SC accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred.

PACITA DAVID-CHANvs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHIL. RABBIT BUS LINES, INC.G.R. No. 105294. February 26, 1997

FACTS:Petitioner alleged that her property, consisting of around 635 square meters, situated in Del Pilar, San Fernando, Pampanga and covered by TCT No. 57596-R, located around the property are the following: Northern and western sides: various business establishments .Southern boundary: land of the Pineda family East-northeastern boundary: a lot with an area of approximately 161 square meters owned by private Philippine Rabbit Lines, which lied between her property and the MacArthur Highway.On September 29, 1987, petitioner filed with the trial court an amended petition with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction, seeking to stop private respondent from fencing its property and depriving her of access tothe highway. In short, petitioner’s lot was almost completely surrounded by other immovables and cut off from the highway. Her only access to the highway was a very small opening measuring two feet four inches wide through the aforementioned property of private respondent, which was now being obstructed by the bus lines’ construction of aconcrete fence. Petitioner believed she was entitled to a wider compulsory easement of right of way through thesaid property of private respondent.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is legally entitled to a right of way through private respondent’s property?

HELD: Citing Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil Code, petitioner submits that “the owner of an estate may claim a compulsory right of way only after he (or she) has established the existence of four requisites, namely: (1) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity is paid;(3) the isolation is not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be

the shortest.”While petitioner may be correct in her theoretical reading of Articles 649 and 650, she nevertheless failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy their requirements .Evaluating her evidence, respondent Court ruled that petitioner is not “without adequate outlet to a public highway” since she built a concrete fence on the southern boundary of her property to separate it from the property of the Pineda family. Worse, during the pendency of the case, she closed the 28-inch clearance which she could use as a means to reach the National Highway without passing through the property of defendant. If plaintiff wants a bigger opening, then she can always destroy a portion of the concrete fence which she erected and pass through the property of the Pineda family which, as shown on the attached sketch on the Commissioner’s Report, has an open space on the southern boundary of plaintiff’s land .The appellate court likewise found that petitioner failed to satisfy the third requirement because she caused her own isolation by closing her access through the Pineda property, The Court of Appeals also ruled that petitioner failed to prove she made a valid tender of the proper indemnity, since her complaint contained no averment that demand for the easement of right of way had been made after payment of the proper indemnity.

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC vs. CA- Easement of Right of Way

Like any other contractual stipulation, a voluntary easement cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots.

FACTS:The controversy in this case is regarding the right of way in Manyan road. The road is a 15 meter wide road abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traverses the edges of La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila University and Maryknoll College on the south. The said road was originally owned by the Tuasons sold a portion of their land to Philippine Building Corporation. Included in such sale was half or 7.5 meters width of the Mangyan road. The said corporation assigned its rights, with the consent of the tuasons, to AdMU through a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Mortgage. Ateneo later on sold to Maryknoll the western portion of the land. Tuason developed their land which is now known as La Vista. On January, 1976, Ateneo and La Vista acknowledged the voluntary easement or a Mutual right of way wherein the parties would allow the other to use their

half portion of the Manyan road (La Vista to use AdMU’s 7.5 meters of the mangyan road and also the other way around.) Ateneo auctioned off the property wherein Solid Homes Inc., the developer of Loyola Grand Villas, was the highest bidder.

ADMU transferred not only the property, but also the right to negotiate the easement on the road. However, La Vista did not want to recognize the easement thus they block the road using 6 cylindrical concrete and some guards over the entrance of the road blocking the entrance of the residents of Loyola Grand Villas. Solid Homes Inc. filed for injunction and La vista in turn filed a third party complaint against AdMU. Some of the arguments of the petitioner were that Loyola residents had adequate outlet to a public highway using other roads and also that AdMU has not yet finalized the negotiation of the easement.

ISSUES: Whether or not there is an easement of right of way?

RULING: YES.There was a voluntary easement of right of way which was acknowledged on January 1976 by the Tuasons and Admu (the easement was established by PBC and the Tuasons but I don’t think I can find the details regarding it in the case… I just saw the one regarding “acknowledgement” between admu and the Tuasons.) Being such, the 4 requisites for a compulsory easement need not be met. And like any other contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary recession of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of the dominant lots. In the case at bar, all the predecessors-in-interest of both parties recognized the existence of such easement and there was no agreement yet to revoke the same. The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the voluntary agreement is thus demandable.

The Court also emphasized that they are not creating an easement but merely declaring one (there no such thing as a judicial easement).

VDA. DE BALTAZAR V. COURT OF APPEALS

For someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way, 4 requisites must be present: (1) the estate must be surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway (2) after payment of the proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to the propietor’s own acts and (4) the right of way

claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

FACTS:Daniel Panganiban is the owner of Lot No. 1027. It is bounded on the north by Sta. Ana River, on the south by the land of vda. de Baltazar and on the west by lot 1028 and on the east by Lot 1025. Directly in front of 1026, 1028, and 1025 is the Braulio St.

Panganiban filed a complaint against the Baltazars for the establishment of a permanent and perpetual easement of right of way for him to have access to the provincial road. The RTC dismissed the complaint for it found 2 other passageways. The CA reversed the decision for it found that there was a strip of land used by Panganiban and his grandfather as a right of way for 30 years until it was closed and that the 2 other passageways were only temporary and was granted to Panganiban when the right of way was closed. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:Whether or not Panganiban is entitled to an easement of right of way

RULING: YESIt has been held that for someone to be entitled of an easement of right of way, 4 requisites must be present. (1) the estate must be surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public highway (2) after payment of the proper indemnity (3) the isolation is not due to the propietor’s own acts and (4) the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest.

Panganiban has all 4 requisites. With regard to the 1st requisite, his land is bounded on all sides by immovables, the lands of Baltazar, Legaspi and Calimon and by the river. The 2nd requisite is settled by a remand to the lower court for the determination of the proper indemnity. As regards the 3rd requisite, it was found that Panganiban bought the land from the Baltazars therefore its isolation was not due to his own acts. And with regard to the 4th requisite, the passage claimed is the shortest distance from his lot to Braulio Street. Panganiban was established all 4 requisites therefore is entitled to the easement.