ec competition policy newsletter vol 2 no 2 · ec competition policy newsletter editor: chris jones...

EC COMPETITIONPOLICYNEWSLETTER

Editor:Chris Jones

Address:European Commission,C150, 00/158,Wetstraat 200, rue de la LoiBrussel B-1049 Bruxellestel. +322 2957620fax. +322 2955437

Electronic Mail:X400: C=be;A=rtt;P=cec;OU=dg4;S=info4Internet: [email protected] Wide Webhttp://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/dg4home.htm

ISSN:

1025-2266

number 2volume 2Summer 1996

c o m p e t i t i o n p o l i c y

NEWSLETTERPublished quarterly by the Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission

The proposal for a EuropeanContents

1 The proposal for a Europeancompetition agency, by Karel VANMIERT

Opinions & Comment5 Liberalization policy and State aid in

the air transport sector, by MichaelNIEJAHR & Giuseppe ABBAMONTE

9 La révision du règlement sur lecontrôle des concentrations: laproposition de la Commission, parEric CUZIAT

12 La communication de la Commissionconcernant la non-impositiond'amendes, par Vincent JORIS

15 La politique européenne deconcurrence 1995, par K. VAN MIERT

Anti-Trust Rules20 Summary of the most important recent

developments, by Joos STRAGIERwith Hugo VERLACKT and StephenRYAN

27 Press releases28 Court Judgements

Mergers27 Summary of the most important recent

developments, by Kristin SCHREIBER36 Press releases

State Aid38 Summary of the most important recent

developments, by Roland KOBIA42 Press Releases

International Dimension ofCompetition Policy45 Summary of the most important recent

developments, by S. DEPYPERE,B. CARTON and Y. SCARAMOZZINO

47 Parallel Importation and LocalBusiness in Malta, by B. GATT

INFORMATION SECTION

50 DG IV Staff List52 Documentation63 Coming up ...63 DG IV on the World Wide Web64 More Information

competition agencyby Karel VAN MIERT, Commissionner responsible for Competition

Community competition law comprisesrules covering the activities of privateenterprises, state monopolies, monopolyrights and state aid granted by MemberStates, some of which are not appliedat national level. All these rules arecurrently applied and enforced by theCommission (Article 89 EC Treaty).However, at the Inter-governmentalConference, launched in Turin on 29March 1996, the German governmenthas put forward a proposal designed tochange the current institutional order.They argue that a competition agencyseparate from the Commission shouldbe created. This agency would becharged with the application of thecompetition rules vis-à-vis privateenterprises (i.e. the prohibition ofrestrictive arrangements (Article 85 ECTreaty) and abuses of a dominantposition (Article 86 EC Treaty) as wellas EC merger control (CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 4064/89)["antitrust rules"]), whereas theCommission would retain theresponsibility for enforcing theremaining competition rules and, ofcourse, for conducting competitionpolicy. Both sets of rules are equallyimportant even in quantitative terms. In1995, there were:

- 668 "antitrust" cases (559 new casesof restrictive arrangements and abuse ofdominant positions and 109 merger

cases), and- approximately 685 state monopolyand monopoly rights as well as stateaid cases.

In my view the proposal to addanother agency to the already existing12 is flawed for a number of reasons.

COMPETITION POLICY ISCLOSELY LINKED TO OTHERCOMMUNITY POLICIES

Community competition policy servesspecial objectives which are unique toa Union of 15 Member States. TheCommunity was founded with the aimof establishing a common market andan economic and monetary union. Inorder to achieve these ambitious goalsthe Community has a number ofcommon policies at its disposal. Thecommon policies, of whichcompetition policy forms a part, areclosely interlinked.

The classical example of the linkbetween policies is the single marketprogramme which aims at creating aninternal market without frontiers. TheCommunity applies these commonpolicies hand in hand in order toabolish barriers for trade between

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Member States and to open upnational markets for other Europeancompetitors. Competition policy playsan important rôle in this. Thus,whereas internal market policyintroduces directives in order to openup public procurement markets andstimulates the establishment ofEuropean technical standards,competition policy ensures that theseconstraints are not replaced by newones. Companies must not be allowedto thwart the emerging internal marketthrough restrictive agreements, abusesor mergers which would allow themto keep markets partitioned, blockexports and imports and impede newentrants. In the same way MemberStates must not be allowed to replaceeliminated forms of protectionism bystate aids or exclusive rights accordedto monopolies. More generally,competition policy ensures that thesingle market with its efficiency gainsbecomes a reality and not only atheoretical possibility.

The close link between communpolicies also means that thecompetition principle is already takeninto account at a very early stage ofthe development of measures of theCommunity, for instance, in the areasof research&technical development,regional or environmental policy.

This link between policies is reflectedin the institutional order of theCommunity. The mandate of aEuropean competition authority hasbeen given to the same institutionwhich has been entrusted with thecomprehensive task "[of ensuring] theproper functioning and developmentof the common market" (Article 155EC Treaty) (the Commission). Thisenables the competition rules to beapplied jointly, and more effectively,with other common policies. To takethe enforcement of the competition

rules away from the Commissionwould render it more difficult toachieve the ambitious objectives ofthe Union.

ALL COMMUNITYCOMPETITION RULES FORMA UNITY

As I have already pointed out, there isa broad range of Communitycompetition rules. These rules allow aneffective competition policy. Theyform a unity which requires a uniformapproach. This means, for instance,that the effects of a state aid oncompetition have to be assessed in thelight of all other Communitycompetition rules (see, for example,CFI 1995 ECR II, 1971 Aitec, BritishCement Association, Blue Circle,Castle, Rugby and Titan v Commission.The antidumping rules are also a partof this unity, see ECJ 1992 ECR I,3843 Extramet v Council). If appliedcoherently, the rules mutually reinforceeach other. A uniform approach isparticularly relevant for those caseswhere all the instruments have to beapplied together.

The combined use of the rules hasbeen essential in the past to make thesingle market programme a success.At present, the comprehensiveapplication of the full range is crucialfor the Community to liberalise themarkets, amongst other, fortelecommunications, postal services,energy and transport.

Take, for example, the sector of airtransport. Cases of state aid to "flagcarriers", and the formation ofstrategic alliances occurring in theindustry (see, for instance, the allianceof Swissair/Sabena), are foundtogether and have to be analysedtogether. The same applies to state aid

for "national champions" as well asabuses of dominant position (see, forexample, Air Lingus/Ryan Air case).Finally, cases of access to essentialfacilities such as ground-handlingservices at airports have to be dealtwith (see the cases of Frankfurt/Mainand Milan).

In future, the full range of Communitycompetition rules will again beinstrumental for integrating thenational economies of new MemberStates into the existing single marketin order to create an even larger singlemarket. The same holds for thestructural changes occuring as aconsequence of the creation of theEuropean Monetary Union.

The proposed creation of an agencywould make it much more difficult toapply all the strands of Communitycompetition law coherently. Thus, forexample, the Commission wouldremain responsible for the control ofstate aid but the agency would controlthe transaction for which the state aidmay have been granted. The agency inturn would be responsible for theprohibition of an abuse committed bya private enterprise in one MemberState, whereas the Commission wouldhave to deal with a similar abuse inanother Member State where it hasbeen committed by an undertaking towhich a Member State grantedmonopoly rights (see, for instance, theHolyhead and Rødby cases where ferryoperators were refused access to theseports). Responsibilities would thus besplit-up where they should not.

The dilution of enforcement of theCommunity competition rules wouldnot be the only result of the split-up. Itwould also have negative repercussionsfor the further progress of the singlemarket, liberalisation, enlargement andmonetary union.

2 Competition Policy Newsletter Volume 2 · Number 2 · Summer 1996

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THE COMMISSION IS THEAPPROPRIATE COMPETITIONAUTHORITY FOR THECOMMUNITY

The legislators of the Treaty of Romeentrusted the Commission with theresponsibility of applying theCommunity competition rules (Article89 EC Treaty). They believed rightlythat only the Commission wouldpossess the authority and legitimacywith the wider public necessary toreconcile possible conflicts betweenpolicies and to set priorities for thepromotion of the principle ofcompetition in view of the evolvingCommunity. And, in fact, theCommiss ion has deve lopedcompetition policy and its instrumentssuccessfully on the basis of aconsensus which it achievedthroughout the Community in spite ofthe differences between Member Statein terms of approaches, stages ofdevelopment and weight attributed tocompetition policy.

The consensus at Community level hasallowed the Commission to develop afully-fledged system of legalinstruments (including merger controlsince 1990) and to exercise an effectivecompetition law enforcement. Outsideobservers acknowledge the controlpractice as competition-oriented andreasonably strict. The Germangovernment, for example, stated withregard to EC merger control that "all inall there exists no reason forsubstantial criticism of the decisionalpractice" (German government in anofficial publication of the GermanBundestag on the Activities' Report ofthe Bundeskartellamt for 1995. Theoriginal German text reads: "In derGesamtbewertung sieht sie keinenAnlaß zu wesentlicher Kritik an denE r g e b n i s s e n d e rEntscheidungsfindung").

The Commission would not be able tofulfill its comprehensive task aseffectively as at present, if it had tocede the application of theCommunity antitrust rules to anagency. The agency, on the otherhand, would lack the authority and theflexibility to apply the competitionrules successfully in the Communitycontext. What is more, its democraticaccountability is uncertain. Theproposal would thus also impede theobjectives of the Community throughthe weakening of an institution key toits success.

ARGUMENTS GIVEN FOR THECREATION OF A EUROPEANCOMPETITION AGENCY

Not just law enforcement

One of the main arguments used tojustify the creation of an agency isthat decisions in individualcompetition cases should not be a taskfor a politically oriented decision-making body.

However, it is a strength ofCommunity competition policy andlaw that is not to be developed andapplied in isolation but as an integralpart of other Community policies andby the Commission. It is due to thesefactors that competition policy hasbeen a success in the past and that acomprehensive and effective body ofcase law and practice has beendeveloped. The Community findsitself in a unique situation whichrequires policies, legal instrumentsand an institutional order for whichthere is no parallel in the MemberStates.

It is unlikely that "pure" and dogmaticlaw enforcement through an agencycould have been equally successful inthe Community context. The pursuanceof the Community objectives requirespolitical judgement. Certainly, theCommission must only considercompetition criteria and apply the rule-of-law. However, to the extent that thecompetition rules leave room forassessment and discretion, it can usethis room to apply the rules in anevolutionary manner and in view ofother Community policies. Theapplication of any rules can only bedelegated to an agency once thedevelopment of the Community hasreached a certain maturity and thereexists a widely shared consensus onthe policy and its rules. This is not thecase for Community competitionpolicy at the moment. There is a widerange of views between Member Stateson the emphasis to be given whenapplying this policy but, moreimportantly, the rules themselves arestill evolving to adapt to radicalchanges of the economic and politicalenvironment because of liberalisation,enlargement and monetary union.

Whilst policy and application of therules must evolve to meet thesechallenges, it is noteworthy thatCommunity procedures provide asystem of legal 'checks and balances'.The College of Commissioners has totake account of proceedings whichinclude oral hearings of the parties andthe deliberations of an AdvisoryCommittee of Member States'competition experts. All decisions aresubject to close scrutiny of theEuropean Courts which lookremorselessly into all the proceduraland substantive issues a case raises. Ofthe many decisions taken in the last 40years, none has ever been annulledbecause it had been motivated by otherthan competition considerations.

Competition Policy Newsletter Volume 2 · Number 2 · Summer 1996 3

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Moreover, the proposal for an agencywould, contrary to its objective,increase the risk of decisions inindividual cases being taken onpolitical considerations. It is morethan likely that the creation of theagency could only become acceptableby the parallel establishment of a newlevel of political control. A publicinterest test exists in one form orother in almost all Member States,including notably Germany (InGermany the Minister of Economicscan overrule a prohibition decision ofthe Bundeskartellamt in a merger caseon request of the parties. Of the 108prohibition decisions of theBundeskartellamt 6 have beenoverturned on political grounds by theMinister in 1973-1994). It wouldallow the Commission to override thecompetition based decisions of theagency on political grounds.Obviously, that power would have tobe exercised when the parties orindividual Member States raisearguments of political or industrialopportunity in favour of the merger.

The above described two step-decision-making could also introducean undesirable element of conflictbetween Member States. It couldtrigger the reappraisal of agencydecisions, and the Commission, whichwould have to overrule the agency byputting competition considerationsaside.

Efficiency

It is also alleged that an agency wouldbe more efficient than the Commissiondealing with the constant increase inthe number of cases. In view of thefuture enlargement of the Communitythe Commission should, it is argued,therefore be relieved of the burden ofdecisions on individual competitioncases.

It is difficult to imagine how thecreation of an additional enforcemententity could render the application ofthe competition rules more efficient.Whereas the agency would apply theantitrust rules, the Commission wouldcontinue to enforce the othercompetition rules. Since the legalprocedures, consultation mechanismswith Member States and multi-linguistic regime would remainunchanged, the growing number ofcases would pose the same difficultiesto an agency as it would to theCommission.

It is likely, however, that the split-upwould render law enforcement lessefficient than it is at present. The needfor close cooperation between the twoauthorities in order to ensure coherentapplication of all Communitycompetition rules would most probablyprolong proceedings in individualcases and would certainly require moreresources to accomplish the task. Also,the introduction of a two-stageprocedure for mergers, which wouldallow parties to request a review by theCommission or the Council on non-competition grounds, would certainlyprolong the decision-making process.

Contrary to what is alleged, theproposed agency would rendercompetition law enforcement lessefficient and, thus, less effective thanat present.

ENABLING PROVISION

In the absence of consensus on theimplementation of the suggestion, ithas been proposed to add only anenabling provision to the Treaty inorder to allow the creation of acompetition agency in the future.However, this proposal would notonly meet the same objections as the

creation of the agency itself but wouldfurther aggravate the concerns. This isbecause existing deep divergences ofopinion on the future institutionalstructure would only have beenpapered over.

The result would be that theCommission would find it moredifficult to conduct an independentcompetition policy and apply thecompetition rules autonomously. AnyMember State not satisfied with adecision of the Commission in anindividual case, could at any time callor threaten to call for the transfer ofthe Commission's competences to anagency by application of the suggestedenabling provision. This would notonly destabilise the Commission indeveloping competition policy and lawbut also have the perverse effect of"politicising" the decision-makingprocess in individual cases.

CONCLUSION

The proposed creation of an agency,which would enforce the Communityantitrust rules separately from theCommission, would cut important linksbetween competition policy and otherCommunity policies. It wouldendanger the current comprehensiveand uniform application of allcompetition rules and weaken theCommission as the promotor of theCommunity. The agency would, thus,have a negative impact not only on theeffectiveness of the competition rulesbut also on the future progress of thecommon market and the economic andmonetary union. The proposal wouldtherefore cause a big reorganisationand involve many risks for the smallresult of removing a theoreticalconcern.


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Liberalization policy and State aidin the air transport sector

By Michael NIEJAHR and Giuseppe ABBAMONTE, DG VII-C-2

On 1 January 1993, the third and finalpackage of measures for theliberalization of the Community'sinternal air transport market enteredinto force. This package completes theprocess of gradual market liberalizationwhich started with a limited initiativeon inter-regional air services in 1983,followed by two consecutive packagesof liberalization measures in 1987 and1990 as well as rules for the freeprovision of air cargo services betweenthe Member States of the Communityin early 1991.

THE THIRD PACKAGE

The third package essentially consistsof three complementary sets ofregulations.

First, Council Regulation (EEC) No2407/92 (OJ No L 240, 24.8.1992, p.1) establishes common rules on thelicensing of air carriers. Anyundertaking which complies with thoserules, including the obligations of beingmajority owned and effectivelycontrolled by Member States ornationals of Member States, is entitledto receive an operating licencepermitting it to carry out carriage byair of passengers, mail and cargo forremuneration or hire.

In its decision of July 1995 in the caseof Swissair/Sabena (OJ No L 239,7.10.1995, p. 19), the Commission had

the opportunity to provide extensiveguidance of its interpretation of theownership and control requirementsenshrined in the Regulation. It statedthat those requirements are essentiallydesigned to safeguard the interests ofthe Community's air transport industryand, in particular, to ensure that marketaccess possibilities under the thirdpackage will effectively be exploited byCommunity air carriers and will not beexercised, either directly or throughsubsidiaries, by air carriers from thirdcountries. First, the majority ownershiprequirement is complied with if at least50% plus one share of the (equity)capital of the air carrier concerned areowned by Member States and/ornational of Member States. Theremaining shares may indeed be heldby one or more investors from thirdcountries, and such shareholding mustnot in itself be considered incompatiblewith that requirement (although thescale of the third-country investment aswell as the distribution of the shareswithin each group of shareholders needto be taken into account in anyassessment under the effective controlrequirement). Second, the effectivecontrol requirement is complied with ifMember States and/or nationals ofMember States have, either individuallyor acting together with other MemberStates or nationals of Member States,the ultimate decision-making power inthe management of the air carrierconcerned. They must be able, eitherdirectly or indirectly through

appointments to the decisive corporatebodies of the carrier, to have the finalsay on such key questions as, forexample, the carrier's business plan, itsannual budget or any major investmentor cooperation projects. Such abilitymust not be substantially dependentupon the support of individuals orcompanies from third countries.

Second, Council Regulation (EEC) No2408/92 (OJ No L 240, 24.8.1992, p. 8)provides that an air carrier holding sucha licence generally enjoys free access toall intra-Community routes. Nodistinction is made any longer betweenscheduled and non-scheduled flights, norbetween air passenger and air cargoservices. The operation of cabotageservices continues, until April 1997, tobe subject to certain limitationspertaining to their consecutive natureand the capacity which can be offered.Moreover, the Regulation contains anumber of well-defined safeguardclauses allowing a Member State, underthe control of the Commission, tointervene in the principle of free marketaccess for public policy reasons such as,for example, the maintenance of airservices to remote regions, airportpolicy or the protection of theenvironment. Member States have so farmade use of those safeguard clausesprimarily to distribute traffic betweenairports belonging to the same airportsystem (Article 8) and to impose publicservice obligations on regional routes(Article 4).

The Regulation entrusts the Commissionwith special decision-making powers tocontrol the application of any of thesafeguard clauses mentioned above. Inthis area, the Commission is thereforenot required to have recourse to thenormal infringement procedure ofArticle 169 of the Treaty. In the firstthree years of application of the thirdpackage, the Commission made use of


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those special decision-making powersin order to ensure that Community aircarriers were granted access to theairport of Paris(Orly). That access wasinitially obstructed by the way in whichthe French authorities distributed thetraffic between the airports of the Parisairport system (Orly and Charles-de-Gaulle). In three decisions of May1993 (OJ No L 140, 11.6.1993, p. 51)and April 1994 (OJ No L 127,19.5.1994, pp. 28 and 35), theCommission found the Frenchmeasures in question to bediscriminatory and disproportionate inrelation to the policy objectives pursuedand, thus, incompatible with therequirements of Article 8(1) of theRegulation.

As a matter of practice, theCommission's intervention was crucialfor an effective and timelyliberalization of the air transport marketin France since Orly accounted forsome 85% of the domestic air servicesto and from Paris. The importance ofthe Commission's special decision-making powers in this context isillustrated by the follow-up to the twodecisions of April 1994. In both cases,the French authorities appealed to theCourt of Justice and, in addition,applied for interim measuressuspending the effects of the seconddecision concerning access to the routesParis(Orly)-Marseille and Paris(Orly)-Toulouse. After the Court had rejectedthat latter application for interimmeasures (1994 ECR I-5229), theFrench authorities complied with theirobligations under Community law byimplementing the contested decisionand, thus, established a fait accomplifrom which no roll-back was possibleany more. In February 1996, theFrench authorities eventually withdrewtheir appeal. The French authoritiesalso withdrew their appeal against thefirst decision concerning access to theroute between Paris(Orly) and London

after they had committed themselves toabide by the Commission's reasoning inthe context of the state aid procedureconcerning Air France (OJ No L 254,30.9.1994, p. 73) and revised theirtraffic distribution rules for the Parisairport system in a way which theCommission, in a futher decision ofMarch 1995 (OJ No L 162, 13.7.1995,p. 25), found to be acceptable.

Third, Council Regulation (EEC) No2409/92 (OJ No L 240, 24.8.1992, p.15) allows an air carrier to freely set itsfares and rates for the services operatedwithin the internal market under theabove-mentioned rules. Again, MemberStates may intervene in that pricingfreedom under safeguard clausesallowing them to withdraw excessivelyhigh passenger fares or to stopsustained downward developments ofsuch fares (so-called downwardspirals). Cargo rates, in contrast, cannotbe subject to such interference. Neitherof those intervention possibilities hasbeen used so far.

The Commission services have,however, established informalguidelines to be followed in any futurecases. According to those guidelines,the safeguard clauses are exceptions tothe general principle of price freedomand, as such, must be interpretedstrictly and applied only in exceptionalcircumstances. An air fare willgenerally not be challenged asexcessively high if there are no legal orfactual barriers to market entry, and ifthere is a high degree of competitionon the route or routes concerned. In allother cases, the final assessment will bebased on a qualitative analysis of, first,the respective fare operating ratio and,second, the comparison with farescharged by the carrier underinvestigation for other comparableservices. Moreover, any intervention inthe case of sustained downwarddevelopment of air fares presupposes at

least two previous rounds of faredecreases by the carriers operating onthe route or group of routes concerned.Such intervention will only be requiredif none of those carriers is able togenerate profits from its operations.Neither does it suffice that the carriersmerely lose revenues (but are stilloperating profitably), nor that only someof the operating carriers suffer fromlosses.

IMPACT OF THE THIRDPACKAGE

The third package has largely replacedthe bilateral agreements betweenMember States, which used to impose amultitude of restrictions on theprovision of international air services,and can truly be called revolutionary asregards both its substantive content andthe number of states involved in theliberalization process. It is now possibleto set up an air carrier anywhere in theCommunity in accordance with onesingle set of rules and to operatebetween two Community airportswithout generally being subject to anyrestrictions on capacity, frequency orpricing. The new rules have thusintroduced the flexibility which theCommunity's air transport industryneeds to face the global challenges.They allow the air carriers to becomemore efficient in their operations and,thus, to offer better and cheaper servicesto their coustomers.

In the first three years of its application,the third package has produced someencouraging results and further marketdevelopments can be expected. MemberStates have altogether licenced some800 air carriers of which around 20%operate scheduled air services.Moreover, there has been a significantincrease in competition both in thedomestic air transport markets of someof the larger Member States as well as


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on some of the existing internationalroutes within the Community. Finally,air carriers have over the past threeyears introduced a large number of lowpromotional fares for passengertransport. The levels of basic fares forbusiness travel, in contrast, have so farremained relatively stable. It is notablyin this latter area where increasedcompetition should result in further faredecreases over the years to come.

ANCILLARY AIR TRANSPORTLEGISLATION

The Community has also enactedseveral ancillary sets of rules in orderto establish the conditions for fair andequitable competition. Those rulesinclude, in particular, regulations on theallocation of airport slots (OJ No L 14,22.1.1993, p. 1) and the operation ofcomputerized reservation systems (OJNo L 220, 29.7.1989, p. 1 and OJ NoL 278, 11.11.1993, p. 1) as well asdirectives on the mutual acceptance ofcockpit personnel licences (OJ No L373, 31.12.1991, p. 21) and the gradualphasing-out of noisy aircraft (OJ No L76, 23.3.1992, p. 21). Moreover, theCommunity has created a legalframework for the certification ofaircraft, maintenance organizations andair operators and for the licensing ofpersonnel involved in aviation safetyand aircraft operations (OJ No L 373,31.12.1991, p. 4). Finally, referenceshould be made to a draft directive onthe gradual liberalization of the ground-handling market at Community airportswhich is presently passing through thelegislative process (common positionadopted by the Council on 28 March1996, OJ No C 134, 6.5.1996, p. 30).The directive, if adopted, is aimed atincreasing competition in that particularmarket and, thus, reducing the costsand improve the quality of ground-handling services.

COMPETITION AND STATE AIDPOLICY

The internal air transport market would,however, not be complete without aneffective enforcement of thecompetition rules of the Treaty and theMerger Regulation (OJ No L 395,30.12.1989, p. 1).

As regards the enforcement of thecompetition rules applying toundertakings, the Commission hasrepeatedly acknowledged the need fora restructuring of the airline industry(most recently in the XXV Report onCompetition Policy, § 76) and, thus, isgenerally prepared to look favourablyon mergers and alliances between aircarriers. The Commission thereforeapproved, albeit subject to certainconditions, the merger betweenSwissair and Sabena in July 1995(Case No IV/M.616) and the alliancebetween Lufthansa and SAS in January1996 (OJ No L 54, 5.3.1996, p. 28).The two cases are discussed in moredetail in respectively summer 1995 andspring 1996 editions of the CompetitionPolicy Newsletter.

The most important and mostcontentious policy area is the control ofstate aids granted to individual aircarriers by the Member States. Beforethe entry into force of the liberalizationmeasures, at the time when the airtransport sector was tightly regulatedby virtue of bilateral agreementsbetween the Member States, there waslittle point in strictly controlling stateaid. Those agreements regulated airtransport between two countries andprevented free competition from takingplace on the corresponding routes. In areport of March 1992 (DocumentSEC(92) 431 final), the Commissionindicated that several air carriers werebenefiting from public funding whichoften took the form of direct operating

aid. That finding was not surprisingsince a large part of the Community aircarriers are state owned undertakingsbenefiting from privileged financialrelations with the public entities.

With the exception of two casesinvolving Sabena (OJ L 300, 31.10.1991,p. 48) and Iberia (XXII Report onCompetition Policy, p.269), the situationonly changed after the entry into force ofthe third package which opened up thepossibilities for meaningful competitionbetween the air carriers and, thus,created a situation where state aidseverly distort competition in the market-place. Between 1993 and 1994, theCommission scrutinized the restructuringprogrammes of several state-ownedairlines, including Aer Lingus (OJ L 54,25.2.1994, p. 30), TAP (OJ L 279,28.10.1994, p. 29), Air France (OJ L254, 30.9.1994, p. 73) and OlympicAirways (OJ L 273, 25.10.1994, p. 22),and made its authorization of the aidelements involved in those programmessubject to increasingly stringentconditions. The main elements of thisnew policy, which are clearly spelt out inthe Commission's guidelines on theapplication of Articles 92 and 93 of theTreaty and Article 61 of the EEAAgreement to state aids in the aviationsector (OJ C 350, 10.12.1994, p. 5), canbe summarized as follows :

* Direct operating aid is prima facieprohibited. It can only be acceptable inthe form of a reimbursement forcompliance with standards required bypublic service obligations imposedunder Article 4 of Council Regulation(EEC) No 2408/92 or as aid of a socialcharacter under Article 92(2)(a) of theTreaty.

* Any other aid to an individual aircarrier, for example aid involved in arecapitalization programme of theairline, can only be authorized if itforms part of a comprehensive and self-


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contained restructuring programmewhich is designed to restore thecarrier's financial health within areasonable time period and does notenvisage, or in fact implies the risk,that further aid will be required in thefuture.

* Any such authorization ofrestructuring aid will include conditionswhich are designed to prevent, interalia, that trade is affected to an extentcontrary to the common interest andthat the beneficiary carrier transfers itsproblems onto its competitors (e.g.prohibition of price leadership on theEuropean routes or prohibition to buystakes in other air carriers).

* Restructuring aid to an airline whichhas already received such aid beforewill only be allowed under exceptionalcircumstances, unforeseeable andexternal to the company (the so-calledone-time-last-time principle).

The one-time-last-time principle doesnot mean, however, that a MemberState is prevented from entering intoany financial transaction with an aircarrier it owns. Article 222 of theTreaty in fact explicitly acknowledgesthe existence of public ownershipsystems and, thus, enshrines the rightfor the Member States to invest ordivest in company capital. According toa consolidated case-law of the Court ofJustice (see case C-40/85, Belgium vCommission, (1986) ECR 2321; caseC-142/87, Belgium v Commission,(1990) ECR I-959), in order to examinewhether a financial transaction betweena Member State and a companyinvolves aid the Commission appliesthe market economy investor principle.No state aid is involved if a privateinvestor of a size comparable to that ofthe bodies administering the publicsector, would have provided capital ofsuch amount under the same

circumstances. A capital injection intoa state-owned air carrier by theMember State is only subject to theone-time-last-time principle if, on thebasis of the market economy investorprinciple, it has been demonstrated thatit amounts to state aid.

These principles were tested in themost recent (second) case concerningIberia. In January 1995, the Spanishauthorities asked the Commission toapprove a capital injection of 130billion pesetas into Iberia. TheCommission applied the marketeconomy investor principle with theassistance of an external consultantand, notably in view of the high riskand cash drain associated with Iberia'sinvestments in South America,concluded that the envisagedtransaction amounted to state aid. TheCommission then indicated to theSpanish authorities that, as Iberia hadalready received restructuring aid in1992 and could not rely in this case onany exceptional circumstances,unforeseeable and external to thecompany, it would not be possible toapprove the transaction. After intensivediscussions with the Commission,Iberia and the Spanish authoritieseventually agreed to sell the major partof the company's investments in SouthAmerica to a holding controlled by USbanks and to reduce the amount of thecapital injection to 87 billion pesetas.On the basis of those changedcircumstances and in view of a numberof additional commitments by theSpanish authorities, the Commissioncame to the conclusion that thetransaction satisfied the marketeconomy investor principle. The futurecashflows generated by Iberia,appropriately discounted at thecompany's cost of capital, exceeded thecapital outlay. Therefore, no state aidelements were involved. Consequently,the Commission raised no objections in

respect of the recapitalization plan ofthe Spanish air carrier in January 1996(OJ No L 104, 27.4.1996, p. 25).

The Iberia case gives strong evidencethat the Commission is determined toadhere to the one-time-last-timeprinciple and to allow restructuring aidonce and only once. This case is,however, not the first where theCommission applied the marketeconomy investor principle andconcluded that the financial transactionsinvolved did not contain any state aidelements. In fact, there are threeprecedents of May, July and October1995 involving, respectively, Lufthansa,Sabena and the French air carrier AOM.A negative application of the marketeconomy investor principle is found inthe CDC case, where the Commissionconsidered that the subscription by theFrench public bank CDC to FF 1.5bnbonds issued by Air France did not takeplace under market conditions. Thetransaction would not have been enteredinto by a rational private investor andamounted to state aid (OJ L 258,6.10.1994, p. 26).

Finally, it should be recalled that theCommission also investigated anddecided other state aid cases in the airtransport sector regarding, inter alia,compensation for the deficit incurred byTAP on the air routes to and from theAzores and Madeira (OJ L 260,8.10.1994, p. 27) and aid granted for theoperation of air routes to and fromSardinia (OJ L 26, 2.2.1996, p. 29).Those two cases demonstrate that theCommission is generally willing toauthorize any direct operating aidgranted outside the framework of anyduly established public serviceobligations only in cases where eitherthe aid is of a social character or Art. 4of Council Regulation (EEC) No2408/92 does not (yet) apply (such asthe air routes to and from the Azores).


OPINIONS AND COMMENTSIn this section DG IV officials outline developments in Community competition procedures. It is important torecognise that the opinions put forward in this section are the personal views of the officials concerned. Theyhave not been adopted or in any way approved by the Commission and should not be relied upon as astatement of the Commission's or DG IV's views.

La révision du règlement sur lecontrôle des concentrations: laproposition de la Commission

par Eric CUZIAT, DG IV-B

Suite à la publication de son Livrevert sur la révision du règlementr e l a t i f au c o n t r ô l e d e sconcentrations d'entreprises(Règlement du Conseil (CEE) n°4064/89 du 21 décembre 1989)(COM (96) 19 final; voir égalementCompetition policy newsletter -number 1 - volume 2 - Spring 1996pages 8 à 10) et du débat qui s'ensuivit, la Commission a adopté le10 juillet dernier une proposition demodification du règlement sur lesconcentrations (NB: La versionfinalisée de cette proposition dansles onze langues officielles del'Union sera transmise dans lecourant de l'été au Conseil et auParlement Européen. Elle sera dèslors disponible pour les partiesintéressées et publiée au JOCE).

Cette proposition se présente sousla forme de deux projets distincts,sous couvert d'une seulecommunication au Conseil et auParlement Européen. En effet,compte tenu de l'existence d'unedouble base juridique (article 1erparagraphe 3 du règlement pour larévision des seuils, d'une part, etarticles 87 et 235 du Traité pourtoute autre modification) et desmodalités de vote attachées à

chacune de ces deux bases(majorité qualifiée dans le premiercas, unanimité dans le second), laCommission a présenté deux projetsde règlement, l'un relatif à laréduction des seuils, y compris ledispositif pour les plurinotifications,l 'autre relatif aux autreschangements dont le nouveaurégime pour les entreprisescommunes.

LA RÉDUCTION DES SEUILSDE CONTRÔLABILITÉ ET LEDISPOSITIF POUR LESPLURINOTIFICATIONS

Comme la Commission l'adémontré dans son Livre vert, ungrand nombre d'opérations ayantdes effets transfrontalierssignificatifs dans la Communautéé c h a p p e a u c o n t r ô l ecommunautaire, compte tenu duniveau élevé des seuils actuels. Or,la Commission a considéré quepour de telles concentrations,l'intervention communautaire sejustifie conformément au principede subsidiarité. De plus, la

Commission a constaté qu'un certainn o m b r e d ' o p é r a t i o n s d econcentration, en dessous des seuils,étaient notifiées auprès de plusieursautorités nationales de contrôle.Nonobstant la multi-notifiabilité deces opérations qui constitue un trèsfort indice de leur caractèrecommunautaire, la Commission,consc iente des problèmesspécifiques en termes de délais et desécurité juridique que posent lesplurinotifications aux entreprises, aconsidéré qu'il convenait derésoudre également cette question.

Pour les raisons exposées ci-dessus,la Commission proposait dans sonLivre vert de réduire les seuils decontrôlabilité des opérations deconcentration, aujourd'hui fixés à 5milliards et 250 millions d'écus, à 2milliards d'écus pour ce quiconcerne le chiffre d'affairesmondial réalisé par l'ensemble desparties à la concentration et à100 millions d"écus pour ce quiconcerne le chiffre d'affairescommunautaire réalisé par au moinsdeux des entreprises concernées.Par ailleurs, la Commisionproposait, à titre subsidiaire, derésoudre le problème denotifications multiples par uneprocédure spécifique.

A la lumière des débats engagésdans le cadre de la révision durèglement, la Commission estparvenue à la conclusion qu'il étaitnécessaire de combiner les deuxpropositions du Livre vert, afin derecueillir un plus large consensussur le niveau des seuils et


OPINIONS AND COMMENTS

d'apporter, en tout état de cause,une réponse aux problèmes poséspar les plurinotifications.

La Commission propose donc deréduire les seuils actuels à 3milliards d'écus pour ce quiconcerne le chiffre d'affairesmondial et à 150 millions d'écuspour ce qui concerne le chiffred'affaires communautaire. La règledes deux tiers demeurerait quant àelle inchangée. De plus, entre cesnouveaux seuils et des seuilsplanchers de 2 milliards et 100millions d'écus, la compétenceexclusive de la Commission seraitétendue aux seules opérations quiseraient notifiables auprès de troisautorités nationales de contrôle.

Le dispositif envisagé pour letraitement des plurinotificationss'inscrit dans le cadre des optionsprésentées dans le Livre vert. Lesconsultations avec les Etatsmembres et les représentants dumonde des affaires ont permis d'enaffiner certains éléments. Toutesles opérations de concentration sesituant entre les seuils ci-dessusmentionnés et ne satisfaisant pas àla règle des deux tiers seraient dedimension communautaire etnotifiables auprès de laCommission, dès lors qu'ellesrempliraient les conditionsd'examen (critères de seuils ouautres) dans au moins trois Etatsmembres de la Communautéeuropéenne, que le système dechacun de ces trois Etats soitobligatoire ou volontaire.L'opération de concentration seraitréputée remplir les conditions pourêtre soumise à examen dans lecadre des systèmes nationaux

mentionnés par les parties dans lanotification, à moins que les Etatsmembres concernés n'informent laCommision que tel n'est pas le casdans un délai de deux semaines àcompter de la réception par cesEtats membres de tous lesrenseignements requis. Touteopposition devrait être motivée parécrit. La Commission, quant à elle,se bornerait à vérifier si les Etatsmembres ont réagi dans le délaiimparti, sans contrôler en propre siles critères nationaux onteffectivement été remplis ou non.Dans le cadre de ce nouveaudispositif, la première phased'examen serait prolongée de deuxsemaines.

Certains détails de cette procéduredevront être fixés par la suite dansun nouveau règlement d'application,notamment devraient y figurer lescirconstances dans lesquelles laCommision pourrait déclarer unenotification incomplète, lorsquel'information fournie par les partiesest insuffisante aux yeux des Etatsmembres pour déterminerl'application de leurs dispositionsnationales de contrôle.

LES AUTRES PROPOSITIONSDE MODIFICATION

Les dispositions de renvoi

L'article 9 est modifié de sorte quedans les affaires où un marchédistinct à l'intérieur d'un Etat

membre ne constitue pas une parties u b s t a n t i e l l e d u m a r c h écommunautaire, l'Etat membrelimiterait sa demande de renvoi àdémontrer que l'opération affecte untel marché sans avoir à prouverl'existence d'une menace de créationou de renforcement d'une positiondominante. Une telle modificationtrouve sa justification dans le faitque la Commission ne peut interdireune concentration que dans lamesure où elle crée ou renforce uneposition dominante dans une partiesubstantielle du marché commun.

Pour ce qui concerne l'article 22, laproposition de la Commission ouvreà plusieurs Etats membres lapossibilité d'effectuer une demandede renvoi commune dans les affairesoù une position dominante seraitcréée ou renforcée dans une zonegéographique étendue à leursterritoires. De plus, les dispositionsrelatives à la suspensions'appliqueraient aux concentrationsrenvoyées à la Commission sur labase de l'article 22 pour autantqu'elles n'auraient pas été mises enoeuvre à la date où les partiesseraient informées par laCommission qu'une telle demande aété formulée.

Le traitement des entreprisescommunes

P r e n a n t e n c o m p t e l e spréoccupations exprimées lors de laconsultation quant au traitementdifférencié des entreprisescommunes, la Commission a décidéde proposer une solution qui



combine les avantages de chacundes deux groupes d'option quifiguraient dans le Livre vert.

Dans le cadre de la proposition dela Commission, le concept deconcentration, tel que défini àl'article 3 du règlement, est étenduà toutes les entreprises communesde plein exercice. Par conséquent,les entreprises communes qualifiéesaujourd'hui de "coopératives" et quisont "de plein exercice" seraientdésormais soumises au champd'application et à la procédure durèglement sur les concentrations.Pour les entreprises communescoopératives d'exercice partiel, lasituation demeurerait inchangée.

Sur le fond, et puisque lesentreprises communes coopérativesde plein exercice seraientc o n s i d é r é e s c o m m e d e sconcentrations, le critère de laposition dominante prévu à l'article2 du règlement leur serait appliquéà titre principal. Toutefois, lescritères de l'article 85(1) et (3) duTraité pourraient leur être appliquéssi nécessaire, ceci dans la mesureoù l'entreprise commune conduiraità la coordination du comportementconcurrentiel d'entreprises quir e s t e n t i n d é p e n d a n t e s .L'application de l'article 85(1) et (3)s'effectuerait alors non pas selon lesprocédures du règlement 17 maisselon celles du règlement sur lesconcentrations qui présente ledouble avantage d'un délai bref etd'une décision formelle.

Désormais, une seule décision decompatibilité ou d'incompatibilitéavec le marché commun serait

adoptée. Pour ce qui concerne lesaspects éventuels relevant del'article 85(1) et (3), la décisionaccorderait une exemption pour ladurée de vie de l'entreprisecommune. Néanmoins, unedisposition permettrait à laCommission de révoquer sadécision sur ces aspects, pourautant qu'avec le temps la positiondes sociétés mères sur le marchéserait renforcée de telle manièreque la coordination de leurcomportement concurrentiel necorrespondrait plus aux exigencesde base de l'article 85(3).

Enfin, il convient de préciser queles opérations de cette naturetombant en dessous des seuils decontrôlabilité seraient de lacompétence des Etats membres.Pour ce qui concerne les aspectscoopératifs de ces entreprisescommunes, le régime actuel derépartition des compétences entre laCommission et les Etats membrescontinuerait de s'appliquer.

Le revenu bancaire et lespropositions de "toilettage"

Pour ce qui concerne la base decalcul du chiffre d'affaires desétablissements financiers et autresétablissements de crédit, laCommission, afin de mieux refléterl'activité de la totalité du secteurbancaire, propose de substituer audixième des actifs, le produit brutbancaire, conformément à ladéfinition du produit bancairefigurant dans la directive

86/635/CEE. Par ailleurs,l'allocation géographique du chiffred'affaires serait basée sur lalocalisation de la branche ou de ladivision accordant le prêt oufournissant le service.

Plusieurs propositions de "toilettage"peaufinent ou clarifient le texte durèglement. On retiendra notammentl'introduction d'une base légaleexpresse pour les engagements depremière phase (dans ce cas defigure, la première phase est portéeà six semaines pour faciliter laconsultation des Etats membres etdes tiers intéressés), de même quepour les restrictions accessoirescouvertes en première phase. Onsignalera enfin l'harmonisation de lapériode de suspension avecl'adoption d'une décision finale.

La proposition de modification durèglement sur les concentrationsdépasse par conséquent la simplerévision des seuils ou desmécanismes de renvoi, prévue par lerèglement lui-même. C'est unprojet, somme toute ambitieux, quela Commission transmet au Conseilpuisqu'il s'attache également àétendre le champ d'application durèglement aux plurinotifications et àl 'ensemble des entreprisescommunes de plein exercice. Deplus, la Commission a saisil'opportunité qui lui était ici donnéed'optimiser encore la mise en oeuvredu règlement sur les concentrations,au travers d'un "toilettage" du texte.Il appartient désormais au Conseilde traduire ces propositions dans unnouveau règlement mieux adaptéaux réalités du marché intérieur.



Sur proposition de M. Van Miert,

La communication de laCommission concernant la non-imposition d'amendes ou laréduction de leur montant dans lesaffaires portant sur des ententes.

par Vincent JORIS, DG IV-A-2

la Commission a adopté, le 10juillet 1996, une communicationprévoyant - à certaines conditions -de réduire l'amende qui aurait éténormalement imposée auxentreprises qui dénoncent auprèsd'elle certains types d'ententesillicites, voire - dans certains cas -de ne leur infliger aucune amendeen échange de leur coopération.

Comme les autres communicationsde la Commission en matière deconcurrence, celle-ci codifielargement la pratique antérieure del'institution en la matière. D'autrepart, elle annonce aux opérateurséconomiques la façon dont laCommission entend réagirlorsqu'une entreprise la contactepour dénoncer des ententes illicitesqui lui étaient inconnues ou pourlui fournir des informationsfacilitant sa mission de sanction deces ententes.

LE BUT VISÉ PAR LACOMMUNICATION

L'objectif de ce nouvel instrumentest de contribuer à la lutte de la

Commission contre les ententessecrètes les plus dangereuses, àsavoir celles qui visent à fixer desprix ou des quotas de production oude vente, à se partager des marchésou à interdire les importations oules exportations. Ces agissements,entraînant des augmentations deprix et des réductions de choix,sont préjudiciables pour lesconsommateurs, mais aussi pour lesentreprises qui, du fait de leurprotection artificielle, ne sont pastentées d'innover et donc d'êtrecompétitives. Il est dès lors crucialde pouvoir découvrir ces pratiqueset y mettre fin.

Or, l'expérience récente prouve qu'ilest bien souvent très difficile à laCommission de déceler desententes dont le secret a tendance àêtre d'autant mieux gardé que lesprofits qui en sont tirés sontimportants. Les moyens que mettenten oeuvre certaines entreprises pourles cacher sont parfois sophistiqués,allant jusqu'à l'organisation defausses inspections pour enseignerà leur personnel comment fairedisparaître efficacement les preuvesdes ententes illicites. Le butpremier de la communication est

par conséquent de percer le mur dusilence organisé autour de cesententes secrètes.

De plus, l'absence de lignesdirectrices en la matière nepermettait pas à la Directiongénérale de la concurrence d'indiquer aux entreprises quellecontrepartie elles obtiendraient enéchange d'aveux de participation àces ententes.

L'ÉVOLUTION DE LAPROPOSITION

La source d'inspiration de laproposition est le programme declémence ("leniency programme"),introduit en 1978 par le"Department of Justice" des Etats-Unis et élargi en 1993, au profitdes entreprises lui proposant leurcoopération avant que le"Department" ait connaissance del'entente (1978) ou, lorsqu'il connaîtcelle-ci, avant qu'il ait des preuvessuffisantes pour pouvoir lasanctionner (1993).

Le projet initial proposait den'infliger aucune amende auxentreprises qui: (i) informeraient laCommission de l'existence d'uneentente avant que la Commissionn'ait officiellement procédé à desvérifications sur l'affaire ou, (ii)seraient les premières à proposerleur coopération au cours des étapespréliminaires de l'examen d'uneaffaire, à un moment où laCommission n'a pas encore obtenusuffisamment de preuves pour



motiver l'adoption d'une décisioninfligeant des amendes.

Le projet de communication traitaitégalement des cas dans lesquels lesentreprises collaboreraient avec laCommission sans toutefoissatisfaire aux critères mentionnésci-dessus. Aux entreprisescoopèrant pleinement avec laCommission après que desvérifications ont déjà été réalisées,il était prévu d' octroyer uneréduction très importante del'amende, définie comme uneréduction d'au moins 50 % dumontant de l'amende qu'il aurait étéapproprié d'infliger sans leurcoopération.

Lorsqu'une entreprise aurait coopérésans être la première, lacommunication prévoyait que desréductions pouvaient encore êtreaccordées, tout en précisant qu'ilétait impossible de donner àl'avance des indications sur leurniveau, en raison de la diversité dessituations relevant de cettecatégorie. Cette approche s'inspiraitde la politique suivie par laCommission, telle qu'illustrée par sad é c i s i o n d a n s l ' a f f a i r e"Cartonboard" (décision du13.07.1994, IV/33833, J.O. n°L 243du 19.09.1994).

Cette proposition fut approuvée parla Commission en tant que projet le6 décembre 1995 et publiée auJournal Officiel n° C 341, du 19décembre 1995. Le texte approuvéet publié différait de la propositionoriginelle en ce qu'il excluait lecaractère automatique de la non-imposition, de manière à préserverle pouvoir d'appréciation de la

Commission dans chaque cas. Lapublication avait pour but derecueillir les observations de tousles intéressés sur ce projet.

Cette publication a donné lieu à desprises de position d'une dizained'associations, européenne ounationales, d'entreprises, d'uneassociation d'avocats et de plusieurscabinets d'avocats. En résumé, lesassociations d'entreprises semontraient hostiles au projet, alorsque, parmi les associations etcabinets d'avocats, les opinionsétaient partagées. Le projet aégalement été examiné par lesexperts gouvernementaux des Etatsmembres, à leur réunion du18 janvier 1996. L'accueil y a étégénéralement favorable.

Le projet publié a été profondémentremanié pour tenir compte de cesobservations.

LA COMMUNICATIONADOPTÉE

Le champ d'application de lacommunication a été précisé. Lenouveau texte s'applique aux seulesinfractions qui y sont expressémenténoncées. Il s'agit de concertationssecrètes, constituant des violationsgraves de l'article 85. Si lesententes horizontales sontprincipalement visées, les accordsverticaux ne sont pas exclus, s'ilsprennent l'une des formes énoncéesdans le texte.

Le titre B (non-impositiond'amende ou réduction très

importante de son montant) vise lescas où une entreprise dénonce uncartel avant que la Commission aitprocédé à une vérification et sansque celle-ci dispose d'informationssuffisantes pour prouver l'existencede l'entente. Cette section a été laplus profondément modifiée.L'objectif principal a été de trouverun équilibre entre la nécessité depréserver la marge d'appréciation dela Commission et celle d'offrir auxentreprises une sécurité juridiquesuffisante.

Une première innovation majeure,répondant à l'exigence de laisser auCollège son pouvoir d'appréciationpour fixer dans chaque cas lemontant de l'amende, consiste dansla suppression du caractèreautomatique de la non-imposition.C'est pourquoi les titres B (non-imposition) et C (réduction trèsimportante) anciens ont étéfusionnés. Toutefois, la sécuritéjuridique ainsi que l'attractivité de lacommunication ont conduit à fixerune fourchette de réduction, d'unminimum de 75 % pouvant allerjusqu'à la non-imposition totale.

Le titre C (réduction importante dumontant de l'amende) vise lesdénonciations intervenant après quela Commission a procédé à desvérifications. Pour que desdénonciations intervenant à ce stadejustifient une réduction significatived'amende, il faut que cesvérifications aient été infructueuses.Elles ne doivent donc pas avoirapporté de preuves suffisantes pourjustifier l'engagement d'uneprocédure, au sens de l'article 9 §3du règlement n° 17.



Pour ces dénonciations la fourchettede réduction est de 50 à 75%.

Mais, dans les deux hypothèses,(dénonciations avant et aprèsverifications) l'entreprise doitremplir cumulativement les 4conditions suivantes :

- être la première à apporter deséléments déterminants pourprouver l'existence de l'entente,

- avoir mis fin à sa participation àl'activité illicite au plus tard aumoment où elle dénoncel'entente,

- fournir à la Commission toutesles informations dont elledispose au sujet de l'entente etmaintenir une coopération totaletout au long de l'enquête,

- ne pas avoir contraint une autreentreprise à participer à l'ententeni eu dans celle-ci un rôledéterminant.

De ces conditions celle consistantà n'accorder la non-imposition,uneréduction très importante ou uneréduction importante qu'à lapremière entreprise dénonciatriceest capitale, car elle crée un climatgénéral de méfiance entre lesentreprises participant à l'infraction.

En effet, chaque entrepriseparticipante se rend compte qu'ellepourrait échapper à toute amendesi elle était la première à dénoncerl'infraction, tandis qu'elle seraitpunie par une amende si l'une desautres entreprises la devançait.

Chaque entreprise a donc intérêt àessayer d'être la première àdénoncer l'infraction, sauf si elle estassurée qu'aucune des autres n'al'intention de dénoncer. Dès qu'uneentreprise perçoit la possibilitéqu'une autre entreprise puisse fairele pas, il devrait se déclencher unecourse à la dénonciation. Cemécanisme tend à ébranler de façondéterminante la stabilité et donc ladurée moyenne des ententes. Laprévision de cet effet est égalementde nature à diminuer l'attrait departiciper à de nouvelles ententes.

Quant aux entreprises qui coopèrentsans remplir toutes les conditionsexposées c i -dessus , e l lesbénéficieront d'une réduction de 10à 50% (titre D: réductionsignificative du montant del'amende). Comme dans le projetinitial, les hypothèses visées sontnombreuses. Parmi elles doit êtremise en évidence celle de la non-contestation de la matérialité desfaits après réception de lacommunication des griefs.

Cet exemple est d'une très grandeimportance pratique. Il existe denombreux précédents d'entreprisesayant demandé spontanément quelleréduction d'amende leur seraitoctroyée si elles reconnaissaient lesfaits sur lesquels la Commissionfondait ses accusations. Lareconnaissance de la matérialité desfaits par une entreprise partie à unee n t e n t e s e c r è t e f a c i l i t econsidérablement le travail de laCommission, en particulier à l'égarddes autres parties à cette entente, etlui épargne des ressources

précieuses pour la suite de laprocédure.

Enfin, il y a lieu de préciser que

- la communication ne concerne pasles initiatives individuelles d'unmembre du personnel d'uneentreprise ; elle ne vise que lesdémarches émanant d'uneentreprise même;

- ce n'est qu'au moment où laCommission adoptera sa décisionde constatation d'infraction qu'elleappréciera si les conditions sontremplies;

- la communication ne modifie pasles conséquences civiles del'infraction;l'infraction ne disparaîtpas du fait qu'elle a été reconnue;l'entente reste contraire àl'article 85 §1 et, dès lors, estnulle en vertu de l'article 85 §2;ses victimes pourront bénéficier dedommages-intérêts, accordés parles juridictions nationalescompétents

DEPUIS L'ADOPTION

Depuis son adopt ion , lacommunication a été publiée auJournal Officiel n° C 207, du18.07.1996.

Surtout, son utilité paraît confirmée.Depuis son adoption une entreprisea déjà approché la Directiongénérale de la Concurrence pourdénoncer une entente inconnue decelle-ci.



Le Commissaire Karel Van Miert a

La politique européenne deconcurrence en 1995

Karel VAN MIERT présente au Parlement Européen leXXVème Rapport sur la politique de concurrence

présenté le 30 mai le 25ème rapport surla politique de concurrence à laCommission Economique et Monétaireet de la Politique Industrielle duParlement Européen (COM (96) 126final - IP/96/457). A cette occasion, ila prononçé un discours, le texte duquelest repris ci-dessus.

" Ladies and gentlemen,

As last year, I very much appreciatethe opportunity to present thecompetition report "en primeur" to theEuropean Parliament, before it isreleased to the press.

I firmly believe that the cooperationand the dialogue with the EuropeanParliament is an essential condition fora successfull competition policy. Infact, today, more than ever before,competition policy is deeply involvedin the citizens' daily life. It is thereforeincreasingly subject to close and criticalscrutiny at all levels within theEuropean Union and indeed beyond - itis no longer a marginal subject that isonly of interest to specialists. Acting inclose liaison with the EuropeanParliament may thus help to bringabout the wide democratic consensuswhich is indispensable to have aneffective competition policy.

I am pleased that in sensitive andcrucial areas of my policy, the

European Parliament has shown itselfto be a solid ally in the interest ofEuropean industry and citizens.

In your Resolution on the previouscompetition report, you have requesteda further strengthening of transparencyand democratic accountability incompetition matters. You may knowthat, following meetings with thePresident of your Committee, Mr vonWogau and Mrs. Riis-Jørgensen, I havesent a letter to confirm my firmwillingness to continue the policy ofopenness with the European Parliament.I have indicated in this letter that I amready to meet the Parliament morefrequently to discuss recentdevelopments and more specificcompetition policy issues and decisions.These discussions could take the formof regular two-monthly meetings orhearings within the framework of thisCommittee.

I hope that, in the next few months, wewill be able to agree upon a practicalworking scheme for these regularmeetings.

FORM AND CONTENT OFCOMPETITION REPORT

This year's report differs in presentationfrom the previous competition reports.

In view of the success of last year'sseparate brochure which summarizedthe major decisions and developments

in the field of competition, I havedecided to produce a much shorterreport and to publish it entirely in theform of a brochure. The documenth i g h l i g h t s t h e main pol icydevelopments, decisions and legislation.It situates the competition developmentswithin their wider context of otherCommunity policies, such as industrialpolicy, internal market, InformationSociety, R&D, social policy andenvironmental policy. This reflects thatCommission's view that competitionpolicy should be applied in conjunctionwith other Community policies to forma set of coherent instruments to realizebasic Community objectives.

In addition to the Commission's report,the Directorate-general for Competitionis preparing a more descriptive report ofcompetition cases in 1995, includingcomplete lists of references. It will bepublished around the summer in alllanguages of the Community togetherwith the Commission's report.

SHARP INCREASE OF NEWCASES

1995 has seen an increase of more than35 % of the overall number of newcases.

The increase has been more than 42 %in the field of restrictive agreements andabuse of dominant positions. TheCommission handled a record numberof merger notifications : up from 100 in1994 to 114 in 1995. Also in the area ofstate aid, the Commission registered ahuge increase of notifications (680compared to 510 in 1994) and itadopted a record number of decisions.

The increase is partly due to theaccession of three new Member Statesto the European Union on 1 January1995. It is certainly also a sign thatEuropean industries are increasingly



aware that their playing field is Europeas a whole. In addition, the rapidlychanging and increasingly globaleconomic environment gives firms anincentive to cooperate or merge so asto remain competitive.

In the field of state aid, the increasealso results from greater transparencyand stricter control by the Commission,which gives rise to a higher number ofnotifications and complaints.

I do not expect that the number ofcompetition cases will decrease in thenear future. On the contrary, I believethat it will further grow in the comingyears. To that we must add anotherfactor. The ability to react quickly tochanges in the market place is anessential element of the competitivenessof European industry. It is thereforeimportant to maintain an efficientlyadministered competition policy.

For these very reasons, and, in view ofthe limited resources at its disposal, itis self-evident that the Commission hasto fix priorities in order to maintain aneffective competition policy.

CORE COMPETITION POLICYACTIONS

Competition policy has two majorobjectives which are to a large extentcomplementary : competitiveness anddevelopment of the European economyon the one hand and consumerprotection on the other hand. Bothobjectives are present in theCommission's continuing enforcementof the existing competition rules to allkinds of restrictions of competition - bethey by means of state or private action- which affect the competitiveness ofEuropean industries or which affect theconsumers' access to products and

services. Sometimes it has to do this insectors, such as transport andtelecommunications, where differentant i -compet i t ive i ssues arisesimultaneously. In such cases, theCommission has the ability to use thewhole array of instruments at itsdisposal (e.g. rules on restrictiveagreements and abuse of a dominantposition; liberalization measures;merger control; and control of stateaid) to ensure the optimum outcome.

NEED TO SECURE OPENMARKETS

Restrictive agreements and abuse ofdominant positions which act toexclude new competitors from themarket or which seal off nationalmarkets are a first type of cases whichdeserve the Commission's priorityattention.

In 1995, the Commission has continuedto take vigilant action wherecompanies, through anti-competitiveagreements or practices, wall offnational markets by restricting parallelimports and prevent consumers fromtaking advantage of price differencesbetween Member States (Glasurit;Organon). With the same end in view,the new regulation on car distributionin Europe ensures that individualconsumers are free to carry outpersonal imports.

The need to safeguard and improve thecompetitiveness of European industryrequires that markets remain open andaccessible to companies attempting toexploit the possibilities offered by thesingle market. The Commission hastherefore pursued a stringent policywhere companies attempt, be it throughrestrictive agreements or unilateralaction, to obstruct the access of newentrants to the market (Unilever/Mars;Van Marwijk/FNK-SCK).

The Commission's strict approach vis-à-vis this type of restrictions isparticularly important in sectors whichtraditionally were protected byregulatory monopoly or exclusive rights,and which, as a result of theirliberalization, create new possibilitiesfor market entry. Recent examples are :ground handling services; discriminatorylanding fees (Brussels airport);discrimination against second mobilephone operators (Omnitel, Mobistar).Other cases of the same nature areRoscoff and Elsinor concerning accessto port facilities for competing ferryservices.

CONTINUATION OF PROCESSOF LIBERALIZATION OFTRADITIONALLYMONOPOLIZED MARKETS

The liberalization of traditionallymonopolized markets remains animportant priority of today's competitionpolicy. Once achieved, thesecompetition driven markets will enhancecompetitiveness and innovation, andthereby create new jobs. At the sametime, universal public services, to whichall citizens have equal access ataffordable prices, should be safeguardedin areas where market forces areinadequate. For this reason, a sector-by-sector approach is the most appropriate.For example, with the support of theEuropean Parliament, decisive progresshas been made in legislative provisionsliberalizing telecommunication serviceswhich, as a sector subject to rapidinnovation, can bypass nationalboundaries. I refer to the liberalizationof mobile telephones, alternativenetworks and voice telephony on 1January 1998. I deplore that the sameprogress has not been possible in theenergy sector given the importance ofthis sector for the competitiveness ofEuropean economy.



COOPERATION ANDSTRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

Today's economic environment ischaracterized by dynamic markets,innovation and globalization (with theconcurrent sharp increase incompetitive pressures which it entails).As a result, companies are looking fordifferent forms of cooperation to enablethem to remain competitive on themarket by improving their R&D,reducing their costs and developingnew products.

In principle the Commission takes apositive view where such cooperationleads to efficiencies which outweighthe disadvantages in competition terms.The Commission's positive approach tostrategic alliances in the telecom sector(Atlas/Phoenix) and cooperationagreements between major air carriers(Lufthansa/SAS) are just two examplesof how it has done so recently.

In doing so however, the Commissionhas sought to ensure that suchcooperation between firms does notprevent third party access to themarket. As a matter of fact, only thosecompanies which are used tocompetition and which perform well inopen and dynamic markets will be ableto do so as well on a wider scale - beit in other geographic areas or in amore global economy in general. Onlyby securing competitive and growthoriented market-structures, can thecurrent restructuring process in sectorssuch as telecommunications generatenew services at competitive prices,reduced costs for industry, newinvestment and employment.

The Commission has also a pro-activerole to play to cultivate the conditionswhich make dynamic markets possible.For instance, it has adopted a newblock exemption authorizing certain

categories of agreements on technologytransfers, which is expected to facilitatethe diffusion of technologicalinnovations within the Union.

Mergers and acquisitions also have animportant impact on employment andinvestment. Although in the short runthey may lead to layoffs, in themedium to long term, they have anumber of positive effects oninvestment and employment.

The Commission's role in this field isto secure those positive effects.Mergers which create or strengthen adominant position may hurt otherindustries as well as the finalconsumer. Moreover, in emergingmarkets, concentrations in an earlystage of market formation may lead toforeclosure effects that are discouragingtechnological innovation andinvestment by market entrants. It isprecisely this concern which has ledthe Commission to prohibit operationsin the media sector, which is ofgrowing significance in thedevelopment of the Information Society(Nordic Satellite Distribution,RTL/Veronica/Endemol).

CONTROL OF STATE AID

The Community's competition policywould be incomplete without a strictstate aid policy. The Commission'sfourth survey on state aid in theCommunity has shown that, while thereis a slow but steady fall, total aidgranted remains high. Further effortsare therefore necessary to reduce aidlevels by strengthening controlm e c h a n i s m s a n d i m p r o v i n gtransparency.

In the first place, the prerequisite for anefficient state aid control is thatMember States notify all aid measures

to the Commission and do not put theminto effect before the Commission hasapproved them. The continued violationby Member States of the notificationobligation has induced the Commissionto take further steps to make MemberStates respect that obligation. In acommunication adopted in May theCommission thus reserved its right, incertain cases, provisionally to orderMember States to recover aid granted inbreach of the notification obligationuntil the Commission had adopted afinal decision approving the aid.Moreover, in a notice on cooperationwith national courts the Commission hasshown its willingness to assist them toprotect the rights of companies againstnon-notified aid granted to competitors.

An efficient state aid control does notmean, however, that all state aid shouldbe prohibited. In fact, the majority ofthe decisions taken by the Commissionare positive. Many state aid measurespursue objectives in the interest of theCommunity, such as economic andsocial cohesion, a sufficient degree ofR&D and environmental protection, thedevelopment of SMEs, and the necessityof allowing time for structuraladjustment, in particular for socialreasons. Other cases have shown thenecessity for the Commission to takeinto consideration the particularcharacteristics of the sector involved(Credit Lyonnais; French Post Office).The Commission's role is to verifywhether these aid measures do not gobeyond what is necessary to achievethose fundamental Communityobjectives and that they do not distortcompetition and affect trade betweenMember States unduly.

The Commission adopted, for the firsttime, employment aid guidelinesexplaining under which conditions stateaid to firms to promote employmentmay be approved. Moreover, it adopteda new framework on state aid for R&D,



confirming its favourable approach tothis kind of aid. This shows that theCommission's state aid policy continuesto play an active role in overcomingstructural unemployment and instrengthening the competitiveness ofthe European economy.

ADJUSTMENTS TO REINFORCETHE EFFICIENCY ANDTRANSPARENCY OFCOMPETITION POLICY

The current political and economicsituation necessitates the continuousmodernization of the instruments andprocedures available to theCommission, in order to improve therelevance, efficiency and transparencyof competition policy.

PRIORITIZATION

I already referred to the need to bemore selective in dealing withindividual competition cases. For thispurpose, several instruments havealready been developed. Some of themmay need to be broadened or refinedfurther (for example : concept of deminimis). New instruments may needto be considered and we might have toexplore the boundaries of current law,in particular procedural rules.

DECENTRALIZATION

Where the Commission has to beselective, the role of nationalauthorities and courts in competitioncases becomes more important. TheCommission stimulates, whereappropriate, more frequent applicationof the competition rules by nationalcourts and national competitionauthorities. In cases where anappreciable economic effect is feltmainly in one Member State, national

courts and authorities may be betterplaced to handle the case.

In the field of anti-trust, the preparationof a new notice on cooperation betweenthe Commission and nationalcompetition authorities is welladvanced, and will complement theexisting one on cooperation with thenational courts.

Decentralized enforcement should not,however, lead to differing applicationof competition law in the EuropeanUnion. The Commission thereforeattaches great importance tocommunication and cooperationbetween national and Communityofficials. Moreover, the majority ofMember States now have competitionlaws which substantially resemble thoseof the Community. This process of"soft harmonization" is a naturalconsequence of the integration process,which creates pressure for a level-playing field throughout theCommunity.

In the field of state aid, the subsidiarityprinciple dictates that the Communitymust have exclusive competencebecause Member States cannot beasked to control their own state aidexpenditures in a fair way vis-à-vistheir neighbours. However, one aspectcan be handled at national level :national courts may act uponcomplaints by the competitors of thefirm supported by state aid, and inparticular it may control whetherrequired notification and approvalprocedures have been followed by theMember State. The Commission hasalso published a notice in this area.

SIMPLIFICATION ANDTRANSPARENCY

The current legislative framework oncompetition is sometimes felt by

industry as a too strait-jacket whichdoes not necessarily respond to currenteconomic realities. The Commission istherefore making efforts to simplify andreview its policy where necessary. Ihave already mentioned the new groupexemption for technology transferagreements. In the field of state aid, theCommission started working on arevised and consolidated regionalframework. The new notice on state aidof minor importance also simplifies theuse of this instrument for MemberStates.

For the same purpose of simplificationand review, the Commission ispreparing a green paper setting outdifferent alternatives for future policy inthe area of vertical restraints. Myservices have already started preparinga similar review exercise for horizontalcooperation arrangements (in particularspecialization and R&D). It both cases,the results will be submitted to a wideand in-depth public consultation of allinterested political and socio-economicpartners. I look forward to hearing yourviews on these matters which I willfully take account of in deciding whichline to take.

The Commission is also publishingmore frequently guidelines to explainhow it intends to apply the competitionrules. I refer for example to theguidelines on cross-border credittransfers, the employment aid guidelinesand the recently adopted new SMEguidelines.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ANEFFICIENTLY ADMINISTEREDCOMPETITION POLICY

Where structural adjustment is involved,companies are right to expect from theCommission decisions that are efficient,timely and transparent. In the field ofmerger control, the Commission's record



is particularly successful in this respect.Most of the decisions are taken in theinitial examination period of fourweeks. The remaining operations(seven in 1995) which enter into an in-depth investigation are completedwithin another four months.

However, further improvements are stillpossible. In January of this year theCommission published a Green Paperwhich seeks to further increase theefficiency of merger control. Itexamines how to extend the advantageof the one-stop-shop principle tooperations with cross-border effectswhich today may be confronted withthe problem of multiple notifications ofthe same transaction in several MemberStates. Multiple national filingsincrease uncertainty, effort, and cost forbusiness and may lead to conflictingdecisions.

Your Committee has already beenconsulted on the Merger Green Paper.I am very grateful for your support tothe reduction of the thresholds. I amlooking forward to have the opinion ofthe European Parliament on all aspectsof the Green Paper. I can not but stressthe role which the European Parliamentplays in this whole exercise.

The need for an efficient administrativeprocedure also exists for cooperationagreements which involve structuralchanges and important investment. Anaccelerated procedure has already beenintroduced for structural cooperativejoint ventures. The Commission is nowconsidering whether the current"voluntary" procedure should not beturned into a procedure which setslegally binding deadlines for all fullfunction joint ventures.

INTERNATIONALCOOPERATION

The increasing globalization of theworld economy and the changingpattern of modern trade haveencouraged the Community to co-operate in competition matters with itstrading partners where possible.

The report on competition policy in thenew trade order, drafted by anindependent group of experts at myrequest, is a valuable contribution tothe necessary development in this field.It recommends on the one hand thestrengthening of bilateral cooperationon the basis of the current EC/USagreement, and on the other hand theelaboration of a plurilateral cooperationframework.

On bilateral cooperation, theCommission has already startedexamining the report's proposals withthe Member States' competitionauthorities with a view to determininghow we should proceed.

On the multilateral front, I and mycolleagues hope in the coming weeks tobe able to present a Commissionposition with a view to launchingdiscussion on the need for aninternational framework in the WTO.

Another important task lies in buildingup our relations with the Countries ofCentral and Eastern Europe (CEEC), aswell as the ex-USSR states and theMediterranean States. We haveexperienced competition as an elementof democracy. We are convinced that

our partner countries can likewisebenefit from this experience. We aretherefore actively involved in a processof technical assistance and cooperation.I am happy that the CEEC Countries areprogressively introducing andimplementing our competition rules.

CONCLUSION

Despite the increasing workload, I amconvinced that the Commission isperfectly capable of ensuring aneffective competition policy, fullyadapted to a rapidly changing economicand political environment. Competitionpolicy should be seen and applied inconjunction with other Communitypolicies to form a set of coherentinstruments to realise basic Communityobjectives.

What is sometimes presented as aweakness is a strength. Communitycompetition policy can only beeffective, if it takes fully into accountthe economic and political realities in arapidly changing common market.

This is one of the major reasons why Ido not favour the establishment of aseparate European cartel office.Moreover, the actual system ensures acoherent policy as the same authorityapplies all different competition rules. Aseparate office would not be anadequate means to increase efficiency,but would rather reduce efficiency.

Finally, and most importantly, the actualinstitutional framework allows theEuropean Parliament to be closelyassociated to this policy through itsfruitful cooperation with theCommission."


ANTI-TRUST RULESApplication of Articles 85 & 86 EC and 65 ECSCMain developments between 1st April and 31st July 1996

Summary of the most importantrecent developments

by Joos STRAGIER, DG IV-A-1 in collaboration with Hugo VERLACKT DG IV-F-2 and Stephen RYAN DG IV-F-3

ACCORDS DE COOPÉRATION

Banque Nationale de Paris/DresdnerBank

Le 24 juin 1996, la Commission adécidé d'exempter pour une période dedix ans, l'accord de coopération entre laBanque Nationale de Paris (BNP) et laDresdner Bank (DB) (IP/96/567).

L'accord prévoit une coopérationglobale et en principe exclusive auniveau mondial de la BNP et de la DB.Cette coopération comporte quatrevolets. Les deux banques serapprocheront dans le domaine de leurorganisation interne, en particulier parun échange d'information et undéveloppement commun dans ledomaine de l'informatique, de labureautique, des informationséconomiques, ainsi que des nouveauxproduits ou techniques financiers. Endeuxième lieu, BNP et DB vontcoopérer dans le domaine desfinancements internationaux, dumerchant banking, des marchés descapitaux et du placement des titres. Letroisième volet de la coopération vise àrenforcer les possibilités des deuxbanques d'offrir des services financiersinternationaux à leur clientèlerespective par l'amélioration et leregroupement de leurs entités dans lespays hors de l'Allemagne et de leFrance. Finalement, en ce qui concerne

les marchés domestiques, chaque parties'est engagée à mettre à la dispositionde l'autre tous ses services au meilleurprix et à offrir lui même la gamme laplus large possible de services enprovenance de l'autre partenaire à sapropre clientèle.

L'accord initialement notifié prévoyaitque chaque partie peut émettre un vétoabsolu à un accord de coopération quel'autre partie souhaite conclure avec unconcurrent national de la première.Néanmoins, les deux banques ontaccepté, suite à la demande de laCommission, de limiter ce droit derefus aux cas où l'accord decoopération avec la tierce banqueimplique l'utilisation de savoir-faire oude secrets d'affaires résultant de lacoopération entre BNP et DB ouprovenant de la banque détenant ledroit de véto. Cette modification a étéconfirmée dans une annexe à l'accordde coopération.

La présence de chacune des deuxbanques sur le marché national deservices bancaires de son partenaireétant plutôt faible, la Commission ad'abord constaté que la coopérationdans le domaine de l'organisation, desmarchés des capitaux et de la gestiondes actifs sur les marchés nationauxrespectifs ne conduit pas à unerestriction sensible de la concurrenceactuelle. La même constatation vautpour l'engagement de chacune à mettreà la disposition du partenaire ses

propres produits bancaires pour qu'ilpuisse les distribuer sur son marchénational. En revanche, la Commission aconclu que ces aspects de la coopérationsont en mesure de restreindre demanière non négligeable la concurrencepotentielle entre ces deux banques. Acet égard, la Commission a pris enconsidération les facteurs suivants: lecadre législatif communautaire qui afacilité l'accès des banques aux marchéstierces dans la Communauté; la futureintroduction de la troisième phase del 'Union monétaire ainsi quel'introduction de la monnaie unique; etles nouvelles voies de distribution deservices bancaires. La Commissionconsidère que ces facteurs devraientpermettre aux grandes banquesuniverselles, comme les parties encause, de développer de manièreindépendante leurs activités sur desmarchés autres que leurs marchésnationaux. Selon la Commission, lacoopération est telle que les deuxbanques n'auront plus d'intérêtéconomique à faire ainsi.

Néanmoins, la Commission a décidéque les conditions d'exemption sontremplies. La coopération conduira à uneamélioration de la production desservices financiers offerts auxparticuliers et aux entreprises ainsi qu' àune amélioration de la distribution desservices et des produits de chacune dansle pays de l'autre. Toutes les restrictionsque la Commission a pu constater sontindispensables pour atteindre lesaméliorations résultant de lacoopération. Cela vaut également pourle droit de véto comme il a été modifiésur demande de la Commission. Pour lereste, la coopération ne conduit pas àune élimination de la concurrence surles marchés allemands et français.

La Commission a fixé la durée del'exemption à dix ans pour pouvoir


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réexaminer éventuellement les effets dela coopération dans un délairaisonnable après la mise en place del'Union monétaire.

En ce qui concerne les marchésbancaires dans les pays "tiers" qui sontégalement affectés par la coopération,la Commission n'a pas pu constater unerestriction sensible de la concurrence.Cela vaut également pour les activitésde dimension internationale, enparticulier les activités sur les marchésfinanciers. Vu la taille relative des deuxb a n q u e s s u r c e s m a r c h é sinternationaux, la coopération ne va pasrestreindre la concurrence de manièresensible. Au contraire, elle est plutôtfavorable à la concurrence enrenforçant la position des deux banquesau niveau international.

BFGoodrich/ Messier-Bugatti

Dans le domaine des roues et freinspour avions commerciaux, notammentles Airbus A-330/340 et A-321, laCommission a autorisé un accord decoopération entre les sociétésBFGoodrich des Etats-Unis et Messier-Bugatti en France par l'envoi d'unelettre administrative (comfort-letter).

BFGoodrich et sa division BFGAerospace sont actives dans l'industrieaérospatiale et fabriquent plusieurscomposants d'avion. D'autres sociétésdu groupe fabriquent des instruments etdes équipements électroniques ou sontactives dans la chimie. Messier-Bugatti est une filiale duconstructeur français de moteursd'avion Snecma. Ses activitéscomprennent divers composants d'avioncomme les roues et freins.

En vue de participer à une soumissionpour les roues et freins des avionsAirbus A-330/340 et A-321 et derépartir les risques financiers liés à une

telle opération, les deux parties ont missur pied une filiale commune quicoordonne les activités des sociétésmères concernant les produits destinésaux avions Airbus en question. Cecicomprend notamment le développementen commun des produits, laprésentation des offres au constructeurd'avion, la recherche de la clientèlechez les lignes aériennes, l'organisationde la fabrication des composants parles mères et la mise à la disposition dela clientèle d'un service après-vente.

Une caractéristique de ce marché estqu'il est mondial et que le nombred'opérateurs est réduit, surtout en ce quiconcerne les constructeurs d'avions.Pour sauvegarder un degré maximal deconcurrence dans ce type de marché ilest indispensable que des opérateurspeuvent coopérer dans des programmesde coopération concrets sans pourautant perdre leur liberté de coopérerdans d'autres programmes avec d'autrespartenaires.

La Commission a veillé à s'assurer quedans le domaine du service après-vente,où un grand nombre d'opérateursindépendants sont présents, les sociétéscertifiées par les autorités aéronautiquessoient assurées d'un accès garanti auxpièces et aux manuels d'instructionnécessaires à la bonne exécution del'entretien et de la réparation des roueset freins des avions en question.

ORGANISATIONSPROFESSIONNELLES

Fenex

Le 5 juin, la Commission a pris unedécision constatant que l'associationnéerlandaise des expéditeurs Fenex aenfreint l'article 85 en établissant etdiffusant des tarifs conseillésd'expédition.

La Commission a pu constater que, pourune période allant du 10 janvier 1989jusqu'au 1er juillet 1993, Fenex adistribué à ses membres annuellementdes listes de tarifs en florins, ou enpourcentages, avec un tarif minimumexprimé en florins pour différentesservices d'expédition à prester dans lesports maritimes et aux frontièresterrestres.

Etant une fédération d'organisationsd'expéditeurs néerlandais jusqu'au 22juin 1991 et depuis cette date, uneassociation regroupant directement dessociétés d'expédition, Fenex constitueune association d'entreprises au sens del'article 85 (1).

Lors de la procédure, Fenex a fait valoirque les tarifs en cause n'ont qu'unevaleur de recommandation qui ne limitepas la liberté des expéditeurs de fixerleurs tarifs. Cette recommandation neconstituerait pas une décisiond'association au sens de l'article 85 (1).Pour la Commission, l'élaboration et ladiffusion de tarifs conseillés par Fenexdoivent être interprétées commel'expression fidèle de la volonté del'association de coordonner lecomportement de ses membres sur lemarché en cause. La pratiqued'élaboration et de diffusion de tarifsrecommandés est une activité régulièreet constante de Fenex depuis de trèsnombreux années. De plus, les sociétésmembres de l'association avaientmanifestement un intérêt commun àcoordonner leur comportement en ce quiconcerne les tarifs des prestations encause. En outre, les recommandationstarifaires sont accompagnées decirculaires exprimant la ferme volontéd e l ' a s s o c i a t i o n q u e s e srecommandations soient suivies d'effets.En fin, l'élaboration et la diffusion detarifs recommandés constituaient pourFenex une activité pour laquelle elleétait clairement habilitée. Conformémentà la jurisprudence de la Cour de Justice


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(Affaire 8/72 Cementhandelaren contreCommission, Rec. 1972, 977; Affaire45/85 Verband der Sachversicherercontre Commission, Rec. 1987, 405;voir également affaires jointes 209 à215 et 218/78 Heintz van Landewyckcontre Commission, Rec. 1980, 3125 etaffaires jointes 96-102, 104, 105, 108et 110/82 NV IAZ InternationalBelgium contre Commission, Rec.1983, 3369), la Commission aconsidéré que la pratique de tarifsrecommandés de Fenex avait un objetanticoncurrentiel.

Par ailleurs, dans sa décision, laCommission a fait une distinction entrela diffusion par une organisationprofessionnelle de tarifs conseillésd'une part et la diffusion d'indicationsfacilitant pour les entreprises, le calculde leurs propres structures de prix derevient afin de leur permettre d'établirde façon autonome leurs prix de vente.Les tarifs conseillés sont de nature àinciter les entreprises en cause à alignerleurs tarifs, abstraction faite de leursprix de revient. Ce risque n'est enrevanche pas inhérent à un schéma decalcul de coûts.

Eudim

Eudim est une association de grossistesen matériel pour installations, avecpour objectif de promouvoir lecommerce de gros européen dans troissegments : plomberie, chauffage etsanitaires.

La Commission a reçu une plaintecontre les membres de cetteorganisation professionnelle quiauraient enfreint l'article 85 (1) enlimitant le nombre des membres à unseul par pays, en appliquant ungentlemen's agreement visant aupartage du marché et en échangeant desinformations commerciales de caractèreconfidentiel, notamment sur les prix.

L'existence d'une "règle du marchénational" limitant les activitéstransfrontalières de chacun desmembres a pu être confirmée par laCommission au cours de son enquête.En outre, la Commission a pu établirque les membres d'Eudim échangentdes informations confidentiellesconcernant les prix d'achat auprès desfournisseurs d'une part et le marché desclients d'autre part.

La Commission a considéré quel'échange d'informations concernant lemarché des fournisseurs n'était pas denature à restreindre la concurrence surle marché de gros en cause. S'agissantdes informations relatives au marchédes clients, la Commission a considéréque les échanges ne restreignaient pasla concurrence dans la mesure où ilsétaient limités à des informationsgénérales et non confidentielles. Parcontre, l'échange d'informationsconfidentielles et individuelles, tellesque le volume des ventes et les partsde marché, est susceptible derestreindre la concurrence, enp a r t i c u l i e r s u r u n m a r c h éoligopolistique. Dans le cas d'espèce, laCommission a considéré que le marchéde gros du matériel pour installationsest trop fragmenté pour être considérécomme oligopolistique. Dès lorsl'échange d'informations individuelles etconfidentielles entre les membresd'Eudim sur le marché des clientsn'aurait pas d'effet sensible sur lastructure concurrentielle du marché degros en cause.

Bienque Eudim a nié l'existence de toutaccord territorial, les membres d'Eudimont indiqué explicitement dans unedéclaration formelle que chacun d'euxest libre de vendre ses produits et des'établir partout où il le juge opportun.Cette déclaration est inclue dans lesnouveaux arrangements en vigueur ausein d'Eudim qui ont ont étéformellement notifiés à la Commission.

La Commission a indiqué qu'elle al'intention d'adopter une positionfavorable à l'égard de ces accordsmodifiés (Communication faiteconformément à l'article 19 §3 duRèglement n 17, JO C 111 du 17.4.96).

MARITIME TRANSPORT :COMMISSION GIVES GREENLIGHT TO FIVE CONSORTIUMAGREEMENTS

On the basis of proposals from Mr VanMiert, the Commission has recentlyauthorised a series of consortiumagreements in the maritime transportsector. These are the first casesinvolving the application of theregulation which the Commissionadopted on 20 April 1995 (seeIP/95/409 and Annex) and which granta block exemption to liner shippingconsortia offering international maritimeliner services from one or moreCommunity ports. Liner shippingconsortia are agreements betweenshipping companies, the object of whichis to bring about cooperation for thejoint operation of a maritime linertransport service by means of variousarrangements. Four of these consortiumagreements, all of which existed beforethe entry into force of the regulation,have been authorised and may operateuntil 21 April 2000, the date on whichthe regulation expires.

So far as the fifth agreement, it is not aconsortium falling within the scope ofthe exemption regulation and has beengranted individual exemption.

The Commission has been able toestablish that each of these consortia hasnot only allowed the participatingshipping lines to rationalise theiractivities but has also contributed tosignificant improvements in the qualityand frequency of liner shipping services


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offered to shippers as well as, in somecases, the number of ports served. TheCommission has checked that theconsortia remain subject to effectivecompetition on the routes where theyoperate thereby guaranteeing thatshippers obtain a fair share of thebenefits which result from theseagreements. The following five consortia willbenefit from exemption.

(1) St Lawrence Coordinated Service

On 13 October 1995, Canada MaritimeLimited and Orient Overseas ContainerLine (UK) notified to the Commissionthe St Lawrence Coordinated Service(SLCS), a consortium agreement underwhich these shipping companiesoperate a joint liner service between theport of Montreal in Canada and variousports in North-West Europe.

On 27 March 1996, the Commissiondecided not to oppose this agreementand to allow it to benefit from thegroup exemption. In order to be able tobenefit from exemption, the partiesagreed to delete, at the request of theCommission, a clause in the agreementwhich required all goods of Quebec orOntario origin or destination to beshipped via the port of Montreal, whichrestricted the possibility of the partiesto use, even within the scope of adifferent agreement, the competingCanadian port of Halifax. This clausewas not considered to be indispensablefor the objectives of the consortium.The deletion of this clause clearlyshows the wish of the Commission notto allow parties to a consortiumagreement to impose restrictions ofcompetition relating to routes otherthan the routes on which theconsortium operates.

(2) East African Container Service

On 17 October 1995, six shippingcompanies notified to the Commissionthe East African Container Service(EACS), a consortium agreement underwhich they operate a joint liner servicebetween ports in Europe (including inthe UK and Mediterranean) and portsin East Africa and the Red Sea. The sixcompanies are The CharenteSteam-Ship Co Ltd, DSR-SenatorLines, Ellerman Lines Ltd, P&OContainers Ltd, WEC Lines,Mediterranean Shipping Company. On27 March 1996, the Commission adecided not to oppose the agreementand to allow it to benefit from thegroup exemption.

(3) Joint Mediterranean CanadaService

On 19 October 1995, Canada MaritimeLimited and DSR-Senator Linesnotified to the Commission the JointMediterranean Canada Service (JMCS),a consortium agreement under whichthese shipping companies operate ajoint liner service between the port ofMontreal in Canada and various portsin the eastern Mediterranean. On 2April 1996 the Commission decidednot to oppose the agreement and toallow it to benefit from the groupexemption.

(4) Joint Pool Agreement

On 20 October 1995, Andrew WeirShipping Ltd and Euro Africa ShippingLine Co Ltd notified to theCommission the Joint Pool Agreement(JPA), a consortium agreement underwhich these shipping companiesoperate a joint liner service for thetransport of goods between the Britishports of Hull and Felixstowe and thePolish port of Gdynia. On 1 April 1996

the Commission a decided not to opposethe agreement and to allow it to benefitfrom the group exemption.

(5) Agreement benefitting fromIndividual Exemption - ExemptionDecision of 9 April 1996

On 11 August 1995, Finncarriers Oy Aband Poseidon Schiffahrt AG applied tothe Commission for an exemption underArticle 85(3) of the EEC Treaty inrespect of the Baltic Liner ConferenceAgreement. Under the agreement theparties operate a joint service on ajointly agreed schedule at jointly agreedtariff and service arrangement rates. Thejoint service consists in the provision ofregular ferry services for ro-ro,container and rail/ferry traffic betweenports and points in Finland and (i) portsand points in Germany (and otherContinental points via German ports)and (ii) ports and points in Scandinavia(Sweden, Denmark and Norway), witha small volume of traffic to and fromRussia via Finland to those countries.

The parties take joint investmentdecisions, in particular for theacquisition of vessels and equipmentthat are specifically designed for theclimatic conditions where they operateand which are also specially designed tomeet the specific needs of Finnishshippers. The joint service is managedby Finncarriers.

Such an agreement which brings abouta highly integrated joint service doesnot amount to a consortium agreementfalling within the scope of theregulation adopted in April 1995 sinceit does not concern exclusively thetransport of goods principally bycontainers. A large part of the goods arenot containerised and the consortium istherefore unable to benefit from thegroup exemption and must benefit froman individual exemption if it is to beauthorised.


ANTI-TRUST RULES

In order to obtain the comments ofthird parties, in accordance with normalprocedures, the Commission publisheda notice in the Official Journal on 16February 1996 setting out a summaryof the application. No observationswere received and within a period ofninety days following publication theCommission considered that theconditions of Article 85(3) werefulfilled and decided on 9 April 1996not to oppose the exemption of thisagreement; Accordingly, in accordancewith the applicable regulations, themaritime activities are exempted for aperiod of six years and the inlandactivities (which in this case are minor)are exempted for a period of threeyears.

Principal Features of CommissionRegulation No 870/95

This favourable treatment on the partof the Commission is explained by theadvantages brought about by consortia.In general, they help to improve notonly productivity but also the qualityand the frequency of the liner transportservices offered to transport users byrationalising the activities of themember companies and by theeconomies of scale which they bringabout.

The conditions and obligations that aconsortium must respect in order tobenefit from the block exemption areset out in article 5 to 9 of RegulationNo 870/95. These conditions andobligations are attached to the blockexemption in order to guarantee thatthe requirements of Article 85(3) of theTreaty are fulfilled. Above all, theyseek to ensure that consortia areoperating in trades where they remainsubject to effective competition in orderto guarantee that shippers obtain a fairshare of the benefits resulting fromthese agreements.

To that effect, a consortium whichwishes to benefit automatically fromthe block exemption must have a tradeshare below 30% or 35% depending onwhether or not it is a consortiumoperating within a liner Conference.

The benefit of the group exemption isstill available through a simplifiedopposition procedure to a consortiumwhose trade share exceeds the limits of30% or 35% but is not above 50% ofthe direct trade provided it fulfils theother conditions contained inRegulation No 870/95 and provided theCommission does not opposeexemption within a period of sixmonths counting from the date ofnotification.

Where a consortium enjoys a tradeshare above 50% or where it does notfulfil the other conditions which theregulation attaches to the benefit of theblock exemption, such an agreementmust be notified to the Commission soas to apply for individual exemptionpursuant to Article 85(3) of the Treaty.

Finally, the regulation provides afavourable procedural regime forconsortia existing at the date of entryinto effect of the Regulation As aresult, consortia existing on that datewhich have a trade share higher to 50%but which fulfil the other conditions ofthe block exemption may, for a periodof six months following the entry intoforce of the Regulation, also benefitfrom the simplified oppositionprocedure. [IP/96/400] 96/05/08

ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION

Interbrew

Le brasseur belge Interbrew a notifié àla Commission une circulaire interner é g l a n t l a p o l i t i q u e d ecommercialisation à suivre par ses

filiales en Europe pour les produits dugroupe. La circulaire confiait laresponsabilité, pour chaque paysconcerné, à une filiale spécifique dugroupe. En outre, les filiales étaientsoumises aux règles suivantes :

- interdiction de vendre les produitsdans un autre territoire ;

- transfert de chaque commande d'unacheteur d'un autre territoire vers lafiliale responsable du pays concerné ;

- transfert de chaque commandedestinée à un autre pays mais émanantd'un acheteur local sans activitécommerciale locale vers la filialeresponsable ;

- même transfert pour des acheteurslocaux ayant pratiqué des exportations(parallèles) dans le passé, à moins queces derniers puissent prouver que lacommande était destinée à un client duterritoire local ;

- même traitement que décrit ci-dessuspour un acheteur local dont lescommandes accusent une augmentationdisproportionnée par rapport au marchélocal ; et

- mesures d'accompagnement quant à lareprise des vidanges provenant d'unautre pays.

Par sa notification, Interbrew a demandéà la Commission de se prononcer àl'égard de cette circulaire "intra-groupe"sur la non-applicabilité de l'article 85.

Conformément à l'arrêt de Tribunal dePremière Instance du 12 janvier 1995dans l'affaire T-102/92 Viho Europecontre Commission, la DirectionGénérale de la Concurrence a d'abordconsidéré que la circulaire n'est pasconstitutive d'un accord restricif deconcurrence au sens de l'article 85 (1)en ce qui concerne les relations entre les


ANTI-TRUST RULES

entreprises au sein du groupeInterbrew. Il en est autrement del'obligation pour chaque filiale dugroupe de soumettre l'exécution decommandes de certains acheteurs -quisont supposés d'exporter- établis surson territoire de responsabilité à unecondition d'accepter une clause dedestination (qui revient à une conditionexplicite ou implicite de ne pasexporter). Cette obligation aboutirait àun accord restrictif couvert par l'article85 (1) au moment que cet accord esteffectivement conclu entre quelconquefiliale et son distributeur.

Dans l'affaire Viho, le Tribunal ne s'estpas prononcé sur la question de savoirsi la politique de distribution de Parkeren confiant à une filiale lacommercialisation de ses produits dansun Etat Membre et en contraignant lesache teurs à s 'approvisionnerexclusivement auprès d'une filialedéterminée, pourrait être constitutived'un abus de position dominante. Eneffet, le Tribunal a pu constater quedans le cas d'espèce il n'y avait passuffisamment d'éléments pour conclureque Parker se trouve en positiondominante sur le marché concerné.

Dans le cas d'espèce, les services de laCommission ont considéré queInterbrew se trouve en positiondominante sur le marché belge de labière. De plus, la concrétisation desdifférentes instructions contenues dansle circulaire constituerait un abus decette position dominante d'Interbrew.Le fait que les comportements abusifsauraient lieu dans un marchégéographique relevant autre que celuidans lequel Interbrew est en positiondominante, n'exclut pas l'application del'article 86, dans la mesure où cescomportements ont pour effet demaintenir et/ou à cloisonner lesdifférents marchés nationaux permettantInterbrew de mieux exploiter saposition dominante sur le marché belge.

En particulier, la mise en oeuvre de lapolitique de distribution comme elle aété décrite dans la circulaire, permettraà Interbrew de protéger le marché belgede la concurrence "intrabrand" desbières d'Interbrew en provenanced'autres Etats membres. En effet, lesimportateurs parallèles belges, et dèslors les consommateurs belges, severraient limités considérablement dansleur possibilité de s'approvisionner enbières d'Interbrew en France où certainsproduits du groupe sont moins chersqu'en Belgique.

Pour ces raisons , la DG IV a envoyéà Interbrew une lettre d'avertissement.Informée de cette prise de position,Interbrew a indiqué que les instructionsdu circulaire n'ont pas été mise enoeuvre, et elle les a retirées sousréserve de tous ses droits.

L'intervention de la DG IV dans cetteaffaire confirme sa politique d'interdiretoute entrave au commerce parallèlerésultant soit d'un accord entreentreprises, soit d'un abus de positiondominante. En effet, dans un marchéunique, le consommateur doit avoir lapossibilité de se procurer un produit làoù son prix est le plus intéressant et lecommerce parallèle doit pouvoirexercer sa fonction d'arbitrage.

Novo Nordisk

Undertakings have been accepted fromN o v o Nord i sk , t h e Dan i shpharmaceutical company, which aredesigned to ensure competition in themarkets for components of NovoNordisk's insulin self-injection deliverysystems.

Novo Nordisk is Europe's leadinginsulin producer. In 1985 NovoNordisk introduced a new method ofinsulin self-injection, the so-called"insulin pen" system. For many

diabetes sufferers, this has proved moreconvenient than traditional self-injectiondelivery systems such as thehypodermic syringe. About a third of alldiabetics in Europe already employ suchpen systems and the trend is continuing.The systems consist of an injectiondevice (the "pen"), non-refillablecartridges containing the insulin dosage,and disposable needles. Othercompanies now produce similar pendelivery systems, including manufactureof the various components, some ofwhich are compatible with NovoNordisk systems. Compatiblecomponents in this context are thosewhich can safely and effectively be usedin combination with the Novo Nordiskproducts, and which do not cause thesystem to malfunction in any materialway.

On the foot of a complaint by US-basedmedical device manufacturer, BectonDick inson , the Commission'sDirectorate-General for competitioncarried out an investigation and arrivedat the preliminary conclusion that NovoNordisk occupies a dominant positionon the insulin market, and on themarkets for the various components ofpen delivery systems, in most MemberStates. It concluded that it has beenabusing its dominance, contrary to theCommunity's competition rules, by insome instances disclaiming liability forthe malfunction of its pen products, orrefusing to guarantee such products,when they are used in conjunction withthe compatible components of othermanufacturers. Objection was made notonly to the explicit disclaimer of liabilityby Novo Nordisk in such circumstances,but equally to the phrasing of disclaimersin such a way as to create unfoundedconfusion or uncertainty in the minds ofconsumers as to the safety or effectivenessof using non-Novo Nordisk components inits pen delivery systems.

Objection was also made by DG IV to theclaim by Novo Nordisk that some


ANTI-TRUST RULES

components were incompatible withNovo Nordisk systems because of theirinability to facilitate the carrying out ofan ancilliary and optional "functioncheck" designed to check dosageaccuracy. This check was not consideredmaterial to the issue of compatibility.Novo Nordisk, while expressly contestingthe allegations made in the complaint andthe Commission's preliminaryconclusions, has now undertaken to takemeasures which meet the Commission'sconcerns: liability disclaimers, whetherexpressed orally or in writing, will nolonger be used in relation to the issue ofcombined use of Novo Nordisk insulinpen products with other manufacturers'compatible components. Novo Nordiskhas furthermore indicated that it will nottreat other manufacturers' components asincompatible with its pen systems merelyon the basis of their inability to enablethe ancilliary "function check" for its penproducts to be carried out.

The wording of its safety warnings topatients for all relevant packaging,promotional material and productliterature will be revised throughout theEEA in accordance with theseundertakings. These changes, includingadaptation of existing stock, will beintroduced on a country by country basisas soon as the necessary regulatoryapproval has been obtained. Clearinstruction concerning the new positionwill also be given to Novo Nordisk salesand marketing staff in all EEA countries.

Deutsche Telekom

On the 25th of June, Commissioner KarelVan Miert sent a letter to the GermanM i n i s t e r o f P o s t a n dTelecommunications, Mr WolfgangBötsch marking his agreement on a seriesof conditions for the introduction of newbusiness customer tariffs by DeutscheTelekom.

Deutsche Telekom AG's (DT) hadoriginally planned to introduce newtariffs as from 1 January 1996. TheCommission consequently launched anown initiative investigation concerningDTs plans for the introduction of rebatesfor providing voice services to businesscustomers in order to assess whether thepublic telecom operator is abusing itsdominant position. Such abuse couldresult in unfair elimination of newcompetition in that part of the businessmarket which has recently beenliberalised. The Commission had alsoreceived a complaint (January 1996) fromall the major competitors of DT in therecently liberalised areas of network andbusiness voice services in Germany (CNI,RWE, Telliance, Plusnet, Meganet, ViagIntercom, Worldcom).

In a provisional assessment of theproposed tariff scheme the Commission'sDirectorate General for Competitionconcluded that the new tariffs wereincompatible with the competition rulesof the Treaty. It was clear in particularthat the tariffs would discriminate infavour business customers vis a visresidential customers, that they wouldhave 'price squeezing' effects oncompetitors, and that they represented"bundling" i.e. the undue linking of theprovision of monopoly and competitiveservices. The modifications andconditions now agreed betweenCommissioner Van Miert and Mr Bötschaim at eliminating these problems.

The Commission requires that thefollowing conditions are met:

- New business customer tariffs will notenter into force before 1 November 1996.

- The new tariffs will not be appliedretroactively.

- The Federal Minister of Posts andTelecommunications confirms that on thedate of entry into force of new businesscustomer tariffs at least two licences for

the construction or ownership and controlof alternative infrastructure for theprovision of liberalised services havecome into force in Germany.

- The Federal Minister of Posts andTelecommunications undertakes to ensure,that new access agreements betweenDeutsche Telekom and its competitors forthe "break in" and "break out"[Passingcalls into and out of DT's network] ofDT's public switched telecommunicationsnetwork are concluded at the latest at thetime of entry into force of the newbusiness customer tariffs. He willencourage the parties to initiatenegotiations on such agreementsimmediately.

- Deutsche Telekom will ensure a strictseparation between its general voicetelephony offerings by Deutsche TelekomAG and the offering of CorporateNetwork solutions at least until 1 January1998. (6) Deutsche Telekom must offertrial rebates to domestic customers beforethe new business customer tariffs enterinto force. These rebates will be generallyapplied as from 1 January 1997 at thelatest.

Since these conditions will meet theCommission's concerns regarding thecompatibility of DT's proposed tariffs withthe competition rules of the Treaty, MrVan Miert said in his letter that he intendsto suspend the Commission investigationuntil the measures requested have beenfully implemented, and that he wouldrecommend the Commission formallyclose the procedure once these conditionsare met.

The implementation of these measures isalso expected to have important positiveeffects on the broader competitivestructure of German telecoms markets. Inparticular:

- The introduction of the new tariffs willbe delayed until the effective opening ofalternative infrastructures and until oneyear before the introduction of fullcompetition for voice telephony.


ANTI-TRUST RULES

- Corporate Network providers competingwith DT will get favourable terms ofaccess (lower tariffs) for the network"break in" and "break out".

- A clear separation of DT's offeringswill increase market transparency for itscustomers - Residential customers willbenefit from rebates introduced in parallelwith the rebates for business customers.

A number of telecommunicationsorganisations in the European Union arecurrently considering major reform oftheir tariffs in preparation for fullliberalisation of telecoms markets in1998. The Commission encourages therebalancing of tariffs in so far as thisreflects commercial adaptation tocompetitive conditions. However, untilfull liberalisation is achieved closeattention must be paid to the effects andmotivations of tariff reforms.

Currently competition is growing in therecently liberalised markets such asbusiness and data services, while otherareas, such as access to end customersand public voice telephony, will mostlyremain closed until 1998. In this run upperiod there is a risk that incumbenttelecommunications operators mayrestructure tariffs in such a way as toexploit the difference between increasingprice elasticities in the competitivemarkets and the lower price elasticity(due to absence of competition) in thelatter. This could harm the new suppliersof liberalised services, by "pricesqueezing" them out of the market.

During the current adjustment period, theCommission will therefore pay specialattention to these aspects, in order toavoid anti-competitive effects.

[IP/96/543] 96/06/25

Press releases

The full texts of Commission'sPress releases are available on-line from the RAPID database,on the day of their publication bythe Commission's Spokesman'sService. To obtain access toRAPID, please write to EUR-OPInformation, Marketing andPublic Relations (OP/4B)2 rue Mercier L-2985Luxembourg tel. +352 292942455, fax +352 2929 42763

COMMISSIONER VAN MIERTSATISFIED WITH VISADROPPING ITS PROPOSED RULE

Mr Van Miert, the EU competitionCommissioner, has announced that he issatisfied with the recent decision of theEU Board of Visa International to dropthe proposal that would have banned itsmembers from issuing competing cards.Before Visa's Board meeting, Mr VanMiert has warned taht Visa's propsalcould not be accepted. Visa USA alsoconfirmed to the Commission that itsrules do not prevent the EU branches,parnts or subsidiaries of Visa USAmembers from issuing competing cards.As a consequence, the Commission'sDirectorate General for Competition (DGIV) intends soon to close its investigationof these matters.

This investigation was launched inJanuary after some of Visa's competitors,such as American Express and DeanWitter Discover, made formal complaintsto the Commission. The Commission'sDG IV has reached the preliminary viewthat Visa's proposal, if adopted, wouldhave infringed the EC competition rulesbecause it would have restirctedcompetition between international cardssystems as well as between banks wichissue cards riding on those systems. The

Commission is determined to ensure thatpayment card markets are kept open andthat access by new competitors is notimpeded. IP/96/585 [96/07/03]

Other press releases

IP/96/432 : FINANCIAL SERVICES:MEETING CONSUMERS'EXPECTATIONS - COMMISSIONADOPTS GREEN PAPER [96/05/22]

IP/96/456 : ELSINORE PORT OPENEDFOR ACCESS TO A NEWCOMPETING FERRY SERVICE [96/05/30]]

IP/96/462 : COMMISSION CLEARSBRITISH GAS NETWORK CODE[96/05/31]

IP/96/627 : THE COMMISSIONPROHIBITS TARIFF CONCER-TATIONS IN THE FIELD OF THEAIR TRANSPORT OF CARGO [96/07/10]

IP/96/629 : CARTEL BUSTING :COMMISSION FORESEES LOWEROR NO FINES FOR COMPANIESDISCLOSING EXISTENCE OFILLICIT PRACTICES [96/07/10]

IP/96/685 : MONITORING THEAPPLICATION OF COMMUNITYLAW - 1995 REPORT [96/07/23]

IP/96/695 : NEW MECHANISM FORREGULATORY TRANSPARENCYWITH REGARD TO INFORMATIONSOCIETY SERVICES [96/07/24

IP/96/713 : EU'S DUTY-FREEARRANGEMENTSUNSATISFACTORY [96/07/29]

IP/96/718 : COMMISSION TO CARRYOUT DETAILED INQUIRY INFINNISH SUPERMARKET CASE [96/07/26]


ANTI-TRUST RULES

Court JudgementsThese summaries of Court Judgements have been prepared by DGIV officials and represent their personal views on the Judgement.These views have not been adopted or in any way approved by theCommission and should not be relied upon as a statement of theCommission's or DG IV's views. The CELEX document numbers forthese Judgements are also included within brackets.

THE ENGLISH HIGH COURT'SJUDGMENT IN IBERIA U.K. LTDV (1) BPB INDUSTRIES PLC AND(2) BRITISH GYPSUM LTD

The facts

The defendants (BPB Industries Plc andBritish Gypsum Ltd) are major suppliersof plasterboard to the UK and for thepurposes of Article 86, occupy adominant position in that market. Whenthe plaintiff (Iberian UK Ltd) began toimport cheaper Spanish plasterboard tothe UK, the defendants took steps toprotect their market. The plaintiff havecomplained to the Commission of abuseof dominant position by the defendants.Having init iated infringementproceedings, the Commission adopted adecision (89/22) in which it foundbreaches of Article 86 and imposed fineson both defendants. This decision wassubsequently appealed to the CFI (CaseT-65/89) and then to the ECJ (Case C-130/93P). In both cases the appeals weredismissed in their entirety.

The plaintiff also brought an action fordamages in the English High Courtalleging that, contrary to Article 86 of theTreaty, the defendants had acted inbreach of their statutory duty so as toabuse their dominant position. It is in thiscontext that the High Court dealt with theissue of whether a party could, innational proceedings, rely on conclusionsof facts and issues reached by theCommission, the CFI and the ECJ inrelated proceedings. In essence, theplaintiff wanted to be able to proceed

with its claim without having to provefrom scratch that the defendants hadabused their dominant position.

Legal background: "res judicata" andabuse of process

The plaintiff's arguments were basedlargely on the common law doctrine of"res judicata" in the form known as"issue estoppel". Namely, a party to civilproceedings is not entitled to makeagainst the other party an assertion, if thesame assertion was made in previouscivil proceedings between the sameparties and found to be incorrect. Theplaintiff claimed that it is not open toeither party to relitigate in the High Courtissues which have been determined in theresolution of that dispute in Europeanproceedings.

The High Court gave consideration to thenature of Commission proceedings incompetition cases and held that inrelation to Article 85 and 86investigations, although proceedings tookon an adversarial character, they wereadministrative in nature and could not betreated as civil for the purposes of issueestoppel.

Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that itwould be an abuse of process for thedefendants to deny the correctness andapplicability of the findings in theEuropean proceedings.

The High Court held that even though thefacts did not fall squarely within the

doctrine of issue estoppel, the doctrinecould be extended beyond the abovedefinition. In any case it was irrelevantwhether not being able to relitigatepreviously decided facts and issues istermed issue estoppel or abuse of process,since both are manifestations of the samegroup of public policy considerations.

Relationship between national andEuropean proceedings

In examining public policy considerations,the court looked at the relationshipbetween national and Europeanproceedings and, in particular, the risk ofconflicting decisions associated with thecompetence the Commission shares withnational courts in applying Article 85(1)and 86. The court referred to certainprinciples on the avoidance of conflictingdecisions. These are restated in theCommission's notice on cooperationbetween national courts in applyingArticles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty (OJC 39, 13.2.1993) (at paragraphs 18, 19and 33). These principles are worth citinghere.

In Stergio Delimitis v. Henniger Brau[1991] ECR I-935, the ECJ held that:

"conflicting decisions would be contraryto the general principle of legal certaintyand must, therefore, be avoided whennational courts give decisions onagreements or practices which maysubsequently be the subject of a decisionby the Commission..."

This was consistent with the ECJ'sdecision in Foto-Frost v. HauptzollamtLübeck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199:

"Divergences between courts in theMember States as to the validity ofCommunity acts would be liable to placein jeopardy the very unity of theCommunity legal order and detract fromthe fundamental requirement of legalcertainty."


ANTI-TRUST RULES

Also, Advocate General Van Gerven in HJ Banks & Co. Ltd. v. British CoalCorporation [1994] ECR 1209 stated that:

"the duty of cooperation which.... Article5 of the EEC Treaty imposes on thenational court (and which appliesexpressly to acts of the institutions)entails for the national court theobligation in relation to a decisionadopted by the Commission and reliedupon or challenged by the parties beforethe court, to mitigate as far as possible inthe interests of the Community the risk ofa ruling that conflicts with that decision."

The High Court also quoted a number ofEnglish authorities in support of theproposition that the English court shouldorder a stay, where to do otherwisewould run the risk of conflicting with theCommission's decision.

The High Court's Conclusions

On the basis of the above, the HighCourt concluded the following:

1. The English courts should take allreasonable steps to avoid or reduce therisk of arriving at a conclusion which isat variance with a decision of, or onappeal from, the Commission in relationto competition law.

2. Except in the clearest cases of breachor non-breach, it will be a properexercise of discretion to stay proceedingsin the English courts to await theoutcome of the European proceedings.

3. It follows that if as a matter of publicpolicy national courts are required to stayproceedings pending the resolution ofEuropean competition proceedings, thenthe latter should have a major impact inproceedings before the national court(otherwise there is no point in there beinga stay).

4. Where, as here, the parties havedisputed the same issues before theCommission and have had real and

reasonable opportunities to appeal froman adverse decision, there is no injusticein obliging them to accept the resultobtained in Europe. Therefore, whetherexpressed in terms of res judicata orabuse of process, it would be contrary topublic policy to allow persons who havebeen involved in competition proceedingsin Europe to deny in the English courtsthe correctness of the conclusions reachedin Europe. It would be an abuse ofprocess to allow the defendants to mounta collateral attack on the Commissiondecision in proceedings against any partybefore any national court.

5. Thus the Commission Decision, thejudgment of the CFI and/or the opinionof the AG and the judgment in the ECJare conclusive of facts and issues in therelevant national proceedings. Thedefendants, being addressees of thesedecisions are bound by them. The issueof whether such decisions wereadmissible did not arise in this case, butthe court held that a stay of the nationalproceedings followed by mereadmissibility of the result in Europewould enable at least one of the parties toplead arguments as to why theCommission, the CFI and the ECJ werewrong. This goes against the cases citedabove. C. MITROPOULOS [694J0018]

Other Judgements

Extracts are published in the weeklypublication " Les activités de la Courde Justice et du Tribunal dePremière Instance des CE",available on-line from the RAPIDdatabase, a few days after itspublication.

Conclusions de M. C.O. Lenz du 25avril 1996 : Aff.C-73/95 P Viho EuropeBV / Commission; Pourvoi contre l'arrêtdu Tribunal, rendu le 12 janvier 1995,dans l'affaire T-102/92 - Annulation de

la décision de la Commission rejetant laplainte de VIHO visant à faire constaterune infraction à l'art. 85, par. 1, du traitéCE de la part de Parker Pen (IV/32.725- VIHO/Parker Pen II) - Obligationimposée par la société mère à ses filialesde se limiter à leur zone de distribution

Arret de la Cour du 2/5/96: Aff. C-18/94Barbara Hopkins e.a. / National Powerplc e.a.; Prejudicielle; Traite CECA Discriminations entre producteurs Application des art. 4 et 63 du traite.Effet direct - Abus de positiondominante Art. 86 du traite Reparationdes dommages resultant de la violationde ces dispositions Competencesrespectives de la Commission et du jugenational; (Sixieme chambre)

Conclusions de M. D. Ruiz-JaraboColomer du 27/6/1996 Aff. C-333/94-P;Tetra Pak International SA /Commission ; Pourvoi contre l'arrêt duTribunal dans l'affaire T-83/91 opposantTetra Pak International à la Commission- Refus d'annuler la décision92/163/CEE de la Commission relative àune procédure d'application de l'art. 86.

Ordonnance du Tribunal du 3 juin 1996,Aff. T-41/96 R Bayer AG / Com-mission; Concurrence, Procédure deréféré; Sursis à exécution

Arrêt du Tribunal du 11 juillet 1996,Aff. T-528/93, T-543/93, T-546/93Métropole Télévision / Commission;Annulation de la décision (CEE) 403/93de la Commission du 11 juin 1993 -inapplicabilité de l'art 85 § 1 auxdisposition statutaires de l'UER-Restrictions dans l'accès au marché desspectatcles sportifs retransmis enEurovision.

Conclusions de M. Tesauro du 9 juillet1996 Aff. C-282/95-P GuérinAutomobiles / Commission

Conclusions de M. Lenz du 11 juillet1996, Aff. C-264/95 P Commission /UIC Billets de transports ferroviaires


MERGERSApplication of Council Regulation 4064/89Main developments between 1st April and 31st July 1996


Kristin SCHREIBER, DG IV-B-4

NUMBER OF CASES ANDDECISIONS

The second quarter of 1996 has seenan increase in the number ofdecisions taken by the Commissionunder the Merger Regulation.Between 1st April and 22nd July, theCommission took 54 decisions underthe Regulation. This total includesone prohibition decision under Article8 ( 3 ) o f t h e R e g u l a t i o n(Gencor/Lonrho), three decisionsunder Article 8(2) of the Regulation(clearance with conditions andobligations : Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz andHolland Media Groep; clearancewithout conditions : Shell /Montecatini- the two latter decisionsreplacing earlier decisions adopted bythe Commission) as well as fourdecisions under Article 6(1)(c) of theRegulation to begin in depth "Phase2" investigations into cases on whichthe Commission had serious doubts(Ciba-Geigy / Sandoz, Telefonica /Sogecable / Cablevision, Kesko /Tuko and Saint Gobain / WackerChemie /NOM).

This brought the total number ofcases on which decisions have beentaken during the first half of 1996(up to 31st July) to 73.

Gencor/Lonrho

Following five months of detailedinvestigations, the Commissiondecided on 24th April 1996 to declareincompatible with the commonmarket the proposed merger in theplatinum sector between ImpalaPlatinum, controlled by the SouthAfrican company Gencor and Lonrhoplatinum division (LPD), a SouthAfrican subsidiary of the BritishCompany Lonrho PLC.

Both Gencor and Lonrho havesubstantial operations in the EuropeanUnion. The Commission consideredthat the merger would lead to thecreation of a duopoly dominating theworld market for platinum andrhodium as a result of whicheffective competition would besignificantly impeded in the commonmarket within the meaning of Article2(3) of the Merger Regulation.

The parties have - seen relatively -lower market shares in the Commonmarket than in other parts of theworld and have argued that theoperation would, therefore, only havea minor impact on the commonmarket. However, the platinummarket is a world market and pricesfor platinum are set at the world

marke t l eve l . Therefore ,anticompetitive effects of theoperation in the platinum marketwould be felt in the EuropeanCommunity, for example throughhigher prices, for all the platinum soldin Europe.

The merger between Gencor andLonrho would have enabled these twocompanies to reach roughly equalmarket shares in the platinum marketas the other South African GroupAmplats (Anglo American PlatinumCorporation); i.e. approximately 35%each, the other major supplier beingRussia with an approximate marketshare of 25%. Half of the Russiansupplies come from stocks.

In addition to this situation withregard to market shares, it has to benoted that the market for platinum hasspecial features which increase thepotential for the existence of adominant duopoly :

1) Only 20% of the trade in platinumis transacted in the exchanges ofLondon, New York and Tokyo. Thebulk (80%) of the trade is determinedby long-term contracts.

2) The demand for platinum in itsthree major fields of application isinelastic at current prices since thereare virtually no substitutes forplatinum. The three major uses forplatinum are jewellery (38%), themanufacturing of motor car catalyticconverters (32%) and industrialcatalysis applications (20%),particularly in chemicals, glassmanufacturing and the production ofliquid crystals for television andcomputer screens.


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3) Purchasers have a very limitedmargin for negotiations and clearlyno countervailing buyer power.

4) On the supply side, the absence ofgenuine alternatives is an importantfactor, especially given thedistribution of world reserves. TheSouth African groups control 90% ofworld reserves, the remaining 10%being located in Russia.

Since Russia started in 1990 to lowerits stock levels, these stocks may bereduced to almost zero by the end ofthe century.

5) Over recent years two mainelements have contributed to therelative fall in platinum price : theRussian stock liquidation andLonrho's relatively low productioncosts. Lonrho's absorption in theplanned merger would therefore haveled to less competition in the market.

It is worth underlining that, from theoutset of the procedure, the SouthAfrican Authorities have been keptinformed by the Commission ofdevelopments in this case and haveattended the hearings organised inBrussels.

Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz

On 17th July, after four months ofextensive investigations, theCommission approved the proposedmerger between Ciba-Geigy andSandoz into Novartis. The decisionwas granted under the condition thatthe parties comply with anundertaking given in the area ofanimal health.

The activities of Ciba-Geigy andSandoz overlap in four areas : health

care (where Novartis will become thesecond largest producer behind GlaxoWellcome), animal health (number 2behind Pfizer), crop protection(number 1) and seeds (number 2behind Pioneer). Ciba has anaggregate worldwide turnover ofECU 13.1 billion, Sandoz of ECU9.1 billion.

The Commission decided to openproceedings on 2nd May because ofserious concerns with regard to themerger's compatibility with theCommon Market. At that time, itcould not be excluded that the mergerwould lead to the creation ofdominant positions in a number ofmarkets, not least because of itscomplexity and because of thecombination of Ciba-Geigy's andSandoz tremendous research anddevelopment potential. Furtherinvestigations eliminated all but oneof these concerns. Indeed, whileover 100 affected markets wereiden t i f i ed , t he merger ispredominantly of a complementarynature.

Even in overlapping markets, marketshare additions were found, in mostcases, not to be significant and wherethey are, the merger will neverthelessnot lead to a dominant position.Novartis will continue to facecompetition in all areas from anumber of major competitors,including Glaxo Wellcome, UpjohnPharmacia, Bayer, BASF, Agrevo,Rhône-Poulenc and many others.The presence of these competitorsand the real possibility of marketentry as well as the price restrainingeffects of generics (both in the healthcare and the crop protection area)will ensure that markets remaindynamic.

The Commission also examined veryclosely the R&D activities of themerging parties. While the mergerwill result in a significant combinedR&D potential - Novartis having forinstance twice as large a potential asthe next competitor in crop protectionR&D - it was considered that enoughother companies have the required"critical mass" at their disposal toalleviate concerns.

Commission's investigations in theR&D area focused on developmentsin the field of gene technology andgene therapy in which the parties havea particular strength. In the course ofits investigations, the Commissionestablished that the two companiescould, as a result of holdings in U.S.companies, have exclusive access to acombination of possible future patentsin the area of particular gene therapiesfor brain and other tumours whichmight result in foreclosure effects.

However, given a number ofuncertainties linked notably to theunclear patent situation (the patents inquestion have not yet been granted),as well as to doubts about the successof the method of treatment and aboutthe possibility of technicallycircumventing the patents, theCommission concluded that it can notbe said with sufficient probability thatthe merger will lead to the creation orstrengthening of a dominant positionon any future market. However, theCommission has taken note that themerging parties have declared theirreadiness to use their influence so thatnon-exclusive licenses shall begranted for those possible futurepatents which might cause theforeclosure.

The remaining competition concernrelated to the market for small animal


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ectoparasiticides (SAE), mainlyproducts for treatment of fleas andticks in cats and dogs.

This market can be split in two ways: according to the place where theproduct is administered (the animalor the environment) and according tothe nature of the product ("adulticides" killing mostly adultparasites and Insect GrowthRegulators (IGR's) which interruptthe reproductive cycle of theparasite).

Adulticides and IGR's cannot beconsidered as full substitutes. Themerging parties will have aparticularly strong position in theimportant IGR market segment.Ciba-Geigy and Sandoz control threeout of the five worldwide availableactive substances.

In terms of the SAE market'sdevelopment, access to IGR activeingredients is crucial for competitors'ability to develop IGR products.Access to one active ingredient ofSandoz (methoprene) has been ofparticular importance to competitors.In order to solve the identifiedcompetition problem, the parties haveundertaken to grant non-exclusivelicenses for methoprene and to supplythe licensees with this activeingredient until the commencement ofproduction by the licensee, but for amaximum period of 2 years.

Subject to the condition of fullcompliance with this commitmentmade by the parties, the Commissiondeclared the concentration compatiblewith the Common Market and withthe functioning of the EEAagreement.

Bosch/Allied Signal

On 10th April 1996, the Commissionapproved the acquisition by RobertBosch GmbH of Allied Signal's totalworldwide hydraulic brakes business,including anti-block systems (ABS)for hydraulic brakes. While Boschdoes not manufacture hydraulicbrakes and related components,Allied Signal reaches slightly over30% market share in the "actuationsystems" market (behind the leadingITT and ahead of Lucas) and justunder 20% in the "foundationsystems" market (after Lucas andITT).

The Commission particularlyexamined the market for ABS forhydraulic brakes for which Bosch hasan EEA market share of 50% (30%on a worldwide basis) a share whichhas, however, been continuouslydiminishing. Allied Signal only haslow market shares, both on aworldwide basis and in the EEA.Apart from ITT, none of Bosch'scompetitors in the EEA market(Kelsey-Hayes, Nissin Kogyo andLucas) reach market shares of over5%. The Commission concluded thatthe concentration would not create orstrengthen a dominant position ofBosch because of ITT's significantand increasing market share norwould it lead to an anticompetitiveoligopoly consisting of Bosch andITT.

Indeed, the demand side of the ABSmarket is very powerful. In addition,ABS are an inhomogeneous, verycomplex technical product, in whichthere is constant innovation andwhere special instructions from carmanufacturers play an important role.It is a market characterized by great

uncertainty about future trends whichcan therefore be expected to give riseto an intensification of competition.

This market analysis of theCommission was to a certain extentconfirmed by the decision of Lucasand Varity to enter into a full mergerwhich was approved by theCommission on 15th July. AlthoughVarity, through its subsidiary Kelsey-Hayes is the world's largest producerof ABS, its current market share inEurope is indeed just under 5%, withLucas reaching an even lower share.It is therefore expected that themerger will provide the new entitywith the potential to competeeffectively with the leading integratedbrakes manufacturers and in particularwith Bosch and ITT.

Holland Media Groep (HMG)

On 17th July 1996 the Commissionapproved the Dutch TV joint ventureHolland Media Groep SA (HMG) ina modified form. Initially HMG hadbeen set up as a joint venture betweenRTL4 SA (RTL), VerenigingVeron ica Omroeporganisa t ie( V e r o n i c a ) a n d E n d e m o lEntertainment Holding BV (Endemol)for the operation of the three Dutchgeneral interest channels RTL4, RTL5and Veronica. Following an in depthinvestigation, on 20th September 1995,the Commission declared thisoperation - which had already beencompleted - incompatible with thecommon market.

The Commission's investigation ofthis case was initiated following arequest from the Dutch government tothis effect, based on Article 22 of theMerger Regulation. Since therequired turnover thresholds set out in


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the Merger Regulation were notreached by the parties, theCommission would, in the absence ofthe Dutch request, have had nojurisdiction to deal with the case.However, given that there is nosuspension effect for cases underArticle 22, the parties had beenentitled to complete the operation.

In its decision of 20th September theCommission concluded that the HMGjoint venture would lead to thecreation of a dominant position onthe TV advertising market in TheNetherlands and to the strengtheningof Endemol's already existingdominant position on the Dutch TVproduction market.

As a reaction to the Commission'sArticle 8.3 decision, Endemolcompletely withdrew its participationin HMG. Furthermore, HMG enteredinto the commitment vis-à-vis theCommission to transform RTL5 froma general interest channel into a newschannel.

The withdrawal of Endemol fromHMG has removed the structural linkbetween the largest Dutch TVproducer and the leading commercialTV broadcaster in The Netherlands,a link which resulted in thestrengthening of Endemol's dominantposition.

After the withdrawal, HMG will nolonger have the preferential access toEndemol's productions. In addition,the withdrawal from HMG alsoallowed Endemol to set up a newsports channel in The Netherlands,together with other parties.

Furthermore, after the transformationof RTL5 into a news channel, HMGwill only operate two general interest

channels with coordinated programschedules, giving thereby more roomfor competing general interestchannels. Finally, the largest part ofthe current market shares of RTL5 inthe TV advertising market will beprobably set free for competition.Taking also into account the futuremarket entry of the new sportschannel, it can be expected that thecurrent market share of HMG in TVadvertising will decrease to a levelwhich would be close to the positionof RTL4 and RTL5 before thecreation of HMG which was around50%.

In view of the modifications of thejoint venture and on the basis ofHMG's commitment vis-à-vis theCommission with regard to RTL5,the Commission was now able todeclare the concentration compatiblewith the common market and toadopt a decision based on Article 8.2of the Regulation.

Amendment of Shell/MontecatiniDecision

On 24th April 1996, the Commissiondecided to amend its Decision 94/811EC of 8.6.1994 which had authorizedthe establishment of Montell, a jointventure in the polyolefins sectorbetween Shell and Montedison,subject to conditions and obligationscorresponding to commitments givenby the parties. In its initial Decision,the Commission considered that, as aresult of the establishment ofMontell, two fully-owned subsidiariesof the Royal Dutch/Shell group ofcompanies would be linked with thetwo leading technologies for themanufacture of polypropylene (PP).These were : Montedison's Spheripoltechnology and the Unipol

technology developed by UnionCarbide Corporation (UCC) and ShellOil, a Royal Dutch/Shell USsubsidiary. In particular, Shell wouldbe the industrial leader of Montell,which would develop and marketSpheripol, while Shell Oil would bean important contributor to the Unipoltechnology package through thesupply of catalysts.

In the Commission's view, RoyalDutch Shell's control over thecompetitive behaviour of its twosubsidiaries would affect the rivalrybetween Spheripol and Unipol, whichwas the main competitive relationshipon the market for the licensing of PPtechnology and associated services.Other existing PP technologyproviders or potential entrants into themarket were not likely to represent asignificant constraint on the exerciseof market power by the parties in theshort to medium term. For thesereasons, the Commission concludedthat the notified concentration wouldlead to dominance on the PPt e c h n o l o g y marke t u n l e s sMontedison's PP technology businesswould be kept separate from Montell.The Decision, therefore, contained acondition which required thatMontedison's Polypropylene (PP)technology business would remainoutside Montell and would betransferred to a separate company,Technipol.

However, after the adoption of theoriginal decision, Shell Oil divestedall its interests and assets in the PPtechnology business to Union CarbideCorporation (UCC), including itsinterests and assets in the Unipoltechnology business. In the light ofthese developments, the parties askedthe Commission to review its originalDecision, in order to assess whether


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the separation of Montedison's PPtechnology business from Montellwas still necessary.

The Commission's investigationshowed that, following thedivestiture, Unipol would fall outsidethe scope of influence of Shell andUCC would be endowed with all thenecessary assets and resources tocontinue competing effectivelyagainst Technipol on the market.The divestiture of Shell Oil's businesson its own would therefore ensurethat the creation of Montell wouldnot lead to a dominant position onthe market for the licensing of PPtechnology. The separation ofMontedison's PP technology businessfrom Montell was therefore no longera necessary condition from the pointof view of Community competitionlaw.

On this basis, the Commissionamended its original decision byrevoking the conditions andobligations relating to Montedison'sPP technology business. Thepossibility for such a review wasexpressly provided in the originalDecision itself (par. 118).

GEHE/Lloyds Chemists (Referredto UK)

On 22nd March 1996, theCommission decided that the publicbid by GEHE for Lloyds Chemistsshould be referred to the UKCompetition Authorities for furtherinvestigation. At that time, Lloydswas already subject to a bid byUniChem, another leading Britishchemist. This parallel UniChem bidfor Lloyds did not fall under theMerger Regulation and had alreadybeen referred by the UK Competition

Authorities to the Monopolies andMergers Commission (MMC).Referral of the GEHE/Lloyds case tothe UK Authorities thereforepresented the advantage of allowingboth bids to be examined by thesame regulatory authority on acoordinated timeframe.

Lloyds owns the second largest (afterBoots) chain of retail pharmacies inthe UK with over 900 outlets and hasin recent years entered the businessof pharmaceutical wholesaling, nowbeing the third largest UKwholesaler. Through its AAHsubsidiary, GEHE is the largestpharmaceutical wholesaler in the UKand, at the retail level, GEHE alsoowns a large chain of some 360 retailpharmacies. UniChem is the secondlargest UK wholesaler and owns achain of around 400 retailpharmacies.

On 19th July, the UK Secretary ofState for Trade and Industryannounced that DTI accepted theconclusion reached by MMC thatboth the UniChem and the GEHE bidfor Lloyds would operate against thepublic interest in the wholesalepharmaceutical market. (The retailpharmacy sector is not expected to beadversely affected by either merger).It was decided by the UK that neithermerger could go ahead unlessUniChem and GEHE undertook, by18th October, first to divest certainpharmaceut ica l wholesa l ingbusinesses operated by Lloyds and, second, identified, within the samedeadline, a firm buyer or buyers withwhom agreements in principle havebeen reached to purchase the depotsconcerned. Those buyers would haveto be unconnected with the companyacquiring Lloyds and should becapable of running the depots as

effective full-line wholesalingbusinesses. Buyers will have to beapproved by the Secretary of Tradeand Industry. He announced that ifno such undertakings are given or ifno suitable buyers are identified bythe cut-off date, either or bothmergers will be blocked.

It is worth underlining that, withregard to the substance of the issue,the conclusion reached by MMC isfully consistent with the result of theCommission's investigations.

Telefonica / Sogecable / Cablevision

On 26th July 1995 Telefonica andSogecable together with Canal Plus,Spain agreed to merge their activitiesrelating to the supply of services tooperators of cable, audiovisual andtelevision services in a joint venture,Cablevision. This joint venture alsohas indirect effects on the voicetelephony and data communicationsmarkets. At the time, the companiesconcerned considered the operation tobe of a purely national dimension andno notification was made to theCommission. On 1st March 1996, theSpanish Government authorizedCablevision as a concentration withnational dimension. The operationwas completed and Cablevision hasbeen active on the market for severalmonths. However, the Commissiontook the view that the operationrequired notification under the MergerRegulation (see also below) and theparties finally submitted a notificationon 31st May. On 19th July 1996, theCommission decided to initiate an indepth investigation of the operationbecause of serious doubts with regardto its compatibility with the commonmarket. The Commission notably


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believes that the concentration could,on the one hand, lead to foreclosureeffects by preventing market entry ofnew competitors into the market ofservices to operators of cable,audiovisual and television servicesand, on the other hand, delay theeffects of the forthcomingliberalisation of the market for voicetelephony in Spain. The Commissioninitiated detailed "Phase 2"investigations in two other cases:K e s k o / T u k o a n d S a i n tGobain/Wacker Chemie/NOM.

Kesko/Tuko

On 26 July the Commission decidedto open proceedings on theacquisition of Tuko Oy by Kesko Oy.Kesko and Tuko are active in Finlandin the wholesale and retail of dailyconsumer goods (both food and non-food products) and specialty goods(including building materials,clothing, shoes and householdelectronics).

As in the Holland Media Groep case,the Commission's investigation wasinitiated following a request from aMember State to this effect, based onArticle 22 of the Merger Regulation.In the absence of the Finnish request,the Commission would have had nojurisdiction to deal with the casesince both Kesko and Tuko achievemore than two thirds of theirCommunity-wide turnover in oneMember State, Finland.

The decision to open proceedingswas based on serious doubts as to thecompatibility of the acquisition withthe common market. During thedetailed investigation of the case,particular attention will be devoted tothe high market shares in the Finnishmarket, notably in the area of daily

consumer goods. In addition,foreclosure effects for potentialcompetitors wishing to enter theFinnish market as well as forsuppliers of daily consumer goodscannot be excluded and will have tobe closely examined.

Saint-Gobain/Wacker Chemie/NOM

On 31st July the Commission openedproceedings for a detailedinvestigation of the proposed jointventure between two subsidiaries ofSaint-Gobain and Wacker Chemieand NOM (a private state-ownedDutch investment and developmentcompany) for the manufacture,processing, marketing and sale ofsilicon carbide.

Silicon carbide is a synthetic,extremely hard and heat resistantmineral which is used among otherapplication in the abrasives, therefractory and the iron and steelindustry.

The Commission is concerned thatthe proposed joint venture may leadto a dominant position in siliconcarbide for abrasive and refractoryapplications in the EEA. Theoperation will, indeed, combine thetwo most important WesternEuropean producers of siliconcarbide, under the leadership ofSaint-Gobain, which will in thisprocess become by far the largestproducer of silicon for theseapplications in the EEA. Additionalconcerns stem from the fact thatSaint-Gobain's silicon carbidebusiness is vertically integrated andfrom the possibility that, if dominantpositions were identified, this verticalintegration could further distortcompetition.

Key issues during the investigationswill be the possibility to usesubstitutes for silicon carbide inabrasive and refractory applications aswell as to source silicon carbide forthese applications from outside theEEA.

Final decisions on this case as well ason Kesko / Tuko and Telefonica /Sogecable / Cablevision shall beadopted by the Commission at thelatest by end of November / beginningof December.

COURT DECISION ONSOGECABLE

On 12.07.1996 the Judge President ofthe Court of First Instance (CFI)decided to reject the request fromSogecable for interim measures bydeclaring the appeal irreceivable.

Sogecable had brought action againstthe Commission before the CFI askingthe Court to quash the Commission"decision" allegedly taken on 6.2.1996(letter from the Director General ofDG IV informing the parties that, onthe basis of the information in theCommission's possession, Cablevisionwas a concentration with aCommunity dimension within themeaning of the Merger Regulation)and subsequently requested interimmeasures under Articles 185 and 186of the Treaty.

Sogecable notably asked the Court todecide that the Commission will nottake any decision under the MergerRegulation in particular with regard toArticles 8, 13, 14 and 15 (definitivedecisions on the compatibility of theconcentration with the Common


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Market or imposing fines to theundertakings) before the Court wouldrule on the validity of the actschallenged in the main appeal.

The Court stated that when assessingthe receivability of the appeal, it wasfirst necessary to check whether theinterim measures requested arecompatible with the division ofcompetenc ies be tween theCommunity institutions and inparticular between the CommunityJudiciary and the Commission.

The President of the Court ruled that,in the context of interim measures, itis not possible for the Judge to takea decision that would impede theCommission to accomplish its powersof investigation and sanctionimmediately after the starting of anadministrative procedure and evenbefore the Commission has adoptedthe provisional or definitive decisionsthat the parties want to avoid.

The Judge President stated that if therequest of the plaintiff was accepted,the Judiciary would not be in the roleof controlling the Commission butrather replacing the Commission inthe exercise of its administrativefunctions. The granting of interimmeasures in the context of anadministrative Commission procedureis only possible under exceptionalcircumstances that have to be provenby the parties.

Press releasesThe full texts of Commission's Pressreleases are available on-line fromthe RAPID database, on the day oftheir publication by the Commission'sSpokesman's Service. To obtainaccess to RAPID, please write toEUR-OP Information, Marketingand Public Relations (OP/4B)2 rue Mercier L-2985 Luxembourgtel. +352 2929 42455,fax +352 2929 42763

IP/96/283 : COMMISSION CLEARSACQUISITION OF JOINT CONTROLOF SAP SOLUTIONS GMBH BYDEUTSCHE TELEKOM [96/04/02]

IP/96/303 : THE COMMISSIONAUTHORISES THE JOINT VENTUREOF ZENECA SEEDS ANDVANDERHAVE [96/04/10]

IP/96/304 COMMISSION APPROVESTHE ACQUISITION BY BOSCH OFALLIED SIGNAL'S HYDRAULICBRAKE BUSINESS [96/04/10]

IP/96/320 COMMISSION CLEARSKVAERNER'S BID FOR TRAFAL-GAR HOUSE PLC [96/04/17]

IP/96/323 THE COMMISSIONCLEARS THE ACQUISITION OFJOINT CONTROL OF THE SWEDISHBUILDING MATERIALS COMPANYEUROC BYGGHANDEL [96/04/19]

IP/96/334 THE COMMISSIONCLEARS JOINT CONTROL OFSHEFFIELD FORGEMASTERS LTDBY NATWEST VENTURES LTD &SCHRODER VENTURE MANAGERS(GUERNSEY) LTD [96/04/25]

IP/96/335 THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES A JOINT VENTUREBETWEEN GEC ALSTHOM ANDTARMAC [96/04/19]

IP/96/346 THE COMMISSIONOPPOSES THE MERGER OF THE

PLATINUM OPERATIONS OFGENCOR AND LONRHO [96/04/24]

IP/96/347 COMMISSION ALLOWSINCORPORATION OF MONTE-DISON'S POLYPROPYLENETECHNOLOGY BUSINESS INTO THEMONTELL JOINT VENTURE WITHSHELL [96/04/24]

IP/96/382 COMMISSION OPENSDETAILED INVESTIGATION INTOCIBA-GEIGY/ SANDOZ MERGER[96/05/03]

IP/96/385 THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES TAKEOVER BY KRUPPOF ACCIAI SPECIALI TERNI SPA(AST) [96/05/03]

IP/96/386 THE COMMISSIONCLEARS THE CREATION OF AJOINT VENTURE BY BHF-BANKAND CREDIT COMMERCIAL DEFRANCE [96/05/03]

IP/96/426 COMMISSION CLEARSGEC/THOMSON JOINT VENTURE INNON-MILITARY SONARS [96/05/20]

IP/96/427 COMMISSION APPROVESJOINT VENTURE IN THE FIELD OFFLEXIBLE PACKAGING [96/05/20]

IP/96/434 THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES A JOINT VENTUREBETWEEN THOMSON S.A. ANDDAIMLER- BENZ AG [96/05/22]

IP/96/435 THE COMMISSIONCLEARS A CONCENTRATION INTHE BRITISH RAILWAYS SECTOR[96/05/22]

IP/96/437 COMMISSION GIVESGO-AHEAD FOR ACQUISITION OFNUOVA TIRRENA BY TOROASSICURAZIONI [96/05/23]

IP/96/438 COMMISSION CLEARSTHE CREATION OF A JOINTVENTURE BETWEEN HOECHSTAND KLOCKNER WERKE [96/05/24]


MERGERS

IP/96/439 COMMISSION APPROVESACQUISITION OF CONTROL OFMAZDA MOTOR CORPO-RATIONBY FORD MOTOR CO.. [96/05/28]

IP/96/471 THE COMMISSIONAUTHORIZES CREATION OF JOINTVENTURE BETWEEN EMERSONAND CATERPILLAR IN THEDIESEL GENSET SECTOR. [96/06/04]

IP/96/483 THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES A CONCENTRATION INTHE SPANISH SEED OIL SECTOR[96/06/10]

IP/96/516 THE COMMISSIONAUTHORISES CREATION OF JOINTVENTURE BETWEEN EXXON ANDDSM IN THE METALLOCENEPLASTOMER AND POLYETHYLENESECTORS [96/06/14]

IP/96/527 COMMISSION APPROVESJOINT VENTURE IN BRICKINDUSTRY [96/06/18]

IP/96/531 COMMISSION APPROVESTHE MERGER OF SUN ALLIANCEGROUP AND ROYAL INSURANCE[96/06/20]

IP/96/542 COMMISSION APPROVESA CONCENTRATION IN THETEMPORARY PERSONNELSERVICES SECTOR [96/06/25]

IP/96/565 COMMISSION APPROVESACQUISITION BY SARA LEE OFAOSTE HOLDING AND AL PONTEPROSCIUTTI [96/06/27]

IP/96/567 COMMISSION CLEARSCOOPERATION BETWEENBANQUE NATIONALE DE PARISAND DRESDNER BANK [96/06/28]

IP/96/572 COMMISSION APPROVESTHE CREATION OF A JOINTVENTURE BETWEENBAYERNWERK AND GAZ DEFRANCE [96/07/02]

IP/96/573 COMMISSION APPROVESTHE ACQUISITION OF JOINTCONTROL OF BANQUE INDOSUEZBY COMPAGNIE DE SUEZ ANDTHE CAISSE NATIONALE DUCREDIT AGRICOLE [96/07/02]

IP/96/574 COMMISSION APPROVESJOINT VENTURE IN LUBRICATINGOIL ADDITIVES [96/07/02]

IP/96/601 COMMISSION APPROVESTHE ACQUISITION OF POLIET BYSAINT-GOBAIN [96/07/04]

IP/96/602 COMMISSION APPROVESJOINT VENTURE OF BAYER ANDHUELS IN THE FIELD OF LATEX[96/07/04]

IP/96/603 COMMISSION FINDSTHAT THE ACQUISITION BYISOVER ST. GOBAIN OF JOINTCONTROL OF BPB'S UK AND IRISHINSULATING PRODUCTSSUBSIDIARIES DOES NOT FALLUNDER THE MERGERREGULATION [96/07/04]

IP/96/613 COMMISSION APPROVESCREATION OF JOINT ENTERPRISEINVOLVING IP GROUPE ANDREUTERS [96/07/09]

IP/96/628 COMMISSION PROPOSESTO REVISE RULES ON COMPANYMERGERS AND CONCENTRATIONS[96/07/10]

IP/96/640 THE COMMISSIONCLEARS A CONCENTRATION INTHE DUTCH INSURANCEMARKETS [96/07/12]

IP/96/643 COMMISSION APPROVESTHE MERGER BETWEEN LUCASAND VARITY [96/07/15]

IP/96/651 ATLAS-GLOBALONE:COMMISSION GIVES GO-AHEADTO GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICA-TIONS ALLIANCE CONDITIONALON LIBERALISED REGULATORYFRAMEWORK [96/07/17]

IP/96/652 COMMISSION CLEARSMERGER BETWEEN CIBA-GEIGYAND SANDOZ AFTER ANUNDERTAKING BY THE PARTIES.[96/07/17]

IP/96/653 COMMISSION APPROVESHOLLAND MEDIA GROEP IN ITSMODIFIED FORM [96/07/17]

IP/96/677 COMMISSION STARTSENQUIRY INTO CABLEVISION[96/07/22]

IP/96/678 COMMISSION APPROVESACQUISITION BY ENDERLYHOLDINGS LIMITED OF THEGROUP OF COMPANIESSAIA-BURGESS ELECTRONICS[96/07/22]

IP/96/679 COMMISSION APPROVESTAKEOVER OF ALLDERSINTERNATIONAL BY SWISSAIR[96/07/22]

IP/96/680 THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES THE CREATION OF AJOINT VENTURE COMPANYBETWEEN HOECHST AND 3M[96/07/22]

IP/96/699 THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES A CONCENTRATION ININTERNATIONAL EXPRESSDELIVERY SECTOR [96/07/24]

IP/96/705 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES THE ACQUISITION OFTHE JOINT CONTROL OF THEGROUP SAINT-LOUIS [96/07/25]

IP/96/717 : COMMISSION APPROVESJOINT VENTURE IN THE FIELD OFHOUSEHOLD PACKAGINGPRODUCTS [96/07/26]

IP/96/725 : COMMISSION APPROVESCREATION OF JOINT VENTURECOMPANY IN MID-STREAMNATURAL GAS [96/07/29]


STATE AIDMain developments between 1st April and 31st July 1996

Summary of the most importantrecent developmentssecond quarter of 1996

by Roland KOBIA, DG IV-G-1

INTRODUCTION

Pendant la période de référence(1/4/1996 à 30/6/1996) et pour ce quiconcerne les textes de portée générale,la Commission a adopté unecommunication sur les aides d'Etat enrelation avec les réductions du coût dutravail (cfr infra). Elle est égalementsur le point d'adopter un encadrementsur les aides d'Etat aux entreprisessituées dans des quartiers urbainsdéfavorisés. En mai, les services de laCommission ont tenu avec les expertsdes Etats membres et de l'Autorité deSurveillance de l'AELE, une réunionmultilatérale au cours de laquelle ontété discutés le projet de codificationdes règles en matière d'aides à finalitérégionale, les futures lignes directricesen matière de ventes ou locations deterrain publics à des entreprises ainsique la nécessité du maintien d'unrégime particulier dans le secteur dutextile/confection. La Commission estenfin en train de finaliser laconstitution de son Cinquième "Rapportsur les aides d'Etat dans le secteur desproduits manufacturés et certains autressecteurs de l'Union européenne" quicouvrira la période 1993-1994. Laparution de ce dernier est prévue avantla fin 1996.

Pour ce qui concerne les casspécifiques, de nombreuses etimportantes décisions ont été prisespendant la période de référence (cfrinfra). Un fait marquant de cette

période est assurément le nombre élevé,tant en termes relatif qu'absolu, ded é c i s i o n s f i n a l e s n é g a t i v e s ,conditionnelles ou mixtes. Cettetendance constitue une nouvelleconfirmation de la volonté de laCommission de veiller à la stricteapplication des règles en matière d'aided'Etat dans un contexte difficile desurenchère des interventions publiques.L a C o m m i s s i o n e s t t o u tparticulièrement attentive aux violationsde l'obligation de notification contenuedans l'article 93§3 du traité CE et estrésolue à user de tous les instrumentsnécessaires pour lui assurer un effetutile.

TEXTE DE PORTÉE GÉNÉRALE

La communication de la Commissionsur la réduction des coûts du travailen relation avec les aides d'Etat(Non encore publiée.)

En juin, la Commission a adopté unecommunication confirmant et clarifiantsa position et son préjugé favorable, autitre des règles de concurrence enmatière d'aides d'Etat, vis-à-vis desmesures publiques qui visent à réduireles coûts indirects du travail. Cettecommunication prend place dans lecadre du Livre Blanc "Croissance,Compétitivité, Emploi" ainsi que duPacte de confiance pour l'emploi lancépar le Président J. Santer.

La communication encourage lesmesures de réduction des coûts du

travail, notamment en faveur des bassalaires, dans la mesure où elles ne sontpas ciblées de manière spécifique surdes secteurs considérés commesensibles, en situation de surcapacité ouen crise. L'expérience a cependantmontré que ce sont ces secteurs qui sontle plus souvent visés par les mesuresenvisagées par les Etats membres. Or,des réductions sectoriellement cibléesont généralement pour effet detransférer les difficultés et les problèmesde chômage vers les entreprisesconcurrentes qui ne bénéficient pas detelles mesures. Elles risquent d'avoir unimpact négatif sur la compétitivité àlong terme et donc sur l'emploi etd'entraîner une surenchère d'aides entreEtats membres. La Commission proposepar conséquent des pistes alternativesvisant le même objectif mais respectantle droit communautaire. Ainsi, lesmesures de réduction du coût du travailne relèveront pas de l'article 92§1 CE:a) lorsqu'elles s'appliquent à toutes lesentreprises ou à certaines catégories detravailleurs seulement; b) lorsqu'ellestombent sous la règle de minimis (JOCEC68 du 6.3.1996); et c) lorsqu'ellesconcernent des activités ne faisant pasl'objet d'échanges entre Etats membres(les services de proximité notamment).Les autres mesures constitueront desaides d'Etat qui pourront, le cas échéant,être approuvées sur une base régionale(zones de développement), sociale(création d'emploi parmi les catégoriesles plus défavorisées) ou horizontale(PME).

Cette communication présente un doubleintérêt. D'abord, elle contribue, dans ledomaine social, à clarifier la notiond'"aide d'Etat" au sens de l'article 92§1CE par rapport à la notion de "mesuregénérale" visée notamment par lesarticles 101 et 102 CE. Ensuite, ellerend compte du soutien de la politiquede concurrence aux objectifs


STATE AID

communautaires de lutte contre lechômage et d'amélioration de lacompétitivité des entreprises.

CAS SPÉCIFIQUES

Les aides à la recherche-développement

Le cas Olivetti. (Aide d'Etat N812/95)En mai, la Commission a ouvert laprocédure contradictoire de l'article93§2 CE à l'encontre d'une aideproposée en faveur de l'entrepriseOlivetti SpA pour le développementd'ordinateurs personnels multi-médiapour usage individuel ou de groupe. Leprojet s'inscrit dans un secteur qui faitclairement l'objet d'échanges entre Etatsmembres et où la concurrence entreopérateurs européens est importante(Siemens-Nixdorf et Vobis enAllemagne, ICL en Grande Bretagne,Bull en France). L'aide proposéeconsiste en un prêt à taux réduit de 37millions d'écus en 1996, couvrant 100%des coûts éligibles et remboursable surune période de 10 ans. L'intérêt prévupour le remboursement du prêtdonnerait une intensité d'aide actualiséede 20,75%. La Commission a émis desérieux doutes sur la nécessité del'opération, considérant que le projetsemble constituer une opérationnaturelle pour l'entreprise qui ne va pasau-delà des efforts normaux derecherche et développement (R&D). Lecaractère incitatif de l'aide n'est doncpas encore démontré et il apparaît quel'entreprise pourrait en tout état decause procéder à la réalisation de ceprojet sans aide eu égard auxperspectives lucratives ouvertes dans cedomaine.

L'intérêt de ce cas réside notammentdans le fait qu'il a permis un examende ce qui est ou non une activité

normale de R&D pour une entrepriseactive dans un secteur hautementconcurrentiel et en développement trèsrapide, activité qui pourrait êtreconduite sans aides d'Etat; il a permisaussi un examen de la nature"précompétitive" d'un projet de R&D.Si les aides à la R&D jouissentgénéralement d'un préjugé favorable dela part de la Commission, cette dernièretient à éviter que les Etats membresn'utilisent cette voie afin d'octroyer desaides à des projets qui tiennent plus desaides à l'investissement normal ou pireencore au fonctionnement qu'à devéritables activités de R&D,particulièrement dans des secteurs dehaute technologie comme lesordinateurs personnels ou les semi-conducteurs. De telles aides peuvent serévéler particulièrement distorsives surle commerce intra-communautaire.

Transrapid. (Aide d'Etat N175b/94) Enmai, la Commission a approuvé leprogramme allemand pour ledéveloppement du système ferroviaireTransrapid, basé sur la propulsionmagnétique. L'apport public total dugouvernement allemand se monte à DM560 millions jusqu'à 1999, budget dedéveloppement qui constitue lacontinuation d'un programme derecherche commencé dans les années'70 dans le but de transporter passagerset fret à une vitesse comprise entre 300et 500 Km/h.

L'aide a été approuvée car laCommission a acquis la conviction quece projet allait au-delà du seul intérêtde l'industrie allemande et promouvaitl ' i n t é r ê t c o m m u n a u t a i r e . L egouvernement allemand a en effetouvert l'accès des fonds publics à touteentreprise européenne intéressée àprendre part dans le projet dedéveloppement.

Taxe parafiscale sur certains produitspétroliers au profit de l'Institut françaisdu Pétrole (IFP)(France). (Aide d'EtatC48/94) En mai, la Commission adécidé de clore la procédure de l'article93§2 CE ouverte à l'encontre demesures en faveur d'industries deraffinage, pétrochimie et autresindustries connexes, financées par unetaxe parafiscale perçue sur certainsproduits pétroliers et versée à l'IFP. LaCommission a considéré que lesmesures ne constituaient pas des aidesau sens de l'article 92§1 CE, après avoirnotamment obtenu l'engagement desautorités françaises de supprimerl'exonération prévue pour les produitsexportés.

Cette décision est intéressante en cequ'elle applique les dispositions del'Encadrement des aides à la Rechercheet Développement (JOCE C83 du11.4.1986) sur l'existence ou non d'uneaide d'Etat au sens de l'article 92§1CEet éclaircit la position de la Commissionvis-à-vis des aides parafiscales. Ladécision dispose que le mécanisme neconstitue une aide ni en faveur de l'IFP(en ce qu'il est un établissement derecherche public à but non lucratif), nien faveur des entreprises bénéficiant infine des résultats de la recherche menéepar l'IFP (de par l'absence dediscrimination dans l'accès aux résultatset de par la cession des résultatsnormalement au prix du marché). Ainsi,sur la base de données factuellesmontrant que les entreprises étrangèressont dans ce cas des clients plusimportants de l'IFP en termes de chiffred'affaires que les entreprises françaiseset outre l'absence d'aide au sens del'article 92§1 CE, la Commission aestimé qu'en l'espèce la présomption dediscrimination selon laquelle une taxeparafiscale financant un régime d'aidesbénéficie "par la force des choses"principalement aux entreprisesnationales était renversée.


STATE AID

Les aides régionales

L a r é v i s i o n d e l a c a r t eluxembourgeoise. (Aide d'Etat N70/96)En mai, la Commission a approuvé,dans le cadre de l'article 93§3 CE, lanouvelle carte des zones dedéveloppement au Grand-Duché deLuxembourg ainsi que les nouveauxtaux d'intensité d'aide y afférents. Lanouvelle carte est caractérisée par uneréduction substantielle de la couverturede population nationale aux aidesrégionales (de 78,97% à 42,5%), duterritoire couvert par ces aides (de 58%à 45%) ainsi que du nombre decommunes éligibles (de 53% à 38%).De même, si les taux d'intensité d'aidefaciaux sont restés les mêmes (17,5%-20% et 25% bruts), ils ont néanmoinsconnu une baisse en termes relatifs.

Cette décision est intéressante àplusieurs titres : elle marque la fin del'exercice de révision des cartes deszones de développement de tous lesEtats membres (même si de nouvellesrévisions sont entre-temps déjà prévuesen Italie, au Danemark et enAllemagne); elle confirme la politiquegénérale de la Commission en matièrede réduction des couvertures depopulation aux aides régionales (faisantainsi application du principe deconcentration des aides) ainsi que destaux maxima d'intensité d'aide; elleassure enfin une plus grande cohérencegéographique entre les interventions desobjectifs régionaux des Fondsstructurels et celles des autoritéspubliques nationales.

Les aides dans les secteurs encadrés

Le secteur automobile

Volkswagen/Mosel and Chemnitz. (Aided'Etat C62/91 - ex NN75, 77, 78,79/91). En juin, la Commission a pris

sur ce cas une décision finalepartiellement négative. Le cas concerneune aide de DM 779,8 millions que lesautorités allemandes envisagaientd'octroyer à Volkswagen, sous lecouvert d'aides à finalité régionale (lesrégions de Mosel et Chemnitz étant deszones éligibles sur la base de l'article92§3.a CE), sous forme de subventionsdirectes, d'amortissements spéciaux etde remboursements d'impôts sur lebénéfice. L'intensité de l'aide envisagées'élevait à 30,5% à Mosel et 27,3% àChemnitz. Suite à une analysecoûts/bénéfices comparative destinée àmesurer la proportionnalité entre l'aideproposée et les problèmes régionaux, laCommission en a conclut que l'intensitédu handicap régional s'élevait à 22,3%pour Mosel et 20,8% pour Chemnitz.Ainsi, une aide à un tel investissementdans un secteur souffrant de surcapacitéstructurelle a été considérée commedevant s'en tenir à ce qui eststrictement nécessaire pour compenserle handicap régional respectif des deuxsites. La Commission a finalementdécidé d'approuver DM 539,1 millionset de refuser le reste du montantproposé, ie 240,7 millions, ce montantayant été considéré incompatible avecl'article 92§3.c CE pour non respect ducritère de proportionnalité.

Deux éléments intéressants de ce casrésident dans la définition d'ungreenfield project dans l'analysecoût/bénéfice et dans la question de lacapacité. Pour ce qui concerne lepremier point, les handicapsd'exploitation de 5 années seront prisen considération par comparaison avecune expansion, alors que seules lestrois premières années de productionsont prises en compte. Pour ce quiconcerne le second point, laCommission considère maintenant quele marché des voitures normalespassagers souffre de surcapacitéstructurelle avec la conséquence que les

aides d'Etat ne pourront être approuvéesdans ce segment qu'à hauteur duhandicap régional calculé dans l'analysecoût/bénéfice.

Mercedez-Benz/Ludwigsfelde (MBL).(Aide d'Etat C61/91 - ex NN74, 80/91).En juin, la Commission a pris une autredécision partiellement négative dans lesecteur automobile. Suite à l'intentiondes autorités allemandes d'octroyer uneaide à la restructuration de DM 132,8millions en faveur d'un projetd'investissement (de DM 239,8 millions)à Ludwigsfelde, la Commission aidentifié trois types d'intervention : unecompensation des pertes par laTreuhandanstalt, des prêts àl'investissement, des subventionsrégionales ainsi qu'un élément d'aidedans la vente de participations. Dansson analyse de la compatibilité desaides, la Commission les a considéréescomme des aides à la restructurationdevant être analysées à la lumière desconditions contenues dans les lignesdirectrices sur les aides d'Etat ausauvetage et à la restructuration. (JOCEC368 du 23.12.1994) La vérification desconditions de viabilité à long termeendéans une période raisonnable, de nonaffectation des conditions deconcurrence par le biais de réductionsde capacité et de proportionnalité entrel'aide et les coûts et bénéfices de larestructuration, ont ainsi amené laCommission à accepter l'aide à hauteurde DM 124,3 millions. La réduction decapacité s'est faite à un niveau similaireà l'intensité de l'aide (51,8% pour cettedernière et 48,6% pour la première). LesDM 8,6 millions restants et constituésdu prix de vente des participations ont,eux, été considérés comme nonproportionnels avec les coûts etbénéfices du plan de restructuration et,par là, refusés pour incompatibilité avecl'article 92§3.c CE. Leur valeur avait eneffet été estimée à DM 16,47 millionsalors que MBL avait payé le portefeuille7,9 millions.


STATE AID

Les fibres synthétiques

La Seda de Barcelona. (Aide d'EtatC56/94) En avril, la Commission aadopté une décision f inaleconditionnelle à l'encontre d'aides nonnotifiées octroyées par les autoritésespagnoles à l'entreprise productrice defibres synthétiques La Seda deBarcelona. La décision d'approbation aété prise sur la base de trois élémentsprincipalement. D'abord, l'entreprise,dans le cours de la procédure del'article 93§2 du traité CE, a fourni unplan de restructuration qui doitpermettre de revenir à la viabilitéendéans une période raisonnable.Ensuite, la capacité de production totalede l'entreprise -pour ce qui concerne lesproduits tombant dans le champd'application de l'encadrement des aidesdans le secteur des fibres synthétiques(JOCE C346 du 30.12.01992 prolongépar JOCE C224 du 12.8.1994) - devaitêtre réduite de 25%, ce qui a étéconsidéré comme "significatif" par laCommission. Cette considération estfondée sur la viabilité probable à long-terme de l'entreprise, sur sa localisationdans une zone de développement et surle fait que les changements vont aboutirà une réduction nette de la capacitéproductive dans l'Espace EconomiqueEuropéen d'environ 1%, améliorant parlà le taux moyen d'utilisation descapacités pour les produits en cause.Enfin, l'aide est limitée au minimumnécessaire pour mener à bien larestructuration, le critère de nécessitéétant ainsi rempli. L'approbation del'aide a toutefois été soumise à lafourniture par les autorités espagnolesd'un rapport annuel démontrant lapleine application du plan derestructuration.

Ce cas montre à nouveau que le terme"significatif" utilisé dans l'encadrementdes fibres synthétiques est une notionqui doit être interprétée au cas par cassur la base des mérites propres de

l'affaire et nécessite des analyseséconomiques approfondies menées parla Commission, avec le cas échéantl'aide d'experts indépendants.

Le secteur sidérurgique (traité CECA)

Walzwerk Ilsenburg GmbH. (Aided'Etat C11/95 - ex N777/94). En mai,la Commission a adopté une décisionfinale négative à l'égard d'aides d'Etatproposées par le gouvernementallemand à l'entreprise en question sousforme d'un subside à l'investissementde DM 5,85 millions et d'un abattementfiscal de DM 0,9 million. En effet, labase juridique permettant l'approbationd'aides régionales à l'investissementdans le secteur sidérurgique n'était plusapplicable, le délai utile étant forclos. Ilfaut rappeler à cet égard que sous letraité CECA, toute aide à l'industriesidérurgique est prohibée. Face à ceprincipe d'incompatibilité plus rigideque sous le traité CE, le Code des aidesà la sidérurgie (JOCE L362 du31.12.1991) permettait toutefois l'octroid'aides dans certains cas particulierstels les activités de R&D.

Le même Code permettait égalementdes aides régionales à l'investissementsur le territoire de l'ex RDA.Cependant, cette dernière possibilitéex is ta i t un iquement jusqu'au31.12.1994, les notifications devant êtredéposées à la Commission au plus tardle 30.6.1994. Or, dans le cas d'espèce,la notification a été enregistrée en datedu 25.11.1994, trop tard pour que laCommission puisse terminer laprocédure de l'article 6§3 du Code(consultation des Etats membres) etprendre une décision avant le31.12.1994.

Le raisonnement utilisé dans le casd'espèce est similaire à celui que laCommission a développé dans les casHalyvourgia Thessalia, ReinwaldRecycling et Hansa Chemie Abbruch.

Les aides dans les secteurs nonencadrés.

Chaussure

Intervention extraordinaire au soutiende la production et de l'emploi (Italie).(Aide d'Etat C23/95 - ex NN 59/94). Enavril, la Commission a adopté unedécision finale négative à l'égard d'aidessous forme de fiscalisation totale oupartielle des charges sociales patronalespour les PME du secteur en questiondans le but de créer des postes detravail.

Les critiques de la Commission neportaient bien entendu pas sur lesobjectifs poursuivis par les autoritésitaliennes en matière de créationd'emploi (dont l'approche était parailleurs novatrice car ciblée sur descatégories défavorisées de chômeurs),mais plutôt sur les modalités utiliséespour atteindre ces objectifs et lesconséquences qui en découlaient. C'estle caractère sectoriellement ciblé, quiplus est sur un secteur déjà leader auniveau européen et dans lequel levolume d'échanges intracommunautairesest très fort, qui a motivé la positionnégative de la Commission dans ce cas.La Commission donne ici uneconfirmation supplémentaire de sapolitique défavorable vis-à-vis des aidesciblées sectoriellement. La position de laCommission en matière de réduction descoûts du travail a fait l'objet d'unenouvelle communication qui permet uncertain ciblage (cfr supra).

Textile, Habillement, cuir, chaussure

Mesures expérimentales de baisse desc h a r g e s s o c i a l e s ( " P l a nBorotra")(France). (Aide d'EtatN246/96) En mai, la Commission a prisune décision présentant certainessimilarités avec le cas précédent des"Chaussures en Italie". Elle a en effet


STATE AID

décidé d'ouvrir la procédure de l'article93§2 CE à l'encontre de mesures desuppression des charges socialespatronales au niveau du SalaireMinimum Garanti (SMIG) et unallégement dégressif jusqu'à 1,5 fois cedernier prévues pour les seuls secteursindustriels en question. De par lecaractère ciblé sectoriellement dans dessecteurs connaissant d'importantséchanges intracommunautaires, laCommission a des doutes sur lacompatibilité de telles propositionsdans la mesure où, jusqu'à présent, lesautorités françaises n'ont pu apporteraucun élément démontrant la rationalitééconomique et la nécessité objectived'un traitement dérogatoire à l'efficacitégénérale du système des chargessociales.

Une fois encore, la Commission semontre réticente vis-à-vis de mesuresqui pourraient provoquer une escalade(et probablement un jeu à somme nulleaggravé de dépenses publiques inutiles)des aides sectorielles entre Etatsmembres avec comme conséquence larefragmentation artificielle du MarchéUnique. La Commission est toutefoisconsciente des problèmes gravesd'emploi dans l'Union et étudie lespossibilités d'atteindre les mêmesobjectifs au travers de mesures moinsdistorsives, telles des aides générales àl'emploi ciblées sur certaines catégoriesde chômeurs.

Le secteur sidérurgique (hors CECA)

Breda Fucine Meridionali (BFM).(Aide d'Etat C13/95 - ex NN9/95). Enmai, la Commission a clos la procédurede l'article 93§2 CE par une décisionfinale négative déclarant à la foisillégales et incompatibles les d'aidesd'Etat octroyées à l'entreprise BFM.Les aides versées ne trouvaient en effetjustification dans aucune desdérogations prévues aux articles 92§2

et 92§3 CE. La Commission aconsidéré que les aides ponctuellesversées n'étaient destinées à permettreque la survie industrielle de BFM, sansaucune compensation justificatoire.

L'affaire touche aux relations entrel'Etat et les entreprises publiques et,dans ce cadre, au caractère d'aide destransferts de ressources entre eux. Ici,la Commission a considéré que lesentreprises publiques peuvent tirer unavantage du fait d'être contrôlées parl'Etat lorsque ce dernier va au-delà deson simple rôle d'acteur économiquepropriétaire d'entreprises. Ainsi,l'application du critère de l'investisseurprivé opérant dans des conditionsnormales de marché a permis à laCommission d'en conclure que, mutatismutandis et toutes choses étant parailleurs, l'octroi de prêts répétés, lesinjections de capital et l'effacement desdettes n'auraient pas été accessibles àune entreprise dont les propriétairesétaient privés.

Enfin, l'affaire est intéressante en cequ'elle a connu également desdéveloppements en droit interne, BredaFucine ayant notamment été exclued'un marché public pour pratiquecommerciale déloyale. En effet, leTribunal de Commerce de Bruxelles(Chambre des actions en cessation) aconfirmé en date du 13 février 1995 unjugement précédent rendu par défaut le26 décembre 1994 qui disposait "...qu'en participant à <un> appel d'offres... ,aux prix soumissionnés, alorsqu'elle bénéficie de mesures d'aidesd'Etat non régulièrement notifiées etqui font l'objet d'une procédured'examen de la part des services de laCommission, et en enfreignant ainsi lesarticles 92 et 93 du traité de Rome,<Breda Fucine Meridionali> commetun acte contraire aux usages honnêtesen matière commerciale, interdit parl'article 93 de la loi du 14 juillet1991". Un recours par Breda Fucine

devant la section Administration duConseil d'Etat est actuellement pendantcontre son exclusion de l'appel d'offreset la décision d'attribuer le marchépublic à un concurrent.

Press releasesThe full texts of Commission's Pressreleases are available on-line fromthe RAPID database, on the day oftheir publication by the Commission'sSpokesman's Service. To obtainaccess to RAPID, please write toEUR-OP Information, Marketingand Public Relations (OP/4B) 2 rueMercier L-2985 Luxembourgtel. +352 2929 42455, fax +352 292942763

IP/96/300: COMMISSION GIVESGREEN LIGHT FOR INVESTMENTAID TRANCHE OF SOME DM 48MILLION FOR EAST GERMANSHIPYARD [96/04/03]

IP/96/327 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES STATE AID TOSHIPBUILDING IN FINLAND.[96/04/18]

IP/96/328 : COMMISSION APPROVESRESCUE AID TO GRUPPO FOCHI[96/04/18]

IP/96/345 : COMMISSION FINDSFRENCH SCHEME TO ENCOURAGEINVESTMENT IN SHIPPING COMPA-TIBLE WITH THE TREATY [96/04/24]

IP/96/362 : COMMISSION DELAYSPAYMENT OF 2nd TRANCHE OFAID TO OLYMPIC AIRWAYS ANDREQUESTS FURTHER INFOR-MATION FROM GREECE [96/04/30]

IP/96/363 : COMMISSION DECIDESTHAT THE PRICE PAID BY THEUKGOVERNMENT FOR BUILDING THE


STATE AID

CHANNEL TUNNEL RAIL LINKDOES NOT CONSTITUTE A STATEAID [96/04/30]

IP/96/364 : COMMISSION ASKSITALY TO SUSPEND AID TORESTRUCTURING OF THE ROADHAULAGE SECTOR & REQUESTSFURTHER INFORMATION [96/04/30]

IP/96/367 : THE COMMISSIONAUTHORIZES AID TO THESPANISH COALMINING INDUSTRYAMOUNTING TO A TOTAL OFPTAS 293 000 MILLION [96/04/30]

IP/96/368 : THE COMMISSIONAUTHORIZES AID AMOUNTING INTOTAL TO MORE THAN DM 13 000MILLION TO THE GERMANCOALMINIG INDUSTRY [96/04/30]

IP/96/369 : THE COMMISSION ISAUTHORIZING AID TOTALLING FF4 400 MILLION TO THE FRENCHCOALMINING INDUSTRY [96/04/30]

IP/96/370 : COMMISSION RAISESNO OBJECTION TO REGIONALINVESTMENT IN FAVOUR OFSEMICONDUCTORS' MANUFA-CTURING PLANT IN DRESDEN[96/04/30]

IP/96/371: GERMANY: COMMISSIONGIVES GO-AHEAD FOR 1995-99PLAN TO IMPROVE REGIONALECONOMIC STRUCTURES [96/04/30]

IP/96/372 : GERMANY -COMMISSION REQUESTSCHANGES TO STATE GUARANTEESCHEME FOR INVESTMENT INNEW LANDER [96/04/30]

IP/96/373 : COMMISSION'S DOUBTSABOUT STATE AID TO OLIVETTI'SDEVELOPMENT OF PORTABLEMULTIMEDIA PERSONALCOMPUTERS [96/04/30]

IP/96/374 : ITALY - FOOTWEARINDUSTRY: NEGATIVECOMMISSION DECISION [96/04/30]

IP/96/421 : STATE AID FRANCE:COMMISSION REQUESTSFURTHER INFORMATION ON THE"TEXTILE PLAN" [96/05/15]

IP/96/422 : STATE AID DENMARK:"ENERGIE 2000" [96/05/15]

IP/96/423 : BREMER VULKAN: THECOMMISSION REQUESTS URGENTCLARIFICATION ON RESCUE AIDFOR DORRIES SCHARMANN, ABREMER VULKAN SUBSIDIARY[96/05/15]

IP/96/447 : INTEREST RATESUBSIDY ON SHORT TERMOPERATING LOANS. [96/05/29]

IP/96/448 : THE COMMISSIONAUTHORIZES AID OF ESC 345MILLION TO THE PORTUGUESECOAL INDUSTRY [96/05/29]

IP/96/449 : COMMISSION FINDSTHAT THE FINANCING OF SPATAAIRPORT DOES NOT CONSTITUTEA STATE AID [96/05/29]

IP/96/459 : PARAFISCAL CHARGELEVIED ON CERTAIN PETROLEUMPRODUCTS FOR THE BENEFIT OFTHE INSTITUT FRANCAIS DUPETROLE DOES NOT CONSTITUTEAID [96/05/30]

IP/96/460 : STATE AID FORRESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENTIN AGRICULTURE [96/05/31]

IP/96/476 : COMMISSIONAUTHORIZES GERMAN ANDAUSTRIAN FOREIGN INVESTMENTPROMOTION SCHEMES [96/06/05]

IP/96/486 : COMMISSION RULES ONTHREE ITALIAN STATE AID CASESIN THE MARITIME SECTOR[96/06/12]

IP/96/499 : COMMISSIONAUTHORIZES INCREASE INREGIONAL AID RATES IN WESTBERLIN [96/06/13]

IP/96/500 : COMMISSION APPROVESGERMAN AID TO MERCEDES-BENZIN BERLIN MARIENFELDE [96/06/13]

IP/96/501 : COMMISSION DOES NOTOPPOSE TO A REGIONAL AID INFAVOUR OF MERCEDES BENZSPAIN [96/06/13]

IP/96/502 COMMISSION AGREESWITH PROPOSED PUBLICACQUISITION OF A MINORITYSHAREHOLDING IN SERVOLA SPABUT OPENS PROCEDURE ONENVIRONMENTAL STATE AIDCONCEPT. [96/06/13]

IP/96/528 : COMMISSION DEVELOPSITS POSITION ON AID AIMED ATREDUCING LABOUR COSTS[96/06/19]

IP/96/553 : COMMISSION TOPROVIDE ECU 2.6 MILLION FORTEXTILE AREAS IN AUSTRIA[96/06/27]

IP/96/561 : COMMISSION APPROVES124 MILLION DM AID TOMERCEDES-BENZ INLUDWIGSFELDE [96/06/26]

IP/96/562 : FINAL DECISION ON AGERMAN PROPOSAL TO PROVIDESTATE AID TO VOLKSWAGEN INTHE NEW LANDER [96/06/26]

IP/96/581 : CREDIT FONCIER DEFRANCE: COMMISSION ASKSFRENCH AUTHORITIES FORDETAILED INFORMATION [96/07/03]

IP/96/582 : COMMISSION HASSERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUTINVESTMENT ALLOWANCE INNEW LANDER [96/07/03]

IP/96/583 : COMMISSION APPROVESAID FOR CLOSURE OF VLAAMSESCHEEPSBOUW MAATSCHAPPIJ[96/07/03]

IP/96/584 : COMMISSION APPROVESFOUR REGIONAL-DEVELOPMENT


STATE AID

AID SCHEMES IN ASTURIAS(SPAIN) [96/07/03]

IP/96/626 : THE SITUATION OF THEEUROPEAN UNION AUTOMOBILEINDUSTRY [96/07/10]

IP/96/656 : COMMISSION OPENSPROCEDURE ON AID TO BREMERVULKAN CRUISE VESSEL"COSTA I" [96/07/17]

IP/96/662 : COMMISSION CLOSESARTICLE 93.2 PROCEDURERELATING TO COMPAGNIEGENERALE MARITIME [96/07/18]

IP/96/663 : AID TO CREATESTABLE JOBS IN EXTREMADURA(SPAIN) [96/07/18]

IP/96/664 : SHIPBUILDING - THECOMMISSION DECIDES TO OPENPROCEDURE AGAINST DENMARK[96/07/18]

IP/96/665 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES A FRENCH R&DSCHEME FOR THE AERONAUTICSSECTOR [96/07/18]

IP/96/667 : THE COMMISSIONDECIDES TO INVESTIGATE ANITALIAN PROPOSAL TO PROVIDER&D AID TO SGS-THOMSON[96/07/18]

IP/96/668 : COMMISSION DECIDESTO CLOSE AGAINST PLANNEDAID TO A WOOD PROCESSINGCOMPANY [96/07/18]

IP/96/669 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES A DUTCH R&DSCHEME FOR ENVIRONMENTALAND ENERGY EFFICIENCY INTRANSPORT [96/07/18]

IP/96/670 : COMMISSIONDECLARES LAND SALES TOSIEMENS REAL ESTATE HOLDINGILLEGAL [96/07/18]

IP/96/693 : COMMISSIONAUTHORISES THIRD TRANCHE OFSTATE AID FOR AIR FRANCE[96/07/24]

IP/96/458 : STATE AID [96/05/30]

IP/96/619 : A GLOBALFRAMEWORK FOR ALLCOMMUNITY ACTIONS INFAVOUR OF SMES [96/07/10]

IP/96/720 : FINNISH AIDPROGRAMME FORAGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS[96/07/30]

IP/96/736 : STATE AID BREMERVULKAN: GREEN LIGHT FOR THECONSTRUCTION OF TWO FERRYBOATS BUT DOUBTS ON THECONTRACT FOR TWOCONTAINERSHIPS [96/07/30]

IP/96/737 : STATE AID BANCO DINAPOLI: COMMISSION ASKS FORMORE INFORMATION [96/07/30]

IP/96/738 : SPAIN : COMMISSION APPROVES AID TO RESTRUCTURECAR MAKER SANTANA [96/07/30]

IP/96/739 : SKET: COMMISSIONMAINTAINS DOUBTS ABOUTRESTRUCTURING PLAN [96/07/30]

IP/96/740 : COMMISSIONAPPROVES AIDE TO MCC-FRANCEFOR ITS CAR INVESTMENTPROJECTS AT HAMBACH [96/07/30]

IP/96/741 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVED THE AID TO GM/OPELPORTUGAL, S.A. IN FAVOUR OFITS INVESTMENT PROJECT INAZAMBUJA [96/07/30]

IP/96/742 : COMMISSIONAPPROVES AID TO NISSAN GROUPIN SUPPORT OF A RESTRU-CTURING PROJECT OF NISSANMOTOR IBERICA SA [96/07/30]

IP/96/743 : COMMISSION APPROVESAUSTRIAN STATE AID IN FORM OFCAPITAL INJECTIONS BY AUSTRIATABAK INTO HEAD TYROLIAMARES [96/07/30]

IP/96/746 : VW SAXONY: COMMISSION INSISTS ON FULLCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS DECISIONOF 26 JUNE [96/07/30]

IP/96/748 : COMMISSION DOES NOTOBJECT FRENCH AID IN FAVOUROF AN EUREKA PROJECT OF RAND D FOR THE DEVELOPMENTOF AN ELECTRIC CAR [96/07/31]

IP/96/749 : STATE AID GERMANY:COMMISSION APPROVES AID TOHALBMOND TEPPICHWERKEGMBH (OELSNITZ ET ADORF) INEAST GERMANY [96/07/31]

IP/96/750 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES A FRENCH R&DSCHEME FOR LAND TRANSPORT [96/07/31]

IP/96/751 : THE COMMISSIONAPPROVES A DUTCH R&D SCHEMEFOR 'CLUSTER' PROJECTS [96/07/31]

IP/96/752 : THE COMMISSIONDECIDES TO INVESTIGATE ADUTCH PROPOSAL TO PROVIDE R&D AID TO PHILIPS [96/07/31]

IP/96/753 : STATE AID SPAIN -TUBACEX: COMMISSION TAKESPARTIAL NEGATIVE DECISIONORDERING RECOVERY OF AID[96/07/31]

IP/96/754 : COMMISSION TAKES ANEGATIVE DECISION WITHRESPECT TO STATE AID TOWERKSTOFF- UNION GMBH[96/07/31]


INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF COMPETITION POLICYMain developments between 1st April and 31st July 1996


by Stefaan DEPYPERE, Brona CARTON andYannick SCARAMOZZINO, DG IV-A-3

CENTRAL and EASTERNEUROPEAN COUNTRIES,BALTIC STATES, NEWINDEPENDENT STATES

During the second quarter, activity hasbeen focused on horizontal events andthe pre-accession strategy.

Horizontal Competition events

Competition Conference Brno. Thesecond Conference between theCommission and the competitionauthorities of the Central and Easterneuropean Countries took place from 8-10 May in Brno (Czech Republic).Apart from the "traditional" participants(Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic,Slovak Republic, Romania, Bulgaria)four more countries are now taking partin these conferences : Estonia, Latvia,Lithuania and Slovenia.

The structure followed, to a largeextent that of the Conference inVisegrad in 1995. The morningprogramme on the first day wasdominated by speeches delivered bytwo EU representatives and a roundtable discussion between the head ofthe delegations.In the afternoon theparticipants split up into two workinggroups to give presentations on, and todiscuss, antitrust and state aid issues,while a special programme for thedelegation leaders was organised

allowing them to discuss more generalissues.On the last day of the conferencethe presidents of the working groupspresented their report which wasfollowed by a panel discussion and apress conference.

The main objective of the Conferencewas threefold :- to underline the importance ofcooperation in competition matters inthe international field;- to stress the role of competitionpolicy as comprising not only antitrust,but also state aid, state monopolies ofa commercial character, as well asundertakings with special and exclusiverights;-to allow the officers of the variousauthorities to exchange ideas and toreview technical matters together.

The main results can be summarized asfollows :-In the context of the pre-accessionstrategy, technical discussions, whichhave taken place in two workinggroups, were focused on issues relatedto the introduction and theimplementation of antitrust rules andstate aid control,-The cooperation between the EuropeanCommission and the CEECs'competition authorities, at the DirectorsGeneral's level, as well as at theexperts' level, has been strengthened.

Conclusion. The Conference, financedunder the PHARE programme, was

well organised and can be considered asuccessful event in terms of being afollow-up to last year's VisegradConference. At the end of theconference, the Brno Joint Declarationon a joint action programme forcompetition was signed by all the CEECrepresentatives of the authoritiesresponsible for antitrust and state aid,and by the Director General of DG IV.

Baltic Booster Conference. The BalticBooster Conference, financed by thePHARE programme, was organised toboost competition policy developmentin the baltic States, so that it can catchup with practice in other CentralEuropean countries.

In each state a workshop was organisedto tackle technical aspects ofcompetition policy. Simultaneously,high level political contacts wereorganised to increase political awarenessof competition policy issues and finallya larger scale conference took place,bringing together participants from thethree States in one central location(Riga).An innovative aspect of the eventconsisted of the participation by arepresentative from one of the MemberStates and a competition specialist froma CEEC country to each of themeetings.

Main results. Intensive technicaldiscussions enhanced knowledge aboutthe contents and substance ofcompetition law and policy. At the endof the Conference a Memorandum ofUnderstanding between CompetitionAuthorities of the Baltic States and anagreement of Co-operation between theCompetition Authorities of the Republicof Latvia and Lithuania were signed.This is eminently justified by theeconomic interest to apply the samecompetition policy in these three smallcountries.


INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION

Collective Traineeship. Currently, theDGIV is finalising, in cooperation withcertain Member States, the "SecondCollective traineeship for officials ofthe Central and Eastern Europeanauthorities responsible for anti-trustpolicy and state aid control".Thisproject, financed by PHARE, will takeplace in November.Taking into accountthe necessity to set up efficient stateaid controls in these countries, thisyear's collective traineeship will befocused not only on anti-trust rules, aswas the case last year, but also on stateaid control.

Training for Academics. In the autumn,the first information and discussionprogramme for academics in CentralEuropean countries in the field ofcompetition law and policy will takeplace in Athens.This project, financedby PHARE, aims to stimulate attentionin the area of competition law andpolicy amongst scholars and academicsin Central Europe. A further objectiveshould be to analyze and approximateexisting legislation within those CEECswith that of the EU. This should notonly allow for an improvement in thefunctioning of CEEC competitionauthorities, but it should also establisha dialogue between the training staffand academics, with respect to theirexperiences regarding the functioningof competition authorities vis-a-vistheir national competition laws. Thehope is to encourage sustainable cross-country cooperation and theestablishment and strengthening ofnetworks between academics in theCEECs and academics in the EU.

Pre-accession strategy

The European Council in Madrid hasinvited the Commission to submit itsOpinion on the Central and EasternEuropean countries' application formembership to the European Union, as

soon as possible after the conclusion ofthe Intergovernmental Conference. Forthe preparation of its opinions, theCommission sent to each applicantcountry a technical questionnaire inApril.This questionnaire aims to get afull appreciation of the actual andprospective progress of each candidatecountry in its preparations towardsassuming the obligations ofmembership.The Competition section ofthe above mentioned questionnairecontains questions regarding antitrust,state aid, public undertakings andundertakings with special or exclusiverights (general aspects and sector-specific aspects) and state monopoliesof a commercial character. Replies tothe questionnaire are expected by theend of July 1996.

In June, a series of bilateral meetingsbetween the Commission and eachapplicant country took place inBrussels . The objective of this seriesof meetings was to review progress andresolve problems regarding thequestionnaire for the preparation of theCommission's Opinions. The DG IVhas provided some assistance withtechnical issues raised by the candidatecountries.

TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONALFRAMEWORK OF COMPETITIONRULES

On 18 June 1996, the Commissiona d o p t e d a C o m m u n i c a t i o n(Communication from the Commissionto the Council of 18 June 1996,"Towards an international frameworkof competition rules, COM(96) 284final) to the Council on trade andcompetition, which addresses theproblem of anti-competitive practiceshindering effective access to foreignmarkets. The reason for adopting aCommunication at this time is to

prepare a Community position on tradeand competition for the WTOMinisterial meeting in Singapore at theend of the year.

The Commission does not propose thecreation of an international competitionauthority, with its own powers ofinvestigation and enforcement,considering that this is not a feasibleoption at present. Rather, in line withthe analysis and recommendations of thereport of the independent group ofexperts, "Competition policy in the newtrade order: strengthening cooperationand rules", the Commission prefers agradual, building-block approach. Tothis end it proposes the creation of aworking group in the WTO to examinethose areas where consensus could beestablished. The first four blocks areoutlined in the Communication.

Firstly, countries would committhemselves to assuring domesticcompetition structures. This wouldimply basic competition rules on mergercontrol, abuse of monopoly power andother restrictive agreements. Thiswould be coupled with adequateenforcement structures and a right ofaccess for private parties to domesticenforcement authorities, includingnational courts.

Secondly, a core of common principleswould be identified and wouldeventually be adopted at internationallevel. The Commission suggests that itwould be opportune to concentrateinitially on 'horizontal' restraints, suchas price or output fixing or marketsharing cartels, bid-rigging, groupboycotts, export cartels. Work onmonopolies and 'vertical' restraints, e.g.exclusive distribution and supplyagreements, would take longer but workcould begin in parallel.

Thirdly, the elements of a cooperationinstrument would be developed. These



would be based to a large extent onexperience to date under the OECDRecommendation and various bilateralagreements and include provisions onnotification, cooperation andinformation exchange betweencompetition authorities. The instrumentcould also include a "positivecomity" provision, enabling onecompetition authority to request anotherto investigate and if necessary takeaction where anti-competitive conducton the latter's market affects theformer's important interests Finally, theWTO's rules for settling disputes couldbe used if a country fails to set upadequate competition rules or fails toreact to a request by another country toinvestigate a case.

The WTO is considered a moreappropriate forum than either of theother existing multilateral fora, theOECD and UNCTAD, because of itsnear universal membership, its strongtools for settling disputes and the factthat it provides a forum fornegotiations, consultations andinformation exchange to be conductedon a continuous basis.

Nonetheless, the OECD and UNCTADhave a continuing and important role toplay in the trade and competitiondebate and the Commission proposesthat both organizations should be askedto continue their work in this area,taking account of developments in theWTO.

As the group of experts suggested, theCommission considers that thisinternational competition frameworkwould initially draw members from thedeveloped and advanced developingcountries, although it would be open toany country prepared to accept theobligations which membership entails.

The EU, both at Community andMember State level, has some of the

toughest competition rules in the world,coupled with a strong commitment totheir enforcement. Globalisation andliberalisation are resulting in increasedcompetition in Europe whileencouraging European firms to seeknew markets further afield. Anti-competitive conduct should not beallowed to exclude or limit Europeanfirms' access to foreign markets.Therefore, the Commission considersthat it is clearly in the interests of theEU that competition on these marketsis fair and that the competition rulesare equitably enforced.

The Communication was discussed bythe Full Members of the Council'sArticle 113 Committee at a meeting of28 June, when it was given a generallywarm reception. The Council willcontinue to consider the details of theproposal in the framework of the 113Committee and intends to invitecompetition experts of the MemberStates to join their trade colleagues indefining a position on theCommission's proposals.

ParallelImportation andLocal Businessin Malta

by Bemadette GATT, Maltesetrainee with DG IV-A-3

With the coming into force of theCompetition Act, 1994 in Malta, onemajor source of concern for Maltesebusinessmen has been whether theirbusiness arrangements should be re-organised in a way as to allow for thepossibility of parallel importation.

The source of this influence stems fromthe application and interpretation of theEuropean Community competition rules,which have served, and continue to serve,as a model both for the enactment andapplication of Maltese competition law.Indeed, the European Court and theEuropean Commission have not rarelyannulled or condemned restrictivepractices which tended to stifle parallelimports.

The idea of having parallel importationworks in two stages. First, goods arelawfully marketed in the place of export,the foreign country. These goods arechannelled to the place of importation, thedomestic country, via an authoriseddistribution network, usually at a higherprice. Taking advantage of the lowerprice, a third person buys the goods in thecheaper, foreign country and imports themin parallel into the dearer, domesticcountry.

Admittedly, there are arguments for andagainst the idea of parallel importation.From the positive side, making the goodsavailable at a lower price through parallelimportation is beneficial to consumers.As more distributors or producers enter



the market and seek customers, thequantity of goods increases, forcingprices further down. This fall in pricesmay also reflect a fall in costs as somedistributors or producers strive to increasetheir profits by searching for even moreefficient ways to make and supply thegoods.

However, if parallel imports are allowed,there are also risks. Considering thesituation ex ante i.e. at the time anagreement is concluded, there is much forcommending that a distributor who has toinvest to tool up and set up shop, and anintellectual property right holder who hasto carry out research and development tomaterialise his inventive activities, begiven the adequate protection andincentive to undertake the commercialrisk. If parallel importers are allowed tofree ride on the efforts of the distributorand the intellectual property right holderto sell their goods in an establishedmarket at a cheaper price or after copyingsomething someone else has produced,the incentive to invest and take risks maybe lacking.

In fact, at times both the European Courtand Commission have been prepared tocondone opposition to parallel imports (atleast temporarily) when the necessityarose of encouraging incentives to invest.And this has been done at the expense ofupholding the goal of establishing acommon market.

Common and Internal MarketPerspectives

Barring those exceptional instances whererestrictions on parallel imports have beenallowed at EC level, the Community hasadopted a firm stand on the issue and thenon-elimination of parallel imports hasbecome an imperative in EC competitionlaw enforcement. The rationale for suchan approach in the Community is quitelogical.

Parallel imports confront the EC with acomplication not faced in other

jurisdictions. The basic object of the ECis market integration: to create a unifiedmarket out of the several nationalmarkets of the Member States.Accordingly, an agreement to divide thecommon market along the frontiers of theMember States and to stay out of thecompetitors' territories in other States isthe most serious of all breaches of ECcompetition law.

Against this market integration scenario,domestic competition law regimes areconcerned almost exclusively witheconomic efficiency. In other words,when applying domestic competition lawlocal authorities are primarily concernedwith maintaining a healthy competitiveenvironment within the national market.

This situation would logically lead to aless interventionist attitude than isexpected under the EC system. Indeed,the different objectives pursued under thetwo systems serve to alter legal andeconomic perspectives. For example, ad i s t r i b u t i o n s y s t e m w h i c hcompartmentalises the common marketalong national boundaries may serve toenhance interbrand competition at theexpense of eliminating intrabrandcompetition across national boundaries.While such a system - which mayintroduce a new brand on the market -may be allowed under nationalcompetition regimes, it will definitelyinfringe the EC competition rules sincethere is an effect on trade betweenMember States.

As a result one should proceed withcaution when following the EC attitudetowards parallel imports: EC competitionlaw if not necessarily performing thesame function as national competitionlaw.

Applying these premises within the localcontext, it was arguably not the intentionof the Maltese legislator to adopt blindlythe EC practice of prohibiting absoluteterritorial protection with the aim ofopening up markets. The provisions ofthe Competition Act are infringed only

where the obstruction of parallel importsrestricts competition within the parametersof the Maltese market. Until Maltabecomes an EU Member State, the scopeof the local competition rules ought to bethat of achieving the aims of economicefficiency and consumer welfare. It isagainst this background that the notion ofparallel importation should be made toapply.

The Local Scene

The question which consequently needs tobe addressed is to what extent can localagreements obstructing parallel importssurvive the test imposed by section 5 ofthe Maltese Competition Act ?

By far the most common instances whereparallel imports may be impeded occur inexclusive distribution or sole agencyagreements, and trade mark licensingagreements. Taking, the relevant marketto be the whole of the national market, aforeign manufacturer or wholesaler maysupply goods to a local distributor,granting him absolute territorialprotection, or a foreign licensor suppliestrademarked goods to a local licenseeenabling the latter to sue for infringementof trade mark law anyone who tries toimport the same goods bearing the sametrade mark.

Under the Maltese Competition Act,Section 5 declares unlawful any agreementbetween undertakings, any decision by anundertaking or by an association ofundertakings and any concerted practicebetween undertakings having the object oreffect or preventing, restricting ordistorting competition within the relevantmarket.

Primafacie, both agreements mentionedabove infringe section 5 since there existsan agreement between undertakingshaving the object or effect of restrictingcompetition within the local market: thegoods can be obtained by users from onesource only, i.e. intrabrand competition iseliminated, there is no price competition,



the dealer need not strive for more cost-effective ways of getting the product tothe consumer, the market would notadapt so flexibly to changes in consumerwants, etc.

However, a situation could arise where alocal dealer would not consider it worthyto invest in bringing over to Malta a newbrand of goods or to import a well-known brand and invest in providing theoptimal quality in sales services unless heis protected, at least temporarily, fromparallel imports via exclusive distributionagreements or trade mark licences.

Could one not say that allowing theimpedition of parallel imports in suchinstances serves to promote interbrandcompetition and allows consumers awider choice of brands at different pricesthan would be the case if the dealer isgiven no territorial protection and noincentive to invest and penetrate themarket ? In other words, would not anagreement providing for absoluteterritorial protection in suchcircumstances serve to stimulate - and notrestrict - competition on the local marketand is therefore not caught by section 5at all ?

The next crucial issue is whether thesame argument holds once Maltabecomes a European Union member.Upon EU accession, the Competition Actwould apply in parallel with theCommunity competition rules and mustbe applied in a way as not to frustrateEU objectives, including that of marketintegration. The Act would regulateinternal competition cases; whilst theTreaty rules would apply to cases havinga European Union dimension.

At this stage there exists the threat thatexclusivity which might otherwise becleared under section 5, falls foul of theEC rules. If business agreementsinvolving local businessmen aim at

isolating the Maltese market from the restof the common market, there isdoubtlessly an effect on inter-state trade.

In such an eventuality it is hoped that, onaccount of the diminutive market shareswhich the majority of local undertakingshave within the common market,agreements entered into between localundertakings and foreign enterprises donot exceed the threshold of the deminimis doctrine under EC law (currentlyset at a market share of not more than5% and an aggregate turnover notexceeding 300 million ECU). Suchagreements would then escape theapplication of the EC competition ruleson account of the insignificant impact onthe EU market.

Still, it is important to note that the deminimis doctrine does not apply where anagreement concluded in one countryforms part of a network of similaragreements within the common market sothat, although the single local agreementmay not have an appreciable effect on thecommon market, the cumulative effect ofthe parallel agreements may serve tocompartimentalise the common marketalong national boundaries.

Another possible solution would be forthe foreign supplier to integrate forwardand acquire the local undertaking as asubsidiary. Any arrangements concludedwould then amount to unilateral conductperformed by a single economic unit andtherefore cannot be considered to infringeEC rules on restrictive agreements (whichregard only bilateral conduct).

However, unilateral conduct by adominant entity stands to be controlledby Article 86 of the EC Treaty where astricter yardstrick is applied (than underArticle 85) and absolute exclusivity iscondemned. Hence, one must bewarewhether an arrangement (concludedbetween foreign parent and local

subsidiary) which had a de minimis effectduring its initial stages proves to besuccessful and a position of dominancewithin the common market settles in. Insuch an eventuality, it is difficult toimagine how territorial protection will beallowed under Article 86.

Conclusion

The issue of parallel importation willcontinue to constitute a struggle on themarket. Consumers will keep up anunremitting demand for cheaper prices andfaster availability. But they will also wantnew and better products and salesservices, and guarantees of quality.

It is hoped that the Maltese authoritieswill emphasise the goals of economicefficiency and consumer welfare whendealing with arrangements impedingparallel imports. An ex ante analysis ofthe market is called for when examiningthe effect of such clauses. If the marketremains more competitive on account ofproviding an investor with territorialprotection, there appears to be no reasonwhy, in the particular circumstancesexamined above, the elimination ofparallel imports should not be condoned,at least temporarily, until an adequatereturn is ensured.


INFORMATION SECTION

DG IV staff listTélécopieur central : 295 01 28

Directeur général Alexander SCHAUB 2952387/2954576

Directeur général adjoint Jean-François PONS 2994423/2962284plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et D

Directeur général adjoint Gianfranco ROCCA 2951152/2951139plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et F

Conseiller principal . . .Conseiller auditeur Joseph GILCHRIST 2955673/2960246(chargé également de la sécurité des informations) télécopieur: 2969578Conseiller auditeur . . .

Assistants du Directeur général Christopher JONES 2965030/2957491. . .

directement rattachés au Directeur général :1 Affaires administratives et budgétaires; Irène SOUKA 2957206/2960189

Information, Parlement européenComité Economique et Social

2 Questions informatiques Guido VERVAET 2959224/2951305

DIRECTION APolitique générale de la concurrence et coordination Jonathan FAULL 2958658/2965201

Conseiller Juan RIVIERE MARTI 2951146/2960699

1 Politique générale de la concurrence et Coordination David DEACON 2955905/2960562 Chef adjoint d'unité Emil PAULIS 2965033/2966207

2 Affaires juridiques et législation Helmut SCHRÖTER 2951196/2955911Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

3 Aspects internationaux Claude RAKOVSKY 2955389/2962368Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

DIRECTION BTask Force "Contrôle des opérations Götz DRAUZ a.i. 2958681/2952965de concentration entre entreprises"

Télécopieur du Greffe Concentrations 2964301/29672441 Unité opérationnelle I . . .2 Unité opérationnelle II Enrique LOPEZ VEIGA 2957381/29611803 Unité opérationnelle III Roger DAOUT 2965383/29655744 Unité opérationnelle IV Kirtikumar MEHTA 2957389/2952871

DIRECTION CInformation, communication, multimédias John TEMPLE LANG 2955571/2954512

1 Télécommunications et Postes Herbert UNGERER 2968623/2968622Coordination Société d'information- Cas relevant de l'Article 85/86 Suzette SCHIFF 2957657/2954785

2 Médias, éditions musicales . . . - Aspects de propriété intellectuelle Sebastiano GUTTUSO 2951102/2954363

3 Indu. de l'information, électronique de divertissement Fin LOMHOLT 2955619/2951150


INFORMATION SECTION

DIRECTION DServices Humbert DRABBE 2950060/2952701

Conseiller Georges ROUNIS 2953404

1 Services financiers (banques, assurances) Luc GYSELEN 2961523/2959987

2 Transports Serge DURANDE 2957243/2954623

3 Commerce (y compris la grande distribution), Luigi CAMPOGRANDE 2952767/2960872tourisme & autres services

DIRECTION EIndustries de base Rafael GARCIA PALENCIA 2950253/2950900

1 Acier, métaux non ferreux, produits minéraux non Maurice GUERRIN 2951817/2951816métalliques, bâtiment, bois, papier, verre

2 Prod. chimiques de base & transformés, caoutchouc Wouter PIEKÉ 2959824/2956422

3 Energie (charbon, hydrocarbures, électricité, gaz) Paul MALRIC-SMITH 2959675/2964903

4 Cartels et Inspections Pierre DUPRAT 2953524/2954850Chef adjoint d'unité notamment chargé des Cartels Julian JOSHUA 2955519

DIRECTION FIndu. des biens d'équipement & de consommation Sven NORBERG 2952178/2959031

1 Indu. mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses Franco GIUFFRIDA 2956084/2950663

2 Automobiles, autres moyens de transport Dieter SCHWARZ 2951880/2950479et construction mécanique connexe

3 Produits agricoles, alimentaires, pharmaceutiques,textiles et autres biens de consommation Jürgen MENSCHING 2952224/2961179

DIRECTION G Aides d'Etat Asger PETERSEN 2955569/2958566

Conseiller Francisco ESTEVE REY 2951140Conseiller . . .

Task Force "Aides dans les nouveaux Länder Stefaan DEPYPERE 2990713/2952007

1 Politique des aides d'Etat Anne HOUTMAN 2959628/2969719Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

2 Aides horizontales Claude ROUAM 2957994/2954592

3 Aides à finalité régionale Loretta DORMAL-MARINO 2968603/2952521Chef adjoint d'unité Alfredo MARQUES 2962542/2967581

4 Aides sectorielles I Martin POWER 2955436/2950991Chef adjoint d'unité Geert DANCET 2960993/2950068

5 Aides sectorielles II Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 2960949/2955900Chef adjoint d'unité . . .

6 Entreprises publiques et services Ronald FELTKAMP 2954283/2960450

7 Analyses,inventaires et rapports Reinhard WALTHER 2958434/2955410


INFORMATION SECTION

Documentation ...This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given byCommunity officials that may be of interest. Copies of these areavailable from DGIV's home page on the World Wide Web. Futureissues of the newsletter will contain details of conferences oncompetition policy which have been brought to our attention.Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of this facilityshould refer to page 1 for the address of DGIV's Information Officer.

SPEECHES AND ARTICLES__________________________

Règles de concurrence de l'UnionEuropéenne applicables auxentreprises. Joos Stragier. Charleroi,7.10.95

EU pharmaceutical forum. Mergers,J o i n t Ventures a n d t h ePharmaceutical Industry by J. Gatti

Calendrier et mesures d'ouverturedes télécommunications à laconcurrence par J.F. PONS.Symposium international destélécommunications Monaco, le 22mars 1996

Transport multimodal et fixationdes taux de transport terrestre.Paris, le 28 mars 1996 par J.F.PONS Distribution automobile et autres:les relations verticales entre règlede concurrence et règle de raisonpar R. GOYER (paru le 7 mars 1996dans SEMAINE JURIDIQUE,Cahiers de Droit de l'Entreprise(Supplément)

T h e E U a p p r o a c h o ndemonopolisation issues -presentation delivered by Mr ClaudeRAKOVSKY Directorate General forCompetition of the EuropeanCommission, BRNO, May 1996

Preparing for 1998 and beyond -Keynote address by CommissionnerK. Van Miert at the IICTelecommunications forum 15 July1996 - [SPEECH/96/198]

Auswirkungen des EU-BeitrittsÖsterreichs auf den öffentlichenUnternehmenssektor, by G.Obermann and K. Soukup, inZeitschrift für öffentliche undgemeinwirtschaftliche Unternehmen,Band 19, Heft 1 1996 p. 95

COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONSON COMPETITION__________________________

Unless otherwise indicated,these publications are availablethrough the Office for OfficialPublications of the EuropeanCommunities, 2 rue Mercier,L 2985 Luxembourg -Tel.4992821 - Fax 488573, or itssales offices (see last page).;use ISBN or Catalogue Numberto order.

LEGISLATION

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities - volume 1A Rulesapplicable to undertakings, situation at30 june 1994; this publication contains

the text of all legislative acts relevant toArticles 85, 86 and 90. catalogue No:(xx=language code; 9 languages) CM 29-93-A01-xx-C

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities, Addendum to VolumeIA: Rules applicable to udertakingssituation as of 31 December 1994. catalogue No: (xx=language code; 9languages) CM 88-95-436-xx-C

Merger control in the EuropeanUnion, this publication contains the textof all legislative acts relevant to theMerger regulation; catalogue No:(xx=language code; 9 languages) CV 88-95-428-xx-C

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities - volume IIA Rulesapplicable to State aid, situation at 31December 1994; this publication containsthe text of all legislative acts relevant toArticles 42, 77, 90, 92 to 94. CatalogueNo. (xx=language code; 9 languages) :CM-29-93-A02-xx-C

Brochure concerning the competitionrules applicable to undertakings ascontained in the EEA agreement andtheir implementation by the ECCommission and the EFTAsurveillance authority, CV-77-92-118-EN-C

COMPETITION DECISIONS

Reports of Commission Decisionsrelating to competition-Articles 85,86 and 90 of the EC Treaty.Catalogue numbers:* 64/72, in it, de, fr, nl: CM 76-92-996-xx-C* 73/80, in da, de, en, fr, it, nl: CM 76-92-988-xx-C* 81/85, in 7 languages: CM79-93-792-xx-C* 86/88, 9 languages: CM 80-93-290-xx-C* 89/90, 9 languages: CV 73-92-772-xx-C* 90/92, 9 languages: CV 84-94-387-xx-C* 93/94, 9 languages: CV 90-95-946-xx-C


INFORMATION SECTION

COMPETITION REPORTS

European Community competitionpolicy 1995, 11 languages, (available onrequest through DG IV's CelluleInformation)

XXV Report on competition policy1995, 11 languages, CM-94-96-429-xx-C

XXIV Report on competition policy1994, 11 languages, CM-90-95-283-xx-C

XXIIIeme Rapport sur la politiquede concurrence 1993, 9 languages, CM82-94-650-xx-C

XXIIe Rapport sur la politique deconcurrence: 1992, 9 languages, CM76-93-689-xx-C

XXIe Rapport sur la politique deconcurrence: 1991, 9 languages, CM73-92-247-xx-C

Fourth survey on State aid in theEuropean Union in the manufacturingand certain other sectors (11languages). ISBN 92-827-5381-6.

Older annual reports are also availableon request.

OTHER DOCUMENTS andSTUDIES

Community Competition Policy in theTelecommunications Sector, acompedium prepared by DG IV; itcontains Directives under art 90,Decisions under Regulation 17 andunder the Merger Regulation as well asrelevant Judgements of the Court ofJustice. Volume I and addendum; copiesare available through DG IV-C-1 (tel.+322-2968623, 2968622, fax +322-2969819).

Interim report of the Multimodalgroup CM-95-96-350-EN-C

Survey of the Member States nationallaws governing vertical distributionagreements CM-95-96-996-EN-C

Brochure explicative sur les modalitésd'application du Règlement (CE) Nº1475/95 de la Commission concernantcertaines catégories d' accords dedistribution et de service de vente etd'après-vente de véhiculesautomobiles. Copies available throughDG IV-F-2 (tel. +322-2951880,2950479, fax. +322-2969800)

Proceedings of the 2nd EU/JapanSeminar on competition,CV-87-95321-EN-C.

The Institutional Framework for theRegulation of Telecom-municationsand the Application of EC Compe-tition Rules - Final Report, ForresterNorall & Sutton, CM-94-96-590-EN-C

Competition Aspects of Access Pricing-December 1995, M. Cave, P. Crowther,L. Hancher, CM-94-96-582-EN-C

Competition Aspects ofInterconnection Agreements in theTelecommunications Sector, CM-90-95-801-EN-C

The effect of conglomerate mergerson competition; CM-59-90-039-EN-C

Surveys of the Member States'powers to investigate and sanctionviolations of national competitionlaws, CM 90-95-089-EN-C

L' Office de l'harmonisation dans lemarche interieur, AH-89-95-260-FR-C

Information exchanges among firmsand their impact on competition,CV 89-95-026-EN-C

Impact of EC-funded R&Dprogrammes on human resource

development and long-termcompetitiveness, CG NA-15-920-EN-C

Meeting universal service obligationsin a competitive telecommunicationssector, CV 83-94-757-EN-C

The geographical dimension ofcompetition in the European singlemarket, CV 78-93-136-EN-C

Copyright and information limits tothe protection of literary andpseudo-literary works in the MemberStates of the EC, CM 75-92-049-EN-C

Evaluation of the Impact of EuropeanCommunity Research Programmesupon the Competitiveness of EuropeanIndustry: Concepts and approaches,CD NA-14-198-EN-C

Competition and integration:Community merger controlpolicy,CM AR-94-057-EN-C

Growth, competitiveness, employment:The challenges and ways forward intothe 21st century: White paper, 9languages, CM 82-94-529-xx-C

Growth, competitiveness, employment:The challenges and ways forward intothe 21st century: "White paper" - Vol.2 -Part C, CM NF-93-0629-A-C

EG-Wettbewerbsrecht undZulieferbeziehungen derAutomobilindustrie,CV 73-92-788-DE-C

Competition policy in the new tradeorder: strengthening internationalcooperation and rules,CM 91-95-124-EN-C

The impact of joint ventures oncompetition: The case of petrochemicalindustry in the EEC,CM 70-91-491-EN-C


INFORMATION SECTION

Forum consultatif de la comptabilite:subventions publiques,C-184-94-735-FR-C

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acier dela Communaute: Rapport surl'enquete 1993, CM 83-94-2963-A-C

Les investissements dans lesindustries du charbon et de l'acier dela Communaute: Enquete 1992, 9languages, CM 76-93-6733-A-C

The effect of different state aidmeasures on intra-Communitycompetition, CM 59-90-702-EN-C

Study on the impact of liberalizationof inward cross-border mail on theprovision of the universal postalservice and the options forprogressive liberalization: Finalreport, CV 89-95-018-EN-C

Green Paper on the development ofthe single market for postal services,9 languages, CD NA-14-858-EN-C

COST allocation and cross subsidies,CV 83-94-894-EN-C

New industrial economics andexperiences from European mergercontrol: New lessons about collectivedominance ? CM 89-95-737-EN-C

Competition and integration:Community merger control policy,CM AR-94-057-EN-C

The effects of intra-Communitycompetition of export subsidies tothird countries: The case of exportcredits, export insurance and officialdevelopment assistance,CM 59-90-281-EN-C

Aid element of government R&Dcontracts, CM 70-91-314-EN-C

Concurrence et cooperation dans letransport aerien en Europe,CV 74-92-815-FR-C

European Economy, Supplement A,Recent economic trends, No 4 - 04/94,State aid control in the context ofother community policies, 9 languages,CM-AS-94-004-xx-C.

European Economy,; "Competition andintegration - Community merger controlpolicy", Supplement A nr. 3/95, 9languages, CM AS-95--005-xx-C,

Activities in favour of SMEs and thecraft sector. European Commission.1995. ISBN 92-827-5175-9 + versionFR et DE.

Aides et prêts de l'Union européenne- Guide des financementscommunautaires. 1995. ISBN 92-827-4601-1.

Répertoire de jurisprudence de droitcommunautaire 1977-1990. 3 volumes.Cour de justice des Commuautéseuropéennes.

Conference on Competition Policy.Organised by the European Commissionin cooperation with the Office ofEconomic Competition of Hungary.Visegrad. 19-21 June 1995.

Les marchés publics en Europe - Lesdirectives (+EN,DE) ISBN 92-826-8189-0.

The institutional framework for theregulation of telecommunications andthe application of EC competitionrules. Document DG IV. ISBN 92-827-6508-3.

Competition aspects of access pricing.Document DG IV. 1996. ISBN 92-827-6509-1

PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIALJOURNAL

1st April to 31 July 1996__________________________

ARTICLES 85, 86, 90(RESTRICTIONS ANDDISTORTIONS OF COMPETITIONBY UNDERTAKINGS)

Commission Notice on the non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartelcases (published on 18-07-96 in OJC207)

DECISION OF THE EEA JOINTCOMMITTEE No 12/96 of 1 March1996 amending Annex XIV(Competition) to the EEA Agreement(published on 23-05-96 in OJ L124)

Corrigendum to Directive 95/62/EC ofthe European Parliament and of theCouncil of 13 December 1995 on theapplication of open network provision(ONP) to voice telephony (OfficialJournal of the European CommunitiesNo L 321 of 30 December 1995)(published on 01-05-96 in OJ L108)

Council Decision of 25 June 1996 on theimplementation of a Community actionprogramme to strengthen thecompetitiveness of European industry(published on 06-07-96 in OJ L167)

Commission Decision of 5 June 1996relating to a proceeding pursuant toArticle 85 of the EC Treaty (IV/34.983 -Fenex) (published on the 20-07-96 in OJL181)

Commission Decision of 24 June 1996relating to a proceeding pursuant to Art85 of the EC Treaty and Art 53 of theEEA Agreement (IV/34.607 - BanqueNationale de Paris - Dresdner Bank) (published on the 27-07-96 in OJ L188)


INFORMATION SECTION

Commision Regulation (EC) No1523/96 of 24 July 1996 amendingRegulation (EEC) No 1617/93 on theapplication of Article 85(3) of theTreaty to certain categories ofagreements and concerted practicesconcerning joint planning andcoordination of schedules, jointoperations, consultations on passengerand cargo tariffs on scheduled airservices and slot allocation at airports (published on the 31-07-96 in OJ L190)

Preliminary notice of an exclusivedealing contract (Case No IV/35.832/E-1 - Cominco + Anvil) (Text with EEArelevance) (published on 02-04-96 inOJ C99)

Notification of a joint venture (Case NoIV/35.939 - Automotive products &Kongsberg) (published on the 11-04-96in OJ C105)

Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) ofCouncil Regulation No 17 (Case NoIV/33.815, 35.842 - Eudim) (Text withEEA relevance) (published on 17-04-96in OJ C111)

Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) ofCouncil Regulation No 17 (Case NoIV/E-2/35.813 - BPChemicals/Erdölchemie) (Text withEEA relevance) (published on 18-04-96in OJ C113)

Notice pursuant to Article 12(2) ofCouncil Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86(Case No IVMAR/35.488 - HansaFerry)(Text with EEA relevance) (publishedon 23-04-96 in OJ C118)

Notice pursuant to Article 12(2) ofCouncil Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86(Case No IV/35.481 - Stena Tor Line)(Text with EEA relevance) (publishedon 20-07-96 in OJ C209)

Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) ofCouncil Regulation No 17/62 (Case NoIV/E-3/35.485 - REN/Turbogás) (Textwith EEA relevance) (published on 23-04-96 in OJ C118)

Amended proposal for a CouncilDirective on access to thegroundhandling market at Communityairports (Text with EEA relevance)(published on 27-04-96 in OJ C124)

Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) ofCouncil Regulation No 17/62 (Case NoIV/E-3/35.698 - ISAB Energy) (Textwith EEA relevance) (published on 09-05-96 in OJ C138)

Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) ofCouncil Regulation No 17/62 (Case NoIV/F-1/33.055 - Danish TennisFederation) (Text with EEA relevance)(published on 09-05-96 in OJ C138)

Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) ofCouncil Regulation No 17 (Case NoIV/35.293 - IBOS Association) (Textwith EEA relevance) (published on 23-07-96 in OJ C213)

Notification of a cooperation agreement(published on 25-06-96 in OJ C184)

Notification of a joint venture (Case NoIV/36.054 - CGI+Lombard) (publishedon the 02-07-96 in OJ C191)

Notification of an agreement (Case NoIV/36.061 - ECU Banking Association)(published on the 05-07-96 in OJ C194)

CONTROL OFCONCENTRATIONS/MERGERPROCEDURES

COMMISSION DECISION of 16January 1996 relating to a proceedingpursuant to Council Regulation (EEC)No 4064/89 declaring a concentration tobe compatible with the common marketand the functioning of the EEA Agree-ment (Case No IV/M.623 Kimberly-Clark/Scott) (Text with EEA relevance)(Only the English text is authentic)(published on 23-07-96 in OJ L183)

COMMISSION DECISION of 20September 1995 relating to a proceeding

pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC)No 4064/89 (IV/M.553 -RTL/Veronica/Endemol) (Only theEnglish text is authentic) (published onthe 05-06-96 in the OJ L134)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.738 -Natwest/Schroder/Sheffield) (publishedon the 09-07-96 in OJ C199)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.700 -Emerson/Caterpillar) (published on the06-07-96 in OJ C195)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.689 -ADSB/Belgacom) (published on the05-07-96 in OJ C194)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.748 -CGEA/NSC) (published on the 02-07-96in OJ C191)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.742 - ToroAssicurazioni/Nuova Tirrena) (publishedon the 02-07-96 in OJ C191)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.556 -Zeneca/Vanderhave) (published on the28-06-96 in OJ C188)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.721 -Textron/Valois) (published on the26-06-96 in OJ C186)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.724 -GEC/Thomson-CSF (II)) (published onthe 26-06-96 in OJ C186)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.732 -Nordic Capital/Euroc) (published on the04-06-96 in OJ C159)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.733 -


INFORMATION SECTION

Frantschach/B+K/Volfin) (published onthe 01-06-96 in OJ C157)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.683 -GTS-Hermes Inc./HIT Rail BV)(published on the 01-06-96 in OJ C157)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.726 -Bosch/Allied Signal) (published on the30-05-96 in OJ C155)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.710 -BHF-Bank/Credit Commercial deFrance) (published on the 29-05-96 inOJ C154)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.740 -Krupp (II)) (published on the 16-05-96in OJ C144)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.731 -Kvaerner/Trafalgar) (published on the07-05-96 in OJ C135)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.717 -Viacom/Bear Stearns) (published on the04-05-96 in OJ C132)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.714 -Preussag/ELCO Looser) (published onthe 03-05-96 in OJ C130)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.699 -Tomkins/Gates) (published on the27-04-96 in OJ C124)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.675 -Alumix/Alcoa) (published on the25-04-96 in OJ C121)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.704 -Unilever/Diversey) (published on the18-04-96 in OJ C113)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.741 -Ford/Mazda) (published on the 22-06-96in OJ C179)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.744 -Thomson/Daimler-Benz) (published onthe 22-06-96 in OJ C179)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.663 -DOW/Dupont) (published on the10-04-96 in OJ C104)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.698 -NAW/Saltano/Contrac) (published onthe 04-04-96 in OJ C102)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.702 -Starck/Wienerberger) (published on the04-04-96 in OJ C102)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.718 -Phoenix/Comifar) (published on the03-04-96 in OJ C101)

Non-opposition to a notifiedconcentration (Case No IV/M.651 -AT&T/Philips) (published on the02-04-96 in OJ C99)

Inapplicability of the Regulation to anotified operation (Case No IV/M.711 -Generali/Unicredito) (published on 04-05-96 in OJ C132)

Inapplicability of the Regulation to anotified operation (Case No IV/M.722 -Teneo/Merill Lynch/Bankers Trust)(published on 04-07-96 in OJ C159)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.797 - GrantRailLimited) (published on the 30-07-96 inOJ C221)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.803 - Rewe / Billa)(published on the 30-07-96 in OJ C221)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.806 - BritishAirways/TAT) (published on the27-07-96 in OJ C218)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.800 - Siemens/SommerAllibert Industrie) (published on the23-07-96 in OJ C213)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.798 - General Electric /CompuNet) (published on the 19-07-96in OJ C208)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.736 - CCB/CLF) (published on the 19-07-96 in OJ C208)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.785 - Thomas Cook /Sunworld) (published on the 13-07-96 inOJ C203)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.727 - BP/Mobil) (published on the 12-07-96 in OJ C202)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.767 - Thomson-CSF/Finmeccanica/Elettronica)(published on the 11-07-96 in OJ C201)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.774 - Saint-Gobain/Wacker-Chemie/NOM)(published on the 10-07-96 in OJ C200)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.769 - NorskHydro/Arnyca (Enichem Agricoltura))(published on the 05-07-96 in OJ C194)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.750 - IFIL/Worms/SaintLouis) (published on the 05-07-96 in OJC194)

Request for examination of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.784 -Kesko/Tuko) (published on the 04-07-96in OJ C193)


INFORMATION SECTION

Request for examination of aconcentration (Case No IV/M.801 -Blokker/Toys R Us) (published on the26-07-96 in OJ C216)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.734 - Melitta/Dow-Newco) (published on the 04-07-96 inOJ C193)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.760 - Klöckner/ARUS)(published on the 26-07-96 in OJ C216)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.747 - ChevronCorporation/British Gas/NOVACorporation/NGC Corporation) (published on the 02-07-96 in OJ C191)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.709 - Telefonica /Sogecable / Cablevision) (published onthe 11-06-96 in OJ C167 and on the 29-06-96 in OJ C189)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.771 - AMB/Rodutch) (published on the 29-06-96 in OJ C189)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.787 - PTT Post/TNT -GD NET) (published on the 27-06-96 inOJ C187)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.789 - Enderly/SBE) (published on the 27-06-96 in OJ C187)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.757 - 3M/Hoechst) (published on the 27-06-96 in OJ C187)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.782 - Swissair/AlldersInternational) (published on the25-06-96 in OJ C184)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.768 - Lucas/Varity)(published on the 20-06-96 in OJ C177)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.730 - IP/Reuters) (published on the 12-06-96 in OJ C168)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.751 - Bayer/Huls -Newco) (published on the 12-06-96 inOJ C168)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.764 - St-Gobain/Poliet)(published on the 12-06-96 in OJ C168)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.709 -Telefonica/Sogecable/Cablevision)(published on the 11-06-96 in OJ C116)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.745 - Bayernwerk/Gazde France) (published on the 08-06-96in OJ C165)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.735 - BPB/Isover) (published on the 08-06-96 in OJ C165)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.775 - Hong Kong AeroEngine Services - 'HAESL') (publishedon the 06-06-96 in OJ C162)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.719 - Rohm/Rohm andHaas) (published on the 06-06-96 in OJC162)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.756 - CreditAgricole/Banque Indosuez) (publishedon the 01-06-96 in OJ C157)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.765 - ADIA/ECCO) (published on the 30-05-96 in OJ C155)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.758 - Sara Lee/AosteHolding SA) (published on the 29-05-96in OJ C154)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.759 - Sun

Alliance/Royal Insurance) (published onthe 22-05-96 in OJ C148)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.708 - Exxon/DSM) (published on the 22-05-96 in OJ C148)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.755 -Creditanstalt/Koramic) (published on the21-05-96 in OJ C146)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.720 - Cereol/Aceprosa)(published on the 11-05-96 in OJ C140)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.700 -Emerson/Caterpillar) (published on the03-05-96 in OJ C130)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.742 - ToroAssicurazioni/Nuova Tirrena) (publishedon the 25-04-96 in OJ C121)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.741 - Ford/Mazda) (published on the 25-04-96 in OJ C121)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.605 -Hoechst/Klockner-Werke/Hartfolien)(published on the 23-04-96 in OJ C118)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.748 - CGEA/NSC) (published on the 20-04-96 in OJ C116)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.744 -Thomson/Daimler-Benz) (published onthe 19-04-96 in OJ C114)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.724 -GEC/Thomson-CSF (II)) (published onthe 19-04-96 in OJ C114)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.733 -Frantschach/B+K/Volfin) (published onthe 12-04-96 in OJ C106)


INFORMATION SECTION

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.710 - BHF-Bank/CreditCommercial de France) (published onthe 11-04-96 in OJ C105)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.740 - Krupp II) (published on the 10-04-96 in OJ C104)

Prior notification of a concentration(Case No IV/M.737 -Sandoz/Ciba-Geigy) (published on the04-04-96 in OJ C102)

Opinion of the Advisory Committee onConcentrations given at the 32ndmeeting on 5 September 1995concerning a preliminary draft decisionrelating to Case IV/M553 -RTL/Veronica/Endemol (published on05-07-96 in OJ C160)

Opinion of the Advisory Committee onConcentrations given at the 35thmeeting on 20 December 1995concerning a preliminary draft decisionrelating to Case IV/M.623 - Kimberly-Clark/Scott Paper (published on 23-07-96 in OJ C213)

STATE AID

Amended proposal for a CouncilRegulation (EC) amending CouncilRegulation (EEC) No 1107/70 on thegranting of aids for transport by rail,roal and inland waterways (published on20-06-96 in OJ C177)

Commission communication on themethod of application of Article92(3)(c) of the EC Treaty to nationalregional aid (Text with EEA relevance)(published on 26-06-96 in OJ C186)

Community guidelines on State aid forsmall and medium-sized enterprises(published on 23-07-96 in OJ C213)

Accelerated procedure for processingnotifications of employment aid -

Standard notification form (published on27-07-96 in OJ C218)Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC)on aid to shipbuilding (published on 23-07-96 in OJ C213)

DECISION OF THE EEA JOINTCOMMITTEE No 16/96 of 4 March1996 amending Annex XV (State aid) tothe EEA Agreement (published on23-05-96 in OJ L124)

COMMISSION DECISION of 20December 1995 amending Spanish aidschemes for the motor vehicle industry(Only the Spanish text is authentic)(Text with EEA relevance) (publishedon 16-05-96 in OJ L119)

COMMISSION DECISION of 13March 1996 concerning fiscal aid givento German airlines in the form of adepreciation facility (Only the Germantext is authentic) (Text with EEArelevance) (published on the 20-06-96 inthe OJ L146)

COMMISSION DECISION of 21February 1996 relating to aid granted bythe French Government to Cellulose duRhone et de l'Aquitaine (CDRA) (Onlythe French text is authentic) (Text withEEA relevance) (published on the18-06-96 in the OJ L144)

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITYDECISION No 23/96/COL of 6 March1996 on the seventh amendment of theprocedural and substantive rules in thefield of State aid (new rules on State aidto the synthetic fibres industry)(published on the 13-06-96 in the OJ L140)

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITYDECISION No 124/95/COL of 6December 1995 on the sixth amendmentof the procedural and substantive rulesin the field of State aid (published onthe 23-05-96 in the OJ L124)

EFTA SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITYDECISION No 106/95/COL of 31October 1995 on a tax exemption for

glass packaging from a basic tax onnon-reusable beverage packaging (AidNo 95-002 (Norway)) (published on the23-05-96 in the OJ L124)

COMMISSION DECISION of 7February 1996 concerning aid to begranted by Ireland to the steel companyIrish Steel (Only the English text isauthentic) (Text with EEA relevance)(published on the 21-05-96 in the OJ L121)

COMMISSION DECISION of 15 April1996 relating to aids in Finland in thelive plant and floriculture products sector(published on the 03-05-96 in the OJ L109)

COMMISSION DECISION of 31January 1996 concerning therecapitalization of the Iberia company(Only the Spanish text is authentic) (Textwith EEA relevance) (published on the27-04-96 in the OJ L104)

COMMISSION DECISION of 7February 1996 concerning additionalfinancial aid by the United Kingdom inrespect of the coal industry in the1995/96 financial year (Only the Englishtext is authentic) (published on the25-04-96 in the OJ L102)

COMMISSION DECISION of 29November 1995 on aid to be granted byAustria to Voest-Alpine ErzbergGesellschaft mbH (Only the German textis authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)(published on the 16-04-96 in the OJ L94)

COMMISSION DECISION of 31October 1995 concerning the aid grantedby Spain to Seat SA, a member of theVolkswagen group (Only the Spanishtext is authentic) (Text with EEArelevance) (published on the 05-04-96 inthe OJ L88)

Commission Decision of 13 May 1996amending Decision 96/169/ECconcerning the dates to be fixed byMember States for the submission of


INFORMATION SECTION

'area' aid applications under theintegarted administration and controlsystem for certain Community aidschemes (the 'integrated system')(published on the 15-05-96 in the OJL142)

Commission Decision of 20 March 1996on aid which Italy plans to grant toenterprises in a state of insolvencyresulting from the obligation to repayState aid pursuant to Communitydecisions adopted under Articles 92 and93 of the Treaty (Text with EEArelevance) (published on the 19-07-96in OJ L180)

Authorization for State aid pursuant toArticles 92 and 93 of the EC Treaty -Cases where the Commission raises noobjections (Text with EEA relevance)- published on 04-04-96 in OJ C102- published on 10-04-96 in OJ C104- published on 18-04-96 in OJ C113- published on 19-04-96 in OJ C114- published on 20-04-96 in OJ C116- published on 26-04-96 in OJ C123- published on 01-05-96 in OJ C128- published on 24-05-96 in OJ C150- published on 30-05-96 in OJ C155- published on 01-07-96 in OJ C157- published on 12-06-96 in OJ C168- published on 18-06-96 in OJ C175- published on 28-06-96 in OJ C188- published on 05-07-96 in OJ C194- N136/95 and N137/95 published on11-07-96 in OJ C201- published on 19-07-96 in OJ C208- published on 23-07-96 in OJ C213- published on 25-07-96 in OJ C215- published on 31-07-96 in OJ C222

State aid- C54/95 (ex N777/95, N780/95,N790/95, N791/95, N793/95, N794/95):Italy (published on 03-04-96 in OJC101)- C61/95 (ex NN69/94): Germany(published on 03-04-96 in OJ C101)- C55/95 (ex NN46/95): Italy (published on 04-04-96 in OJ C102)- C4/96 (ex N360/95): Italy (publishedon 10-04-96 in OJ C104)

- C1/96 (ex N977, 978, 979/95): Italy(published on 25-04-96 in OJ C121)- C2/96 (ex N829/95): Germany(published on 25-04-96 in OJ C121)- C10/96 (NN 142/95): Belgium(published on 25-04-96 in OJ C121)- C27/95 (ex NN 45/95): France(published on 27-04-96 in OJ C124)- C60/95 (NN 169/95): Austria(published on 27-04-96 in OJ C124)- C5/95 (ex N741/94): Belgium(Wallonia region) (published on 14-05-96 in OJ C142)- C15/95 (ex N 679/94) Belgium(Flanders) (published on 14-05-96 in OJC142)- C53/95 (ex NN 143/95): Spain(published on 16-05-96 in OJ C144)- C57/95 (ex NN 67/95): Germany(published on 16-05-96 in OJ C144)- C58/95 (ex NN72/95): Germany(Northrhine Westphalia) (published on16-05-96 in OJ C144)- C11/96 (ex N1/96): Germany(published on 16-05-96 in OJ C144)- C7/96 (ex N806/95 and NN31/96):Germany - New Länder (published on24-05-96 in OJ C150)- C9/96 (ex N518/B/95): Italy - Sicily(published on 24-05-96 in OJ C150)- C8/96 (ex N537/94): Italy (publishedon 25-05-96 in OJ C151)- C6/96 (ex N853/95): Austria(published on 12-06-96 in OJ C168)- C53/94 (NN 126/94): France(published on 15-06-96 in OJ C171)- C14/94 : Greece (published on 19-06-96 in OJ C176)- C2/95 (ex N775/94 and N776/94):Germany (published on 26-06-96 in OJC186)- C16/96 (ex N205/96): France(published on 09-07-96 in OJ C199)- C43/95 (ex NN73/94): Italy (Lazio)(published on 12-07-96 in OJ C202)- C3/96 (ex NN187/95): France(published on 17-07-96 in OJ C206)- C13/96 (ex N88/96): Spain (publishedon 17-07-96 in OJ C206)- C18/96 (ex N246/96): France(published on 17-07-96 in OJ C206)- C19/96 (ex N177,178, 180, 181,182/96): Italy (published on 25-07-96 inOJ C215)

Corrigendum to the authorization forState aid pusuant to Articles 92 and 93of the EC Treaty (OJ C 55, 24-02-96)(published on 17-04-96 in OJ C111)

Corrigendum to the authorization forState aid pusuant to Articles 92 and 93of the EC Treaty (OJ C 53, 22-02-96)(published on 17-04-96 in OJ C111)

Assent No 14/96 given by the Councilpursuant to the second paragraph ofArticle 64 of the Treaty establishing theEuropean Coal and Steel Community(published on 13-07-96 in OJ C203)

Assent No 16/96 given by the Councilpursuant to the second paragraph ofArticle 54 of the Treaty establishing theEuropean Coal and Steel Community(published on 23-07-96 in OJ C213)

Authorization of State aid pursuant toArticle 61 of the EEA Agreement andArticle 4(7) of the Act referred to inpoint 1b of the Annex XV to the EEAAgreement - EFTA SurveillanceAuthority decision not to raise objections(published on 23-05-96 in OJ C149)

Authorization of State aid pursuant toArticle 61 of the EEA Agreement andArticle 1(3) of Protocol 3 to theSurveillance and Court Agreement -EFTA Surveillance Authority decisionnot to raise objections- published on 23-05-96 in OJ C149- published on 20-06-96 in OJ C177

WRITTEN QUESTIONS

WRITTEN QUESTION E-430/96 byBernie Malone (PSE) to the Commission(29 February 1996) (96/C 173/110)Subject: State aid to Iberia (published on17-06-96 in OJ C117)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-811/96 byDavid Hallam (PSE) to the Commission(26 March 1996) (96/C 183/92) Subject:European Union subsidies to the carpetindustry (published on 24-06-96 in OJC118)


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WRITTEN QUESTION P-709/96 byRichard Howitt (PSE) to theCommission (12 March 1996) (96/C183/87) Subject: Mobil and BP merger(published on 24-06-96 in OJ C118)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-707/96 byCarl Lang (NI) to the Commission (12March 1996) (96/C 183/86) Subject: Aidto the textile industry (published on24-06-96 in OJ C118)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3501/95 byPer Stenmarck (PPE) to the Commission(3 January 1996) (96/C 161/36) Subject:De-regulation of the postal servicesmarket (published on 05-06-96 in OJC116)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-237/96 byPhillip Whitehead (PSE) to theCommission (31 January 1996) (96/C122/79) Subject: Car distributionRegulation (published on 25-04-96 inOJ C112)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-166/96 byBryan Cassidy (PPE) to the Commission(1 February 1996) (96/C 122/73)Subject: P & I Clubs - The InternationalGroup Agreement (IGA) (published on25-04-96 in OJ C112)



WRITTEN QUESTION E-3563/95 byIrene Crepaz (PSE) to the Commission(5 January 1996) (96/C 112/78) Subject:Liberalization of the energy market:consumer protection (published on17-04-96 in OJ C111)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3453/95 bySusan Waddington (PSE) to theCommission (18 December 1995) (96/C112/56) Subject: State subsidies toEuropean airlines (published on17-04-96 in OJ C111)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3072/95 byBartho Pronk (PPE) to the Commission(20 November 1995) (96/C 112/32)Subject: European genericpharmaceuticals industry (published on17-04-96 in OJ C111)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-3134/95 byJesus Cabezon Alonso (PSE) to theCommission (20 November 1995) (96/C109/47) Subject: EU workers on boardMoroccan fishing vessels (published on15-04-96 in OJ C110)

WRITTEN QUESTION P-575/96 byPeter Skinner (PSE) to the Commission(1 March 1996) (96/C 173/129)Subject: Kimberley Clark/Scott mergerand subsequent redundancies (publishedon the 17-06-96 in OJ C117)

WRITTEN QUESTION E-210/96 byCristiana Muscardini (NI) to theCommission (5 February 1996) (96/C173/64) Subject: Acquisitions by theOlivetti Group of telecommunicationsmedia (published on the 17-06-96 in OJC117)

COURT OF JUSTICE/TRIBUNAL

Affaires introduites devant la Cour

Aff. C-67/96Albany International BV / StichtingBedrijfspensioenfonds TextielindustriePréjudicielle - Kantongerecht teArnhem - Interprétation des art. 85, 86et 90 du traité CE - Application à une fondation gérant un fond de pensionsobligatoires pour les entreprises del'industrie textile

Aff. C-106/96Royaume-Uni / Commission

Annulation des décisions faisant l'objetdu communiqué de presse de laCommission du 23 janvier 1996(IP/96/67) - Aides aux projets européenspour combattre l'exclusion sociale

Aff. C-148/96 P (R) Anthony Goldstein /Commission; Pourvoi contrel'ordonnance de référé du Président duTribunal, rendue le 27 février 1996, dansl'affaire T-235/95 - Ordonnance portatntrejet d'une demande de mesuresprovisoires introduite dans le cadre d'uneprocédure tendant à faire constater laviolation des art. 85 et 86 du traité CEpar le "General Medical Council"organisme chargé de réglementer lesprofessions médicales au Royaume-Uni.

Aff. C-163/96Silvano Raso e.a.

Demande de décision préjudicielle - Pretura circondariale - La Spezia -Interprétation des art. 59, 86 et 90, par.1, du traité CE - Réglementationnationale qui interdit aux entreprises concessionnaires d'un terminal portuaired'avoir recours à l'activité d'entreprises autres que cellesconstituées par les anciennes compagnies ou groupes portuaires pour la prestation de services aux utilisateursdu terminalAff. C-176/96Jyri Lehtonen et Castors Canada DryNamur-Braine ASBL / Fédération royale belge des sociétés de basket-ball(FRBSB) ASBLDemande de décision préjudicielle - Tribunal de première instance deBruxelles - Interprétation des art. 6, 48, 85 et 86 du traité CE -Réglementation d'une fédération sportivequi fixe des périodes de transferts pourl'engagement de joueurs professionnelspouvant être alignés au cours d'unepériode de championnatAff. C-182/96Allemagne / Commission

Annulation de la décision C(96)841 final concernant une aide fiscale enmatière d'amortissements octroyée au profit d'entreprises allemandes -


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Amortissements extraordinaires sur lesaéronefs

Aff. C-195/96Allemagne / Commission

Annulation de la décision C(96)1203final de la Commission concernant uneaide d'Etat concédée par le Freistaat Bayern à l'entreprise CECA NeueMaxhütte Stahlwerke GmbH

Affaires introduites devant leTribunal

Aff. T-37/96: Luftfartsfunktionaererne /Commission; Annulation de la decision de la Commission 96/180/CE relative a une procedure d'application de l'art. 85 du traite CE et de l'art. 53 de l'accord EEE (IV/35.545 LH/SAS) - Accord decooperation entre Lufthansa et SAS

Aff. T-38/96: Guerin Automobiles /Commission; Recours en carence tendant a faire constater que la Commission s'est illegalement abstenuede prendre une decision suite a laplainte deposee par la requerante sur lefondement de l'art. 85 du traite CE etdu reglement (CEE) no 123/85 de laCommission et concernant l'impositionpar la societe Nissan France d'un regime de concession incompatibleavec les conditions dudit reglement -Nouvelle mise en demeure adressee a la Commission suite a l'exceptiond'irrecevabilite soulevee par celle-cidans l'affaire T-195/95 - Recours en indemnite en reparation du prejudice pretendument cause par lecomportement de la Commission

Aff. T-39/96: SGA / Commission;Recours en carence tendant a faireconstater que la Commission s'estillegalement abstenue de prendre une decision ainsi que d'adopter desmesures provisoires suite a la plainte deposee par la requerante sur le

fondement de l'art. 85 du traite CE et de l'art. 3 point 11 du reglement (CEE) no 123/85 de la Commission, etconcernant les agissements de lasociete Peugeot aupres desconcessionnaires de ses filialesetrangeres afin de les empecher d'accepter de vendre des vehicules aux intermediaires francais - Nouvellemise en demeure - Recours enindemnite en reparation du prejudicepretendument cause par lecomportement de la Commission

Aff. T-31/96: Credit Lyonnais /Commission; Annulation de l'art. 2 c) de la decision (95/547/CE) de laCommission portant approbationconditionnee de l'aide accordee par laFrance a la banque Credit Lyonnais

Aff. T-32/96: Societe Generale /Commission (Voir affaire T-31/96)

Aff. T-41/96: Bayer / Commission;Annulation de la decision de la Commission relative a une procedured'application de l'art. 85 du traite CE (IV/34.279/F3) ADALAT - Interdictionimposee par la requerante auxgrossistes etablis dans les divers Etats membres d'exporter lemedicament en question vers d'autresEtats membres - Demande dedommages-interets

Aff. T-45/96: Sodima / Commission;Recours en carence tendant a faire constater que la Commission s'estillegalement abstenue de prendre unedecision suite a la plainte deposee par la requerante sur le fondement des art. 85 et 86 du traite ainsi que du reglement(CEE) no 123/85 de la Commission etconcernant l'imposition par la societePeugeot d'un regime de concession incompatible avec les conditionsd'exemption etablies par ledit reglement- Nouvelle mise en demeure adressee ala Commission suite a l'exceptiond'irrecevabilite soulevee par celle-cidans l'affaire T-190/95 - Recours enindemnite en reparation du prejudice

pretendument cause par le comportementde la Commission

Aff. T-52/96: Sogecable / Commission;Annulation de la décision de la Commission de considérer que l'accordde création de la société "Cablevisión" constitue une opération de concentration de dimensioncommunautaire, dans le sens durèglement (CEE) nu 4064/89, relatif au contrôle des opérations de concentration entre entreprises

Aff. T-65/96: Kish Glass / Commission;Annulation de la décision de laCommission, du 21 février 1996, rejetant la plainte de la requérante relative à uneprocédure d'application de l'art. 86 dutraité CE (Affaire IV/34.193 - KishGlass)

BOOKS and PUBLICATIONS__________________________

Received by DG IV' s library

GATS: the General Agreement onTrade in services: a guide forbusiness/EU. European Commission.ISBN 92-827-4230-X.

The law of the European Community:including the EEA agreement byAndrew Evans. Dordrecht: Kluwer 1994.ISBN 82-518-3234-9.

Cases and materials: the law of theEuropean Community including theEEA Agreement edited by AndrewEvans and Per Falk. Helsinki:Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 1994. ISBN82-518-3276-4

Konzeption, Formen und Wirkungender Subventionen zur Förderung derTransformation in Ostdeutschland vonKersten Trojanus. München: IFO-Institut


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für Wirtschaftsforschung, 1995. ISBN 3-88512-252-9.

Country profile-Lithuania 1993.European Commission 1996. ISBN 92-827-5952-0.

Kooperationsgruppen des Handelsund Franchisesysteme in Europa ausder Sicht des EG-Wettbewerbsrechtsvon Volker Beuthien, Günter ChristianSchwarz. ISBN 3-525-86053-6.

Droit communautaire des affaires.Tome 2. Droit communautaire de laconcurrence par André Decocq. Paris:Cours de droit-Litec, 1995. 1994/95.ISBN 2-7111-2482-7.

Die Wettbewerbs- und Kartellgesetzeder osteuropäischen Staaten/hrsg. undeingeleitet von Ulrich W. Schulze.Berlin Verl. 1994.

European Community air law by JohnBalfour. London Butterworths 1995.ISBN 0-406-05217-4.

Fordham Corporate Law Institute.22nd annual conference on internationalantitrust law & policy. 1995.

Free movement of goods in theEuropean Community under articles30 to 36 of the Rome Treaty by PeterOliver. London: Sweet & Maxwell,1996. ISBN 0-421-51110-9.

Die Finanzierungshilfen des Bundes,der Länder und der internationalenInstitutionen. Ausgabe 1995/96.

Electric utility regulation in theEuropean Union - a country bycountry guide by Eugene D. CROSS.Chichester : Wiley, 1996

Competition policy : a game-theoreticperspective by Louis Philips.Cambridge : Cambridge UniversityPress, 1995. ISBN 0-521-49871-6.

Cinema, television, video et nouveauxmedias en Europe : annuaire

statistique... by Ismo Silvo 1995/96.ISBN 92-871-2661-5

Commercial Communications. DGXV. March 1996. Vol. 1. Issue 3. C1-AA-96-003-EN-C.

Le Traité de Maastricht: genese,analyse, commentaires. J. Cloos, G.Reinesch, D. Vignes, J. Weyland.Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1994. ISBN 2-8027-0931-3.

Privatisations: un défi stratégique,juridique et institutionnel. P. Guislainavec la collaboration de M. Knerf.Bruxelles, De Boeck, 1995. ISBN 2-8041-1981-5.

EEC competition law handbook. M.van der Woude, C. Jones and X. Lewis.London, Sweet and Maxwell. 1995.

Sicherung des Leistungswettbewerbsdurch das Verbot der unbilligenBehinderung in § 26 Abs. 4 GWB. J.Wuttke. Carl Heymanns VerlagKG. 1995.

Aspects juridiques de la concurrencemartitime. G. Athanassiou. Paris,Pedone 1996. ISBN 2-233-00286-5.

Europe, concurrence et servicepublic/Centre européen desentreprises à participation publique.Paris, Masson 1995. ISBN 2-225-84975-7

La consommation d'électricité, de gaznaturel et de fuel en France et lesconditions de la concurrence entreles énergies. J.J. Rosa. Janvier 1996

Les communications cellulairesmobiles: stratégies de tarification etconcurrence/OCDE. Paris, OCDE,1996. ISBN 92-64-24789-0

Comparative Competition Policy.National Institutions in a global market.G. Bruce Doern and S. Wilks.Clarendon Press - Oxford, 1996

Competition policy. 1994 Workshopwith the dynamic non-membereconomies. Organisation for economicco-operation and development. Paris1996

The revival of Japanese competitionpolicy and its importance for EU-Japan relations. S. Wilks with a prefaceby K. Sanekata. ISBN 0-905031-83-0

European consumer guide to the singlemarket/EU (2nd edition)EN & FR.European Commission. 1996.

Trends in Europe. Consumer Attitudesand the Supermarket 1995. Report byA. Tordjman, HEC School ofManagement. France.

Die Kontrolle und Harmonisierungnationaler Beihilfen durch dieKommission der EuropäischenGemeinschaften. M. Rosenstock.Europäischer Verlag der WissenschaftenPeter Lang.

Subventions à l'industrie: manuel denotification/OECD. Paris, OCDE, 1995.ISBN 92-64-24318-6.

Forschungssubventionen auswettbewerbspolitischer Sicht. M.Meyer. Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1995.ISBN 3-7890-3701-X.

Policy issues in insurance: investment,taxation, insolvency/OECD. Paris,OECD, 1996. ISBN 92-64-14787-X.

Aspects fondamentaux des assurances:investissement, fiscalité,insolvabilité/OCDE. Paris, OCDE,1996. ISBN 92-64-24787-4

Guide de l'artisanat et de la petiteentreprise dans l'Union européenne:Représentation -Services officiels -Politiques/UE, Commissioneuropéenne. Bruxelles, Delta 1995.ISBN 2-8029-0119-2.

The Merck index. An encyclopedia ofchemicals, drugs and biologicals ed by


INFORMATION SECTION

Susan Budavari, Maryadèle J. O'Neil (e.a.) 12th ed. 1996. ISBN 0-911910-12-3

Reshaping Greece's EnergyLegislation: the Gradual Adjustmentto EC Standards and Objectives. byAnna Papaioannou. Journal of Energy &Natural Resources Law. Vol. 14. N 1.February 1996

Öffentliche Unternehmen und dieBeihilfeaufsicht der EU, WieSubventionen von der EuropäischenKommission beurteilt verden, by KarlSoukup, MANZ, ISBN 3-214-08235-3

Coming up ...._________________________________

The following publications areunder preparation by DG IV;however, a budget has beenallocated only for publicationsmarked with an *:

EC Competition PolicyNewsletter: autumn/Winter 1996

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities -volume 1BExplanation of rules applicable toundertakings.

Dealing with the Commission -notifications, complaints,inspections and fact-findingpowers.

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities -volume 3A:International aspects ofcompetition policy*

Competition law in the EuropeanCommunities -Addendum tovolume 2A: Rules applicable toState aid.

Actes Forum Européen de laConcurrence.(co-edition with J.Wiley) Catalog number: CV-88-95-985-EN-C*

L' application des articles 85/86par les juridictions nationales*

Recueil des décisions sur les aidesd'Etat*

Brochure sur la politique de laconcurrence dans le Marchéunique (concernant lesart.85,86,90 et le règlement sur lesconcentrations)

Brochure sur la politiqueconcernant les aides d'Etat

Brochure concernant des sujetsprésentant un intérêt pratiquepour l'industrie de laCommunauté et plusparticulierement les PMEs

Video: Introduction tocompetition policy

Video: Dealing with theCommission - Notifications,complaints, inspections and fact-finding powers

Exchange of confidentialInformation Agreements andTreaties between the US andcertain Member States

DG IV on the WorldWide Web

___________________

Since the 25th of June 1996, DG IVhas a home page on the Europaserver available on the World WideWeb. Our address ishttp://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg04/dg4home.htm.

On the new homepage the followinginformation can be found:

DG IV's Mission & Directory :Under this heading the user can finda brief description of the main areasof DG IV's activity and someintroductury articles on Europeancompetition policy. DG IV's staff listis also available.

What is New : Most recentdevelopments.

DG IV's areas of activity : for themain DG IV's areas of activity wealready introduce (or plan tointroduce in the near future) data forthe following sub-headings:

Press releases issued during the pastmonth : These documents aredownloaded daily from the RAPIDdatabase; because of the updatingprocedure data is introduced with adelay of 2-3 working days.

Published in the Official Journalduring the last 6 months : We plan tointroduce the full text of importantdocuments published in the OfficialJournal. Only the published versionwill be legally binding and data will


INFORMATION SECTION

be introduced some days afterpublication.

Legislation in force : A full list bysubject will be introduced. This sub-heading will in term contain anupdated version of the legislationpublished in Vol IA: Rulesapplicable to undertakings; Vol IIA:Rules applicable to state aid; VolIIIA: International dimension.

Commission Decisions on individualcases : A full list by year is alreadyavailable for the antitrust and mergerheadings. A list of the mostimportant decisions by subject yearis also under preparation. We alsoplan at a later stage to introduce thetext of the most important acts of thelatest week, after their publication inthe Official Journal.

Judgements of the European Courtof Justice and the Court of Firstinstance : According to preliminaryinformation, the Court of Justice willinaugurate its own World Wide Website later this year. By usingextensive links we hope we will beable to provide : a) the schedule ofthe Court and the Court of FirstInstance; b) a full list of casesintroduced; c) a full list ofJudgments of the Court and the CFIby year and by subject; and d) thetext of the most important acts of thelatest week. Interested users canalready find several comments andanalyses drafted by DG IV officialsand already published in the ECCompetition Policy Newsletter.

Communications and importantdocuments : this heading willeventually contain miscelaneousinformation of some importance(e.g. under the State Aid heading thereference rates used by the

Commission to measure the aidelement of state subsidies; under theMergers heading the monthly andannual equivalences between theECU and national currenciesnecessary for the calculation of theyearly turnover in ECUs)

Documentation, publicationsspeeches and articles : This headingalready contains all speeches of theCommissionner for Competition andof DG IV officials since 1993, aswell as the Newsletter, the AnnualCompetition Report, the list ofCommunity publications onCompetition available to the publicand what is coming up etc.

Special features : under the headingInternational Dimension the userwill find links to the most importantsites of national competitionauthorities. DG IV's publications areavailable in a portable documentformat (pdf) produced with theAdobe Acrobat® software.Interested users can download thedocuments but they will also needthe Acrobat Reader® software toread them. This software is availablefree of charge and enables the userto read and print pdf documents onhis/her printer without changing theinitial format. In a certain way anexact facsimile "paper copy" of theoriginal can be reproduced locally.

Finally, interested users should notethat DG IV's pages are underconstruction. Members of DG IV'sCellule Information do their best -view the extremely limited resourcesavailable - to introduce data for eachheading and we expect to cover allheadings systematically as fromSeptember onwards. It goes withoutsaying that your comments, ideas

and corrections - even your positivefeedback - are always welcome,preferably by e-mail([email protected]). The site was setup since January 1996 by GeraldMessiaen, official at DG IV-01.

More Information ...___________________

The Directorate General for Competition(DG IV) receives many requests withspecific questions. It is in factimpossible, given the resourcesavailable, to investigate and replyindividually to each one of them., so inthe future we will answer only requestsfor the annual report and theNewsletter. In order to better inform thepublic on Competition Policy, DG IVproduces several publications, availablethrough the Office for OfficialPublications of the European Union (seecatalog under the heading CommunityPublications on Competition). We alsopublish three times a year the "ECCompetition Policy Newsletter",available free of charge. Speeches by theCompetition Commissioner and byofficials from the Directorate General aswell as general documentation will besystematically available through ourWWW home pages. Please address yourcorrespondence to :

European Commission,Directorate General IV-Competition,

Cellule Information,C150 00/158, Rue de la Loi 200

Wetstraat, BruxellesB-1049 Brussel, Belgium.

fax(+322) 29 55437 E-Mail:Internet: [email protected] X.400:c=be;a=rtt;p=cec;ou=dg4;s=info4


INFORMATION SECTION

Cases covered in this issue___________________________

Anti-trust Rules

Commission Decisions

20 Banque Nationale de Paris / Dresdner Bank21 BFGoodrich / Messier-Bugatti21 Fenex22 Eudim23 St Lawrence Coordinated Service23 East African Container Service23 Joint Mediterranean Canada Service23 Joint Pool Agreement23 Baltic Liner Conference Agreement24 Interbrew25 Novo Nordisk26 Deutsche Telekom27 VISA

Court Judgements

28 Iberia UK / BPB Industries and British Gypsum

Mergers


30 Gencor / Lonrho31 Ciba-Geigy / Sandoz32 Bosch / Allied Signal32 Holland Media Groep33 Shell / Montecatini34 GEHE / Lloyds Chemists34 Telefonica / Sogecable / Cablevision35 Kesko / Tuko35 Saint-Gobain / Wacker Chemie / NOM

Court Judgements

35 Sogecable

STATE AID


38 Aides à l'emploi (reduction des coûts du travail)39 Olivetti39 Transrapid39 Institut Français du Pétrole40 Carte luxembourgeoise40 Volkswagen / Moseland Chemnitz

40 Mercedes-Benz / Ludwigsfelde41 La Seda de Barcelona41 Walzwerk Ilsenburg41 Chaussures italiennes41 Plan Borotra41 Breda Fucine Meridionali


66

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ec competition policy newsletter vol 2 no 2 · ec competition policy newsletter editor: chris jones...

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