Echo and Mirror: Clone Hysteria, Genetic Determinism andStar Trek Nemesis

Author

Tranter, K, Statham, B

Published

2007

Journal Title

Law, Culture and the Humanities

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1177/1743872107081425

Copyright Statement

© 2007 SAGE Publications. This is the author-manuscript version of the paper. Reproduced inaccordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Please refer to the journal's website foraccess to the definitive, published version.

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http://hdl.handle.net/10072/18838

Link to published version

http://lch.sagepub.com/

Griffith Research Online

https://research-repository.griffith.edu.au

1

Echo and Mirror: Clone Hysteria, Genetic Determinism and

Star Trek Nemesis

Kieran Tranter1 and Bronwyn Statham2, 1

Address for correspondence: Kieran Tranter, Griffith Law School, PMB 50, Gold

Coast Mail Centre, 9726, Queensland, AUSTRALIA.

E-mail: k.tranter@griffith.edu.au

This essay is concerned with the hysteria surrounding cloning and the law that this

hysteria called forth in Australia. It is suggested that instead of fearing the clone, it is

the clone hysteria that is truly frightening. This argument is substantiated through a

parallel reading of two accounts of clones. The first is the very public account of

cloning that ended with the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth). The

second is the latest cinema adventure of the Star Trek Next Generation crew: Star

Trek: Nemesis (Nemesis).3 The horrors that the Act prohibits are made explicit in

Nemesis. The film exposes and questions elements of clone hysteria. However, its

commitment to genetic determinism means it ultimately participates in, rather than

rejects, clone hysteria. It is only through directly addressing genetic determinism that

clearer thinking and lawmaking about clones and cloning can begin.

This argument is presented in three parts. It begins by setting out the hysteria that

called forth the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth), noting that there was

no systematic examination of the evils of cloning. The next part suggests that Star

Trek: Nemesis offers a working through of the anxieties of clone hysteria. Two

2

anxieties are identified: the clone as double and the clone as artefact. Underlying both

of these anxieties is the false notion that genetic makeup is determinative of essential

identity. However, the film’s attempt to tell a counter narrative of acceptance,

difference and life history is only partially successful. The final part considers this

residual disquiet. It is suggested that in true Trek style the film explores and maps the

frontiers opened by contemporary biotechnology but returns to a known home. It is

the task of settlers, not explorers, to make a life at the frontier.

I. Clone Hysteria

It is not an understatement to describe the media frenzy and public debate about

cloning that followed Dolly the sheep as hysterical.4 However, for all the headlines of

science fiction becoming science fact,5 Dolly as proof that cellular biology had done

what was previously thought impossible – creating a mammalian clone from the

combination of an unfertilised egg and the nucleus of a specialised adult cell – did not

immediately call forth law.6

In Australia it was not until December 19, 2002, nearly six years after the news of

Dolly7 that the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) became law. As law,

the Act is elegant in its simplicity. It prohibits the creation or importation into

Australia of a human clone with a maximum penalty of 15 years imprisonment.8 It

prohibits, with the lesser maximum penalty of 10 years imprisonment, other

reproductive and genetic manipulations: creating a chimeric embryo (a human em

into which animal DNA has been added); creating a hybrid embryo (an embryo

created from the cross-fertilisation of a human and animal gamete); the harvesting o

and trading in human embryos; and creating a human embryo from the genetic

material of more than two persons.

bryo

f

9 Assuming that the more morally repugnant the

3

offence the greater the penalty, it appears from the Act, that leading the army of

dangerous beings marching menacingly out from cyberpunk (animal-human mutants,

entities with multiple ‘parents’ and nefarious traders in genetic stuff10) is the cl

short, the Act declares that in Australia the clone is very b

one. In

ad indeed.11

But why does the clone attract this opprobrium? Textbooks define a clone as an entity

with an identical genetic sequence to another individual.12 However, this definition

fails to explain the extreme penalties for cloning in the Act. After all, there are many

‘clones’ in nature. Normal cellular reproduction by mitosis involves the splitting of a

single cell into two identical daughter cells. Plant propagation by cutting produces

siblings with the same genes as the parent, and identical twins also satisfy the

definition.13 Clearly, the clones that the Act fearfully anticipates possess something

more then genetic sameness.

Intervening between Dolly and the Act was stem cell technology. Stem cells are

‘promethean’ cells that have no immediate function but can be triggered into

generating any specialist cell types. Stem cell technology offers the potential for

regeneration of cells that otherwise die through age and disease.14 Cloning and stem

cell technology meet in the concept of therapeutic cloning: that is, using cloning to

create a clone embryo and then destroying the embryo by harvesting the stem cells.

Given the established politics surrounding the use and abuses of human embryos,

these elements of stem cell technology – making a potential human for an ‘end’ and

‘horrible images of…little babies being dismembered’15 to harvest a product –

generated considerable lobbying from the religious right and the biomedical research

community for law.16 The Act can be seen as a legislative response to a sustained

public panic surrounding stem cell technology.

4

What became the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) was initially

introduced to the Commonwealth Parliament by the Howard Liberal-National

Coalition Government as the Research Involving Embryos and Prohibition of Human

Cloning Bill 2002 (Cth).17 In the second reading speech the Prime Minister asserted

that:

I do not underestimate the sensitive nature of the subject matter assessed

in this legislation, nor the strength of views that many will have on these

issues…This Bill, in my view, successfully balances respect for human

dignity, ensures that community standards and ethical values are upheld

and enables the enormous potential of embryonic stem cell research to be

explored…18

Howard’s speech amounted to a careful defence of his Government’s compromise of

allowing surplus IVF embryos to be used for stem cell research, and his references to

‘balance’ must be seen in that light. As to cloning Howard was much less

circumspect: ‘Like many in the community, I am opposed to any form of human

cloning, both reproductive and therapeutic, and consider that now is the time to

prohibit such practices from occurring in Australia.’19

Howard’s speech is remarkable in that it carefully justified the stem cell compromise

but the prohibition of cloning was announced without any justifications or

explanations. Instead, Howard joined with ‘many in the community’ who do not need

to explain why their opinions should form law. Howard here repeats an observable

pattern regarding cloning.

5

In the lengthy parliamentary debates that accompanied the passage of the Prohibition

of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) the members repeated this pattern. Stem cell

research was a matter of controversy requiring justification, argument and rhetorical

ploys, while prohibiting cloning was the point of commonality. Labor Opposition

members were allowed a conscience vote on stem cell research but it was made clear

that ‘[o]ur policy does not support human cloning.’20 When members turned their

minds to the prohibition of cloning, its prohibition was described as ‘self evident,’21

through bold statements like ‘we say no’22 without any further justification. Indeed,

members were more likely to comment that the provisions in the Bill dealing with

cloning had ‘unanimous support.’23 The original Research Involving Embryos and

Prohibition of Human Cloning Bill 2002 was split on August 29, 2002 to free debate

about stem cell research from the uncontroversial prohibition of cloning,24 and the

new Prohibition of Human Cloning Bill 2002 (Cth) was immediately passed.25 A

similar pattern followed in the Senate. Cloning was to be prohibited because it

‘…transgresses normal and reasonably acceptable ethical and moral bounds…[t]his is

simply a reasonable argument about what people would accept as reasonable.’26

Cloning offends ‘human dignity,’27 and ‘[w]e all support this Bill, of course, because

it outlaws human cloning.’28 And so the Bill passed the Senate with very minor

textual amendments,29 which were accepted by the House.30 In urging the House to

accept the amendments, Stephen Smith summarised, ‘[a] ban on human cloning is

sensible, is necessary and, on the basis of the debate here and in the Senate, has the

universal and unanimous support of Parliament.’31 Like the Prime Minister’s speech,

what was remarkable about the parliamentary debate was a lack of debate: all are

agreed that cloning simply must be banned.32

6

This muffled silence in the parliamentary record about clones was repeated in the

2001 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional

Affairs Report (the Andrews Report) that recommended Commonwealth legislation to

prohibit cloning. In this forum little justification for prohibiting cloning was given.

The Report declares that:

the notion of ‘photocopying’ a human being is contrary to human dignity,

confuses family and personal relationships and offends many of the

deepest understandings of our unique identity and individuality.33

However, the Report did not explain why cloning was contrary to human dignity; why

it was such a danger to family and personal relationships; and what it was about

cloning that offends the deepest understandings about identity. Instead, it catalogued

the arguments made in submissions and declares to have found a middle ground in

prohibiting cloning and allowing stem cell research on surplus IVF embryos.34 A

similar presumption can be discerned in the Australian Health Ethics Committee

(AHEC) reference of December 1998 that also unquestionably accepted that cloning

threatens human dignity.35 Like the Andrews Report the AHEC deferred to

community standards:

The Working Group chose not to conduct public consultation as so many

International and National pronouncements from professional groups and

community groups indicated a consensus of opinion on prohibiting the

cloning of human beings.36

This opposition to cloning on the basis of a perceived consensus of opinion was

reflected in the wider public reporting and comment that followed after Dolly. The

7

initial reporting of Dolly in Australia immediately linked the technology to a Brave

New World and Saddam Hussein.37 However, while in 1997 and 1998 there were the

occasional calls in the Australian press for human cloning in specific situations,38 by

2001 these had disappeared and opposition to human cloning became the common

ground in the public debate surrounding stem cell technology.39 In this debate the

spectre of human cloning was deployed by opponents of stem cell research to

persuade the public as to the inherent wrongness of stem cell technology.40 This

negative characterising of human cloning was also accepted by pro-stem cell research

advocates who were careful to distinguish their position from support for human

cloning.41

Therefore, the public controversy was marked by extreme anxiety surrounding the

clone. Cloning was to be prohibited, cloning was associated with other evils and

cloning should be distinguished from other medical technologies. As Renata Salecl

has recently reminded anxiety is ‘a state of fear that is objectless.’42 Clones were the

subject of fear, but the ‘object’ of the fear, why exactly were clones to be prohibited

by law, was not articulated. Behind the claims of ‘community standards’ and ‘human

dignity’ lay a terrified society feeling under threat by something that was almost

unspeakable.43 That is not to say that there was not within the Australian biomedical

ethics field a serious debate concerning cloning.44 However, this debate was framed

by an intellectual distaste for irrational hysteria and a championing of the professional

philosopher as the bringer of light and reason to the issue:

It is, however, folly to oppose human cloning outright…It is necessary

that the debate on human cloning should continue, but in a civilised

8

society it must be free of subjectivity and zealous appeals to people’s

emotions and fears.45

For the professional ethicist what was to be feared in the clone hysteria was the

hysterical fear. However, this debate shared with the public record an absence;

namely analysis and appreciation of why cloning brought forth a hysterical response.

Instead, this literature points to the repetitive accounts of clones in popular culture as

originating and nurturing clone hysteria.46 Indeed, many commentators on cloning

listed the culturally significant clone stories, like the Boys from Brazil (cloned Hitlers

going awry), Jurassic Park, (cloned dinosaurs going awry) and Multiplicity (clones

just going awry) as evidence that the public hysteria has its roots within Hollywood

sensationalism.47 At times the influence of popular culture on the public debate of

cloning was particularly obvious. The Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer clearly

had the Boys from Brazil on his mind when he informed the House that:

I think all of us would agree that the implications of allowing human

cloning are uncertain and, to some of us, even somewhat frightening. It

raises the concept of eugenics…one particularly reflects here on the Nazis

during the 1930s and the 1940s.48

However, identification of popular stories of clones being bad does not explain clone

hysteria. More deeply it does not explain the popularity and persistence of clone

stories in the first place. That there are shared cultural stories points to something

horrifyingly fascinating about clones. The clone hysteria post-Dolly emanated from

something fundamental about how clones are conceived, rather than particular

common stories. Indeed, the existence of a ‘clone cannon’ is itself evidence of this

fundamental orientation. The question then is to go boldly beyond the public record

9

and the professional glossators to examine the deep origins of the clone hysteria. In

the next section, a reading of another text from 2002, Star Trek: Nemesis, is used both

to map the particular anxieties that manifest together as clone hysteria and show what

is at stake in attempting to challenge the fear of the clone.

II. Star Trek: Nemesis

2002 can be seen as the unofficial ‘year of the clone.’ 2002 witnessed clone hysteria

both inside and outside Federal Parliament as the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act

2002 (Cth) made its way to the rulebooks. It also was the year that two American

science fiction institutions, Star Wars and Star Trek, released films dealing with

clones.

While the clone featured in the title of the Lucas saga, Star Wars: Attack of the

Clones, clones were not at the forefront of a film reiterating classic golden age science

fiction themes of the decline, decay and corruption of a fading galactic system.49

When the clones battle onto the screen it is not that they are clones that is the issue,

but that they form an efficient army capable of restoring order to a changed galaxy.

Unlike its space opera rival, Star Trek: Nemesis (Nemesis) is a reflection on cloning

and clone hysteria. The film is structured around a double set of clones: Captain Jean-

Luc Picard (Patrick Stewart) – and his younger clone Shinzon (Tom Hardy); and the

android Commander Data (Brent Spiner) – and his physically identical ‘prototype’

B4. The contours of the convoluted plot need to be summarised

The story begins with Shinzon seizing control of the Romulan Empire through

assassinating the Romulan Senators and installing himself as Praetor. Shinzon then

requests a meeting with the Federation, ostensibly with the objective of making peace.

10

The Enterprise is the closest Federation ship, and so the Next Generation crew begin

their final film adventure.50

However, the overtures of peace turn out not to be as genuine as the offers made to an

earlier Enterprise Capitan by the Klingons in Star Trek VI.51 Shinzon is a clone with a

history. He was created by the Romulans with the intention of having him

impersonate the real Picard, thereby placing a Romulan agent at the heart of Star

Fleet. To fulfil his destiny Shinzon is an intriguing piece of genetic engineering:

created using ‘temporal DNA’, he has been designed so his aging could be accelerated

to match Picard’s age. For reasons unknown, this use of Shinzon was abandoned, and

in an attempt to destroy the evidence of the plot Shinzon was condemned to die as a

slave in the dilithium mines of Romulus’ twin planet Remus.52

But Shinzon does not die. Instead, he leads the Remans in an uprising against their

Romulan oppressors. With the support of the Remans, the collusion of the Romulan

military and armed with the Scimitar a battleship of unparalleled destructive power,

Shinzon has staged his coup. Predictably, there is rather more to Shinzon’s plan than

liberating his ‘Reman brothers’ from the hell of Romulan oppression. First, like all

Star Trek baddies Shinzon’s ultimate goal is to destroy Earth, destabilising the

Federation and increasing the power of the Romulan Empire. Second, and perhaps

more importantly, Shinzon’s unique genetically engineered potential is also his fatal

weakness: he needs a ‘DNA transfusion’ from Picard or he will die. And so we learn

that it is no coincidence that it is Picard who is dispatched to negotiate with Shinzon.

Shinzon has contrived to lure the Enterprise into close proximity to Romulus by

planting B4 on a nearby planet, confident that the Enterprise would detect his

‘positronic’ signal and go to investigate.

11

The film concludes with a final confrontation between the Enterprise and the

Scimitar. The remarkably resilient Enterprise survives the encounter and Picard saves

humanity from annihilation. When the space debris settles, Shinzon’s ship has been

destroyed, the Romulans are back in control of the Empire, Shinzon himself is dead,

but so too, rather surprisingly, is Data.

It is by reason of the prioritising of clones through the narrative paralleling of two sets

of clones that the film presents itself as a reflection on clones and cloning. The film

not only maps what is absent in the public record on cloning – the key anxieties that

make up clone hysteria – but also attempts to destabilise these concerns. Two

constitutive anxieties of clone hysteria are identified: the clone as double, and the

clone as artefact. Underlying them both is the notion that the ‘essence’ of identity is

genetically determined. The clone as double links thinking about clones to other

narratives of the twin and the double; the clone as artefact names the anxieties

surrounding the manufactured status of the clone and the concerns of the status of the

original and the copy. The idea of genetic determinism captures the residual anxiety

that, ultimately, an essential, material substance determines an entity’s identity. This

anxiety remains and corrupts the film’s attempt to pose a counter story of acceptance,

difference and life experience.

The Clone as Double

For Wendy Doniger the cultural anxiety surrounding clones can be located in the

mythology of the double.53 The clone is a concern precisely because it promises an

undistinguished ‘twin’ of the original. Identical twins are problematic due to their

sameness and hence their indistinguishableness, but also due to a perceived uncanny

closeness. First, twin narratives abound with stories of doppelgangers, the identical

12

malevolent others that substitutes themselves for the innocent original. De Nooy and

Statham regard these substitution horrors as involving secondary themes depending

on the gender of the twins; with stories of male doubles often involving a counter

narrative of loyalty which is invariably absent from female twin stories, that

predominately have a dichotomous good (virginal) twin and bad (promiscuous)

twin.54 A second archetypical twin narrative involves an association of twins with the

uncanny. Twins are often considered to have special psychic connections; shared

memories, extra sensory perception and other mental powers.55

In Nemesis the Picard-Shinzon double faithfully reproduces the discursive

conventions of twin narratives. It can be seen that, notwithstanding the age difference

Picard and Shinzon, are strongly, even excessively, represented according to the

classical twin narratives of ‘good’ original and ‘evil’ double. Picard’s age signifies

him as the initial, while Shinzon’s youth demarcates him as the second. The plot is

structured from Picard’s perspective of discovering his clone. This is reinforced when

Shinzon tells his origin story (complete with gratuitous flashback) in the nefarious

machinations of the Romulan High Command. While Trekkies need little textual

convincing of the ‘goodness’ of Picard, as the film goes on Shinzon is revealed as not

only being conceived in evil but as being evil: he bullies and dictates to his lackeys (in

contrast to Picard’s leadership of his crew); he treats the android B4 as a tool (in

contrast to Picard’s respect for both androids); and, ultimately, he threatens the Earth

with a weapon of mass destruction (in contrast to Picard’s sworn duty and repeated

examples of protecting the Earth, the Federation and life itself). Like the classic

substitution twin narrative, Shinzon is revealed as obsessive towards the ‘original’, an

obsession that leads to a compulsion to kill Picard. This coding of good and bad twin

exceeds the established boundaries for male twin narratives by incorporating

13

sexualisation (as in female twin’s narratives) of the distinction between Picard and

Shinzon. At Riker’s and Troi’s wedding Picard plays respectable masculine roles of

‘father of the bride’ and also ‘best man.’ Further, in established Star Trek lore Picard

is clearly established as heterosexual and monogamous in his relationships, lacking

even the hyper-sexuality of Kirk.56 In contrast, Shinzon is a deviant who ‘rapes’ Troi

via a telepathic ménage à trois.57

In addition through over-determining Picard-Shinzon as good-evil twins, the film also

suggests the uncanny dimension of twin narratives. Having revealed himself as

Picard’s clone, Shinzon directly invokes the ‘two as one’ metaphor of twin narratives:

SHINZON: .... I can see as well as you can. I can feel everything you feel.

In fact, I feel exactly what you feel, don’t I Jean-Luc. Come to dinner -

just the two of us; or, should I say, just the one of us.

This referencing of the uncanny is reinforced, when at times Picard and Shinzon do

the classic twin double-act of finishing each other’s sentences.

SHINZON: Were we Picards always warriors?

PICARD: I think of myself as an explorer.

SHINZON: Well, were we always explorers?

PICARD: I was the first Picard to leave our solar system. It caused quite a

stir in the family, but, I’d spent my youth …

SHINZON: … looking at the stars, dreaming about what was up there,

about …

14

PICARD: … new worlds.

The good-bad twin references, together with the uncanny twin suggestions, highlight

a key aspect of clone hysteria; clones are evil beings with an unnatural connection to

the original. This negative characterisation of the clone is counterbalanced by Data-

B4.

The Data-B4 double challenges the reading of clones according to the conventions of

twin narratives. Externally, they are perfectly identical and it could be expected that

they will be distinguished along similar lines; with B4 the malicious copy actively

seeking to subsume the original Data. However, they are not so coded. B4 is a

simpleton - in android terms his ‘neural pathways are less advanced’; he is an

unconscious pawn in Shinzon’s scheming, rather then an active participant. This

means that B4 responds no differently to Picard’s overtures of respect and friendship

than to Shinzon’s disregard and violence. Contrary to the classic doppelganger

narratives, it is Data who successfully exploits his identicalness with B4 to infiltrate

the Scimitar, rather than an ‘evil’ B4 impersonating Data. Further, notwithstanding

the potential for android connectivity to explain an uncanny link between Data and

B4, the relationship is not so burdened. Even during and after the two androids were

hardwired together in Data’s ‘failed’ attempt to copy his memories to B4, there is no

hint of the uncanny ‘two as one’ commonality suggested by Picard-Shinzon. In the

film the Data-B4 double resists the overarching twin narratives that frame the Picard-

Shinzon double. It is possible that this is because in the wider Star Trek story Data

already has an evil twin in Lore. In the television episodes dealing with the Lore-Data

double, the established tropes of good/bad twin are clearly evident. Lore attempts to

destroy all the organic life forms on his home planet, in opposition to Data’s duties as

15

a Star Fleet officer to protect life and his internal commitments to the ‘Laws of

Robotics.’58 In another episode Lore tries to destroy Data by disabling his ethical

program and ‘feeding’ him a diet of emotions that he cannot resist.59 It is possible that

the Data-Lore double has exhausted the need for Data-B4 to be framed according to

the twin conventions.60 In doing so, the film challenges the treatment of clones that it

articulates so clearly with the Picard-Shinzon double. In the film Data is Data, B4 is

B4, and the interaction is not one of good/evil, but one of kin. Data quickly labels B4

‘brother’ and soon accepts B4’s difference from him. And so it is Data who

decommissions B4 when he is revealed as a pawn of Shinzon because Data accepts

that B4 will never be any different from what he is – manufactured as the unwitting

accomplice to Shinzon’s plans.

In the Picard-Shinzon double, Nemesis suggests that clones are to be feared; that

clones would be evil, homicidal and interrupt the natural order in uncanny ways. As

such the film gives substance to the ‘community standards’ and ‘human dignities’ that

regularly appeared in the public record surrounding the Prohibition of Human

Cloning Act 2002 (Cth). However, the film also challenges this element of the clone

hysteria. Through Data-B4 the film suggest that clones need not be conceived

according to the extreme narratives of twin stories, but surface similarities can be

pierced, leading to more complex assessments of difference. However, the clone as

double is one only element of clone hysteria. Clones are not just twins but are

manufactured twins. The clone as artefact is the other element of the clone hysteria

the film expresses and challenges.

16

Clone as Artefact

Clones are artificial twins. Inherent in the term ‘clone’ is the notion of intervention

and conscience creation. The clone as an artefact is the second anxiety within the

clone hysteria that Nemesis maps. Again the Picard-Shinzon double excessively

prioritises the dilemmas feared to arise from the manufactured nature of the clone,

while the Data-B4 double can be read as providing a different account.

The struggle between Picard and Shinzon drives the plot in Nemesis. Viewers are

compelled to see Picard as the original coming to face his copy in Shinzon. In doing

so, what immediately are at stake in the film are the questions of identity and the

consequences of destabilising identity. Returning to the Enterprise after his initial

encounter with Shinzon, Picard is clearly shaken and indignant at discovering he has a

copy. For much of the film Picard is given over to introspection. He cradles a

photograph of himself the same age as Shinzon, wonders at his own youthful

overconfidence and muses on whether, had their situations been reversed, he might

not have ended up precisely like Shinzon. The original script made Picard’s emotion

state blatant. In a scene that was eventually not included in the cinema release Picard

confides in Troi:

TROI: …The strongest sense I had was that he’s very curious about you.

He wants to know you.

PICARD: Does he indeed!

TROI: Captain your feelings are appropriate.

…

17

PICARD: Can you imagine what it was like standing there, looking at

him?

TROI: What you’re feeling is a loss of self.

PICARD: It was as if part of me had been stolen.

TROI: We cherish our uniqueness. We believe that there can only be one

of us in the universe.

PICARD: Now there are two.

Even without that scene Picard’s notion of self is clearly disrupted by Shinzon. Picard

and viewer alike quickly see Shinzon as violent, warlike and impulsive, the very

opposite of Picard, the coolheaded, diplomatic peacemaker. The fundamental

challenge that Shinzon offers to Picard’s sense of self is evident to Shinzon. It is a

weakness that Shinzon attempts to exploit as relations deteriorate to armed conflict:

You are me! The same noble Picard blood runs through our veins. Had

you lived my life you’d be doing exactly as I am. So look in the mirror.

See yourself. Consider that, Captain. I can think of no greater torment for

you.

While Picard is unsettled by the appearance of his evil clone, when the phasers start

flying and the Federation is in danger, he pulls himself together and wins the day.

Picard the original is tested, but survives. Shinzon the copy is not made of such

durable substance. After meeting Picard, Shinzon descends into a full-blown crisis of

identity. Shinzon, as Picard’s clone, is a human who was raised by Romulans, but was

rejected and disposed of on Remus. At times he characterises himself as Reman and

18

refers to his ‘Reman brothers.’ However, on another occasion he inserts himself into

the Picard family history: “Were we Picards always explorers?” he asks Picard.

Shinzon knows he is a clone. He knows that he is not Reman; but understands equally

that he is not quite human – he is an experiment gone wrong – a (steadily degrading)

copy of a human. The solution is obvious: the copy can only possess an identity

through destroying the original:

PICARD: What is all this about.

SHINZON: It’s about destiny, Picard. It’s about a Reman outcome.

PICARD: You’re not Reman.

SHINZON: And I’m not quite human. So what am I? My life is

meaningless as long as you’re still alive. What am I while you exist? A

shadow? An echo?

….

PICARD: Shinzon, I’m a mirror for you as well.

SHINZON: Not for long, captain. I’m afraid you won’t survive to witness

the victory of the echo over the voice.

The Picard-Shinzon double’s talk of echoes and mirrors dramatises the anxiety that

comes from the manufactured nature of the clone; the fear that existence of a copy

will challenge the original’s sense of self, and the fear that the copy must desire

destruction of the original in order to claim an authentic identity. This emphasising of

19

the originality of identity as opposed to the secondary nature of the copy is challenged

by Data-B4.

Absent from the representations of the Data-B4 in Nemesis is the existential angst of

Picard and Shinzon. Neither Data’s nor B4’s identity is thrown into crisis by the

knowledge of the other. Conceivably, this is because they already are cognisant that

they are artificial creations, the products of a not quite sane scientist’s experiments.61

For Data the potential that there are others of him is an established feature of his

identity. Indeed, Shinzon exploits his knowledge of Data’s openness to and active

search for others like himself in using B4 as bait to lure the Enterprise to the Romulan

border. Having ‘rescued’ B4, Data embraces his ‘prototype’ with some enthusiasm.

Indeed rather than being troubled by their similarity, Data tries to make B4 into an

even more faithful copy of himself by downloading his memory into B4, in the

attempt to upgrade B4 into another Data:

GEORDI: I still can’t believe the Captain went along with the memory

download.

DATA: Captain Picard agrees that the B4 was probably designed with the

same self-actualisation parameters as myself. If my memory engrams are

successfully integrated into his positronic matrix, he should have all my

abilities.

GEORDI: Yeah but he would also have all of your memories as well. You

feel comfortable with that?

DATA: I feel nothing, Geordi. It is my belief that with my memory

engrams he will be able to function as a more complete individual.

20

GEORDI: An individual more like you, you mean?

Significantly, there is no question of Data downloading anything from B4. In this

sense the dynamic between Data and B4 is quite unlike that between Picard and

Shinzon: if Shinzon insists that he is a mirror for Picard, Picard is only too ready to

respond that he too is a mirror for Shinzon. So whereas Picard-Shinzon plays out the

feared loss of identity and competition between the original and the copy, Data-B4

displaces these expectations. Data, unlike Picard begins the film without privileging

himself as a unique creation of nature. He is an artefact, the product of a repeatable

process of manufacture. His identity and sense of self is not given by bountiful nature

but has been hard won in ‘life.’ This is reinforced in the failure of Data’s memory to

change B4. It suggests that identity lies beyond determinative essences, whether

genetic or positronic. In a significant exchange, as the Enterprise races from

Romulus, Picard and Data reflect on the recent interactions with their doubles:

PICARD: He says he is a mirror.

DATA: Of you, Sir?

PICARD: Yes.

DATA: I do not agree. Although you share the same genetic structure, the

events of your life have created a unique individual.

PICARD: If I had lived his life, is it possible that I would have rejected

my humanity?

DATA: The B4 is identical to me, although his neural pathways are not as

advanced. But even if they were, he would not be me.

21

PICARD: How can you be sure?

DATA: I aspire, Sir, to be better than I am. B4 does not; nor does Shinzon

In Nemesis the Picard-Shinzon double articulates the fear that clones as artefacts lead

to a loss of identity in a war for meaningful survival between the original and the

cloned copy. Clones are not just evil doubles but, ultimately, will be driven to seek

destruction of the original. When twined with the clone as double anxiety the

extraordinary clone hysteria that surrounded and was given voice in the Prohibition of

Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) can be understood. No wonder cloning needed to be

prohibited by a penalty of fifteen years imprisonment. However, Nemesis also

challenges these clone anxieties. The Data-B4 double suggests identity lies beyond

any essence that determines self in life experience. Clones need not be conceived

according to the logic of original and copy according to which there can be only one.

Genetic Determinism and the Essence of Identity

In parading the two elements of the clone hysteria, clone as double and clone as

artefact, Nemesis can be read as articulating the anxieties that called forth the

Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth). If the film just did this it would offer

little more than other celluloid adventures in the clone cannon. However, Data-B4

challenge the established concerns surrounding cloning. In this way Nemesis suggests

alternative accounts of clones emphasising acceptance, difference and the importance

of life experience for identity, instead of the struggle between good and evil, loss of

identity and the logic of the original and the copy. In doing so the film reveals what is

the central myth that sustains the clone hysteria: that basic material essence, whether

biological or positronic, determines the self.

22

As we have seen Shinzon challenges Picard’s identity by continually suggesting that

their common genetic heritage means that Shinzon and his monstrous behaviour is

internal also to Picard; Picard would be Shinzon if the circumstances were reversed:

SHINZON: You don’t trust me.

PICARD: I have no reason to.

SHINZON: You have every reason. If you had lived my life and

experienced the suffering of my people, you would be standing where I

am.

PICARD: And if you had lived my life, you would understand my

responsibility to the Federation. I cannot allow my personal feelings to

unduly influence my decisions.

SHINZON: All I have are my personal feelings. I want to know what it

means to be human. The Remans have given me a future; you can tell me

about my past.

PICARD: I can tell you about my past.

For Picard-Shinzon genetics matters and genes are regarded as a type of chemical fate

that predetermines an individual. Hence, the clone illicitly trespasses on another’s

fate, bringing evil, loss of self and threatened annihilation. Ultimately, an individual

manifests a core essence that shines through the surface accretion of lived experience:

SHINZON: Not quite the face you remember?

PICARD: Not quite.

23

SHINZON: A lifetime of violence will do that. They broke my nose, my

jaw. But so much is the same. The eyes! Surely you recognize the eyes.

PICARD: Yes.

SHINZON: Our eyes reflect out lives, don’t they? And yours are so

confident.

However, through the Data-B4 double the film challenges the notion that genetics

determine identity. The download of Data’s memory into B4’s supposedly identical

hardware does not produce the expected Data II: Geordi’s sceptical observation

during the download that ‘maybe [B4] is not supposed to be like you, Data. Maybe

he’s supposed to be exactly the way he is,’ seems correct. Therefore, it is Data,

reflecting on that experience, who suggests to Picard that identity lies beyond

essences, whether positronic or genetic, in the intangible life history and aspirations of

a being. In short it is the android that rejects a materialist basis for the self in genetic

determinism and champions a spiritual commitment to aspiration.

In Data the film attempts to go beyond the material basis of the self in genetic

determinism. In many respects this is a radical step as clone hysteria witnesses the

strength of genetic determinism. However, and somewhat counter intuitively, by the

final shot of the Enterprise undergoing repairs above a blue Earth, Nemesis does not

confidently present the victory of spiritualism over determinism, aspiration over fate,

for Data is dead and with him goes a vision of identity in which life experience is

centralised and genetic determinism is minimised.

The Picard-Shinzon double does not stray from the expected narrative - in the

inevitable final confrontation the original restores the world through destroying the

24

clone. There is little room for acceptance, difference and life in a brawl over a knife in

the disintegrating bridge of a doomed ship. Data is one of the many sacrificed to the

Picard-Shinzon double. While Data becomes a martyr to life, the message is that

living goes to those accepting the reality that identity is genetically determined. This

message is communicated in one of the last scenes when it becomes apparent that

B4’s earlier termination by Data was not permanent. It appears Picard has revived B4

in an attempt to resurrect Data. The exchange between Picard and B4 is frustrating.

Picard is attempting to explain Data’s sacrifice; B4 does not understand and Picard

leaves. The camera follows Picard, and then swings back to B4. B4 is mumbling the

words to a song in a voice like a faint AM radio station. But not any song. The song is

the one that Data sang at Riker’s and Troi’s wedding many scenes earlier. In some

small sense Data is back. Perhaps the memory engram download has worked in some

small way after all, and Data lives on as a spectral presence.62

At this point the film undermines any previous attempt at challenging genetic

determinism. If the download worked it means that essences matter. Data’s

speculation on life and aspiration seemingly in the wake of the failure of essence was

premature and now can be abandoned as a null hypothesis. The film articulates why

clones are feared (because they are perfect copies of the original), suggests that

alternative accounts of clones can be made (that clones are never really identical), but

then accepts the core of the clone hysteria in genetic determinism. The gene strikes

back.

III. Genetic Frontiers

25

Nemesis ends in disquiet in much the same way that a serious review of the public

record surrounding the Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) ends in

disquiet. The public record manifests clone hysteria. Clones are to be prohibited by

law and the need for legislation is regarded as obvious and uncontroversial. Absent

from the public record is any sober assessment of clones and cloning. Instead,

recourse is made to rhetorical ploys like ‘community standards’ or ‘human dignity’

that prima facie justify and explain the extreme penalties in the Act. At one

significant level Nemesis articulates what exactly is being feared in the clone hysteria.

Indeed, Nemesis articulates that clone hysteria is based on two groups of anxieties.

The first are the established twin narratives of good/evil twin and the uncanny

connection between twins. The second group of anxieties arise from the status of the

clone as an artefact, giving rise to concerns for loss of identity, concerns with

originals and copies and the notion that clones must harbour homicidal desires

towards their original. At another level Nemesis is a site for reflection on these

anxieties. The double of Data-B4 questions the necessity of conceiving the clone

within framing narratives of good/evil, original/copy, and loss of identity. Data-B4

highlights that clone hysteria is a manifestation of genetic determinism, of seeing

genes as fundamental in the constitution of an individual and suggests alternative

accounts of clones involving acceptance, difference and life experience. In this way

Nemesis maps the new frontiers for identity and politics in the post-Dolly universe, an

admirable task for a Star Trek film. But, the film is an exploration, for it boldly goes,

but ultimately returns to the genetic determinism that informed the public record on

clones. In the final scenes essence is prioritised and earlier attempts to posit life, spirit

or aspiration as the source of individuality vanish in a poorly recollected song.

26

Donna Haraway has suggested that in the contemporary West notions of the

individuality, freedom and future have become dominated by genetic determinism.63

The nature/nurture debate of earlier generations has become drowned in a helix of

deoxyribonucleic acid. For Haraway and others, genetic determinism is the ideology

of a conservative epoch, an epoch marked by an abandonment of the social, a

rejection of community over individuality, retribution over rehabilitation, and the

return to a naturalisation of social, ethnic and economic inequality.64 As such it is

possible to argue that the clone hysteria, the fear of ‘photocopying human beings’ as

the Andrews Report expressed it, articulates and inscribes in the public record that

genetic determinism is, for want of a better phrase, the ‘truth.’ A truth that Nemesis

tells is problematic but ultimately, in the promise of Data’s resurrection, unassailable:

genes make us who we are. This is what is truly frightening in the clone hysteria: not

the prospect that there might be children with an identical nucleinic genome to other

humans, but that we live in a culture where essence matters, difference is naturalised

and inequality is normal.

Nemesis might fail in its attempts to escape genetic determinism through the

valorisation of acceptance, difference and life, but its failure is instructive. Arguably,

Nemesis maps the limits of older politics within the new frontiers. In conflating

genotype with phenotype genetic determinism oversteps its science into myth. It

confuses the genetic potential of an entity with its concrete actuality and ignores the

contextual influences of environment and life history on the development of an

entity.65 It is here in the gap between the science and myth that essentialism can be

addressed and clearer thinking and lawmaking about clones and cloning can begin.

27

Word Count (Including footnotes): 8806

28

1 Griffith Law School, Griffith University

2 Griffith Law School, Griffith University

1 The authors would like to thank William P. MacNeil, Allan Ardill, and two

anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. We

would like to thank Narottami Emmett for her research assistance.

3 “Star Trek: Nemesis” (dir. Stuart Baird, Paramount Pictures, 2002).

4 Tom Wilke and Elizabeth Graham, “Power without Responsibility: Media Portrayals

of Dolly and Science”, Cambridge Quarterly of Heathcare Ethics 7 (1998). On the

panic of cloning see Roger Brownsword, “Stem Cells and Cloning: Where the

Regulatory Consensus Fails”, New England Law Review 39 (2005), pp.535-7.

5 “The Gene is out of the Bottle”, The Age (Melbourne), February 25, 1997, p.14. On

the repetition of the headline see Gregory Pence, Who”s Afraid of Human Cloning

(Lanham, Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), p.xv.

6 In December 1998 the Australian Health Ethics Committee (AHEC) provided the

Commonwealth Government with advice for the need for national prohibition of

cloning. Australian Health Ethics Committee, Scientific, Ethical and Regulatory

Considerations Relevant to Cloning of Human Beings (Canberra, National Health and

Medical Research Council, 1998), p.v. In doing so the AHEC suggested that the

Commonwealth affirm its support for the November 11, 1997 UNESCO Declaration

on the Human Genome and Human Rights, Article 11:

Practices which are contrary to human dignity, such as reproductive

cloning of human beings, shall not be permitted. States and competent

international organizations are invited to cooperate in identifying such

29

practices and in determining, nationally or internationally, appropriate

measures to be taken to ensure that the principles set out in this

Declaration are respected.

7 Gina Kolata, Clone: The Road to Dolly and the Path Ahead (New York, William

Morrow, 1998), p.32. It must be remembered that February 23, 1997 was the public

announcement of Dolly. It was born July 5, 1996.

8 Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) ss. 9, 11.

9 Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) ss. 10, 15, 20(1), 20(2), 19, 22 and

23.

10 Walter Effross, “High-Tech Heroes, Virtual Villains, and Jacked-In Justice: Visions

of Law and Lawyers in Cyberpunk Science Fiction”, Buffalo Law Review 45 (1997)

and William Pencak, “Lyres Against the Law: Orpheus as Cyberpunk Outlaw”, Legal

Studies Forum 23 (1999).

11 In discussing the penalties for cloning in the second reading speech of the Bill, the

Prime Minster indicated: “[t]his is a severe penalty and indicates the seriousness of

the crime.” Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, June

27, 2002, p.4542 (John Howard, Prime Minister).

12 Harvey Lodish, Arnold Berk, S. Lawrence Zipursky, Paul Matsudaira, David

Baltimore and James E. Darnell, Molecular Cell Biology (New York, W. H. Freeman,

2000), p.G-4.

13 On natural or “gecko” cloning see Matthew David and Jamieson Kirkhope,

“Cloning/Stem Cells and the Meaning of Life”, Current Sociology 53 (2005), p.368.

On the problems with using “clone” as a legal definition see Brenda Gogarty, “What

Exactly is an Exact Copy? And why it Matters when Trying to Ban Human

Reproductive Cloning in Australia”, Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (2003), pp.84-9.

30

14 Melodie Slabbert, “Cloning and Stem Cell Research: A Critical Overview of the

Present Legislative Regime in Australia and the Way Forward”, Journal of Law and

Medicine 10 (2003), p.515.

15 Alex Bruce, “The Search for Truth and Freedom: Ethical Issues Surrounding

Human Cloning and Stem Cell Research”, Journal of Law and Medicine, 9 (2002),

p.327.

16 On the elements of the political lobbying from moral groups and medical

researchers on cloning see, Christine Critchley and Lyn Turney, “Understanding

Australians” Perceptions of Controversial Research: The Influence of Social Trust,

Religiosity and Anti-Intellectualism on Opposition to Stem Cell Research”,

Australian Journal of Emerging Technologies and Society 2 (2004), p.79. Two

examples of this lobbying can be see at Patrick Carlyon, “The Clone Ranger”, The

Bulletin (Sydney), April 23, 2002, pp. 22–4, and Bill Uren, “Potential Hazards”,

Eureka Street, 12 (2002), p.19.

17 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, June 27, 2002,

p.4541 (John Howard, Prime Minister).

18 Op. cit., p.4543.

19 Op. cit., p.4541.

20 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, August

20, 2002, p.5242 (Simon Crean, Leader of the Opposition).

21 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, August 21,

2002, p.5317 (David Cox).

22 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, August

28, 2002, p.6053 (Kim Beazley).

31

23 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, August 21,

2002, p.6068 (Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

24 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, August 21,

2002, p.6192 (Bruce Billson).

25 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, August 29,

2002, p.6197.

26 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, November 11, 2002, pp.5838-9

(John Hogg).

27 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate September 18, 2002, p.4421

(Richard Alston, Minister for Communications, Information Technology and the

Arts).

28 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, November 11, 2002, p.5843

(Christopher Ellison).

29 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, November 14, 2002, p.6342.

Following the recommendations in the Senate Community Affairs Legislation

Committee, Provisions of the Research Involving Embryos and Prohibition of Human

Cloning Bill 2002 (Canberra, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia,

2002).

30 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, December 11,

2002, p.10115.

31 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, December 11,

2002, p.10114 (Stephen Smith).

32 Standing out against this background, Senator Barnett presents one of the few direct

attempts at justification of the prohibition of cloning. Cloning, the Senator argued,

threatens the continuation of the family and the stability of identity. He added: “Let us

32

not just assume and take it as a fact that human cloning is wrong. We must put on the

record the reasons why and make it clear to society as a whole that each person is

important and that each individual is to be honoured and respected.” However, this

task was one that he does not undertake. Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates,

Senate, November 11, 2002, pp.5833-4 (Guy Barnett).

33 House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs,

Human Cloning: Scientific, Ethical and Regulatory Aspects of Human Cloning and

Stem Cell Research (Canberra, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia,

2001), p.x.

34 Kim Little, “Human Reproductive Cloning: An Analysis of the Andrews Report”,

Monash Bioethics Review 21 (2001), p.83-6.

35 Australian Health Ethics Committee, Cloning of Human Beings, p.v.

36 Op. cit., p.ii.

37 Steve Dow, “Ethicists Predict Human Cloning”, The Age (Melbourne), February

25, 1997, p.7. Graeme Leech, “The Genetic Gene”, The Australian (Sydney), March

1, 1997, p.22. Here Australian journalists can be seen adopting a similar set of

“metaphors and storytelling themes” as their United States counterparts, Matthew C.

Nisbet, Dominique Brossard and Adrianne Kroepsch, “Framing Science: The Stem

Cell Controversy in an Age of Press/Politics”, Press/Politics 8 (2003), p.43-2, 61.

38 For example see, John Kerin and Carolyn Collins, “Double Take”, The Australian

(Sydney), January 24, 1998, p.26 and Carmelo Amalfi, “Gene Expert Rejects Fear”,

The West Australian (Perth), July 22, 1997, p.11.

39 Andre Malan, “Scientists Ignore Moral Issues”, The West Australian (Perth),

March 31, 2001, p.16, Gautam Naik, “A Feat of Duplication”, The Australian

33

Financial Review (Melbourne), November 28, 2001, p.53, Jim Buckell, “Stem-cell

Research Outpaces Cloning”, The Australian (Sydney), July 29, 2002, p.3.

40 See the Catholic Archbishop of Sydney in George Pell “Decision a Pyrrhic Victory

for Pragmatism”, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), April 9, 2002, p.13.

41 See the report of the comments of Professor Don Metcalf in Richard Yallop, “No

Ban, Urges Stem Pioneer”, The Australian (Sydney), August 14, 2002, p.5.

42 Renata Salecl, On Anxiety ( London, Routledge, 2004), p.18.

43 John Harris, Clones, Genes and Immortality (Oxford, Oxford University Press,

1998), p.31.

44 For example Thomson argued for limited therapeutic cloning. Judith Thomson,

“Legal and Ethical Problems of Human Cloning”, Journal of Law and Medicine 8

(2000). In reply Blackford suggested that arguments against reproductive cloning are

not as overwhelming as Thomson and the general public suspect. Russell Blackford,

“Thinking about Human Cloning: A Reply to Judith Thomson”, Journal of Law and

Medicine, 9 (2001).

45 David Swanton, “Human Cloning: Beyond the Hype”, Australian Rationalist, 47

(1998), p.26.

46 Dean Bell, “Human Cloning and International Human Rights Law”, Sydney Law

Review, 21 (1999), p.217. See generally Christine Corcos, Isabel Corcos and Brian

Stockhoff, “Double-Take: A Second Look at Cloning, Science Fiction and Law”,

Louisiana Law Review 59 (1999).

47 For example see Ronald Chester, “Cloning for Human Reproduction: One

American Perspective”, Sydney Law Review, 23 (2001), p.321.

48 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, August 21,

2002, p.6068 (Alexander Downer, Minister for Foreign Affairs).

34

49 On this theme in golden age US science fiction see Brian Ash, Faces of the Future -

the Lessons of Science Fiction (London, Elek/ Pemberton, 1975).

50 Scott Foundas, “Star Trek Nemesis”, Variety, December 9-15, 2002, p.39. On the

active official and unofficial literary adventures of Star Trek crews once retired from

television and films, see Constance Penley, NASA / TREK: Popular Sciences and Sex

in America (London, Verso, 1997).

51 Paul A. Cantor “Shakespeare in the Original Klingon: Star Trek and the End of

History”, Perspectives on Political Science, 29 (2000), p.162.

52 Remus is the classic science fiction environment of the harsh prison planet where

an intense survival of the fittest produces a tough, fanatical warrior population, most

readily associated with Frank Herbet’s Dune series. See Frank Herbert, Dune

(London, New English Library, 1965).

53 Wendy Doniger, “Sex and the Mythological Clone” in Martha C. Nussbaum and

Cass R. Sunstein, eds., Clones and Clones: Facts and Fantasies about Human

Cloning (New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 1998), p.115.

54 Juliana De Nooy and Bronwyn Statham, “Telling the Good from the Bad in Twin

Films”, Continuum: Journal Media & Cultural Studies, 12 (1998).

55 Otto Rank, The Double: A Psychoanalytic Study (Detroit, Wayne State University

Press, 1971) and John Herdman, The Double in Nineteenth-century Fiction: The

Shadow Life (New York, St Martin’s Press, 1991).

56 Brian L. Ott and Eric Aoki, “Popular Imagination and Identity Politics: Reading the

Future in Star Trek”, Western Journal of Communication, 65 (2001), p.404.

57 In doing so following the television episode “Violations” (Season 6, February 3,

1992). On Troi and rape see Robin Roberts, “Rape, Romance and Consent in Star

Trek: The Next Generation”, Extrapolation 40 (1999).

35

58 “Datalore” (Season 1, January 31, 1988). On Data as an Asimov robot see Sue

Short, ““The Measure of a Man” Asimov’s Bicentennial Man, Star Trek’s Data and

Being Human”, Extrapolation 44 (2003).

59 “Decent” (Season 6, July 4, 1993) and “Decent II” (Season 7, October 3, 1993).

60 Jon Wagner and Jan Lundeen, Deep Space and Sacred Time (Westpoint, Praeger

1998), p.71.

61 As expressed in the academically celebrated “Measure of Man” (Season 2,

February 26, 1989) See Jeffery Nesteruk, “A New Narrative for Corporate Law”,

Legal Studies Forum 23 (1999) and Viviane Casimir, “Data and Dick’s Deckard:

Cyborg as Problematic Signifier”, Extrapolation 38 (1997), p.280.

62 This reading of the climax in Nemesis with Data’s survival has also been made by

Short, “Measure of a Man”, p.222.

63 Donna Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millennium.FemaleMan©_Meets

_OncoMouse™: Feminism and Technoscience (New York, Routledge, 1997), p.145-9

64 Op. cit. See also Dorothy Nelkin and M. Susan Lindee, The DNA Mystique: The

Gene as Cultural Icon (New York, W. H. Freeman and Company, 1995) and

Eileen Webb and Kieran Tranter, “Genes R Us: Ethics and Truth in DNA”,

Alternative Law Journal 26 (2001), p.172.

65 Usher Fleising, “Genetic Essentialism, Mana, and the Meaning of DNA”, New

Genetics and Society 20 (2001).