econ 308: employment decisions chapters 13 week 13.1: nov. 16, 2010 1

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ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

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Page 1: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

ECON 308: Employment Decisions

Chapters 13

Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010

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Page 2: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Structure of Decision Rights (Ch 13)• BUNDLING TASKS INTO JOBS

– Specialized versus Broad Task Assignment – Productive Bundling of Tasks

• BUNDLING OF JOBS INTO SUBUNITS– Grouping Jobs by Function– Grouping Jobs by Product or Geography– Trade-offs between Functional and Product or Geographic

Subunits• Environment, Strategy, Architecture Matrix Organizations

– Mixed Designs– Network Organization– Organizing within Subunits

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Page 3: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Bundling Tasks into Job Subunits

• Example: FinWare Financial Software Distributor

Task 1

Task 3 Task 4

Task 2

CustomerType

Individuals

Firms

Sales Service

Function

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Page 4: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Methods of grouping jobs

• U-form of organization(unitary)(Smokestack)– by functional specialty

• Sales• Finance• Engineering• Marketing• Manufacturing

– each primary function in one major sub-unit

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Page 5: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Finware as functional organization

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Page 6: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Specialized task assignment: Assign by function

• Benefits– Comparative Advantage (Different Skill sets)

• Sales• Technicians

– Lower Cross-Training Costs • Costs

– Foregone complementarities(Car door & Latch)– Coordination Costs: ( Insurance sales , underwritting)– Functional Myopia– Reduced Flexibility

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Page 7: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Incentive Issues

• Cost of monitoring• Broad Bundling and compensation (Faculty)

– Teaching– Research

• Incentive effects– Sales: Commission– Technicians: Customer Satisfaction

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Page 8: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Bundling of Jobs into Sub-units

• Group by Function– Benefits

• Coordination within the functional area• Promotes functional expertise• Hiring and reward structure easier to define

– Problems• Management must coordinate• Information flows poorly across departments • Difficult to compensate profitability • Wasted time: (Airport Security 4 per flight)

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Page 9: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Bundling of Jobs into Sub-units

• Group by Geography– Benefits

• Decentralized decision making authority• Managers compensated on performance of division

– Problems• May ignore interdependencies

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Page 10: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Where Functional Subunits Work Well

• Small firms• Homogeneous products• Stable underlying technology

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Page 11: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Methods of grouping jobs

• U-form of organization (unitary)• M-form of organization (multidivisional)• Matrix organization

– intersecting lines of authority– functional departments address performance reviews

and professional development– product/geographic subunits address customer/client

needs

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Page 12: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Matrix Organizations: Multidemensional

Consumer Products Team

Sales Division

Business Products Team

Service Division

Business Sales Department

Consumer Sales Department

Business ServiceDepartment

Consumer ServiceDepartment

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Page 13: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Chrysler

• Original: Functional• Revised: Product teams

– Engineers– Finance– Marketing– Assembly line production

• Ex. Moon-roof control on cheaper model

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Page 14: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Case Study: IBM Credit

• Valued at $10 billion in 1993• Reduced the time needed to process credit

applications from 6 days to 4 hours– Old task assignment system: Functionally organized

• Credit Checkers• Contract preparers• Loan Pricing• Document preparation

– Reorganized task assignment:• Case workers

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Page 15: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

IBM Credit’s Old Functional Organization

CreditDepartment

ContractsDepartment

PricingDepartment

DocumentsDepartment

General Manager

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Page 16: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

IBM Credit’s Revised Organization

Case Worker Case Worker Case Worker Case Worker

General Manager

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Page 17: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

ECON 308: Employment Decisions

Chapter 14

Attracting and Retaining Qualified Employees

Week 13.2: Nov. 18 , 2010

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Page 18: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Attracting & Retaining Employees

• Principles:– Maximum Value: Marginal Revenue Product

(willing to pay)– People won’t come to your firm until you make

them at least as well of as the could be elsewhere (Opportunity Cost: Have to pay)

– Paying more than is needed to attract employees puts a firm at a competitive disadvantage

– It is in the interest of both employee and firm to maximized the value created in the relationship

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Page 19: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Chapter 14 Organization

• No-frills Competitive Labor Market• Some complications

– Human Capital– Compensating Differentials– Costly Information– Internal Labor Markets– The Salary-Fringe Benefit Mix

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Page 20: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

No-Frills Competitive Model

• Labor market is competitive – no discretion over wages

• Market Wages are costless to observe• Workers are identical• Jobs are identical• All labor is rented on the spot market• All compensation is monetary

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Page 21: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Basic Competitive Model

Number of Employees

E

Wag

e in

$

Marginal Revenue Product of labor

Market Wage Rate

E*

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Page 22: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Human Capital

• Terminology– Human Capital: Skills– Investment in Human Capital: Education, OJT– “rate of return” on Human Capital: MB > MC

• Types of Human Capital– General (Excel, Word, text messaging)– Firm Specific: (proprietary software)

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Page 23: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Compensating Differentials

• Consider 3 Welding jobs– Job X pays $8/hour in clean, air-conditioned

safe working conditions, – Job Y pays $8/hour in a dirty, outdoor

construction site,– Job Z pays $8/hour in ship construction

yard.• Is this an equilibrium wage?

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Page 24: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Compensating Differentials

• Must pay more when a job has undesirable characteristics– $20-300 more must by paid for every 1/10,000

increase in the probability of being killed on the job

– A firm with 1,000 employees could reduce wages by $20,000-$300,000 per year by preventing one accidental death every 10 years.

• Knowledge of necessary CD how to invest in alternatives: safety devices

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Page 25: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Compensating Differentials

• Implications–Unpleasant jobs get done–Companies are rewarded for making

jobs more pleasant–Workers may choose the level of risk

they wish to face

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Page 26: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Compensation Information: Costly to acquire

• Compensation may be hard to see– Workers differ in human capital so they may

differ in the compensation offered– Firms don’t share all of the details of

compensation with prospective employees• Symptoms…

– …of over-paying: too many qualified applicants– …of under-paying: few applicants, high

turnover

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Page 27: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Problems with under-paying

• Low compensation is associated with high turnover so costs of re-training are high

• When turnover is high there may be incentive problems

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Page 28: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Internal Labor Markets

• Hire at entry level, promote from within– Law Firms, Accounting Firms, Hospitals– In 1991 an employee between 45 & 54 had

typically been with the same employer for 10 years or longer

– Half of all men and ¼ of women stay with the same firm at least 20 years

• Most Internal Labor Markets rely on implicit contracts

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Page 29: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Tradeoffs in Long-TermEmployee Agreements

• Benefits of internal labor markets– Accumulates more firm-specific human capital– Better motivation– There is incentive to avoid behavior that is

dysfunctional in the long run– Managers know more about employee attributes

• Costs of internal labor markets– Restricted competition for advanced jobs

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Page 30: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Pay in Internal Labor Markets

Tenure with the firm

SalaryCompensation

Marginal RevenueProduct of Labor

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Page 31: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Tradeoffs with Career Earnings• Advantages

– Efficiency wages reduce turnover and shirking– Since pay rises faster than MRPL employees have strong

incentives to make the firm look good– Promotions become a reward for good behavior

• Disadvantages– Promotions may be manipulated because of destructive

behavior toward other rivals– Promotions are a crude incentive tool since they are

infrequent– The Peter Principle: People rise to level of incompetence– Much time may be spent lobbying managers for promotions

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Page 32: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

The Salary-Fringe Benefit Mix

• Fringe Benefits account for about 25% of compensation for the average American

• Examples– Health Insurance– Non-Social Security pension programs– Subsidized Education– Discounted Meals

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Page 33: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Indifference Curves Between Salaries and Fringe Benefits

Fringe Benefits

Mon

etar

y C

ompe

nsat

ion

Utility = U1

Utility = U2

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Page 34: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Iso-Cost Lines Between Salaries and Fringe Benefits

Fringe Benefits

Mon

etar

y C

ompe

nsat

ion

Slope = -1

Iso-cost line at $50,000 ($50K) of total payment$50 K

$50K

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Page 35: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Optimal combination: Salaries and Fringe Benefits

Fringe Benefits

Mon

etar

y C

ompe

nsat

ion

$50 K

$50K$20K

$30K

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Page 36: ECON 308: Employment Decisions Chapters 13 Week 13.1: Nov. 16, 2010 1

Fringe Benefits

• Payroll taxes– Make the iso-cost line flatter– The total tax-bill (including the part paid by the

employees) will matter in determining the optimal mix of fringe benefits

• Applications– Fringe benefits can be used to screen for particular

types of employees– Cafeteria-style plans are desirable when

administration costs are low and when adverse selection is not a problem.

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