economic and management benefits from the coordination of...

North American Journal of Fisheries Management 14:262-277. 1994© Copyright by ihc American Fisheries Society 1994

Economic and Management Benefits from the Coordination ofCapture and Culture Fisheries: The Case of

Prince William Sound Pink SalmonEVELYN PINKERTON

School of Community and Regional PlanningUniversity of British Columbia

6333 Memorial Road, Vancouver, British Columbia V6T IZ2, Canada

Abstract.—Aquaculture developments often create policy conflicts with established fisheries whenthe two are not coordinated through a common planning framework. The state of Alaska andcommunity-based, fisher-led salmon aquaculture associations have been unusually successful atcoordinating, through cooperative management, the traditional salmon capture fisheries and newculture fisheries for pink salmon Oncorhynchus gorbuscha, despite predictable problems. The PrinceWilliam Sound Aquaculture Corporation in particular has moved from its original involvementin resource enhancement into partnership with the state in harvest planning, allocation, and com-prehensive regional planning. Some of the specific economic benefits and the general managementbenefits of this institutional arrangement are explored. One economic benefit was an 8-year periodof price advantage for the association's cost-recovery fish because of large and consistent volumeand quality. The ecological, political, and institutional conditions that made these developmentspossible are analyzed.

There is mounting evidence that cooperativefish and wildlife management, or the sharing ofdecision making between government agencies andcommunity-based stakeholders, has the potentialto improve management in a number of ways.Numerous case studies and broader analyses havedocumented specific types of improvements andconstructed hypotheses about the conditions un-der which these are most likely to occur (e.g., Dro-letetal. 1987; Pinkerton 1987, 1989, 1991; Usher1987; Yarbrough 1987; Acheson 1988; Feit 1988;Osherenko 1988; Jentoft 1989; Rettigetal. 1989;Albrecht 1990; McGoodwin 1990; Berkes et al.1991; Pomerantz and Blanchard 1992). Most ofthese studies could be considered part of a largerliterature on community-based institutions for themanagement of common-property resources,emerging from institutional economics, politicaltheory, and cultural ecology (McCay and Acheson1987; Feeny et al. 1990; Ostrom 1990; Bromley1992). The case study of joint resource enhance-ment presented in this article also contributes tothese larger theoretical discussions by adding newkinds of evidence for how, why, and when stake-holder-government cooperation can improve par-ticular management outcomes.

Resource enhancement is one particular man-agement area in which government and fishingcommunities appear to be able to accomplish moretogether than either could achieve alone (Amend1989). It has been hypothesized that one potential

improvement under a comanagement regime is abetter bargaining position for fishers' organiza-tions, which can translate into higher prices (Pin-kerton 1988).

The almost two decades of experience in en-hancement of pink salmon Oncorhynchus gorbus-cha in Prince William Sound, Alaska, describedin this paper, presents an opportunity to test thishypothesis in particular. However, the more fun-damental undertaking here is to assess in generalthe strengths and weaknesses of a cooperative ap-proach to stock enhancement. This discussiontherefore poses both a specific and a general ques-tion. First, under what conditions have the largenumbers of pink salmon that a fishers' enhance-ment association has produced in Prince WilliamSound—acting cooperatively with the state—beentranslated into higher prices for the fishers' asso-ciation? Second, to what extent has a comanage-ment approach to enhancement succeeded in in-tegrating the traditional capture fisheries with thenew culture fisheries?

The second, more general question is key tounderstanding the significance of the Prince Wil-liam Sound model, because the harmonious co-ordination of new and traditional fisheries may bea far more important benefit than direct price ben-efits. New or expanded fisheries based on resourceenhancement are likely to grow in importance asworld population expands and as both fish andagricultural resources suffer overexploitation, mis-

262

COORDINATION OF CAPTURE AND CULTURE FISHERIES 263

management, or habitat degradation (IDRC 1991;Larkin 1991; Pitt 1993). Yet new fisheries are oftenintroduced by new actors in a manner that threat-ens or competes with traditional fisheries, eitherthrough the market or through access to limitedecosystemic resources (Meggs 1988). The planningof enhancement efforts and subsequent develop-ments through a comanagement arrangement in-volving established fishers allows the two sectorsto coordinate and to avoid some of the incom-patibilities and conflicts that often arise betweenthem. The avoidance of conflicts is, in itself, aconsiderable management benefit.

This discussion is based primarily on interviewsconducted between 1987 and 1993 with key actorsin the Prince William Sound Aquaculture Cor-poration (PWSAC), with current and former per-sonnel in the Alaska Department of Fish and Game(ADF&G), and with U.S. and Canadian fish-mar-keting experts in university, governmental, andnongovernmental settings. Also relevant was myjoint research with Steve Langdon on the originof aquaculture associations in Alaska (Pinkertonand Langdon 1988), my attending a PWSAC boardmeeting in 1989, research by Jim Payne on thePrince William Sound fishery and the early historyof PWSAC (Payne 1985), and my in-depth re-search in cooperation with Nelson Keitlah of theNuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council, on the formation,development, and present operation of theSouthern Southeast Regional Aquaculture Asso-ciation.

The Regional Aquaculture AssociationConcept in Alaska

The PWSAC, founded in 1974, was the firstfishers' regional aquaculture association to formin Alaska. A regional aquaculture association inAlaska is formed when the commercial salmonfishers licensed to fish one fishery managementarea form a nonprofit corporation and apply to theCommissioner of Fish and Game to be certifiedas a "qualified"9 regional association. Alaska hasseven principal fishery management areas forsalmon: Prince William Sound, Southeast, Yak-utat, Cook Inlet, Kodiak, the Alaska Peninsula-Aleutian Islands, and Bristol Bay. To qualify as aregional association, the nonprofit corporationmust convince the commissioner that it representsthe commercial fishers in the fishery managementarea, as well as the other user groups and affectedparties, such as subsistence fishers, sport fishers,Native corporations, local processors, and localcommunities (ADF&G 1986: Alaska Statute

16.10.380). Commercial fishers form the majorityof the association board and are usually elected tofairly represent users of different gear types (e.g.,purse-seiners, drift gill-netters). These boardmembers then appoint the other board membersto represent the noncommercial local fishing andcommunity interests.

The PWSAC is run by a board of 43 (of which23 are commercial fishers), which meets in Jan-uary, June, and September. One-third of the boardis elected each year by all licensed commercialfishers in the area. An executive committee iselected by the full board every June, meets month-ly or more often, and distributes minutes and amonthly newsletter to the other board members.The full board sets general policy and the executivecommittee implements it.

The PWSAC first formed under existing law fornonprofit corporations, and then assisted the Alas-ka legislature in writing statutes to enable othernonprofit corporations to form and be given re-gional association status. A series of statutes andregulations passed in 1976 and afterward, es-pecially Alaska Statute 16.10.375-620 (ADF&G1986), granted democratically constituted associ-ations of this sort the power to decide by majorityvote to tax its commercial members 2 or 3% ofthe value of their catch in order to finance andmanage salmon rehabilitation and enhancementprojects of their own choosing. (Projects and anyactivity that would affect wild stocks, such as tak-ing eggs, had to be approved by the agency head.)A regional association was also empowered to bor-row start-up funds for capital projects from a staterevolving-loan fund. Association representativeswere empowered to act as partners with the statefishery managers on regional planning teams todevelop regional salmon enhancement and man-agement plans, and to evaluate to what extent newenhancement proposals from any quarter com-plied with these plans. Finally, and most impor-tant to this discussion, the association was em-powered to sell surplus fish returning to itshatcheries in order to support operations, expan-sion, research, and other management activities.

The willingness of fishers to tax themselves andto contribute volunteer time to enhancement plan-ning (through serving on association boards andcommittees, and donating labor and equipment toprojects) was the ideological engine that won sup-port for the regional enhancement association con-cept from all quarters. Conservatives perceivedthis approach as private enterprise; liberals fo-cused on the collective action aspect. The power

264 PINKERTON

to sell fish not needed as hatchery brood stock,however, was the main economic engine whichmade enhancement feasible and was to propel thePWSAC into a powerful market position. Its suc-cess in both the economic and political realm dem-onstrates how the regional aquaculture associationconcept can be a way of positively involving fisherorganizations and communities in economic de-velopment that has some accountability to thosewho have already made substantial investmentsin an existing fishery. At the same time, the ideabehind comanagement is to maintain checks andbalances between fishers and fishing communitieson the one hand and on the other hand state man-agers mandated to protect the wild stocks.

The Prince William SoundAquaculture Corporation

How and why aquaculture associations haveemerged in some regions of Alaska and not othersis explored elsewhere (Pinkerton and Langdon1988). This discussion is limited to how PrinceWilliam Sound, and its oldest nonaboriginal com-munity of Cordova, home for most of the residentcommercial fishers, was an advantageous place tolead an initiative. Its history predisposed Cordovafishers to radical political and economic change,and its ecology called for unusual human inter-vention.

Ecologically, Prince William Sound is a focalpoint for the transportation of North Slope oil andgas, for increased timber production, and recrea-tional use by adjacent large population centers.The founders of PWSAC, who had lost the 1971battle to stop the trans-Alaska pipeline, which nowhas its terminus in Valdez, feared that the healthand productivity of fish habitat would inevitablysuffer (PWSAC 1975). These predictions were ful-filled by the running aground of the oil tanker,Exxon Valdez, in 1989, which oiled areas of PrinceWilliam Sound. Major damage had already hap-pened once as a result of the 1964 earthquake andresulting tidal wave, uplift, and subsequent sub-siding, all of which destroyed considerable amountsof fish habitat (Roys 1971), in some cases per-manently. Climatic and marine environmental cy-cles also contributed to the decline of salmon runsto historic lows in the 1960s and 1970s. All thesefactors made Prince William Sound residents par-ticularly interested in strategies for buffering theirfisheries from the extreme fluctuations caused byboth nature and human intervention.

Political and institutional factors in Prince Wil-

liam Sound, and other places like it, were also keyto launching the Alaska concept of fisher-con-trolled aquaculture. The main population centerat Cordova (about 2,000) had been a seat of tradeunionism and socialist activism since the 1930s,when strikes and violent strike-breaking were fre-quent occurrences. The Cordova District Fisher-man's Union (CDFU) continued to be active as apolitical organization despite a 1955 order fromthe Federal Trade Commission to "cease and de-sist from any further involvement with price andwage negotiations because of monopolization andtrade restraints" (Payne 1985). The CordovaAquatic Marketing Association (CAMA) wasformed in 1955 under the guidelines of the Fish-erman's Collective Marketing Act (1934) (15U.S.C. 11521). Considered a collective associationof independent businesspeople, the CAMA cannotstrike, picket, or interfere with any fisher's rightto go fishing. In practice, however, the CAMA wasable to engage not only in price disputes, but alsoin voluntary vessel tie-ups, which functioned asinformal social pressure to discourage membersfrom fishing during price negotiations (Payne1985). Members of the CDFU and the CAMAspearheaded the formation of the PWSAC, andmade up the majority of its board of directors.Their history of political activism and their soli-darity in a single community favorably predis-posed them toward launching Alaska's first aqua-culture initiative, and giving fishers a leadershipposition in it. Payne (1985) argued that their anti-pipeline struggle, as well as their successful state-wide fight to bring about a license limitation policy(implemented in 1973), helped build the confi-dence and connections that worked so well in pro-curing the legislative and financial support to le-galize the fisher-operated aquaculture program.

Ecological IssuesThe type of salmon aquaculture for which Cor-

dova fishers and other Alaska fishers fought issometimes called "salmon ranching." This in-volves harvesting eggs from a favorable stock, ar-tificially incubating and rearing the eggs to the fry,fed fry, or smolt stage in their first year of life, andreleasing these young salmon to the North Pacific"pasture" to feed and grow. The salmon return asadults to the area from which they were released.Timing of release, site of release, choice of stock,and timing of harvest of wild stock can be variedso that hatchery stocks interfere less and mix lesswith wild stocks. Appropriately and carefully used,salmon ranching ideally can act to stabilize natural


variations in run size without endangering wildstocks.

Prince William Sound fishers were deeply con-cerned about the potential threat that hatcheryproduction posed to wild stocks in Puget Soundand the Columbia River (Waldo 1981). Some neg-ative impacts of enhanced production on wildstocks in the British Columbia Salmonid Enhance-ment Program, begun in 1977, were not fully un-derstood for some 15 years (D. D. Bailey, CanadaDepartment of Fisheries and Oceans, 1991, un-published data). However, the geography and ecol-ogy of Prince William Sound appeared to lendthemselves well to stock separation. Hatcherieswere sited in areas whose immediate vicinity con-tained little or no wild stocks, and in areas wherehatchery returns could be harvested in terminallocations after they had separated from wild stocks.Since the 1964 earthquake, there had been no trollfisheries or interception fisheries outside the sound,so mixed-stock fishery problems seemed unlikely.

Despite the favorable geography, ecology, andhatchery siting, the most recent evidence suggeststhat mixed-stock fisheries may have become aproblem in the western corridor into Prince Wil-liam Sound. By 1987, when the hatchery pinksalmon returns became substantial, a fishery thatsometimes occurred in this entrance area of thesound began to attract more boats. Returns in 1987from the first tagging study of PWSAC fish lookedpromising: aggregate wild stock escapements werestrong (Geiger 1990). The 1989 Exxon Valdez oilspill occasioned the funding of larger tagging stud-ies, combined with run reconstruction analysis(enabling a disaggregation of escapement data). Therun reconstruction analysis for 1990 and 1991 sug-gested that the fishery in the western entrance areawas a possible cause of a serious decline in wildpink salmon escapement to particular areas (H.Geiger, ADF&G, 1993, personal communication).There is disagreement among experts about howto interpret the data, however, and only furtherstudy will clarify the issue (Alaska State Senate1992; Hull 1993).

Although the management of wild fish was themandated responsibility of ADF&G, the problemof identifying hatchery fish for management pur-poses was voluntarily shared by PWSAC. Taggingand tag analysis of new increments of hatcheryproduction did not become the financial respon-sibility of aquaculture associations until after 1992(Alaska State Senate 1992). The PWSAC taggedthe hatchery fish at its own expense from 1986 to1988, it funded—with help from fishers and pro-

cessors—a doubling of ADF&G escapement sur-veys (from once- to twice-weekly flights over 209indicator streams), it contributed US$120,000 toADF&G tagging programs in 1991-1993, and itcontributed $100,000 to tag recovery in 1993.

Although PWSAC fishers will benefit from bet-ter information about mixed-stock fisheries if bet-ter information shows that more fisheries are pos-sible, they run the risk that better information willindicate that fewer and more-constricted fisheriesare required to conserve wild stocks. Thus,PWSACs commitment to better information in-dicates a willingness to take this risk and to supportmanagement of both wild and hatchery stocks.

Prince William Sound may not have escapedthe problems that have plagued state-operatedsalmon enhancement programs elsewhere, andthere is predictable pressure from the industry(processors and individual fishers) to ignore theproblem, as there is in other jurisdictions. How-ever, Prince William Sound comanagers are in abetter position to resist these pressures and to ad-dress such problems because of the logistical, fi-nancial, moral, and entrepreneurial supportADF&G receives from PWSAC and similarly sit-uated efforts.

The entrepreneurship of Douglas Island Pinkand Chum (DIPAQ hatchery, a small private non-profit hatchery in southeast Alaska, has made moreacceptable in Alaska a far superior and more eco-nomical tool for in-season run analysis and man-agement (Parker et al. 1990; Munk et al. 1993).The DIPAC hatchery has worked for 6 years withEric Volk, a consultant from the Washington De-partment of Fisheries, and his colleagues, who ap-plied the concept of mass thermal marking of oto-liths to hatchery-raised Pacific salmon. Otoliths,which are biogenic crystals found in the brain cap-sules of most fish species, lay down a prominentdark ring, detectable under transmitted light mi-croscopy, in response to a properly timed tem-perature drop during hatchery rearing. This mark-ing can be varied to identify specific releases andinvolves almost no cost to hatcheries, whereasanalysis of recovered otoliths is estimated at halfthe cost of conventional coded-wire tagging andtag analysis. Through the combined encourage-ment of Volk, researchers at the University ofAlaska at Juneau, and the DIPAC hatchery,ADF&G began otolith marking at two of its ownlaboratories in 1991. By 1993, one laboratory be-gan to also participate in analyzing the pink salm-on returns from DIPAC's second mass-markingeffort by analyzing the otoliths of a harvest sample.

266 PINICERTON

Through a cooperative agreement between DI-PAC and ADF&G, DIPAC provided staffing forthe sample processing and analysis, and ADF&Gprovided the laboratory and technical supervision.According to one involved party, without DIPAC,Alaska would not be anywhere near mass marking.The ADF&G sees this exercise as directly appli-cable to the improvement of in-season manage-ment of mixed-stock fisheries in Prince WilliamSound, where managers are being kept abreast ofdevelopments.

Mass marking of hatchery fish, if it were adoptedand funded in Prince William Sound, would great-ly improve the ability of ADF&G to meet fixedwild escapement targets again. Under this conser-vation strategy, fisheries are tailored to the degreeof escapement documented at particular time pe-riods of the run; thus, escapement and conserva-tion are guaranteed before a fishery can occur. Un-der this scenario, problems are likely to occur onlywhen the runs are late and concentrated into ashort time period. Alaska Statute 16.05.730, passedin 1992, stated, "Fish stocks in the State shall bemanaged consistent with sustained yield of wildfish stocks and may be managed consistent withsustained yield of enhanced fish stocks." Throughthis statute, managers have far stronger groundsfor resisting pressure to open a fishery in the ab-sence of clear information on the impact on wildstocks. In 1993, ADF&G closed the questionableentrance area fishery.

During the 1992 legislative review of the Alaskasalmon enhancement program (Alaska State Sen-ate 1992), there was a general recognition thathatchery programs had been instituted in a climateof alarm about declining wild stocks, in which thecaution of ADF&G staff about mixed-stock fish-eries, and the eventual limits of the North Pacificpasture and local estuarine environments, seemedless important than they do now. Many Alaskanseven felt that if the North Pacific pasture was lim-ited, they should send out more Alaskan fish tograze before other countries do. The smaller av-erage size of salmon throughout the Pacific regionin 1991 raised questions for Alaskans aboutwhether the commons was now overgrazed.Changes in climate and marine environment maypartly or fully explain this occurrence (Beamishand Bouillon 1993). However, with the renewedconcern in the early 1990s for the need to protectwild salmon, and to better identify and understandgenetically distinct populations, it appears likelythat ecological concerns will gradually be trans-lated into management actions.

Institutional Issues

The institutional form of aquacultural devel-opment that Alaska fishers successfully promotedwas called "private nonprofit." The latter term wasto distinguish it from two other forms feared bythe fishers. Private for-profit salmon ranching waspermitted in Oregon, where the Weyerhauser Cor-poration released its own fish. Because of the sizeand influence of the corporation, many feared thatit would attempt to influence harvest managementso that a large percentage of the fish would returnto be harvested at its hatchery—at the expense ofcommercial fishers. Alaska fishers' abhorrence ofprivate ownership of public resources had solidi-fied around the campaign to ban the use of privatefish traps, owned chiefly by out-of-state proces-sors, during Alaska's bid to become a state in thelate 1950s. The new state government did ban thefish traps, and by implication affirmed its com-mitment to assuring that benefits from public re-sources would not be reserved for a few privateinterests.

The other form of aquacultural developmentthat Alaska fishers feared was in the state of Wash-ington, where the Department of Fisheries oper-ated state hatcheries. Much of the hatchery con-struction predated current scientific understandingof the impact of hatcheries on wild stocks. Thelocation and planning of volume and release tim-ing of hatchery stocks contributed substantially tothe decline of wild stocks in Puget Sound and onthe Columbia River. A 1971 state hatchery pro-gram in Alaska under the Fisheries Rehabilitationand Enhancement Division of ADF&G sufferedsome of the same accusations. Fishers often op-posed state hatchery locations and species selectedfor enhancement. These were believed to be influ-enced more by political and budgetary conve-nience than by sound biological arguments: theSnettisham hatchery was the most cited sample ofpoor siting and species selection.

The private nonprofit program was launched inAlaska largely in reaction to these perceived prob-lems in conventional private and state-operatedhatchery programs. Fishers believed they couldmake better decisions than either private industryor state agencies alone about where best to locateenhancement projects, what species to enhance,and how large the projects should become.

The private nonprofit program, as legislated in1976, made two helpful mechanisms available tothe regional aquaculture associations. First, an as-sociation could develop its own enhancement plan


and submit it to the regional planning team. Sec-ond, the regional aquaculture association consti-tuted half the membership of the regional planningteam, which produced a 20-year plan (PWSRPT1983). The team in each management area com-prised three regional association representativesand three ADF&G personnel. The regional plan-ning team had to approve all applications for suchprojects as building new hatcheries, enlarging ex-isting ones, and taking eggs, before these could beapproved by the head of ADF&G. Thus, fishers'associations in a private nonprofit system not onlycan take the initiative in launching their own proj-ects, but also have a say in state and small privateprojects, and in creating a vision for the region.

As it has turned out, regional enhancement as-sociations have become the dominant institution-al form: state hatcheries are now being leased tothe regional enhancement associations. (Usuallythe associations feel it is worth paying to have thehatcheries in operation rather than having themclosed.) Small private ("mom-and-pop") enhance-ment enterprises like the DIPAC hatchery, whichdo not have association status and cannot taxmembers, but can sell cost-recovery fish, areadopting the board structure of the associations.Fishers' associations can operate the hatcheriesmore economically than the state because they canavoid certain civil service inflexibilities.

Even more importantly, however, the associa-tion-operated hatcheries are self-supporting be-cause of their legal ability to sell hatchery escape-ment not needed as brood stock, and to tax theirmembers to pay operating costs. Thus, state tax-payers are relieved of the burden of paying forhatchery operations, as fishers' associations takethem over. The regional associations are becomingthe predominant institution for enhancement, bothbecause they use fewer public resources and be-cause they have gained credibility with ADF&Gand the state over time.

Of course, the associations and the small mom-and-pop hatchery projects borrowed money fromthe state revolving-loan fund. To conduct full cost-benefit analysis, these loans and the fishers' self-imposed tax on their landings would need to beevaluated against the contribution of hatchery fishto fishers' incomes and regional economies, andother factors beyond the scope of this discussionalso would need to be considered. Here the focusis on general management benefits and a particulartype of economic benefit (discussed below).

The most important management benefit in re-cent years has been the expansion of the regional

associations' "mandate" for comanagement of en-hancement to include comanagement of allocationand harvest planning. This occurred becausePWSAC's cost recovery was sufficiently lucrativeto pay for management activities, and also becausethe association had a good working relationshipwith ADF&G and had established its credibility.The PWSAC thus contributed to management,both fiscally and logistically, in ways that ADF&Gcould not have done alone.

The management of allocation is a prime ex-ample. As the number of hatchery fish increased,so did conflict over allocation of these fish. Underinstruction from the Board of Fish (a citizens' boardthat is the body responsible for setting allocationpolicy), PWSAC formed its own allocation taskforce in 1989 and developed a policy for internalallocation of wild and enhanced stocks among itsmembers by gear types, principally purse seine anddrift gill net (PWSAC 1990). The PWSAC plannergot representatives of these gear groups workingtogether by putting many small mixed groups inrooms and giving them the assignment to decideupon fair allocation principles. The small groupsthen came together in a larger whole and were ableto reach agreement. The PWSAC members,ADF&G, and the Board of Fish thus avoided thecostly and acrimonious court battles over alloca-tion such as those that have occurred in BritishColumbia, Washington State, and one area ofAlaska.

The PWSAC then used the allocation principlesof its own task force to develop a comprehensiveproduction plan (PWSAC 1991) and to work withthe regional planning team toward a new salmonmanagement plan (PWSAC and ADF&G 1991)for wild and enhanced stocks in Prince WilliamSound. The recommendations of these bodies havebeen adopted by the citizens' Board of Fish, andby the regional planning team, which includesADF&G members.

Participation in these new activities by the re-gional enhancement association means that Co-management has been extended from enhance-ment into harvest planning, comprehensiveregional planning (coordination of enhancementand wild-stock management), and allocation. Tobriefly note a point that is developed in more depthelsewhere (Yarbrough 1987;Pinkerton 1989, 1991;Pinkerton and Keitlah 1990), when regionally orlocally based stakeholder organizations becomeinvolved in management, they are likely to im-prove the quality and credibility of decisions, be-cause they balance the state agency perspective

268 PINKERTON

120

100

.£ 80

u§L 60

15

(J 40

20

0

PWSAC

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992FIGURE 1 .—Prince William Sound Aquaculturc Corporation's (PWSAQ cost-recovery price compared with Prince

William Sound ex-vessel price for pink salmon, 1981-1992. Sources: Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission andPWSAC (unpublished sales data). (To convert to cents per kilogram, multiply the cents-per-pound value by 2.20.)

with a local, holistic perspective, which encouragesa more integrated, comprehensive approach toplanning. Locally based bodies tend to be con-cerned with the territorial and ecosystem integrityof the local area, which is a good basis for inte-grating the culture and capture fisheries of an areain a sustainable way. At the same time, potentialexcesses are likely to be checked by nonlocal bod-ies.

Cost-Recovery Sales: Do They Affect thePrice of the Other Fish?

One institutional issue, the relationship of cost-recovery price to ex-vessel price (also calledgrounds price), has had a more positive outcomethan the one envisaged by the fishers. Originallyfishers feared that sales of cost-recovery returns tothe hatchery would depress the price of fisher-caught common-property fish taken in marine ar-eas. (In this context, "common-property fish"means the surplus offish above reproduction needsof wild and hatchery stocks that are available tobe caught by licensed fishers. These fish are dis-tinguished from "PWSAC fish," which are the"cost-recovery" portion of the hatchery fish thatreturn to the hatchery, then are held live in floatingpens, and are sold to support PWSAC projects.)

Fishers thought of their organization, PWSAC,as separate from their private fishing efforts, and

feared that they might be setting up a monster thatwould dump massive quantities of lower-qualityfish harvested at the hatchery site, thus loweringthe price of the fish they caught in marine areas.As a result, one of the original statutes (AlaskaStatute 16.10.450) was written with the followingrequirement: "Fish returning to hatcheries and soldfor human consumption shall be of a comparablequality to fish harvested by commercial fisheriesin the area, and shall be sold at prices commen-surate with the current market." This requirementdid little to reassure the fishers that prices of allfish would not be depressed by the entry of a great-er quantity of fish on the market. The followingdiscussion of the history of the relationship of theprice and volume of PWSAC cost-recovery fish tothe ex-vessel price of common-property caughtfish will show that this fear was ill founded. Thereal point of the next section, however, is that, forthe 8-year period 1983-1990, PWSAC (cost-re-covery) pink salmon commanded a higher pricethan the ex-vessel (common-property) pink salm-on in Prince William Sound, and also in southeastAlaska, the other major producer of pink salmon.

Ex- Vessel Price Compared with PWSAC PriceThe PWSAC chose to enhance mostly pink

salmon, and for simplicity, this discussion is con-fined to this species. The first hatchery was built


100

90

80

ja 70

fc 60

9 50s<& 40

30

20

A-

\/»

Supply Regions:Prince William Sd. Seine

v Southeast Alaska SeineBC Net Caught

1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992FIGURE 2.—Ex-vessel price for pink salmon caught in Prince William Sound (seine), southeast Alaska (seine),

and British Columbia (BC seine and gill-net average), 1978-1992. Sources: Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,and Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (unpublished data). (To convert to cents per kilogram, multiplythe cents-per-pound value by 2.20.)

in 1975, but the first available records of salesprices are 1981. The 1981 and 1982 average pricesof PWSAC fish were the same as average ex-vesselprices in those years (Figure 1).

Dramatic increases in volume of returns wereapparent already in 1981-1982, however. In 1979began a dramatic climb in pink salmon returnsfrom a historical average (since the 1920s) of 5million fish to a 10-year average (1979-1988) of18 million fish. During most of the 1980s, a re-bounding of wild stocks contributed to this trend,but by the late 1980s, a downturn in wild stocksmeant that in some years the stocked fish contrib-uted up to 80% of the common-property harvest.

The PWSAC policy requires that approximately70% of the hatchery returns be taken in the com-mon-property fishery, and only 30% (less broodrequirements) be sold for cost recovery by PWSAC.The increasing volume of hatchery contributions,even when wild fish returns fluctuated—and there-fore the increasing volume of the cost-recoveryfish—was to play an important role in PWSACprices.

Up through 1983, the CAM A acted as the bar-gaining agent for both the ex-vessel price and thePWSAC fish. Average ex-vessel prices for pinksalmon in Prince William Sound tended to be

roughly equivalent to average ex-vessel prices forpink salmon seined in southeast Alaska and forthose seined or caught by gill net in British Co-lumbia, the other large pink salmon productionareas (Figure 2). (In British Columbia, unionizedbargaining first missed and later, in 1987-1992,targeted pink salmon—hence the different pricingpattern.)

Events in 1982 created a turning point forPWSAC and the traditions of collective bargainingby the CAMA. After the botulism scare of 1981,and the greater difficulty of marketing Alaskancanned fish, the local processors offered only $0.237Ib in 1982 (compared with $0.44/lb average in1981). (To convert to price per kilogram, multiplythe per-pound price by 2.20.) However, the runwas large, so the governor invited in foreign float-ing processors after the local capacity was takenup, as is legally required. By this time the volumeof PWSAC fish was considerable, and one U.S.company offered $0.35/lb if all the PWSAC cost-recovery fish, plus a matching number of the com-mon-property fish caught, could be sold as a unit.The CAMA was not prepared to deal in partialunits at this point, so this offer was refused andthe fish were sold to a Korean processor at $0.237Ib, instead of the $0.35/lb offered before the season

270 PINKERTON

&

30

25

20

15

T2=0.1226

4 6Millions of Fish

10

FIGURE 3.—Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation's (PWSAQ premium price for cost-recovery pinksalmon in relation to the volume of cost-recovery fish, 1981-1990. Sources: PWSAC and Commercial FisheriesEntry Commission (unpublished data). (To convert to cents per kilogram, multiply the cents-per-pound value by2.20.)

by the other floating processor, or the $0.16/lbsome local processors were offering at the peak ofthe run.

For the first time it became apparent that a largevolume of live fish sold as a unit could attract ahigher price. It was also apparent that the cost-recovery PWSAC fish were of high quality for themost part. They were held live in floating pens asthey came in, and brood stock was taken from theearly, middle, and late part of the run. Their sexwas known so that a buyer was purchasing a knownquantity of eggs and fish of known quality. Floatingprocessors could literally lift the live fish onto theirdecks and process them instantly.

By 1983 volume had become the price driverfor PWSAC fish. In 1984 the processors refusedto bargain any more with the CAMA for eitherPWSAC or common-property fish. But by this timefloating processors were being attracted to PrinceWilliam Sound to bid on the now predictably largequantity of high-quality fish. The attorney gener-al's office rejected the legal objections raised byIcicle Seafoods, a major canning company, toPWSACs putting up its fish to open bid.

The pattern that began to emerge in 1983 wasthat PWSAC fish commanded a significantly high-er price than the common-property fish in PrinceWilliam Sound, southeast Alaska, and British Co-lumbia (Figures 1, 2). Except in 1987, this patternprevailed until 1991, when the price differential

became only $0.01/lb. A positive correlation be-tween the volume of PWSAC fish and the pre-mium for these fish supported interview state-ments that volume was the price driver (Figure 3).There was no significant correlation between worldsupply of pink salmon and the PWSAC premiumduring those years (Figure 4). The most likely ex-planation for the higher price during times of high-er PWSAC volume is simply that one reliable,consistent large supplier who could guaranteequality and eliminate tendering costs lowered risksto buyers and commanded a premium.

New supply and harvest timing conditions in1990 began the breakdown of the bidding systemthat had supported the higher PWSAC prices, abreakdown that would be completed by worldmarket changes in 1991-1992. A record return toPrince William Sound in 1990 produced an over-abundant harvest of fish, which required specialsupply management strategies for the first time.The timing of the harvest "opening" by ADF&Gcreated a local market glut and quickly put thevolunteer fishers who were called in to help PWSACharvest cost-recovery fish in conflict with theirown fishing activities. Processors were able to takeadvantage of the situation, and fishers sold cost-recovery fish at lower prices in order to get backquickly to their own private fishing businesses.

New supply conditions and political constraintsalso contributed to a further price collapse in 1991.


30

25

2°

a10

5

r2= 0.0007

150 200 250 300 350Thousands of Metric Tons

400 450

FIGURE 4.—The lack of relationship between Prince William Sound's premium price for pink salmon and worldproduction of pink salmon, 1981-1992. Sources: Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corporation (unpublisheddata); FAO (1992). (To convert to cents per kilogram, multiply the cents-per-pound value by 2.20.)

The record high Alaska pink salmon returns in1989 and 1990 had already resulted in a backlogof unsold canned pink salmon among domesticprocessors, including some of PWSACs usualbuyers. These processors suggested to PWSAC theywould not be major buyers in 1991 when a thirdconsecutive record return was projected. ThePWSAC began negotiating with foreign processorsin the expectation that the state would license themto buy fish. (The Magnuson Fishery Conservationand Management Act, Public Law 94-256 of 1976,requires the United States to open its 200-mi ex-tended economic zone to foreign processors if do-mestic processors cannot handle all the fish.) Do-mestic processors were able to take advantage ofa new state committee appointee and convince thestate not to license foreign processors in 1991 (in-terviews, Alaska State Senate 1992:76). In addi-tion, ADF&G and PWSAC differed in their in-season analysis of run strength, and in whether anup-front fishery was advisable because of wildstocks damaged by the oil spill. Low early returns,brood-year data, and percentage of females re-turning signaled to PWSAC that the run was goingto be late, but ADF&G disagreed with PWSACsprediction (which was first stated in January 1991)that the local run size would be 28 million. Con-sequently, a second, emergency, petition byPWSAC to license foreign processors was denied.

Bidding stopped soon thereafter, and the PWSACprice did not exceed the ex-vessel price for muchof the season. This record return arrived later, inmore mature condition, and in a more concen-trated time period than normal, and domestic pro-cessors stopped buying. By the end of the 1991season, millions of PWSAC pink salmon had beendonated to Alaska charities and to the SovietUnion, or simply dumped. Early bidding and salesto foreign processors could have allowed the saleof all or most PWSAC fish, although it is doubtfulthat the price would have been higher for muchof the season.

New Supply and Market ConditionsFacing PWSAC

The eventual price of a good portion of PWSAC's1991 pink salmon would probably have been thesame as the ex-vessel price, because of 2 years ofaccumulated high inventory (1.2 million cases)added to a third high-production year (Knapp 1993;NMFS 1993a:66; Figure 4). The PWSAC premi-um had previously occurred in years when the U.Spreseason inventory was about 1 million cases orless, but by 1992, when preseason inventory wasabout 1 million cases, bidding had not been rees-tablished. It is likely that the traditional cannershad become more cautious because of slow inven-tory sales, and the marked 1991 increase in Rus-

272 PINKERTON

550

1982 19841986 1988 1990 1992FIGURE 5.-World production of pink salmon, 1981-1992. Sources: for 1981-1990 data, FAO (1992); for 1991-

1992 data. National Marine Fisheries Service (1993a), and Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada andInternational North Pacific Fisheries Commission (unpublished estimates). The Russo-Japanese joint venture catch-es were counted under Russia; 1991-1992 Japanese catches are very preliminary estimates.

sian production, which was about 50% of worldpink salmon production in that year (Figure 5).

The former Soviet Union was beginning to movebeyond its traditional sales to Soviet bloc coun-tries, selling small quantities of frozen and cannedpink salmon in Europe (e.g., in 1991, the formerUSSR sold 2,400 metric tons of the canned prod-uct to Europe, whereas the United States sold21,416 metric tons) and exporting larger quantitiesof fresh and frozen pink salmon to Japan throughquota allocations to Japanese vessels in its ex-tended economic zone (e.g., 10,000 metric tons in1992: ACIB 1993; ISTC 1993; NMFS 1993b). Ob-servers predict that this amount may already beunderestimated, and will increase to 50,000-70,000metric tons (including all salmon species), for thereasons discussed below (P. Christiansen, Institutefor Current World Affairs, 1993 personal com-munication; G. Knapp. University of Alaska, 1993personal communication).

Since 1987, Russia has undertaken a series ofjoint ventures with Japanese companies in theconstruction of pink salmon hatcheries (severalnot yet producing), in processing technology, andin marketing research (Kravanja 1992; Akaha1993). The basic dynamic in this relationship ap-

pears to be Russian access to Japanese capital,technology, and marketing experience in exchangefor Japanese access to Russian fish. In recordedsales of pink salmon to Europe and Japan, the priceof Russian pink salmon has been substantiallylower than that of other suppliers (ACIB 1993;ASMI 1993). This price difference is consistentwith the observation that considerable amountsof salmon leave Russia through Korean compa-nies and other buyers who make individual ar-rangements through patron-client relationshipswith bureaucrats in the Russian Ministry of Fish-eries. It appears that Russian pink salmon havecaptured and may continue to hold Asian marketsto which Alaskan fish once had greater entry(Christiansen, 1993 personal communication).

Where does this leave PWSAC? Should Alaskanhatcheries scale down production, as the legisla-ture is now considering? What are the prospectsfor the expansion of the other markets for pinksalmon, or the eventual reentry of Alaska into someAsian markets?

Currently, Alaska pink salmon are mostlycanned, and the United States is by far the largestbuyer. The U.S. per-capita consumption of cannedsalmon (mostly pink salmon) remained, in 1991-


1992, at the level it was 10 years before (0.5 lb/person), while the population grew and cannedexports increased (NMFS 1993a). Therefore, thecanned salmon market grew.

However, even with this expansion, these tra-ditional markets are clearly not enough to absorbthe new surplus. World consumption of fish andNorth American consumption of fish per capitahas been growing, but not of fish in the cannedform. Considered in the context of declining worldsupplies offish, especially low-value fish, productform may be the issue more than supply, at leastfor the low end of the salmon market.

The canners' traditional domination of the mar-ket has inhibited the development of new productforms until recently. In 1993 McDonald's was test-ing Alaska pink salmon "McNuggets"; a PWSAC-contracted researcher was testing smoked, vacu-um-packed pink salmon fillets; and the federallyfunded Alaska Fisheries Development Founda-tion was to test three new product forms by buyingthe fish from PWSAC, working with a local pro-cessor, and developing markets.

Although the immediate prospects for expand-ing pink salmon markets are unclear and maydeteriorate before they improve, longer-term pros-pects could be brighter. Some question the long-term sustainability of the Russian pink salmonfishery, given the lack of effective surveillance ofeither harvest or habitat destruction (Akaha 1993;Christiansen, 1993 personal communication), orbecause of other limiting factors (Johnson 1992).

Ironically, the 1993 Prince William Sound com-mercial pink salmon harvest was only 5.8 millionpieces, constituting a run "failure" that did notappear elsewhere in the state. Speculation atADF&G points to genetic change in wild fish instreams affected by the Exxon Valdez oil spill.Although the future of Prince William Sound itselfis unclear, the issues raised by its experience havebroad relevance and are summarized in the nextsection.

Synthesis and ConclusionsEconomic and Culture-CaptureManagement Benefits

The PWSAC experience provides an exampleof how comanagement of enhancement can put afishers' organization such as PWSAC into a betterbargaining position for fish prices, provided thata world oversupply of the fish being enhanced isnot too great. The better bargaining position wasrelated to four factors that lowered the risks ofbuyers: high quality, large volume, predictability

in both quality and volume, and the possibility ofdealing with one seller. These are, of course, gen-erally favorable factors in achieving a good sellingposition for any highly perishable and seasonallyavailable product. For fisheries with annual fluc-tuations in production, these factors are especiallyimportant in reducing processor risk.

What is important about the finding for fishersand managers is the advantage of collectively sell-ing at least a portion of the catch live through afishers' organization and distributing the benefits.In this case, the benefits were distributed by re-serving 70% of the hatchery fish for area-licensedfishers to catch. Even at the low 1990 pink salmonprices ($0.32/lb), gross benefits to Prince WilliamSound seiners attributable to PWSAC-producedfish were $17,868,800, or an average of $70,907per seiner, and a seiner paid an average of only$2,974 as a 2% landings tax to support enhance-ment. Of course, there were community benefitsas well, including an increase in processing jobsin the area and PWSAC's employing of about 100local residents. Benefits also accrued to ADF&G,which was relieved of some of the costs of harvestplanning, regional enhancement planning, allo-cation, tag recovery, and operation of state hatch-eries. In this type of cooperative management ofresource enhancement, there are benefits to gov-ernment and to a broad range of community res-idents, and opportunities for substantially im-proving the selling position of comanaginginstitutions and increasing the catch volume fortheir members.

Under what economic conditions are these ben-efits sustainable? How much did the scale ofPWSAC production contribute to the oversupplythat eventually outstripped existing markets andlowered the price? Alaska's hatchery-attributableproduction of pink salmon was 30% of total pro-duction in 1989 and 45% in 1990 (equivalent toabout a million cases in each year). Therefore, insome sense, both PWSAC (as the largest singleproducer of pink salmon) and all other state andprivate hatcheries raising pink salmon contributedto the surplus that eventually eliminated PWSAC'spremium and lowered ex-vessel prices.

But the real question here may be about the paceof product form and market development in re-lation to the pace of increase in supply. Not until1992-1993 did a foundation, the private food in-dustry, and PWSAC itself, begin serious researchon new product forms. It is widely believed thatthe Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute, theoret-ically set up to deal with such issues a decade ago,

274 PINKERTON

has not done so because of the traditional cannerson its board, who have had little interest in in-novation. Canners have perhaps perceived theimmediate benefits of increased production as alowering of price, and have focused less on longer-term implications.

Most experts believe that if the United States isto continue as the main buyer of pink salmon,processors of Alaskan pink salmon will need tofind ways to convert some portion of the productinto microwavable dinners, frozen or vacuum-packed fillets, or other product forms requiringlittle preparation time or little specialized knowl-edge of fish. At any rate, the economic benefitsdescribed here are apparently sustainable only ifexpansion of production is coordinated with thedevelopment of new markets.

In addition, international price competition forpink salmon may force Alaskans to lower the costof production. It is already rumored that Russiais selling pink salmon live from estuarine traps at$0.035-0.05/lb. Meanwhile, part of the Canadiangovernment's Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy inBritish Columbia involves comanagement agree-ments between the Department of Fisheries andOceans and First Nations, through which FirstNations sell salmon selectively caught in traps.This strategy is likely to continue because it isconsidered highly desirable as a technique for stockidentification and separation.

One method for lowering the cost of productionwhile widely sharing benefits is through the low-cost harvesting and live fish sales by comanage-ment institutions such as PWSAC. At presentAlaskan fishers have invested heavily in vesselsand gear and say they would resist this alternative,unless it is based on past catch records. Equitabledistribution would be difficult, but not impossible.The idea may be taken more seriously—at least asan interim measure—if price and volume do notimprove in the near term.

Another alternative is to increase the percentshare of PWSAC sales, especially during low-priceyears, and to eliminate the tax. In 1993 the PWSACboard decided to increase the PWSAC share by5%. Theoretically, there will be declining fishersupport for PWSAC as the percent of PWSACsharvest increases, unless prices rise enough to cov-er fisher production costs. Hull (1993) considersvarious scenarios. In good-price years, replacingthe tax on fishers with a higher PWSAC percentageis rational, because these fish fetch a higher priceand thus fewer of them would be required to raisethe same amount of revenue for PWSAC.

To what extent has a comanagement approachto resource enhancement succeeded in integratingthe culture and capture fisheries? Here the biolog-ical, economic, and political aspects of this ques-tion are summarized.

As the discussion has suggested, for mixed-stockfisheries issues, PWSAC working with ADF&Gwas no worse and probably much better than con-ventional bodies dealing with fishery resource en-hancement, such as enhancement divisions of gov-ernment fisheries agencies or private companieslike Weyerhauser. The PWSAC sales generatedmore money for tagging studies and escapementcounts so that wild populations, as well as inter-actions between wild and hatchery stocks, couldbe better understood. The PWSAC supported bothfinancially and logistically the extensive planningand study involved in producing the integratedharvest plan for wild and enhanced stocks, andsupported the continuing research on wild-hatch-ery stock interactions through cosponsorship of a2-d symposium on the subject in Cordova in 1991,and through continued tagging and tag analysisstudies.

At times, the local holistic ecosystem perspec-tive of PWSAC has put it in a better position topredict accurately or to take a strong position. In1971 PWSACs founders strongly opposed theproposed oil port at Valdez, and predicted the verydisaster to their fisheries that came to pass as theExxon Valdez oil spill. Although the ADF&G pre-diction of in-season run strength is usually fairlyaccurate, in 1991 the PWSAC analysis, which wasbased on low early returns to neighboring Valdez'shatchery facility, brood-year data, and percentageof females returning, was more accurate. This ep-isode indicated that, when ADF&G and PWSACdisagree, the analysis of the latter may have some-thing more valuable to contribute than has beenacknowledged.

Economically, the comanagement of enhance-ment by PWSAC and ADF&G has used fewerpublic resources than ADF&G would have usedproducing the same amount offish and then tryingto explain and resolve the culture-capture issueswith the fishers and the general public. The PWSACsales have paid for the hatcheries, additional datageneration, analysis, planning, and conflict reso-lution, and fishers have contributed weeks of vol-unteer time and labor because of their support ofthese processes.

Politically, PWSAC has contributed to conflictresolution over allocation of enhanced stocks andwild stocks, and over development planning in


general. The involvement of PWSAC in these pro-cesses has made the organization seen more legit-imate to local communities and fishers, who feltthey were fairly represented because PWSAC hadsome accountability to them. Although the har-monizing of the concerns of culture and capturefisheries is never easy or perfect, PWSAC has beenable to take a more balanced approach than coulda state agency or a private company alone. Fur-thermore, the checks and balances applied toPWSAC by ADF&G and the Board of Fish hasmeant that decisions are more likely to be bal-anced.

General Conditions for Comanagement ofResource Enhancement

Although every jurisdiction has a unique historyand circumstances that do or do not permit thedevelopment of such biological, economic, andpolitical benefits, a few general favorable condi-tions may be identified from this Alaskan pinksalmon comanagement example. These conditionsare presented here as working hypotheses.

First, fishers' organizations may develop priceadvantage in collective sales from enhancementactivities if they have

• the right to sell a substantial percentage of theenhanced fish,

• sufficient and sufficiently predictable volume andquality of product, and

• market and market product development con-comitant with supply.Second, fishing-dependent communities such as

Cordova will continue to experience economicbenefits from enhancement activities when fishprices drop (even when fishers do not experiencesuch benefits) if• there is sufficient volume of marketable fish to

maintain shore-based jobs in the association andin processing plants; and

• the association is allowed to sell enough fish tomaintain itself during low-price or low-volumeyears.Third, management benefits from coordinating

capture and culture fisheries may accrue if• the quality of the enhanced stock is sufficient

when it reaches the terminal area to comparefavorably with its quality where it might oth-erwise be intercepted;

• legislation supports feasible conditions for thesetting up of fisher enhancement organizations

and affords them access to capital and allows arepayment schedule that coincides with the ap-pearance of benefits;

• the local board is structured to have account-ability to both fishers and local communities,and is checked and balanced by accountabilityto other statewide bodies;

• there is ideological support locally and statewidefor the concept of collective action by local or-ganizations that want to share responsibility withthe state agency; and

• there is a preexisting local institutional base withan orientation toward regional or local sustain-able ecosystem management, or it is possible tocreate such a base because of preexisting socialcapital (experience, credibility).

The latter condition is not necessary for all areas,but helps a great deal in an area pioneering a newconcept, as it did in Cordova.

In summary, the comanagement approach toresource enhancement adopted in Prince WilliamSound has produced considerable specific eco-nomic benefits to fishers and communities, andhas also created a number of political, economic,and biological management benefits for the stateand local community. This paper has identifiedthe principal conditions that appear to permit thesetting up of institutional arrangements that canallow these benefits to accrue.

AcknowledgmentsI am especially grateful to Gunnar Knapp, Ar-

min Koernig, Courtland Smith, Hal Geiger, BillGreen, Don Amend, and two anonymous review-ers for excellent comments on earlier drafts; to thenumerous board members and staff at PWSACand ADF&G in Juneau and Cordova and to thoseat the Commercial Fisheries Entry Commissionwho supplied data and helpful discussion; and tothe Alaska Center for International Business, theAlaska Fisheries Development Foundation, andPeter Christiansen at the Institute for CurrentWorld Affairs. Also gratefully acknowledged is thesupport of the Social Sciences and Humanities Re-search Council of Canada for the 1988 portion ofthis research, and the support of Fisheries andOceans Canada, Indian and Northern Affairs Can-ada, and the Native Affairs Branch of the provinceof British Columbia for the 1987 portion. I warmlythank the Southern Southeast Regional Aquacul-ture Association, West water Research Centre, theNuu-chah-nulth Tribal Council, and the BarkleySound Tribal Fisheries Committee for their helpand cooperation.

276 P1NKERTON

References

Acheson, J. 1988. The lobster gangs of Maine. Uni-versity Press of New England, Hanover, NewHampshire.

ACIB (Alaska Center for International Business). 1993.Statistics compiled from Eurostat and the JapanTariff Association. University of Alaska, Anchor-age.

ADF&G (Alaska Department of Fish and Game). 1986.Alaska statutes and regulations for private nonprofitsalmon hatcheries. ADF&G, Fisheries Rehabilita-tion Enhancement and Development Division, Pri-vate Nonprofit Hatchery Program, Juneau.

Akaha, T. 1993. Japanese-Russian fishery joint ven-tures and operations: opportunities and problems.Marine Policy (May): 199-212.

Alaska State Senate. 1992. Legislative review of theAlaska salmon enhancement program. Senate Spe-cial Committee on Domestic, International, andCommercial Fisheries, Final Report. Juneau.

Albrecht, Daniel. 1990. Co-management as transac-tion: the Kuskokwim salmon management workinggroup. Master's thesis. McGill University, Montre-al.

Amend, D. F. 1989. Alaska's regional aquaculture as-sociation's co-management of salmon in southernsoutheast Alaska. Pages 125-134 in E. Pinkerton,editor. Co-operative management of local fisheries:new directions for improved management and com-munity development. University of British Colum-bia Press, Vancouver.

ASMI (Alaska Seafood Marketing Institute). 1993. Re-tail price audit, UK, July. ASMI, Seattle, Washing-ton.

Beamish. R., and D. Bouillon. 1993. Pacific salmonproduction trends in relation to climate. CanadianJournal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 50:1002-1016.

Berkes. F., R. Preston, and P. George. 1991. Co-man-agement. The evolution in theory and practice ofthe joint administration of living resources. Alter-natives 18(2): 12-18.

Bromley, D., editor. 1992. Making the commons work:theory practice and policy. ICS Press, San Francisco.

Drolet, C, A. Reed, M. Breton, and F. Berkes. 1987.Sharing wildlife management responsibilities withnative groups: case histories in northern Quebec.Transactions of the North American Wildlife andNatural Resources Conference 52:389-398.

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the UnitedNations). 1992. Fishery statistics: catches andlandings 1990. FAO Yearbook of Fishery Statistics70.

Feeny, D., F. Berkes, B. McCay. and J. Acheson. 1990.The tragedy of the commons: twenty-two years later.Human Ecology 18:1-19.

Feit, H. 1988. Self-management and state-manage-ment: forms of knowing and managing northernwildlife. Pages 72-91 in M. Freeman and L. Carbyn,editors. Traditional knowledge and renewable re-source management in northern regions. Boreal In-

stitute for Northern Studies, University of Alberta,Edmonton.

Geiger, H., editor. 1990. Pilot studies in tagging PrinceWilliam Sound hatchery pink salmon with coded-wire tags. Alaska Department of Fish and Game,Commercial Fisheries Division, Fishery ResearchBulletin 90-02, Juneau.

Hull, D. H. 1993. The theory of clubs and the PrinceWilliam Sound Aquaculture Corporation: a benefit-cost analysis. Master's thesis. University of Wash-ington, Seattle.

IDRC (International Development Research Centre).1991. Tomorrow's catch. IDRC Reports 19 (2).(Ottawa.)

ISTC (Industry Science & Technology Canada). 1993.Statistics from Japan fisheries market report 1992.ISTC, Vancouver.

Jentoft, S. 1989. Fisheries co-management: delegatinggovernment responsibility to fishermen's organi-zations. Marine Policy (April): 13 7-154.

Johnson, T. 1992. Russian far east: Kamchatka salmonlandings. Pacific Rim Fisheries Update 1(5):5. (An-chorage, Alaska.)

Knapp, G. 1993. Salmon markets. Alaska Center forInternational Business, University of Alaska, An-chorage.

Kravanja, M. 1992. Russia-Japan hatchery projects.National Marine Fisheries Service, Silver Spring,Maryland.

Larkin, P. A. 1991. The wet revolution: fisheries pro-duction to the year 2025. Pages A-22 to A-35 in J.P. Harville, editor. Proceedings of the North Amer-ican fisheries leadership workshop. American Fish-eries Society, Bethesda, Maryland.

McCay, B., and J. Acheson, editors. 1987. The ques-tion of the commons: the culture and ecology ofcommunal resources. University of Arizona Press,Tucson.

McGoodwinJ.R. 1990. Crisis in the world's fisheries:peoples, problems, and policies. Stanford Univer-sity Press, Stanford, California.

Meggs, G. 1988. Salmon. The decline of the BritishColumbia fishery. Douglas and Mclntyre, Vancou-ver.

Munk, K. M., W. W. Smoker, D. R. Beard, and R. W.Mattson. 1993. A hatchery water-heating systemand its application to 100% thermal marking of in-cubating salmon. Progressive Fish-Culturist 55:284-288.

NMFS (National Marine Fisheries Service). 1993a.Fisheries of the United States, 1992. NMFS. SilverSpring, Maryland.

NMFS (National Marine Fisheries Service). 1993b. Fishexport and import data, 1991-1992. NMFS, SilverSpring. Maryland.

Osherenko,G. 1988. Wildlife management in the NorthAmerican Arctic: the case for co-management. Pages92-104 in M. Freeman and L. Carbyn, editors. Tra-ditional knowledge and renewable resource man-agement in northern regions. Boreal Institute forNorthern Studies, University of Alberta, Edmon-ton.


Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the commons: the evo-lution of institutions for collective action. Cam-bridge University Press, New York.

Parker, N. C., A. E. Georgi, R. C. Heidinger, D. B. Jester,Jr., E. D. Prince, and G. A. Winans, editors. 1990.Fish-marking techniques. American Fisheries So-ciety Symposium 7.

Payne, J. 1985. The effects of the 1964 earthquake onthe Cordova, Alaska commercial salmon fishery.Doctoral dissertation. Washington State University,Pullman.

Pinkerton, E. 1987. Intercepting the state: dramaticprocesses in the assertion of local comanagementrights. Pages 344-369 in B. McCay and J. Acheson,editors. The question of the commons: the cultureand ecology of communal resources. University ofArizona Press, Tucson.

Pinkerton, E. 1988. Co-operative management of localfisheries: a route to development. Pages 257-273 inJ. W. Bennett and J. R. Bowen, editors. Productionand autonomy: anthropological studies and cri-tiques of development. University Press of America,Lanham, Maryland.

Pinkerton, E. 1989. Introduction: attaining better fish-eries management through co-management—pros-pects, problems and propositions. Pages 3-33 in E.Pinkerton, editor. Co-operative management of lo-cal fisheries: new directions for improved manage-ment and community development. University ofBritish Columbia Press, Vancouver.

Pinkerton, E. 1991. Locally based water quality plan-ning: contributions to fish habitat protection. Ca-nadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences48:1326-1333.

Pinkerton, E., and N. Keitlah. 1990. The Point NoPoint Treaty Council: innovations by an inter-tribalfisheries management co-operative. Nuu-chah-nulthTribal Council and School of Community and Re-gional Planning, University of British ColumbiaPlanning Papers, Discussion Paper 26, Vancouver.

Pinkerton, E., and S. Langdon. 1988. Regional aqua-culture associations in Alaska: an overview. Pages1-23 in E. Pinkerton and seven coeditors. Launch-ing a fisheries co-management pilot project: learningfrom the experiences of Alaska and Washington State.Phase I. Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Van-couver.

Pin, D. 1993. The overfishing crisis: there's ample causefor global alarm. Vancouver Sun August 7:B4.

Pomerantz, G. A., and K. Blanchard. 1992. Successful

communication and education strategies for wildlifeconservation. Transactions of the North AmericanWildlife and Natural Resources Conference 57:156-163.

PWSAC (Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corpora-tion). 1975. Salmon culture program. PWSAC,Cordova, Alaska.

PWSAC (Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corpora-tion). 1990. Allocation of enhanced salmon.PWSAC, Allocation Task Force on Enhanced Salm-on, Report 6 (compendium of investigative reportsand policy recommendations), Cordova, Alaska.

PWSAC (Prince William Sound Aquaculture Corpora-tion). 1991. Production Planning Committee rec-ommendations to the board. PWSAC, Cordova,Alaska.

PWSAC and ADF&G (Prince William Sound Aquacul-ture Corporation and Alaska Department of Fishand Game). 1991. Prince William Sound salmonmanagement plan. Prince William Sound/CopperRiver Regional Fisheries Planning Team, ProposalReport, Cordova.

PWSRPT (Prince William Sound Regional PlanningTeam). 1983. Prince William Sound-Copper Riv-er comprehensive salmon plan. Phase 1—20 yearplan (1983-2002). Prince William Sound Aquacul-ture Corporation and Alaska Department of Fishand Game, Cordova.

Rettig, B., F. Berkes, and E. Pinkerton. 1989. The fu-ture of fisheries co-management: a multi-disciplin-ary assessment. Pages 273-289 in E. Pinkerton, ed-itor. Co-operative management of local fisheries:new directions for improved management and com-munity development. University of British Colum-bia Press, Vancouver.

Roys, R. S. 1971. The effect of tectonic deformationon pink salmon runs in Prince William Sound. Na-tional Academy of Sciences, Division of Earth Sci-ences, Committee on Alaska Earthquake, Washing-ton, D.C.

Usher, P. 1987. Indigenous management systems andthe conservation of wildlife in the Canadian north.Alternatives 14(l):3-9. (Waterloo, Ontario.)

Waldo, J. 1981. U.S. v. Washington, phase II. Analysisand recommendations. Prepared for the NorthwestWater Resources Committee, Seattle.

Yarbrough, C. J. 1987. Using political theory in fisherymanagement. Transactions of the American Fish-eries Society 16:532-536.

economic and management benefits from the coordination of...

Documents